Aṅguttara Nikāya · Discourse 4.187

With Vassakāra

Vassakārasutta — Brāhmaṇavagga — the nineteenth chapter of the Fours

Setting
Rājagaha, in the Bamboo Grove, the squirrels’ feeding ground
Speakers
Vassakāra, a chief minister of Magadha, and the Buddha
Form
Four questions with real, asymmetric answers, then an unprompted illustration from the questioner
Length
~4 minutes to read
Northern parallel
The asymmetry between a corrupted and an integrous person's discernment is a recurring theme across the early collections; this reading guide does not assert a specific matching sutra number
Difficulty
★★★☆☆ — a real logical claim, not a refusal, followed by one of the chapter's more vivid political anecdotes

Why this discourse

Vassakāra returns to ask a genuine four-part question, and this time the Buddha gives real answers rather than declining all four. Can a false person recognize another false person? Impossible. A true person? Also impossible. Can a true person recognize another true person? Possible. A false person? Also possible. Corruption blinds in both directions; integrity sees clearly in both. Vassakāra, delighted, supplies his own illustration — a story about a king, a teacher, and why devotion is sometimes evidence.

Reading guide

The teaching in one sentence

An untrue person cannot reliably recognize either an untrue or a true person; a true person can recognize both.

A real answer, not a refusal

This chapter’s reader has already met the fourfold-question-and-refusal pattern twice, in AN 4.173 and AN 4.174 back in the Cetanāvagga, where every one of four logically exhaustive options was rejected. This discourse uses the identical four-part shape — asked, restated, then explained — but here the four questions get four real, differentiated answers.

Can an untrue person know of an untrue person, ‘this one is untrue’? Impossible, it can’t happen. Can an untrue person know of a true person, ‘this one is true’? Also impossible. Can a true person know of a true person? Possible. Can a true person know of an untrue person? Also possible.

The shape of the asymmetry

Set out as a two-by-two — who is doing the judging, crossed with who is being judged — the pattern is not that like recognizes like and unlike fails to recognize unlike. It is that one axis is entirely blind and the other entirely sighted, regardless of what is being looked at.

An untrue person cannot correctly identify character in either direction: not another untrue person, and not a true one either. A true person can correctly identify character in both directions: both a fellow true person and an untrue one.

The discourse does not explain the mechanism, but the shape of the claim suggests one. Whatever corrupts judgment about others’ character corrupts it comprehensively, not selectively; whatever grounds accurate judgment does the same. Discernment of character, on this account, is not itself divided into separate skills for spotting the good and spotting the bad — it is one capacity, present or absent as a whole.

Vassakāra supplies his own example

Where AN 4.183 left Vassakāra approving and departing without adding anything, here he responds to the Buddha’s answer by volunteering an illustration of his own, unprompted: a story making the rounds in the assembly of the brahmin Todeyya.

Members of that assembly had been mocking King Eḷeyya for his excessive deference to the ascetic Rāmaputta — bowing to him, rising for him, greeting him with cupped palms. Todeyya answers the mockery with a question of his own: isn’t King Eḷeyya himself astute, even better than the experts, in matters of duty and speech? They agree he is. So too are the king’s own most trusted men — Yamaka, Moggalla, Ugga, and the rest — each named individually. And it is precisely because Rāmaputta is even more astute and expert than these already-astute judges that they defer to him as they do.

What the illustration proves, and what it does not

Todeyya’s reasoning is a direct, concrete application of the Buddha’s abstract claim: astute judges (true persons, on the discourse’s vocabulary) can recognize a still more astute figure, and their deference is itself evidence of what they have recognized, precisely because true persons can identify true persons.

It is worth being exact about what the story does and does not establish. Neither Vassakāra nor the text asserts that Rāmaputta actually is a true person in the discourse’s technical sense, or that the king’s deference is infallible proof of anything. The illustration demonstrates the logical shape of the principle — that discerning judges’ agreement is evidence-worthy in a way undiscerning agreement is not — without the discourse taking a position on Rāmaputta himself one way or the other. This reading guide does not extend the passage further than that.

Vassakāra leaves, twice over

The discourse ends exactly as AN 4.183 did: incredulous praise, a plea of duties calling him away, permission granted, approval and departure. The repetition across Vassakāra’s two appearances in this chapter is a matched pair worth reading together — a senior political figure, in both cases, brings his own material to the exchange (a stated doctrine in the first, a live political anecdote in the second) and leaves each time having had it examined rather than simply confirmed.

Key terms

asappurisa / sappurisa — “untrue person” and “true person” — the two categories the question is asked about, in every direction.
ṭhānaṁ vijjati — “it’s possible” — literally the ground or basis exists; the Buddha’s answer for the two cases involving a true person as the one doing the recognizing.
aṭṭhānametaṁ anavakāso — “it’s impossible, it can’t happen” — the canon’s strong impossibility formula, applied to both cases involving an untrue person as the judge.
Todeyya — the brahmin who answers his own assembly’s mockery of King Eḷeyya with a chain of reasoning from the astuteness of the king’s judges to the astuteness of Rāmaputta.
upasaṅkamati — “goes up to” — the ordinary verb of Vassakāra’s approach to the Buddha, shared with nearly every visit-narrative in this chapter.

