The Simile of Ten Coins I — Mutual Inclusion
The Different-Substance Gate, and Why One Coin Contains Ten十玄緣起無礙法門義・異體門
Parts 24 through 27 built the causal machinery this section now puts to use: the three natures that are not finally two, and the six meanings by which a cause is a cause at all. Here Fazang turns to what those chapters were preparing all along — the Ten Mysterious Gates of unobstructed dependent origination, Huayan's single most celebrated teaching, and the formal statement of how "one is exactly all, and all is exactly one." He begins, disarmingly, with arithmetic: a way of counting ten coins that will show a careful reader why "one" and "ten" were never as separate as they looked.
Two Realms: What Cannot Be Said, and What Can
Fazang opens by drawing a firm line between two kinds of "fruit" — the buddha's own realm of complete realization, which cannot be described at all, and the causal path leading toward it, which can. Everything that follows in this section, however dazzling, is offered as the second kind of speech, not the first.
此等義門故。得毛孔容剎海事也。思之可解。三十玄緣起無礙法門義。夫法界緣起。乃自在無窮。今以要門略攝為二。一者明究竟果證義。即十佛自境界也。二者隨緣約因辯教義。即普賢境界也。
Because of gates of meaning such as these, a single pore of skin can hold within it an ocean of buddha-lands. Think it through, and this can be understood.
Third [of the topics under this gate on the principle itself]: the teaching of the Ten Mysterious Gates of unobstructed dependent origination. Now, the dependent origination of the dharma-realm is autonomous and without end. Here, by way of essential approach, we gather it up briefly under two headings. The first clarifies the meaning of the ultimate realization of the fruit — this is the very realm of the ten buddhas themselves. The second discusses the teaching in terms of cause, according with conditions — this is Samantabhadra's own realm.
初義者。圓融自在一即一切。一切即一。不可說其狀相耳。如華嚴經中究竟果分國土海及十佛自體融義等者。即其事也。不論因陀羅及微細等。此當不可說義。何以故。不與教相應故。地論云。因分可說果分不可說者。即其事也。
As for the first meaning: perfectly fused and autonomous, one is exactly all, and all is exactly one — its features and marks cannot be spoken of at all. This is exactly the matter the Avataṃsaka Sūtra addresses when it speaks, in the fruit-portion, of the ocean of lands of ultimate realization and of the fusion of the ten buddhas' own substance. It does not discuss Indra's Net, or the subtle, or the like — these belong to what cannot be spoken of. Why? Because they do not correspond to what teaching can match. The Daśabhūmika Treatise says: "the cause-portion can be spoken of; the fruit-portion cannot be spoken of" — this is exactly that matter.
問義若如是。何故。經中乃說佛不思議品等果耶。答此果義。是約緣形對為成因故說此果。非彼究竟自在果。所以然者。為與因位同會而說故。知形對耳。
Question: If the meaning is so, then why does the sūtra speak of fruits such as those in its chapter on the Buddha's inconceivable qualities? Answer: This sense of "fruit" is spoken of by setting form against conditions, for the sake of establishing the cause — it is not that ultimate, autonomous fruit. The reason is that it is spoken of together with, and matched to, the stage of cause; know that it is spoken of only as a form set in contrast.
This opening move is easy to miss and worth pausing on. Fazang is telling the reader, before a single coin is counted, that the Ten Mysterious Gates about to unfold are still a teaching — a raft, addressed to causal understanding, not the wordless thing itself. The Avataṃsaka's own descriptions of the "fruit" — Vairocana's ocean of lands, the fusion of the ten buddhas — belong, on this accounting, to what strictly cannot be said. When the sūtra nonetheless describes such things at length, Fazang's answer is that it is doing so in the register of cause, addressed to bodhisattvas still on the path, not reporting the buddha's own experience directly. Keep this distinction in mind through the rest of this section: everything vivid and countable that follows — coins, mirrors, nets — is Samantabhadra's realm, the causal approach, not the "inexpressible" itself.
