What Must Arise Together?
This page carries Ru-Yi's complete translation of fascicle 4, continuing Chapter 2 (根品第二之二至三, the second and third parts of the Indriya-nirdeśa). It covers which dharmas are so tightly bound that they can never arise apart from one another, from the minimal atomic cluster of matter up through mind's inseparability from its own mental factors, and then the full debate over whether "possession" (得, prāpti) is a genuinely real, distinct dharma or merely a conventional label — including the rival "transformed basis" seed theory, the classification of possession and non-possession, and the puzzle of what it means to possess a possession.
1. A New Chapter Question: Which Dharmas Must Arise Together?
Fascicle 4 opens the second part of Chapter 2 with a fresh question, framed against the treatise's basic five-category ontology of all dharmas.
今應思擇，一切有為如相不同，生亦各異，為有諸法決定俱生、有定俱生。謂一切法略有五品：一色、二心、三心所、四心不相應行、五無為。無為無生，此中不說。今先辯色決定俱生。
Now one should consider: since all conditioned dharmas differ in their characteristics, their arising likewise differs in each case — are there dharmas that definitely arise together with certain others, in fixed groups? All dharmas, briefly, fall into five categories: form, mind, mental factors, formations dissociated from mind, and the unconditioned. The unconditioned does not arise at all, so it is not discussed here. Let us first discuss form's definite co-arising.
This opens a brand-new major topic within Chapter 2's second installment: which dharmas are bound together so tightly that they never occur apart from one another, always arising as an indivisible package. The five-category ontology named here — form, mind, mental factors, formations dissociated from mind, and the unconditioned — has been implicit throughout this treatise; the unconditioned is set aside immediately since, being entirely outside causation, it never "arises" in the first place, making the question of what it co-arises with simply moot.
2. The Minimal Atomic Cluster: Eight, Nine, or Ten Factors
The treatise establishes the absolute floor for any physical cluster in the desire realm — never a single isolated atom, but always a minimal bundle of at least eight distinct factors.
頌曰：欲微聚無聲，無根有八事，有身根九事，十事有餘根。論曰：色聚極細立微聚名，為顯更無細於此者。此在欲界無聲無根，八事俱生隨一不減。云何八事？謂四大種及四所造色、香、味、觸。
Verse: In the desire realm, an atomic cluster without sound and without a sense faculty has eight factors; with the body faculty, nine; with the other faculties, ten. Prose: "The finest division of a cluster of form" is given the name "atomic cluster," to indicate that nothing finer than this exists. In the desire realm, a cluster without sound and without a sense faculty has eight factors arising together, with not even one factor reducible. What are these eight? The four primary elements, together with four kinds of derived form: visible form, smell, taste, and the tangible quality.
無聲有根諸極微聚，此俱生事或九或十。有身根聚九事俱生，八事如前，身為第九。有餘根聚十事俱生，九事如前，加眼等一。眼耳鼻舌必不離身，展轉相望處各別故。
For atomic clusters without sound but with a sense faculty, the co-arising factors are nine or ten. A cluster with the body faculty has nine — the eight as before, with the body faculty as the ninth. A cluster with one of the other faculties has ten — the nine as before, plus that faculty. The eye, ear, nose, and tongue can never occur apart from the body faculty, because, though mutually distinct in location, they are all situated upon it.
The "atomic cluster" (微聚) is the absolute finest-grained unit of matter this system recognizes — never a single atom acting alone, echoing a point made far earlier in this translation that a solitary atom can never by itself produce perception, but always a minimal bundle. Even the barest possible cluster, lacking both sound and any sense faculty, still requires eight distinct factors together: the four primary elements (earth, water, fire, wind) plus four kinds of derived matter (visible form, smell, taste, and the tangible quality as an object). Adding a sense faculty adds factors in a strict, load-bearing order: the body faculty adds one, making nine; and since the eye, ear, nose, and tongue are never found except embedded within a body that also has the tactile faculty right there, adding any of those adds a full two beyond the base eight — the body faculty plus the specific sense itself — making ten.
3. Adding Sound, and a Puzzle About the Four Elements
Sound raises the counts by one across the board, before a genuinely interesting question opens: if the four elements never occur apart, why does ordinary experience only ever notice one at a time?
於前諸聚若有聲生，如次數增九十十一，以有聲處不離根生，謂有執受大種因起。若四大種不相離生，於諸聚中堅濕煖動，云何隨一可得非餘？
Among the aforementioned clusters, if sound also arises, the counts respectively increase to nine, ten, and eleven — since wherever sound arises in this context, it does not occur apart from where a sense faculty arises, because it arises specifically from primary elements that are "grasped," that is, part of a living body. If the four primary elements always arise inseparably together, then within these clusters — solidity, moisture, warmth, and motion — how can only one of these ever be detected, and not the others?
