Emptiness, and the Danger of Making It a View
Examining Formations — Examining Bondage and Release觀行品第十三 — 觀縛解品第十六
This is the middle of the treatise and its turning point. Chapter 13 finally names what all the refuting has been for — emptiness — and in the same breath sets the guard that the rest of Buddhist history would keep forgetting: emptiness was taught to release people from views, and anyone who makes a view out of emptiness is past curing. Chapter 15 then supplies the technical backbone, showing that an inherent nature could never have been produced by anything, and that fixing things as existent is eternalism while fixing them as non-existent is annihilationism. Chapter 16 asks who is bound and who is freed, and finds nobody standing on either side of the transaction.
The Text
Chapter 13 · Examining Formations 觀行品第十三
The chapter opens with a line of scripture the opponent produces as an ally and Nāgārjuna takes away from him: the Buddha called the formations deceptive. Piṅgala then walks through all five aggregates in turn — form, feeling, perception, consciousness, formations — hunting for a fixed nature in each and finding, in each, only a succession too fine to cut. Out of that comes the word the treatise has been circling for twelve chapters. And then, having named emptiness, Nāgārjuna spends his last two verses making sure the reader cannot pick it up and carry it away.
問曰：
Question:
如佛經所說， 虛誑妄取相，
諸行妄取故， 是名為虛誑。
As the Buddha's sūtra says:
what is deceptive bears the mark of false grasping;
and because the formations are falsely grasped,
they are for that reason called deceptive.
佛經中說，虛誑者，即是妄取相；第一實者，所謂涅槃，非妄取相。以是經說故，當知有諸行虛誑妄取相。答曰：
In the sūtra the Buddha says that what is deceptive is precisely what bears the mark of false grasping, and that what is foremost and real — namely nirvāṇa — does not bear the mark of false grasping. Since the sūtra says this, one should know that the formations do carry the deceptive mark of false grasping. Answer:
虛誑妄取者， 是中何所取？
佛說如是事， 欲以示空義。
If what is deceptive is what is falsely grasped,
then in it, what is there to grasp?
The Buddha spoke of things in this way
wishing to show the meaning of emptiness.
若妄取相法即是虛誑者，是諸行中為何所取？佛如是說，當知說空義。
If a thing that bears the mark of false grasping is precisely what is deceptive, then in these formations what is there to be grasped? When the Buddha spoke in this way, one should know that he was teaching the meaning of emptiness.
The Five Aggregates, Searched One by One
問曰：云何知一切諸行皆是空？
Question: How does one know that all the formations are empty?
答曰：一切諸行虛妄相故空。諸行生滅不住，無自性故空。諸行名五陰，從行生故。五陰名行，是五陰皆虛妄無有定相。何以故？如嬰兒時色非匍匐時色、匍匐時色非行時色、行時色非童子時色、童子時色非壯年時色、壯年時色非老年時色。如色念念不住故，分別決定性不可得。
嬰兒色為即是匍匐色乃至老年色，為異，二俱有過。何以故？若嬰兒色即是匍匐色乃至老年色者，如是則是一色皆為嬰兒，無有匍匐乃至老年。又如泥團常是泥團，終不作瓶。何以故？色常定故。若嬰兒色異匍匐色者，則嬰兒不作匍匐、匍匐不作嬰兒。何以故？二色異故。如是童子、少年、壯年、老年色不應相續有，失親屬法無父無子。若爾者，唯有嬰兒應得父，餘則匍匐乃至老年不應有分。是故二俱有過。
Answer: All formations are empty because they bear a false mark. Formations arise and cease and do not abide; having no inherent nature (svabhāva), they are empty. "Formations" is a name for the five aggregates, since the aggregates are produced from formation; and the five aggregates are called formations. These five aggregates are all false and have no fixed mark. Why? The form of infancy is not the form of the crawling child; the form of the crawling child is not the form of the child who walks; the form of the child who walks is not the form of the boy; the form of the boy is not the form of the man in his prime; the form of the man in his prime is not the form of the old man. Since form does not abide from one moment to the next, no fixed nature can be found by analyzing it.
Is the infant's form the very same as the crawling child's form and so on up to the old man's, or is it a different form? Both alternatives are at fault. Why? If the infant's form were the very same as the crawling child's and so on up to the old man's, then there would be a single form and all of it would be infancy: there would be no crawling child and none of the rest up to the old man. It would be like a lump of clay that is always a lump of clay and never becomes a pot — because form would be permanently fixed. And if the infant's form were different from the crawling child's form, then the infant would not become the crawling child, nor the crawling child the infant. Why? Because the two forms are different. In the same way the forms of the boy, the youth, the man in his prime and the old man could not occur in continuous succession; and the very law of kinship would be lost — there would be no father and no son. In that case only the infant would get to have a father, and the rest, from the crawling child up to the old man, would have no share in one. Therefore both alternatives are at fault.
問曰：色雖不定，嬰兒色滅已，相續更生乃至老年色，無有如上過。
Question: Though form is not fixed, the infant's form ceases and then, in continuous succession, is produced again, on up to the form of the old man. So none of the faults above arise.
答曰：嬰兒色相續生者，為滅已相續生？為不滅相續生？若嬰兒色滅，云何有相續？以無因故。如雖有薪可燃，火滅故無有相續。若嬰兒色不滅而相續者，則嬰兒色不滅，常住本相亦無相續。
Answer: When the infant's form is produced in continuous succession, is it produced in succession after having ceased, or produced in succession without having ceased? If the infant's form has ceased, how is there any succession? For there would be no cause of it. Though there is firewood to be burned, once the fire has gone out there is no continuing on. And if the infant's form does not cease and yet continues, then the infant's form does not cease at all: it abides permanently in its original mark, and here too there is no succession.
問曰：我不說滅不滅故相續生，但說不住相似生，故言相續生。
Question: I do not say that succession is produced by way of ceasing or not ceasing. I say only that form does not abide and that what arises resembles what came before — and that is why I speak of production in succession.
答曰：若爾者，則有定色而更生，如是應有千萬種色。但是事不然，如是亦無相續。如是一切處求色無有定相，但以世俗言說故有。如芭蕉樹求實不可得，但有皮葉。如是智者求色相念念滅，更無實色可得，不住色形色相。相似次第生難可分別，如燈炎分別定色不可得，從是定色更有色生不可得。是故色無性故空，但以世俗言說故有。
Answer: If that were so, there would be a fixed form that is produced again, and in that case there would have to be a thousand or ten thousand kinds of form. But this will not do, and on this account too there is no succession. Search for form anywhere at all in this way and it has no fixed mark; it exists only by the speech of the world. It is like a plantain tree: search it for a core and none can be found, there are only sheath and leaf. So too one who is wise, searching for the mark of form, finds it ceasing moment by moment, with no real form to be had and nothing abiding as form's shape or form's mark. What arises next resembles what came before and is hard to tell apart — as with the flame of a lamp, no fixed form can be picked out, and no arising of a further form out of that fixed form can be found either. Therefore form is empty because it has no nature; it exists only by the speech of the world.
受亦如是，智者種種觀察，次第相似故生滅難可別知，如水流相續，但以覺故說三受在身。是故當知，受同色說。
想因名相生，若離名相則不生。是故佛說，分別知名字相故名為想。非決定先有，從眾緣生無定性，無定性故如影隨形。因形有影、無形則無影，影無決定性。若定有者，離形應有影。而實不爾，是故從眾緣生，無自性故不可得。想亦如是，但因外名相，以世俗言說故有。
Feeling is the same. One who is wise examines it in every way: because what comes next resembles what came before, its arising and ceasing are hard to tell apart, like the continuous flow of water. It is only because there is awareness of them that one speaks of the three feelings as present in the body. Therefore know that what is said of feeling is what was said of form.
