The Factors of Enlightenment, Part Two

The exposition: the bodhisattva's cultivation of the path-factors having been explained, the bodhisattva's cultivation of calm-abiding and insight is next explained.

Settling the mind in correct concentration —
this itself is called calm-abiding;
correctly abiding in the discernment of phenomena —
this is called the mark of insight.

The exposition: settling the mind in correct concentration is itself called calm-abiding — the mind resting on correct concentration without perceiving a separate mind, calm-abiding not being established apart from correct concentration; this is the mark of calm-abiding. Correctly abiding in the discernment of phenomena is called the mark of insight — resting on correct abiding, discerning the substance of phenomena; this is the mark of insight. Question: how are these two practiced?

One who universally seeks every merit
should cultivate both of these entirely;
as a single part, or not a single part —
since cultivation is both single and paired.

The exposition: one who universally seeks every merit should cultivate both of these entirely — if a person seeks every kind of merit without exception, that person should cultivate both calm-abiding and insight without exception. As a sūtra teaches, the Buddha told the monks: "If there is something sought, how is it obtained? Monks — being free of desire, free of unwholesome and evil dharmas," and so on, at length. "Monks, there are two dharmas that must be cultivated: namely, calm-abiding and insight." As a single part, or not a single part: a single part means either calm-abiding alone or insight alone; not a single part means calm-abiding and insight combined. Question: why? Answer: since cultivation is both single and paired. Cultivating singly is a single part — either cultivating calm-abiding, or cultivating insight. Cultivating in pairs is not a single part — calm-abiding and insight cultivated together. Question: what are the distinctions of kind between these two practices? And what is their function?

Able to penetrate, and able to emerge;
signless, and unconditioned;
the pure land, and the pure fruit —
these are the function of the two.

The exposition: the first half of this verse clarifies the distinctions of kind; the second half displays their function. On the ground of conviction and practice, these two dharmas are called cultivation resting on support. Once one enters the great grounds, there are four further distinctions: first, penetrating cultivation, entering the first ground; second, emerging cultivation, entering through the sixth ground, since across these six grounds one emerges through skillful means still bearing signs; third, signless cultivation, entering the seventh ground; fourth, unconditioned cultivation, entering the last three grounds — cultivation that still exerts effort is called conditioned, and since the last three grounds exert no effort, it is called unconditioned. These five are the distinctions of kind. The pure land is cultivating the practice of purifying a buddha-land, resting on the last three grounds; the pure fruit is performing the practice of the transformation of the basis. These two purities are their very function. The bodhisattva's calm-abiding and insight having been explained, the bodhisattva's cultivation of the five kinds of skillful means is next explained.

Ripening oneself, and maturing beings;
swiftly attaining the fruit, and accomplishing one's function;
the path of birth-and-death unbroken —
these are taught as the five skillful means.

The exposition: the five kinds of skillful means: first, ripening the buddha-dharma in oneself, taking non-discriminating wisdom as the skillful means; second, maturing beings, taking the four means of gathering as the skillful means; third, swiftly attaining enlightenment, taking repentance, rejoicing, requesting the turning of the wheel of the Dharma, and generating supreme vows as the skillful means; fourth, accomplishing one's function, taking the two gateways as the skillful means — the two gateways being the gateway of dhāraṇī and the gateway of absorption, since through these two gateways one is able to accomplish the work of benefiting beings; fifth, the path of birth-and-death unbroken, taking nirvāṇa without fixed abode as the skillful means. Question: what are the distinctions among these skillful means? What is their function?

The bodhisattva's skillful means are unequaled;
their distinctions rest on the various grounds;
being able to accomplish benefit for self and other —
this is said to be their function.

The exposition: the first half of this verse clarifies the distinctions among the skillful means; the second half displays their function. As to distinctions: these five means are, among all bodhisattvas, foremost and unequaled — why? Because, throughout the various grounds, they are not shared with the two vehicles; hence their distinction. As to function: being able to accomplish every benefit for both oneself and others — this is their function. The bodhisattva's skillful means having been explained, the bodhisattva's dhāraṇī is next explained.

Karmic ripening, and hearing and habituation;
and concentration, too, as cause —
resting on these three practices,
retention is of three kinds.

The exposition: dhāraṇī has three kinds: first, attained through ripening — attained through the power of past-life karma; second, attained through habituation — attained through the power of hearing and retaining in this present life; third, attained through cultivation — attained through resting on the power of concentration. Question: what are the distinctions of kind?

Two are lesser, and one is greater;
the one that is greater is again threefold —
before the grounds, and on the grounds,
in the impure and the pure stages.

The exposition: two are lesser, and one is greater — among these three kinds, that attained through ripening and that attained through habituation should be understood as the two lesser kinds, while that attained through cultivation should be understood as the one greater kind. The one that is greater is again threefold — within this greater kind, there are three further grades: mild, middling, and superior. That possessed by a bodhisattva not yet entered onto a ground is mild; that possessed by a bodhisattva already entered onto the impure grounds is middling — namely, the first seven grounds; and that possessed by a bodhisattva entered onto the pure grounds is superior — namely, the last three grounds. Question: what is its function?