Setting Up the Simile: Different Substance and Same Substance
Fazang now explains why he reaches for coins at all, and lays down the master distinction — different substance versus same substance — that will organize the entire discussion of the Ten Mysterious Gates through Part 29.
第二義者有二。一以喻略示。二約法廣辯。初喻示者。如數十錢法。所以說十者。欲應圓數顯無盡故。此中有二。一異體。二同體。所以有此二門者。以諸緣起門內有二義故。一不相由義。謂自具德故。如因中不待緣等是也。二相由義。如待緣等是也。初即同體。後即異體。
The second meaning has two parts: first, briefly showing it through a simile; second, discussing it broadly in terms of principle. As for showing it through simile: it is like the method of counting ten coins. The reason ten is spoken of is that we wish to correspond to a round, complete number, and thereby manifest inexhaustibility.
Within this there are two: first, different substance; second, same substance. The reason there are these two gates is that within every gate of dependent origination there are two senses. The first is the sense of not depending on one another — meaning that each thing is replete with its own quality in itself, as with a cause that does not depend on conditions. The second is the sense of depending on one another — as with depending on conditions. The former is same substance; the latter is different substance.
Ten coins, not some other number: Fazang says outright that ten is chosen only because it is a "round, complete number" that can stand in for any totality — the point is never about the number ten as such, but about how any one member of any complete set relates to the whole. Picture ten actual coins laid in a row and numbered one through ten.
The different-substance/same-substance split maps directly onto the "six meanings of a cause" from Part 27: a cause "not depending on conditions" is complete in itself — that is same substance, one coin's own multiplicity considered on its own; a cause "depending on conditions" needs the others to be what it is — that is different substance, ten distinct coins considered against one another. This part works out different substance in full; Part 29 turns to same substance.
Within Different Substance: Mutual Identity and Mutual Inclusion
Different substance itself divides in two — mutual identity 相即 and mutual inclusion 相入 — mapped onto the emptiness/existence and potency/impotency axes already familiar from the six meanings of a cause.
就異體中有二門。一相即。二相入。所以有此二門者。以諸緣起法皆有二義故。一空有義。此望自體。二力無力義。此望力用。由初義故得相即。由後義故得相入。
Within different substance there are two gates: first, mutual identity; second, mutual inclusion. The reason there are these two gates is that every dharma of dependent origination has two senses: first, the sense of emptiness and existence, viewed with respect to its own substance; second, the sense of potency and impotency, viewed with respect to its function. By the first sense one arrives at mutual identity; by the second sense one arrives at mutual inclusion.
初中由自若有時他必無故。故他即自。何以故。由他無性以自作故。二由自若空時他必自有故自即他。何以故。由自無性用他作故。以二有二空各不俱故。無彼不相即。有無無有無二故。是故常相即。若不爾者緣起不成。有自性等過。思之可見。
As for the first: because when self exists, other necessarily lacks that same existence, other is therefore identical with self. Why? Because other, lacking any nature of its own, is constituted by self. Second, because when self is empty, other necessarily itself exists, self is therefore identical with other. Why? Because self, lacking any nature of its own, is put to use by other. Since the two "existings" and the two "emptyings" can never each occur together, there is no case in which they fail to be mutually identical. Since existing-and-not-existing and not-existing-and-existing are never two separate things, they are therefore always mutually identical. Were it not so, dependent origination could not be established, and the fault of things possessing a nature of their own, and the like, would follow. Think this through and it can be seen.
