Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 22.155

Substantialist View

Sakkāyadiṭṭhisutta — Diṭṭhivagga

Setting
Sāvatthī
Speakers
The Buddha, questioning the mendicants directly
Form
The identical structure as SN 22.150-154, now examining sakkāyadiṭṭhi specifically
Length
Short — compressed, following the established pattern
Northern parallel
Sakkāyadiṭṭhi is one of the ten fetters and is treated at length across the Canon; SN 22.44 earlier in this book gave it extended technical treatment
Difficulty
Moderate — best appreciated with familiarity with sakkāya's own earlier treatment in this book

Why this discourse

Applies this vagga's opening set's method to sakkāyadiṭṭhi specifically — "substantialist view," this book's own most central and recurring technical term, already given extended treatment at SN 22.44 and echoed throughout the four-truths material at SN 22.103-105.

Reading guide

A term this book has built toward throughout

"When what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does substantialist view arise?" — sakkāyadiṭṭhi is not a new term introduced here, but one of this book's own recurring technical anchors, first given extended treatment at SN 22.44 and structurally central to the four-truths material of SN 22.103-105 much earlier in Khandhavagga.

Traced to the same two conditions once more

"When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, substantialist view arises" — the identical mechanism as every other view examined in this vagga's opening set, now applied to name specifically the technical term this book itself has relied on most heavily.

A quiet culmination of this book's own vocabulary

Reading this discourse against SN 22.44's earlier, fuller treatment of sakkāya reveals this discourse's role: not introducing new content about substantialist view, but confirming that the same simple grasping-and-insisting mechanism this vagga has traced for every other view applies equally to the book's own central term — nothing about sakkāyadiṭṭhi's importance exempts it from the same analysis given to lesser-known formulas.

One more generalization remaining

SN 22.156 will apply the identical structure to attānudiṭṭhi ("theory of self"), a third general label for substantially the same phenomenon, before this vagga's opening set moves to its final two discourses on fetters and shackles.

Key terms

sakkāyadiṭṭhi — substantialist view — this discourse's own subject, this book's own most central recurring technical term
sakkāya — substantial reality — the underlying term, given extended treatment at SN 22.44 and structural centrality at SN 22.103-105
upādāya abhinivissa — because of grasping and insisting on — the shared conditions this discourse traces once more
micchādiṭṭhi — wrong view — SN 22.154's own more general term, of which sakkāyadiṭṭhi is one specific technical instance
attānudiṭṭhi — theory of self — the term SN 22.156 will examine next

The text

The complete discourse: the question about substantialist view, traced to its conditions and dismantled by the standard examination. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1At Sāvatthī. “Mendicants, when what exists, because of grasping what and insisting on what, does substantialist view arise?” “Our teachings are rooted in the Buddha. …”

§2“When form exists, because of grasping form and insisting on form, substantialist view arises. When feeling … perception … choices … consciousness exists, because of grasping consciousness and insisting on consciousness, substantialist view arises.

§3What do you think, mendicants? Is form permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would substantialist view arise?” “No, sir.”

§4“Is feeling … perception … choices … consciousness permanent or impermanent?” “Impermanent, sir.” … “But by not grasping what’s impermanent, suffering, and perishable, would substantialist view arise?” “No, sir.” “Seeing this … They understand: ‘… there is nothing further for this place.’”

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Self-check quiz

Ten questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 10
What term does this discourse examine?
Correct: A. This book's own most central and recurring technical term.
Question 2 of 10
Where else in this book has sakkāya already received extended treatment?
Correct: A. One of this book's own most heavily relied-upon technical anchors.
Question 3 of 10
What conditions does this discourse trace for substantialist view?
Correct: A. The same mechanism applied to every view examined so far.
Question 4 of 10
What does this discourse's role turn out to be, reading it against SN 22.44's earlier treatment?
Correct: A. Nothing about the term's importance exempts it from the same analysis given to lesser-known formulas.
Question 5 of 10
What discourse will examine the term "attānudiṭṭhi" next?
Correct: A. A third general label for substantially the same phenomenon.
Question 6 of 10
How does sakkāyadiṭṭhi relate to SN 22.154's own "wrong view"?
Correct: A. A specific technical term nested within the broader general category.
Question 7 of 10
How many aggregates does this examination apply to?
Correct: A. Form, feeling, perception, choices, and consciousness.
Question 8 of 10
What examination dismantles substantialist view in this discourse?
Correct: A. The identical examination used throughout this vagga's opening set.
Question 9 of 10
Where is this discourse set?
Correct: A. Matching SN 22.150-154's own setting.
Question 10 of 10
What comes after this discourse within Diṭṭhivagga's opening set?
Correct: A. One more generalizing discourse before this set turns to fetters and shackles.
Answered 0 of 10 · Correct 0