Notes Beside the Bamboo Window — Third Collection, Part 4
Continuing the Third Collection (三筆). Three linked entries of genuine textual scholarship: a careful, two-sided review of a Ming monk's attacks on Sengzhao's classical treatises and on Guifeng Zongmi, a defense of Qingliang Chengguan's commentary against a partisan critic, and Zhuhong's own reflection on when criticizing revered past masters is legitimate and when it becomes mere quarrelsome habit.
15. 肇論 — The Treatises of Sengzhao
A careful, partly sympathetic review of Master Kongyin's attacks on Sengzhao's "Treatise on the Immutability of Things" and on Guifeng Zongmi's account of Bodhidharma — finding Kongyin wrong on two specific points, but conceding he was right on two others.
空印駮肇公「物不遷論」,予昔為之解,今復思之:空印胡繇而為此駮?其繇有二,一者不察來意,二者太執常法。不察來意者,若人問物何故不遷,則應答云:「以性空故。」今彼以昔物不至今為物遷,而漫然折以性空;性空雖是聖語,然施於此,則儱統之談,非對機破的之論也。得無似作文者,辭句雖佳而不切於本題者乎?太執常法者,僧問大珠:「如何是大涅槃?」珠云:「不造生死業。」此常法也。又問:「如何是生死業?」珠云:「求大涅槃是生死業。」在常法,必答以「隨妄而行是生死業」矣,今乃即以「求大涅槃為生死業」,與肇公即以「物不至今為不遷」意正同也,故無以駮為也。又空印謂圭峰不當以達磨直指之禪為六度之一,圭峰何處有此語?其所著《禪源詮》云:「達磨未到,諸家所解,皆是四禪八定之禪。南嶽天台所立教義雖極圓妙,然其趨入門戶次第亦只是前之諸禪。唯達磨所傳,頓同佛體,迥異諸門。」其說如此明顯,而曰以直指禪為六度禪,則吾所未諳也。雖然,空印駮肇公之論「不遷」,呵圭峰之議初祖,則誠過矣;至其謂圭峰不當以荷澤為獨紹曹溪,天台門下所論或多不出於大師之口,此二說者確論也。
Master Kongyin refuted Sengzhao's own "Treatise on the Immutability of Things" — I addressed this myself once before, and now reconsider the matter again: on what grounds did Kongyin mount this refutation? There are two reasons, I think: first, a failure to grasp the question's actual intent; second, an excessive attachment to conventional formulas.
As for failing to grasp the intent: suppose someone asks why things do not shift and change, and the answer given is simply "because of the emptiness of inherent nature." But the questioner is really asking about how a past thing fails to persist into the present — calling this "the shifting of things" — while the one answering responds only with the vague generality of "emptiness of nature." Emptiness of nature is certainly a sagely teaching, but applied here it becomes only a broad, imprecise remark, not an answer that truly meets the actual question. Is this not exactly like a piece of writing whose phrasing is elegant but entirely misses its own stated topic?
As for excessive attachment to conventional formulas: consider when a monk asked Master Dazhu Huihai, "What is great nirvana?" Dazhu answered: "Not creating the karma of birth and death." This is the conventional formula. The monk asked further: "What, then, is the karma of birth and death?" Dazhu answered: "Seeking great nirvana is itself the karma of birth and death." By the conventional formula, one would expect the answer to be "following delusion is the karma of birth and death" — and yet here Dazhu instead answers with "seeking great nirvana is itself the karma of birth and death," which is exactly the same logic as Sengzhao's own claim that "a past thing failing to reach the present is precisely immutability." There is no need at all, then, to refute it.
