Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 22.126

Liable to Originate

Uppādasutta — Avijjāvagga

Setting
Sāvatthī
Speakers
An unnamed mendicant questioning the Buddha; both ignorance and knowledge answered in one discourse
Form
Two sequential question-and-answer exchanges within a single discourse
Length
Medium — both the ignorance and knowledge definitions given in full
Northern parallel
The "liable to originate/vanish" (samudayadhamma/vayadhamma) formula recurs elsewhere in the Canon in similar contexts of arising and passing
Difficulty
Moderate — the threefold originate/vanish/both criterion is more granular than this book's usual three-mark formula

Why this discourse

Opens Avijjāvagga ("Ignorance") by returning to the same basic question asked at SN 22.113-114 — what is ignorance, what is knowledge — but now answered with a new, more granular criterion never used before in this book: not merely origin and cessation, but three distinct failures to see an aggregate as liable to originate, liable to vanish, and liable to both.

Reading guide

The same question, asked once more

A mendicant approaches the Buddha with the identical opening question already asked at SN 22.113: "they speak of this thing called 'ignorance'. What is ignorance? And how is an ignoramus defined?" — though this time the same mendicant also asks about knowledge within the same discourse, rather than across two separate ones.

A threefold criterion, more granular than origin and cessation

"It's when an unlearned ordinary person doesn't truly understand form, which is liable to originate, as form which is liable to originate" — the first of three distinct failures, followed by an identical failure regarding form "liable to vanish," and a third regarding form "liable to originate and vanish."

This is a more granular criterion than SN 22.113's simple "origin, cessation" pairing: rather than treating arising and passing as a single package to be understood together, this discourse insists on three separate failures of recognition — failing to see the liability to arise, failing to see the liability to pass, and failing to see both together as a single combined characteristic.

Both ignorance and knowledge, in a single discourse

Unlike SN 22.113-114's separate treatment, this discourse gives both definitions back to back: the mendicant, having heard the definition of ignorance, immediately asks the identical question about knowledge, and receives the precise inversion — "truly understands" replacing "doesn't truly understand" — within the same exchange.

Opening a vagga of criterion variations

Avijjāvagga's own organizing principle becomes visible only across its full ten discourses: each pair or set returns to the same basic ignorance/knowledge question, but answers it through a different technical criterion — this discourse's originate/vanish/both, then the gratification/drawback/escape triad, then the fuller five-point origin/disappearance/gratification/drawback/escape formula, and finally SN 22.113's own four-point origin/cessation/practice formula returning to close the vagga.

Key terms

avijjā — ignorance — the term this vagga takes its name from, defined here through a new criterion
uppādadhamma — liable to originate — the first of three distinct failures named in this discourse's criterion
vayadhamma — liable to vanish — the second failure, distinguished from the first
uppādavayadhamma — liable to originate and vanish — the third, naming the combined characteristic as its own distinct object of understanding
yathābhūtaṁ nappajānāti — "doesn't truly understand" — the precise phrase marking each of the three failures

The text

The complete discourse: the ignorance question and its threefold answer, then the knowledge question and its precise inversion. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1At Sāvatthī. Then a mendicant went up to the Buddha, bowed, sat down to one side, and said to him: “Sir, they speak of this thing called ‘ignorance’. What is ignorance? And how is an ignoramus defined?”

§2“Mendicant, it’s when an unlearned ordinary person doesn’t truly understand form, which is liable to originate, as form which is liable to originate. They don’t truly understand form, which is liable to vanish, as form which is liable to vanish. They don’t truly understand form, which is liable to originate and vanish, as form which is liable to originate and vanish. They don’t truly understand feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, which is liable to originate, as consciousness which is liable to originate. They don’t truly understand consciousness, which is liable to vanish, as consciousness which is liable to vanish. They don’t truly understand consciousness, which is liable to originate and vanish, as consciousness which is liable to originate and vanish. This is called ignorance. And this is how an ignoramus is defined.”

§3When he said this, the mendicant said to the Buddha: “Sir, they speak of this thing called ‘knowledge’. What is knowledge? And how is a knowing one defined?”

§4“Mendicant, it’s when a learned noble disciple truly understands form, which is liable to originate, as form which is liable to originate. They truly understand form, which is liable to vanish, as form which is liable to vanish. They truly understand form, which is liable to originate and vanish, as form which is liable to originate and vanish. They truly understand feeling … perception … choices … consciousness, which is liable to originate, as consciousness which is liable to originate. They truly understand consciousness, which is liable to vanish, as consciousness which is liable to vanish. They truly understand consciousness, which is liable to originate and vanish, as consciousness which is liable to originate and vanish. This is called knowledge. And this is how a knowing one is defined.”

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Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What question does the mendicant ask, matching an earlier discourse in this book?
Correct: A. The identical opening question already asked at SN 22.113.
Question 2 of 10
How many distinct failures does this discourse's criterion name?
Correct: A. Liable to originate, liable to vanish, and liable to both — treated as three separate failures.
Question 3 of 10
What is the first failure named in the criterion?
Correct: A. The first of three distinct failures of recognition.
Question 4 of 10
How does this criterion compare to SN 22.113's simpler origin/cessation pairing?
Correct: A. Rather than a single combined package, three distinct recognitions are required.
Question 5 of 10
How does this discourse structure the questions about ignorance and knowledge?
Correct: A. Unlike SN 22.113-114's separate treatment across two discourses.
Question 6 of 10
What does the discourse's definition of knowledge do to the ignorance definition?
Correct: A. The identical threefold criterion, inverted.
Question 7 of 10
What organizing principle does Avijjāvagga follow across its ten discourses?
Correct: A. Each pair or set uses a different criterion — this discourse's own, then others to follow.
Question 8 of 10
How many aggregates does this threefold criterion apply to?
Correct: A. Form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness, following the standard pattern.
Question 9 of 10
Where is this discourse set?
Correct: A. The setting shifts to Varanasi for most of the remaining discourses in this vagga.
Question 10 of 10
What vagga does this discourse open?
Correct: A. SN 22.126 opens Book III's thirteenth vagga, named for the "ignorance" theme running through it.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0