The Four Immaterial States
This page carries Ru-Yi's translation of the Visuddhimagga's chapter 10, Āruppaniddesa ("The Description of the Immaterial States") — the four formless attainments reached beyond the fine-material jhānas: the bases of infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Each is reached not by dropping a jhāna factor, as with the four fine-material jhānas, but by transcending one object after another — form, then space, then consciousness, then that consciousness's own departure — illustrated throughout by some of this treatise's most memorable similes: a snake-fearing fugitive, a cloth blown from a jar's mouth, an empty meeting-hall, a king who admires craftsmen without envying them, and a shed built precariously over an unclean place.
Translation Method
The Pāli source is the Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana (Sixth Council) romanized edition maintained by the Vipassana Research Institute (VRI, tipitaka.org), cross-checked against the Pali Text Society's Rhys Davids edition (1920–21) as digitized on GRETIL. The VRI text is used under its stated terms — freely available for non-commercial use, with attribution to the Vipassana Research Institute — while the GRETIL/PTS digitization, which carries its own CC BY-SA licence, is used only to verify readings, never copied.
The English translation is Ru-Yi's own, made directly from the Pāli. No existing English translation of the Visuddhimagga — including Bhikkhu Ñāṇamoli's copyrighted The Path of Purification — is consulted, paraphrased, or used as a guide for wording or structure. Reading notes are grounded only in the text's own internal citations and in the general, uncontested conventions of the Pāli commentarial (aṭṭhakathā) genre — never in a modern scholar's specific interpretation. Each translated passage carries a short vocabulary list for readers learning Pāli alongside the text, continuing the same format established on this site's earlier Visuddhimagga chapters.
Why Go Beyond Form at All? Two Similes for a Fugitive Mind
The chapter opens immediately after the divine abidings by turning to the four immaterial attainments, beginning with the base of infinite space. The meditator wishing to develop it must first see the danger inherent in form itself — since it is on account of form that beatings, the taking up of weapons, quarrels, and disputes all occur — and resolve to go beyond it entirely. Two vivid similes capture the specific quality of mind required: a man deathly afraid of snakes who flees even the mere sight of a rope or a crack in dried earth, and a man who has fled one village to escape an enemy only to panic at the mere sight of someone who merely resembles that enemy in another village. Neither man wants so much as to look at the thing that frightens him — and this, the chapter says, is exactly the attitude the meditator must take toward form itself, not merely toward the specific coarse form that first provoked the wish to escape it.
Brahmavihārānantaraṃ uddiṭṭhesu pana catūsu āruppesu ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ tāva bhāvetukāmo "dissante kho pana rūpādhikaraṇaṃ daṇḍādānasatthādānakalahaviggahavivādā, natthi kho panetaṃ sabbaso āruppeti. So iti paṭisaṅkhāya rūpānaṃyeva nibbidāya virāgāya nirodhāya paṭipanno hotī"ti (ma. ni. 2.103) vacanato etesaṃ daṇḍādānādīnañceva cakkhusotarogādīnañca ābādhasahassānaṃ vasena karajarūpe ādīnavaṃ disvā tassa samatikkamāya ṭhapetvā paricchinnākāsakasiṇaṃ navasu pathavīkasiṇādīsu aññatarasmiṃ catutthajjhānaṃ uppādeti.
Tassa kiñcāpi rūpāvacaracatutthajjhānavasena karajarūpaṃ atikkantaṃ hoti, atha kho kasiṇarūpampi yasmā tappaṭibhāgameva, tasmā tampi samatikkamitukāmo hoti. Kathaṃ? Yathā ahibhīruko puriso araññe sappena anubaddho vegena palāyitvā palātaṭṭhāne lekhācittaṃ tālapaṇṇaṃ vā valliṃ vā rajjuṃ vā phalitāya vā pana pathaviyā phalitantaraṃ disvā bhāyateva uttasateva, neva naṃ dakkhitukāmo hoti. Yathā ca anatthakārinā veripurisena saddhiṃ ekagāme vasamāno puriso tena vadhabandhagehajhāpanādīhi upadduto aññaṃ gāmaṃ vasanatthāya gantvā tatrāpi verinā samānarūpasaddasamudācāraṃ purisaṃ disvā bhāyateva uttasateva, neva naṃ dakkhitukāmo hoti.
Tatridaṃ opammasaṃsandanaṃ – tesaṃ hi purisānaṃ ahinā verinā vā upaddutakālo viya bhikkhuno ārammaṇavasena karajarūpasamaṅgikālo. Tesaṃ vegena palāyanaaññagāmagamanāni viya bhikkhuno rūpāvacaracatutthajjhānavasena karajarūpasamatikkamanakālo. Tesaṃ palātaṭṭhāne ca aññagāme ca lekhācittatālapaṇṇādīni ceva verisadisaṃ purisañca disvā bhayasantāsaadassanakāmatā viya bhikkhuno kasiṇarūpampi tappaṭibhāgameva idanti sallakkhetvā tampi samatikkamitukāmatā. Sūkarābhihatasunakhapisācabhīrukādikāpi cettha upamā veditabbā.
Next after the divine abidings, among the four immaterial states set out, one wishing first to develop the base of infinite space, on account of the saying, "for it is on account of form that the taking up of sticks, the taking up of weapons, quarrels, disputes, and contention are seen to occur; that does not exist at all in the immaterial — having reflected thus, he is one who has entered upon the path to disenchantment with, dispassion toward, and cessation of forms themselves" (M.N. 2.103), having seen the danger in physical form born of past kamma by way of these instances of taking up sticks and the rest, and by way of the thousand afflictions such as diseases of the eye and ear, sets aside the delimited space-kasiṇa and produces the fourth jhāna by way of one of the nine kasiṇas beginning with the earth kasiṇa.
For him, although the physical form born of past kamma has been gone beyond by way of the fine-material-sphere fourth jhāna, still, since the kasiṇa's own form is merely a counterpart of that same form, he wishes to go beyond that too. How so? Just as a man deathly afraid of snakes, having been chased by a snake in the forest and fled at speed, becomes afraid and terrified merely on seeing, at the place of his flight, a streak resembling a snake's track, a palm leaf, a creeper, a rope, or a crack in dried earth, and has no wish at all to look at it — and just as a man living in a single village together with a malicious, hostile person, harassed by that person through killing, binding, and burning down his house, goes to live in another village, and there too, seeing a man of similar form, voice, and manner to his enemy, becomes afraid and terrified and has no wish at all to look at him —
here is the correspondence of this simile: just as the time when those men were harassed by the snake or the enemy corresponds to the monk's time of possessing physical form born of past kamma by way of an object; just as their fleeing at speed and going to another village corresponds to the monk's time of going beyond physical form born of past kamma by way of the fine-material-sphere fourth jhāna; so too, just as their wish, upon seeing at the place of their flight or in the other village a streak, a palm leaf, or the like, or a man resembling the enemy, not to see fear and terror, corresponds to the monk's own recognition that the kasiṇa's form, too, is merely a counterpart of that same form, and his consequent wish to go beyond that as well. The similes of a man mauled by a boar, or terrified of a dog, or of demons, should also be understood in this same connection.
The chapter's opening move is a striking piece of psychological continuity across what might otherwise look like an abrupt technical transition: rather than treating the shift from fine-material to immaterial jhāna as simply "the next item on the list," the text insists on tracing the actual motivational thread — the same aversion to form that drove the meditator away from ordinary sense objects toward the kasiṇa disk in the first place logically extends, once seen clearly, to the kasiṇa disk itself, since it too is nothing but a counterpart of the very physical form being escaped.
Both similes share a precise structural feature worth noting: in neither case is the fleeing man's fear about the streak of rope, the crack in the earth, or the look-alike stranger themselves — he knows perfectly well these are not the snake or the actual enemy. The fear is a trained, generalized aversion carried over from the real danger, applied now even to harmless resemblances. This is exactly the meditator's own situation: the kasiṇa disk is not itself a threat, but its resemblance to ordinary form is reason enough to want to go beyond it, precisely because that resemblance is real.
immaterial, formless — a- (not) + rūpa (form); the standard term for the four attainments this chapter treats, each taking a progressively more abstract, non-physical object than any fine-material jhāna.
physical form born of past kamma — karaja (produced, born) + rūpa (form); the ordinary physical body and its associated sense-sphere objects, as distinct from the kasiṇa-disk's own "counterpart" form used as a meditation object.
a counterpart of that — tad- (that) + paṭibhāga (a counterpart, likeness); the technical description of the kasiṇa's own form as sharing enough in common with ordinary physical form to inherit the same danger and warrant the same wish to be transcended.
Removing the Kasiṇa Without Touching It
Having seen the danger even in the kasiṇa's own fourth jhāna — that it still takes a form as its object, that it has joy as a near enemy, and that it is gross compared to the peaceful liberation ahead — the meditator "removes" the kasiṇa disk in a purely mental sense: not by physically taking it away, but simply by ceasing to attend to it and attending instead only to the space it had occupied. The technique is illustrated by a striking image: a man who has been watching a colored cloth stretched over a jar's mouth, who, when the cloth is suddenly blown away, finds himself looking at nothing but the bare space where it had been — exactly the shift in attention by which the fourth-jhāna consciousness on the kasiṇa disk gives way to the new consciousness of infinite space.
Evaṃ so tasmā catutthajjhānassa ārammaṇabhūtā kasiṇarūpā nibbijja pakkamitukāmo pañcahākārehi ciṇṇavasī hutvā paguṇarūpāvacaracatutthajjhānato vuṭṭhāya tasmiṃ jhāne "imaṃ mayā nibbiṇṇaṃ rūpaṃ ārammaṇaṃ karotī"ti ca, "āsannasomanassapaccatthika"nti ca, "santavimokkhato oḷārika"nti ca ādīnavaṃ passati. Aṅgoḷārikatā panettha natthi. Yatheva hetaṃ rūpaṃ duvaṅgikaṃ, evaṃ āruppānipīti.
So tattha evaṃ ādīnavaṃ disvā nikantiṃ pariyādāya ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ santato anantato manasikaritvā cakkavāḷapariyantaṃ vā yattakaṃ icchati tattakaṃ vā kasiṇaṃ pattharitvā tena phuṭṭhokāsaṃ "ākāso ākāso"ti vā, "ananto ākāso"ti vā manasikaronto ugghāṭeti kasiṇaṃ. Ugghāṭento hi neva kilañjaṃ viya saṃvelleti, na kapālato pūvaṃ viya uddharati, kevalaṃ pana taṃ neva āvajjeti, na manasi karoti, na paccavekkhati, anāvajjento amanasikaronto apaccavekkhanto ca aññadatthu tena phuṭṭhokāsaṃ "ākāso ākāso"ti manasikaronto kasiṇaṃ ugghāṭeti nāma. Kasiṇampi ugghāṭiyamānaṃ neva ubbaṭṭati na vivaṭṭati, kevalaṃ imassa amanasikārañca "ākāso ākāso"ti manasikārañca paṭicca ugghāṭitaṃ nāma hoti, kasiṇugghāṭimākāsamattaṃ paññāyati. Kasiṇugghāṭimākāsanti vā kasiṇaphuṭṭhokāsoti vā kasiṇavivittākāsanti vā sabbametaṃ ekameva.
So taṃ kasiṇugghāṭimākāsanimittaṃ "ākāso ākāso"ti punappunaṃ āvajjeti, takkāhataṃ vitakkāhataṃ karoti. Tassevaṃ punappunaṃ āvajjayato takkāhataṃ vitakkāhataṃ karoto nīvaraṇāni vikkhambhanti, sati santiṭṭhati, upacārena cittaṃ samādhiyati. So taṃ nimittaṃ punappunaṃ āsevati, bhāveti, bahulīkaroti. Tassevaṃ punappunaṃ āvajjayato manasikaroto pathavīkasiṇādīsu rūpāvacaracittaṃ viya ākāse ākāsānañcāyatanacittaṃ appeti. Idhāpi hi purimabhāge tīṇi cattāri vā javanāni kāmāvacarāni upekkhāvedanāsampayuttāneva honti. Catutthaṃ pañcamaṃ vā arūpāvacaraṃ. Sesaṃ pathavīkasiṇe vuttanayameva.
