Majjhima Nikāya · Discourse 136

The Longer Analysis of Deeds

Mahākammavibhaṅgasutta

Setting
Near Rājagaha, in the Bamboo Grove, told to Venerable Ānanda
Speakers
The Buddha, Venerable Ānanda, with Venerable Samiddhi, the wanderer Potaliputta, and Venerable Udāyī appearing in the frame story
Form
A narrative frame about a botched answer, opening into a systematic, four-part analysis of kamma and rebirth
Length
~25 minutes to read
Northern parallel
A Madhyama-āgama parallel is generally identified as MĀ 171 (“Discourse Distinguishing Great Deeds”), though the correspondence is drawn from comparative catalogues rather than confirmed here segment by segment
Difficulty
★★★★☆ — dense and closely argued; easy to misread without tracking each of the four cases carefully

Why this discourse, one-hundred-and-thirty-sixth

MN 135, the discourse just before this one, gives kamma its cleanest possible face: seven tidy pairs of deed and result, memorized and repeated across the ancient Buddhist world for that very clarity. This discourse takes the same subject and complicates it — on purpose. It opens with a wanderer’s overconfident claim, a junior mendicant’s inadequate defense of the Buddha, and Ānanda escorting the whole mess back to its source. What follows is the Buddha’s own corrective: a demonstration that the very same visible outcome — a killer reborn well, a virtuous person reborn badly — can arise from entirely different underlying causes, and that jumping from a single observed case to a universal rule is exactly the mistake that even meditators with genuine psychic powers make. It is, in effect, the fine print the tidy version needs.

Reading guide

The teaching in one sentence

The same visible result — a person who killed being reborn well, a person who was virtuous being reborn badly — can arise from entirely different underlying causes, so no one, however psychically gifted, is entitled to leap from a single observed case to a universal law about how kamma works; only the Buddha’s own “great analysis of deeds” accounts for the full complexity, including the fact that a deed’s fruit can ripen earlier, later, or right at the moment of death.

A wanderer’s overclaim

The frame story is almost a comedy of escalating error. The wanderer Potaliputta tells Venerable Samiddhi that he has heard the Buddha teach two things: that bodily and verbal deeds are “done in vain” and only mental deeds are real, and that there exists a meditative attainment in which nothing at all is felt. Samiddhi, only three years ordained, flatly denies the first claim as a misrepresentation but affirms the second — and then, pressed on what one feels after an intentional deed, answers simply: “suffering.” Potaliputta leaves without agreeing or disagreeing, which is itself a quiet signal that something has gone wrong.

A junior mendicant imagines the Teacher needs defending

Samiddhi reports the exchange to Ānanda, who takes the matter straight to the Buddha rather than trying to settle it themselves — a small model of how disputed Dhamma points are supposed to be handled. The Buddha’s first response is characteristically dry: he does not even recall meeting Potaliputta, and in any case Samiddhi’s categorical “suffering” was the wrong kind of answer to a question that needed careful analysis, not a flat assertion. When Venerable Udāyī tries to rescue Samiddhi by suggesting he meant a different technical point, the Buddha rebukes him too, for guessing at something “irrational.” The correct answer, the Buddha says, would have distinguished deeds by way of body, speech, or mind according to whether each is to be experienced as pleasant, painful, or neutral — a basic but easily missed distinction that has nothing to do with whether bodily and verbal deeds are somehow less real than mental ones.

The great analysis: four individuals

Having cleared away the confusion, the Buddha offers to teach Ānanda something far more demanding: the “great analysis of deeds.” It begins with four kinds of people, cutting across the obvious expectation that bad conduct leads to a bad rebirth and good conduct to a good one:

ConductRebirth
Kills, steals, engages in sexual misconduct, lies, and holds wrong viewReborn in hell
Kills, steals, engages in sexual misconduct, lies, and holds wrong viewReborn in a heavenly realm
Refrains from all of the above, holds right viewReborn in a heavenly realm
Refrains from all of the above, holds right viewReborn in hell

Stated so baldly, this looks like it undoes MN 135’s tidy correlations entirely. It doesn’t — but seeing why takes the rest of the discourse.