Know that the bodhisattva,
constantly resting on dhāraṇī,
opens up the Dharma and retains the Dharma —
such, entirely, is its function.

The exposition: here, it should be known that the bodhisattva, resting on dhāraṇī, constantly opens up and reveals the sublime Dharma, and constantly receives and retains it — this is its function. The bodhisattva's dhāraṇī having been explained, the bodhisattva's arising of vows is next explained.

Intention and aspiration together are their substance;
wisdom alone is their cause;
the grounds themselves are their ground;
and twofold fruits are also their fruit.

Know that their distinctions are three:
manifold, vast, and pure;
this function is of two kinds:
accomplishing oneself, and benefiting others.

The exposition: these two verses distinguish vows through six meanings: own-nature, cause, ground, fruit, distinctions, and function. Intention joined with aspiration together is their own-nature. Wisdom is their cause. The grounds are their ground. Twofold fruits are their fruit — namely, the immediate fruit and the future fruit. Vows are their cause, since through them the mind attains what it seeks — attaining what it seeks meaning that whatever the mind wishes is accomplished. Further, through the power of vows one roams through the fruits of one's vows — namely, the body emitting light, the voice uttering sounds, and so on, at length. Their distinctions are of three kinds: first, manifold — the ground of conviction and practice's vows wishing to attain this and that, variously; second, vast — the bodhisattva's ten great vows upon entering the grounds; third, pure — becoming ever purer, ground after ground, until utterly pure at the buddha ground. These are the distinctions. Their function is of two kinds: accomplishing oneself, and accomplishing the benefit of others — this is their function. The bodhisattva's vows having been explained, the bodhisattva's cultivation of the three concentrations is next explained.

Know that the twofold selflessness,
and the support of the twofold notion of self,
and that support's constant stillness —
are the objects ranged over by the three concentrations.

The exposition: the three concentrations have three objects: first, the twofold selflessness of person and phenomena, the object of the concentration of emptiness; second, the five aggregates of appropriation that support the twofold grasping of self, the object of the concentration of wishlessness; third, that support's utter stillness, the object of the concentration of signlessness. These three objects grasped are the three domains; the three subjects that grasp them are the three concentrations — hence, the three concentrations. Question: what is the meaning of the names of the three concentrations?

The concentration of emptiness is without discrimination;
wishlessness is weariness turning away from birth;
signlessness is constantly delighting in attainment —
of that support's constant stillness.

The exposition: the concentration of emptiness is without discrimination — the meaning of non-discrimination is the meaning of the concentration of emptiness, since it does not discriminate the twofold self of person and phenomena. Wishlessness is weariness turning away from birth — the meaning of weariness and turning away is the meaning of the concentration of wishlessness, since it is weary of and turns away from what supports the grasping of self. Signlessness is constantly delighting in attainment, of that support's constant stillness — the meaning of delighting in attainment is the meaning of the concentration of signlessness, since it delights in attaining that support's utter stillness. Question: how do the three concentrations arise?

What is to be known, and what is to be cut off,
and what is to be personally realized —
in this order, emptiness and the rest —
cultivation is of three kinds.

The exposition: what is to be known, what is to be cut off, and what is to be personally realized: what is to be known is the twofold selflessness of person and phenomena; what is to be cut off is what supports the twofold grasping of self; what is to be personally realized is that support's utter stillness. In this order, emptiness and the rest — cultivation is of three kinds: here, in order to know the twofold selflessness of person and phenomena, the concentration of emptiness is cultivated; in order to cut off what supports that twofold grasping, the concentration of wishlessness is cultivated; and in order to personally realize that support's utter stillness, the concentration of signlessness is cultivated. The bodhisattva's cultivation of the three concentrations having been explained, the bodhisattva's four Dharma seals are next explained.

Just as the three concentrations above,
the four seals are their support;
the bodhisattva teaches them thus,
for the benefit of the multitude of beings.

The exposition: the four Dharma seals are: first, the seal that all conditioned things are impermanent; second, the seal that all conditioned things are suffering; third, the seal that all dharmas are without self; fourth, the seal that nirvāṇa is still. Here, it should be known that the seals of impermanence and suffering serve as the support for accomplishing the concentration of wishlessness; the seal of no-self serves as the support for accomplishing the concentration of emptiness; and the seal of stillness serves as the support for accomplishing the concentration of signlessness. The bodhisattva teaches these four seals as the support for the three concentrations, entirely for the benefit of sentient beings. Question: what is the meaning of impermanence, and so on through the meaning of stillness?

The meaning of what is without meaning, the meaning of discrimination;
the meaning of unreal discrimination;
the meaning of the stilling of every discrimination —
these are the meanings of the four seals.