Ayaṃ pana viseso, evaṃ uppanne arūpāvacaracitte so bhikkhu yathā nāma yānapputoḷi kumbhimukhādīnaṃ aññataraṃ nīlapilotikāya vā pītalohitodātādīnaṃ vā aññatarāya pilotikāya bandhitvā pekkhamāno puriso vātavegena vā aññena vā kenaci apanītāya pilotikāya ākāsaṃyeva pekkhamāno tiṭṭheyya, evameva pubbe kasiṇamaṇḍalaṃ jhānacakkhunā pekkhamāno viharitvā "ākāso ākāso"ti iminā parikammamanasikārena sahasā apanīte tasmiṃ nimitte ākāsaññeva pekkhamāno viharati. Ettāvatā cesa "sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamā nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā 'ananto ākāso'ti ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharatī"ti vuccati (vibha. 508; dī. ni. 2.129).
Thus, wishing to become disenchanted with and depart from the kasiṇa's own form, which is the object of that fourth jhāna, having gained mastery in the five ways, he emerges from that proficient fine-material-sphere fourth jhāna and sees the danger in it thus: "this jhāna has as its object a form from which I have become disenchanted," and "it has joy as a near enemy," and "it is gross compared to the peaceful liberation." There is, however, no grossness of factors involved here — for just as this jhāna has two factors, so too do the immaterial attainments.
Having thus seen the danger there, and having exhausted his delight in it, attending to the base of infinite space as peaceful and as infinite, having spread out the kasiṇa either to the limit of the world-system or to whatever extent he wishes, and attending to the space touched by it as "space, space," or "infinite space," he removes the kasiṇa. For in removing it, he neither rolls it up like a mat, nor lifts it away like a cake from a dish; he simply does not advert to it, does not attend to it, does not review it — and, by this very not-adverting, not-attending, and not-reviewing, but instead attending only to the space it touched as "space, space," he is said to "remove the kasiṇa." Even while it is being "removed," the kasiṇa itself neither rolls up nor unrolls; it is simply called "removed" in dependence on his non-attention to it together with his attention to "space, space" — only the mere space left by the removal of the kasiṇa becomes apparent. "The space left by the removal of the kasiṇa," "the space touched by the kasiṇa," and "the space vacated by the kasiṇa" — these are all one and the same thing.
He repeatedly adverts to this sign, the space left by the removal of the kasiṇa, as "space, space," striking at it and considering it again and again. As he thus repeatedly adverts to it in this way, the hindrances are suppressed, mindfulness becomes established, and the mind becomes concentrated by way of access. He repeatedly cultivates, develops, and makes much of that sign. As he thus repeatedly adverts to and attends to it, just as fine-material-sphere consciousness becomes absorbed in the earth kasiṇa and the rest, so too the consciousness of the base of infinite space becomes absorbed in space. Here too, in the preceding portion, three or four impulsion moments are sense-sphere consciousnesses associated with equanimous feeling; the fourth or fifth is immaterial-sphere consciousness. The rest is exactly as stated for the earth kasiṇa.
But here is a distinctive feature: when the immaterial-sphere consciousness has thus arisen, that monk is like a man who has bound some blue, or yellow, red, or white cloth over the opening of a cart-basket, a jar's mouth, or the like, and stands looking at it — and then, when that cloth is suddenly removed by a gust of wind or by some other means, stands looking at nothing but the bare space. Just so, having previously dwelt looking with the eye of jhāna at the kasiṇa disk, when that sign is suddenly removed by this preliminary attention of "space, space," he dwells looking at nothing but space. By this much he is said to "dwell having attained the base of infinite space, by completely transcending perceptions of form, by the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, and by non-attention to perceptions of variety, thinking, 'space is infinite'" (Vibh. 508; D.N. 2.129).
The insistence that the kasiṇa is "removed" without being touched, rolled up, or lifted away is a carefully precise piece of phenomenology: what actually changes is nowhere in the physical disk at all, but entirely in the direction of the meditator's attention — a reminder that everything about this whole progression through the immaterial attainments takes place purely at the level of what the mind chooses to advert to, never at the level of any external object being manipulated.
The cloth-over-a-jar simile earns its place by capturing something the more abstract "removing the kasiṇa" language could easily leave vague: the space was there all along, underneath or behind the cloth, exactly as unbounded space exists everywhere the kasiṇa disk once seemed to occupy — the disk was never actually blocking anything, and its removal reveals what its own presence had merely been obscuring from attention.
to remove, to open up, to lift off — the technical verb for this chapter's signature technique: withdrawing attention from the kasiṇa disk so that only the space it touched remains as the new object.
the space left by the removal of the kasiṇa — kasiṇa + ugghāṭima (removed) + ākāsa (space); one of three equivalent names this section gives for the exact object of the new, immaterial-sphere consciousness.
the peaceful liberation — santa (peaceful) + vimokkha (liberation); the standard of comparison against which even the accomplished fine-material fourth jhāna is judged "gross," motivating the further ascent into the immaterial attainments.
What "Completely Transcending Perceptions of Form" Actually Means
The chapter now unpacks the canonical formula's opening phrase word by word. "Perceptions of form" turns out to be a compressed reference to two things at once: the fifteen fine-material-sphere jhānas themselves (wholesome, resultant, and functional) and their nine kasiṇa-type objects — both are called "form" elsewhere in the canon, and both must be left behind together, since transcending the perceptions necessarily means transcending their objects as well, even though the Vibhaṅga's own definition speaks only of the perceptions. The chapter is careful to note that reaching the immaterial attainments genuinely requires abandoning one specific object (the kasiṇa) in favor of an entirely new one (space) — unlike the fine-material jhānas, which merely deepen concentration on the very same object throughout.
Tattha sabbasoti sabbākārena, sabbāsaṃ vā anavasesānanti attho. Rūpasaññānanti saññāsīsena vuttarūpāvacarajjhānānañceva tadārammaṇānañca. Rūpāvacarajjhānampi hi rūpanti vuccati "rūpī rūpāni passatī"tiādīsu (dī. ni. 2.129), tassa ārammaṇampi "bahiddhā rūpāni passati suvaṇṇadubbaṇṇānī"tiādīsu (dī. ni. 2.173), tasmā idha rūpe saññā rūpasaññāti evaṃ saññāsīsena vuttarūpāvacarajjhānassetaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Rūpaṃ saññā assāti rūpasaññaṃ. Rūpaṃ assa nāmanti vuttaṃ hoti. Pathavīkasiṇādibhedassa tadārammaṇassa cetaṃ adhivacananti veditabbaṃ. Samatikkamāti virāgā nirodhā ca. Kiṃ vuttaṃ hoti? Etāsaṃ kusalavipākakiriyavasena pañcadasannaṃ jhānasaṅkhātānaṃ rūpasaññānaṃ, etesañca pathavīkasiṇādivasena navannaṃ ārammaṇasaṅkhātānaṃ rūpasaññānaṃ sabbākārena anavasesānaṃ vā virāgā ca nirodhā ca virāgahetuñceva nirodhahetuñca ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharati. Na hi sakkā sabbaso anatikkantarūpasaññena etaṃ upasampajja viharitunti.
Tattha yasmā ārammaṇe avirattassa saññāsamatikkamo na hoti, samatikkantāsu ca saññāsu ārammaṇaṃ samatikkantameva hoti. Tasmā ārammaṇasamatikkamaṃ avatvā "tattha katamā rūpasaññā? Rūpāvacarasamāpattiṃ samāpannassa vā upapannassa vā diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārissa vā saññā sañjānanā sañjānitattaṃ, imā vuccanti rūpasaññāyo. Imā rūpasaññāyo atikkanto hoti vītikkanto samatikkanto. Tena vuccati sabbaso rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamā"ti (vibha. 602) evaṃ vibhaṅge saññānaṃyeva samatikkamo vutto. Yasmā pana ārammaṇasamatikkamena pattabbā etā samāpattiyo, na ekasmiññeva ārammaṇe paṭhamajjhānādīni viya. Tasmā ayaṃ ārammaṇasamatikkamavasenāpi atthavaṇṇanā katāti veditabbā.
Herein, "completely" means in every way, or the meaning is "of all, without remainder." "Perceptions of form": by the heading of "perception," this refers both to the fine-material-sphere jhānas themselves and to their objects. For the fine-material-sphere jhāna itself is also called "form" in such passages as "possessing form, one sees forms" (D.N. 2.129); its object too is called "form" in such passages as "one sees forms externally, whether beautiful or ugly" (D.N. 2.173). Therefore here, "perception with regard to form" is called "perception of form" — by the heading of "perception," this is a designation for the fine-material-sphere jhāna so referred to. Or: "that for which form is the perceived object" is "perception of form" — the meaning is, "form is its name." This should be understood as a designation for the object as well, distinguished as the earth kasiṇa and the rest. "By completely transcending" means by dispassion toward and cessation of. What is meant is this: by way of wholesome, resultant, and functional consciousness, there are fifteen jhānas reckoned as "perceptions of form," and, by way of the earth kasiṇa and the rest, nine objects reckoned as "perceptions of form" — through the dispassion toward and cessation of these, in every way and without remainder, and by being the cause of that dispassion and that cessation, one dwells having attained the base of infinite space. For it is not possible to dwell having attained this without having completely transcended perception of form.
Herein, since there is no transcendence of perception for one who has not become dispassionate toward the object, and, once the perceptions have been transcended, the object too has thereby been transcended — therefore, without stating the transcendence of the object separately, it is said in the Vibhaṅga: "Herein, what is perception of form? The perceiving, the act of perceiving, the state of having perceived, in one who has attained the fine-material-sphere attainment, or in one reborn there, or in one dwelling happily in the present life — these are called perceptions of form. One has gone beyond, passed beyond, completely transcended these perceptions of form; therefore it is said, 'by completely transcending perceptions of form'" (Vibh. 602) — thus in the Vibhaṅga only the transcendence of the perceptions themselves is stated. But since these attainments must be reached by way of transcending the object, and not by remaining within one single object throughout, as with the first jhāna and the rest — therefore it should be understood that this explanation of the meaning has also been given by way of the transcendence of the object.
The chapter's careful logical move here — from "there is no transcending perception without transcending its object" to "therefore the Vibhaṅga's silence about the object is not really a silence at all" — is a good example of how this treatise handles an apparent gap in the canonical wording: rather than treating the Abhidhamma's own definition as incomplete, it shows that the definition's narrower focus on perception alone already entails the broader claim about the object, since the two cannot come apart.
The explicit contrast with "the first jhāna and the rest" is a small but important structural marker: it flags that the immaterial attainments work by a genuinely different mechanism than progression through the four fine-material jhānas, where the object (say, the earth kasiṇa) stays fixed throughout while only the accompanying factors change — here, by contrast, each new attainment requires a wholly new object.
perception of form — rūpa (form) + saññā (perception); shown here to carry a double reference, to the fine-material jhānas themselves and to their nine kasiṇa-type objects, both transcended together in reaching the first immaterial attainment.
wholesome, resultant, and functional — the three ethical/functional categories of consciousness (kusala: wholesome/kammically active; vipāka: resultant; kiriya: functional, neither wholesome nor productive of result) across which the fifteen fine-material jhāna-consciousnesses are distributed.
transcendence of the object — ārammaṇa (object) + samatikkama (transcending); the specific technical claim that reaching an immaterial attainment requires abandoning one object for an entirely new one, unlike progress through the fine-material jhānas.
Resistance-Perceptions Gone, Variety-Perceptions Merely Unattended
The formula's remaining two phrases receive an equally careful dissection, and the chapter draws out a genuinely important asymmetry between them: "perceptions of resistance" — the five ordinary sense-perceptions arising from contact between a sense-organ and its object — are said to have wholly "disappeared," since they simply cannot occur once the mind no longer operates through the five sense-doors at all, even as far back as the first jhāna. "Perceptions of variety," by contrast, still technically exist in the plane of existence this jhāna produces, and are merely not attended to — a distinction illustrated by Āḷāra Kālāma, whose absorption was so complete that five hundred carts passed close beside him without his seeing or even hearing them.
Paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamāti cakkhādīnaṃ vatthūnaṃ rūpādīnaṃ ārammaṇānañca paṭighātena samuppannā saññā paṭighasaññā. Rūpasaññādīnaṃ etamadhivacanaṃ. Yathāha – "tattha katamā paṭighasaññā? Rūpasaññā saddasaññā gandhasaññā rasasaññā phoṭṭhabbasaññā, imā vuccanti paṭighasaññāyo"ti (vibha. 603). Tāsaṃ kusalavipākānaṃ pañcannaṃ, akusalavipākānaṃ pañcannanti sabbaso dasannampi paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamā pahānā asamuppādā appavattiṃ katvāti vuttaṃ hoti.
Kāmañcetā paṭhamajjhānādīni samāpannassāpi na santi. Na hi tasmiṃ samaye pañcadvāravasena cittaṃ pavattati. Evaṃ santepi aññattha pahīnānaṃ sukhadukkhānaṃ catutthajjhāne viya, sakkāyadiṭṭhādīnaṃ tatiyamagge viya ca imasmiṃ jhāne ussāhajananatthaṃ imassa jhānassa pasaṃsāvasena etāsamettha vacanaṃ veditabbaṃ.
Atha vā kiñcāpi tā rūpāvacaraṃ samāpannassāpi na santi, atha kho na pahīnattā na santi. Na hi rūpavirāgāya rūpāvacarabhāvanā saṃvattati, rūpāyattā ca etāsaṃ pavatti. Ayaṃ pana bhāvanā rūpavirāgāya saṃvattati. Tasmā tā ettha pahīnāti vattuṃ vaṭṭati. Na kevalañca vattuṃ, ekaṃseneva evaṃ dhāretumpi vaṭṭati. Tāsañhi ito pubbe appahīnattāyeva paṭhamaṃ jhānaṃ samāpannassa saddo "kaṇṭako"ti (a. ni. 10.72) vutto bhagavatā. Idha ca pahīnattāyeva arūpasamāpattīnaṃ āneñjatā (vibha. 226) santavimokkhatā (ma. ni. 1.66) ca vuttā. Āḷāro ca kālāmo arūpasamāpanno pañcamattāni sakaṭasatāni nissāya nissāya atikkamantāni neva addasa, na pana saddaṃ assosīti (dī. ni. 2.192).
Nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārāti nānatte vā gocare pavattānaṃ saññānaṃ, nānattānaṃ vā saññānaṃ. Yasmā hi etā "tattha katamā nānattasaññā? Asamāpannassa manodhātusamaṅgissa vā manoviññāṇadhātusamaṅgissa vā saññā sañjānanā sañjānitattaṃ, imā vuccanti nānattasaññāyo"ti evaṃ vibhaṅge (vibha. 604) vibhajitvā vuttā idha adhippetā asamāpannassa manodhātumanoviññāṇadhātusaṅgahitā saññā rūpasaddādibhede nānatte nānāsabhāve gocare pavattanti, yasmā cetā aṭṭha kāmāvacarakusalasaññā, dvādasākusalasaññā, ekādasa kāmāvacarakusalavipākasaññā, dve akusalavipākasaññā, ekādasa kāmāvacarakiriyasaññāti evaṃ catucattālīsampi saññā nānattā nānāsabhāvā aññamaññaṃ asadisā, tasmā nānattasaññāti vuttā. Tāsaṃ sabbaso nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārā anāvajjanā asamannāhārā apaccavekkhaṇā. Yasmā tā nāvajjeti, na manasi karoti, na paccavekkhati, tasmāti vuttaṃ hoti.
Yasmā cettha purimā rūpasaññā paṭighasaññā ca iminā jhānena nibbatte bhavepi na vijjanti. Pageva tasmiṃ bhave imaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharaṇakāle, tasmā tāsaṃ samatikkamā atthaṅgamāti dvedhāpi abhāvoyeva vutto. Nānattasaññāsu pana yasmā aṭṭha kāmāvacarakusalasaññā, nava kiriyasaññā, dasākusalasaññāti imā sattavīsatisaññā iminā jhānena nibbatte bhave vijjanti, tasmā tāsaṃ amanasikārāti vuttanti veditabbaṃ. Tatrāpi hi imaṃ jhānaṃ upasampajja viharanto tāsaṃ amanasikārāyeva upasampajja viharati, tā pana manasikaronto asamāpanno hotīti.
Saṅkhepato cettha rūpasaññānaṃ samatikkamāti iminā sabbarūpāvacaradhammānaṃ pahānaṃ vuttaṃ. Paṭighasaññānaṃ atthaṅgamā nānattasaññānaṃ amanasikārāti iminā sabbesaṃ kāmāvacaracittacetasikānaṃ pahānañca amanasikāro ca vuttoti veditabbo.
"By the disappearance of perceptions of resistance": perceptions arising through the impact of the physical bases such as the eye and the rest against their objects such as visible form is called "perception of resistance" — a designation for perception of visible form and the rest. As it is said: "Herein, what is perception of resistance? Perception of visible form, perception of sound, perception of smell, perception of taste, perception of tangible object — these are called perceptions of resistance" (Vibh. 603). Of these, five are wholesome-resultant and five are unwholesome-resultant; "by the disappearance," in every way, of all ten of these perceptions of resistance — that is, by their abandoning, their non-arising, having made them not occur — this is what is meant.
Admittedly, these perceptions do not exist even for one who has attained the first jhāna and the rest, since at that time the mind does not operate by way of the five sense-doors at all. Even so, just as pleasure and pain, already abandoned earlier, are mentioned again in connection with the fourth jhāna, and just as personality-view and the rest, already abandoned earlier, are mentioned again in connection with the third path — so too here, this statement about these perceptions should be understood as made for the sake of generating enthusiasm for this jhāna, by way of praising it.
Or rather: although these perceptions do not exist even for one who has attained the fine-material sphere, still, they are not absent there because they have been abandoned. For fine-material-sphere development does not lead to dispassion toward form — indeed, its very occurrence depends upon form. But this development does lead to dispassion toward form. Therefore it is proper to say that these perceptions are abandoned specifically here. And it is proper not merely to say so, but to hold this as a settled fact. For it was precisely because these had not yet been abandoned at that earlier stage that the Blessed One called sound "a thorn" for one who has attained the first jhāna (A.N. 10.72); whereas here, precisely because they have been abandoned, the immaterial attainments are said to possess "imperturbability" (Vibh. 226) and "the state of the peaceful liberation" (M.N. 1.66). And it is told that Āḷāra Kālāma, having attained an immaterial attainment, neither saw nor even heard about five hundred carts passing close beside him, one after another (D.N. 2.192).
"By non-attention to perceptions of variety": either perceptions occurring in a varied field, or perceptions that are themselves various. For since these are defined in the Vibhaṅga thus: "Herein, what is perception of variety? The perceiving, the act of perceiving, the state of having perceived, in one who has not attained absorption, possessed of the mind-element or the mind-consciousness-element — these are called perceptions of variety" (Vibh. 604) — what is meant here are the perceptions, comprised under the mind-element and mind-consciousness-element, of one who has not attained absorption, occurring in a field that varies and differs in kind as visible form, sound, and so on; and since these number forty-four in all — eight sense-sphere wholesome perceptions, twelve unwholesome perceptions, eleven sense-sphere wholesome-resultant perceptions, two unwholesome-resultant perceptions, and eleven sense-sphere functional perceptions — being various, differing in kind, and unlike one another, they are therefore called "perceptions of variety." "By non-attention," in every way, to these perceptions of variety — that is, by non-adverting, non-consideration, non-review; the meaning is, because he does not advert to them, does not attend to them, does not review them.
And since the former two — perceptions of form and perceptions of resistance — do not exist even in the plane of existence produced by this jhāna, still less at the time of dwelling having attained this jhāna within that same plane — therefore, for these two, their complete absence is expressed by both terms, "transcendence" and "disappearance." But as for perceptions of variety: since twenty-seven of these — eight sense-sphere wholesome perceptions, nine functional perceptions, and ten unwholesome perceptions — do exist within the plane of existence produced by this jhāna, therefore it should be understood that "non-attention" is said with reference to these. For indeed, one dwelling having attained this jhāna dwells having attained it precisely through non-attention to these; whereas one who attends to them is not one who has truly attained it.
In brief, here, "by the transcendence of perceptions of form" expresses the abandoning of all fine-material-sphere states. "By the disappearance of perceptions of resistance, by non-attention to perceptions of variety" expresses, respectively, the abandoning and the mere non-attention of all sense-sphere consciousness and its associated mental factors.
The three-way distinction drawn here — form-perceptions transcended, resistance-perceptions disappeared, variety-perceptions merely unattended-to — is not stylistic variation in the canonical wording but a precise map of three genuinely different relationships a meditator's mind can have to a category of mental content: full abandonment (the fine-material states, left behind for good upon reaching the immaterial), functional absence going back even further (the five sense-perceptions, already impossible from the first jhāna onward), and mere non-attention to something that technically still exists in that plane of being (the forty-four "variety" perceptions, of which twenty-seven survive but simply go unnoticed).
The Āḷāra Kālāma anecdote does real evidential work rather than merely decorating the point: it is offered as historical testimony, not hypothetical illustration, that an accomplished meditator's absorption in the immaterial attainments can genuinely exclude even five hundred carts' worth of noise and visual disturbance passing directly beside him — grounding an otherwise highly abstract Abhidhamma distinction in a report of what actually, verifiably happened to a specific named teacher.
perception of resistance — paṭigha (impact, resistance, striking against) + saññā (perception); the five ordinary sense-perceptions arising from contact between a sense-organ and its object, said to be functionally absent from as early as the first jhāna.
perception of variety — nānatta (diversity, variety) + saññā (perception); the forty-four kinds of ordinary sense-sphere perception, twenty-seven of which technically still exist in the immaterial plane but are simply never attended to there.
imperturbability — a- (not) + iñjati (to shake, waver) + -tā (abstract-noun suffix); a quality attributed specifically to the immaterial attainments once perceptions of resistance have genuinely been abandoned, unlike the fine-material jhānas, where sound remains a disturbing "thorn."
Why It Is Called "The Base of Infinite Space"
The chapter closes its treatment of the first immaterial attainment with a precise etymological breakdown of its full canonical name, tracing "infinite" through to "space-infinity" and finally to "the base of infinite space" — a base in exactly the sense that a particular resort or dwelling-place is a base for the beings who inhabit it, here serving as the foundation for the jhāna and all its associated mental factors. This etymological work, characteristic of the treatise's method throughout, closes out the section proper before the chapter moves on to the second immaterial attainment.
Ananto ākāsoti ettha nāssa uppādanto vā vayanto vā paññāyatīti ananto. Ākāsoti kasiṇugghāṭimākāso vuccati. Manasikāravasenāpi cettha anantatā veditabbā. Teneva vibhaṅge vuttaṃ "tasmiṃ ākāse cittaṃ ṭhapeti, saṇṭhapeti, anantaṃ pharati, tena vuccati ananto ākāso"ti (vibha. 605).
Ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharatīti ettha pana nāssa antoti anantaṃ, ākāsaṃ anantaṃ ākāsānantaṃ, ākāsānantameva ākāsānañcaṃ, taṃ ākāsānañcaṃ adhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena āyatanamassa sasampayuttadhammassa jhānassa devānaṃ devāyatanamivāti ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ.
Upasampajja viharatīti tamākāsānañcāyatanaṃ patvā nipphādetvā tadanurūpena iriyāpathavihārena viharatīti.
Ayaṃ ākāsānañcāyatanakammaṭṭhāne vitthārakathā.
"Space is infinite": here, since neither its point of arising nor its point of ending is discernible, it is "infinite." "Space" refers to the space left by the removal of the kasiṇa. The infinity here should also be understood by way of the meditator's own attention. For this reason it was said in the Vibhaṅga: "He places his mind upon that space, settles it there, pervades it as infinite — therefore it is said, 'space is infinite'" (Vibh. 605).
