True and Provisional Interpenetrate, and the Six Meanings of a Cause
The Three Natures, Revealed and Summarized — the Six Meanings of a Cause, Named顯示其義・總說／因門六義
The resolving discussion closes on a positive note: suchness, the dependent nature, and the discriminated nature each genuinely are existent, nonexistent, both, and neither — the very four positions that produced only faults when grasped one-sidedly now stand true of each nature all at once, without contradiction, once the two-aspects doctrine is fully in view. A closing summary, anchored in a scriptural exchange about why a Tathāgata sees neither birth-and-death nor nirvana, brings the whole three-natures topic to rest. Then, with no more ceremony than a bullet mark in the source text, an entirely new topic opens: the six meanings that make something a cause at all.
1. Revealing the True Meaning: Each Nature, All Four Positions
The third part of the resolving discussion states, without any hedge of denial this time, that each nature truly does hold every one of the four positions — because, once the two-aspects doctrine from Part 24 is in view, none of the faults from Part 25 actually follow.
第三顯示其義者。真如是有義。以迷悟所依故。又不空義故。不可壞故。餘如上說。又真如是空義。以離相故。隨緣故。對染故。餘亦如上。又真如是亦有亦無義。以具德故。違順自在故。鎔融故。又是非有非無義。以二不二故。定取不得故。餘翻說準上知之。
Third, revealing the true meaning. Suchness has the meaning of existence, since it is what delusion and awakening both depend upon, since it is the meaning of non-emptiness, and since it cannot be destroyed — the rest as explained above. Suchness also has the meaning of emptiness, since it is apart from all characteristics, since it follows conditions, and since it stands opposed to defilement — the rest likewise as above. Suchness also has the meaning of being both existent and nonexistent, since it is replete with every virtue, since it is sovereign over both opposition and accord, and since existence and nonexistence are fused into one. And it has the meaning of being neither existent nor nonexistent, since the two are not two, and since it cannot be fixed and grasped at all. The rest, stated in reverse, may be understood by the same pattern as above.
二依他是有義。緣成故無性故。餘準前知。依他是無義。以緣成無性故。亦準前知。依他是亦有亦無義。以緣成無性故準前。依他是非有非無義。以二不二故隨取一不得故準前。三遍計是有。約情故。遍計是無。約理故。遍計是亦有亦無。由是所執故。遍計是非有非無。由是所執故。餘準前思之。上來別明三性竟。
Second, the dependent nature has the meaning of existence, since it is formed by conditions and is without a nature of its own — the rest to be understood as before. The dependent nature has the meaning of nonexistence, since it is formed by conditions and is without a nature of its own — likewise as before. The dependent nature has the meaning of being both existent and nonexistent, since it is formed by conditions and is without a nature of its own — as before. The dependent nature has the meaning of being neither existent nor nonexistent, since the two are not two and neither can be fixed and grasped alone — as before. Third, the discriminated nature is existent, with respect to deluded feeling; it is nonexistent, with respect to principle; it is both existent and nonexistent, since it is precisely what is attached to; and it is neither existent nor nonexistent, since it is precisely what is attached to. The rest is to be considered as before. This concludes the direct exposition of each of the three natures above.
The contrast with Part 25 is total, and deliberate. There, every one of these same four positions, held fixedly and in isolation, produced eternalism or nihilism or both. Here, the identical four positions are simply true, all at once, of each nature. Nothing about the positions has changed; what has changed is that they are now being read as four faces of the single, two-aspected reality established back in Part 24, rather than as four competing, mutually exclusive claims about a nature conceived as one flat, undifferentiated thing. This is the whole point of running the faults first: only after seeing exactly how each position collapses when isolated can a reader appreciate what it means for a position to hold without collapsing.
2. The Summary: Raise One, Take Up All Three
Fazang now steps back to give the "stated as a whole" summary promised at the very start of Part 24, anchored in a scriptural exchange preserved within the Mahāyānasaṃgraha tradition: a Brahmin asks the Buddha why the Tathāgata is said to see neither birth-and-death nor nirvana, and receives an answer built entirely out of the dependent nature's two portions.
第二總說者。三性一際舉一全收。真妄互融。性無障礙。如攝論婆羅門問經中言。世尊。依何義說如是言。如來不見生死不見涅槃。於依他中分別性及真實性生死涅槃。依無差別義。何以故。此依他性。由分別一分成生死。由真實一分成涅槃。
Second, the summary statement. The three natures are one and the same: raise any one of them and it takes up the whole; the true and the false interfuse with each other, and their natures are without obstruction. As the Sūtra of the Brahmin's Questions, cited within the Mahāyānasaṃgraha tradition, says: "World-Honored One, on what basis do you say that the Tathāgata neither sees birth-and-death nor sees nirvana?" — this is spoken on the basis that, within the dependent nature, the discriminated nature and the true, real nature, as birth-and-death and nirvana respectively, are without difference. Why? Because this dependent nature, by its portion belonging to the discriminated nature, forms birth-and-death, and by its portion belonging to the true, real nature, forms nirvana.
