The Stump in the Dark

"Good son, disputes of this kind belong to the Buddha's own domain, not something known by any śrāvaka or pratyekabuddha. Should a person give rise to doubt regarding this, he is thereby able to shatter countless afflictions, vast as Mount Sumeru; but should he give rise to a fixed conclusion about it, this is called attachment." Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, what is meant by attachment?" The Buddha said: "Good son, a person of this kind — whether hearing it from another, seeking it out in the scriptures himself, or being deliberately taught it — is unable to let go of the very thing he clings to; this is called attachment." Kāśyapa said, further: "World-Honored One, is attachment of this kind wholesome, or unwholesome?" "Good son, attachment of this kind is not called wholesome. Why is this? Because it is unable to shatter the net of doubt." Kāśyapa said, further: "World-Honored One, a person of this kind is, from the very start, free of doubt himself — how, then, can it be said that he fails to shatter the net of doubt?" "Good son, to be free of doubt in this way is itself simply doubt." "World-Honored One, should a person hold that a stream-enterer never falls into the three evil destinies, is such a person, too, to be called attached, to be called doubting?"

"Good son, this may be called a fixed conclusion, not doubt. Why is this? Good son, it is exactly like a person who, having previously seen both a man and a tree, later, walking at night, sees a stump from a distance and gives rise to doubt: is it a man, or is it a tree? Good son, it is like a person who, having previously seen both a monk and a brahmin ascetic, later sees, from a distance on the road, a monk, and gives rise to doubt: is this a śramaṇa, or is this a brahmin ascetic? Good son, it is like a person who, having previously seen both an ox and a water-buffalo, later sees, from a distance, an ox, and gives rise to doubt: is this an ox, or is this a water-buffalo? Good son, every being, having previously seen two things, later gives rise to doubt — why is this? Because the mind has not fully grasped the distinction. I, too, have never taught that a stream-enterer both falls into the three evil destinies and does not fall into them — for what reason, then, should this person give rise to a doubting mind at all?" Kāśyapa said: "World-Honored One, as the Buddha has taught, doubt necessarily requires having first seen two things. Yet there is a case where a person gives rise to doubt without having seen either of two things at all — what is this case? It is nirvāṇa itself. World-Honored One, it is exactly like a person who, encountering muddy water along the road, though he has never seen it before, still gives rise to doubt: is this water deep, or is it shallow? This person has not seen it — how, then, does doubt arise?" "Good son, nirvāṇa itself is simply the severing of suffering; what is not nirvāṇa is simply suffering itself. Every being sees these two things: suffering, and the absence of suffering. Suffering and its absence are hunger and thirst, cold and heat, anger and joy, sickness and ease, old age and youth, birth and death, bondage and liberation, separation from those one loves, and encounter with those one hates. Having seen these, beings then give rise to doubt: will there ever truly, finally, be a departure from every such affliction? It is for this very reason that beings give rise to doubt regarding nirvāṇa. Should you think that, since this person has never before seen muddy water, how could doubt arise at all — this reasoning does not hold. Why is this? Because this person has already seen it elsewhere, and it is for this very reason that, upon reaching this place he has never before been, doubt arises once more." "World-Honored One, this person, having previously seen both deep and shallow water, no longer gives rise to doubt regarding those — why, then, does doubt arise once more now?" The Buddha said: "Good son, it is precisely because he has not yet actually traveled this particular water himself that doubt arises. It is for this very reason that I say: doubt arises from a lack of full comprehension."

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, as the Buddha has taught, doubt is itself attachment, and attachment is itself doubt — to whom, then, does this actually apply?" "Good son, to one who has severed his own wholesome roots." Kāśyapa said: "World-Honored One, what kind of person is able to sever his own wholesome roots?" "Good son, one who is intelligent, clever, and sharp of faculty, well able to draw fine distinctions, yet who has departed from good spiritual friends, does not listen to the true Dharma, reflects unwisely, and does not abide by the Dharma — a person of exactly this kind is able to sever his own wholesome roots. Departed from these four supports, such a person reflects to himself: 'There is no such thing as a genuine gift. Why is this? Because giving is simply the relinquishing of one's own wealth — and, were giving truly to bear fruit, the donor ought always to end up poor, since a seed's own fruit resembles the seed itself; it is for this very reason that I say there is no cause and no fruit at all.' Should anyone reason in this way, that there is no cause and no fruit, this is exactly what is called severing one's own wholesome roots.

"He further reflects: 'The donor, the recipient, and the wealth given — these three things are all impermanent, never remaining fixed. If nothing remains fixed, how can one even say "this is the donor," "this is the recipient," "this is the wealth"? And, if there is no recipient at all, how could any fruit be obtained? For this very reason, there is no cause and no fruit.' Should anyone reason in this way, that there is no cause and no fruit, one should know that this person is able to sever his own wholesome roots. "He further reflects: 'One who gives, in the act of giving, gives by way of five factors — yet the recipient, having received them, may then act either wholesomely or unwholesomely, and the donor, for his part, receives neither the wholesome nor the unwholesome fruit of this. Just as, in the way of the world, a fruit is produced from a seed, and this fruit, in turn, becomes a seed — the cause here is the donor, the fruit is the recipient, and yet this recipient is unable to make the donor himself receive this wholesome or unwholesome result. For this very reason, there is no cause and no fruit.' Should anyone reason in this way, that there is no cause and no fruit, one should know that this person is able to sever his own wholesome roots. "He further reflects: 'There is no such thing as a genuine gift-object. Why is this? Because the object given is itself morally neutral. If it is morally neutral, how could it possibly yield a wholesome fruit? Whatever yields neither a wholesome nor an unwholesome fruit is simply morally neutral — and, if wealth itself is morally neutral, one should know that it yields no wholesome or unwholesome fruit whatsoever; therefore there is no giving, no cause, and no fruit at all.' Should anyone reason in this way, that there is no cause and no fruit, one should know that this person is able to sever his own wholesome roots. "He further reflects: 'The one who gives is simply his own intention. If it is intention, it cannot be seen, has no physical counterpart, and is not a material dharma at all — and, if it is not material, how could it possibly be given? Therefore there is no giving, no cause, and no fruit at all.' Should anyone reason in this way, that there is no cause and no fruit, one should know that this person is able to sever his own wholesome roots. "He further reflects: 'Should a donor give an offering for the sake of an image of the Buddha, an image of a god, or a deceased father or mother, there is, in truth, no recipient present at all — and, if there is no recipient, there ought to be no fruit at all; and, if there is no fruit, there is no cause; and, if there is no cause, there is no fruit.' Should anyone reason in this way, that there is no cause and no fruit, one should know that this person is able to sever his own wholesome roots."