The puzzle is a foundational and genuinely interesting one: the four primary elements — earth (solidity), water (moisture), fire (warmth), wind (motion) — are held to never occur apart from one another. Every particle of matter, however solid-seeming, technically contains all four in some proportion. So why does a rock simply feel hard, without also feeling obviously wet, warm, and in motion? The question sets up the treatise's answer in the next section — one that will turn out to explain a very ordinary, everyday observation everyone has already made without knowing its Abhidharma explanation.
4. Resolving the Puzzle: Dominant Function and Latent Seeds
Two rival explanations are recorded side by side, along with a striking everyday observation offered as evidence, and a rare moment of the treatise admitting the limits of what can be known by inference alone.
於彼聚中勢用增者明了可得，餘體非無。如覺針鋒與籌合觸，如甞鹽味與麨合味。云何於彼知亦有餘？由有攝熟長持業故。有說：遇緣堅等便有流等相故，如水聚中由極冷故有煖相起，雖不相離而冷用增，如受及聲用有勝劣。
Within that cluster, whichever element's function is intensified is what becomes clearly detectable — the essential nature of the others is not thereby absent. It is like feeling a needle's point together with a bundled tally-stick in contact with the skin, or tasting salt's flavor mixed together with roasted grain-flour's flavor. How do we know the others are still present too? Because the cluster still performs the functions of cohering, ripening, growing, and sustaining. Some say: under the right conditions, even a solid thing can develop a flowing quality — just as, in a cluster of water, extreme cold gives rise to the appearance of warmth; though never separate, the cold function is ordinarily what is intensified, just as feeling and sound each have their own degrees of dominance.
有餘師說：於此聚中餘有種子未有體相，故契經說：於木聚中有種種界。界謂種子。如何風中知有顯色？此義可信，不可比知。或所合香現可取故，香與顯色不相離故。
Other masters say: within this cluster, the remaining elements exist as seeds without yet having a manifest characteristic — hence a sutra says, "within a cluster of wood there are various elements," meaning by "element" here, a seed. How, then, do we know that visible color is present within wind itself? This should simply be trusted, since it cannot be established by direct inference — or: because the smell mixed together with it can indeed be detected, and smell is never separate from visible color.
The resolution is really about the gap between metaphysical presence and perceptual salience. Nothing is ever missing from the cluster — all four elements are always genuinely there — but only the dominant one registers to ordinary perception, the way a sharp needle-point stands out from a bundle of blunter sticks even though the whole bundle touches the skin, or a strong salt flavor masks a subtler grain flavor in the same mouthful. The "extreme cold feels like warmth" observation — anyone who has touched dry ice or a very cold piece of metal and felt something like a burn knows this directly — is offered as concrete evidence that the non-dominant qualities are still active, and can even flip which one becomes dominant under extreme conditions.
A rival explanation is more deflationary: rather than holding all four always fully manifest with only one salient, this view says the non-dominant three exist merely as latent seeds, not yet actualized — a genuinely different metaphysical picture, which the treatise records without adjudicating between the two. The closing point about wind's invisible color is a rare moment of epistemic humility: some doctrinal claims, the text admits, simply cannot be verified by ordinary inference and must be accepted on the teaching's own authority, or inferred indirectly through an associated quality — here, smell — that can actually be perceived.
5. The Form Realm's Simpler Clusters, and What We're Actually Counting
The same counting exercise closes for the form realm, before a methodological aside asks a deceptively simple question: what exactly is being counted when we say "eight factors"?
前說色界香味並無，故彼無聲有六七八，有聲有七八九俱生。此可准知，故不別說。此中言事為依體說、為依處說？若爾何過？二俱有過。
It was earlier stated that the form realm lacks both smell and taste. Therefore, clusters there without sound have six, seven, or eight factors co-arising; with sound, seven, eight, or nine. This can be inferred by the same reasoning as before, so it is not separately explained. In this context, does the word "factor" refer to distinct substances, or to distinct locations? Either way, is there a problem? Both readings have one.
若依體說，八九十等便為太少，由諸微聚必有形色，有多極微共積集故。重性輕性定隨有一，滑性澁性隨一亦然。或處有冷有飢有渴，是則所言有太少過。若依處說，八九十等便為太多，由四大種觸處攝故應說四等，是則所言有太多失。二俱無過。應知此中所言事者，一分依體說，謂所依大種；一分依處說，謂能依造色。
If explained by substance, then eight, nine, ten, and so on would be too few, since every atomic cluster also necessarily has shape, many atoms being accumulated together; heaviness or lightness definitely accompanies one or the other as well, and so does smoothness or roughness; a given case might also have coldness, hunger, or thirst — so the stated counts would be too few. If explained by location, then eight, nine, ten would be too many, since the four primary elements are all subsumed under the single tangible sense-field, so it should simply be said "four" and so on — so the stated counts would be too many. Neither reading actually has a problem: "factor," as used here, is partly based on substance — the supporting primary elements — and partly based on location — the supported derived matter.
