Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 35.108

I'm Better

Seyyohamasmisutta — Yogakkhemivagga

Setting
Not restated in this discourse
Speakers
The Buddha and the assembled mendicants, in call and response
Form
SN 35.105's own catechism structure repeated, testing the threefold conceit of better, equal, and worse against each sense faculty
Length
~2 minutes to read
Northern parallel
A rough counterpart may exist in the Chinese Saṃyukta-āgama (T99), though this reading guide does not assert a specific matching sutra number
Difficulty
★★★☆☆ — a familiar catechism, testing a new target

Why this discourse

This discourse repeats SN 35.105's own catechism almost verbatim, with one addition: where that discourse asked what conditions pleasure and pain, this one asks what conditions the conceits “I'm better,” “I'm equal,” and “I'm worse” (seyyo, sadiso, hīno) arising in people. The answer adds a term SN 35.105 did not need: not merely grasping (upādāya) the sense faculty but insisting on it (abhinivissa), adhering to it as a ground for comparison. The same three-step test — impermanent, therefore suffering, therefore no proper ground — follows, closing on the identical arahant declaration already met twice this vagga.

Reading guide

SN 35.105's own catechism, re-run for conceit

The structure is identical to SN 35.105 — a question posed to the mendicants, their deferral, the answer, then the three-step test — but the target shifts from pleasure and pain to the threefold conceit of being better, equal, or worse than others.

A term SN 35.105 didn't need

Where SN 35.105 named grasping (upādāya) alone as the condition, this discourse adds insisting on (abhinivissa) the sense faculty as a second link before the conceit can arise — comparison requires not just grasping a faculty but adhering to it as one's own standing ground.

Three conceits, one root

Seyyo (better), sadiso (equal), and hīno (worse) are named together throughout, not treated as three separate problems — all three depend on the identical grasping-and-insisting condition, and all three dissolve together once that condition is seen through.

The same close as the discourse two before it

The catechism's ending — disillusionment, dispassion, freedom, the full arahant formula — repeats SN 35.105's own closing lines nearly word for word, the second time this vagga has reached that destination by a slightly different road.

Key terms

seyyohamasmi, sadisohamasmi, hīnohamasmi — “I'm better,” “I'm equal,” “I'm worse” — the threefold conceit this discourse traces to grasping and insisting on the sense faculties
abhinivissa — insisting on, adhering to — the term this discourse adds beyond SN 35.105's grasping (upādāya) alone
māna — conceit — the general category this discourse's threefold formula belongs to, though the word itself is not used here
vipariṇāmadhamma — perishable, liable to change — the same third quality tested in SN 35.105's identical catechism
nibbindati… vimuccati — grows disillusioned… is freed — the closing sequence shared word for word with SN 35.105

The text

The complete discourse: the opening question, and the full catechism testing the threefold conceit across the eye and, by elision, the remaining five faculties, closing on the arahant declaration. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1“Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, do people think ‘I’m better’ or ‘I’m equal’ or ‘I’m worse’?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

§2“When there’s an eye, because of grasping the eye and insisting on the eye, people think ‘I’m better’ or ‘I’m equal’ or ‘I’m worse’. … When there’s a mind, because of grasping the mind and insisting on the mind, people think ‘I’m better’ or ‘I’m equal’ or ‘I’m worse’. What do you think, mendicants? Is the eye permanent or impermanent?”

§3“Impermanent, sir.” “But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?” “Suffering, sir.” “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would people think ‘I’m better’ or ‘I’m equal’ or ‘I’m worse’?” “No, sir.” …

§4“Is the mind permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” “But if it’s impermanent, is it suffering or happiness?” “Suffering, sir.” “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would people think ‘I’m better’ or ‘I’m equal’ or ‘I’m worse’?” “No, sir.”

§5“Seeing this, a learned noble disciple grows disillusioned with the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mind. Being disillusioned, desire fades away. When desire fades away they’re freed. When they’re freed, they know they’re freed. They understand: ‘Rebirth is ended, the spiritual journey has been completed, what had to be done has been done, there is nothing further for this place.’”

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Self-check quiz

5 questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 5
What threefold conceit does this discourse trace to grasping and insisting on the sense faculties?
Correct: A. Seyyo, sadiso, hīno — the three comparative conceits this discourse's own title names.
Question 2 of 5
What term does this discourse add beyond SN 35.105's “grasping” alone?
Correct: A. A second link, adhering to the faculty as a ground for comparison.
Question 3 of 5
Which earlier discourse in this vagga uses an almost identical catechism structure, testing pleasure and pain instead of conceit?
Correct: A. “Because of Grasping,” the direct structural model for this discourse.
Question 4 of 5
What three qualities does the catechism's closing question test together, unchanged from SN 35.105?
Correct: A. The identical three-part test carried over from SN 35.105.
Question 5 of 5
What does the discourse conclude follows once grasping and insisting on the sense faculties is seen through?
Correct: A. The same closing formula SN 35.105 already reached.
Answered 0 of 5 · Correct 0