二明力用中自有全力故。所以能攝他。他全無力故。所以能入自。他有力自無力(反上可知)。不據自體故非相即。力用交徹故成相入。又由二有力二無力各不俱故。無彼不相入。有力無力。無力有力無二故。是故常相入。又以用攝體更無別體故。唯是相入。以體攝用無別用故。唯是相即。此依因六義內準之。
Second, to clarify potency and function: because self has complete potency in itself, it is able to gather other into itself. Because other is wholly without potency, it is able to enter into self. The reverse case — other having potency and self lacking it — may be understood in the same way, reversed. Because this is not based on a difference of self-substance, it is not mutual identity; because potency and function interpenetrate, mutual inclusion is thereby constituted. Again, because the two "having potency" and the two "lacking potency" can never each occur together, there is no case in which things fail to be mutually inclusive. Since having-potency-and-lacking-potency and lacking-potency-and-having-potency are never two separate things, they are therefore always mutually inclusive. Further, since function gathers substance into itself with no separate substance remaining, this is mutual inclusion alone; since substance gathers function into itself with no separate function remaining, this is mutual identity alone. This should all be understood in accordance with the six meanings of a cause.
Two different questions are being asked about any two related things, and Fazang wants them kept separate. Mutual identity 相即 asks: considered in terms of what each thing is (its substance, empty or existent), can one be simply identical with the other? Mutual inclusion 相入 asks a different question: considered in terms of what each thing does (its potency, its causal power), can one contain the other without becoming it? The two often travel together in Huayan writing as a single compound, 相即相入 — this is the origin of that phrase, and this part works out mutual inclusion in full; mutual identity gets its own full treatment a few paragraphs on, within this same different-substance gate.
The logic of mutual inclusion is really just this: if something has "complete potency" — if it is genuinely doing all the causal work — then whatever depends on it is, in that sense, gathered up inside it, the way a cause contains its effect. If something has "no potency" of its own, it must in that same sense have entered into, been absorbed by, whatever does have the potency. Nothing here is mystical; it is closer to saying that a load-bearing wall "contains" the roof it holds up more fully than the roof contains the wall — except Fazang will shortly argue that, run correctly, the relation has to go both ways at once.
The Ten Coins, Counted Two Ways
Now Fazang actually counts. Lay ten coins in a row and number them one through ten. Count upward from the first coin toward the tenth, and then count downward from the tenth back to the first — and each direction turns out to license a different, equally valid, description of what "one" and "ten" mean.
於中先明相入。初向上數十門。一者一是本數。何以故。緣成故。乃至十者一中十。何以故。若無一即十不成故。一即全有力故攝於十也。仍十非一矣。餘九門亦如是。一一皆有十。準例可知。向下數亦十門。一者十即攝一。何以故。緣成故。謂若無十即一不成故。
Within this, mutual inclusion is clarified first. Counting upward, there are ten gates. The first is "one," the base number — why? because it is completed through conditions — up through the tenth: "one is within ten." Why? Because without "one," "ten" could not be constituted; "one," being wholly potent, is therefore able to gather "ten" into itself. Yet "ten" is still not "one." The remaining nine gates are all likewise: each single one contains "ten" within it, and this may be known by the same pattern.
Counting downward there are also ten gates. The first is: "ten" gathers "one" into itself. Why? Because it is completed through conditions — meaning that without "ten," "one" could not be constituted.
即一全無力歸於十也。仍一非十矣。餘例然。如是本末二門中。各具足十門。餘一一錢中準以思之。此約異門相望說耳。問既言一者。何得一中有十耶。答大緣起陀羅尼法。若無一即一切不成故。定知如是。此義云何。所言一者非自性一。緣成故。是故一中有十者。是緣成一。若不爾者。自性無緣起不得名一也。乃至十者皆非自性十。由緣成故。為此十中有一者。是緣成無性十。若不爾者。自性無緣起不名十也。是故一切緣起皆非自性。何以故。隨去一緣即一切不成。是故一中即具多者。方名緣起一耳。
"One," being wholly without potency, therefore returns into "ten"; yet "one" is still not "ten." The rest follow the same pattern. In this way, within both the upward and the downward gate, each is replete with all ten gates; the same reasoning should be applied to each and every one of the coins in turn — this is spoken of in terms of the different gates viewed against one another.