若爾，大種事應成多，造色各別，依一四大種故。應知此中依體類說，諸四大種類無別故。何用分別如是語為？語隨欲生，義應思擇。如是已辯色定俱生。
If that is so, should not the primary-element factors then become numerous, since derived matter is each individually distinct while depending on a single set of four primary elements? One should understand that the primary elements are spoken of by type of substance here, since the four primary elements, as a type, admit no further distinction within that type. What use is there in belaboring such wording? Language follows what one wishes to express; it is the meaning that should be carefully considered. Thus form's definite co-arising has now been explained.
The form realm's simpler counts follow directly from a rule established much earlier in this translation — the form realm lacks smell and taste entirely — so its clusters are simply the desire realm's counts minus two. The more interesting payoff is the closing methodological aside: pressed on whether "factor" means substance or location, the treatise refuses to be pinned to either pure reading, since each one alone generates an absurd over- or under-count. Instead it adopts a practical hybrid: the four primary elements are counted by type — there are always exactly four types, however many atoms exist — while derived matter is counted by individual kind, since each type of derived quality is its own distinct thing. The closing remark, that the meaning matters more than the wording, is a small but telling moment of Abhidharma pragmatism, refusing to let a terminological puzzle grow bigger than the substantive point it was meant to serve.
6. Mind and Mental Factors Always Co-Arise, and So Do the Four Marks of Conditioning
Two further, even more universal co-arising rules follow: mind never occurs without its mental factors, and every conditioned dharma whatsoever arises together with the four marks that define conditioned existence itself.
餘定俱生今次當辯。頌曰：心心所必俱，諸行相或得。論曰：心與心所必定俱生，隨闕一時餘則不起。諸行即是一切有為，謂色、心、心所、心不相應行。前必俱言流至於此，謂色心等諸行生時，必與有為四相俱起。言或得者，謂諸行內唯有情法與得俱生；餘法不然，是故言或。
The remaining categories' definite co-arising should be explained next. A verse states: mind and mental factors necessarily co-arise; all formations co-arise with their characteristics; or, also, with possession. Prose: Mind and mental factors necessarily co-arise — whenever even one is lacking, the others do not arise either. "Formations" means all conditioned dharmas: form, mind, mental factors, and formations dissociated from mind. The earlier word "necessarily co-arise" carries forward to apply here too: when form, mind, and the other formations arise, they necessarily arise together with the four characteristics of the conditioned. As for saying "or": this means that, among all formations, only dharmas belonging to sentient beings co-arise together with "possession"; other dharmas do not, hence the word "or."
Mind and its mental factors are as inseparable as any of the form-clusters just discussed — a moment of consciousness never occurs as bare awareness alone, always accompanied by at least some minimal set of mental factors, and vice versa. Even more universal: literally every conditioned dharma whatsoever — form, mind, mental factors, and formations dissociated from mind alike — necessarily arises together with the four defining marks of conditioned existence itself (birth, continuance, decay, and cessation), since to be conditioned at all just is to be marked by this fourfold pattern.
The qualifier "or" narrows one further rule to a specific subset: "possession" (得, a technical formation representing a being's ownership of a dharma) accompanies a dharma's arising only when that dharma belongs to a sentient being's own continuum — inanimate matter, for instance, arises with the four marks like everything else, but has no "owner," and so never co-arises with possession.
7. The Five Categories of Mental Factors
Having established that mind and its mental factors always co-arise, the treatise now asks the natural follow-up: what exactly are these "mental factors"?
向言心所，何者是耶？頌曰：心所且有五，大地法等異。論曰：諸心所法且有五品。何等為五？一、大地法；二、大善地法；三、大煩惱地法；四、大不善地法；五、小煩惱地法。地謂行處，若此是彼所行處，即說此為彼法地。大法地故名為大地，此中若法大地所有名大地法，謂法恒於一切心有。
As for the mental factors just mentioned, what are they? A verse states: mental factors, to begin with, are of five categories — the universal-ground dharmas and so on, each different. Prose: Mental factors, to begin with, fall into five categories: universal-ground dharmas, universal-wholesome-ground dharmas, universal-affliction-ground dharmas, universal-unwholesome-ground dharmas, and minor-affliction-ground dharmas. "Ground" means the domain in which something operates — if this dharma is the domain in which that dharma operates, this is called the ground for that dharma. Because it is the ground for universal dharmas, it is called "the universal ground"; within this, whatever dharma belongs to the universal ground is called a "universal-ground dharma" — a dharma present in absolutely every moment of mind.
This is the entry point into one of the most foundational taxonomies in classical Buddhist psychology: every mental factor that can ever accompany a moment of mind is sorted into exactly five categories, by how widely it applies. Some accompany every mental moment whatsoever, wholesome or not; some accompany only wholesome moments; some only afflicted ones; some only specifically unwholesome ones; and some — the "minor" afflictions — only some afflicted moments, not all. The next several sections work through each category's specific membership list, beginning with the ten factors that pervade every mind without exception.