"He further reflects: 'There is no father, no mother. Were father and mother truly the cause of a being's birth, they ought, by rights, to always be producing beings without ever ceasing — since the cause is always present. And yet they do not always produce a being; therefore one should know that there is, in truth, no such thing as father or mother.' "He further reflects: 'There is no father, no mother. Why is this? Were a being's own body truly caused by its father and mother, any single person ought to possess both the male and the female faculty at once — and yet no one possesses both; therefore one should know that beings are not caused by father and mother at all.' "He further reflects: 'Beings are not produced by father and mother as their cause. Why is this? We see with our own eyes that beings do not resemble their own father and mother — in body, in complexion, in mind, in bearing, in manner of movement — and therefore father and mother are not the cause of beings.' "He further reflects: 'In the world generally there are four kinds of "non-existence": first, "non-existence" before something has arisen, as when a lump of clay has not yet become a usable pot; second, "non-existence" once something has already ceased, as once a pot has already shattered, this too is called non-existence; third, mutual "non-existence" between distinct things, as an ox does not exist within a horse, nor a horse within an ox; and fourth, absolute "non-existence," as with a rabbit's horn or a tortoise's hair. The relation between beings and their father and mother is exactly the same, falling under one of these four kinds of "non-existence." Were father and mother truly the cause of a being, then, when the parents die, the child ought necessarily to die as well — and yet this is not so; therefore father and mother are not the cause of beings.' "He further reflects: 'Were father and mother truly the cause of beings, then beings ought always to be produced by father and mother alone. And yet there are, further, beings born by transformation and beings born from moisture; therefore one should know that beings are not produced by the cause of father and mother at all.' "He further reflects: 'There are, indeed, beings that grow and develop without any father or mother as their cause at all — exactly as the peahen, hearing the sound of thunder, thereby conceives; or exactly as the blue sparrow, drinking the male sparrow's urine, thereby conceives; or exactly as the jīvañjīva bird, seeing the male's own dance, thereby conceives.' Reflecting in this way, should such a person fail to encounter a true spiritual friend, one should know that he is able to sever his own wholesome roots."

"He further reflects: 'In the world generally there is no such thing as a wholesome or unwholesome fruit at all. Why is this? There are beings who fully possess the ten wholesome dharmas, who delight in generous giving, and who diligently cultivate merit — and yet these very people also fall ill with disease, die prematurely in their prime, lose their own wealth, and suffer every kind of sorrow and affliction. And there are those who practice the ten unwholesome deeds, who are stingy, greedy, envious, idle, and lazy, cultivating no wholesome dharma at all — and yet these very people enjoy bodily ease, freedom from illness, a life lived out to its natural end, abundant wealth, and no sorrow at all. Therefore one should know that there is no such thing as a wholesome or unwholesome fruit.' "He further reflects: 'I have, moreover, once heard the sages themselves say that a certain person, having cultivated wholesome deeds, upon death fell straight into the three evil destinies, while another, having done unwholesome deeds, upon death was born among humans and gods; therefore one should know that there is no such thing as a wholesome or unwholesome fruit.' "He further reflects: 'The sages themselves offer two different teachings — some say that killing yields a wholesome fruit, others say that killing yields an unwholesome fruit; therefore one should know that the sages' own teaching is itself not fixed. If even the sages are not fixed in what they teach, how could I possibly be fixed in anything? Therefore one should know that there is no such thing as a wholesome or unwholesome fruit.' "He further reflects: 'In the world generally there is no such thing as a sage at all. Why is this? Were it said that a sage attains the true path, then, for any being who cultivates the true path while still possessing affliction, one should know that both the true path and affliction are present in this person at one and the same time — and, if both are present at once, one should know that the true path is simply unable to destroy affliction at all. And should someone cultivate the path while having no affliction at all, then what, exactly, would such a path even accomplish? Therefore, for one who still possesses affliction, the path cannot destroy it; and for one who no longer possesses affliction, the path is of no use at all. Therefore one should know that, in the world generally, there is no such thing as a sage.'"

"He further reflects: 'Ignorance conditions formations, and so on, all the way through to birth conditioning old age and death — these twelve links are possessed equally by every being alike. The noble eightfold path, too, has a nature that is equally shared, and so, exactly as with the twelve links, when a single person attains it, everyone ought to attain it at once; when a single person cultivates it, the suffering of everyone ought to be extinguished at once — why is this? Because affliction, too, is shared equally by all. And yet this is plainly not what happens; therefore one should know that there is no such thing as a true path at all.' "He further reflects: 'The sages themselves possess every dharma an ordinary being possesses — that is to say, eating and drinking, walking, standing, sitting, and lying down, sleeping, laughing with joy, hunger and thirst, cold and heat, sorrow, and fear. If the sages share exactly these very things with ordinary beings, one should know that the sages have not truly attained the noble path at all; for, had they truly attained the noble path, they ought to have forever severed every one of these very things. And, since these very things are plainly not severed, one should know that there is no such thing as the path at all.' "He further reflects: 'The sages themselves possess a body, receive the pleasures of the five desires, and are, further, subject to being cursed, insulted, and beaten by others; they feel envy and pride toward others, experience suffering and pleasure, and perform both wholesome and unwholesome deeds — and it is on account of exactly this that one knows there is no such thing as a sage at all. Were there truly such a thing as the path, it ought to sever all of these very things; and, since these things are plainly not severed, one should know that there is no such thing as the path.' "He further reflects: 'One who possesses great compassion is called a sage. For what reason is he called a sage? It is on account of the path itself that he is called a sage. Were the path's own nature simply compassion itself, it ought, by rights, to feel compassion for every being at once, without needing to wait for anyone to first cultivate it and only then attain it. And, if the path itself possesses no compassion at all, then for what reason does a sage, upon attaining this very path, thereby become able to feel compassion? Therefore one should know that the world possesses no such thing as a noble path at all.' "He further reflects: 'The four great elements, altogether, do not arise from any cause at all; every being alike possesses this very nature of the four great elements, without regard for whether this particular being ought to reach this particular shore, or that one ought not. Were there truly such a thing as the noble path, its own nature ought to be exactly the same, indifferent in this way. And yet this is plainly not what happens; therefore one should know that the world possesses no such thing as a sage.'"