Four ascetics, four hasty conclusions

The Buddha now describes four meditators, each genuinely accomplished, each developing real clairvoyance (“purified and superhuman”), and each observing exactly one of the four cases above with their own eyes. Every one of them then makes the identical mistake: from a single true observation — this killer went to hell, or this killer went to heaven, or this virtuous person went to heaven, or this virtuous person went to hell — each leaps to a sweeping universal claim (“everyone who kills is reborn in hell,” or its opposite), and then declares that anyone who thinks differently simply has the wrong notion. Genuine meditative attainment, the discourse is careful to show, does not by itself protect against this exact error in reasoning.

What the Buddha grants — and what he doesn’t

The Buddha’s response to all four ascetics follows one precise pattern, repeated four times with only the details changed: he grants that bad deeds do have bad results in general, and he grants the specific case they actually witnessed. But he refuses to grant the universal extension — “everyone who kills is reborn in hell” — and he refuses to grant that everyone who sees it differently is simply wrong. “Because,” he says each time, “the Realized One’s knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise.” This is the discourse’s real center of gravity: a demonstration of exactly where inference from direct observation is reliable (the particular case) and where it silently overreaches (the general law).

Why the same conduct can lead to different rebirths: timing

The resolution the Buddha then gives is about timing, not exception. A person’s bad or good deed that is “to be experienced as painful” or “as pleasurable” may have been done long before the visible act in question, may be done afterward, or — critically — a wholly different deed, or even just the state of mind at the moment of death, can determine where someone is reborn next. The killer reborn in heaven may be experiencing the ripening of an earlier good deed, or may have died with a wholesome state of mind, even while the killing itself still has its own painful fruit waiting, “in this very life, or in the next life, or in some subsequent period.” Nothing is wasted or cancelled; the ledger is simply far longer and more layered than a single lifetime’s visible conduct can show.

Four kinds of deeds

The discourse closes with its own compressed technical summary, distinguishing deeds that are ineffective and appear ineffective, ineffective but appear effective, effective and appear effective, and effective but appear ineffective. This is the whole lesson in a single line: what a deed looks like it is doing, from the outside, and what it is actually doing, causally, are two different questions — and confusing them is precisely the ascetics’ mistake, restated as doctrine.

The companion to MN 135

Read together, the two discourses are not in tension so much as they are looking in opposite directions. MN 135 reasons forward: given this pattern of conduct, if reborn human, expect this trait — a cautious, general tendency, not a courtroom verdict on any individual case. MN 136 reasons about the danger of going backward: from a single observed rebirth, don’t infer a universal rule about its cause. Both discourses agree that kamma is real and that conduct matters; MN 136 simply insists that the machinery connecting the two is subtler, longer, and less visible than any one lifetime, or any one clairvoyant glimpse, can reveal.

Key terms

mahā-kammavibhaṅga — the “great” or “longer” analysis of deeds, named to contrast directly with the culā- (“shorter”) analysis of MN 135.
the four individuals — bad conduct paired with hell, bad conduct paired with heaven, good conduct paired with heaven, and good conduct paired with hell: the four cases the whole discourse exists to explain.
abhiññā — “clairvoyance,” here described as “purified and superhuman”; the discourse’s point is that even this genuine power does not, by itself, license a sweeping generalization from what it sees.
“obstinately stick…” — the discourse’s recurring phrase for each ascetic’s error: mistaking one true, particular observation for an exhaustive universal law.
effective / ineffective, and how they appear — the closing fourfold typology distinguishing a deed’s actual causal potency from how potent it merely looks from the outside.

The text

The discourse in full: the frame story of Potaliputta, Samiddhi, and Ānanda; the Buddha’s correction; and the complete “great analysis of deeds,” including all four ascetics and the Buddha’s response to each. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

A wanderer’s claim

§1So I have heard. At one time the Buddha was staying near Rājagaha, in the Bamboo Grove, the squirrels’ feeding ground.