Kongyin further holds that Guifeng was wrong to classify Bodhidharma's own direct-pointing Chan as merely one among the six perfections — but where did Guifeng ever actually say any such thing? In his own Prolegomenon to the Collected Writings on the Source of Chan, he wrote: "Before Bodhidharma's arrival, every school's understanding amounted only to the meditation of the four dhyānas and eight absorptions. Though Nanyue's and Tiantai's own teachings on the three truths are supremely subtle, the order in which one enters their practice still follows this same earlier form of meditation. Only what Bodhidharma himself transmitted is suddenly identical to the Buddha's own essence, utterly distinct from every other school." Guifeng's own statement here is entirely clear — how, then, could Kongyin accuse him of treating direct-pointing Chan as merely one of the six perfections? This I simply cannot understand.
And yet, while Kongyin's refutation of Sengzhao's "immutability" argument, and his rebuke of Guifeng's own treatment of the First Patriarch, were both genuinely excessive, his further claims — that Guifeng was wrong to treat Heze as the sole true heir of Caoxi, and that many views attributed to Tiantai's own followers did not, in fact, originate from the Great Master's own mouth — are, in fact, correct and well-argued positions.
Sengzhao (384–414) was one of Kumārajīva's most brilliant disciples, celebrated as "foremost in understanding emptiness" among his circle, and his collected treatises (the Zhao Lun) remain foundational early Chinese Buddhist philosophy; Zhuhong had already defended the "Immutability of Things" treatise once before, in the First Collection's own entry on the subject, making this a deliberate return to unfinished business — this time evaluating not the treatise itself but a specific later critic's objections to it, point by point, conceding ground where the critic was right rather than defending Sengzhao unconditionally.
16. 華嚴論疏 — Commentaries and Treatises on the Flower Ornament Sutra
A defense of Qingliang Chengguan's commentary against a partisan layman's charge that its fourfold structural division fragments the Flower Ornament Sutra's own unity — arguing the sutra's sequential stages and its perfect interfusion are two views of a single, seamless whole.
或問:「《肇論》已聞命矣,又一居士力詆清涼者,何如?」予謂:「彼居士惟崇棗柏之論,其詆清涼者,言不當以信解行證分裂全經,大失經旨。不思經開信、住、行、向、地等,其分裂也抑又甚矣!然則佛亦非歟?夫行布圓融,一而二、二而一者也,必去行布,則圓融何物?因該果海,果徹因源,則先後同歸,首尾一貫,無縫無罅,何處覓其分裂也?況論有論體,疏有疏體,發明大意,莫尚乎論;委曲發明,窮深極微,疏鈔之功不可思議。二大士者,皆羽翼《華嚴》之賢聖,不可得而軒輊者也。」予嘗有書達居士,居士不答,未知其允否,因記之。
Someone asked: "I have already heard your view on the Treatises of Sengzhao — now what about a certain layman who fiercely attacks Qingliang?" I answered: "That layman reveres only Li Tongxuan's own Combined Treatise, and his attack on Qingliang concerns Qingliang's use of the fourfold scheme of faith, understanding, practice, and realization to divide up the whole sutra — which, he claims, badly betrays the sutra's own unified purpose. But has he never considered that the sutra itself already sets out the stages of faith, abiding, practice, dedication, and ground? Is that division not even more extensive still? Would this mean the Buddha himself was mistaken?
In truth, the sutra's own 'sequential' and 'perfectly interfused' approaches are one and the same thing seen two ways — remove the sequential structure entirely, and what, then, would 'perfect interfusion' even consist of? As it is said: 'the cause already contains the ocean of the fruit; the fruit traces back to the very source of the cause' — the beginning and end are unified, seamless and unbroken throughout. Where, then, could any real fragmentation possibly be found?
And besides, a treatise has its own proper form, and a commentary has its own proper form as well. In bringing out the sutra's overall meaning, nothing surpasses the Combined Treatise; but in painstakingly elaborating every detail, plumbing the deepest and most minute points of doctrine, the achievement of the Commentary is truly inconceivable. Both great masters served as devoted guardians of the Flower Ornament Sutra — there is simply no basis for ranking one above the other." I once wrote a letter to this same layman on the matter, but he never replied — I do not know whether he ultimately accepted my reasoning, and so I record it here.