"He further reflects: 'Should every sage share one single, identical nirvāṇa, one should then know that there is, in truth, no such thing as a sage at all. Why is this? Because a thing of this kind can never actually be obtained — a truly permanent, abiding dharma, by its very nature, can never be obtained, never taken up or set down at all. And should the sages, instead, each attain their own separate nirvāṇa, many in number, this, too, would then be impermanent — why is this? Because whatever can be counted is, by that very fact, a conditioned thing. Were nirvāṇa a single thing, then, the moment a single person attained it, everyone ought to attain it at once. Were nirvāṇa many things, it would then have a boundary — and, having a boundary, how could it possibly be called permanent? Should someone say that nirvāṇa's own essence is one, while liberation itself is many — exactly as a single canopy has many spokes and ribs beneath it — this reasoning does not hold either. Why is this? Because what each individual attains is not what everyone attains at once; and, having a boundary in this way, it ought to be impermanent. And, being impermanent, how could it possibly still be called "nirvāṇa" at all? And, if nirvāṇa itself does not exist, who, then, could possibly be a sage? Therefore one should know that there is no such thing as a sage at all.' "He further reflects: 'The sage's own path is not attained through causes and conditions at all. And, were the sage's own path not attained through causes and conditions, why, then, does everyone fail to become a sage? And, since not everyone becomes a sage, one should know that there is, in truth, no such thing as a sage, nor any such thing as the noble path, at all.' "He further reflects: 'The sages teach that right view arises from two causes and conditions: first, hearing the Dharma from another; and second, one's own inner reflection. Should these two causes and conditions themselves arise from further conditions, then whatever they arise from must, in turn, arise from yet further conditions still — and, proceeding in this way without end, one falls into the fault of infinite regress. And should these two things, instead, not arise from any conditions at all, then why does every single being fail to attain them?' Contemplating in this way, such a person is able to sever his own wholesome roots. "Good son, should any being deeply hold to views of exactly this kind, that there is no cause and no fruit, this person is thereby able to sever the five faculties beginning with faith. Good son, one who severs his own wholesome roots is by no means an inferior, foolish, or dull-witted person — nor does this occur among the gods, nor in the three evil destinies; and the very same holds true of one who causes a schism in the saṅgha."

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, when, exactly, is a person of this kind able to regenerate his own wholesome roots?" The Buddha said: "Good son, this person regenerates his own wholesome roots at two particular moments: the moment of first entering hell, and the moment of emerging from hell. Good son, wholesomeness itself is of three kinds — past, present, and future. As for the past kind, its own nature has already ceased of itself; though the cause has already ceased entirely, its fruit has not yet ripened, and so this is not called the severing of a past fruit. It is the severing of the causes belonging to all three times together that is properly called 'severing.'"

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, if the severing of the causes belonging to all three times is what is called severing one's wholesome roots, then a person who has severed his wholesome roots must still possess buddha-nature. This very buddha-nature — is it past, is it present, is it future, or does it pervade all three times equally? If it is past, how could it possibly be called permanent — since buddha-nature, too, must be permanent, one should therefore know that it cannot be past. If it is future, how could it possibly be called permanent — and why, then, does the Buddha teach that every being is certain, in the end, to attain it? If it is certain to be attained, how could it possibly be said to be 'severed'? If it is present, how, again, could it possibly be permanent — and why, further, does the Buddha say that it is certain to be seen? The Tathāgata has, moreover, taught that buddha-nature possesses six qualities: first, permanence; second, truth; third, reality; fourth, goodness; fifth, purity; and sixth, visibility. If one who has severed his own wholesome roots still possesses buddha-nature, he ought not, then, to be called one who has severed his wholesome roots at all. And if he does not possess buddha-nature, how, then, can it still be said that every being entirely possesses buddha-nature? And should it be said that buddha-nature both exists and is severed at once, how, then, can the Tathāgata still teach that it is permanent?"