釋曰。依他性非生死。由此性因真實成涅槃故。此性非涅槃。何以故。此性由分別一分即是生死。是故不可定說一分。若見一分餘分性不異。是故不見生死。亦不見涅槃。由此意故。如來答婆羅門如此。
The exposition says: The dependent nature is not birth-and-death, since this nature, by virtue of the true, real, becomes nirvana; and this nature is not nirvana either, since this same nature, by virtue of the discriminated portion, is precisely birth-and-death. Hence one cannot fix on and speak of only one portion. If, seeing one portion, one recognizes that its nature is not different from the remaining portion — for this reason the Tathāgata neither sees birth-and-death nor sees nirvana. It is for this reason that the Tathāgata answered the Brahmin in just this way.
This is Part 24's core claim — the true fully pervading the false to its very root — turned into an actual answer to an actual question. Why does the Tathāgata see neither birth-and-death nor nirvana? Not because he sees some third, blank thing instead, and not because he refuses to look. It is because "birth-and-death" and "nirvana" name two portions of a single dependent nature, and to see one portion truly is already to see that its nature is not different from the other. Fixing on either name in isolation is the very failure to see that the Tathāgata's non-seeing corrects.
3. Three Portions of One Teaching
A second scriptural citation extends the same point to a threefold division found in the Abhidharma Sūtra — a scripture Vasubandhu's Yogācāra draws on directly.
又云。阿毘達磨修多羅中。世尊說法有三種。一染污分。二清淨分。三染污清淨分。依何義說此三分。於依他性中。分別性為染污分。真實性為清淨分。依他性為染污清淨分。依此義說三分。釋曰。阿毘達磨修多羅中說。分別性以煩惱為性。真實性以清淨分為性。依他性由具兩分。以二性為性。故說法有三種。一煩惱為分。二清淨為分。三二法為分。依此義故作此說也。
It is further said: In the Abhidharma Sūtra, the World-Honored One taught that dharmas are of three kinds — the defiled portion, the pure portion, and the portion that is both defiled and pure. On what basis are these three portions spoken of? Within the dependent nature, the discriminated nature is the defiled portion, the true, real nature is the pure portion, and the dependent nature itself is the portion both defiled and pure. It is on this basis that the three portions are spoken of. The exposition says: The Abhidharma Sūtra states that the discriminated nature takes affliction as its nature, the true, real nature takes the pure portion as its nature, and the dependent nature, possessing both portions, takes both natures as its nature. Hence dharmas are said to be of three kinds: one portion of affliction, one portion of purity, and one portion of both together. It is on this basis that this is said.
此上論文。又明真該妄末無不稱。真妄徹真源體無不寂。真妄交徹二分雙融無礙全攝。思之可見。
This passage from the treatise, moreover, shows that the true fully pervades the false to its very root, matching it in every particular; that the false thoroughly penetrates back to the true source, its essence never other than still; and that the true and the false interpenetrate, the two portions fused together without obstruction, each taking up the whole of the other. Consider this and it will become clear.
This closes the treatise's whole discussion of the three natures — direct exposition, resolving discussion, and now summary — with the same phrase it opened on in Part 24: 真該妄末，妄徹真源. That repetition is the point. Everything between the two occurrences — the mirror simile, the tetralemma against all three natures, the catalogue of eternalist and nihilist faults, the Bhāviveka–Dharmapāla resolution, and now these two scriptural citations — has been one long demonstration of what that single sentence actually costs to establish, and what it is worth once established. It licenses, among much else, everything the next several parts of this collection will do with the metaphor of a single pore of skin containing whole world-oceans.
4. A New Topic Opens: Six Meanings of a Cause
The source text marks the shift with nothing more than a small circular mark — no fanfare, no transition sentence. The three-natures discussion is finished; a wholly new topic, the second of the four sub-gates announced at the very start of Part 24, now begins.
◎第二緣起因門六義法。將釋此義六門分別。一釋相。二建立。三句數。四開合。五融攝。六約教。第一門中有二。初列名。次釋相。初列名者。謂一切因皆有六義。一空有力不待緣。二空有力待緣。三空無力待緣。四有有力不待緣。五有有力待緣。六有無力待緣。
◎ Second, the six meanings of a cause in dependent origination. In explaining this topic there are six sub-gates of analysis: first, explaining the marks of the six; second, establishing why there are exactly six; third, the fourfold analysis of positions; fourth, opening and combining their permutations; fifth, their interfusion with the six characteristics; sixth, considering them across the teachings. The first sub-gate has two parts: first, listing the names; second, explaining the marks. First, listing the names: every cause has six meanings — first, empty, potent, and condition-independent; second, empty, potent, and condition-dependent; third, empty, impotent, and condition-dependent; fourth, existent, potent, and condition-independent; fifth, existent, potent, and condition-dependent; sixth, existent, impotent, and condition-dependent.