"One dwells having attained the base of infinite space": here, since it has no end, it is "infinite"; space that is infinite is "the infinity of space"; that very infinity of space is "space-infinity"; that space-infinity, in the sense of being a foundation for this jhāna together with its associated states, is a "base," just as a particular resort is called "a base" for those beings who dwell in it — thus it is "the base of infinite space."
"Dwells having attained": having reached and accomplished that base of infinite space, he dwells by way of a mode of conduct suited to it.
This is the detailed treatment of the meditation subject of the base of infinite space.
The double location of "infinity" — in the space itself, which has no discernible beginning or end, and in the meditator's own attention, which pervades it without limit — quietly prevents a possible misunderstanding: infinite space is not being described here as some independently existing cosmic entity the meditator merely discovers, but as a meditation object whose infinite character is inseparable from how it is being attended to.
The comparison to "the gods' resort" as a model for how "base" (āyatana) functions is a small but effective piece of ordinary-language grounding for an otherwise highly abstract compound: just as a particular locale serves as the place where certain beings characteristically dwell, so infinite space serves as the "place" — the necessary supporting condition — where this specific jhāna and its associated mental factors occur.
the base of infinite space — ākāsa (space) + ānañca (infinity, abstract noun from ananta) + āyatana (base, foundation); the full canonical name of the first immaterial attainment, built up here term by term.
foundation, support — the specific sense in which infinite space is called a "base": not a location one travels to, but the necessary underlying support for the jhāna-consciousness and its associated mental factors.
a mode of conduct by way of the postures — iriyāpatha (posture, bodily deportment) + vihāra (dwelling, mode of life); the standard commentarial gloss for "dwells," describing the settled way of life proper to one who has actually attained a given meditative state.
The Base of Infinite Consciousness
The second immaterial attainment is reached by an exactly parallel method to the first, now redirected onto a new object: rather than the infinite space itself, the meditator attends to the very consciousness that occurred while pervading that space, repeating "consciousness, consciousness" rather than "infinite, infinite." Seeing the base of infinite space as still having the fine-material jhāna as a near enemy and as less peaceful than what lies ahead, he lets go of it entirely — a transcendence the chapter is careful to note applies to both the earlier jhāna and its object at once, exactly as before — and the new consciousness becomes absorbed in the prior consciousness itself, now taken as boundless.
Viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ bhāvetukāmena pana pañcahākārehi ākāsānañcāyatanasamāpattiyaṃ ciṇṇavasībhāvena "āsannarūpāvacarajjhānapaccatthikā ayaṃ samāpatti, no ca viññāṇañcāyatanamiva santā"ti ākāsānañcāyatane ādīnavaṃ disvā tattha nikantiṃ pariyādāya viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ santato manasikaritvā taṃ ākāsaṃ pharitvā pavattaviññāṇaṃ "viññāṇaṃ viññāṇa"nti punappunaṃ āvajjitabbaṃ, manasikātabbaṃ, paccavekkhitabbaṃ, takkāhataṃ vitakkāhataṃ kātabbaṃ. "Anantaṃ ananta"nti pana na manasikātabbaṃ.
Tassevaṃ tasmiṃ nimitte punappunaṃ cittaṃ cārentassa nīvaraṇāni vikkhambhanti, sati santiṭṭhati, upacārena cittaṃ samādhiyati. So taṃ nimittaṃ punappunaṃ āsevati, bhāveti, bahulīkaroti. Tassevaṃ karoto ākāse ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ viya ākāsaphuṭe viññāṇe viññāṇañcāyatanacittaṃ appeti. Appanānayo panettha vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Ettāvatā cesa "sabbaso ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ samatikkamma anantaṃ viññāṇanti viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharatī"ti (vibha. 508; dī. ni. 2.129) vuccati.
Tattha sabbasoti idaṃ vuttanayameva. Ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ samatikkammāti ettha pana pubbe vuttanayena jhānampi ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ, ārammaṇampi. Ārammaṇampi hi purimanayeneva ākāsānañcañca taṃ paṭhamassa āruppajjhānassa ārammaṇattā devānaṃ devāyatanaṃ viya adhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena āyatanañcāti ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ. Tathā ākāsānañcañca taṃ tassa jhānassa sañjātihetuttā "kambojā assānaṃ āyatana"ntiādīni viya sañjātidesaṭṭhena āyatanañcātipi ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ. Evametaṃ jhānañca ārammaṇañcāti ubhayampi appavattikaraṇena ca amanasikaraṇena ca samatikkamitvāva yasmā idaṃ viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja vihātabbaṃ, tasmā ubhayampetaṃ ekajjhaṃ katvā "ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ samatikkammā"ti idaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ.
Anantaṃ viññāṇanti taṃyeva ananto ākāsoti evaṃ pharitvā pavattaviññāṇaṃ "anantaṃ viññāṇa"nti evaṃ manasikarontoti vuttaṃ hoti. Manasikāravasena vā anantaṃ. So hi tamākāsārammaṇaṃ viññāṇaṃ anavasesato manasikaronto "ananta"nti manasi karoti. Yaṃ pana vibhaṅge vuttaṃ "anantaṃ viññāṇanti, taṃyeva ākāsaṃ viññāṇena phuṭaṃ manasi karoti, anantaṃ pharati, tena vuccati anantaṃ viññāṇa"nti (vibha. 610).
Tattha viññāṇenāti upayogatthe karaṇavacanaṃ veditabbaṃ. Evañhi aṭṭhakathācariyā tassa atthaṃ vaṇṇayanti, anantaṃ pharati taññeva ākāsaṃ phuṭaṃ viññāṇaṃ manasi karotīti vuttaṃ hoti.
Viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharatīti ettha pana nāssa antoti anantaṃ. Anantameva ānañcaṃ. Viññāṇaṃ ānañcaṃ viññāṇānañcanti avatvā viññāṇañcanti vuttaṃ. Ayañhettha rūḷhīsaddo. Taṃ viññāṇañcaṃ adhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena āyatanamassa sasampayuttadhammassa jhānassa devānaṃ devāyatanamivāti viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ. Sesaṃ purimasadisamevāti.
Ayaṃ viññāṇañcāyatanakammaṭṭhāne vitthārakathā.
But one wishing to develop the base of infinite consciousness, having gained mastery in the five ways over the attainment of the base of infinite space, and having seen the danger in the base of infinite space thus, "this attainment has the fine-material-sphere jhāna as a near enemy, and is not as peaceful as the base of infinite consciousness" — having thus exhausted his delight in it, attending to the base of infinite consciousness as peaceful, he should repeatedly advert to, attend to, review, and strike at and consider the very consciousness that occurred pervading that space, thinking, "consciousness, consciousness." But he should not attend to it as "infinite, infinite."
As he thus repeatedly moves his mind over that sign, the hindrances are suppressed, mindfulness becomes established, and the mind becomes concentrated by way of access. He repeatedly cultivates, develops, and makes much of that sign. As he does so, just as the consciousness of the base of infinite space became absorbed in space, so now the consciousness of the base of infinite consciousness becomes absorbed in the consciousness that pervaded that space. The method of absorption here should be understood exactly as already stated. By this much he is said to "dwell having attained the base of infinite consciousness, by completely transcending the base of infinite space, thinking, 'consciousness is infinite'" (Vibh. 508; D.N. 2.129).
Herein, "completely" is as already explained. But as for "by transcending the base of infinite space": here, by the method already stated, "the base of infinite space" refers both to the jhāna itself and to its object. For the object too, by the same method as before, is called "the base of infinite space" in the sense of being a foundation, since it is the object of that first immaterial jhāna, just as a particular resort is called "a base" for beings dwelling in it; and likewise, since it is the very cause of the arising of that jhāna, it is also called "the base of infinite space" in the sense of being its place of origin, just as in such expressions as "Kamboja is a source of horses." Thus, since one must dwell having attained this base of infinite consciousness only by transcending both of these — the jhāna and the object — by way of making them not occur and by non-attention to them, therefore, taking both of these together as one, it is said, "by transcending the base of infinite space" — this should be so understood.
"Consciousness is infinite": the meaning is, attending to that very consciousness which occurred pervading what was previously perceived as infinite space, now as "infinite consciousness." Or: it is infinite by way of the meditator's own attention — for, attending without remainder to that consciousness which has space as its object, he attends to it as "infinite." Now, it is said in the Vibhaṅga: "'Consciousness is infinite': he attends to that very space, touched by consciousness; he pervades it as infinite; therefore it is said, 'consciousness is infinite'" (Vibh. 610).
Herein, "by consciousness" should be understood as an instrumental case used in the sense of the accusative. For the teachers of the commentaries explain its meaning thus: "he pervades it as infinite" means "he attends to the very consciousness that has touched that space."
"One dwells having attained the base of infinite consciousness": here, since it has no end, it is "infinite"; that very infinite state is "infinity." Rather than saying "the infinity of consciousness," it is said "consciousness-infinity" — this is simply an established usage here. That consciousness-infinity, in the sense of being a foundation for this jhāna together with its associated states, is a "base," just as a particular resort is called "a base" for those who dwell in it — thus, "the base of infinite consciousness." The rest is exactly as before.
This is the detailed treatment of the meditation subject of the base of infinite consciousness.
The precise grammatical note on "by consciousness" (viññāṇena) — flagging it as an instrumental case doing the work of an accusative — is a small technical aside, but a telling one: even in a text this focused on meditative attainment, the commentarial tradition's philological rigor never relaxes, and a passage's grammar is checked as carefully as its doctrine, because a misparsed case ending could otherwise suggest that consciousness is somehow the *means* by which space is pervaded, rather than being itself the very thing now taken as the object.
The transition from "infinite space" to "infinite consciousness" as an object is a subtle but significant move: the meditator does not need to manufacture some entirely new object out of nothing, but simply redirects attention from the space that was pervaded to the awareness that was doing the pervading — each immaterial attainment, as this chapter will make explicit later, taking the previous attainment's own consciousness as its next object, one link in a single unbroken chain of refinement.
the base of infinite consciousness — viññāṇa (consciousness) + ānañca (infinity) + āyatana (base); the second immaterial attainment, reached by taking as object the very consciousness that pervaded infinite space in the first attainment.
an established usage, a conventional expression — invoked here to explain why the compound is "viññāṇañca" rather than the more grammatically expected "viññāṇānañca," a minor irregularity attributed simply to settled linguistic convention.
the sense of the accusative (object) case — upayoga (application, the accusative case) + attha (sense, meaning); the grammatical function the instrumental case "viññāṇena" is here said to actually perform, per the ancient commentarial teachers' own explanation.
The Base of Nothingness, and the Empty Meeting-Hall
The third immaterial attainment reverses the direction of the previous two: rather than taking some positive object as infinite, the meditator now attends to the sheer absence of the very consciousness that had pervaded space, repeating "there is not, there is not" or "empty, empty" or "vacant, vacant." The chapter illustrates the resulting state of mind with a memorable image: a man who returns to a pavilion where monks had assembled for some business, finds them all departed, and looks in at a space that is now simply, matter-of-factly empty — not empty in the sense of prompting thoughts like "how many monks have died or gone away," but empty in the plain, undramatic sense of an absence noticed without further elaboration.
Ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ bhāvetukāmena pana pañcahākārehi viññāṇañcāyatanasamāpattiyaṃ ciṇṇavasībhāvena "āsannaākāsānañcāyatanapaccatthikā ayaṃ samāpatti, no ca ākiñcaññāyatanamiva santā"ti viññāṇañcāyatane ādīnavaṃ disvā tattha nikantiṃ pariyādāya ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ santato manasikaritvā tasseva viññāṇañcāyatanārammaṇabhūtassa ākāsānañcāyatanaviññāṇassa abhāvo suññatā vivittākāro manasikātabbo. Kathaṃ? Taṃ viññāṇaṃ amanasikaritvā "natthi natthī"ti vā, "suññaṃ suñña"nti vā, "vivittaṃ vivitta"nti vā punappunaṃ āvajjitabbaṃ, manasikātabbaṃ, paccavekkhitabbaṃ, takkāhataṃ vitakkāhataṃ kātabbaṃ.