Perception arises in dependence on names and marks; apart from names and marks it does not arise. This is why the Buddha said that because it discriminates and knows the mark of a name it is called perception. It is not something definitely present beforehand. Arising from a host of conditions it has no fixed nature, and having no fixed nature it is like a shadow following a shape. Because there is a shape there is a shadow; where there is no shape there is no shadow — the shadow has no fixed nature of its own. If it definitely existed there would be a shadow apart from the shape, but in fact there is not. Therefore it arises from a host of conditions, and having no inherent nature it cannot be found. Perception is the same: it depends only on external names and marks, and it exists by the speech of the world.
識因色聲香味觸等、眼耳鼻舌身等生，以眼等諸根別異故，識有別異。是識為在色、為在眼、為在中間？無有決定。但生已識塵識此人、識彼人。知此人識為即是知彼人識。為異是二，難可分別。如眼識，耳識亦難可分別。以難分別故，或言一或言異，無有決定分別，但從眾緣生故，眼等分別故空無自性。如伎人含一珠出已復示人則生疑，為是本珠、為更有異？識亦如是，生已更生，為是本識、為是異識？是故當知，識不住故無自性，虛誑如幻。
Consciousness arises in dependence on form, sound, smell, taste, touch and the rest, and on eye, ear, nose, tongue, body and the rest; and because the faculties, the eye and the others, are separate and different, consciousness has its separations and differences too. Is this consciousness in the object, in the eye, or in between? There is nothing fixed about it. It is only that, once arisen, consciousness knows an object, knows this person, knows that person. Is the consciousness knowing this person the very same as the consciousness knowing that person? Or are the two of them different? They are hard to tell apart. As with eye-consciousness, so with ear-consciousness — equally hard to tell apart. And because they are hard to tell apart, some say they are one and some say they are different; there is no fixed way to distinguish them. They arise only from a host of conditions, and because the eye and the rest are separate discriminations, consciousness is empty and without inherent nature. It is like a performer who holds a pearl in his mouth, brings it out, and shows it again, so that doubt arises: is this the original pearl, or is there another one? Consciousness is the same: having arisen it arises again, and one asks whether this is the original consciousness or a different consciousness. Therefore know that because consciousness does not abide it has no inherent nature; it is deceptive, like a magical illusion.
諸行亦如是。諸行者，身、口、意。行有二種：淨、不淨。何等為不淨？惱眾生、貪著等，名不淨。不惱眾生、實語、不貪著等，名淨，或增或減。淨行者，在人中、欲天、色天、無色天受果報已則減，還作故名增。不淨行者亦如是，在地獄、畜生、餓鬼、阿修羅中受果報已則減，還作故名增。是故諸行有增有減故不住。如人有病，隨宜將適病則除愈，不將適病則還集。諸行亦如是，有增有減故不決定，但以世俗言說故有，因世諦故得見第一義諦。
The formations are the same. "Formations" means those of body, speech, and mind. Formative activity is of two kinds, pure and impure. What is impure? Troubling sentient beings, greed and clinging, and the like — these are called impure. Not troubling sentient beings, truthful speech, not clinging and the like are called pure. And these increase and decrease. One whose activity is pure, having received its fruit among human beings, among the gods of the desire realm, of the form realm, of the formless realm, thereby decreases it; and because he does it again, that is called increase. It is the same for one whose activity is impure: having received its fruit in the hells, among animals, among hungry ghosts, among the asuras, he thereby decreases it, and because he does it again, that is called increase. Therefore, since the formations have increase and decrease, they do not abide. It is like a person who is ill: treated as befits the case, the illness is cured; not treated as befits it, the illness gathers again. The formations are the same: having increase and decrease they are not fixed, and they exist only by the speech of the world — and it is by way of conventional truth that one comes to see ultimate truth.
所謂無明緣諸行，從諸行有識著，識著故有名色，從名色有六入，從六入有觸，從觸有受，從受有愛，從愛有取，從取有有，從有有生，從生有老、死、憂悲苦惱、恩愛別苦、怨憎會苦等，如是諸苦皆以行為本。
佛以世諦故說，若得第一義諦生真智慧者則無明息，無明息故諸行亦不集，諸行不集故見諦所斷身見、疑、戒取等斷，及思惟所斷貪、恚、色染、無色染、調戲無明亦斷。以是斷故一一分滅，所謂無明、諸行、識、名色、六入、觸、受、愛、取、有、生、老死憂悲苦惱恩愛別苦怨憎會苦等皆滅。以是滅故，五陰身畢竟滅更無有餘，唯但有空。是故佛欲示空義故，說諸行虛誑。復次諸法無性故虛誑，虛誑故空。如偈說：
Namely: ignorance conditions the formations; from the formations comes the clinging of consciousness; because consciousness clings there is name-and-form; from name-and-form, the six sense-fields; from the six sense-fields, contact; from contact, feeling; from feeling, craving; from craving, grasping; from grasping, becoming; from becoming, birth; and from birth, aging and death, grief and sorrow, pain and distress, the suffering of parting from those one loves, the suffering of meeting those one hates, and the rest. All such suffering has formation for its root.
The Buddha taught this by way of conventional truth. If one attains ultimate truth and true wisdom is born, then ignorance is stilled; and because ignorance is stilled the formations do not accumulate; and because the formations do not accumulate, what is abandoned by seeing the truths — the view of a self in the body, doubt, the grasping at rules, and the rest — is abandoned, and what is abandoned by cultivation — greed, hatred, attachment to form, attachment to the formless, restlessness, and ignorance — is abandoned as well. Because of that abandoning, each link in turn ceases: ignorance, the formations, consciousness, name-and-form, the six sense-fields, contact, feeling, craving, grasping, becoming, birth, aging and death, grief and sorrow, pain and distress, the suffering of parting from those one loves, the suffering of meeting those one hates — all of it ceases. And because of that ceasing, the body of the five aggregates utterly ceases with nothing left over, and there is only emptiness. It was therefore in order to show the meaning of emptiness that the Buddha said the formations are deceptive. Furthermore: things are deceptive because they have no nature, and because they are deceptive they are empty. As the verse says:
諸法有異故， 知皆是無性；
無性法亦無， 一切法空故。
Because things have difference in them,
we know they are all without nature;
but a natureless thing does not exist either,
for all things are empty.
The engine of this whole long passage is one homely observation: the body of an infant is not the body of a crawler, nor of a walker, nor of a boy, nor of a man in his prime, nor of an old man. Nobody disputes it. Piṅgala's question is what we are entitled to conclude from it. Take the two available answers. If the infant's form is the old man's form, then nothing ever changed, and a person is an infant forever — as a lump of clay that is fixedly and permanently clay never becomes a pot. If the infant's form is another form, then nothing at all carries across, and the consequence he draws is worth sitting with: kinship collapses. Only the infant has a father. The old man is a stranger who was never anybody's son.
The opponent's repair is the obvious one, and it is the one most modern readers reach for too: continuity, 相續. Nothing is identical and nothing is severed; each moment ceases and a similar one arises. Piṅgala presses exactly where it hurts. Did the infant's form cease before the next one arose, or not? If it ceased, the succession has no cause — though there is firewood to be burned, once the fire has gone out there is no continuing on. If it did not cease, it is still here, and there is nothing for anything to continue from. The objector's third try — not ceasing, not persisting, just resemblance — is the honest position, and it is granted almost everything except the one thing it wanted: a fixed form somewhere in the series to be the thing that resembles.