The exposition: here, the bodhisattva takes what is without meaning as the meaning of impermanence, since the discriminated mark is utterly, constantly without existence. He takes the meaning of discrimination as the meaning of no-self, since the discriminated mark exists only as discrimination — both what is discriminated and its self are the discriminated mark, being without any substance. He takes the meaning of unreal discrimination as the meaning of suffering, since the mind and mental factors of the three realms are the very substance of suffering — this is the dependent mark. And he takes the meaning of the stilling of every discrimination as the meaning of stillness — this is the true, real mark. Furthermore, it should be known that the dependent mark, additionally, is taken as the meaning of impermanence through its being destroyed moment by moment. Question: how is momentary destruction established?

Through arising, and through following from a cause;
through contradiction, and through not abiding;
through the absence of any substance, and the fixedness of the mark;
through resembling continuation, and through utter cessation;

through transformation, cause, and fruit;
through retention, and through dominance;
through following purity, and through following karmic arising —
these fifteen meanings establish it.

The exposition: these two verses establish the meaning of momentary destruction through fifteen meanings: arising, following from a cause, contradiction, not abiding, absence of substance, the fixedness of the mark, resembling continuation, utter cessation, transformation, cause, fruit, retention, dominance, following purity, and following karmic arising. Through these fifteen meanings, the meaning of momentary destruction can be established.

First, through arising: conditioned things flowing on in continuity is called arising. Were there no meaning of momentary destruction, yet conditioned things still flowed on in continuity called arising, this would not hold. If you say a thing abides for a time, and afterward the earlier ceases and the later arises, and this is called continuity — then there would be no continuity at all, since during the time of temporary abiding, no later arising exists.

Second, through following from a cause: whenever a thing, having previously ceased, later arises, it must rely on causes and conditions; apart from causes and conditions, it would have no substance. If you say that a thing's initial cause is able to generate many later fruits, this does not hold — the initial cause, once it has performed its function, ceases entirely; how, then, could it act as cause for later fruits? If you say the initial cause, once arisen, arises no further, then what further use is there in establishing this cause? If you say that, having arisen, it does not yet cease, and only ceases at a later time — then, when that later time comes, what is the cause of its cessation?

Third, through contradiction: if you further hold that the very cause that gives rise to a thing is also the cause of its cessation, this does not hold — arising and cessation are contradictory, and there is no principle by which a single cause could serve both, just as light and darkness do not coexist, and cold and heat do not coincide; it is the same here — hence the cause of arising is not the very cause of cessation. If, as you hold, conditioned things, once arisen, do not immediately cease, this contradicts both the scriptures and reason. It contradicts the scriptures because the Buddha told the monks: conditioned things are like an illusion, a phenomenon of destruction, a temporary phenomenon, not abiding for even a moment. It contradicts reason because practitioners, contemplating the arising and cessation of conditioned things, reflect on their momentary destruction; were this not so, then, facing death and seeing the mark of cessation, there would be no weariness, no freedom from desire, no liberation — and one would be no different from any other ordinary being.

Fourth, through not abiding: if you say that conditioned things, once arisen, come to abide, does the conditioned thing abide by itself, or does it abide through some other cause? If it abides by itself, why can it not abide forever? If it abides through some other cause, that abiding has no substance of its own — what, then, could serve as its cause? Neither alternative holds; hence the meaning of momentary destruction is established.

Fifth, through absence of substance: if you hold that the cause of abiding is present while the cause of destruction has not yet arrived, and so the thing abides, and only ceases once the cause of destruction later arrives — unlike fire transforming black iron to red — this does not hold, since a cause of destruction is, in the end, without any substance at all. As for the simile of fire transforming iron, I hold no such view: when iron meets fire, its blackness resembles ceasing and its redness resembles arising — it is fire's function that draws forth the resemblance of redness arising; fire does not, in reality, transform black iron into something new. Likewise, when water is boiled down to almost nothing, no further water then arises — nor does this mean that water, once joined with fire, becomes without substance only then.

Sixth, through the fixedness of the mark: the Buddha taught that the conditioned mark of conditioned dharmas is fixed without exception — namely, impermanence. If you hold that conditioned things, once arisen, do not immediately cease, then a conditioned dharma would, for however brief a time, not be impermanent — and this would fall into a mark that is not fixed without exception.

Seventh, through resembling continuation: if you say that, were a thing newly arising moment by moment, how could one form the notion of it as the same, old thing — it should be answered that this knowledge arises through a resembling continuation: just as a lamp's flame, arising in resemblance moment by moment, gives rise to the notion of "the same old lamp," when in fact each moment differs, the prior substance having ceased to exist.

Eighth, through utter cessation: if you say, how is it known that a later thing is not the former one — it should be answered that this is known through utter cessation: were it to abide without ceasing, then the later moment's abiding would be no different from the first moment's abiding; since there is a difference, one knows the later thing is not the former thing.