The Buddha said: "Good son, the Tathāgata, the World-Honored One, gives, for the sake of beings, four kinds of answer: first, a definite answer; second, an analytical answer; third, an answer following the question; and fourth, a set-aside answer. "Good son, what is meant by a definite answer? Should someone ask whether evil karma yields a wholesome fruit or an unwholesome fruit, one ought to answer definitely that it yields an unwholesome fruit — and the same holds for wholesome karma. Should someone ask whether the Tathāgata is omniscient, one ought to answer definitely that he is omniscient. Should someone ask whether the Buddha's own Dharma is pure, one ought to answer definitely that it is certainly pure. Should someone ask whether the Tathāgata's own disciples abide in accordance with the Dharma, one ought to answer definitely that they do abide in accordance with the Dharma. This is called a definite answer. "What is meant by an analytical answer? It is exactly like my own teaching of the four noble truths. What are these four? Suffering, its arising, its cessation, and the path. What is the truth of suffering? Because there are the eight kinds of suffering, it is called the truth of suffering. What is the truth of its arising? Because the five aggregates are its very cause, it is called the truth of arising. What is the truth of its cessation? Because craving, hatred, and delusion are ultimately exhausted, it is called the truth of cessation. What is the truth of the path? Because of the thirty-seven factors that assist the path, it is called the truth of the path. This is called an analytical answer. "What is meant by an answer following the question? It is exactly like my own teaching that all dharmas are impermanent. Someone then asks, further: 'For the sake of what dharma does the Tathāgata, the World-Honored One, teach impermanence?' I answer: 'The Tathāgata teaches impermanence for the sake of conditioned dharmas — and the very same holds for no-self.' It is exactly like my own teaching that all dharmas are burning. Someone then asks, further: 'For the sake of what dharma does the Tathāgata, the World-Honored One, teach that all things are burning?' I answer: 'The Tathāgata teaches that all things are burning for the sake of craving, hatred, and delusion.'"

"Good son, the Tathāgata's own ten powers, four kinds of fearlessness, great loving-kindness and great compassion, three foundations of mindfulness, and the eighty thousand koṭi gates of samādhi such as the Śūraṅgama; the thirty-two marks, the eighty minor characteristics, and the thirty-five thousand gates of samādhi such as the five wisdom-seals; the vajra concentration and the four thousand two hundred gates of samādhi; and the countless, boundless samādhis of skillful means — dharmas of exactly this kind are the Buddha himself, and are buddha-nature itself. Buddha-nature of this kind possesses seven qualities: first, permanence; second, self; third, bliss; fourth, purity; fifth, truth; sixth, reality; and seventh, goodness. This is called an analytical answer. "Good son, a bodhisattva in his final body possesses a buddha-nature of six qualities: first, permanence; second, purity; third, truth; fourth, reality; fifth, goodness; and sixth, partial visibility. This is called an analytical answer. "As for your own earlier question, whether one who has severed his own wholesome roots still possesses buddha-nature — this person, too, possesses the very buddha-nature of the Tathāgata, and, too, the buddha-nature of a bodhisattva in his final body; yet, since these two forms of buddha-nature are, for now, obstructed with regard to the future, they may be called 'absent'; and, since he is certain to attain them in the end, they may equally be called 'present.' This is called an analytical answer. "The Tathāgata's own buddha-nature is neither past, nor present, nor future; the buddha-nature of a bodhisattva in his final body, however, is partly visible in both the present and the future, and, for this reason, may be called 'present' — and, since it is not yet seen in full, may also be called 'future.' Before the Tathāgata himself had attained supreme, perfect awakening, buddha-nature, considered as a cause, was likewise past, present, and future; considered as a fruit, however, this is not so — it is, in one sense, within the three times, and, in another sense, not within the three times at all. The buddha-nature of a bodhisattva in his final body, considered as a cause, is likewise past, present, and future, and the very same holds true of it considered as a fruit. This is called an analytical answer. "A bodhisattva at the ninth abiding possesses a buddha-nature of six qualities: first, permanence; second, goodness; third, truth; fourth, reality; fifth, purity; and sixth, visibility. Considered as a cause, this too is past, present, and future, and the very same holds true of it considered as a fruit. This is called an analytical answer. "A bodhisattva from the eighth abiding down through the sixth abiding possesses a buddha-nature of five qualities: first, truth; second, reality; third, purity; fourth, goodness; and fifth, visibility. Considered as a cause, this too is past, present, and future, and the very same holds true of it considered as a fruit. This is called an analytical answer. "A bodhisattva from the fifth abiding down through the first abiding possesses a buddha-nature of five qualities: first, truth; second, reality; third, purity; fourth, visibility; and fifth, a mixture of wholesome and unwholesome. Good son, as for these buddha-natures of five, six, and seven qualities — since one who has severed his own wholesome roots is nonetheless certain to attain them in the end, they may indeed be said to be 'present.' This is called an analytical answer. "Should anyone say, flatly, that one who has severed his own wholesome roots either definitely possesses buddha-nature or definitely does not possess it, this is called a set-aside answer." Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said: "World-Honored One, I have always understood that to give no answer at all is what is called a 'set-aside answer.' Why, then, does the Tathāgata now call something he has actually answered a 'set-aside answer'?" "Good son, I, too, am not calling a failure to answer at all a 'set-aside answer.' Good son, a set-aside answer of this kind is, further, of two further kinds: first, one that checks a wrong view; and second, one that warns against attachment. It is for this very reason that it is called a set-aside answer."

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha, further: "World-Honored One, as the Buddha has taught — what is meant by a cause that is past, present, and future, yet a fruit that is likewise past, present, and future, and also neither past, present, nor future at all?" The Buddha said: "Good son, the five aggregates are of two kinds: as cause, and as fruit. The five aggregates as cause are past, present, and future. The five aggregates as fruit are likewise past, present, and future, and are also neither past, present, nor future. Good son, every bond of ignorance and affliction is itself buddha-nature — why is this? Because it is buddha-nature considered as a cause. From ignorance, formations, and the various afflictions, the wholesome five aggregates are obtained, and this very obtaining is called buddha-nature; and, from these wholesome five aggregates, one eventually attains supreme, perfect awakening. It is for this very reason that I earlier taught, in the sūtras, that beings' own buddha-nature is exactly like milk mixed with blood: the blood is simply ignorance, formations, and every affliction, while the milk is simply the wholesome five aggregates themselves. It is for this very reason that I teach that supreme, perfect awakening is attained from the very afflictions together with the wholesome five aggregates — exactly as every being's own body is formed from the union of semen and blood, buddha-nature, too, is exactly the same. For a stream-enterer or a once-returner, who have severed only a little affliction, buddha-nature is like milk. For a non-returner, buddha-nature is like curds. For an arhat, it is like fresh butter. From a pratyekabuddha up through a bodhisattva of the ten abidings, it is like refined butter. For the Tathāgata, buddha-nature is like the finest ghee. Good son, it is present affliction that acts as an obstruction, preventing beings from actually beholding it — exactly as, in the fragrant mountains, there grows a certain forbearance-grass that not every cow is able to graze upon; buddha-nature, too, is exactly the same. This is called an analytical answer." Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, if these buddha-natures of five, six, and seven qualities exist only in the future, how can it be said that one who has severed his own wholesome roots possesses buddha-nature at all?" The Buddha said: "Good son, it is exactly like beings who possess past karma — on account of this very karma, beings receive, in the present, the fruit of this karma. There is likewise future karma, which, not yet having arisen, will certainly never yield a fruit while present affliction remains. Were there truly no affliction at all, every being ought already to behold buddha-nature with perfect clarity — and it is for this very reason that one who has severed his own wholesome roots, through the very cause and condition of present affliction, is able to sever his wholesome roots, while, through the very power of future buddha-nature, he is able to regenerate his wholesome roots once more." Kāśyapa said: "World-Honored One, how, exactly, can something future give rise to wholesome roots?" "Good son, it is exactly like a lamp, or the sun — though not yet arisen, it is nonetheless able to dispel darkness. The arising that is yet to come is likewise able to give rise to a being's own future buddha-nature. This is called an analytical answer."