Question: Since you speak of "one," how can "one" contain "ten" within it? Answer: In the great dhāraṇī-teaching of dependent origination, without "one," "the whole" could not be constituted — this can be known with certainty. What does this mean? What is called "one" here is not a self-natured "one"; it is "one" precisely because it is completed through conditions. That is why "one" contains "ten" within it: it is a "one" completed through conditions. Were it not so — a self-natured "one" without dependent origination — it could not be called "one" at all. And likewise up through "ten": none of these are a self-natured "ten," but a "ten" completed through conditions. That within this "ten" there is a "one" means only that it is a "ten," without nature of its own, completed through conditions. Were it not so — a self-natured "ten" without dependent origination — it could not be called "ten" at all. Therefore all dependent origination is entirely without self-nature. Why? Because if any single condition were removed, the whole could not be constituted. This is exactly why, when the one contains the many within it, it deserves the name "the one of dependent origination."
問若去一緣即不成者。此則無性。無自性者。云何得成一多緣起。答秖由無性得成一多緣起。何以故。由此緣起是法界家實德故。普賢境界具德自在無障礙故。華嚴云。菩薩善觀緣起法。於一法中解眾多法。眾多法中解了一法。是故當知。一中十十中一。相容無礙仍不相是。一門中既具足十義故。明知一門中皆有無盡義。餘門亦如是。問一門中攝十盡不。答盡不盡。何以故。一中十故盡。十中一故不盡。四句護過去非顯德等。準之可解耳。別別諸門中準例如是。緣起妙理應如是知。第一門竟。
Question: If removing a single condition means the whole cannot be constituted, then this is exactly "without a nature of its own." If there is no nature of its own, how can the dependent origination of the one and the many be established at all? Answer: It is precisely because of this absence of nature that the dependent origination of the one and the many can be established. Why? Because this dependent origination is the very real virtue proper to the dharma-realm's own household; Samantabhadra's realm is replete with virtue, autonomous, and free of obstruction. The Avataṃsaka says: "A bodhisattva who skillfully contemplates the dharma of dependent origination understands the many dharmas within the one dharma, and understands the one dharma within the many dharmas." From this one should know: the one within the ten and the ten within the one mutually contain one another without obstruction, and yet are never simply identical to one another. Since a single gate is already replete with all ten meanings, it is clear that within any single gate there is, in every case, a meaning of inexhaustibility; the other gates are all likewise.
Question: Does a single gate exhaust the ten, or does it not? Answer: Both exhausted and not exhausted. Why? Because the one is within the ten, it is exhausted; because the ten is within the one, it is not exhausted. The four propositions guard against error without displaying any further virtue beyond this; understood by this pattern, it can be grasped. Each and every other gate follows the same pattern. The wondrous principle of dependent origination should be known in just this way. The first gate is hereby concluded.
This is the heart of the whole simile, so it is worth working through slowly with actual coins in mind. Counting upward — one, two, three... ten — "one" is the base from which the count begins, and by the time you reach "ten" you could not have gotten there without that first coin: remove it, and there is no longer a set of ten at all, only nine. In that sense "one" is doing all the causal work of producing "ten," and so — in Fazang's vocabulary — "one" has "complete potency" and "ten" is gathered up inside it: one contains ten.
But count downward instead — ten, nine, eight... one — and the logic reverses just as validly: "ten" is the complete set you started with, and "one" only shows up as the last remaining member of that set once you strip the rest away. Now it is "ten" that has the potency, and "one" that is gathered inside it: ten contains one. Both directions are equally true of the very same ten coins, because — this is Fazang's real point — neither "one" nor "ten" was ever a fixed, self-sufficient quantity to begin with. A "one" that existed all by itself, needing nothing else, could never combine with anything to make "ten." It is only because "one" is itself a product of conditions — dependent, relational, without any nature of its own — that it can enter into, and be entered by, the other nine.
This is why Fazang keeps repeating that "emptiness of self-nature" is not a problem for dependent origination but its very precondition. If "one" really were an irreducible, self-existing unit, it could never be woven into "all"; because it is empty of any such fixed identity, it can be. This is the same insight the treatise's very first Q&A about causes settled long ago, now cashed out concretely enough to count on your fingers.
