Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 22.156

Theory of Self

Attānudiṭṭhisutta — Diṭṭhivagga

Setting
Sāvatthī
Speakers
The Buddha, questioning the mendicants directly
Form
The identical structure as SN 22.150-155, now examining attānudiṭṭhi
Length
Short — compressed, following the established pattern
Northern parallel
Attānudiṭṭhi, "theory of self" or "view following self," is closely related to but terminologically distinct from sakkāyadiṭṭhi
Difficulty
Moderate — best appreciated alongside SN 22.154-155 as the close of a three-term arc

Why this discourse

Closes this vagga's three-discourse generalizing arc: after wrong view (SN 22.154) and substantialist view (SN 22.155), this discourse examines attānudiṭṭhi, "theory of self" — a third general label, tracing once more to the identical grasping-and-insisting conditions before this opening set turns to its final two discourses on fetters and shackles.

Reading guide

A third name for closely related ground

"When what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does theory of self arise?" — attānudiṭṭhi shares obvious territory with SN 22.155's sakkāyadiṭṭhi, though the terms are not identical: attānudiṭṭhi emphasizes the theorizing about a self (view "following" or "pursuing" self), where sakkāyadiṭṭhi emphasizes the substantial reality being mistakenly constructed.

The identical mechanism, a third time

"When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, theory of self arises" — exactly the same grasping-and-insisting conditions traced for wrong view generally and substantialist view specifically, now shown to produce this third, closely related label as well.

What three terms sharing one mechanism accomplishes

By this point, having traced micchādiṭṭhi, sakkāyadiṭṭhi, and attānudiṭṭhi all to the identical source, this vagga makes a cumulative point that no single discourse could make alone: the book's varied technical vocabulary for self-related error is not describing three different mental events but three different names given to a single recurring phenomenon, viewed and labeled from slightly different angles.

Turning to fetters and shackles

This discourse's own closing examination completes the vagga's opening view-focused sequence; SN 22.157-158 will shift from views specifically to the broader consequences of grasping — fetters, insistence, shackles, and attachments — before SN 22.159 closes both the vagga and SN22 itself with the discourse to Ānanda.

Key terms

attānudiṭṭhi — theory of self, view following self — this discourse's own subject, closing the three-term generalizing arc
sakkāyadiṭṭhi — substantialist view — SN 22.155's own closely related term, emphasizing the substantial reality mistakenly constructed
micchādiṭṭhi — wrong view — SN 22.154's own most general term, of which both attānudiṭṭhi and sakkāyadiṭṭhi are specific instances
upādāya abhinivissa — because of grasping and insisting on — the shared conditions traced a third time in this discourse
saṁyojana — fetters — the term SN 22.157 will turn to next, shifting from views to their consequences

The text

The complete discourse: the question about theory of self, traced to its conditions and dismantled by the standard examination. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1At Sāvatthī. “Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does theory of self arise?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

§2“When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, theory of self arises. When feeling … perception … choices … consciousness exists, because of grasping consciousness and insisting on consciousness, theory of self arises.

§3What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would theory of self arise?” “No, sir.”

§4“Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would theory of self arise?” “No, sir.” “Seeing this … They understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place.’”

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Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What term does this discourse examine, closing the three-term generalizing arc?
Correct: A. The third general label after wrong view (154) and substantialist view (155).
Question 2 of 10
How does attānudiṭṭhi differ in emphasis from sakkāyadiṭṭhi?
Correct: A. Closely related but not identical technical terms.
Question 3 of 10
What conditions does this discourse trace for theory of self?
Correct: A. The same mechanism traced for wrong view and substantialist view alike.
Question 4 of 10
What cumulative point does tracing three terms (micchādiṭṭhi, sakkāyadiṭṭhi, attānudiṭṭhi) to one mechanism make?
Correct: A. A point no single discourse in this set could make alone.
Question 5 of 10
What does this vagga's opening set turn to after this discourse?
Correct: A. SN 22.157-158, shifting from views to their broader consequences.
Question 6 of 10
What discourse closes both this vagga and the whole of SN22?
Correct: A. The vagga's own final discourse, closing SN22 (Khandhasaṃyutta) entirely.
Question 7 of 10
How many aggregates does this examination apply to?
Correct: A. Form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness.
Question 8 of 10
What examination dismantles theory of self in this discourse?
Correct: A. The identical examination used throughout this vagga's opening set.
Question 9 of 10
Where is this discourse set?
Correct: A. Matching SN 22.150-155's own setting.
Question 10 of 10
What is micchādiṭṭhi's relationship to both sakkāyadiṭṭhi and attānudiṭṭhi?
Correct: A. As established at SN 22.154, the broadest of the three terms in this arc.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0