Bodhisattva Kāśyapa said to the Buddha: "World-Honored One, if it is said that the five aggregates are buddha-nature, how can it also be said that beings' own buddha-nature is neither internal nor external?" The Buddha said: "Good son, for what reason have you lost the thread of my own meaning in this way? Have I not already taught that beings' own buddha-nature is the middle way?" Kāśyapa said: "World-Honored One, I have, in truth, not lost the thread of your meaning at all — it is simply that beings are unable to understand this very middle way, and it is for their sake that I raise this question." "Good son, beings' own failure to understand is itself the middle way — at times there is understanding, and at times there is a failure to understand. Good son, it is for the sake of opening beings' own understanding that I teach that buddha-nature is neither internal nor external. Why is this? Ordinary beings say, some of them, that buddha-nature dwells within the five aggregates, exactly as a fruit dwells within a container; while others say that it exists apart from the aggregates altogether, exactly like space — and it is for this very reason that the Tathāgata teaches the middle way. Beings' own buddha-nature is neither the internal six sense-bases nor the external six sense-bases; it is only through the union of what is internal and what is external that it is called the middle way. It is for this very reason that the Tathāgata proclaims that buddha-nature is itself the middle way, neither internal nor external — and so it is called the middle way. This is called an analytical answer.

"Further, good son, what, again, is meant by 'neither internal nor external'? Good son, some say that buddha-nature is itself the non-Buddhist paths. Why is this? Because the bodhisattva mahāsattva, across countless ages, dwells among the non-Buddhist paths, severing every affliction there, taming his own mind, and teaching and transforming beings, and only afterward attains supreme, perfect awakening — and it is on this account that buddha-nature is said to be itself the non-Buddhist paths. Others say that buddha-nature is itself the inner Buddhist path. Why is this? Because, though the bodhisattva cultivates the non-Buddhist paths across countless ages, were he to depart from the inner Buddhist path, he would be unable to attain supreme, perfect awakening at all — and it is on this account that buddha-nature is said to be itself the inner Buddhist path. It is for this very reason that the Tathāgata blocks both of these two extremes, teaching that buddha-nature is neither internal nor external, and yet may also be called both internal and external — and so it is called the middle way. This is called an analytical answer. "Further, good son, some say that buddha-nature is itself the Tathāgata's own vajra body, the thirty-two marks, and the eighty minor characteristics. Why is this? Because these are never deceptive or false. Others say that buddha-nature is itself the ten powers, the four kinds of fearlessness, great loving-kindness and great compassion, the three foundations of mindfulness, the Śūraṅgama, and every other samādhi. Why is this? Because it is on account of these very samādhis that the vajra body, the thirty-two marks, and the eighty minor characteristics arise. It is for this very reason that the Tathāgata blocks both of these two extremes, teaching that buddha-nature is neither internal nor external, and yet may also be called both internal and external — and so it is called the middle way. This is called an analytical answer. "Further, good son, there are, further, those who say that buddha-nature is itself one's own inner, wholesome reflection. Why is this? Because, apart from wholesome reflection, one is unable to attain supreme, perfect awakening at all — and it is for this reason that buddha-nature is said to be itself inner, wholesome reflection. Others say that buddha-nature is itself the hearing of the Dharma from another. Why is this? Because it is through hearing the Dharma from another that one becomes able to reflect wholesomely within — and, without hearing the Dharma at all, there would be no reflection whatsoever — and it is on this account that buddha-nature is said to be itself the hearing of the Dharma from another. It is for this very reason that the Tathāgata blocks both of these two extremes, teaching that buddha-nature is neither internal nor external, and yet may also be called both internal and external — and so it is called the middle way. "Further, good son, there are, further, those who say that buddha-nature is external, referring to the perfection of giving, since it is from the perfection of giving that supreme, perfect awakening is attained — and it is on this account that they say the perfection of giving is itself buddha-nature. Others say that buddha-nature is internal, referring to the remaining five perfections. Why is this? Because, apart from these five things, one should know that there would be no cause or fruit of buddha-nature at all — and it is on this account that they say these five perfections are themselves buddha-nature. It is for this very reason that the Tathāgata blocks both of these two extremes, teaching that buddha-nature is neither internal nor external, and yet is also both internal and external — and so it is called the middle way. "Further, good son, there are, further, those who say that buddha-nature is internal, exactly like the jewel upon a wrestler's own forehead. Why is this? Because permanence, bliss, self, and purity are exactly like this jewel — and it is on this account that they say buddha-nature is internal. Others say that buddha-nature is external, exactly like a poor woman's own hidden treasure. Why is this? Because it is seen only through skillful means; buddha-nature, too, is exactly the same, existing apart from beings, and coming to be seen only through skillful means. It is for this very reason that the Tathāgata blocks both of these two extremes, teaching that buddha-nature is neither internal nor external, and yet is also both internal and external — and so it is called the middle way."