Ninth, through transformation: if you say that a thing, at its very first arising, does not yet transform, this does not hold, since neither internal nor external dharmas can be found to have a fixed final state. Through transforming from its very first arising, it gradually becomes manifest — just as milk, arriving at the stage of curd, only then displays the mark of curd — yet the substance of this transformation is so subtle it is difficult to discern, and through its resembling continuation one takes it to be the former thing. For this reason, the meaning of momentary destruction is established.

Tenth, through cause: if you grant that mind is momentarily destroyed, then the causes that give rise to mind — namely, the conditioned things of eye, form, and the rest — since their fruit is momentarily destroyed, their cause must likewise be momentary, since a permanent cause cannot give rise to an impermanent fruit.

Eleventh, through fruit: those conditioned things — eye and the rest — are also mind's fruit; hence the meaning of momentary destruction is established, since an impermanent cause cannot give rise to a permanent fruit.

Twelfth, through retention: if you say, how is it known that eye and the other conditioned things are also mind's fruit — it should be answered that this is known because they are retained by mind and thereby grow.

Thirteenth, through dominance: further, as the Buddha taught: mind leads the world away, mind draws the world in — the world turns following mind's mastery. That consciousness conditions name-and-form is spoken in just this sense; hence one knows that conditioned things are mind's fruit.

Fourteenth, through following purity: purity is the mind of one in meditative concentration; that person's conditioned things turn following the pure mind. As a sūtra teaches: a monk who cultivates meditation, complete with supernormal powers, whose mind has attained mastery — should he wish wood to become gold, he attains it at will. Hence one knows that conditioned things are entirely mind's fruit.

Fifteenth, through following karmic arising: just as a being who commits wrongdoing obtains external things that are entirely inferior, while a being who does good obtains external things that are entirely excellent — hence one knows that conditioned things are entirely mind's fruit. There is no principle by which the cause is momentary yet the fruit is not, since the cause has mastery over it. Having thus established, in general, that all conditioned things — internal and external — are momentary, the momentariness of internal dharmas in particular is next established.

Initial arising, and continued arising;
growing arising, and dependent arising;
transforming arising, and ripened arising;
inferior arising, and superior arising;

luminous arising, and non-luminous arising;
and arising in another place;
arising as a seed, and arising without a seed;
image arising — fourteen arisings.

The exposition: these two verses establish the momentariness of internal dharmas' conditioned things through fourteen kinds of arising. First, initial arising: the very first generation of one's own being. Second, continued arising: generation in every moment apart from the first. Third, growing arising: generation nourished and grown through sleep, food, the holy life, and correct absorption. Fourth, dependent arising: the eye consciousness and the other consciousnesses generated resting on the eye and the other faculties. Fifth, transforming arising: form and the rest generated as transformed by craving and the other defilements. Sixth, ripened arising: generation as the completed embryo, infant, child, youth, middle age, old age, and so on. Seventh, inferior arising: generation in the evil destinies. Eighth, superior arising: generation in the good destinies. Ninth, luminous arising: generation in the last two heavens of the desire realm and in every heaven of the form and formless realms. Tenth, non-luminous arising: generation in every place besides the luminous places just named. Eleventh, arising in another place: dying in this place, being generated in that place. Twelfth, arising as a seed: generation of the five aggregates apart from an arhat's very last. Thirteenth, arising without a seed: generation of that very last set of five aggregates just excepted, since no seed for a further generation exists. Fourteenth, image arising: one who has entered the liberative meditations, through the power of mastery in concentration, generating conditioned things as mere images. Question: by what further causes are these fourteen kinds of arising established?

Difference in continuation, and difference in interruption;
following growth, and following dependence;
the fault of abiding, and the fault of going;
not abiding, and the fault of no death;

and, further, following the mark of mind —
the practitioner should know that
these nine causes
establish the fourteen arisings above.

The exposition: these two verses establish the fourteen arisings above through nine causes: difference in continuation, difference in interruption, following growth, following dependence, the fault of abiding, the fault of going, not abiding, the fault of no death, and following mind.

First, difference in continuation: this cause establishes the first, initial arising. Were there no difference in the substance of the cause at the very first arising, then the later conditioned things arising in continuation would likewise show no difference, since the cause's substance would show no difference. Because there is, in fact, a difference in cause, the momentariness of the subsequent conditioned things is established.

Second, difference in interruption: this cause establishes the second, continued arising. Were there no difference of cause in each and every moment, then a later difference of interruption could not be found either. Because there is, in fact, a difference of interruption, the momentariness of conditioned things is established by this meaning.

Third, following growth: this cause establishes the third, growing arising. Being able to bring conditioned things to fullness is called growth; were there no momentariness, yet conditioned things still grew and were nourished, this would not hold, since they would then be abiding. Were conditioned things to abide, they could not gradually increase to fullness — this would not be growth at all.