The text

The discourse in full: four questions with real answers, Vassakāra's praise, and his own political illustration. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

Can an untrue person recognize another?

§1At one time the Buddha was staying near Rājagaha, in the Bamboo Grove, the squirrels’ feeding ground. Then Vassakāra the brahmin, a chief minister of Magadha, went up to the Buddha, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he sat down to one side and said to the Buddha: “Worthy Gotama, could an untrue person know of an untrue person: ‘This worthy one is an untrue person’?” “That’s impossible, brahmin, it can’t happen.” “Could an untrue person know of a true person: ‘This worthy one is a true person’?” “That too is impossible, it can’t happen.” “Worthy Gotama, could a true person know of a true person: ‘This worthy one is a true person’?” “That, brahmin, is possible.” “Could a true person know of an untrue person: ‘This worthy one is an untrue person’?” “That too is possible.”

Vassakāra’s praise

§2“It’s incredible, worthy Gotama, it’s amazing, how well said this was by the worthy Gotama: ‘It’s impossible, it can’t happen, that an untrue person could know … But it is possible that a true person could know …’

The story of Rāmaputta

§3Once, members of the brahmin Todeyya’s assembly were going on complaining about others: ‘This King Eḷeyya is a fool to be so devoted to the ascetic Rāmaputta. He even shows him the utmost deference by bowing down to him, rising up for him, greeting him with cupped palms, and observing proper etiquette for him. And these king’s men are fools too—Yamaka, Moggalla, Ugga, Nāvindakī, Gandhabba, and Aggivessa—for they show the same kind of deference to Rāmaputta.’ Then the brahmin Todeyya reasoned with them like this: ‘What do the good fellows think? When it comes to the various duties and speeches, isn’t King Eḷeyya astute, even better than the experts?’ ‘That’s true, sir.’ ‘It’s because the ascetic Rāmaputta is even more astute and expert than King Eḷeyya that the king is so devoted to him. That’s why he even shows Rāmaputta the utmost deference by bowing down to him, rising up for him, greeting him with cupped palms, and observing proper etiquette for him. ‘What do the good fellows think? When it comes to the various duties and speeches, aren’t the king’s men—Yamaka, Moggalla, Ugga, Nāvindakī, Gandhabba, and Aggivessa—astute, even better than the experts?’ ‘That’s true, sir.’ ‘It’s because Rāmaputta is even more astute and expert than the king’s men that they have such devotion to him. … It’s because Rāmaputta is even more astute and expert than King Eḷeyya that the king is so devoted to him. That’s why he even shows Rāmaputta the utmost deference by bowing down to him, rising up for him, greeting him with cupped palms, and observing proper etiquette for him.’

Vassakāra departs

§4It’s incredible, worthy Gotama, it’s amazing, how well said this was by the worthy Gotama: ‘It’s impossible, it can’t happen, that an untrue person could know … But it is possible that a true person could know … Well, now, worthy Gotama, I must go. I have many duties, and much to do.” “Please, brahmin, go at your convenience.” Then Vassakāra the brahmin, having approved and agreed with what the Buddha said, got up from his seat and left.

· · ·

Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
How does this discourse’s four-question structure differ from AN 4.173 and AN 4.174?
Correct: B. Asked, restated, then explained — the same shape, a different outcome.
Question 2 of 10
Can an untrue person recognize another untrue person?
Correct: B. Neither direction of judgment is available to an untrue person.
Question 3 of 10
Can a true person recognize an untrue person?
Correct: B. A true person can identify character in both directions.
Question 4 of 10
What shape does the asymmetry take, according to the guide?
Correct: B. Discernment of character is one capacity, present or absent as a whole.
Question 5 of 10
What does Vassakāra do that he did not do in AN 4.183?
Correct: B. A live political anecdote, this time, rather than simple approval.
Question 6 of 10
What is Todeyya’s argument in the story?
Correct: B. A direct, concrete application of the Buddha’s abstract claim.
Question 7 of 10
Does the discourse assert that Rāmaputta actually is a true person?
Correct: B. The guide does not extend the passage further than that.
Question 8 of 10
What does the story establish about discerning judges’ agreement?
Correct: B. Because true persons can identify true persons, on the discourse’s principle.
Question 9 of 10
How does this discourse end compared to AN 4.183?
Correct: B. A matched pair across Vassakāra’s two appearances in this chapter.
Question 10 of 10
What is common to Vassakāra’s two appearances in this chapter?
Correct: B. A stated doctrine in the first appearance, a live anecdote in the second.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0