"Good son, beings' own buddha-nature is neither existent nor non-existent. Why is this? Though buddha-nature exists, it is not like space. Why is this? Space, in the world, can never be seen no matter how much skillful means is applied to it, while buddha-nature can indeed be seen — therefore, though it exists, it is not like space. And though buddha-nature is, in a sense, non-existent, it is not the same as a rabbit's horn. Why is this? A tortoise's hair or a rabbit's horn can never be produced no matter how much skillful means is applied to it, while buddha-nature can indeed be produced — therefore, though it is, in a sense, non-existent, it is not the same as a rabbit's horn. Buddha-nature is, therefore, neither existent nor non-existent, and also both existent and non-existent. In what sense is it called existent? Because every being entirely possesses it, forever unbroken and unceasing, exactly like the flame of a lamp, all the way through to the attainment of supreme, perfect awakening — it is for this reason that it is called existent. In what sense is it called non-existent? Because every being, at present, does not yet possess the full array of buddha-dharmas — permanence, bliss, self, and purity — it is for this reason that it is called non-existent. It is through the union of existence and non-existence that the middle way is reached — and it is for this very reason that the Buddha teaches that beings' own buddha-nature is neither existent nor non-existent. "Good son, should someone ask whether a seed contains a fruit within it or not, one ought to answer definitely: both yes and no. Why is this? Because, apart from the seed, no fruit can be produced at all — and it is for this reason that one says 'yes.' Yet the seed has not yet sent up its own sprout — and it is for this reason that one says 'no.' On account of this very reasoning, the answer is both yes and no. Why is this? Because, although the timing differs, the underlying substance is one and the same. Beings' own buddha-nature is exactly the same: should it be said that there exists, within beings, some separate, distinct buddha-nature, this reasoning would not hold. Why is this? Because beings themselves are simply buddha-nature, and buddha-nature is simply beings themselves — it is only the difference in time that produces the difference between purity and impurity. Good son, should someone ask whether the seed is able to produce the fruit, and whether the fruit is able to produce the seed, one ought to answer definitely: it both produces and does not produce."

"World-Honored One, as people in the world commonly say, milk contains curd within it — what is the meaning of this claim?" "Good son, should anyone say that milk contains curd, this is called attachment. Should anyone say that it contains no curd at all, this is called falsehood. Departed from both of these two positions, one ought to state definitely: it both has and does not have curd within it. Why is it said to have it? Because curd is produced from milk — the cause is simply milk, and the fruit is simply curd — and it is for this reason that it is said to have it. Why is it said not to have it? Because their colors and flavors each differ, and their uses differ as well: one afflicted with a heat-disorder takes milk, one afflicted with a cold-disorder takes curd; milk gives rise to cold-disorders, curd gives rise to heat-disorders. Good son, should it be said that milk truly has the very nature of curd within it, then milk would simply be curd, and curd would simply be milk, their nature being one and the same — yet, if this is so, for what reason does milk appear first, and curd never appears first? If there is some cause for this, why does no one in the world ever state it? And if there is no cause for it at all, why, then, does curd never appear first? And if curd never appears first, who, then, establishes the very sequence of milk, curd, fresh butter, refined butter, and ghee? Therefore one knows that curd, originally non-existent, now comes to exist — and, being originally non-existent and now existent, it is an impermanent dharma. Good son, should anyone say that milk possesses the nature of curd and so is able to produce curd, while water does not possess the nature of curd and so cannot produce curd, this reasoning does not hold. Why is this? Because water and grass, too, possess the very nature of milk and curd — for it is precisely from water and grass that milk and curd are produced. Should it be said that milk definitely possesses the nature of curd while water and grass do not, this is simply a falsehood. Why is this? Because the reasoning is applied unequally, and it is for this reason that it is called a falsehood. Good son, should it be said that milk definitely contains curd within it, then curd, too, ought definitely to contain milk within it — yet, for what reason does curd emerge from milk, while milk never emerges from curd? And, if there is no cause for this at all, one should know that curd, too, is originally non-existent and now comes to exist. It is for this very reason that the wise ought to say that milk neither possesses the nature of curd nor lacks the nature of curd at all. Good son, it is for this very reason that the Tathāgata, in this very sūtra, teaches as follows: to say that every being definitely possesses buddha-nature is called attachment; to say that there is no buddha-nature at all is called falsehood; the wise ought instead to say that beings' own buddha-nature both exists and does not exist."

