Catutthaabhabbaṭṭhānasutta — Sītivagga — the ninth chapter of the Sixes, continuing the Second Fifty
Setting
None stated in the source
Speakers
The Buddha alone, addressing the mendicants
Form
A single list plus an explanatory why-clause, closing this tetrad and the chapter with a distinct doctrinal argument
Length
under 1 minute to read
Northern parallel
The fourfold rejection of self-caused, other-caused, both-caused, and uncaused pleasure and pain recurs across the Chinese Āgamas' engagement with rival causal theories; this reading guide does not assert a specific matching sutra number
Difficulty
★★★☆☆ — the chapter's most philosophically dense discourse, naming four rival causal theories and explaining their rejection
Why this discourse
AN 6.95 closes both this tetrad and the chapter with its most argumentative discourse: rather than simply listing six impossibilities, it names four theories of what causes pleasure and pain — self-made, other-made, both-made, or arising anomalously, uncaused — and, uniquely among this tetrad, explains why an individual accomplished in view cannot fall back on any of them: because they have “clearly seen causes and the phenomena that arise from causes.”
Reading guide
The teaching in one sentence
An individual accomplished in view cannot fall back on the idea that pleasure and pain are self-made, other-made, both-made, or uncaused, because they have clearly seen causes and the phenomena arising from causes.
Four positions, not six discrete items
Unlike this tetrad's other three discourses, this one's content reads less as six separate items than as four rival philosophical positions on causation, each rejected in turn — the discourse's own '“six things”' framing sits over content that, in translated summary, groups more naturally as a fourfold argument than a six-item list.
The only discourse in this tetrad with a stated reason
AN 6.92, 6.93, and 6.94 each simply assert their impossibilities. This discourse alone adds “why is that?” (kissa hetu) and answers it: because the accomplished individual has “clearly seen causes and the phenomena that arise from causes” — direct insight into dependent origination, not merely a rule followed without understanding.
Closing the chapter on causal insight, not conduct
Sītivagga opened at AN 6.85 with techniques of mental management and closes here on direct insight into causation — the chapter's arc moves from practical mental technique, through obstacles to listening and stream-entry's fetters, to a philosophical argument grounding the entire set in seeing causation clearly, rather than in ethical conduct alone.
Key terms
sayaṅkataṁ, parakataṁ, sayaṅkatañca parakatañca — “self-made, other-made, both self-made and other-made” — the first three rejected theories of the cause of pleasure and pain.
adhiccasamuppannaṁ — “arising anomalously,” uncaused — the fourth rejected theory, pleasure and pain arising without any of the preceding three kinds of cause.
kissa hetu — “why is that?” — the question this discourse alone poses within its tetrad, followed by an explicit answer.
hetu ca hetusamuppannā ca dhammā sudiṭṭhā — “causes and the phenomena that arise from causes have been clearly seen” — the discourse's own stated reason, direct insight into dependent origination.
paṭiccasamuppāda — “dependent origination” — the broader doctrine this discourse's closing explanation invokes without naming outright.
The text
The discourse in full: four rejected theories of the cause of pleasure and pain, and the reason for their rejection. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).
Four theories that can't be fallen back on
§1“Mendicants, these six things can’t be done. What six? An individual accomplished in view can’t fall back on the idea that pleasure and pain are made by oneself, or that they’re made by another, or that they’re made by both. Nor can they fall back on the idea that pleasure and pain arise anomalously, not made by oneself, by another, or by both. Why is that? It is because an individual accomplished in view has clearly seen causes and the phenomena that arise from causes. These are the six things that can’t be done.”
Why: causes clearly seen
§2
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Self-check quiz
7 questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.
Question 1 of 7
What four theories of the cause of pleasure and pain does this discourse reject?
Correct: B. Four rival philosophical positions on causation, each rejected in turn.
Question 2 of 7
How does this discourse's content differ structurally from the tetrad's other three, according to the guide?
Correct: B. A different shape for its content within the same tetrad framing.
Question 3 of 7
What makes this discourse unique within its tetrad, according to the guide?
Correct: B. AN 6.92–94 assert; this discourse explains.
Question 4 of 7
What reason does the discourse give for why the accomplished individual cannot fall back on any of the four theories?
Correct: B. Direct insight into causation, not a rule followed without understanding.
Question 5 of 7
How does the guide describe this chapter's overall arc, from AN 6.85 to AN 6.95?
Correct: B. A chapter closing on causal insight rather than conduct alone.
Question 6 of 7
Is a setting stated for AN 6.95?
Correct: B. A bare formula, matching this tetrad's other discourses despite its greater philosophical density.
Question 7 of 7
What broader doctrine does this discourse's closing explanation invoke without naming outright, according to the guide?
Correct: B. Direct insight into causes and their arisen phenomena, the substance of dependent origination.