Fourth, following dependence: this cause establishes the fourth, dependent arising. Were it held that the dependent does not abide while its support abides, this does not hold — it is like a person riding a horse: there is no principle by which the person goes while the horse does not go. It is the same here: consciousness depends on the faculty; for consciousness to be momentary while its support is not momentary likewise does not hold.

Fifth, the fault of abiding: this cause establishes six arisings — transforming, ripened, inferior, superior, luminous, and non-luminous arising. As to establishing transforming and ripened arising: were it held that conditioned things, at their very first arising, already abide without ceasing, this does not hold, since there would then be no transforming arising at all — craving and the other defilements' transformation of form could never be found, since if there were no transformation at first, there could be none later either. And if there were no transformation at first, the later stages of ripening could not be found either, since ripening only comes about because transformation occurred first. Establishing inferior and superior arising as momentary follows the same reasoning: were it held that conditioned things abide, yet wholesome and unwholesome habituation still gave their fruits in sequence, this does not hold — only if conditioned things do not abide, but continue in succession, can each in turn properly give its fruit. Establishing luminous and non-luminous arising as momentary follows the same reasoning: were conditioned things to abide, luminous arising, too, would not exist; only because they do not abide does it exist, since mind turns on. The absence of non-luminous arising follows likewise, since there would then be no transformation at any later time.

Sixth, the fault of going: this cause establishes the eleventh, arising in another place. Were it held that conditioned things going to another place is called "going," this does not hold — I now ask you: does "going" mean the conditioned things, having arisen, then carry themselves to another place? Or does it mean, without having arisen, they carry themselves to another place? If, having arisen, they carry themselves there — then, having arisen in this place, they do not arise in the other place; this is simply abiding, and to call it "going" contradicts this very meaning. If, without having arisen, they carry themselves there — then, not having arisen, there was, to begin with, no going at all, and to call it "going" is a meaningless statement. Furthermore, if conditioned things go, whether the action is performed while abiding in this place — this too does not hold, since, abiding, they could not reach another place; or whether the action is performed only once they reach another place — this too does not hold, since there is no reaching another place apart from the going of conditioned things themselves. Whether abiding in this place or abiding in the other place, apart from conditioned things themselves, no "action" whatsoever can ultimately be found — hence "going" is nothing other than the very continuity of conditioned things. Since the action of going itself has no substance of its own, the meaning of momentariness is thereby established. If you say, if there is truly no going, how do ordinary people perceive going — it should be answered that this is conventionally called "going" owing to uninterrupted continuity, there being, in reality, no substance of going at all. If you ask, then by what cause do conditioned things come to continue as "going" — it should be answered that the causes and conditions are innumerable: there is mastery through the force of mind, as in going through bodily deportment; mastery through past karma, as in going through the intermediate state; mastery through the force of the hand, as in an arrow shot or a stone thrown; mastery through a support, as in going by carriage or by boat; mastery through the force of an agent, as in an object blown by the wind; mastery through one's own nature, as wind's nature is to go sideways, fire's nature to go upward, water's nature to go downward; mastery through the power of technique, as going through the air by reliance on a spell or a medicine; mastery through a lodestone, able to make iron go; and mastery through supernormal power, as going by riding the superknowledges. There are innumerable such causes and conditions of this kind, able to make conditioned things continue, conventionally called "going." This meaning should be understood.

Seventh, not abiding: this cause establishes the twelfth, arising as a seed. Were conditioned things to abide, and at some further time a seed still arose, this would not hold, since, moment by moment, there would be no further cause. Only if conditioned things do not abide can a later seed's arising rightly occur.

Eighth, the fault of no death: this cause establishes the thirteenth, arising without a seed. Were there no momentariness, yet at the time of death there were still an arising without a seed, this would not hold. Nor would it hold that there is a seed's arising first, and only later, at the ending of the lifespan, comes an arising without a seed — since, in each and every moment, the cause has no substance of its own; hence, without momentariness, the mind at death could never be established.

Ninth, following mind: this cause establishes the fourteenth, image arising. Through mind's mastery, that image arises moment by moment; were there no momentariness, yet the image still arose, there would be no principle by which this could occur. Question: internal conditioned dharmas having thus been separately established as momentary, by what further causes can the four great elements and the six kinds of derived form belonging to external dharmas be established as momentary?

Through moistening, and through drying;
its nature's motion, increase, and decrease;
twofold arising, and fourfold transformation;
the force of fuel, and gradual attenuation;

and, further, arising following mind,
and establishment through challenge —
every external dharma, without exception,
has momentariness as its very substance.

The exposition: these two verses establish external dharmas as momentary through fourteen causes. Water has two causes: moistening, and drying. Were there no momentariness, water's sometimes moistening and increasing, and sometimes drying up, could not be manifest. Were someone to ask: given no momentariness in water, by what cause does it moisten, and by what further cause does it dry — this could not be answered. Since water is now seen to moisten and to dry, one knows that momentariness is the cause of water's moistening and drying.