Then the plantain tree, which is the best image in the chapter. Strip a banana trunk looking for the wood at the center and you end with a heap of sheaths on the ground, having removed nothing that was not the tree. That is precisely the shape of the analysis of the aggregates. And notice what Piṅgala does not say. He never says there is no form. He says 但以世俗言說故有 — it exists by the speech of the world. Then the sentence that should be underlined on every page of this treatise: 因世諦故得見第一義諦, it is by way of conventional truth that one comes to see ultimate truth. Convention is not a consolation prize handed to people who cannot manage the real thing. It is the road.
One last distinction, because English readers slide past it constantly. Everything above could be mistaken for a vigorous statement of impermanence, and impermanence was never controversial — the Abhidharma had already worked out that everything is momentary, in far more detail than this. Nāgārjuna's move is one step further and it comes in verse 3. From the fact that things differ we know they have no fixed nature; and then, immediately, a natureless thing does not exist either. He is not replacing solid things with fleeting things. Fleeting things with natures of their own would be just as much a problem. He is removing the nature, not the thing — and then removing "naturelessness" as well, in case you were about to keep it.
Difference, and the Milk That Is Not Yet Curds
諸法無有性。何以故？諸法雖生，不住自性，是故無性。如嬰兒定住自性者，終不作匍匐乃至老年。而嬰兒次第相續有異相現，匍匐乃至老年，是故說見諸法異相故知無性。
Things have no nature. Why? Though things arise, they do not abide in an inherent nature, and so they are without nature. If the infant abided fixedly in an inherent nature, it would never become the crawling child, and so on up to the old man. But the infant, in continuous succession, shows different marks — the crawling child and so on up to the old man. This is why it is said that because one sees different marks in things, one knows they have no nature.
問曰：若諸法異相無性，即有無性法，有何咎？
Question: If things, having different marks, are without nature, then there is such a thing as a natureless thing. What is the fault in that?
答曰：若無性，云何有法？云何有相？何以故？無有根本故。但為破性，故說無性。是無性法若有者，不名一切法空；若一切法空，云何有無性法？
問曰：
Answer: If there is no nature, how can there be a thing? How can there be a mark? Why? Because there is no root to it. "Without nature" was said only in order to break "nature." If this natureless thing existed, one could not say that all things are empty; and if all things are empty, how could there be a natureless thing?
Question:
諸法若無性， 云何說嬰兒，
乃至於老年， 而有種種異？
If things are without nature,
how can one speak of the infant,
on up to the old man,
as having all these differences?
諸法若無性則無有異相，而汝說有異相，是故有諸法性。若無諸法性，云何有異相？答曰：
If things were without nature there would be no different marks; but you say there are different marks, and therefore things have a nature. If things had no nature, how could there be different marks? Answer:
若諸法有性， 云何而得異？
若諸法無性， 云何而有異？
If things have a nature,
how could they come to differ?
And if things have no nature,
how could there be any difference?
若諸法決定有性，云何可得異？性名決定有，不可變異。如真金不可變，又如暗性不變為明、明性不變為暗。復次：
If things definitely had a nature, how could they come to differ? "Nature" names what definitely exists and cannot be altered — as true gold cannot be altered, and as the nature of darkness does not change into light, nor the nature of light into darkness. Furthermore:
是法則無異， 異法亦無異，
如壯不作老， 老亦不作壯。
The thing itself has no difference in it,
and another thing has no difference either —
as the man in his prime does not make the old man,
and the old man does not make the man in his prime.
若法有異者，則應有異相。為即是法異？為異法異？是二不然。若即是法異，則老應作老；而老實不作老。若異法異者，老與壯異，壯應作老；而壯實不作老。二俱有過。
If a thing had difference, there would have to be a mark of difference. Is it the thing itself that differs, or is it another thing that differs? Neither will do. If the thing itself differed, then the old man would have to make the old man — and in fact the old man does not make the old man. And if another thing differed, then, since the old man differs from the man in his prime, the man in his prime would have to make the old man — and in fact the man in his prime does not make the old man. Both alternatives are at fault.
問曰：若法即異，有何咎？如今眼見年少經日月歲數則老。答曰：
Question: If the thing itself is what differs, what is the fault? One now sees with one's own eyes that a young man, after days and months and a count of years, grows old. Answer:
若是法即異， 乳應即是酪；
離乳有何法， 而能作於酪？
If this thing itself is what differs,
then milk should already be curds;
and apart from milk, what thing is there
that could make the curds?
若是法即異者，乳應即是酪，更不須因緣。是事不然。何以故？乳與酪有種種異故。乳不即是酪，是故法不即異。若謂異法為異者，是亦不然，離乳更有何物為酪？如是思惟，是法不異、異法亦不異，是故不應偏有所執。
If the thing itself were what differs, milk would already be curds and no further causes and conditions would be needed. This will not do. Why? Because milk and curds differ in all sorts of ways. Milk is not curds, and so it is not the thing itself that differs. And if you say it is another thing that differs, that will not do either: apart from milk, what other stuff is there to become curds? Reflecting in this way — the thing itself does not differ, and another thing does not differ either — one should not cling one-sidedly to either side.
The Last Two Verses: Emptiness, and Its Warning
問曰：破是、破異猶有空在，空即是法。答曰：
Question: You have broken "the thing itself" and broken "another thing," but emptiness is still standing there — and emptiness is a thing. Answer:
若有不空法， 則應有空法；
實無不空法， 何得有空法？
If there were a thing that was not empty,
then there would be a thing that was empty;
but in fact there is no thing that is not empty —
so how could there be a thing that is empty?
若有不空法，相因故應有空法。而上來種種因緣破不空法，不空法無故則無相待，無相待故何有空法？
If there were a non-empty thing, then, since the two are established in reliance on each other, there would be an empty thing. But all the arguments above have broken the non-empty thing; and because there is no non-empty thing there is nothing left to stand in mutual dependence with it — and where there is no mutual dependence, how could there be an empty thing?
問曰：汝說不空法無故空法亦無。若爾者，即是說空但無相待，故不應有執。若有對應有相待、若無對則無相待，相待無故則無相，無相故則無執。如是即為說空。答曰：
Question: You say that because there is no non-empty thing there is no empty thing either. If so, then this is itself a teaching of emptiness — only, since there is no mutual dependence, there should be no clinging. If there is an opposite there is mutual dependence; if there is no opposite there is no mutual dependence; and where there is no mutual dependence there is no mark, and where there is no mark there is no clinging. Just so is emptiness taught. Answer:
大聖說空法， 為離諸見故；
若復見有空， 諸佛所不化。
The great sage taught the dharma of emptiness
in order to release people from every view;
but those who then hold a view of emptiness —
these the buddhas cannot cure.
大聖為破六十二諸見，及無明、愛等諸煩惱故說空。若人於空復生見者，是人不可化。譬如有病須服藥可治，若藥復為病則不可治。如火從薪出以水可滅，若從水生為用何滅？如空是水，能滅諸煩惱火，有人罪重貪著心深，智慧鈍故於空生見，或謂有空、或謂無空，因有無還起煩惱。若以空化此人者，則言我久知是空，若離是空則無涅槃道。如經說，離空無相無作門得解脫者，但有言說。
The great sage taught emptiness in order to break the sixty-two views, and the afflictions — ignorance, craving, and the rest. But if a person gives rise in turn to a view about emptiness, that person cannot be cured. It is like an illness: one takes the medicine and can be treated; but if the medicine itself becomes the illness, there is no treating it. Or like fire: fire comes out of firewood and can be put out with water; but if fire arose from water, what would one use to put it out? Emptiness is the water — it can put out the fire of all the afflictions. But there are people whose offenses are heavy and whose clinging runs deep, and who, their wisdom being dull, give rise to a view about emptiness: some say emptiness exists, some say it does not, and out of that existence and non-existence the afflictions arise all over again. And if one tries to cure such a person with emptiness, he says, "I have known this emptiness for a long time; apart from this emptiness there is no path to nirvāṇa." As the sūtra says, one who claims to attain liberation apart from the gates of emptiness, signlessness, and non-action is merely talking.
