Aṅguttara Nikāya · Discourse 4.234

About Soṇakāyana

Soṇakāyanasutta — Kammavagga — the twenty-fourth chapter of the Fours

Setting
Not specified beyond the visit itself; the brahmin Sikhāmoggallāna comes to the Buddha and reports a conversation with a student named Soṇakāyana
Speakers
The brahmin Sikhāmoggallāna and the Buddha
Form
A narrative frame around a third telling of AN 4.232–233's content, word for word
Length
~3 minutes to read
Northern parallel
This reading guide does not assert a specific matching sutra number for this discourse
Difficulty
★★★☆☆ — the accusation reported here is worth reading carefully, since the discourse never states its rebuttal directly

Why this discourse

A brahmin reports that a student, Soṇakāyana, accused the Buddha of teaching non-doing of all deeds — and therefore, the accusation continues, teaching the annihilation of the world, since the world exists and continues only because deeds are undertaken. The Buddha replies that he cannot even recall meeting this student, then simply restates the four kinds of deeds from AN 4.232 and AN 4.233, without a word of direct rebuttal. The content is left to answer the accusation on its own.

Reading guide

The teaching in one sentence

Accused, at second hand, of teaching that no deeds should be done, the Buddha answers by restating a teaching that names four kinds of deeds, three of which are ordinary moral action and none of which is the absence of action.

The accusation, precisely stated

Samaṇo gotamo sabbakammānaṁ akiriyaṁ paññapeti — ‘the ascetic Gotama advocates the non-doing of all deeds’. Akiriya, ‘non-doing’ or ‘inaction’, is a loaded term in this literature’s vocabulary: elsewhere in the canon it is specifically the doctrine of Pūraṇa Kassapa, one of the six contemporary teachers the early texts catalogue, who held that no action has any moral consequence whatsoever. Soṇakāyana’s accusation borrows a label usually pinned on a rival and pins it instead on the Buddha.

The reasoning attached to the accusation is also worth noting: kammasaccāyaṁ loko kammasamārambhaṭṭhāyī, ‘the world exists through deeds, and remains because deeds are undertaken’. This is a substantial philosophical claim in its own right — that ongoing intentional action is what sustains the world’s continued existence — and it is the premise from which Soṇakāyana concludes that teaching non-doing amounts to teaching the world’s annihilation.

A reply that does not argue

The Buddha’s first response is disarming rather than defensive: he cannot recall even seeing this student, let alone having such a conversation with him. The accusation, in other words, may not correspond to anything the Buddha actually said to anyone.

What follows is stranger, and worth sitting with. The Buddha does not deny teaching non-doing, does not explain what akiriya would mean if he had taught it, and does not directly address Soṇakāyana’s claim about what sustains the world. He simply restates, word for word, the four kinds of deeds already given at AN 4.232 and AN 4.233. The rebuttal, such as it is, is left entirely to the content itself.

Why restating the content is the rebuttal

Read against what AN 4.233 just established, the restatement is not a non-answer. Three of the four kinds of deed described here are ordinary, consequential moral action — hurtful, pleasing, mixed, each leading to a matching rebirth. The fourth kind, the one that ends deeds, was shown at AN 4.233 to be itself an intention, cetanā, not the absence of intention. A teaching built this way cannot coherently be described as advocating that nothing be done. It is, if anything, a teaching unusually insistent that every one of the four kinds of deed, including the one that ends deeds, is a species of intentional action.

The discourse trusts its listener to draw this connection rather than drawing it for them. That is consistent with how bare statement functions elsewhere in this collection: the content, once given accurately, does the argumentative work.

A rare reversal

It is worth flagging plainly that this discourse shows the Buddha on the receiving end of a mislabeling the canon usually applies to someone else’s doctrine. Whether Soṇakāyana’s accusation reflects a genuine confusion, a hostile misreading, or simply secondhand distortion passed through two people before it reached the Buddha, the text does not say. What it preserves is the accusation itself, stated in full, rather than smoothing it away before the reply arrives.

