Itivuttaka · Book of the Threes, Chapter Two · Iti 63

Periods

Addhāsutta

Setting
None given — no place, audience beyond “mendicants,” or occasion, in keeping with the Itivuttaka’s spare form throughout
Speakers
The Buddha alone; the Itivuttaka’s bipartite form never includes an interlocutor
Form
A one-line list of the three periods of time, followed by a three-stanza verse that shifts to a different, related term
Length
Under a minute to read the passage itself
Parallels
No complete Chinese Itivuttaka survives; a partial parallel collection exists in Tibetan translation, with scattered individual parallels across the Āgamas, none specifically identified for this short discourse
Difficulty
★★★☆☆ — the prose is simple, but the verse introduces a more abstract term that takes some unpacking

Why this discourse

The prose half of this discourse could not be simpler: there are three periods — past, future, present — end of list. What makes the discourse worth pausing over is that its verse does not restate this list at all. Instead of talking about time, it talks about something it calls “the communicable” (akkheyya) — whatever can be named, labeled, or talked about — and warns that beings who identify with the communicable become trapped by it, while those who have fully understood it stop assuming there must be some fixed communicator doing the naming. The link between the two halves is left for the reader to supply, and it is one of the more interesting puzzles in this short chapter.

Reading guide

Three periods, one line

The prose statement is about as compressed as this collection gets: “there are these three periods. What three? Past, future, and present. These are the three periods.” No further comment is offered — not on why these three matter, not on how one relates to them wisely or unwisely. On its own, it reads almost like a category definition rather than a teaching.

The verse’s pivot: from “periods” to “the communicable”

What is genuinely striking is that the verse never once uses the words for past, future, or present. Instead it speaks of akkheyya — “the communicable” or “the expressible,” whatever can be put into words and named. “Sentient beings who perceive the communicable become established in the communicable,” it begins; “not understanding the communicable, they fall under the yoke of Death.” Only the wise, who have “fully understood the communicable,” stop assuming there must be an akkhātar — a “communicator” or namer — behind the naming, and in that letting-go touch “the supreme state of peace.”

Why time might count as “communicable”

The two halves make more sense together once you notice what past, future, and present actually are: not things you can point to directly, but labels applied to experience — conventions of speech that let beings sort what has happened, what hasn’t yet, and what is happening now. Read this way, the three periods are a paradigm case of “the communicable”: categories built entirely out of naming, which beings then mistake for solid, independent facts about the world rather than useful but constructed labels.

A quiet warning about labels, not just time

Taken as a whole, the discourse moves from the driest possible statement of a temporal category to a warning that applies far beyond time itself: that clinging to any communicable label — assuming it names something fixed, and assuming there must be a fixed namer standing behind it — is exactly the kind of grasping that keeps a being “under the yoke of Death.” The verse’s final line calls the person who has seen through this a vedagū, a “knowledge-master,” who “cannot be reckoned” — cannot, that is, be pinned down by any further label at all.

The form itself

Like the rest of this chapter, Periods opens with “This was said by the Buddha, the Perfected One: that is what I heard,” gives its prose statement, develops it across three verse stanzas, and closes with a near-mirror of the opening line. No place, audience, or occasion is named beyond “mendicants” — and here, unusually, even the prose statement itself is left to stand almost entirely without elaboration.

Key terms

addhā — “period” or span of time: past (atīta), future (anāgata), and present (paccuppanna).
akkheyya — “the communicable” or expressible: whatever can be named or put into words, the verse’s central and more abstract term.
akkhātar — “the communicator” or namer: an assumed namer behind names, which the verse says the wise no longer conceive.
santipada — “the state of peace”: what is touched by one who has fully understood the communicable.
vedagū — “knowledge-master”: the verse’s closing epithet for one who “cannot be reckoned,” no longer pinned down by any label.

The text

The discourse in full — a one-line prose statement followed by a three-stanza verse that shifts from time itself to the broader problem of clinging to names. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1This was said by the Buddha, the Perfected One: that is what I heard.

The teaching

§2“Mendicants, there are these three periods. What three? Past, future, and present. These are the three periods.” The Buddha spoke this matter. On this it is said:

The verse

§3“Sentient beings who perceive the communicable, become established in the communicable. Not understanding the communicable, they fall under the yoke of Death.

§4But having fully understood the communicable, they don’t conceive a communicator, as they’ve touched liberation with their mind, the supreme state of peace.

§5Accomplished in the communicable, peaceful, in love with the state of peace; making use after reflection, firm in principle, a knowledge master cannot be reckoned.”

§6This too is a matter that was spoken by the Blessed One: that is what I heard.

· · ·

Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What three “periods” does the prose statement name?
Correct: B. This one-line list is the entire content of the prose statement.
Question 2 of 10
Does the verse restate the words “past, future, present” directly?
Correct: C. This shift in vocabulary is one of the discourse’s more distinctive features.
Question 3 of 10
What happens, per the verse, to beings who perceive the communicable but don’t understand it?
Correct: A. This is the verse’s warning about clinging to what can be named.
Question 4 of 10
What does the wise person, who has “fully understood the communicable,” no longer conceive?
Correct: D. The verse specifically denies this assumed namer, not the three periods themselves.
Question 5 of 10
According to the reading guide, why might the three periods of time count as a case of “the communicable”?
Correct: B. This is the reading guide’s own bridge between the two halves of the discourse.
Question 6 of 10
What epithet does the verse use for one who has seen through this clinging to names?
Correct: C. “Cannot be reckoned” means this person can no longer be pinned down by any further label.
Question 7 of 10
How many verse stanzas does this discourse have?
Correct: A. Like Iti 62, this discourse develops its point across three stanzas rather than one or two.
Question 8 of 10
Is a specific place or audience named in this discourse, beyond “mendicants”?
Correct: D. Almost none of these discourses include a narrative setting.
Question 9 of 10
What phrase describes what the wise person “touches” after fully understanding the communicable?
Correct: B. This appears in the verse’s second stanza.
Question 10 of 10
What closing formula does this discourse share with the rest of the Itivuttaka?
Correct: C. This near-mirror of the opening formula closes every discourse in the collection.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0