Notes Beside the Bamboo Window — Third Collection, Part 42
Continuing the Third Collection (三筆). Zhuhong answers two further objections from the same missionary writings: a strained reductio ad absurdum against the precept forbidding killing sentient beings who may have once been one's own parents, and the missionaries' denial of rebirth, which Zhuhong counters with cases of past-life memory drawn from Chinese historical and literary sources.
119. 天說(二)— On Heaven (Part Two)
Zhuhong answers two further objections drawn from the same missionary writings: a strained reductio ad absurdum against the precept forbidding the killing of sentient beings who may once have been one's own parents in a past life, and the missionaries' outright denial of rebirth, which Zhuhong counters with documented cases of past-life memory drawn from Chinese historical and literary sources.
又問:彼云:「《梵網》言:『一切有生,皆宿生父母,殺而食之,即殺吾父母。』如是,則人亦不得行婚娶,是妻妾吾父母也;人亦不得置婢僕,是役使吾父母也;人亦不得乘騾馬,是陵跨吾父母也。」士人、僧人不能答,如之何?予曰:《梵網》止是深戒殺生,故發此論。意謂恆沙劫來生生受生,生生必有父母,安知彼非宿世父母乎?蓋恐其或己父母,非決其必己父母也。若以辭害意,舉一例百,則儒亦有之,禮禁同姓為婚,故買妾不知其姓則卜之。彼將曰:卜而非同姓也,則婚之固無害。此亦曰:娶妻不知其為父母、為非父母,則卜之。卜而非己父母也,則娶之亦無害矣!《禮》云:「倍年以長,則父事之。」今年少居官者何限,其舁轎引車,張蓋執戟,必兒童而後可;有長者在焉,是以父母為隸卒也。如其可通行而不礙,佛言獨不可通行乎?夫男女之嫁娶,以至車馬僮僕,皆人世之常法,非殺生之慘毒比也。故經止云一切有命者不得殺,未嘗云一切有命者不得嫁娶、不得使令也。如斯設難,是謂騁小巧之迂談,而欲破大道之明訓也,胡可得也?復次,彼書杜撰不根之語,未易悉舉,如謂人死,其魂常在,無輪迴者。既魂常在,禹、湯、文武何不一誡訓於桀、紂、幽厲乎?先秦、兩漢、唐、宋諸君,何不一致罰於斯高、莽操、李楊、秦蔡之流乎?既無輪迴,叔子何能託前生為某家子,明道何能憶宿世之藏母釵乎?羊哀化虎,鄧艾為牛,如斯之類,班班載於儒書,不一而足,彼皆未知,何怪其言之舛也!
The elder asked me further about another passage from their writings: "The Brahma Net Sutra says: 'Every living being has, in some past life, been one's own parent — to kill and eat such a being is to kill one's own parent.' If this is truly so, then a person could never marry at all, since his wife or concubine might be his own parent; a person could never keep a servant or maidservant, since doing so would mean putting his own parent to labor; a person could never ride a mule or a horse, since doing so would mean riding upon his own parent's back." Neither the Confucian scholars nor the monks he consulted could answer this objection — what, then, should one say to it?
I answered: the Brahma Net Sutra's statement was made specifically to establish a profound prohibition against killing living beings, and this is the sole purpose behind it. Its meaning is simply that across countless eons of repeated rebirth, every single life one has ever lived necessarily involved parents of some kind — how, then, could one ever be certain that any given being was not one's own parent in some past life? The sutra merely raises the possibility that a being might be one's own past-life parent; it never asserts that any given being definitely is one's own parent. To seize on the literal wording in order to obscure its actual intent, and then extend a single example into a hundred absurd consequences, is a move the Confucian tradition itself would recognize and reject. Confucian ritual propriety, for instance, forbids marriage between people of the same surname — and so, when purchasing a concubine whose surname is unknown, one is required to divine the matter first. Should someone then object: "Since divination confirms she does not share your surname, there is surely no harm in marrying her" — one could, by the same twisted logic, equally argue: "Since one cannot know for certain whether the woman one intends to marry is or is not one's own parent from a past life, let us simply divine the matter, and if the divination confirms she is not one's own past-life parent, then there is surely no harm in marrying her either!"
The Book of Rites states: "One who is twice your own age should be served as a father would be served." And yet how many young officials today are carried in sedan chairs or driven in carriages, with attendants holding open their parasols and bearing their halberds — duties that, strictly speaking, ought only to be performed by children, and yet are performed instead by grown men, some of whom are older than the officials they serve! If this practice can proceed without hindrance in ordinary life, why should the Buddha's own teaching alone be singled out as impossible to put into practice? The marriage of men and women, and likewise the use of carriages, horses, and servants, are simply the ordinary, established customs of human life, in no way comparable to the horror of taking a living being's life. This is precisely why the sutra states only that no living being should ever be killed — it never once states that no living being should ever be married, or ridden upon, or put to service. To raise such an objection is nothing more than indulging in clever but ultimately empty and roundabout argument, in an attempt to undermine a clear and profound teaching of the great Way — how could such an attempt ever succeed?
Beyond this, their writings contain many other baseless and fabricated claims too numerous to list in full — among them, the assertion that after a person dies, the soul persists permanently, with no rebirth or transmigration at all. But if the soul truly persisted permanently in this way, why did the sage-kings Yu, Tang, Wen, and Wu never once deliver a single warning to the tyrants Jie, Zhòu, Li, and You? Why did none of the rulers of the pre-Qin, Han, Tang, or Song dynasties ever manage to mete out a single punishment to villains such as Li Si, Zhao Gao, Wang Mang, Cao Cao, Li Linfu, Yang Guozhong, Qin Hui, or Cai Jing? And if there truly is no rebirth at all, how could Yang Hu, styled Shuzi, have recalled his own past life as the son of a certain family? How could Cheng Hao, styled Mingdao, have recalled the location of a hairpin his own mother had hidden away in some past life? Stories such as Yang Ai transforming into a tiger, or Deng Ai being reborn as an ox, are recorded plainly and repeatedly throughout the Confucian classics themselves, far too numerous to list — and these foreign writers, being unaware of any of this, should hardly surprise us with the errors in their own claims!
The Brahma Net Sutra's teaching that all sentient beings have, across countless past lives, at some point been one's own parent is a genuine and foundational Mahāyāna precept text passage, already the subject of Zhuhong's own formal commentary cited elsewhere in this collection; the historical figures Zhuhong marshals against the missionaries' denial of rebirth — Yang Hu (羊祜, styled Shuzi), the genuine Western Jin statesman whose childhood recollection of a hidden gold ring from a supposed past life is recorded in the official Book of Jin, and Cheng Hao (程顥, styled Mingdao), the celebrated Northern Song Neo-Confucian philosopher whose own past-life memory is recorded in a Song-dynasty biographical anthology — are both drawn from mainstream Confucian historiography rather than Buddhist sources, a deliberate rhetorical choice allowing Zhuhong to answer missionaries skeptical of Buddhist testimony using China's own most respected secular historical record instead.