What Makes an Inference Actually Valid
Lecture Notes
The question you've been begging since Session 1 of Collected Topics
Every single time you said "that doesn't prove it — there is no pervasion," across two entire courses, you were relying on an intuition nobody had formally defined for you yet. Why does smoke prove fire, but a rooster's crow doesn't prove sunrise? Why does "impermanent" prove "product," but "has a color" doesn't prove "green"? You could always feel the difference. This chapter is where Dharmakīrti finally writes down the actual test.
The three modes of a valid reason
A reason (a piece of evidence offered to prove something) only counts as logically valid if it passes all three of these, together — not two out of three, all three:
- It genuinely applies to the case at hand. If you're arguing about this mountain, there actually has to be smoke on this mountain — not smoke somewhere else, not smoke you're assuming. (This is where "the reason is not established" lives — a reason that fails this mode is simply false.)
- Positive pervasion: everywhere the reason occurs, the thing you're proving occurs too. Every genuinely smoky place is a fiery place, no exceptions. (This is where "no pervasion" catches a reason that's real but doesn't force the conclusion.)
- Negative pervasion: everywhere the thing you're proving is absent, the reason is absent too. Every non-fiery place is a non-smoky place. (The mirror image of mode 2 — checking the connection holds in reverse as well, not just forward.)
Notice something: modes 2 and 3 are exactly the two failure points you've been testing this whole time with "no pervasion." You were doing this formal check informally, by feel, from the very first color-and-shape debate. This chapter just gives it its full name: pervasion (khyab pa) — the genuine, checkable, two-directional connection between a reason and what it proves.
Three types of valid reason
Dharmakīrti sorts every reason that actually passes all three modes into one of three families:
- "Pervasion" was never just a Collected Topics word. It's the technical center of the entire logical system — modes 2 and 3, applied to whatever subject you're debating.
- You already knew the three reason-types from experience — smoke/fire (effect), product/impermanent (nature) — before you had names for them. This chapter is the payoff for paying attention back then.
Discussion Questions
- Go back to Collected Topics Session 1's "has a color, therefore green" trap. Which specific mode does it fail — 1, 2, or 3?
- Is mode 3 (negative pervasion) doing real independent work, or is it automatically guaranteed once mode 2 holds? Argue it either way.
- Of the three reason-types (effect, nature, non-perception), which feels most intuitively solid to you, and which feels shakiest?
- Try classifying "this room is empty of elephants, because if one were here, I'd see it, and I don't" — which type of reason is this, and does it remind you of anything from Collected Topics Session 5?
AssignmentChoose one · half to one page · bring it next session
Take a claim from your own everyday reasoning ("you have a fever, because your forehead feels hot" or similar) and formally check it against all three modes. Does it survive?
Come up with one original example each of an effect reason, a nature reason, and a non-perception reason — none copied from this session — and explain why each belongs in its category.
Self-Check
Session 5 — Proving It to Someone Else
This chapter turns from reasoning-for-yourself to putting a valid inference into words someone else can check (為他比量品) — the difference between knowing something is true and actually proving it to a skeptic sitting across from you. It's also this pilot's capstone, closing the four-chapter arc that began with Session 1.