Two verses, and they have to be taken together. Verse 8 first, because it clears the ground. The objector has been watching the demolition and has drawn the natural conclusion: something is left standing at the end, and its name is emptiness. Nāgārjuna's reply is a piece of plain logic about correlative terms. "Empty" only ever meant anything against "non-empty," the way "left" means something only against "right," or "short" against "long." Take away every non-empty thing and "empty" has lost the term it was defined against; it does not then survive on its own as a large fact about reality. It stops describing anything at all. This is why Madhyamaka insists that emptiness is not a substance, not a ground, not the way things secretly are underneath. It is not a fifth item discovered after the four corners have been refuted. It is the name of the refuting.
Which brings us to verse 9, the single most important quatrain in the treatise, and the one to carry away if only one is carried. 大聖說空法，為離諸見故；若復見有空，諸佛所不化。 Emptiness is not a doctrine about what exists. It is a procedure for loosening a grip — taught in order to release people from views, all of them, including any that might form around emptiness itself. And then the line that has no real parallel elsewhere in Buddhist literature: those who make a view out of emptiness are 諸佛所不化, past what the buddhas can do for them. Not merely mistaken. Unreachable.
Piṅgala explains why with two images that are worth keeping. The first is medicine that has become the illness; the physician has nothing left in the bag. The second is sharper: fire comes from wood, and water puts it out — but if fire came out of water, what would you use? Emptiness is the water. It is the one solvent for clinging there is. A person who has learned to cling to emptiness has developed an immunity to the only remedy. Notice too that Piṅgala's diagnosis is not intellectual failure but weight of habit — 罪重貪著心深，智慧鈍, heavy offenses, deep clinging, dull wisdom. Such a person hears the teaching and instantly makes a position of it: some say emptiness exists, some say it does not — and out of those two the whole machinery starts up again. Worse, he now has the vocabulary. "I have known this emptiness for a long time." Nothing you say can be news to him.
This is the answer to every reader who suspects that Madhyamaka is nihilism, and it should be read in the opposite direction from the one that first suggests itself. Nāgārjuna is not saying "nothing exists" and then softening it with a qualifier. He is saying that "nothing exists" is itself one of the views emptiness was meant to dissolve — the annihilationist half of the pair that Chapter 15 is about to name. Someone who has actually understood emptiness does not hold that things are unreal; he holds nothing at all in that department, which is why he can get on with the entirely ordinary business of planting grain, keeping precepts, and treating people decently. Chapter 24 will state the positive version — 以有空義故，一切法得成, because emptiness holds good, everything is possible. This verse is its guardrail. The moment emptiness becomes something you have, it has stopped being emptiness and become one more possession.
Chapter 14 · Examining Combination 觀合品第十四
A short, dry, easily skipped chapter that is doing more than it looks. Its target is the assumption underneath every account of perception: that experience is assembled when separate parts meet — eye here, color there, a self somewhere, and seeing happens when the three come together. Nāgārjuna's answer is that combination requires difference, and difference cannot be found anywhere on its own.
說曰：上〈破根品〉中說見、所見、見者皆不成。此三事無異法故則無合。無合義今當說。問曰：何故眼等三事無合？答曰：
It is explained: In the earlier chapter refuting the faculties it was said that seeing, the seen, and the seer are none of them established. Since these three are not different things, there is no combination among them. The meaning of "no combination" will now be stated. Question: Why is there no combination among the three, the eye and the rest? Answer:
見可見見者， 是三各異方；
如是三法異， 終無有合時。
Seeing, the visible, and the seer —
these three are each in a different place;
and since these three things are different,
there is never a time when they combine.
見是眼根、可見是色塵、見者是我，是三事各在異處，終無合時。異處者，眼在身內，色在身外，我者或言在身內、或言遍一切處，是故無合。復次若謂有見法，為合而見、不合而見？二俱不然。何以故？若合而見者，隨有塵處應有根有我。但是事不然，是故不合。若不合而見者，根我塵各在異處亦應有見，而不見。何以故？如眼根在此，不見遠處瓶，是故二俱不見。
Seeing is the eye faculty, the visible is the object form, and the seer is the self. These three are each in a different place, and there is never a time when they combine. As to "different places": the eye is inside the body, form is outside the body, and as for the self, some say it is inside the body and some say it pervades everywhere. Therefore there is no combination. Furthermore, if you hold that there is such a thing as seeing — does it see in combination, or without combination? Neither will do. Why? If it saw in combination, then wherever the object was, the faculty and the self would have to be there too; but this will not do, and so there is no combination. And if it saw without combination, then the faculty, the self, and the object, each in its different place, ought still to see — and they do not. Why? The eye faculty is here, and it does not see a pot far away. Therefore neither alternative sees.
問曰：我、意、根、塵四事合，故有知生，能知瓶衣等萬物，是故有見、可見、見者。
Question: The four — self, mind, faculty, and object — come together, and so knowing arises, able to know the ten thousand things, pots and cloths and the rest. Therefore there are seeing, the visible, and the seer.
答曰：是事〈根品〉中已破，今當更說。汝說四事合故知生，是知為見瓶衣等物已生、為未見而生？若見已生者，知則無用。若未見而生者，是則未合。云何有知生？若謂四事一時合而知生，是亦不然。若一時生則無相待。何以故？先有瓶、次見、後知生，一時則無先後。知無故，見、可見、見者亦無。如是諸法如幻如夢無有定相，何得有合？無合故空。復次：
Answer: This was already broken in the chapter on the faculties, but let it be stated again. You say that because the four come together, knowing arises. Does this knowing arise after the pot or the cloth has been seen, or does it arise before it has been seen? If it arises after seeing, the knowing is of no use. If it arises before seeing, then there has been no combination yet — so how does knowing arise? And if you say the four combine at one and the same moment and knowing arises then, that will not do either: if they arose at a single moment there would be no dependence of one upon another. Why? First there is the pot, next the seeing, and afterward knowing arises; but at a single moment there is no before and after. And since there is no knowing, seeing, the visible, and the seer do not exist either. Things in this way are like an illusion, like a dream, without any fixed mark. How could there be combination? Because there is no combination, they are empty. Furthermore:
染與於可染， 染者亦復然，
餘入餘煩惱， 皆亦復如是。
Defilement, and what can be defiled,
and the one defiled are just the same;
and so too the remaining sense-fields
and the remaining afflictions, all alike.
如見、可見、見者無合故，染、可染、染者亦應無合。如說見、可見、見者三法，則說聞、可聞、聞者餘入等。如說染、可染、染者，則說瞋、可瞋、瞋者餘煩惱等。復次：
Just as seeing, the visible, and the seer have no combination, defilement, what can be defiled, and the one defiled have no combination either. What is said of the three — seeing, the visible, the seer — is thereby said of hearing, the audible, the hearer, and the remaining sense-fields. And what is said of defilement, the defilable, and the defiled is thereby said of anger, what can be raged at, the angry one, and the remaining afflictions. Furthermore:
異法當有合， 見等無有異，
異相不成故， 見等云何合？
It is different things that should combine,
but seeing and the rest have no difference;
and since the mark of difference is not established,
how could seeing and the rest combine?