Mutual Identity, Counted the Same Two Ways
Having worked out mutual inclusion, Fazang turns to the second gate within different substance — mutual identity — and runs the same upward and downward count, arriving at the treatise's most quoted-sounding line: "one is exactly ten, and ten is exactly one."
初異體門中。第二即義者。此中有二門。一者向上去。二者向下來。初門中有十門。一者一。何以故。緣成故一即十。何以故若無一即無十故。由一有體餘皆空故。是故此一即是十矣。如是向上乃至第十。皆各如前準可知耳。言向下者亦有十門。一者十。何以故。緣成故十即一。何以故。若無十即無一故。由一無體餘皆有故。是故此十即一矣。如是向下乃至第一。皆各如是準前可知耳。以此義故。當知一一錢即是多錢耳。
Within the different-substance gate, the second is the meaning of identity: within this there are two gates, one going upward and one coming downward. The first has ten sub-gates. The first is "one." Why? Because it is completed through conditions, "one" is identical with "ten." Why? Because without "one" there could be no "ten." Since "one" has substance and all the rest are empty of it, this "one" is therefore identical with "ten." Going upward in this way, up through the tenth, each may be known following the same pattern as before.
As for going downward, there are also ten gates. The first is "ten." Why? Because it is completed through conditions, "ten" is identical with "one." Why? Because without "ten" there could be no "one." Since "one" has no substance of its own and all the rest that compose it exist, this "ten" is therefore identical with "one." Going downward in this way, down through the first, each may be known following the same pattern as before. By this meaning, one should know that each and every single coin is identical with the many coins.
問若一不即十者。有何過失。答若一不即十者。有二失。一不成十錢過。何以故。若一不即十者。多一亦不成十。何以故。一一皆非十故。今既得成十。明知一即是十也。二者一不成十過。何以故。若一不即十。十即不得成。由不成十故。一義亦不成。何以故。若無十是誰一。故今既得一。明知一即十。又若不相即。緣起門中空有二義。即不現前便成大過。謂自性等。思之可知。下同體門中準此知之。餘門亦準可知耳。
Question: If "one" were not identical with "ten," what fault would follow? Answer: If "one" were not identical with "ten," two faults would follow. The first is the fault of ten coins never being constituted at all: for if "one" is not identical with "ten," then piling up many "ones" still could not constitute "ten," because not one of them, singly, would be "ten." Since "ten" is in fact now constituted, it is clear that "one" is identical with "ten." The second is the fault of "one" itself not being constituted: for if "one" is not identical with "ten," then "ten" could not be constituted; and because "ten" would not be constituted, the very sense of "one" would also fail to be constituted — for if there were no "ten," whose "one" would it be? Since "one" is in fact now obtained, it is clear that "one" is identical with "ten." Furthermore, were things not mutually identical, the two senses of emptiness and existence within the gate of dependent origination would fail to be present at all, and a great fault — that of things possessing a nature of their own, and the like — would follow. Think this through and it can be known; the same understanding applies to the same-substance gate below, and to the other gates as well.
問若一即十者。應當非是一。若十即一者。應當非是十。答秖為一即十故。是故名為一。何以故。所言一者非是所謂一。緣成無性一。為此一即多者是名一。若不爾者不名一。何以故。由無自性故。無緣不成一也。十即一者準前例耳。勿妄執矣。應如是準知。
Question: If "one" is identical with "ten," should it not then fail to be "one"? And if "ten" is identical with "one," should it not then fail to be "ten"? Answer: It is precisely because "one" is identical with "ten" that it is called "one" at all. Why? Because what is called "one" here is not what is ordinarily meant by "one" — it is a "one" completed through conditions, without a nature of its own. It is called "one" precisely because this "one" is identical with the many; were it not so, it could not be called "one" at all. Why? Because, lacking a nature of its own, without conditions it could not constitute a "one." The same holds, by the same pattern, for "ten" being identical with "one." Do not cling mistakenly to the ordinary sense of these numbers — understand it in just this way.