8. The Ten Universal Mental Factors, Defined
The famous list of ten factors present in absolutely every moment of mind, each given a clean, working definition.
彼法是何？頌曰：受想思觸欲，慧念與作意，勝解三摩地，遍於一切心。
What are these dharmas? A verse states: feeling, perception, volition, contact, desire, wisdom, mindfulness, and attention; determination and concentration — these pervade all mind.
論曰：傳說：如是所列十法，諸心剎那和合遍有。此中受謂三種領納：苦、樂、俱非，有差別故。想謂於境取差別相。思謂能令心有造作。觸謂根境識和合生，能有觸對。欲謂希求所作事業。慧謂於法能有簡擇。念謂於緣明記不忘。作意謂能令心警覺。勝解謂能於境印可。三摩地謂心一境性。
Prose: Tradition holds that these ten dharmas just listed are universally present, combined together, in every momentary instance of mind. Among these: "feeling" means threefold experiencing — pain, pleasure, or neither. "Perception" means grasping the distinguishing characteristics of an object. "Volition" means that which causes the mind to act. "Contact" means the coming-together of faculty, object, and consciousness, enabling actual contact. "Desire" means aspiring toward some undertaking to be done. "Wisdom" means the capacity to discern dharmas. "Mindfulness" means clearly remembering an object without forgetting it. "Attention" means that which alerts the mind. "Determination" means the capacity to affirm an object. "Concentration" means the mind's one-pointedness upon its object.
This is the famous list of ten "universal-ground" mental factors (mahābhūmika-dharmas) — feeling, perception, volition, contact, desire, wisdom, mindfulness, attention, determination, and concentration — held to accompany literally every act of mind that ever occurs, wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral alike. The definitions are deliberately spare and functional rather than descriptive: each names what the factor DOES rather than what it feels like, since these are meant as precise technical categories for analysis, not evocative descriptions. Notice that "wisdom" appears here at the most basic, universal level — even a confused or deluded thought involves some minimal act of discernment, however poor, which is why this baseline capacity is listed as universal rather than reserved only for wholesome states.
9. The Ten Universal Wholesome Factors
The second great list follows immediately: ten factors present in every wholesome moment of mind, and only wholesome ones — but not before a humbling aside on how difficult this whole introspective project really is.
諸心心所異相微細，一一相續分別尚難，況一剎那俱時而有。有色諸藥色根所取，其味差別尚難了知，況無色法唯覺慧取。如是已說十大地法。
The distinguishing characteristics of mind and mental factors are extremely subtle; even distinguishing them one by one across a continuous series is difficult, let alone all arising together within a single instant. Even with physical things — various medicinal herbs perceptible to the physical senses — their differences in flavor are still hard to discern, how much more so for formless dharmas, graspable only by discerning wisdom itself. Thus the ten universal-ground dharmas have now been explained.
大善法地名大善地，此中若法大善地所有名大善地法，謂法恒於諸善心有。彼法是何？頌曰：信及不放逸，輕安捨慚愧，二根及不害，勤唯遍善心。
"The ground for universal wholesome dharmas" is called "the universal wholesome ground"; within this, whatever dharma belongs to it is called a "universal-wholesome-ground dharma" — a dharma always present in every wholesome mind. What are these dharmas? A verse states: faith, and non-heedlessness, tranquility, equanimity, modesty, and conscientiousness, the two roots, and non-harming, diligence — these alone pervade every wholesome mind.
The closing aside on the previous list is worth pausing on: the treatise openly admits that distinguishing ten simultaneously-arising, entirely immaterial mental factors within a single instant is an extraordinarily fine-grained task — harder, it says, than telling apart the subtle flavor differences among medicinal herbs, which are at least physical and perceptible to ordinary taste. This is a genuinely humble moment for a system often associated with confident, exhaustive classification.
The second list — faith, non-heedlessness, tranquility, equanimity, modesty, conscientiousness, the two wholesome roots (non-greed and non-hatred), non-harming, and diligence — names the ten factors present in every wholesome mental moment and only there. Several of these terms will need careful unpacking in what follows, since more than one carries a technical sense quite different from its everyday meaning.
10. Bodily Tranquility, Mental Tranquility, and a Borrowed Name
A genuine puzzle opens: "tranquility" is defined here as purely mental, yet sutras also speak of "bodily tranquility" — how can both be right?