凡物皆以異故有合，而見等異相不可得，是故無合。復次：
Things in general combine because they are different; but no mark of difference can be found in seeing and the rest. Therefore there is no combination. Furthermore:
非但見等法， 異相不可得；
所有一切法， 皆亦無異相。
Not only in seeing and the rest
can no mark of difference be found:
in all things there are,
there is likewise no mark of difference.
非但見、可見、見者等三事異相不可得，一切法皆無異相。問曰：何故無有異相？答曰：
Not only in the three — seeing, the visible, and the seer — can no mark of difference be found; all things whatsoever are without a mark of difference. Question: Why is there no mark of difference? Answer:
異因異有異， 異離異無異；
若法從因出， 是法不異因。
A difference is different in dependence on a difference;
apart from difference there is no difference.
If a thing issues from a cause,
that thing is not different from its cause.
汝所謂異，是異因異法故名為異。離異法不名為異。何以故？若法從眾緣生，是法不異因，因壞果亦壞故。如因樑椽等有舍，舍不異樑椽，樑椽等壞舍亦壞故。問曰：若有定異法，有何咎？答曰：
What you call difference is called difference because it depends on a thing that differs; apart from a thing that differs it is not called difference at all. Why? If a thing arises from a host of conditions, that thing is not different from its cause, for when the cause breaks the fruit breaks along with it. Just as there is a house in dependence on beams and rafters: the house is not different from the beams and rafters, for when the beams and rafters break, the house breaks too. Question: If there is a fixed thing that differs, what is the fault? Answer:
若離從異異， 應餘異有異；
離從異無異， 是故無有異。
If there were a difference apart from what differs by dependence,
there would have to be difference in some other difference;
but apart from what differs by dependence there is no difference,
and therefore there is no difference at all.
若離從異有異法者，則應離餘異有異法。而實離從異無有異法，是故無餘異。如離五指異，有拳異者，拳異應於瓶等異物有異。今離五指異，拳異不可得，是故拳異於瓶等無有異法。
If there were a differing thing apart from what differs by dependence, then there would have to be a differing thing apart from the other differences as well. But in fact, apart from what differs by dependence, there is no differing thing, and so there is no other difference. Suppose the difference that is a fist existed apart from the difference that is the five fingers: then the fist's difference would have to differ from other things such as a pot. But in fact, apart from the difference of the five fingers, the fist's difference cannot be found; and so the fist's difference is not a thing that differs from a pot or anything else.
問曰：我經說，異相不從眾緣生，分別總相故有異相，因異相故有異法。答曰：
Question: Our scripture says that the mark of difference does not arise from a host of conditions: it is because one analyzes the general mark that there is a mark of difference, and it is on account of the mark of difference that there are things that differ. Answer:
異中無異相， 不異中亦無；
無有異相故， 則無此彼異。
In what differs there is no mark of difference,
and in what does not differ there is none either;
and since there is no mark of difference,
there is no difference of this from that.
汝言分別總相故有異相，因異相故有異法。若爾者，異相從眾緣生，如是即說眾緣法，是異相離異法不可得故。異相因異法而有，不能獨成。今異法中無異相。何以故？先有異法故，何用異相？不異法中亦無異相。何以故？若異相在不異法中，不名不異法。若二處俱無，即無異相，異相無故此彼法亦無。復次，異法無故亦無合。
You say that because one analyzes the general mark there is a mark of difference, and that on account of the mark of difference there are things that differ. If that is so, then the mark of difference arises from a host of conditions — which is to say it is itself a thing produced by conditions, since this mark of difference cannot be found apart from the thing that differs. The mark of difference exists in dependence on a differing thing and cannot stand up on its own. Now, in a differing thing there is no mark of difference. Why? Because the differing thing is already there beforehand — what use would a mark of difference be? And in a non-differing thing there is no mark of difference either. Why? If the mark of difference were in a non-differing thing, it would not be called a non-differing thing. And if it is absent in both places, then there is no mark of difference at all; and because there is no mark of difference, this thing and that thing do not exist either. Furthermore, because there are no differing things, there is no combination either.
是法不自合， 異法亦不合，
合者及合時， 合法亦皆無。
A thing does not combine with itself,
nor does a different thing combine;
and the one who combines, the time of combining,
and combination itself are all absent.
是法自體不合，以一故，如一指不自合。異法亦不合，以異故，異事已成不須合故。如是思惟，合法不可得。是故說合者、合時、合法皆不可得。
A thing does not combine with its own substance, because it is one — as one finger does not combine with itself. Nor does a different thing combine, because it is different: a thing already established as different has no need to combine. Reflecting in this way, combination cannot be found. Therefore it is said that the one who combines, the time of combining, and combination itself can none of them be found.
Nobody today loses sleep over whether the eye, a patch of color, and a self "combine." But the assumption under the question is very much alive, and it is the one this chapter is aimed at: that experience is put together out of parts that meet. Piṅgala's first move is disarmingly physical. The eye is inside the body; the form is outside it; and the self, on whichever theory you prefer, is either inside the body or spread through everything. These three never occupy the same place, so there is no moment at which they arrive at one another. And if you say that seeing happens without their meeting, then the eye ought to see the pot on the far side of the hill — which it does not.
The dilemma about knowing is the sharper argument. Does the knowing arise after the pot has been seen? Then it is idle; the seeing already did the work. Before it has been seen? Then nothing has combined yet, and there is nothing for the knowing to be knowing of. All at once, in a single moment? Then the before-and-after that combination was supposed to supply has vanished — first the pot, then the seeing, then the knowing was the whole story, and a single moment has no "then."
What generalizes out of this is the point of the chapter, and it is the fist and the five fingers that make it plain. Two things can only combine if they are two, so combination needs difference to be a real feature of the world, findable in things. But the fist's difference is not an extra item sitting alongside the fingers that you could carry over and compare with a pot. There is no fist-difference apart from the finger-difference; take away the fingers and there is nothing left to be different. Difference is not a property that things carry. It is a relation we lay across them afterward — and combination needed it to be a property. This is the same reciprocity that dismantled cause and fruit back in Chapter 1, run now through the machinery of perception.
Chapter 15 · Examining Being and Non-Being 觀有無品第十五
This is the treatise's technical center, and the chapter most worth memorizing. It defines inherent nature (svabhāva) strictly enough that the definition does the refuting by itself: a nature is what is not made and does not wait on anything else — so a nature that came out of conditions is a contradiction in terms. Then it names the two ditches on either side of the road, permanence and annihilation, and shows that they are produced by the same error.
問曰：諸法各有性，以有力用故，如瓶有瓶性、布有布性，是性眾緣合時則出。答曰：
Question: Things each have a nature, since each has its power and function: a pot has pot-nature, cloth has cloth-nature. And this nature emerges when the host of conditions comes together. Answer:
眾緣中有性， 是事則不然；
性從眾緣出， 即名為作法。
That there is a nature in the host of conditions —
this will not do;
a nature that comes out of conditions
is by that very fact a made thing.
若諸法有性，不應從眾緣出。何以故？若從眾緣出，即是作法，無有定性。問曰：若諸法性從眾緣作，有何咎？答曰：
If things had an inherent nature, it ought not to come out of a host of conditions. Why? Because whatever comes out of conditions is a made thing, and has no fixed nature. Question: If the nature of things is made by a host of conditions, what is the fault? Answer:
性若是作者， 云何有此義？
性名為無作， 不待異法成。
If a nature were something made,
how could that make any sense?