Tassevaṃ tasmiṃ nimitte cittaṃ cārentassa nīvaraṇāni vikkhambhanti, sati santiṭṭhati, upacārena cittaṃ samādhiyati. So taṃ nimittaṃ punappunaṃ āsevati, bhāveti, bahulīkaroti. Tassevaṃ karoto ākāse phuṭe mahaggataviññāṇe viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ viya tasseva ākāsaṃ pharitvā pavattassa mahaggataviññāṇassa suññavivittanatthibhāve ākiñcaññāyatanacittaṃ appeti. Etthāpi ca appanānayo vuttanayeneva veditabbo.
Ayaṃ pana viseso, tasmiṃ hi appanācitte uppanne so bhikkhu yathā nāma puriso maṇḍalamāḷādīsu kenacideva karaṇīyena sannipatitaṃ bhikkhusaṅghaṃ disvā katthaci gantvā sannipātakiccāvasāneva uṭṭhāya pakkantesu bhikkhūsu āgantvā dvāre ṭhatvā puna taṃ ṭhānaṃ olokento suññameva passati, vivittameva passati. Nāssa evaṃ hoti "ettakā nāma bhikkhū kālaṅkatā vā disāpakkantā vā"ti, atha kho suññamidaṃ vivittanti natthibhāvameva passati, evameva pubbe ākāse pavattitaviññāṇaṃ viññāṇañcāyatanajjhānacakkhunā passanto viharitvā "natthi natthī"tiādinā parikammamanasikārena antarahite tasmiṃ viññāṇe tassa apagamasaṅkhātaṃ abhāvameva passanto viharati. Ettāvatā cesa "sabbaso viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ samatikkamma natthi kiñcīti ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharatī"ti (vibha. 508; dī. ni. 2.129) vuccati.
Idhāpi sabbasoti idaṃ vuttanayameva. Viññāṇañcāyatananti etthāpi ca pubbe vuttanayeneva jhānampi viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ ārammaṇampi. Ārammaṇampi hi purimanayeneva viññāṇañcañca taṃ dutiyassa āruppajjhānassa ārammaṇattā devānaṃ devāyatanaṃ viya adhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena āyatanañcāti viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ. Tathā viññāṇañcañca taṃ tasseva jhānassa sañjātihetuttā "kambojā assānaṃ āyatana"ntiādīni viya sañjātidesaṭṭhena āyatanañcātipi viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ. Evametaṃ jhānañca ārammaṇañcāti ubhayampi appavattikaraṇena ca amanasikaraṇena ca samatikkamitvāva yasmā idaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja vihātabbaṃ, tasmā ubhayampetaṃ ekajjhaṃ katvā viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ samatikkammāti idaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ.
Natthi kiñcīti natthi natthi, suññaṃ suññaṃ, vivittaṃ vivittanti evaṃ manasikarontoti vuttaṃ hoti. Yampi vibhaṅge vuttaṃ "natthi kiñcīti taññeva viññāṇaṃ abhāveti vibhāveti antaradhāpeti natthi kiñcīti passati, tena vuccati natthi kiñcī"ti, taṃ kiñcāpi khayato sammasanaṃ viya vuttaṃ, atha khvassa evameva attho daṭṭhabbo. Tañhi viññāṇaṃ anāvajjento amanasikaronto apaccavekkhanto kevalamassa natthibhāvaṃ suññabhāvaṃ vivittabhāvameva manasikaronto abhāveti vibhāveti antaradhāpetīti vuccati, na aññathāti.
Ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharatīti ettha pana nāssa kiñcananti akiñcanaṃ, antamaso bhaṅgamattampi assa avasiṭṭhaṃ natthīti vuttaṃ hoti. Akiñcanassa bhāvo ākiñcaññaṃ, ākāsānañcāyatanaviññāṇāpagamassetaṃ adhivacanaṃ. Taṃ ākiñcaññaṃ adhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena āyatanamassa jhānassa devānaṃ devāyatanamivāti ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ. Sesaṃ purimasadisamevāti.
Ayaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanakammaṭṭhāne vitthārakathā.
But one wishing to develop the base of nothingness, having gained mastery in the five ways over the attainment of the base of infinite consciousness, and having seen the danger in the base of infinite consciousness thus, "this attainment has the base of infinite space as a near enemy, and is not as peaceful as the base of nothingness" — having thus exhausted his delight in it, attending to the base of nothingness as peaceful, should attend to the absence, the voidness, the vacancy of that very infinite-space consciousness which had been the object of the base of infinite consciousness. How? Without attending to that consciousness itself, he should repeatedly advert to, attend to, review, and strike at and consider: "there is not, there is not," or "empty, empty," or "vacant, vacant."
As he thus moves his mind over that sign, the hindrances are suppressed, mindfulness becomes established, and the mind becomes concentrated by way of access. He repeatedly cultivates, develops, and makes much of that sign. As he does so, just as the base of infinite consciousness became absorbed in the exalted consciousness that had touched space, so now the consciousness of the base of nothingness becomes absorbed in the emptiness, vacancy, and non-existence of that very exalted consciousness which had occurred pervading that space. Here too, the method of absorption should be understood exactly as already stated.
But here is a distinctive feature: when that absorption-consciousness has arisen, that monk is like a man who, having seen a community of monks assembled for some particular business in a round pavilion or the like, and having gone off elsewhere, then, right at the conclusion of the assembly's business, when the monks have risen and departed, returns, stands at the entrance, and, looking again at that place, sees it as simply empty, sees it as simply vacant. It does not occur to him, "so many monks have died, or have gone off in various directions" — rather, he simply sees this as empty, as vacant, as a mere state of non-existence. Just so, having previously dwelt looking, with the eye of the base-of-infinite-consciousness jhāna, at the consciousness that had occurred pervading space, when that consciousness has vanished through the preliminary-work attention of "there is not, there is not" and the rest, he dwells simply looking at the absence of that consciousness, reckoned as its departure. By this much he is said to "dwell having attained the base of nothingness, by completely transcending the base of infinite consciousness, thinking, 'there is nothing'" (Vibh. 508; D.N. 2.129).
Herein too, "completely" is as already explained. And here too, "the base of infinite consciousness," by the same method as before, refers both to the jhāna itself and to its object. For the object too, by the same method as before, is called "the base of infinite consciousness" in the sense of being a foundation, since it is the object of that second immaterial jhāna, just as a particular resort is a base for those dwelling in it; and likewise, since it is the very cause of the arising of that jhāna, it is also called "the base of infinite consciousness" in the sense of being its place of origin, just as in such expressions as "Kamboja is a source of horses." Thus, since one must dwell having attained this base of nothingness only by transcending both of these — the jhāna and the object — by way of making them not occur and by non-attention to them, therefore, taking both of these together as one, it is said, "by transcending the base of infinite consciousness" — this should be so understood.
"There is nothing": the meaning is, attending thus, "there is not, there is not," "empty, empty," "vacant, vacant." As for what is said in the Vibhaṅga, "'there is nothing': he makes that very consciousness cease to be, causes it to vanish, makes it disappear; he sees 'there is nothing' — therefore it is said, 'there is nothing'" — although this is expressed in a manner resembling the contemplation of destruction in insight meditation, nevertheless its meaning should be understood in just this same way. For it is said that he, by not adverting to, not attending to, and not reviewing that consciousness, but attending only to its state of non-existence, its state of emptiness, its state of vacancy, "makes it cease to be, causes it to vanish, makes it disappear" — and in no other sense than this.
"One dwells having attained the base of nothingness": here, since there is not even so much as a "something" belonging to it, it is "having-nothing" — the meaning is, not even the mere momentary dissolution of that consciousness remains. The state of having-nothing is "nothingness" — a designation for the departure of the infinite-space-consciousness that had been the object of the base of infinite consciousness. That nothingness, in the sense of being a foundation for this jhāna, is a "base," just as a particular resort is a base — thus, "the base of nothingness." The rest is exactly as before.
This is the detailed treatment of the meditation subject of the base of nothingness.
The chapter takes obvious care to distinguish this attainment's specific flavor of "seeing nothing" from the very different sense in which insight meditation contemplates the destruction of phenomena — even flagging that the Vibhaṅge's own wording here ("makes it cease to be, causes it to vanish") could easily be mistaken for that other, more analytical kind of contemplation, and insisting that what is actually meant is simply attending to an absence, not investigating impermanence.
The empty-pavilion simile is chosen with real precision: the man does not grieve, speculate, or investigate what happened to the departed monks — he simply registers the fact of the empty space with complete equanimity, exactly the undramatic, non-elaborative quality of mind the meditator is meant to bring to the vanished consciousness that had filled the base of infinite consciousness a moment before.
the base of nothingness — a- (not) + kiñcana (something, anything) + āyatana (base); the third immaterial attainment, reached not by taking a new positive object but by attending to the sheer absence of the previous attainment's own consciousness.
a round pavilion, a circular meeting-hall — the setting for this section's central simile, a communal space now seen simply and matter-of-factly empty once its occupants have departed.
contemplation by way of destruction — khaya (destruction, cessation) + sammasana (a thorough grasping, contemplation); the insight-meditation technique this section is careful to distinguish from the present attainment's own, quite different, manner of "seeing nothing."
The Fourth Attainment, and the King Who Would Never Trade Places
The final and most refined immaterial attainment presents a genuine paradox the chapter addresses head-on: the meditator must attend to the base of nothingness as peaceful in order to move beyond it — yet if he is attending to it as peaceful, how can this count as transcending it rather than simply settling into it? The answer lies not in what is attended to but in the complete absence of any wish to re-enter it. This is illustrated by a king who, passing craftsmen at their skilled work, genuinely admires their skill without ever wishing to trade his throne for their trade — his admiration and his complete lack of desire to change places coexist without contradiction, exactly as the meditator can rightly judge the base of nothingness "peaceful" while having not the slightest inclination to attain it again.
Nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ bhāvetukāmena pana pañcahākārehi ākiñcaññāyatanasamāpattiyaṃ ciṇṇavasībhāvena "āsannaviññāṇañcāyatanapaccatthikā ayaṃ samāpatti, no ca nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ viya santā"ti vā "saññā rogo, saññā gaṇḍo, saññā sallaṃ, etaṃ santaṃ, etaṃ paṇītaṃ yadidaṃ nevasaññānāsaññā"ti vā evaṃ ākiñcaññāyatane ādīnavaṃ, upari ānisaṃsañca disvā ākiñcaññāyatane nikantiṃ pariyādāya nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ santato manasikaritvā "sāva abhāvaṃ ārammaṇaṃ katvā pavattitā ākiñcaññāyatanasamāpatti santā santā"ti punappunaṃ āvajjitabbā, manasikātabbā, paccavekkhitabbā, takkāhatā vitakkāhatā kātabbā.
Tassevaṃ tasmiṃ nimitte punappunaṃ mānasaṃ cārentassa nīvaraṇāni vikkhambhanti, sati santiṭṭhati, upacārena cittaṃ samādhiyati. So taṃ nimittaṃ punappunaṃ āsevati, bhāveti, bahulīkaroti. Tassevaṃ karoto viññāṇāpagame ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ viya ākiñcaññāyatanasamāpattisaṅkhātesu catūsu khandhesu nevasaññānāsaññāyatanacittaṃ appeti. Appanānayo panettha vuttanayeneva veditabbo. Ettāvatā cesa "sabbaso ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ samatikkamma nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja viharatī"ti (vibha. 508; dī. ni. 2.129) vuccati.
Idhāpi sabbasoti idaṃ vuttanayameva. Ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ samatikkammāti etthāpi pubbe vuttanayeneva jhānampi ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ ārammaṇampi. Ārammaṇampi hi purimanayeneva ākiñcaññañca taṃ tatiyassa āruppajjhānassa ārammaṇattā devānaṃ devāyatanaṃ viya adhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena āyatanañcāti ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ. Tathā ākiñcaññañca taṃ tasseva jhānassa sañjātihetuttā kambojā assānaṃ āyatanantiādīni viya sañjātidesaṭṭhena āyatanañcātipi ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ. Evametaṃ jhānañca ārammaṇañcāti ubhayampi appavattikaraṇena ca amanasikaraṇena ca samatikkamitvāva yasmā idaṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ upasampajja vihātabbaṃ, tasmā ubhayampetaṃ ekajjhaṃ katvā ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ samatikkammāti idaṃ vuttanti veditabbaṃ.
