Ru-Yi Meditation Center
Saṃyutta Nikāya · Discourse 35.79

Giving Up Ignorance (1st)

Paṭhamaavijjāpahānasutta — Gilānavagga

Setting
Not restated in this discourse
Speakers
An unnamed mendicant questioning; the Buddha answering
Form
A direct question-and-answer: is there one thing whose giving up gives up ignorance itself? — answered, then explained through the six-field catechism of impermanence
Length
~1 minute to read
Northern parallel
A rough counterpart may exist in the Chinese Saṃyukta-āgama (T99), though this reading guide does not assert a specific matching sutra number
Difficulty
★★☆☆☆ — the question’s own circular framing rewards a careful first read

Why this discourse

This discourse opens a pair on giving up ignorance, shifting Gilānavagga away from named individuals (the sick mendicants, Rādha) back to an unnamed questioner. The question itself has a deliberately circular shape: is there one thing whose giving up gives up ignorance and gives rise to knowledge? The Buddha’s answer is, at first glance, unhelpful — ignorance itself is that one thing — but the explanation that follows makes the point concrete: a mendicant gives up ignorance and gives rise to knowledge precisely by knowing and seeing each of the six sense fields, and what arises dependent on each, as impermanent. Ignorance is not removed by adding some new possession or attainment; it dissolves under direct, correct seeing of what is already present. SN 35.80 will ask the identical opening question again and answer it through a different device entirely.

Reading guide

A circular question, answered directly

Is there one thing whose giving up gives up ignorance itself? The Buddha answers without hesitation: ignorance is that one thing — not a paradox, but a way of insisting that no other possession or attainment stands between a mendicant and knowledge.

How ignorance actually dissolves

The explanation that follows makes the answer concrete: knowing and seeing each of the six sense fields, and what arises dependent on each, as impermanent — the same catechism content this book has run many times before, now offered as the mechanism by which ignorance itself is given up.

The first of a pair

This discourse opens a pair with SN 35.80, which asks the identical opening question again but answers it through a different device — not knowing impermanence directly, but hearing a specific teaching and seeing all things as “other.”

Key terms

avijjā — ignorance — what this discourse’s own question asks how to give up
vijjā — knowledge, true knowing — what arises when ignorance is given up
pajānāti — understands, knows — part of the explanatory formula (“knows and sees”) this discourse uses
passati — sees — paired with knowing in the formula that explains how ignorance is actually given up
anicca — impermanent — what a mendicant must know and see each of the six sense fields to be, for ignorance to be given up

The text

The complete discourse: a mendicant’s circular question, the Buddha’s direct answer, and the explanation through the six-field catechism of impermanence. Translation: Bhikkhu Sujato (CC0, SuttaCentral).

§1Then a mendicant went up to the Buddha … and said to him: “Sir, is there one thing such that by giving it up a mendicant gives up ignorance and gives rise to knowledge?”

§2“There is, mendicant.” “But what is that one thing?” “Ignorance is one thing such that by giving it up a mendicant gives up ignorance and gives rise to knowledge.” “But how does a mendicant know and see so as to give up ignorance and give rise to knowledge?”

§3“When a mendicant knows and sees the eye, sights, eye consciousness, and eye contact as impermanent, ignorance is given up and knowledge arises. And also knowing and seeing the pleasant, painful, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on eye contact as impermanent, ignorance is given up and knowledge arises. … Knowing and seeing the mind, ideas, mind consciousness, and mind contact as impermanent, ignorance is given up and knowledge arises. And also knowing and seeing the pleasant, painful, or neutral feeling that arises dependent on mind contact as impermanent, ignorance is given up and knowledge arises. That’s how a mendicant knows and sees so as to give up ignorance and give rise to knowledge.”

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Self-check quiz

5 questions. Click an answer to see immediate feedback. No score is recorded — this is for your own checking.

Question 1 of 5
What question does the mendicant ask at this discourse’s opening?
Correct: A. A deliberately circular question, answered directly by the Buddha.
Question 2 of 5
What does the Buddha identify as that one thing?
Correct: A. Not a paradox, but an insistence that nothing else stands between a mendicant and knowledge.
Question 3 of 5
How, concretely, does a mendicant give up ignorance according to this discourse?
Correct: A. Direct knowing and seeing of impermanence across the six sense fields.
Question 4 of 5
How does SN 35.80, immediately following, relate to this discourse?
Correct: A. A pair: the same question, two different explanatory devices.
Question 5 of 5
What shift in cast marks the transition from SN 35.76-78 to this discourse?
Correct: A. Gilānavagga shifts away from Rādha’s own brief cameo back to an anonymous questioner.
Answered 0 of 5 · Correct 0

Further reading

← PreviousSN 35.78 · With Rādha on Not-Self