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Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 35.105

Because of Grasping

Upādāyasutta — Yogakkhemivagga

Setting
Not restated in this discourse
Speakers
The Buddha and the assembled mendicants, in call and response
Form
A question posed and provisionally deferred, then the full impermanence-suffering-no-proper-ground catechism run across all six sense faculties, closing on the standard arahant declaration
Length
~2 minutes to read
Northern parallel
A rough counterpart may exist in the Chinese Saṃyukta-āgama (T99), though this reading guide does not assert a specific matching sutra number
Difficulty
★★☆☆☆ — a familiar catechism, applied to a new target

Why this discourse

This discourse asks a question this vagga's own opening left unaddressed: not what the Tathāgata has already abandoned, but what ordinary pleasure and pain in oneself actually depend on. The answer names the six sense faculties themselves — not their objects, as SN 35.104 named sights and mental phenomena, but the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind as such — and the grasping (upādāya) of them as the condition for pleasure and pain arising internally. From there the discourse runs the same three-step catechism (impermanent, therefore suffering, therefore no proper ground for pleasure or pain without grasping) already met many times across this project, closing on disillusionment, dispassion, and the full formula of release.

Reading guide

A shift from objects to faculties

SN 35.104 spoke of sights and mental phenomena — the sense objects the Tathāgata has abandoned. This discourse turns instead to the eye and mind themselves as what is grasped (upādāya), the condition for pleasure and pain arising internally.

A question posed, then answered by testing

Rather than simply declaring the condition, the discourse first asks the mendicants directly, receives their formulaic deferral (“our teachings are rooted in the Buddha”), and only then supplies both the answer and the catechism that proves it.

The familiar three-step test, applied to the faculties

Each sense faculty is tested in the same three steps already met repeatedly in this project: is it permanent or impermanent; if impermanent, is it suffering or happiness; and would pleasure and pain arise in oneself from not grasping what is impermanent, suffering, and perishable?

Eye given in full, the rest by peyyāla

The eye receives the complete four-question cycle spelled out; the ear, nose, tongue, and body are folded into a single peyyāla ellipsis before the mind receives the cycle's closing questions in full once more.

Key terms

upādāya — because of grasping — the discourse's own answer to what conditions internal pleasure and pain, naming the sense faculties themselves rather than their objects
ajjhattaṁ sukhaṁ dukkhaṁ — pleasure and pain in oneself — what the discourse traces back to grasping at each sense faculty
bhagavaṁmūlakā no, bhante, dhammā — “our teachings are rooted in the Buddha” — the mendicants' own standard deferral before the Buddha answers his own question
vipariṇāmadhamma — perishable, liable to change — the third quality added to impermanent and suffering in this catechism's closing question
nibbindati — grows disillusioned — the first stage of the closing formula, following directly from seeing all six faculties this way

The text

The complete discourse: the opening question, the mendicants' deferral, and the full catechism run across the eye and, by elision, the remaining five faculties, closing on the arahant declaration. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1“Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what, do pleasure and pain arise in oneself?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

§2“Mendicants, when there’s an eye, because of grasping the eye, pleasure and pain arise in oneself. … When there’s a mind, because of grasping the mind, pleasure and pain arise in oneself. What do you think, mendicants? Is the eye permanent or impermanent?”

§3“Impermanent, sir.” “But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?” “Suffering, sir.” “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would pleasure and pain arise in oneself?” “No, sir.” …

§4“Is the ear … nose … tongue … body … mind permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” “But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?” “Suffering, sir.” “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would pleasure and pain arise in oneself?” “No, sir.”

§5“Seeing this, a learned noble disciple grows disillusioned with the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. Being disillusioned, desire fades away. When desire fades away they’re freed. When they’re freed, they know they’re freed. They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is nothing further for this place.’”

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Self-check quiz

5 questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 5
What does this discourse name as the condition for pleasure and pain arising in oneself?
Correct: A. Upādāya — not the objects met, but the faculties themselves, grasped.
Question 2 of 5
What do the mendicants say before the Buddha answers his own question?
Correct: A. The standard formulaic deferral met elsewhere in this catechism style.
Question 3 of 5
What three qualities does the catechism's closing question test together?
Correct: A. Aniccaṁ, dukkhaṁ, vipariṇāmadhammaṁ — the discourse's own closing test.
Question 4 of 5
Which two sense faculties receive the full catechism spelled out, with the other four folded into a peyyāla ellipsis between them?
Correct: A. The catechism opens on the eye and closes on the mind, with ear, nose, tongue, and body elided.
Question 5 of 5
What does the discourse conclude follows from seeing all six sense faculties this way?
Correct: A. The standard closing formula: nibbindati, virajjati, vimuccati, and the full declaration.
Answered 0 of 5 · Correct 0

Further reading

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