Nevasaññānāsaññāyatananti ettha pana yāya saññāya bhāvato taṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatananti vuccati. Yathā paṭipannassa sā saññā hoti, taṃ tāva dassetuṃ vibhaṅge "nevasaññīnāsaññī"ti uddharitvā "taññeva ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ santato manasi karoti, saṅkhārāvasesasamāpattiṃ bhāveti, tena vuccati nevasaññīnāsaññī"ti (vibha. 619) vuttaṃ. Tattha santato manasi karotīti "santā vatāyaṃ samāpatti, yatra hi nāma natthibhāvampi ārammaṇaṃ karitvā ṭhassatī"ti evaṃ santārammaṇatāya taṃ santāti manasi karoti.
Santato ce manasi karoti, kathaṃ samatikkamo hotīti? Asamāpajjitukāmatāya. So hi kiñcāpi taṃ santato manasi karoti, atha khvassa "ahametaṃ āvajjissāmi, samāpajjissāmi, adhiṭṭhahissāmi, vuṭṭhahissāmi, paccavekkhissāmī"ti esa ābhogo samannāhāro manasikāro na hoti. Kasmā? Ākiñcaññāyatanato nevasaññānāsaññāyatanassa santatarapaṇītataratāya.
Yathā hi rājā mahacca rājānubhāvena hatthikkhandhavaragato nagaravīthiyaṃ vicaranto dantakārādayo sippike ekaṃ vatthaṃ daḷhaṃ nivāsetvā ekena sīsaṃ veṭhetvā dantacuṇṇādīhi samokiṇṇagatte anekāni dantavikatiādīni sippāni karonte disvā "aho vata re chekā ācariyā īdisānipi nāma sippāni karissantī"ti evaṃ tesaṃ chekatāya tussati, na cassa evaṃ hoti "aho vatāhaṃ rajjaṃ pahāya evarūpo sippiko bhaveyya"nti. Taṃ kissa hetu? Rajjasiriyā mahānisaṃsatāya. So sippino samatikkamitvāva gacchati. Evameva esa kiñcāpi taṃ samāpattiṃ santato manasi karoti, atha khvassa "ahametaṃ samāpattiṃ āvajjissāmi, samāpajjissāmi, adhiṭṭhahissāmi, vuṭṭhahissāmi, paccavekkhissāmī"ti neva esa ābhogo samannāhāro manasikāro hoti.
So taṃ santato manasikaronto pubbe vuttanayena taṃ paramasukhumaṃ appanāppattaṃ saññaṃ pāpuṇāti, yāya nevasaññīnāsaññī nāma hoti, saṅkhārāvasesasamāpattiṃ bhāvetīti vuccati. Saṅkhārāvasesasamāpattinti accantasukhumabhāvappattasaṅkhāraṃ catutthāruppasamāpattiṃ.
But one wishing to develop the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, having gained mastery in the five ways over the attainment of the base of nothingness, having seen the danger in the base of nothingness — either thus: "this attainment has the base of infinite consciousness as a near enemy, and is not as peaceful as the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception," or thus: "perception is a disease, perception is a boil, perception is a dart; this is peaceful, this is sublime — namely, neither-perception-nor-non-perception" — and having thus seen both the danger in the base of nothingness and the benefit that lies beyond it, having exhausted his delight in the base of nothingness, attending to the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception as peaceful, he should repeatedly advert to, attend to, review, and strike at and consider: "this very attainment of the base of nothingness, which occurred by taking non-existence as its object, is peaceful, peaceful."
As he thus repeatedly moves his mind over that sign, the hindrances are suppressed, mindfulness becomes established, and the mind becomes concentrated by way of access. He repeatedly cultivates, develops, and makes much of that sign. As he does so, just as the base of nothingness became absorbed in the disappearance of consciousness, so now the consciousness of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception becomes absorbed in the four aggregates reckoned as the attainment of the base of nothingness. The method of absorption here should be understood exactly as already stated. By this much he is said to "dwell having attained the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, by completely transcending the base of nothingness" (Vibh. 508; D.N. 2.129).
Herein too, "completely" is as already explained. And here too, "the base of nothingness," by the same method as before, refers both to the jhāna itself and to its object. For the object too, by the same method as before, is called "the base of nothingness" in the sense of being a foundation, since it is the object of that third immaterial jhāna, just as a particular resort is a base for those dwelling in it; and likewise, since it is the very cause of the arising of that jhāna, it is also called "the base of nothingness" in the sense of being its place of origin, just as in such expressions as "Kamboja is a source of horses." Thus, since one must dwell having attained this base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception only by transcending both of these — the jhāna and the object — by way of making them not occur and by non-attention to them, therefore, taking both of these together as one, it is said, "by transcending the base of nothingness" — this should be so understood.
"The base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception": here, by virtue of what kind of perception is it called by this name? In order to show, first, what sort of perception occurs in one who has practiced in this way, it is said in the Vibhaṅga, having first introduced the term "neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient": "he attends to that very base of nothingness as peaceful; he develops the attainment with a residue of formations; therefore he is called 'neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient'" (Vibh. 619). Herein, "he attends to it as peaceful" means: by way of its having a peaceful object, he attends to it as "peaceful," thinking, "this attainment is indeed peaceful, in that it will go on standing, having taken even a state of non-existence as its object."
If he attends to it as peaceful, one might ask, how does transcendence occur? By his not wishing to enter into it again. For although he does indeed attend to it as peaceful, nevertheless he does not have the engagement, the consideration, the attention consisting in, "I shall advert to this, I shall attain it, I shall resolve upon it, I shall emerge from it, I shall review it." Why not? Because the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception is more peaceful and more sublime than the base of nothingness.
For just as a king, traveling in great royal splendor on the back of a fine elephant through the city streets, and seeing craftsmen — ivory-carvers and the like, each having wrapped one sturdy cloth about his loins and bound another about his head, their bodies covered all over with ivory-dust — performing many kinds of ivory-carving and other crafts, is pleased at their skillfulness, thinking, "ah, how skilled these craftsmen are, that they can perform such crafts as these!" — yet it does not occur to him, "ah, would that I might abandon my kingship and become a craftsman such as this!" Why not? Because of the great benefit of the glory of kingship. He simply passes beyond the craftsmen and goes on his way. Just so, this meditator, although he does indeed attend to that attainment as peaceful, nevertheless does not have the engagement, the consideration, the attention consisting in, "I shall advert to this attainment, I shall attain it, I shall resolve upon it, I shall emerge from it, I shall review it."
He, attending to it as peaceful, reaches, by the method already described, that supremely subtle perception which has attained absorption, by virtue of which he is called "neither-percipient-nor-non-percipient," and is said to "develop the attainment with a residue of formations." "The attainment with a residue of formations" means: the fourth immaterial attainment, whose formations have reached an utterly subtle state.
The king-and-craftsmen simile solves a genuine puzzle rather than merely decorating the text: how can honest appreciation of something's value coexist with a total absence of desire to possess it? The king's admiration for the craftsmen's skill is entirely sincere, not a polite fiction — and precisely because his own position is even better, that sincere admiration generates no pull whatsoever to trade places. The meditator's relationship to the base of nothingness works the same way: it really is peaceful, and he really does recognize that, but the fourth attainment's still-greater refinement leaves no motivational residue drawing him back to it.
"The attainment with a residue of formations" is a carefully hedged name for what is, by any ordinary standard, an extraordinarily subtle state — the phrase concedes that mental formations have not been eliminated altogether (that would be a different attainment entirely, cessation itself) while insisting that what remains is so attenuated that ordinary language runs out, unable to call it simply "perception" or simply its absence.
the attainment with a residue of formations — saṅkhāra (mental formation) + avasesa (remainder, residue) + samāpatti (attainment); the technical name for the fourth immaterial attainment, marking its formations as reduced to an extreme, but not total, subtlety.
engagement, active interest — the specific motivational orientation toward re-entering a prior attainment, whose complete absence, rather than any change in what is perceived, is what actually constitutes "transcending" that attainment.
skillfulness, cleverness — the quality the king in this section's simile genuinely admires in the craftsmen, offered as a model for how the meditator can rightly judge a lesser attainment favorably without any wish to return to it.
Neither Perception Nor Non-Perception: Two Similes, and Why Only Sāriputta Could See It
The chapter now explains exactly why this final attainment carries such a paradoxical name, and — remarkably for a treatise devoted to samatha technique — pauses to note a genuine limit on this attainment's usefulness for insight meditation: its perception has become so attenuated that it can no longer function sharply enough to serve as an object for generating disenchantment, except in the hands of a practitioner of Venerable Sāriputta's caliber, and even he could only grasp it as an undifferentiated mass rather than moment by moment. Two homely similes — a novice's technically-true-but-misleading answers about oil left coating a bowl, and about a trace of water on a path — capture exactly the sense in which something can be truthfully said to be simultaneously "there" and "not there," depending on what function is being asked about.
Idāni yaṃ taṃ evamadhigatāya saññāya vasena nevasaññānāsaññāyatananti vuccati, taṃ atthato dassetuṃ "nevasaññānāsaññāyatananti nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ samāpannassa vā upapannassa vā diṭṭhadhammasukhavihārissa vā cittacetasikā dhammā"ti (vibha. 620) vuttaṃ. Tesu idha samāpannassa cittacetasikā dhammā adhippetā. Vacanattho panettha oḷārikāya saññāya abhāvato sukhumāya ca bhāvato nevassa sasampayuttadhammassa jhānassa saññā nāsaññanti nevasaññānāsaññaṃ. Nevasaññānāsaññañca taṃ manāyatanadhammāyatanapariyāpannattā āyatanañcāti nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ. Atha vā yāyamettha saññā, sā paṭusaññākiccaṃ kātuṃ asamatthatāya nevasaññā, saṅkhārāvasesasukhumabhāvena vijjamānattā nāsaññāti nevasaññānāsaññā. Nevasaññānāsaññā ca sā sesadhammānaṃ adhiṭṭhānaṭṭhena āyatanañcāti nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ.
Na kevalañcettha saññāva edisī, atha kho vedanāpi nevavedanānāvedanā, cittampi nevacittaṃnācittaṃ, phassopi nevaphassonāphasso. Esa nayo sesasampayuttadhammesu. Saññāsīsena panāyaṃ desanā katāti veditabbā. Pattamakkhanatelappabhutīhi ca upamāhi esa attho vibhāvetabbo.
Sāmaṇero kira telena pattaṃ makkhetvā ṭhapesi, taṃ yāgupānakāle thero pattamāharāti āha. So "patte telamatthi, bhante"ti āha. Tato "āhara, sāmaṇera, telaṃ, nāḷiṃ pūressāmī"ti vutte "natthi, bhante, tela"nti āha. Tattha yathā antovutthattā yāguyā saddhiṃ akappiyaṭṭhena "telamatthī"ti hoti. Nāḷipūraṇādīnaṃ vasena "natthī"ti hoti. Evaṃ sāpi saññā paṭusaññākiccaṃ kātuṃ asamatthatāya nevasaññā, saṅkhārāvasesasukhumabhāvena vijjamānattā nāsaññā hoti.
Kiṃ panettha saññākiccanti? Ārammaṇasañjānanañceva vipassanāya ca visayabhāvaṃ upagantvā nibbidājananaṃ. Dahanakiccamiva hi sukhodake tejodhātu sañjānanakiccaṃ pesā paṭuṃ kātuṃ na sakkoti. Sesasamāpattīsu saññā viya vipassanāya visayabhāvaṃ upagantvā nibbidājananampi kātuṃ na sakkoti. Aññesu hi khandhesu akatābhiniveso bhikkhu nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakkhandhe sammasitvā nibbidaṃ pattuṃ samattho nāma natthi apica āyasmā sāriputto. Pakativipassako pana mahāpañño sāriputtasadisova sakkuṇeyya. Sopi "evaṃ kirime dhammā ahutvā sambhonti, hutvā paṭiventī"ti (ma. ni. 3.95) evaṃ kalāpasammasanavaseneva, no anupadadhammavipassanāvasena. Evaṃ sukhumattaṃ gatā esā samāpatti.