"Nature" names what is unmade
and does not wait on another thing to be established.
如金雜銅則非真金，如是若有性，則不須眾緣，若從眾緣出，當知無真性。又性若決定，不應待他出，非如長短、彼此，無定性故待他而有。問曰：諸法若無自性，應有他性。答曰：
Gold mixed with copper is not true gold; just so, if there were an inherent nature, no host of conditions would be needed, and if it comes out of conditions, know that there is no true nature there. Moreover, if a nature were fixed, it ought not to wait on something else in order to emerge — unlike long and short, or this and that, which, having no fixed nature, exist only by waiting on something else. Question: If things have no inherent nature, then they must have other-nature. Answer:
法若無自性， 云何有他性？
自性於他性， 亦名為他性。
If a thing has no inherent nature,
how could it have other-nature?
For an inherent nature, seen from another's side,
is itself called other-nature.
諸法性眾緣作故，亦因待成，故無自性。若爾者，他性於他亦是自性，亦從眾緣生相待故，亦無。無故，云何言諸法從他性生？他性亦是自性故。問曰：若離自性、他性有諸法，有何咎？答曰：
The nature of things is made by a host of conditions and is established by dependence, and so there is no inherent nature. And if that is so, then the other-nature is, from the other's own side, its inherent nature; and since it too arises from a host of conditions and stands in mutual dependence, it too does not exist. And since it does not exist, how can one say that things arise from other-nature? For other-nature is itself an inherent nature. Question: If there are things apart from inherent nature and other-nature, what is the fault? Answer:
離自性他性， 何得更有法？
若有自他性， 諸法則得成。
Apart from inherent nature and other-nature,
how could there be any further thing?
Were there inherent nature and other-nature,
then things would indeed be established.
汝說離自性、他性有法者，是事不然。若離自性他性，則無有法。何以故？有自性、他性法則成，如瓶體是自性、依物是他性。問曰：若以自性、他性破有者，今應有無。答曰：
Your claim that there are things apart from inherent nature and other-nature will not do. If inherent nature and other-nature are set aside, there is no thing at all. Why? Because it is when there is an inherent nature and an other-nature that a thing is established — as a pot's own body is its inherent nature, and what it rests on is its other-nature. Question: If you break existence by way of inherent nature and other-nature, then there must now be non-existence. Answer:
有若不成者， 無云何可成？
因有有法故， 有壞名為無。
If existence is not established,
how could non-existence be established?
For it is because there is an existent thing
that the breaking of it is called non-existence.
若汝已受有不成者，亦應受無亦無。何以故？有法壞敗故名無，是無因有壞而有。復次：
If you have already accepted that existence is not established, you should accept that non-existence too does not exist. Why? Because it is when an existing thing breaks down and decays that one calls it non-existent; this non-existence exists in dependence on the breaking down of an existent. Furthermore:
若人見有無， 見自性他性；
如是則不見， 佛法真實義。
Whoever sees existence and non-existence,
who sees inherent nature and other-nature,
that person does not see
the true meaning of the Buddha's teaching.
若人深著諸法，必求有見。若破自性則見他性，若破他性則見有，若破有則見無，若破無則迷惑。若利根著心薄者，知滅諸見安隱故，更不生四種戲論，是人則見佛法真實義。是故說上偈。復次：
A person who clings deeply to things will always go hunting for a view of existence. Break inherent nature and he sees other-nature; break other-nature and he sees existence; break existence and he sees non-existence; break non-existence and he falls into confusion. But one of sharp faculties, whose clinging is thin, knows that the quieting of views is peace, and gives rise to no further conceptual elaboration (prapañca) of these four kinds; that person sees the true meaning of the Buddha's teaching. This is why the verse above was spoken. Furthermore:
佛能滅有無， 如化迦旃延，
經中之所說， 離有亦離無。
The Buddha can put an end to existence and non-existence,
as when he taught Kātyāyana;
in that sūtra it was said
to be free of existence and free of non-existence too.
《刪陀迦旃延經》中，佛為說正見義離有離無。若諸法中少決定有者，佛不應破有無。若破有，則人謂為無。佛通達諸法相故，說二俱無。是故汝應捨有無見。復次：
In the Sūtra Spoken to Kātyāyana, the Buddha, teaching him the meaning of right view, taught freedom from existence and freedom from non-existence. If there were even a little among things that definitely existed, the Buddha would not have broken both existence and non-existence. Had he broken existence alone, people would have taken it to mean non-existence. Because the Buddha has penetrated the character of things, he said that both are absent. You should therefore give up the view of existence and of non-existence. Furthermore:
若法實有性， 後則不應異；
性若有異相， 是事終不然。
If a thing really had a nature,
it could not afterward become different;
that a nature should bear a mark of difference —
this can never be.
若諸法決定有性，終不應變異。何以故？若定有自性，不應有異相，如上真金喻。今現見諸法有異相故，當知無有定相。復次：
If things definitely had a nature, they could never alter. Why? If they definitely had an inherent nature, they ought to bear no mark of difference — as in the simile of true gold above. But we plainly see that things do bear marks of difference; therefore know that they have no fixed mark. Furthermore:
若法實有性， 云何而可異？
若法實無性， 云何而可異？
If a thing really has a nature,
how could it become different?
And if a thing really has no nature,
how could it become different?
若法定有性，云何可變異？若無性，則無自體，云何可變異？復次：
If a thing definitely has a nature, how could it alter? And if it has no nature, then it has no substance of its own — how could that alter? Furthermore:
定有則著常， 定無則著斷；
是故有智者， 不應著有無。
To fix a thing as existent is to cling to permanence;
to fix it as non-existent is to cling to annihilation.
Therefore one who has wisdom
should cling to neither existence nor non-existence.
若法定有有相，則終無無相，是即為常。何以故？如說三世者，未來中有法相，是法來至現在，轉入過去，不捨本相，是則為常。又說因中先有果，是亦為常。若說定有無，是無必先有今無，是則為斷滅，斷滅名無相續因。由是二見，即遠離佛法。
問曰：何故因有生常見、因無生斷見？答曰：
If a thing definitely bore the mark of existence, it could never bear the mark of non-existence — and that is permanence. Why? Consider those who speak of the three times: a thing's mark is present in the future, that thing comes into the present, and then passes over into the past, never giving up its original mark. That is permanence. And those who say the fruit is already present in the cause are teaching permanence too. And if one says that non-existence definitely exists, this non-existence must be a case of what was there before and is not there now — and that is annihilation, "annihilation" being the name for having no cause of continuity. By these two views one goes far away from the Buddha's teaching.
Question: Why does existence give rise to the view of permanence, and non-existence to the view of annihilation? Answer:
若法有定性， 非無則是常；
先有而今無， 是則為斷滅。
If a thing has a fixed nature,
then, never being absent, it is permanent;
and for what was there before to be gone now
is annihilation.
若法性定有，則是有相非無相，終不應無。若無則非有，即為無法，先已說過故，如是則墮常見。若法先有，敗壞而無者，是名斷滅。何以故？有不應無故，汝謂有無各有定相故。若有斷常見者，則無罪福等，破世間事，是故應捨。
If a thing's nature definitely exists, then it bears the mark of existence and not the mark of non-existence, and it can never become non-existent. Were it non-existent it would not be existent, and would be a nothing — and the fault in that has already been stated. So one falls into the view of permanence. And if a thing that was there before decays and is gone, that is called annihilation. Why? Because what exists ought not to become non-existent — and this follows because you hold that existence and non-existence each have a fixed mark. If one holds the view of annihilation or of permanence, then there is no wrongdoing and no merit, and the affairs of the world are destroyed. Both should therefore be given up.