論曰：如是諸法唯遍善心。此中信者令心澄淨。有說：於諦實業果中現前忍許故名為信。不放逸者，修諸善法離諸不善法。復何名修？謂此於善專注為性。餘部經中有如是釋。能守護心名不放逸。
Prose: These dharmas pervade only wholesome mind-moments. Among these: "faith" is that which makes the mind clear and pure. Some say: it is called faith because of directly and readily accepting the truths, karmic action, and karmic results. "Non-heedlessness" means cultivating wholesome dharmas and abandoning unwholesome ones. But what does "cultivating" mean here? It means having, as its essential nature, focused concentration upon what is wholesome — other schools' texts give this explanation. Alternatively: that which guards the mind is called non-heedlessness.
輕安者謂心堪任性。豈無經亦說有身輕安耶？雖非無說，此如身受應知亦爾，如何可立此為覺支？應知此中身輕安者身堪任性。復如何說此為覺支？能順覺支故無有失。以身輕安能引覺支心輕安故。於餘亦見有是說耶？有，如經說：喜及順喜法名喜覺支。瞋及瞋因緣名瞋恚蓋。正見、正思惟、正勤名慧蘊。思惟及勤雖非慧性，隨順慧故亦得慧名，故身輕安順覺支故得名無失。
"Tranquility" means the mind's capacity for its task. But does not a sutra also speak of "bodily tranquility"? Though this is indeed said, it should be understood analogously to "bodily feeling" — how, then, can this be established as a factor of enlightenment? One should understand that "bodily tranquility" here means the body's own capacity for its task. But how, then, can this be spoken of as a factor of enlightenment? Because it accords with and supports the factor of enlightenment, there is no fault in this — bodily tranquility is able to draw forth mental tranquility, which is itself the genuine factor. Is this same pattern seen elsewhere? Yes: as a sutra says, "joy and dharmas conducive to joy are named the joy-factor-of-enlightenment"; "hatred and the conditions for hatred are named the hindrance of ill-will"; "right view, right thought, and right effort are named the aggregate of wisdom." Thought and effort, though not themselves of the nature of wisdom, are given the name "wisdom" because they support wisdom — so likewise, bodily tranquility, according with the enlightenment-factor, is given that name without fault.
The puzzle is real: if tranquility (輕安, praśrabdhi) is by definition a purely mental factor, how can scripture speak of a bodily version too? The resolution is a general linguistic principle the treatise finds useful enough to apply three times over: a supporting or conducive factor can borrow the name of what it supports, even when it isn't literally that thing. Bodily tranquility isn't itself the genuine enlightenment-factor, but it reliably gives rise to mental tranquility, which is — so it earns the name derivatively. The same pattern explains why "joy-conducive dharmas" get folded into "the joy-factor," why the mere conditions for hatred count as part of "the hindrance of ill-will" itself, and why thought and effort, not themselves wisdom, still get called "the aggregate of wisdom" when they support it. This is a small but genuinely useful piece of the treatise's own hermeneutics — a rule for how technical vocabulary is allowed to stretch.
11. Attention and Equanimity: A Genuine Puzzle the Text Doesn't Fully Resolve
A harder problem follows, and the treatise's own answer reads more like an honest acknowledgment of difficulty than a clean solution.
心平等性、無警覺性說名為捨。如何可說於一心中有警覺性、無警覺性？作意與捨二相應起。豈不前說諸心心所其相微細難可了知。有雖難了，由審推度而復可知。此最難知，謂相違背而不乖反。此有警覺於餘則無，二既懸殊有何乖反？若爾，不應同緣一境，或應一切皆互相應。如是種類所餘諸法，此中應求，如彼理趣，今於此中應知亦爾。
"The mind's evenness, its non-alerted nature" is called "equanimity." How can it be said that, within a single moment of mind, there is both an alerted nature and a non-alerted nature? Attention and equanimity, though seemingly opposite, arise together in association. Was it not said earlier that the characteristics of mind and mental factors are extremely subtle and hard to discern? Though difficult, they can still be known through careful, thorough investigation. But this is the hardest of all to know — that things which seem mutually contradictory are not actually in conflict. This one has alertness, the other lacks it — given they are so utterly different, how could there be no conflict? If that were truly a problem, they should not even be able to take the same object together, or else everything would have to be mutually compatible with everything else without exception. Dharmas of this same kind, the remaining ones, should be worked out following this same line of reasoning.
This exchange reads less like a solved puzzle than an honest admission of one. Attention (作意) is defined as what alerts and rouses the mind; equanimity (捨), in its universal-wholesome sense here, is defined as the mind's even, non-alerted quality — and the objector presses exactly the right question: how can a single moment of mind contain both an alerting factor and a non-alerting one at once, without contradiction? The treatise's answer amounts to: they simply do co-arise, and denying this would force denying other things that plainly do work, such as different mental factors sharing a single object. This is not a triumphant resolution so much as a considered "the model holds even where the intuition strains" — and the text says as much itself, calling this the single hardest case of all to genuinely understand, not merely difficult like the others.
12. Closing the Wholesome Factors: Two Roots, Not Three
A tidy piece of bookkeeping closes the list: the classical "three wholesome roots" appear here as only two, and the reason is a matter of not double-counting.