Qingliang Chengguan (738–839) and Li Tongxuan (the "Jujube-and-Cypress Bodhisattva," already noted for his ascetic diet while composing his own massive commentary in the Second Collection's entry 139 above) each produced independent, monumental commentaries on the Flower Ornament Sutra from different methodological starting points; Zhuhong's mediation here is characteristic of his approach throughout this project — he does not adjudicate which commentator was "right" so much as argue that treatise and commentary serve different, equally necessary functions, the same move he used to reconcile Konggu, Tianqi, and Dufeng's rival meditation methods in the Second Collection's entry 85.
17. 評議先賢 — Assessing the Worthies of the Past
Zhuhong reflects on when criticizing revered past masters is legitimate scholarship and when it curdles into mere partisan abuse, naming several real contemporary excesses he has personally witnessed before explaining his own restraint.
予既敘《肇論》、《雜華》二事,或曰:「先賢不可評議乎?」予曰:非然也。「今人未必不如古人」,昔有是言矣。然吾嘗思之,三百篇多出於郊野閭閻之歌詠,而後人以才華鳴世者不能及;六群比丘,聖眾所不齒,而賢於佛滅度後馬鳴、龍樹,則古人何可輕也?空印之評,其太過者,止在「物不遷」及「圭峰論達磨」兩處耳,非譏貶清涼者比也。吾見有叱辱溫陵者,罵詈長水者;崇尚天台,則盡毀諸家,無一可其意者。勘妙喜為未悟者,藐中峰為文字知識者,又其甚有謂六祖不及永嘉;而遭其挫折一上者,是安可以不辨也?嗟乎!古人往矣,今人猶存,吾何苦為過去者爭閒氣,而取見存者之不悅乎?顧理有當言,不容終嘿者,餘非所恤也。
Having already set out my own views on the Treatises of Sengzhao and the Flower Ornament commentaries, someone asked: "Are the worthies of the past really beyond criticism?" I answered: not at all. It has long been said that "people today are not necessarily inferior to the ancients." And yet, reflecting further, I would note: the three hundred poems of the Book of Odes largely arose from the songs of ordinary villagers and country folk, and yet later writers celebrated for their own literary brilliance could never match them; and the Six Group monks, whom the sacred assembly itself held in contempt, still ranked, in a sense, above Aśvaghoṣa and Nāgārjuna, who appeared only after the Buddha's own passing — so how, then, could the ancients possibly be dismissed lightly?
As for Kongyin's own criticisms, their real excess lies only in two places — the treatise on "immutability," and his treatment of Guifeng's discussion of Bodhidharma — and these are nothing like the outright denigration of Qingliang I have seen elsewhere. I have witnessed people cursing and insulting Wenling, hurling abuse at Changshui; and others who so revere Tiantai that they demolish every other school entirely, finding nothing whatsoever to their liking anywhere else. Some dismiss Miaoxi as still unawakened, belittle Zhongfeng as a mere scholar of texts, and even go so far as to claim that the Sixth Patriarch himself falls short of Yongjia — and when such people meet with real setbacks of their own, how can this go unaddressed?
Alas! The ancients have already passed away, while people of today still remain among us — why should I trouble myself, quarreling idly on behalf of the departed, only to earn the displeasure of the living? And yet, where genuine principle demands to be spoken, I cannot remain silent to the end — as for anything beyond that, it is simply not my concern.
Miaoxi is Dahui Zonggao, already discussed in the Second Collection for his own eighteen "great awakenings" (entry 125 above) and, in this collection's entry 9, his own student Zhang Zishao's austerity — the claim that Miaoxi himself remained unawakened is exactly the kind of overreaching, purely partisan attack Zhuhong distinguishes here from Kongyin's more measured, mostly defensible textual criticism; the entry functions as Zhuhong's own explicit statement of method for the whole run of scholarly entries surrounding it (15 and 16 above) — criticism grounded in genuine argument is legitimate, criticism as mere sectarian score-settling is not.