Yathā ca pattamakkhanatelūpamāya, evaṃ maggudakūpamāyapi ayamattho vibhāvetabbo. Maggappaṭipannassa kira therassa purato gacchanto sāmaṇero thokaṃ udakaṃ disvā "udakaṃ, bhante, upāhanā omuñcathā"ti āha. Tato therena "sace udakamatthi, āhara nhānasāṭikaṃ, nhāyissāmā"ti vutte "natthi, bhante"ti āha. Tattha yathā upāhanatemanamattaṭṭhena "udakamatthī"ti hoti, nhāyanaṭṭhena "natthī"ti hoti. Evampi sā paṭusaññākiccaṃ kātuṃ asamatthatāya nevasaññā, saṅkhārāvasesasukhumabhāvena vijjamānattā nāsaññā hoti.
Na kevalañca etāheva, aññāhipi anurūpāhi upamāhi esa attho vibhāvetabbo. Upasampajja viharatīti idaṃ vuttanayamevāti.
Ayaṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanakammaṭṭhāne vitthārakathā.
Now, in order to show, in terms of meaning, what is meant by "the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception" with reference to the perception thus attained, it is said: "'the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception': the mind and its associated mental factors in one who has attained the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, or in one reborn there, or in one dwelling happily in the present life" (Vibh. 620). Of these, what is intended here are the mind and mental factors of one who has attained it. As for the word's meaning: because coarse perception is absent, yet a subtle perception is present, the perception of this jhāna together with its associated states is "neither perception nor non-perception." And that "neither-perception-nor-non-perception," being included under the mind-base and the mental-object-base, is also a "base" — thus, "the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception." Or alternatively: this perception, because it is incapable of performing the function of sharp perception, is "not perception"; yet, because it exists by way of a subtle residue of formations, it is "not non-perception" either — thus, "neither-perception-nor-non-perception." And that "neither-perception-nor-non-perception," in the sense of being a foundation for the remaining associated states, is also a "base" — thus, "the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception."
And not only perception here is of this kind — feeling, too, is neither feeling nor non-feeling; consciousness, too, is neither consciousness nor non-consciousness; contact, too, is neither contact nor non-contact. The same holds for the remaining associated mental factors. It should be understood that this teaching has been given under the heading of "perception" alone, as a representative case. This meaning should be illustrated by such similes as the oil smeared on a bowl, and others like it.
It is told that a novice smeared a bowl with oil and set it aside. At the time for drinking rice-gruel, the elder said, "Novice, bring the bowl." He said, "Venerable sir, there is oil in the bowl." Then, when told, "Novice, bring the oil — I shall fill a measure with it," he said, "Venerable sir, there is no oil." Herein: since the oil remains inside, coating it, such that it would render the gruel unallowable if mixed in, it is correctly said, "there is oil"; but by way of being enough to fill a measure and the like, it is correctly said, "there is none." Just so, that perception too, because it is incapable of performing the function of sharp perception, is "not perception"; yet, because it exists by way of a subtle residue of formations, it is "not non-perception" either.
What, then, is the function of perception here? It is the apprehending of an object, and, by becoming the domain of insight, the generation of disenchantment. For just as the fire element in lukewarm water is unable to perform its function of burning sharply, so this perception is unable to perform the function of apprehending sharply. And, unlike the perception in the other attainments, it is also unable, by becoming the domain of insight, to generate disenchantment. For, apart from Venerable Sāriputta, there is indeed no monk who, without having first made a firm grip on the other aggregates, is capable of contemplating the aggregates of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception and reaching disenchantment through them. Only one of great wisdom, an ordinary practitioner of insight comparable to Sāriputta, could manage it — and even he could do so only by way of contemplating them as a mass, thinking, "thus indeed, it seems, these states, not having been, come to be; having been, they pass away" (M.N. 3.95) — not by way of insight into each individual state one by one. To such a degree of subtlety has this attainment gone.
And just as by the simile of the oil smeared on the bowl, so too by the simile of the water on the path should this meaning be illustrated. It is told that a novice, walking ahead of an elder traveling along a road, having seen a little water, said, "Venerable sir, there is water — take off your sandals." Then, when the elder said, "If there is water, bring my bathing cloth, we shall bathe," he said, "Venerable sir, there is none." Herein: by way of being merely enough to wet the sandals, it is correctly said, "there is water"; but by way of being sufficient for bathing, it is correctly said, "there is none." Just so too, that perception, because it is incapable of performing the function of sharp perception, is "not perception"; yet, because it exists by way of a subtle residue of formations, it is "not non-perception" either.
And not only by these similes alone — this meaning should be illustrated by other, similarly fitting similes as well. "Dwells having attained" is as already explained.
This is the detailed treatment of the meditation subject of the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.
The novice's two technically-correct-but-opposite answers are chosen with real precision: in both cases, nothing about the actual physical situation changes between the "yes" and the "no" — the same trace of oil, the same trace of water are present throughout. What changes is only the specific function being asked about, exactly paralleling how this jhāna's perception is simultaneously and non-contradictorily "present" (it has not vanished into nothing) and "absent" (it can no longer perform sharp apprehension) depending on which capacity is in question.
The admission that only Sāriputta, and only by contemplating "as a mass" rather than moment by moment, could ever draw insight directly from this specific attainment is a genuinely humbling concession within a text that otherwise projects total systematic confidence — a rare moment where the Visuddhimagga acknowledges a real limit case, an attainment so refined that it becomes, for virtually everyone but the Buddha's foremost disciple in wisdom, functionally unusable as a direct basis for liberating insight.
the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception — neva (neither) + saññā (perception) + na (not) + asaññā (non-perception) + āyatana (base); the fourth and final immaterial attainment, named for a perception too subtle to count fully as either present or absent.
contemplation as a mass, group-contemplation — kalāpa (a bundle, a group) + sammasana (a thorough grasping, contemplation); the only mode by which even Sāriputta could apply insight to this attainment, as opposed to the finer moment-by-moment analysis (anupadadhammavipassanā) possible with coarser states.
disenchantment, revulsion — the specific insight-generated turning-away from conditioned phenomena that this attainment's own perception, unlike that of every coarser attainment, is said to be too subtle to reliably produce.
Miscellaneous Discussion: Same Two Factors, Four Degrees of Refinement
The chapter's closing miscellaneous discussion opens with a precise structural claim: unlike the progression through the four fine-material jhānas, where each step is marked by dropping a specific jhāna factor (first applied and sustained thought, then joy, then pleasure), the four immaterial attainments involve no such transcending of factors at all — all four alike possess only equanimity and one-pointedness of mind. What distinguishes them from one another is purely a transcending of object, one after another: form, then space, then the consciousness that pervaded space, then that consciousness's own departure. Yet each is still genuinely more sublime than the last, illustrated by two similes: the four ascending storeys of a single palace, each stocked with ever more luxurious versions of the same five sensual pleasures, and four cloths of identical size but ever-finer thread, becoming more valuable and more pleasant to the touch without any change in their dimensions.
Asadisarūpo nātho, āruppaṃ yaṃ catubbidhaṃ āha.
Taṃ iti ñatvā tasmiṃ, pakiṇṇakakathāpi viññeyyā.
Āruppasamāpattiyo hi –
Ārammaṇātikkamato, catassopi bhavantimā;
Aṅgātikkamametāsaṃ, na icchanti vibhāvino.
Etāsu hi rūpanimittātikkamato paṭhamā, ākāsātikkamato dutiyā, ākāse pavattitaviññāṇātikkamato tatiyā. Ākāse pavattitaviññāṇassa apagamātikkamato catutthīti sabbathā ārammaṇātikkamato catassopi bhavantimā āruppasamāpattiyoti veditabbā. Aṅgātikkamaṃ pana etāsaṃ na icchanti paṇḍitā. Na hi rūpāvacarasamāpattīsu viya etāsu aṅgātikkamo atthi. Sabbāsupi hi etāsu upekkhā, cittekaggatāti dve eva jhānaṅgāni honti.
Evaṃ santepi –
Suppaṇītatarā honti, pacchimā pacchimā idha;
Upamā tattha viññeyyā, pāsādatalasāṭikā.
Yathā hi catubhūmikassa pāsādassa heṭṭhimatale dibbanaccagītavāditasurabhigandhamālābhojanasayanacchādanādivasena paṇītā pañcakāmaguṇā paccupaṭṭhitā assu. Dutiye tato paṇītatarā. Tatiye tato paṇītatarā. Catutthe sabbapaṇītatarā. Tattha kiñcāpi tāni cattāripi pāsādatalāneva, natthi nesaṃ pāsādatalabhāvena viseso. Pañcakāmaguṇasamiddhavisesena pana heṭṭhimato heṭṭhimato uparimaṃ uparimaṃ paṇītataraṃ hoti.
Yathā ca ekāya itthiyā kantitathūlasaṇhasaṇhatarasaṇhatamasuttānaṃ catupalatipaladvipalaekapalasāṭikā assu āyāmena ca vitthārena ca samappamāṇā. Tattha kiñcāpi tā sāṭikā catassopi āyāmato ca vitthārato ca samappamāṇā, natthi tāsaṃ pamāṇato viseso. Sukhasamphassasukhumabhāvamahagghabhāvehi pana purimāya purimāya pacchimā pacchimā paṇītatarā honti, evameva kiñcāpi catūsu etāsu upekkhā, cittekaggatāti etāni dveyeva aṅgāni honti, atha kho bhāvanāvisesena tesaṃ aṅgāni paṇītapaṇītatarabhāvena suppaṇītatarā honti pacchimā pacchimā idhāti veditabbā.
Having thus known the fourfold immaterial state that the Protector, of unequaled form, has taught, a miscellaneous discussion concerning it should also be understood.
For these immaterial attainments —
All four of these come to be by way of transcending an object; the wise do not hold that there is, for these, any transcending of a factor.
Among these, the first comes about by transcending the sign of form; the second, by transcending space; the third, by transcending the consciousness that occurred pervading space; the fourth, by transcending the departure of the consciousness that occurred pervading space. Thus, in every way, by way of transcending an object, all four of these immaterial attainments come to be — this should be so understood. But the wise do not hold that there is, for these, any transcending of a factor. For there is no transcending of factors in these, as there is in the fine-material-sphere attainments. Rather, in all of these alike, there are only these same two jhāna factors: equanimity and one-pointedness of mind.
Even so —
Each successive one here is more sublime than the one before; the similes to be understood here are the storey of a palace and a woven cloth.
For suppose that, in a four-storeyed palace, on the ground floor, sublime versions of the five cords of sensual pleasure were present, by way of divine dance, song, and music, fragrant scents and garlands, food, bedding, and coverings; on the second floor, these would be more sublime than that; on the third floor, still more sublime than that; and on the fourth floor, most sublime of all. Herein, although all four are equally storeys of one and the same palace, with no difference among them simply as storeys, nevertheless, by virtue of the distinctive richness of the five cords of sensual pleasure, each floor above is more sublime than the one below it.
And suppose that one woman were to spin threads of four grades — coarse, fine, finer, and finest — and make from them cloths weighing four palas, three palas, two palas, and one pala respectively, all equal in length and breadth. Herein, although all four cloths are equal in length and breadth, with no difference among them by way of size, nevertheless, by virtue of pleasantness to the touch, fineness, and costliness, each subsequent cloth is more sublime than the one before it. Just so, although in all four of these attainments there are only these same two factors — equanimity and one-pointedness of mind — nevertheless, through the distinction in their development, each successive one here should be understood, by virtue of the increasing sublimity of its factors, to be more and more sublime than the one before it.