The first two verses are the technical backbone of the entire treatise, and they are short enough to carry in the head. A nature that came out of conditions would be a made thing; but "nature" means precisely what is not made and does not wait on anything else to be what it is. So an inherent nature could never have been produced. There is no such thing as an acquired svabhāva. Everything that has been assembled — which is everything we ever encounter — is disqualified by the definition before the argument even starts.
Piṅgala's two glosses make the point concrete. Gold mixed with copper is not true gold: whatever needed something else in order to be itself was never itself in the first place. And then the sentence that quietly does the most work: unlike long and short, or this and that, which, having no fixed nature, exist only by waiting on something else. Long and short are the paradigm of what a nature is not. Nothing is long by itself; a stick is long beside one thing and short beside another, and no amount of inspecting the stick will find the longness in it. Nāgārjuna's claim is that everything is like the stick.
Verse 3 then closes the escape hatch that Chapter 1 had already named. If a thing has no nature of its own, perhaps it borrows one from another? But the other's nature is, from where that other stands, its own nature — the same thing under a different pronoun. Break inherent nature and other-nature goes with it, because they were never two different kinds of thing. It is also worth noting what the opponent actually said at the top of the chapter: a pot has pot-nature 以有力用故, because it has power and function. Nāgārjuna never denies the function. Pots hold water. What he denies is that the holding is owned by a pot-essence sitting inside the clay.
The last verses name the two ditches, and it is worth seeing exactly where the fault lies. 定有則著常，定無則著斷 — the disease is not existence and it is not non-existence, it is the word 定, fixed. Piṅgala's diagnosis of eternalism is historically precise: the doctrine that a thing's mark waits in the future, arrives in the present, and departs into the past without ever giving up its original mark; and the doctrine that the fruit is already sitting in the cause. Both are ways of having something that survives change intact. Annihilationism is the mirror: what was there is now simply gone, 斷滅名無相續因, with no cause of continuity — nothing carried, nothing owed. And here Piṅgala reaches for the same guardrail that closed the fourth corner in Chapter 1: hold either view and merit and wrongdoing evaporate, and the affairs of the world are destroyed. This is the point at which an English reader should slow down, because "empty" sounds to an English ear exactly like the annihilationist half. It is not the annihilationist half. It is the refusal of the fixing that generates both halves at once.
Chapter 16 · Examining Bondage and Release 觀縛解品第十六
Having taken away inherent nature, Nāgārjuna turns to the thing every reader will now be anxious about: if nothing has a nature of its own, who is it that transmigrates, who is bound, and who gets free? The chapter looks for a party on each side of the transaction — someone bound, someone binding, someone released — and finds nobody standing there. Its last two verses are among the most quoted lines he ever wrote, and among the easiest to misuse. The fivefold search it refers back to was carried out in Part 4, on fire and fuel.
問曰：生死非都無根本，於中應有眾生往來、若諸行往來。汝以何因緣故，說眾生及諸行盡空，無有往來？答曰：
Question: Birth-and-death is not simply without any root. Within it there must be sentient beings that come and go, or formations that come and go. On what grounds do you say that sentient beings and formations are entirely empty, and that there is no coming and going? Answer:
諸行往來者， 常不應往來，
無常亦不應， 眾生亦復然。
If it is formations that come and go,
then as permanent they could not come and go,
and as impermanent they could not either;
and it is the same for sentient beings.
諸行往來六道生死中者，為常相往來？為無常相往來？二俱不然。若常相往來者，則無生死相續，以決定故、自性住故。若以無常往來者，亦無往來生死相續，以不決定故、無自性故。若眾生往來者，亦有如是過。復次：
If formations come and go within birth-and-death in the six destinies, do they come and go under the mark of permanence, or under the mark of impermanence? Neither will do. If they came and went under the mark of permanence, there would be no continuity of birth-and-death, since they would be fixed and would abide in an inherent nature. And if they came and went as impermanent, there would likewise be no coming and going and no continuity of birth-and-death, since they would not be fixed and would have no inherent nature. And if it is sentient beings that come and go, the same faults arise. Furthermore:
若眾生往來， 陰界諸入中，
五種求盡無， 誰有往來者？
If a sentient being comes and goes
among the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields,
the fivefold search finds nothing whatever —
so who is it that comes and goes?
生死陰界入即是一義。若眾生於此陰界入中往來者，是眾生於〈燃可燃品〉中五種求不可得，誰於陰界入中而有往來者？復次：
Birth-and-death and the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields come to one and the same thing. If a sentient being comes and goes among these aggregates, elements, and sense-fields — that being was already sought in five ways in the chapter on fire and fuel, and could not be found. Who, then, is there that comes and goes among the aggregates, elements, and sense-fields? Furthermore:
若從身至身， 往來即無身；
若其無有身， 則無有往來。
If it goes from body to body,
then the one coming and going has no body;
and if it has no body,
there is no coming and going at all.
若眾生往來，為有身往來？為無身往來？二俱不然。何以故？若有身往來，從一身至一身，如是則往來者無身。又若先已有身，不應復從身至身。若先無身則無有，若無有云何有生死往來？
If a sentient being comes and goes, does it come and go with a body, or without one? Neither will do. Why? If it came and went with a body, going from one body to another, then the one coming and going would be without a body. And if it already had a body beforehand, it should not need to go from body to body at all. And if it had no body beforehand, then it does not exist; and if it does not exist, how could there be any coming and going in birth-and-death?
問曰：經說有涅槃滅一切苦，是滅應諸行滅、若眾生滅。答曰：二俱不滅。何以故？
Question: The sūtras say there is a nirvāṇa that extinguishes all suffering. That extinguishing must be either the extinguishing of formations or the extinguishing of a sentient being. Answer: Neither of the two is extinguished. Why?
諸行若滅者， 是事終不然；
眾生若滅者， 是事亦不然。
That formations should be extinguished —
this can never be;
and that a sentient being should be extinguished —
this cannot be either.
汝說若諸行滅、若眾生滅，是事先已答，諸行無有性，眾生亦種種推求生死往來不可得，是故諸行不滅，眾生亦不滅。問曰：若爾者則無縛無解，根本不可得故。答曰：
You speak of the extinguishing of formations or of a sentient being; this has already been answered. Formations have no nature, and a sentient being, sought in every way, cannot be found coming or going in birth-and-death. Therefore formations are not extinguished, and a sentient being is not extinguished either. Question: If that is so, then there is no bondage and no release, since no basis for them can be found. Answer:
諸行生滅相， 不縛亦不解；
眾生如先說， 不縛亦不解。
Formations, marked by arising and ceasing,
are neither bound nor released;
and a sentient being, as was said before,
is neither bound nor released.
汝謂諸行及眾生有縛解者，是事不然。諸行念念生滅故，不應有縛解。眾生先說五種推求不可得，云何有縛解？復次：
Your claim that formations and sentient beings have bondage and release will not do. Formations arise and cease moment by moment, and so they can have no bondage or release. And a sentient being, as was said, cannot be found by the fivefold search — so how could it have bondage or release? Furthermore:
若身名為縛， 有身則不縛，
無身亦不縛， 於何而有縛？
If the body is what is called bondage,
then one who has a body is not bound,
and one without a body is not bound either —
in what, then, is there any bondage?