§2Now at that time Venerable Samiddhi was staying in a wilderness hut. Then as the wanderer Potaliputta was going for a walk he came up to Venerable Samiddhi and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he sat down to one side and said to him: “Reverend Samiddhi, I have heard and learned this in the presence of the ascetic Gotama: ‘Deeds by way of body and speech are done in vain. Only mental deeds are real.’ And: ‘There is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.’” “Don’t say that, Reverend Potaliputta, don’t say that! Don’t misrepresent the Buddha, for misrepresentation of the Buddha is not good. And the Buddha would not say this: ‘Deeds by way of body and speech are done in vain. Only mental deeds are real.’ But, reverend, there is such an attainment where the one who enters it does not feel anything at all.” “Reverend Samiddhi, how long has it been since you went forth?” “Not long, reverend: three years.” “Well now, what are we to say to the senior mendicants, when even such a junior mendicant imagines their Teacher needs defending? After doing an intentional deed by way of body, speech, or mind, reverend, what does one feel?” “After doing an intentional deed by way of body, speech, or mind, reverend, one feels suffering.” Then, neither approving nor rejecting Samiddhi’s statement, Potaliputta rose from his seat and left.

Ānanda takes it to the Buddha

§3–4Soon after he had left, Venerable Samiddhi went to Venerable Ānanda, and exchanged greetings with him. When the greetings and polite conversation were over, he sat down to one side, and informed Ānanda of all they had discussed. When he had spoken, Ānanda said to him, “Reverend Samiddhi, we should see the Buddha about this matter. Come, let’s go to the Buddha and inform him about this. As he answers, so we’ll remember it.” “Yes, reverend,” Samiddhi replied.

Then Ānanda and Samiddhi went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat down to one side, and told him what had happened.

A rebuke, and the answer that should have been given

§5–6When they had spoken, the Buddha said to Ānanda, “I don’t recall even seeing the wanderer Potaliputta, Ānanda, so how could we have had such a discussion? The wanderer Potaliputta’s question should have been answered after analyzing it, but this futile man answered categorically.”

When he said this, Venerable Udāyī said to him, “But perhaps, sir, Venerable Samiddhi spoke in reference to the statement: ‘Suffering includes whatever is felt.’” But the Buddha said to Venerable Ānanda, “See what this futile man Udāyī comes up with? I knew that he was coming up with something irrational. Right from the start Potaliputta asked about the three feelings. Suppose the futile man Samiddhi had answered the wanderer Potaliputta’s question like this: ‘After doing an intentional deed to be experienced as pleasant by way of body, speech, or mind, one feels pleasure. After doing an intentional deed to be experienced as painful by way of body, speech, or mind, one feels pain. After doing an intentional deed to be experienced as neutral by way of body, speech, or mind, one feels neutral.’ Answering in this way, Samiddhi would have rightly answered Potaliputta. Still, who are those foolish and incompetent wanderers of other religions to understand the Realized One’s great analysis of deeds? If you would all listen, Ānanda, I will explain the Realized One’s great analysis of deeds.”

The four individuals

§7–8“Now is the time, Blessed One! Now is the time, Holy One! Let the Buddha explain the great analysis of deeds. The mendicants will listen and remember it.” “Well then, Ānanda, listen and apply your mind well, I will speak.” “Yes, sir,” Ānanda replied. The Buddha said this:

“Ānanda, these four individuals are found in the world. What four? It’s when an individual here kills living creatures, steals, and commits sexual misconduct. They use speech that’s false, backbiting, harsh, or nonsensical. And they’re covetous, malicious, and have wrong view. When their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. But some other individual here kills living creatures, steals, and commits sexual misconduct. They use speech that’s false, backbiting, harsh, or nonsensical. And they’re covetous, malicious, and have wrong view. When their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm. But some other individual here refrains from killing living creatures, stealing, sexual misconduct, or using speech that’s false, backbiting, harsh, or nonsensical. And they’re contented, kind-hearted, and have right view. When their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm. But some other individual here refrains from killing living creatures, stealing, sexual misconduct, or using speech that’s false, backbiting, harsh, or nonsensical. And they’re contented, kind-hearted, and have right view. When their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell.