"Good son, through the coming together of four factors, eye-consciousness is produced. What are these four? The eye, form, light, and the wish to see. This very nature of eye-consciousness is neither the eye, nor form, nor light, nor the wish to see — it is only through their coming together that it comes to be produced. Eye-consciousness of this kind, originally non-existent, now comes to exist, and, having come to exist, returns again to non-existence. Therefore one should know that there is no fixed, essential nature to it at all — and the very nature of curd within milk is exactly the same. Should anyone say that, since water lacks the nature of curd and so does not produce curd, milk must therefore definitely possess the nature of curd, this reasoning does not hold. Why is this? Good son, every dharma has its own distinct cause and its own distinct fruit — it is neither the case that a single cause produces every fruit, nor that every fruit arises from a single cause. Good son, just as eye-consciousness is produced from these four factors, one cannot then say that ear-consciousness, too, ought to be produced from these very same four factors. Good son, apart from the proper skillful means, curd cannot be obtained from milk, nor butter produced from curd — this cannot happen without the necessary skillful means being applied. Good son, the wise could never claim to obtain curd from milk apart from any skillful means at all, only to then claim that fresh butter, too, ought to be obtainable in this same way, apart from any skillful means. Good son, it is for this very reason that I teach, in this very sūtra, that a dharma exists because its cause has arisen, and that a dharma ceases to exist because its cause has ceased. Good son, it is exactly like the nature of salt, which is salty, and is able to make what is not salty become salty. Were something not salty to already possess a salty nature of its own beforehand, why would people in the world still need to seek out salt at all? And, if it did not possess this beforehand, one should know that it was originally without it, and now comes to possess it — obtaining its saltiness through some other, additional condition. Should it be said that everything not salty already possesses a salty nature of its own, merely too subtle to be noticed, and that it is by means of this very subtle nature that salt is able to make it salty — well, if it originally possessed no such nature at all, then, however much salt were added, it could never be made salty. It is exactly like a seed, which already possesses the four great elements of its own, and, relying upon the external four great elements, is thereby able to grow into sprout, stem, branch, and leaf — should the nature of salt be said to work in exactly this same way, this reasoning does not hold either. Why is this? Because, were it true that whatever is not salty already possesses a salty nature beforehand, then salt itself, too, ought to possess a subtle, not-salty nature of its own. And, were salt to possess these two natures at once, for what reason, then, could it never be used by itself, apart from something not salty? Therefore one knows that salt, in truth, possesses neither of these two natures inherently — and, exactly as with salt, so too with everything not salty. Should it be said that the power of the external four great elements is able to increase the internal four great elements, this reasoning, too, does not hold. Why is this? Because a definite sequence is always taught: curd is never obtained from milk, nor butter produced from curd, and so on through every dharma, apart from the necessary skillful means — and the four great elements, too, are exactly the same. Should it be said that the internal four great elements are increased from the external four great elements, one would then expect, in turn, to see the external four great elements increased from the internal — yet this is never observed. It is exactly like the śirīṣa fruit, which originally has no form or substance at all, and yet, the moment the Pleiades appear, this very fruit springs into being, growing to a full five inches in length — a fruit of this kind, in truth, is not increased by reliance upon any external four great elements at all."

"Good son, as for the twelve divisions of the scriptures I have taught, some are taught according to my own intent, some are taught according to another's own understanding, and some are taught according to both together. What is meant by teaching according to my own intent? It is exactly like when five hundred monks asked Śāriputra: 'Venerable one, the Buddha teaches a cause of this very body — what, exactly, is it?' Śāriputra said: 'Venerable ones, each of you has already attained true liberation yourselves — you ought to know this for yourselves; for what reason, then, do you still ask such a question?' One monk said: 'Venerable one, before I had attained true liberation, I held that ignorance itself is the cause of this body — and, contemplating in this way, I attained the fruit of arhatship.' Another said, further: 'Venerable one, before I had attained true liberation, I held that craving and ignorance together are the cause of this body — and, contemplating in this way, I attained the fruit of arhatship.' And another said, further: 'Formations, consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense-bases, contact, feeling, craving, grasping, becoming, birth, and the food and the five desires — these are the cause of this body.' At that time, these five hundred monks, each having stated his own understanding, went together to where the Buddha was, bowed their heads at the Buddha's own feet, circled him three times to the right, and, their reverence complete, withdrew to one side, each presenting his own understanding, exactly as stated above, to the Buddha. Śāriputra said to the Buddha: 'World-Honored One, among all of these people, who has spoken correctly, and who has spoken incorrectly?' The Buddha said to Śāriputra: 'Excellent, excellent! Every single monk has spoken correctly, without exception.' Śāriputra said: 'World-Honored One, what, then, is the Buddha's own intent?' The Buddha said: 'Śāriputra, I teach, for the sake of beings in the desire realm, that father and mother themselves are the cause of this body.' Scriptures of exactly this kind are called teachings according to my own intent.

"What is meant by teaching according to another's own understanding? It is exactly like when the householder Pāṭalika came to where I was, and said: 'Gautama, do you understand illusion? If you understand illusion, you are yourself a great illusionist; and if you do not understand it, you are not omniscient at all.' I said: 'Householder, is one who understands illusion thereby called an illusionist?' The householder said: 'Excellent, excellent! One who understands illusion is indeed himself an illusionist.' The Buddha said: 'Householder, within the kingdom of Śrāvastī, King Prasenajit has an outcaste executioner named Prāṇahara — do you know of him?' The householder answered: 'Gautama, I have long known of him.' The Buddha said: 'Since you have long known of him, does that make you yourself an outcaste executioner?' The householder said: 'Gautama, though I know of this outcaste executioner, this body of mine is certainly not an outcaste executioner.' The Buddha said: 'Householder, you yourself have grasped this very point — that to know of an outcaste executioner is not thereby to be one. Why, then, could I not, in exactly the same way, understand illusion without myself being an illusion? Householder, I truly understand illusion, understand the illusionist, understand illusion's own fruit, and understand illusion's own technique; I understand killing, understand the killer, understand killing's own fruit, and understand killing's own liberation; and, all the way through, I understand wrong view, understand the one who holds wrong view, understand wrong view's own fruit, and understand wrong view's own liberation. Householder, to call one who is not an illusionist an illusionist, or to call one who does not hold wrong view a holder of wrong view, incurs boundless offense.' The householder said: 'Gautama, as you have just shown me, I have incurred a great offense. Everything I now possess, I offer entirely in recompense — I beg only that King Prasenajit never learn of this matter.' The Buddha said: 'Householder, the consequence of this offense is not merely the loss of wealth — it is such as to cause one to fall into the three evil destinies on its account.' The householder, hearing the names of these evil destinies, was filled with terror, and said to the Buddha: 'Holy one, I have now, through my own confusion, incurred a great offense. The holy one is now himself omniscient, and ought surely to know how liberation is attained — how, then, am I to escape hell, the realm of hungry ghosts, and the animal realm?' I then taught him the four noble truths, and the householder, hearing them, attained the fruit of stream-entry, and, filled with shame, confessed to the Buddha: 'I was, before this, simply foolish — the Buddha is no illusionist at all, and yet I called him one. From this day forward, I take refuge in the three jewels.' The Buddha said: 'Excellent, excellent, householder!' This is called teaching according to another's own understanding.