The distinction drawn here — refinement without any change in constituent factors — is a genuinely subtle piece of Abhidhamma analysis, and both similes are chosen to make exactly this specific, otherwise counterintuitive point vivid: two things can be structurally identical by every countable measure (four palace floors, all equally "a storey"; four cloths, all equally sized) while nonetheless differing enormously in quality along some other dimension entirely (luxury of furnishing; fineness of thread) that the structural count alone would never reveal.
This has a real practical implication for how the four immaterial attainments should be understood: a meditator cannot distinguish the base of infinite space from the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception by inventorying which jhāna factors are present, since the answer would be identical in both cases — the entire difference between them lies in the object being transcended and the degree of subtlety that transcending has produced.
transcending of a factor — aṅga (a jhāna factor) + atikkama (transcending); the mechanism by which the four fine-material jhānas are distinguished from one another, explicitly denied to apply among the four immaterial attainments.
transcending of an object — ārammaṇa (object) + atikkama (transcending); the actual mechanism distinguishing the four immaterial attainments from one another, each one taking as its object something derived from transcending the attainment before it.
a traditional unit of weight — used in the cloth simile to specify four grades of fineness (a four-pala cloth being coarsest, a one-pala cloth of the same size being finest), illustrating quality differing independently of any measurable dimension.
The Shed Built Over Filth: A Simile for All Four Attainments in Sequence
A single extended simile now captures the relationship among all four immaterial attainments at once: a shed built over an unclean place, and four men in succession — one who clings to the shed itself out of disgust for the filth beneath it, a second who relies on that first man, a third who judges both of them insecure and stands apart from both, and a fourth who judges the third man's position the soundest and relies on him instead. Each figure maps onto one attainment's specific relationship to the one before it, tracing a chain in which each new attainment is reached precisely by recognizing the insecurity of its predecessor.
Evaṃ anupubbena paṇītapaṇītā cetā –
Asucimhi maṇḍape laggo, eko tannissito paro;
Añño bahi anissāya, taṃ taṃ nissāya cāparo.
Ṭhito catūhi etehi, purisehi yathākkamaṃ;
Samānatāya ñātabbā, catassopi vibhāvinā.
Tatrāyamatthayojanā – asucimhi kira dese eko maṇḍapo, atheko puriso āgantvā taṃ asuciṃ jigucchamāno taṃ maṇḍapaṃ hatthehi ālambitvā tattha laggo laggito viya aṭṭhāsi. Athāparo āgantvā taṃ maṇḍape laggaṃ purisaṃ nissito. Athañño āgantvā cintesi "yo esa maṇḍapalaggo, yo ca tannissito, ubhopete duṭṭhitā. Dhuvo ca nesaṃ maṇḍapapapāte pāto, handāhaṃ bahiyeva tiṭṭhāmī"ti. So tannissitaṃ anissāya bahiyeva aṭṭhāsi. Athāparo āgantvā maṇḍapalaggassa ca tannissitassa ca akhemabhāvaṃ cintetvā bahiṭṭhitañca suṭṭhitoti mantvā taṃ nissāya aṭṭhāsi. Tattha asucimhi dese maṇḍapo viya kasiṇugghāṭimākāsaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ, asucijigucchāya maṇḍapalaggo puriso viya rūpanimittajigucchāya ākāsārammaṇaṃ ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ, maṇḍapalaggaṃ purisaṃ nissito viya ākāsārammaṇaṃ ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ ārabbha pavattaṃ viññāṇañcāyatanaṃ, tesaṃ dvinnampi akhemabhāvaṃ cintetvā anissāya taṃ maṇḍapalaggaṃ bahiṭṭhito viya ākāsānañcāyatanaṃ ārammaṇaṃ akatvā tadabhāvārammaṇaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ, maṇḍapalaggassa tannissitassa ca akhemataṃ cintetvā bahiṭṭhitañca suṭṭhitoti mantvā taṃ nissāya ṭhito viya viññāṇābhāvasaṅkhāte bahipadese ṭhitaṃ ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ ārabbha pavattaṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ daṭṭhabbaṃ.
And these, being thus progressively more and more sublime —
One man clings to a shed built over an unclean place; another relies on him; another stands apart outside, relying on neither; and yet another relies on that one who stands apart. Standing thus, in this order, by way of these four men, all four of these attainments should be known, by their resemblance, by the discerning one.
Here is the application of this meaning: it is told that, in an unclean place, there was a shed. One man came, and, disgusted by that filth, grasped the shed with his hands and stood there, clinging to it as if attached to it. Then another came and relied on that man clinging to the shed. Then yet another came and thought, "both this man clinging to the shed and this man relying on him are badly positioned — their fall, together with the shed's own collapse, is certain; well then, I shall stand outside, apart, relying on neither." He, not relying on the one who was relying on the other, stood outside, apart. Then yet another came, and, having considered the insecurity of both the man clinging to the shed and the man relying on him, and having judged, "the one standing outside is well positioned," relied on him and stood there. Herein: the shed in the unclean place should be seen as the space left by the removal of the kasiṇa. The man clinging to the shed out of disgust for the filth should be seen as the base of infinite space, whose object is space, arising from disgust for the sign of form. The man relying on the one clinging to the shed should be seen as the base of infinite consciousness, which occurs by taking as its starting point the base of infinite space, whose object is space. The man who, having considered the insecurity of both of these, stood outside, apart, relying on neither, should be seen as the base of nothingness, which, without taking the base of infinite space as its object, takes the non-existence of that as its object instead. And the man who, having considered the insecurity of both the one clinging to the shed and the one relying on him, and having judged, "the one standing outside is well positioned," relied on him and stood there, should be seen as the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, which occurs by taking as its starting point the base of nothingness, standing in that "outside" region reckoned as the absence of consciousness.
The simile's structure is worth tracing carefully, since its logic is not simply "each stage is an improvement" but something more specific: each new man's position is motivated by an explicit judgment about the insecurity of the position before it — the third man does not merely prefer standing apart, he reasons his way to it by observing that both the shed-clinger and his dependent share the same impending collapse. This mirrors exactly how each immaterial attainment is reached in this treatise: not by arbitrary preference for something more refined, but by the meditator explicitly seeing the specific danger in the attainment just gained.
The final man's choice — relying on the one who himself relies on nothing — captures something genuinely paradoxical about the fourth attainment's own position: neither-perception-nor-non-perception does not itself abandon all reliance the way the third man's "standing apart" did; instead, it is reached by relying on that very state of non-reliance, taking the base of nothingness's own object-less stability as its own foundation, one further, subtler layer removed from anything nameable at all.
unclean, filthy — the base condition of the location in this section's central simile, standing for the underlying danger (form itself, and everything derived from it) that motivates the entire ascent through the four immaterial attainments.
relying on, dependent on — ni- (down) + śri- (to lean on); the specific relationship each successive man in the simile has to the one before him, mirroring how each attainment takes the previous attainment (or its absence) as its own starting point.
secure, safe / insecure, unsafe — the judgment each new figure in the simile makes about the position of those before him, the deciding factor that motivates each further step in the sequence.
Āruppaniddesa Complete
The chapter closes with two final images explaining why the fourth attainment takes the third as its object at all, despite having already seen its fault. A person unable to find any other livelihood will still rely on a king even after recognizing that king's harshness, simply for lack of any alternative — and just so, the base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, having no other object available to it, takes the base of nothingness as its object regardless of the fault already seen in it. The chapter's very last verse gathers three images of leaning for support — a ladder's rail, a mountain's own summit, one's own knee while climbing — into a single statement of how each of these attainments proceeds only by leaning on the jhāna that came before it. The traditional colophon marking the tenth chapter's completion follows.
Evaṃ pavattamānañca –
Ārammaṇaṃ karoteva, aññābhāvena taṃ idaṃ;
Diṭṭhadosampi rājānaṃ, vuttihetu jano yathā.
Idañhi nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ "āsannaviññāṇañcāyatanapaccatthikā ayaṃ samāpattī"ti evaṃ diṭṭhadosampi taṃ ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ aññassa ārammaṇassa abhāvā ārammaṇaṃ karoteva. Yathā kiṃ? Diṭṭhadosampi rājānaṃ vuttihetu yathā jano. Yathā hi asaṃyataṃ pharusakāyavacīmanosamācāraṃ kañci sabbadisampatiṃ rājānaṃ "pharusasamācāro aya"nti evaṃ diṭṭhadosampi aññattha vuttiṃ alabhamāno jano vuttihetu nissāya vattati, evaṃ diṭṭhadosampi taṃ ākiñcaññāyatanaṃ aññaṃ ārammaṇaṃ alabhamānamidaṃ nevasaññānāsaññāyatanaṃ ārammaṇaṃ karoteva.
Evaṃ kurumānañca –
Āruḷho dīghanisseṇiṃ, yathā nisseṇibāhukaṃ;
Pabbataggañca āruḷho, yathā pabbatamatthakaṃ.
Yathā vā girimārūḷho, attanoyeva jaṇṇukaṃ;
Olubbhati tathevetaṃ, jhānamolubbha vattatīti.
Iti sādhujanapāmojjatthāya kate visuddhimagge
Samādhibhāvanādhikāre
Āruppaniddeso nāma
Dasamo paricchedo.
And, occurring in this way —
This does indeed take that as its object, for lack of anything else — just as people rely on a king for their livelihood even though they have seen his faults.
For this base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, even though it has seen the fault in that base of nothingness — namely, that "this attainment has the base of infinite consciousness as a near enemy" — nevertheless, for lack of any other object, does indeed take that very base of nothingness as its object. Like what? Just as people rely on a king for the sake of their livelihood even though they have seen his faults. For just as people, unable to find a livelihood elsewhere, rely upon and depend upon some sovereign lord of unrestrained, harsh conduct in body, speech, and mind — even though they have seen his fault, thinking, "this one's conduct is harsh" — for the sake of their livelihood, just so this base of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, even though it has seen the fault in that base of nothingness, unable to find any other object, does indeed take this base of nothingness as its object.
And, proceeding in this way —
Just as one who has climbed a tall ladder relies on the ladder's own rail, and just as one who has climbed to a mountain's summit relies on the mountaintop itself, or just as one climbing a mountain leans upon his own knee — just so does each of these proceed, leaning upon the jhāna before it.
Thus, in the Visuddhimagga, composed for the joy of good people,
in the section on the development of concentration,
this is called the Āruppaniddesa —
the tenth chapter.
The king simile makes a point that could otherwise seem to undercut everything the chapter has built: even the most refined attainment described in this entire text is shown to rest, in the end, on nothing more secure than "there was nothing better available" — a strikingly unromantic admission that even a state as sublime as neither-perception-nor-non-perception remains a conditioned, dependent phenomenon, taking a flawed object because no unflawed one exists at that level, rather than because it has somehow transcended the need for an object altogether.
The three closing images of leaning — a ladder's rail, a mountain's summit, one's own knee — are carefully graduated in how much external support they involve, ending with the most minimal and self-contained of the three: leaning on one's own knee while climbing depends on nothing outside the climber himself. This is a fitting final image for a chapter that has spent its entire length showing each attainment growing more subtle, more self-contained, and less dependent on anything resembling an ordinary external object than the one before it.
livelihood, subsistence — the practical, unglamorous motive attributed to both the people relying on a flawed king and, by extension, the fourth immaterial attainment relying on the third despite its recognized fault.
a ladder's side-rail — nisseṇi (ladder) + bāhuka (arm, side-piece); one of three closing images of leaning for support, each a little more self-contained than the last, ending with leaning on one's own knee.
the Description of the Immaterial States — āruppa (immaterial) + niddesa (description, exposition); the traditional title of this tenth chapter, as given in its own closing colophon.
Āruppaniddesa Complete
This completes Ru-Yi's translation of the Visuddhimagga's tenth chapter, Āruppaniddesa — the four immaterial attainments of infinite space, infinite consciousness, nothingness, and neither-perception-nor-non-perception, developed by successively transcending one object after another rather than by dropping jhāna factors, and unified by the chapter's closing similes of the palace's four storeys, the four cloths of a single size, and the shed built over an unclean place. The eleventh chapter, Samādhiniddesa — the Description of Concentration — follows next, opening with the perception of repulsiveness in nutriment before turning to a broader general discussion of concentration itself.