Four ascetics, four hasty conclusions

§9–12Now, some ascetic or brahmin—by dint of keen, resolute, committed, and diligent effort, and right application of mind—experiences an immersion of the heart of such a kind that it gives rise to clairvoyance that is purified and superhuman. With that clairvoyance they see that individual here who killed living creatures, stole, and committed sexual misconduct; who used speech that’s false, backbiting, harsh, or nonsensical; and who was covetous, malicious, and had wrong view. And they see that, when their body breaks up, after death, they are reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. They say: ‘It seems, worthy sir, that there is such a thing as bad deeds, and the result of bad conduct. For I saw an individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And when their body broke up, after death, they were reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell.’ They say: ‘It seems that everyone who kills living creatures … and has wrong view is reborn in hell. Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ And so they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile.’

But some other ascetic or brahmin—by dint of keen, resolute, committed, and diligent effort, and right application of mind—experiences an immersion of the heart of such a kind that it gives rise to clairvoyance that is purified and superhuman. With that clairvoyance they see that individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And they see that they are reborn in a heavenly realm. They say: ‘It seems that there is no such thing as bad deeds, and the result of bad conduct. For I have seen an individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And I saw that they were reborn in a heavenly realm.’ They say: ‘It seems that everyone who kills living creatures … and has wrong view is reborn in a heavenly realm. Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ And so they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile.’

Take some ascetic or brahmin who with clairvoyance sees an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And they see that they are reborn in a heavenly realm. They say: ‘It seems that there is such a thing as good deeds, and the result of good conduct. For I have seen an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And I saw that they were reborn in a heavenly realm.’ They say: ‘It seems that everyone who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view is reborn in a heavenly realm. Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ And so they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile.’

Take some ascetic or brahmin who with clairvoyance sees an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And they see that they are reborn in hell. They say: ‘It seems that there is no such thing as good deeds, and the result of good conduct. For I have seen an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And I saw that they were reborn in hell.’ They say: ‘It seems that everyone who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view is reborn in hell. Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ And so they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile.’

What the Buddha grants — and what he doesn’t

§13–16In this case, when an ascetic or brahmin says this: ‘It seems that there is such a thing as bad deeds, and the result of bad conduct,’ I grant them that. And when they say: ‘I have seen an individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And after death, they were reborn in hell,’ I also grant them that. But when they say: ‘It seems that everyone who kills living creatures … and has wrong view is reborn in hell,’ I don’t grant them that. And when they say: ‘Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion.’ I also don’t grant them that. And when they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile,’ I also don’t grant them that. Why is that? Because the Realized One’s knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise.

In this case, when an ascetic or brahmin says this: ‘It seems that there is no such thing as bad deeds, and the result of bad conduct,’ I don’t grant them that. But when they say: ‘I have seen an individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view. And I saw that they were reborn in a heavenly realm,’ I grant them that. But when they say: ‘It seems that everyone who kills living creatures … and has wrong view is reborn in a heavenly realm,’ I don’t grant them that. … Because the Realized One’s knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise.

In this case, when an ascetic or brahmin says this: ‘It seems that there is such a thing as good deeds, and the result of good conduct,’ I grant them that. And when they say: ‘I have seen an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And I saw that they were reborn in a heavenly realm,’ I grant them that. But when they say: ‘It seems that everyone who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view is reborn in a heavenly realm,’ I don’t grant them that. … Because the Realized One’s knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise.

In this case, when an ascetic or brahmin says this: ‘It seems that there is no such thing as good deeds, and the result of good conduct,’ I don’t grant them that. But when they say: ‘I have seen an individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view. And after death, they were reborn in hell,’ I grant them that. But when they say: ‘It seems that everyone who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view is reborn in hell,’ I don’t grant them that. But when they say: ‘Those whose notion is this have the right notion. Those whose notion is otherwise have a wrong notion,’ I also don’t grant them that. And when they obstinately stick to what they have known, seen, and understood for themselves, insisting that: ‘This is the only truth, anything else is futile,’ I also don’t grant them that. Why is that? Because the Realized One’s knowledge of the great analysis of deeds is otherwise.