慚、愧二種如後當釋。二根者，謂無貪、無瞋，無癡善根慧為性，故前已說在大地法中，不重說為大善地法。言不害者，謂無損惱。勤謂令心勇悍為性。如是已說大善地法。
"Modesty" and "conscientiousness" will be explained later, in more detail elsewhere. "The two roots" means non-greed and non-hatred; as for non-delusion, being itself identical in essential nature to wisdom, it was already discussed among the universal-ground dharmas, so it is not repeated here as a universal-wholesome-ground dharma. "Non-harming" means being free of the intent to injure. "Diligence" means having, as its essential nature, that which makes the mind bold and vigorous. Thus the universal-wholesome-ground dharmas have now been explained.
The classical "three wholesome roots" — non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion — are a set every student of Abhidharma learns early, so it's a small but satisfying detail that only two of them show up explicitly in this list of ten. The third, non-delusion, is simply identical in nature to "wisdom," already counted among the ten universal factors that pervade every mind whatsoever. Rather than list it twice under two different names, the treatise notes the overlap and moves on — a nice example of this system's insistence on tracking essential natures rather than surface vocabulary, even when it means a well-known trio quietly becomes a pair in a particular technical list.
13. Six Factors Present in Every Defiled Mind
The third category arrives: six factors, each the direct counterpart of a wholesome factor already named, present in every defiled mental moment without exception.
大煩惱法地名大煩惱地，此中若法大煩惱地所有名大煩惱地法，謂法恒於染污心有。彼法是何？頌曰：癡逸怠不信，惛掉恒唯染。
"The ground for universal-affliction dharmas" is called "the universal-affliction ground"; within this, whatever dharma belongs to it is called a "universal-affliction-ground dharma" — a dharma always present in every defiled mind. What are these dharmas? A verse states: delusion, heedlessness, laziness, lack of faith, torpor, restlessness — these are constantly and only present in defiled mind.
論曰：此中癡者所謂愚癡，即是無明無智無顯。逸謂放逸，不修諸善，是修諸善所對治法。怠謂懈怠，心不勇悍，是前所說勤所對治。不信者謂心不澄淨，是前所說信所對治。惛謂惛沈。對法中說：云何惛沈？謂身重性、心重性，身無堪任性、心無堪任性，身惛沈性、心惛沈性，是名惛沈。此是心所。如何名身？如身受言，故亦無失。掉謂掉舉，令心不靜。唯有如是六種，名大煩惱地法。
Prose: "Delusion" means ignorance — precisely nescience, lack of knowledge, lack of clarity. "Heedlessness" means not cultivating wholesome dharmas — it is what non-heedlessness counteracts. "Laziness" means indolence, the mind not being bold and vigorous — it is what diligence counteracts. "Lack of faith" means the mind not being clear and pure — it is what faith counteracts. "Torpor" means heaviness. An Abhidharma text asks: what is torpor? It is heaviness of body, heaviness of mind, incapacity of body, incapacity of mind, torpor of body, torpor of mind — this is called torpor. But this is a mental factor — how can it be called "of the body"? Just as we speak of "bodily feeling" without contradiction, so too here there is no fault. "Restlessness" means agitation, that which makes the mind unsettled. There are only these six, called the universal-affliction-ground dharmas.
The pattern from the wholesome list carries over almost perfectly in reverse: heedlessness, laziness, and lack of faith are defined explicitly as what non-heedlessness, diligence, and faith each counteract — three direct opposite pairs. Delusion, torpor, and restlessness round out the six as more intrinsically negative qualities in their own right. The "bodily torpor" aside echoes the earlier "bodily tranquility" puzzle from the wholesome list, resolved the same way: a mental factor's name can extend to describe its bodily manifestation without implying the factor itself is physical.
14. Six or Ten? A Sharp Rebuttal Resolves the Discrepancy
An objector cites the root Abhidharma text's count of ten, not six — and gets a memorably sharp response before the real resolution follows.
豈不根本阿毘達磨中說有十種大煩惱地法，又於彼論不說惛沈。何者十？謂不信、懈怠、失念、心亂、無明、不正知、非理作意、邪勝解、掉舉、放逸。天愛！汝今但知言，至不閑意旨。意旨者何？
But does not the root Abhidharma text state that there are ten kinds of universal-affliction-ground dharmas, and moreover that text does not even list torpor among them? What are these ten? Lack of faith, indolence, forgetfulness, mental distraction, nescience, incorrect awareness, improper attention, wrong determination, restlessness, heedlessness. "Dear one! You now merely know the words, but have not yet grasped the meaning." What is the meaning?
