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Aṅguttara Nikāya · Discourse 3.2

Characteristics

Lakkhaṇasutta — Bālavagga — the first chapter of the Threes

Setting
None stated; the discourse continues from AN 3.1, whose setting at Sāvatthī is understood to hold
Speakers
The Buddha alone, addressing the mendicants
Form
A statement of principle, the three things for each of the pair, and the chapter’s standing training instruction
Length
~1 minute to read
Northern parallel
Comparable material appears in the Chinese Madhyama-āgama (T26); this reading guide does not assert a specific matching sutra number
Difficulty
★☆☆☆☆ — brief and unambiguous, with one sentence worth memorizing

Why this discourse

AN 3.1 told the listener to shun the three things by which a fool is known and did not say what they are. This discourse says: bad conduct by way of body, speech, and mind — and good conduct, for the astute. But its first line is the reason the discourse has its own name and its own page. A fool is characterized by their deeds, and an astute person is characterized by their deeds, for wisdom shines in its traces. That is a claim about how anyone can be known at all, and it settles a question the chapter would otherwise leave open.

Reading guide

The teaching in one sentence

You cannot see wisdom directly; you can see what it leaves behind, and that is what deeds are.

Wisdom shines in its traces

The Pāli behind Sujato’s rendering is kammalakkhaṇo bālo, kammalakkhaṇo paṇḍito, apadānasobhinī paññā. Lakkhaṇa is a mark or characteristic — the same word used of the marks of a great man, and of the three characteristics of existence. Apadāna is a track or a trace, what is left behind by something that has passed.

So the claim is that wisdom is not itself visible and does not need to be. It is legible in its footprints. That is a genuinely useful epistemological point for a tradition which insists that people be evaluated: it says the evaluation is done on conduct, not on report, self-description, atmosphere, or the impression a person makes.

It also cuts both ways, which is the part worth teaching. If wisdom shines in its traces then so does its absence, and a person cannot be foolish privately. The chapter has already said that all danger comes from the foolish; this discourse says that foolishness is always visible in what someone does, which is what makes the previous claim actionable rather than merely alarming.

Body, speech, and mind

The three things turn out to be the standard threefold division of action: conduct by way of body, of speech, and of mind. Bad conduct in all three marks the fool; good conduct in all three marks the astute person.

That the list includes mind is what keeps the discourse from being a simple behaviorism. Mental conduct is conduct: what a person cultivates in thought is on the list of deeds alongside what they do and say. The Threes will return to this division constantly, and it is the reason the collection can make claims about the inner life without abandoning the principle that people are known by their deeds. A thought is a deed.

AN 3.3, the next discourse, makes exactly this explicit: a fool thinks poorly, speaks poorly, and acts poorly, and it is because they do so that the astute can recognize them.

Reading it as a standard for judgment

Practically, this discourse is a rule for how to assess anyone, and it is a restrictive one. Not by what they say about themselves. Not by what others say about them. Not by the quality of their presence or the fluency of their teaching. By their deeds, of which speech is one kind.

That is worth setting against AN 1.378–393 in the Ones, which listed sixteen things that inspire confidence in a monastic — including being handsome, well-presented, and from a good family. The two are not in conflict, but they answer different questions: what makes people trust someone, and what actually shows what someone is. Anyone teaching the first list should teach this discourse alongside it.

Key terms

lakkhaṇa — “characteristic, mark” — the same word used of the marks of a great man and of the three characteristics of existence. Here, what a person is known by.
kamma — “deed, action” — the thing a fool and an astute person are alike characterized by.
apadānasobhinī paññā — “wisdom shines in its traces” — apadāna is a track left behind. Wisdom is not itself visible and is legible in its footprints.
kāya-, vacī-, manoduccarita — bad conduct by way of body, speech, and mind — the three things by which a fool is known, with their positives for the astute.
manokamma — “mental action” — the inclusion that keeps the discourse from being a simple behaviorism. A thought is a deed.

The text

The discourse in full. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

How a person is known

§1“A fool is characterized by their deeds, and an astute person is characterized by their deeds, for wisdom shines in its traces. A fool is known by three things. What three? Bad conduct by way of body, speech, and mind. These are the three things by which a fool is known.

§2An astute person is known by three things. What three? Good conduct by way of body, speech, and mind. These are the three things by which an astute person is known.

So you should train

§3So you should train like this: ‘We will shun the three things by which a fool is known, and we will undertake and follow the three things by which an astute person is known.’ That’s how you should train.”

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Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What are the three things by which a fool is known?
Correct: B. The standard threefold division of action, supplying what AN 3.1 named without stating.
Question 2 of 10
What does apadānasobhinī paññā claim?
Correct: B. A genuinely useful epistemological point for a tradition that insists people be evaluated.
Question 3 of 10
What does that principle rule out as a basis for evaluation?
Correct: B. The evaluation is done on conduct, of which speech is one kind.
Question 4 of 10
How does the principle cut both ways?
Correct: B. Which is what makes AN 3.1's claim actionable rather than merely alarming.
Question 5 of 10
Why does the inclusion of mind matter?
Correct: B. A thought is a deed, which is how the collection makes claims about the inner life without abandoning the principle that people are known by their deeds.
Question 6 of 10
How does AN 3.3 develop this?
Correct: B. The recognizability is the point of the next discourse.
Question 7 of 10
What is lakkhaṇa elsewhere used of?
Correct: B. A mark or characteristic — here, what a person is known by.
Question 8 of 10
Which chapter of the Ones does the guide set this discourse against?
Correct: A. The two answer different questions: what makes people trust someone, and what actually shows what someone is.
Question 9 of 10
Are the two in conflict?
Correct: B. Different questions, both worth asking.
Question 10 of 10
What does the discourse’s closing formula tell the listener?
Correct: B. Repeated across the chapter, and now with content attached.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0

Further reading

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