Wind has three causes: its nature is motion, its increase is intensifying, and its decrease is subsiding. Were wind's nature to abide, there would be no time of motion, since the conditioned thing would have no substance of its own; nor would there be intensifying or subsiding, since it would then be abiding.

Earth has six causes: twofold arising, and fourfold transformation. As to twofold arising: earth is found to arise from water and from wind — at the time of the eon's genesis, that earth was the fruit of water and wind — hence one knows earth, too, is momentary. As to fourfold transformation: earth's transformation is found through four kinds of action: first, action by the force of karma, since sentient beings' karmic force differs; second, action by human labor, through digging and excavating and the rest; third, action by the great elements, through fire, water, and wind; fourth, action by the seasons, through the changing appearance that time brings about. Were there no momentariness, these four transformations could not be found, since the cause would have no substance. Just as earth's momentariness is known through these six causes, so too are the six causes of form, smell, taste, and the tangible known — hence these, too, are momentary.

Fire has one cause: namely, the force of fuel. Through the force of fuel, fire increases and is thereby able to arise; once fuel has arisen together with fire, the fuel can no longer abide, and once fire has burned the fuel, the fire, too, does not abide. Were fire not dependent on fuel, then, once fuel later ran out, fire should still long abide — by the same principle of parallel dependence that it does not.

Following the discussion of fire, sound is next taught to have one cause: namely, gradual attenuation. Just as with the sound of a bell, its gradual attenuation over time can be observed; were there no momentariness, there would be no way for its sound to become fainter over time.

Form included within the mental sphere has one cause: namely, arising following mind. Just as, at the time of receiving the precepts, it arises following the mind's inferior, middling, or superior grade — since mind, the cause, is momentary, its fruit, too, is momentary. Hence external dharmas' momentariness is likewise established.

Further, this is established, in sum, through challenge. I now ask you: why do you wish to accept that conditioned things are impermanent, yet do not wish to accept that conditioned things are momentarily destroyed? If you say that momentary destruction, moment by moment, cannot be known — this does not hold: consider a lamp's flame — even in what appears to be a motionless state, its momentariness likewise cannot be directly known; why, then, do you refuse to accept that its own substance, too, is momentary? If you say that the flame's substance has a momentariness too subtle to perceive — conditioned things are just the same; why, then, do you refuse to accept that they too have momentariness? If you say the flame and conditioned things are not comparable — this does not hold: non-comparability is of two kinds — non-comparability in own-nature, and non-comparability in temporal duration. If it is non-comparability in own-nature that you intend, then this simile still holds, since a simile need not share the very same substance as what it illustrates — otherwise, only a lamp could illustrate a lamp, only an ox could illustrate an ox, and no simile could ever hold at all. If it is non-comparability in temporal duration that you intend, this simile still holds, since both the lamp's flame and conditioned things resemble one another precisely in being momentary — were they not momentary, the simile could not hold. Let me ask you further: when a person rides in a vehicle, does the person go while the vehicle stays put? Answer: no. If so, then for the supporting faculty to stay while the supported consciousness goes is likewise without principle. If you say: why, then, is it that the lamp's flame is directly seen to be extinguished moment by moment, while the lamp's wick is seen to abide just as it is — it should be answered that what you see is not what you think you see: the wick, too, continues in destruction and arising moment by moment, and you simply do not know this as it really is.

If you say: if conditioned things are momentary like a lamp's flame, why do ordinary people not know this — it should be answered that, since conditioned things are the very object of inverted perception, their momentary continuation cannot be directly known; though they in fact arise as separate, distinct moments, ordinary people take them to be the same, prior thing, giving rise to inverted knowledge. Were this not so, there would be no inverted perception of the impermanent as permanent. And if this inversion had no substance to speak of, then there would be no defilement either — and from where, then, would liberation come? Through this line of challenge, the momentariness of conditioned things is thereby established. Momentariness having been established, the meaning of no-self is next established.

Question: is the person to be said to exist, or to be said not to exist?

The person is conventional, not really existent;
to speak of it as real is to find nothing real there —
since it is established, through inversion and defilement,
as the cause of defilement.

The exposition: the person is conventional, not really existent — the person may be said to exist as a mere convention, not as a real substance. On this view, one falls into neither one-sided extreme, being free of both the extreme of existence and non-existence. Question: is the person really existent — how, then, is it known to be non-existent? Answer: because nothing real can be found. That person cannot be found to be real in the way form and the rest can, since it is not something realized by direct cognition and wisdom. Question: granting that the person is not realized by direct cognition and wisdom — the Buddha nevertheless said that a self is presently to be found; your claim that it cannot be found does not hold. Answer: this "can be found" refers to something found through inversion, not something really found — since the Buddha's teaching that one conceives a self where there is no self is precisely what is called inversion. Question: how is this known to be an inversion? Answer: because of defilement. The view of a substantial self is a defilement — namely, the grasping of self and what belongs to self; were it not an inversion, it would not be a defilement. Question: how is it known that the grasping of self is a defilement? Answer: because it is the cause of defilement — since craving and the other defilements arise with the grasping of self as their cause, one knows it to be a defilement.