謂失念、心亂、不正知、非理作意、邪勝解，已說彼在大地法中，不應重立為大煩惱地法。如無癡善根慧為體故，非大善地法，彼亦應爾。即染污念名為失念，染污等持名為心亂，諸染污慧名不正知，染污作意勝解名為非理作意及邪勝解故說。
Forgetfulness, mental distraction, incorrect awareness, improper attention, and wrong determination have already been discussed among the universal-ground dharmas, and so should not be listed again as separate universal-affliction-ground dharmas. Just as non-delusion, being identical in nature to wisdom, is not separately listed as a universal-wholesome-ground dharma, the same principle should apply here. That is: defiled mindfulness is called forgetfulness; defiled concentration is called mental distraction; defiled wisdom is called incorrect awareness; defiled attention and determination are called improper attention and wrong determination, respectively.
"Dear one, you know the words but not the meaning" is a vivid, pointed rebuke — the kind of rhetorical jab classical Indian philosophical debate was not shy about deploying against an objection that looks devastating on the surface but dissolves once properly understood. The resolution runs exactly parallel to the earlier "two roots, not three" case: five of the root text's ten items are not genuinely new factors at all, but simply the defiled, tainted versions of five factors already counted among the universal-ground ten — mindfulness gone wrong is "forgetfulness," concentration gone wrong is "mental distraction," wisdom gone wrong is "incorrect awareness," and so on. Strip out this double-counting and the ten collapses to five genuinely distinct items, plus torpor (which the root text's list happens to omit), landing exactly on six.
15. A Fourfold Analysis, and Torpor's Curious Absence from Another List
A classic Abhidharma tetralemma checks the precise overlap between the universal and the universal-affliction factors, before a further debate about torpor's puzzling omission elsewhere.
若是大地法亦大煩惱地法耶？應作四句。第一句，謂受、想、思、觸、欲。第二句，謂不信、懈怠、無明、掉舉、放逸。第三句，謂如前說念等五法。第四句，謂除前相。
If something is a universal-ground dharma, is it also necessarily a universal-affliction-ground dharma? A fourfold analysis should be made. First case: feeling, perception, volition, contact, desire. Second case: lack of faith, indolence, nescience, restlessness, heedlessness. Third case: mindfulness and the other four dharmas just mentioned. Fourth case: whatever falls outside what has been stated.
又許惛沈通與一切煩惱相應，不說在大煩惱地法。於誰有過？有作是言：應說在此，而不說者順等持故。彼謂諸有惛沈行者速發等持，非掉舉行。誰惛沈行非掉舉行？誰掉舉行非惛沈行？此二未嘗不俱行故。雖爾，應知隨增說行。雖知說行隨用偏增，而依有體建立地法，故此地法唯六義成，此唯遍染心俱起非餘故。如是已說大煩惱地法。
Moreover, some accept that torpor is compatible with every affliction generally, yet still do not list it among the universal-affliction-ground dharmas. Whose position has the fault here? Some say: it should indeed be listed, and the reason it is not is simply to accord with a certain teaching about concentration — they hold that those inclined toward torpor quickly give rise to concentration, unlike those inclined toward restlessness. But who is inclined toward torpor without also being inclined toward restlessness, or the reverse? These two are never entirely absent from each other. Even so, one should understand that describing someone's "inclination" refers to whichever quality predominates. Though which function predominates can differ from case to case, when establishing the ground-dharmas based on genuine essential substance, this category is fixed at exactly six members, since these six alone universally co-arise with every defiled mind, and nothing else does. Thus the universal-affliction-ground dharmas have now been explained.
The tetralemma cleanly separates dharmas that are universal-ground but never affliction-ground (feeling, perception, and the like, which occur in wholesome states too and aren't inherently defiled), dharmas that are affliction-ground but never universal-ground (lack of faith and the rest, absent from wholesome moments entirely), dharmas that are genuinely both at once (mindfulness and the other four, when they occur in their tainted form), and whatever is neither.
The torpor debate is a fine piece of technical hair-splitting: torpor and restlessness, it turns out, are held to always co-occur to some degree, never one without a trace of the other — so a text describing someone's "torpid" or "restless" tendency is really just naming whichever of the two currently predominates, not asserting the other's total absence. This lets the treatise explain away an apparent inconsistency in another text's list without needing to declare that other list simply wrong.
16. Two Factors Present in Every Unwholesome Mind
The fourth category is the leanest of all: just two factors, present in every specifically unwholesome — not merely defiled — mental moment.
大不善法地名大不善地，此中若法大不善地所有名大不善地法，謂法恒於不善心有。彼法是何？頌曰：唯遍不善心，無慚及無愧。論曰：唯二心所但與一切不善心俱，謂無慚、愧，故唯二種名此地法。此二法相如後當辯。如是已說大不善地法。
"The ground for universal-unwholesome dharmas" is called "the universal-unwholesome ground"; within this, whatever dharma belongs to it is called a "universal-unwholesome-ground dharma" — a dharma always present in every unwholesome mind. What are these dharmas? A verse states: pervading unwholesome mind alone are shamelessness and lack of conscientiousness. Prose: There are only two mental factors that accompany every unwholesome mind without exception — shamelessness and lack of conscientiousness — hence only these two are named this ground. The characteristics of these two dharmas will be explained further later. Thus the universal-unwholesome-ground dharmas have now been explained.