"What is meant by teaching according to both together? It is exactly like my own teaching: wherever the wise of the world say a thing exists, I, too, say that it exists; wherever the wise say a thing does not exist, I, too, say that it does not exist. The wise of the world say that the pleasures of the five desires exist, yet are impermanent, suffering, without self, and to be abandoned — and I, too, say that they exist in this way. The wise of the world say that there is no such thing as the pleasures of the five desires being permanent, being self, or being pure — and I, too, say that there is no such thing. This is called teaching according to both together. "Good son, as for my own teaching that a bodhisattva of the ten abidings sees buddha-nature only partially, this is called teaching according to another's own understanding. Why is it called partial seeing? A bodhisattva of the ten abidings, having attained the Śūraṅgama and the other three thousand gates of samādhi, thereby knows with perfect clarity that he himself will certainly attain supreme, perfect awakening, yet does not see that every single being is certain to attain supreme, perfect awakening — and it is for this very reason that I teach that a bodhisattva of the ten abidings sees buddha-nature only partially. Good son, my own constant proclamation that every being entirely possesses buddha-nature is called teaching according to my own intent. That every being is forever unbroken and unceasing, all the way through to the attainment of supreme, perfect awakening, is likewise called teaching according to my own intent. That every being entirely possesses buddha-nature, yet is unable to see it on account of affliction's own covering — this I teach, and you, too, teach it in exactly this same way; this is called teaching according to both together. "Good son, the Tathāgata, at times, teaches countless dharmas for the sake of a single dharma. It is exactly like the teaching, found in the sūtras, that every practice of pure conduct has a good spiritual friend as its cause — though the causes of every practice of pure conduct are, in truth, countless, teaching the single cause of a good spiritual friend already gathers them all in completely. It is exactly like my own teaching that every unwholesome deed has wrong view as its cause — though the causes of every unwholesome deed are, in truth, countless, teaching wrong view already gathers them all in completely. Or, again, teaching that supreme, perfect awakening has faith as its cause — though the causes of this very awakening are, in truth, countless, teaching faith already gathers them all in completely. Good son, though the Tathāgata teaches countless dharmas as buddha-nature, none of them ever depart from the aggregates, the sense-bases, and the elements."

"Good son, the Tathāgata, in teaching the Dharma, uses, for the sake of beings, seven kinds of language: first, cause-language; second, fruit-language; third, cause-and-fruit-language; fourth, simile-language; fifth, not-to-be-taken-literally language; sixth, ordinary worldly language; and seventh, as-intended language. "What is meant by cause-language? It is teaching a future fruit by way of a present cause, exactly as I have taught: good son, when you see a being who delights in killing, and, all the way through, delights in wrong view, you should regard this person as already a being of hell; good son, should there be a being who does not delight in killing, and, all the way through, does not delight in wrong view, you should regard this person as already a being of the heavens. This is called cause-language. "What is meant by fruit-language? It is teaching a past cause by way of a present fruit, exactly as taught in the sūtras: good son, when you see a poor and destitute being, ugly in countenance and lacking any freedom, you should know that this person certainly once broke the precepts, harbored envy and anger, and lacked all sense of shame; when you see a being of great wealth and abundance, complete in every faculty, dignified and free, you should know that this person certainly once kept the precepts, practiced giving, exerted diligent effort, and possessed a sense of shame, free of envy and anger. This is called fruit-language. "What is meant by cause-and-fruit-language? It is exactly as taught in the sūtras: good son, a being's own present six sense-bases and the contact arising from them are themselves the fruit of past karma — and the Tathāgata, too, teaches that this very fruit is itself further called karma, since it is, in turn, the cause and condition by which a future fruit is obtained. This is called cause-and-fruit-language. "What is meant by simile-language? It is exactly as when I speak of the lion king as a simile for my own body — the great elephant king, the great nāga king, the pārijāta tree, the mass of seven jewels, the great ocean, Mount Sumeru, the great earth, the great rain, the ship's captain, the guide, the tamer of men, the mighty wrestler, the bull among oxen, the brahmin, the śramaṇa, the great city, the tāla tree — scriptures using similes of exactly this kind are called simile-language. "What is meant by not-to-be-taken-literally language? It is exactly as when, in the sūtras, I speak of heaven and earth being able to merge, or of rivers never entering the sea; or as when I spoke to King Prasenajit of mountains approaching from the four directions; or as when I taught the laywoman Mṛgāra's mother that, should a sāla tree be able to receive the eight precepts, it too would attain the pleasures of humans and gods; or as when I speak of a bodhisattva of the ten abidings possessing a retrogressing mind — I do not thereby teach that the Tathāgata speaks with two contradictory voices; rather, I would sooner say that a stream-enterer falls into the three evil destinies than say that a bodhisattva of the ten abidings possesses a mind of retrogression. This is called not-to-be-taken-literally language. "What is meant by ordinary worldly language? It is exactly as when the Buddha speaks of man and woman, great and small, coming and going, sitting and lying down, carriages, dwellings, vessels, and clothing, of beings, of permanence, bliss, self, and purity, of armies and forests, cities and towns, of the saṅgha, of illusion, of union and dispersal — language of exactly this kind is called ordinary worldly language. "What is meant by as-intended language? It is exactly as when I rebuke one who has violated the precepts, so that he may reproach himself and uphold the precepts once more; or as when I praise the stream-enterer, so that ordinary beings may give rise to a wholesome mind; or as when I praise the bodhisattva, so that beings may give rise to the bodhi-mind; or as when I describe the suffering and affliction found in the three evil destinies, so that beings may cultivate every wholesome dharma; or as when I teach that all things are burning, solely for the sake of every conditioned dharma, and the very same holds for no-self; or as when I teach that every being entirely possesses buddha-nature, so that all may cease to be heedless. This is called as-intended language."