Question: as you grant, the person is said to conventionally exist with respect to the five aggregates of form and the rest — is this person one with the aggregates, or different from them?

The conventional person and the real aggregates
cannot be said to be either one or different;
were one to say they are one, or different,
two faults would arise.

The exposition: the conventional person and the aggregates cannot be said to be either one or different; were one and different to be asserted, two faults would arise. The two faults: were one to say the person and the aggregates are one, then the aggregates would simply be the person, and the person would be real. Were one to say the person and the aggregates are different, then, although the aggregates would not be the person, the person would still be real. For this reason, the person is a mere designation; whether one or different cannot be said — this is why the Tathāgata's setting this question aside without answering it is thereby established as correct.

If one holds the person to be real,
then whether one or different should be answerable;
that whether one or different cannot be said —
this claim, then, has no principle behind it.

The exposition: if a person, going against the Teacher's instruction, holds that a real person exists, then whether this real person is one with or different from the aggregates should be answerable; yet to hold that whether one or different with the aggregates cannot be said, while also holding it is real, is a claim with no principle behind it. If you say the person cannot be said to be one or different from the aggregates, just as fire is neither different from nor not different from fuel — this does not hold.

Through the distinctness of their marks, and through worldly perception;
the noble ones' own teaching, too, does not support this;
fire and fuel are not beyond speaking of,
since both can be found.

The exposition: through the distinctness of their marks: fire is the fire element, fuel is made of the other elements, each having its own distinct mark; hence fire and fuel are different. Through worldly perception: ordinary people see fuel apart from fire — such as wood yet to be burned — and also see fire apart from fuel — as when wind blows a flame away from its fuel; hence fire and fuel are different. The noble ones' own teaching, too, does not support this: the World-Honored Buddha nowhere taught that whether fire and fuel are one or different cannot be said; hence your holding that whether fire and fuel are one or different cannot be said has no principle behind it. If you say that fire is never seen apart from fuel, and that the wind aspect simply is the fuel — this does not hold, since both can be found separately, fire and wind having two distinct marks.

Furthermore, verse:

Since it is through the presence of two conditions that consciousness arises,
taking the person as a condition is without meaning;
the desired ceasing and the undesired arising —
to speak of the person as generating these is likewise without principle.

The exposition: if one holds that a person is really existent, calling it the seer, the hearer, the perceiver, the cognizer, the eater, the knower, the speaker — then, as to the arising of the eye consciousness and the rest, is the person said to be their agent by being their condition, or is the person said to be their agent by being their master? If the person is their condition — since it is through the presence of two conditions that consciousness arises, taking the person as a condition is without meaning, since no power belonging to the person whatsoever can be seen in the arising of consciousness. If the person is their master — the desired ceasing and the undesired arising, to speak of the person as generating these is likewise without principle: were the person the master, then once a desired consciousness had arisen, it ought to be made never to cease, and should never be made to cease; and an undesired consciousness not yet arisen ought to be made never to arise, and should never be made to arise. For this reason, you should not hold that the person is the seer, and so on through the cognizer.

Furthermore, verse:

Within your holding the person to be real,
what function can be established for it?
Forcing what is unreal to be real
contradicts the Buddha's threefold enlightenment.

The exposition: if the person were really existent, by what function could you establish it? Whatever is really existent must necessarily have some function — as the pure form of the eye and the rest is established through the function of seeing and the rest. The person has no such function by which it could be established; hence the person is not really existent. Furthermore, your forcing what is unreal — the person — to be treated as real contradicts the Tathāgata's three kinds of enlightenment: first, profound enlightenment; second, unshared enlightenment; third, transcendent enlightenment. Were a real person to be seen, this would not be profound enlightenment, would not be enlightenment unshared with outsiders, and would not be enlightenment unfamiliar to the ordinary world. Hence this holding is what the ordinary world grasps at, what outsiders cling to, and what is constantly practiced in birth-and-death.

Furthermore, if the person is the seer, and so on through the cognizer — do the eye and the other faculties have their own function, or no function of their own? If they have their own function, does it arise spontaneously, or does it arise through the person? Question: what doubt does this raise?

If the function arises spontaneously,
then three faults arise;
if the person serves as its condition,
then the eye and the rest would have no function of their own.

The exposition: if it is said that the function of the eye and the rest arises spontaneously, then the person performs no deed at all with respect to the eye and the rest, and three faults arise. If it is said that the function arises through the person as its condition, then the eye and the other faculties would have no function of their own whatsoever. Question: what are the three faults of the function's arising spontaneously?

The person would not be the agent;
the function would not always be arising;
arising would not occur all at once —
hence spontaneous arising does not hold.