Fazang builds his six meanings out of three paired axes — empty 空 or existent 有, potent 有力 or impotent 無力, condition-dependent 待緣 or condition-independent 不待緣 — which would give eight combinations if fully crossed, but only six actually occur as meanings of a cause (why the seventh and eighth are excluded is explained in the next part of this collection). What might look, at first glance, like an abstract combinatorial exercise turns out, in the next section, to be Fazang's own analysis of six technical terms already well known from Yogācāra's doctrine of seeds — the very six characteristics this site's Cheng Weishi Lun and Mahāyānasaṃgraha pages translate directly from the Mahāyānasaṃgraha's own verse.
5. Explaining the Six Meanings
Fazang now works through the six combinations one at a time, showing which classical technical term each one names — and the terms turn out to be exactly the six marks of a seed familiar from Yogācāra literature: momentary cessation, co-existence with its result, depending on a gathering of conditions, fixed nature, drawing forth its own result, and continuing without interruption.
二釋相者。初者是剎那滅義。何以故。由剎那滅故。即顯無自性。是空也。由此滅故果法得生。是有力也。然此謝滅非由緣力故。云不待緣也。二者是俱有義。何以故。由俱有故方有。即顯是不有是空義也。俱故能成有是有力也。俱故非孤是待緣也。
Second, explaining the marks. The first meaning is the meaning of momentary cessation. Why? Because, through momentary cessation, the absence of any nature of its own is made manifest — this is the "empty." And because of this very cessation, the resultant dharma is able to arise — this is the "potent." Yet this passing-away is not brought about by the power of conditions — hence it is called "condition-independent." The second is the meaning of co-existence with its result. Why? Because it is only through co-existing with its result that it comes to exist at all — this shows that it is, of itself, non-existent, which is the "empty." And because it co-exists, it is able to bring about existence — this is the "potent." And because it co-exists, it is not solitary — this is "condition-dependent."
三者是待眾緣義。何以故。由無自性故是空也。因不生緣生故是無力也。即由此義故是待緣也。四者決定義。何以故。由自類不改故是有義。能自不改而生果故。是有力義。然此不改非由緣力故。是不待緣義也。
The third is the meaning of depending on a gathering of conditions. Why? Because it has no nature of its own — this is the "empty." Because the cause itself does not produce the effect, but the conditions do — this is the "impotent." And it is precisely for this reason that it is "condition-dependent." The fourth is the meaning of fixed nature. Why? Because it does not change from its own kind — this is the "existent." Because, without changing from itself, it is able to give rise to its result — this is the "potent." And because this unchanging quality does not come from the power of conditions — this is "condition-independent."
五者引自果義。何以故。由引現自果。是有力義。雖待緣方生。然不生緣果。是有力義。即由此故是待緣義也。六者是恒隨轉義。何以故。由隨他故不可無。不能違緣故無力用。即由此故是待緣也。是故攝論為顯此六義而說偈言。剎那滅．俱有．恒隨轉。應知決定待眾緣唯能引自果。
The fifth is the meaning of drawing forth its own result. Why? Because it draws forth and manifests its own particular result — this is the "potent." And although it depends on conditions in order to arise, it does not give rise to the conditions' own result — this too is the "potent." And it is precisely for this reason that it is "condition-dependent." The sixth is the meaning of continuing without interruption. Why? Because, following along with other conditions, it cannot be absent — yet because it is unable to oppose the conditions, it has no functional potency of its own. And it is precisely for this reason that it is "condition-dependent." Hence, to make these six meanings manifest, the Mahāyānasaṃgraha speaks a verse: "Momentary cessation, co-existence with their result, continuing without interruption — these should be known, along with being fixed, depending on a gathering of conditions, and being able to draw forth only their own result."
Compare this list against this site's own Mahāyānasaṃgraha, Part 2, which translates the very verse Fazang quotes here in full, and against the parallel list of a seed's six marks in Cheng Weishi Lun, Fascicle 2. The six terms are identical — momentary cessation, co-existence with its result, continuing without interruption, fixed nature, depending on a gathering of conditions, and drawing forth its own result — but Fazang is not simply repeating Yogācāra doctrine about seeds specifically. He generalizes the same six marks to any cause whatsoever, and reorganizes them along his own three axes of empty/existent, potent/impotent, and condition-dependent/independent, setting up the analysis of exactly why there are six and not seven or five, which the next part of this collection takes up directly.
Part Twenty-Six Complete
This closes Part 26: the positive statement that suchness, the dependent nature, and the discriminated nature each truly hold all four positions without fault; the closing summary of the whole three-natures topic, anchored in the Brahmin's question about why a Tathāgata sees neither birth-and-death nor nirvana, and in the Abhidharma Sūtra's threefold division of dharmas; and the opening of an entirely new topic, the six meanings of a cause, with all six meanings listed and explained as the classical six marks of a seed reorganized along three new axes.
Part 27 completes this topic: why there are exactly six meanings and not seven or five, their permutations into two-, three-, four-, six-, nine-, twelve-, eighteen-, and thirty-six-fold groupings, how they interfuse with the Six Characteristics unpacked fully from Part 33 onward, and how they apply differently across the Five Teachings.