The timing of ripening

§17–20Now, Ānanda, take the case of the individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view, and who, when their body breaks up, after death, is reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. That bad deed of theirs that is to be experienced as painful was either done previously, or later, or else at the time of death they undertook wrong view. And that’s why, when their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. But anyone here who kills living creatures … and has wrong view experiences the result of that in this very life, or in the next life, or in some subsequent period.

Now, Ānanda, take the case of the individual here who killed living creatures … and had wrong view, and who is reborn in a heavenly realm. That good deed of theirs that is to be experienced as pleasurable was either done previously, or later, or else at the time of death they undertook right view. And that’s why, when their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm. But anyone here who kills living creatures … and has wrong view experiences the result of that in this very life, or in the next life, or in some subsequent period.

Now, Ānanda, take the case of the individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view, and who is reborn in a heavenly realm. That good deed of theirs that is to be experienced as pleasurable was either done previously, or later, or else at the time of death they undertook right view. And that’s why, when their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a good place, a heavenly realm. But anyone here who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view experiences the result of that in this very life, or in the next life, or in some subsequent period.

Now, Ānanda, take the case of the individual here who refrained from killing living creatures … and had right view, and who is reborn in hell. That bad deed of theirs that is to be experienced as painful was either done previously, or later, or else at the time of death they undertook wrong view. And that’s why, when their body breaks up, after death, they’re reborn in a place of loss, a bad place, the underworld, hell. But anyone here who refrains from killing living creatures … and has right view experiences the result of that in this very life, or in the next life, or in some subsequent period.

Four kinds of deeds

§21So, Ānanda, there are deeds that are ineffective and appear ineffective. There are deeds that are ineffective but appear effective. There are deeds that are effective and appear effective. And there are deeds that are effective but appear ineffective.” That is what the Buddha said. Satisfied, Venerable Ānanda approved what the Buddha said.

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Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What does the wanderer Potaliputta claim to have heard the Buddha say?
Correct: C. Venerable Samiddhi denies the first part as a misrepresentation of the Buddha, but affirms the second.
Question 2 of 10
What does the Buddha say was wrong with how Venerable Samiddhi handled the question?
Correct: B. The Buddha does not even recall meeting Potaliputta, and stresses that this kind of question needs careful analysis, not a flat answer.
Question 3 of 10
What is the answer the Buddha says Samiddhi should have given?
Correct: D. This distinguishes deeds by their intended feeling-outcome across all three doors of action, not by ranking body/speech below mind.
Question 4 of 10
What are the "four individuals" the Buddha describes in the great analysis of deeds?
Correct: A. The same conduct — good or bad — can precede either a good or a bad rebirth, which is the puzzle the rest of the discourse resolves.
Question 5 of 10
What mistake do all four clairvoyant ascetics make, according to the discourse?
Correct: C. The discourse shows that genuine psychic power does not by itself prevent this reasoning error.
Question 6 of 10
What does the Buddha grant, and what does he deny, in response to each ascetic?
Correct: B. This precise pattern — grant the particular, deny the universal — repeats for all four ascetics.
Question 7 of 10
How does the Buddha explain why the same conduct can lead to different rebirths?
Correct: D. Nothing is cancelled; the causal picture is simply longer and more layered than a single visible lifetime shows.
Question 8 of 10
What are the "four kinds of deeds" named at the close of the discourse?
Correct: A. This fourfold typology restates the discourse's core point: how a deed looks from outside and what it actually causes are two separate questions.
Question 9 of 10
How does this discourse relate to MN 135, The Shorter Analysis of Deeds?
Correct: C. The two discourses look in opposite directions along the same causal chain.
Question 10 of 10
Who brings Samiddhi's exchange with Potaliputta to the Buddha's attention?
Correct: B. Ānanda's response — "we should see the Buddha about this" — models how disputed points are meant to be resolved.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0