Key terms

akiriya — “non-doing, inaction” — elsewhere the doctrine specifically associated with the teacher Pūraṇa Kassapa, here pinned instead on the Buddha by a secondhand accusation.
kammasaccāyaṁ loko kammasamārambhaṭṭhāyī — “the world exists through deeds, and remains because deeds are undertaken” — the premise behind Soṇakāyana’s claim that teaching non-doing means teaching annihilation.
dassanampi nābhijānāmi — “I don’t recall even seeing [him]” — the Buddha’s first, disarming response, questioning whether the reported conversation happened at all.
cetanā — “intention” — the word AN 4.233 used to define the fourth kind of deed, and the reason this discourse’s restatement functions as a rebuttal.
chattha satthāro — the six contemporary teachers the early texts catalogue, among them Pūraṇa Kassapa, whose doctrine of non-doing this discourse’s accusation borrows and misapplies.

The text

The discourse in full: the brahmin's visit, the reported accusation, and the Buddha's reply. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

The brahmin's visit

§1Then Sikhāmoggallāna the brahmin went up to the Buddha, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, Sikhāmoggallāna sat down to one side, and said to the Buddha:

The reported accusation

§2“Worthy Gotama, a few days ago the student Soṇakāyana came to me and said: ‘The ascetic Gotama advocates not doing any deeds. So he teaches the annihilation of the world!’ The world exists through deeds, and it remains because deeds are undertaken.”

The Buddha's reply

§3“Brahmin, I can’t recall even seeing the student Soṇakāyana, so how could we possibly have had such a discussion? I declare these four kinds of deeds, having realized them with my own insight. What four? There are dark deeds with dark results; bright deeds with bright results; dark and bright deeds with dark and bright results; and neither dark nor bright deeds with neither dark nor bright results, which lead to the ending of deeds. And what are the dark deeds with dark results? It’s when someone makes hurtful choices by way of body, speech, and mind. … Touched by hurtful contacts, they experience hurtful feelings that are exclusively painful—like the beings in hell. These are called dark deeds with dark results. And what are bright deeds with bright results? It’s when someone makes pleasing choices by way of body, speech, and mind. … Touched by pleasing contacts, they experience pleasing feelings of perfect happiness—like the gods of universal beauty. These are called bright deeds with bright results. And what are dark and bright deeds with dark and bright results? It’s when someone makes both hurtful and pleasing choices by way of body, speech, and mind. … Touched by both hurtful and pleasing contacts, they experience both hurtful and pleasing feelings that are a mixture of pleasure and pain—like humans, some gods, and some beings in the underworld. These are called dark and bright deeds with dark and bright results. And what are neither dark nor bright deeds with neither dark nor bright results, which lead to the ending of deeds? It’s the intention to give up dark deeds with dark results, bright deeds with bright results, and both dark and bright deeds with both dark and bright results. These are called neither dark nor bright deeds with neither dark nor bright results, which lead to the ending of deeds. These are the four kinds of deeds that I declare, having realized them with my own insight.”

· · ·

Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What accusation does the brahmin Sikhāmoggallāna report to the Buddha?
Correct: B. Attributed to a student named Soṇakāyana, reported secondhand.
Question 2 of 10
Where else in the canon is the doctrine of "non-doing", akiriya, specifically associated?
Correct: B. The accusation borrows a label usually pinned on a rival teacher.
Question 3 of 10
What is the Buddha's first response to the reported accusation?
Correct: B. Questioning whether the reported conversation happened at all.
Question 4 of 10
What does the Buddha say after that, to address the substance of the accusation?
Correct: B. The content itself is left to answer the accusation.
Question 5 of 10
Why does the guide say this restatement functions as a rebuttal, even without argument?
Correct: B. A teaching built this way cannot coherently be described as advocating that nothing be done.
Question 6 of 10
What premise does Soṇakāyana's accusation rest on?
Correct: B. Making non-doing, on this premise, equivalent to teaching annihilation.
Question 7 of 10
What does the guide call this discourse, relative to how the canon usually assigns the akiriya label?
Correct: B. The text preserves the accusation in full rather than smoothing it away.
Question 8 of 10
How many times, including this discourse, has this same four-kinds-of-deeds content now been given in this chapter?
Correct: B. AN 4.232, AN 4.233, and this discourse.
Question 9 of 10
What does the discourse leave unstated, according to the guide?
Correct: B. Consistent with how bare statement functions elsewhere in this collection.
Question 10 of 10
Who reports the accusation to the Buddha?
Correct: B. The accusation passes through two people before reaching the Buddha.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0