若謂五陰身名為縛，若眾生先有五陰，則不應縛。何以故？一人有二身故。無身亦不應縛。何以故？若無身則無五陰，無五陰則空，云何可縛？如是第三更無所縛。復次：
If you say that the body of the five aggregates is what is called bondage, then, if a sentient being already has the five aggregates, it should not be bound. Why? Because that would give one person two bodies. And what has no body should not be bound either. Why? If there is no body there are no five aggregates, and with no five aggregates there is emptiness — what could be bound? And so there is no third case in which anything is bound. Furthermore:
若可縛先縛， 則應縛可縛；
而先實無縛， 餘如去來答。
If what can be bound were bound beforehand,
then binding could bind what can be bound;
but in fact there is no prior binding —
the rest is answered as with going and coming.
若謂可縛先有縛，則應縛可縛。而實離可縛先無縛，是故不得言眾生有縛。或言，眾生是可縛、五陰是縛；或言，五陰中諸煩惱是縛、餘五陰是可縛。是事不然。何以故？若離五陰先有眾生者，則應以五陰縛眾生，而實離五陰無別眾生。若離五陰別有煩惱者，則應以煩惱縛五陰，而實離五陰無別煩惱。復次如〈去來品〉中說，已去不去、未去不去、去時不去，如是未縛不縛、縛已不縛、縛時不縛。復次亦無有解。何以故？
If you say that what can be bound is bound beforehand, then binding would bind what can be bound. But in fact, apart from what can be bound, there is no prior binding, and so one cannot say that a sentient being has bondage. Some say the sentient being is what can be bound and the five aggregates are the bondage; others say the afflictions within the five aggregates are the bondage and the remaining aggregates are what can be bound. Neither will do. Why? If there were a sentient being prior to and apart from the five aggregates, then the five aggregates could bind the sentient being; but in fact there is no separate sentient being apart from the five aggregates. And if there were afflictions apart from the five aggregates, then the afflictions could bind the five aggregates; but in fact there are no separate afflictions apart from the five aggregates. Furthermore, as was said in the chapter on going and coming — what has gone is not going, what has not gone is not going, and what is now going is not going — so too what has not been bound is not being bound, what has been bound is not being bound, and what is now being bound is not being bound. Furthermore, there is no release either. Why?
縛者無有解， 無縛亦無解，
縛時有解者， 縛解則一時。
What is bound has no release,
and what is unbound has no release either;
and were there release while the binding went on,
bondage and release would be at one time.
縛者無有解。何以故？已縛故。無縛亦無解。何以故？無縛故。若謂縛時有解，則縛解一時，是事不然，又縛解相違故。
問曰：有人修道現入涅槃得解脫，云何言無？答曰：
What is bound has no release. Why? Because it is already bound. What is unbound has no release either. Why? Because there is no bondage. And if you say there is release while the binding is going on, then bondage and release are at one and the same time — which will not do; and besides, bondage and release contradict each other.
Question: There are people who practice the path, enter nirvāṇa in this very life, and attain liberation. How can you say there is none? Answer:
若不受諸法， 我當得涅槃；
若人如是者， 還為受所縛。
"If I do not cling to things,
I shall attain nirvāṇa" —
whoever thinks in this way
is bound by clinging all over again.
若人作是念：我離受得涅槃。是人即為受所縛。復次：
If a person thinks, "Apart from clinging I shall attain nirvāṇa," that person is by that very thought bound by clinging. Furthermore:
不離於生死， 而別有涅槃，
實相義如是， 云何有分別？
There is no nirvāṇa standing apart,
separate from birth-and-death;
such is the meaning of the reality of things —
how could there be any dividing?
諸法實相第一義中，不說離生死別有涅槃。如經說，涅槃即生死、生死即涅槃。如是諸法實相中，云何言是生死、是涅槃？
In the reality of things, in the ultimate sense, one does not say that there is a nirvāṇa standing separate and apart from birth-and-death. As the sūtra says: nirvāṇa is birth-and-death, and birth-and-death is nirvāṇa. In the reality of things so understood, how can one say "this is birth-and-death" and "that is nirvāṇa"?
The chapter is built as a search for a party to a transaction, and it comes up empty at every window. Who transmigrates? If the formations are permanent they cannot travel — a fixed thing abiding in its own nature has nowhere to go and no way to change destination. If they are impermanent there is nothing that lasts long enough to arrive. And a person cannot be slipped in as the traveler either, because the person was already hunted through five positions in the fire-and-fuel chapter and was not in any of them. The body dilemma seals it with a nice piece of common sense: if something goes from body to body, then at the moment of transit it is between bodies and has none; and if it had a body already, it did not need to go anywhere.
Then bondage, and the same shape of answer. If the five aggregates are the chain, a being who already has them cannot be bound by them — you would need a second body for the first to be tied to. A being without them is not there to be tied at all. And there is no third option, because "the person" and "the aggregates" were never two things that could be roped together: apart from the aggregates there is no separate person to bind, and apart from the aggregates there are no separate afflictions to do the binding. Release fares no better. What is bound is already bound, so nothing is happening to it; what is unbound has nothing to be released from; and release occurring during binding would put the chain on and take it off in the same instant.
Verse 9 is where this stops being clever and becomes uncomfortably close to home. If I stop clinging, I will get nirvāṇa. It is the most natural sentence a practitioner ever forms, and Nāgārjuna points out that it is a grasping sentence from end to end: it has an I, a thing to be obtained, and a plan for obtaining it. The non-clinging has been made into a technique for acquisition, which means the acquiring has simply changed costume. There is no way to want your way out of wanting.
Which sets up the last verse, and this is the one most often quoted and most often abused. 涅槃即生死、生死即涅槃 does not mean that nothing needs to change, that practice is unnecessary, or that saṃsāra is fine exactly as it is — read that way it would contradict every page of the chapters on suffering and the path. What is denied is that nirvāṇa is a place elsewhere: one more entity, with a nature of its own, to be reached by a self with a nature of its own, across a gap between two fixed regions. Take away the fixed natures on both sides and the gap has nothing to stretch between. Set this beside Chapter 13's warning and they turn out to be one teaching in two vocabularies. The person who has made emptiness into a view he holds, and the person who has made nirvāṇa into a prize he will one day own, are making exactly the same mistake — and both are still standing where they were, holding something.
Key Terms
| Term | Chinese | What it means here |
|---|---|---|
| saṃskāra — formations | 諸行 | Conditioned, put-together activity: the volitional formations of body, speech, and mind, and by extension all five aggregates. Chapter 13's title term, and the thing the Buddha called "deceptive." |
| continuous succession | 相續 | The opponent's repair for impermanence: nothing persists, nothing is severed, each moment gives way to a similar one. Piṅgala's question is what holds the series together once no member of it has a nature. |
| saṃsarga — combination | 合 | The meeting of separate parts that is supposed to produce experience. Chapter 14 shows it requires difference to be a real property of things, which it is not. |
| conventional truth / ultimate truth | 世諦／第一義諦 | Not two realities but two registers. Chapter 13's key sentence — 因世諦故得見第一義諦 — makes convention the road to the ultimate, not an obstacle in front of it. |
| permanence / annihilation | 常／斷 | The two ditches. Fixing a thing as existent produces the first; fixing it as non-existent produces the second. The fault is in the fixing, 定, not in either term. |
| bondage / release | 縛／解 | Chapter 16's pair. Correlative like cause and fruit: neither survives once the other has no bearer, and the treatise refuses to hand the reader either one to hold. |
| upādāna — clinging | 受 | Here the ninth link's appropriation, not "feeling." Verse 9 turns it on the practitioner: the plan to stop clinging in order to gain nirvāṇa is itself an act of it. |