The apparent paradox in the last exchange — "if one equals ten, how can it still be one?" — is exactly the objection a careful reader should raise, and Fazang's answer is the whole doctrine in miniature. An ordinary "one" — a fixed, self-standing unit with its own nature — could never be identical with "ten," because a genuine unit resists being anything but itself. But that is not the "one" this simile has been describing from the start: it is a "one" that only exists at all because it is "completed through conditions," woven into the other nine from the outset. A "one" like that does not lose its oneness by being identical with the ten; being identical with the ten is what makes it a "one" in the first place, rather than a bare, isolated, self-natured unit that could never have entered into any set to begin with. This is the same emptiness-of-self-nature argument from the previous section, now run in reverse to explain identity rather than inclusion.
Closing the Different-Substance Gate
A final round of questions settles how the whole picture holds together in time — whether the coins' mutual inclusion and identity are all present at once, or unfold in sequence — before Fazang declares the different-substance gate complete.
問上一多義門。為一時俱圓耶。為前後不同耶。答即圓即前後。何以故。由此法性緣起。具足逆順同體不違。德用自在無障礙故。皆得如此。問如上所說。去來義其相云何。答自位不動而恒去來。何以故。去來不動即一物故。但為生智顯理故。說去來等義耳。若廢智一切不可說。如上果分者。即其事也。
Question: As for the gate of the meaning of the one and the many discussed above, are they perfectly complete all at once, or do they differ, occurring in sequence one after another? Answer: They are at once perfectly complete and sequential. Why? Because this dependent origination of the nature of dharmas is replete with counter-flow and with-flow alike, is of a single substance without contradiction, and its virtue and function are autonomous and unobstructed — and so it can be both at once.
Question: As described above, what is the character of "going" and "coming"? Answer: Without stirring from its own position, it is constantly going and coming. Why? Because going-and-coming and not-stirring are one and the same thing; it is only for the sake of generating understanding and manifesting principle that "going" and "coming" and the like are spoken of at all. Were understanding set aside, none of it could be spoken of — this is exactly the matter of the fruit-portion discussed at the start of this part.
問若由智者即非先有。如何說云舊來如此耶。答若廢智即不論緣起。由約智故說舊來如此。何以故。不成即以成即離始終故。智及與法舊來成故。問為由智耶。法如是耶。答為由智也。為法如此也。何以故。同時具足故。餘義準以思之。大段第一異體門訖。
Question: If this depends on understanding, then it did not exist beforehand — how can it be said that things have always, from of old, been thus? Answer: Were understanding set aside, dependent origination itself could not be discussed at all; it is precisely by way of understanding that things are said to have always, from of old, been thus. Why? Because not-being-constituted is, by that very fact, being-constituted, and thereby beginning and end are transcended; understanding and dharma alike have, from of old, always been constituted together.
Question: Is this because of understanding, or because dharmas are simply so? Answer: It is because of understanding, and it is because dharmas are simply so. Why? Because they are simultaneously and fully replete together. The remaining points of meaning should be understood by this same pattern.
The first great section, the different-substance gate, is hereby concluded.
The closing exchange is a caution against a natural misreading: none of this is meant to suggest that mutual inclusion and mutual identity are truths that understanding somehow invents or brings into being for the first time. Fazang's answer — "it is because of understanding, and it is because dharmas are simply so" — refuses to let the reader settle into either a purely subjective reading (it's just how we choose to describe things) or a purely objective one (it would be this way whether anyone understood it or not). Both, held together without contradiction, is itself an instance of the very interpenetration the chapter has been describing all along. The same coordination of "one in ten" and "ten in one" that governs the coins governs, here, the relation between the knowing mind and the dharma it knows.
With the different-substance gate now complete, Part 29 turns to same substance — where the multiplicity Fazang has so far located between the ten coins gets relocated inside a single coin taken on its own — before naming, for the first time, the ten specific Mysterious Gates this whole simile exists to introduce.