The exposition: were the function of the eye and the rest to arise spontaneously, not depending on the person's action, then the person would not be an agent — how, then, could it be called the seer, and so on through the cognizer? This is the first fault. Were the function of the eye and the rest to arise spontaneously, it should then always be arising, and should not sometimes arise and sometimes not; this is the second fault. Were the function of the eye and the rest always arising, then its arising should occur all at once — why, then, could all the senses not function simultaneously? This is the third fault. For this reason, to say that it arises spontaneously does not hold. Question: what further fault attaches to taking the person as the condition?

If the person abides, the function was previously absent;
if the person perishes, then the person is cut off;
and were there some further, third substance,
there is no such thing to serve as the condition.

The exposition: if it is said that the person's abiding serves as the condition for its function — since the person would then be constantly existent, why would the function be absent at first and only present later? This does not hold. If it is said that the person's perishing serves as the condition — then the person would fall into impermanence; this too does not hold. If it is said that there is some further, third person, neither abiding nor perishing, that serves as the condition — no such thing exists. Reasoned in this way, a real person cannot be found.

Furthermore, verse:

The seal that all dharmas are without self,
and the teaching of true emptiness;
having a self carries five faults —
hence one knows there is no self.

The exposition: in the Dharma Seal Sūtra, the Buddha taught: all dharmas are without self. In the True Emptiness Sūtra, the Buddha taught: there is karma and there is its ripening, yet no agent can be found; the former aggregates are relinquished, and later aggregates arise — arising and ceasing belong only to dharmas. In the Increase-by-Five Sūtra, it is taught: holding that there is a self carries five faults: first, falling into a view, giving rise to the view of a self and the view of a life-principle; second, being the same as outsiders; third, deviant conduct and wrong practice; fourth, being unwilling toward, without faith in, and unable to abide in emptiness; fifth, being unable to attain the purity of the noble Dharma. Reasoned in this way, according to the scriptures, a real person cannot be found either.

Question: if there is no real person, why does the World-Honored One, in sūtra after sūtra, speak of a person — calling it the knower, the bearer of the burden, and establishing such persons as the one who follows through conviction, and the rest?

Resting on defiled and pure dharmas,
their stages and their severance are said to differ;
conduct differs, and continuity differs —
this is the unreal, conventionally spoken person.

The exposition: resting on defiled dharmas and pure dharmas, there are differences of stage and differences of severance; hence differences among conventional persons are established. Were there no differences among conventional persons, one could not speak of differences in conduct or differences in continuity. As the Knower Sūtra teaches: what dharmas are called defiled? What is called knowing is the pure dharmas. As the Burden Sūtra teaches: what is the burden? The defiled dharmas. What is relinquishing the burden? The pure dharmas. Were there no difference in conduct or in continuity, these two dharmas could not be spoken of as "the knower" and "the one who bears the burden." The dharmas belonging to the factors of enlightenment have many differences of stage — the path of skillful means, the path of seeing, the path of cultivation, and the ultimate path. Were there no difference in conduct or in continuity, one could not speak of these dharmas belonging to the factors of enlightenment as having distinctions of person such as one who follows through conviction. Since there is no real person, conventional speech is possible only in terms of differences among dharmas. By this reasoning, one knows that what is spoken of is merely a conventional person.

Were it not the Buddha's intention to speak of a merely conventional person, then speaking of a real person would serve no purpose, since it would only give rise to sentient beings' view of a self.

Not for the sake of giving rise to the view of a self —
since this view has already arisen;
since it has already been habituated from beginningless time —
it would serve no purpose; and liberation should follow of itself.

The exposition: the Buddha would not have spoken of a real person for the sake of giving rise to sentient beings' view of a self, since sentient beings' view of a self had already arisen beforehand. Nor would he have spoken of a real person in order to make sentient beings habituate the view of a self further, since sentient beings' view of a self had already been habituated beforehand. Nor would he have spoken of a real person in order to liberate beings from the view of a self, since anyone requiring no effort at all should then attain liberation spontaneously. For this reason, every being who has not yet seen the truths has the view of a self yet has no liberation — unlike the substance of suffering, which is not seen at first and only seen later. The person is not like this — it is not that it goes unseen at first and is only seen later. Moreover: just as, were the substance of suffering not seen at first nor seen later either, there would be no liberation — so too with the substance of a person: whether seen at first or seen later, there would, in either case, be no liberation. Were there really a self, there would necessarily also be something belonging to that self, and from these two graspings, self-love and the other afflictions would arise — and thus there would be no liberation at all. For this reason, one should not wish there to be a real person, since all the faults of self-view and the rest would thereby entirely arise. The factors of enlightenment having thus been separately explained, the foregoing meaning is now summarized as a whole.

Shame and embarrassment and the other merits —
the bodhisattva is forever complete with them;
neither forsaking benefit for himself,
he also brings about benefit for others.

The exposition: this meaning is as already displayed above, stated here in brief. The chapter on the factors of enlightenment is complete.