"Defiled" and "unwholesome" are not quite the same scope in this system — defiled includes states that obstruct progress without being karmically unwholesome in the strict sense, while "unwholesome" is the narrower, morally-charged category. That narrower scope is exactly why this fourth ground has only two members: shamelessness and lack of conscientiousness, the direct opposites of the modesty and conscientiousness named among the wholesome ten, are the only factors specifically tied to every unwholesome act without exception.
17. The Ten Minor Afflictions, and the Five Categories Complete
The fifth and final category closes the whole taxonomy: ten familiar, vivid afflictions that accompany only some defiled states, never all of them together.
小煩惱法地名小煩惱地，此中若法小煩惱地所有名小煩惱地法，謂法少分染污心俱。彼法是何？頌曰：忿覆慳嫉惱，害恨諂誑憍，如是類名為，小煩惱地法。
"The ground for minor-affliction dharmas" is called "the minor-affliction ground"; within this, whatever dharma belongs to it is called a "minor-affliction-ground dharma" — a dharma that accompanies only some portion of defiled minds. What are these dharmas? A verse states: anger, concealment, stinginess, envy, vexation, harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deceit, arrogance — dharmas of this kind are named the minor-affliction-ground dharmas.
論曰：如是類法唯修所斷，意識地起、無明相應、各別現行，故名為小煩惱地法。此法如後隨煩惱中當廣分別。如是已說五品心所。
Prose: Dharmas of this kind are cut off only by cultivation, arise only at the level of mind-consciousness, are associated with nescience, and manifest individually and separately — hence they are named minor-affliction-ground dharmas. These dharmas will be explained in full detail later, in the discussion of the secondary afflictions. Thus the five categories of mental factors have now been explained.
Unlike the universal factors, which always arise together as a complete package, these ten minor afflictions — anger, concealment, stinginess, envy, vexation, harmfulness, resentment, flattery, deceit, and arrogance — typically manifest one or a few at a time rather than all together, which is exactly what "minor" and "individually manifesting" mean here. They are also confined to mind-consciousness alone (never accompanying the five physical sense-consciousnesses) and are cut off only gradually through cultivation, never all at once by a single moment of insight.
With this, the treatise's complete five-category taxonomy of mental factors closes: ten universal factors present in every mind whatsoever, ten present only in wholesome minds, six present only in defiled minds, two present only in specifically unwholesome minds, and ten minor afflictions present only sometimes, in varying combinations. This framework — thirty-eight named factors across five overlapping categories — will underpin much of the psychological analysis still to come in this treatise.
18. A Sixth Category: The Indeterminate Factors
A sixth group of mental factors joins the five just completed — ones too flexible in moral character to belong to any single fixed category — opening a genuinely intricate counting exercise across every type of mind.
復有此餘不定心所，惡作、睡眠、尋、伺等法，此中應說。於何心品有幾心所決定俱生？頌曰：欲有尋伺故，於善心品中，二十二心所，有時增惡作。於不善不共，見俱唯二十，四煩惱忿等，惡作二十一，有覆有十八，無覆許十二，睡眠遍不違，若有皆增一。
There are, moreover, other "indeterminate" mental factors — regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought, and so on — which should be discussed here. In which type of mind, how many mental factors definitely co-arise? A verse states: since the desire realm has applied and sustained thought, within a wholesome mind-type, twenty-two mental factors co-arise, sometimes increased by regret. In the unwholesome-exclusive type, and in view-associated types, only twenty; the four root afflictions, anger and the rest, and the regret type are twenty-one. The obscured-neutral type has eighteen; the unobscured type permits twelve. Sleep is compatible with all, conflicting with none — wherever it is present, every count increases by one.
Regret, sleep, applied thought, and sustained thought earn their own sixth category — "indeterminate" (不定) — precisely because they refuse to sit still in any one of the five categories just completed: unlike faith, which is always wholesome, or delusion, which is always defiled, these four can each occur in a wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral mind alike, taking on the moral flavor of whatever state they happen to accompany. What follows is a genuinely intricate combinatorial exercise: the desire realm's mind-moments sort into five basic types — wholesome; unwholesome tied only to plain delusion; unwholesome tied to the other root afflictions or to wrong view; obscured-neutral; and unobscured-neutral — and the verse previews exactly how many mental factors accompany each.
19. The Wholesome Mind's Twenty-Two Factors, and What "Regret" Really Means
The wholesome mind-type's count comes first, together with a careful unpacking of "regret" — a term whose literal meaning is borrowed, by a pattern of naming this treatise has used before.
論曰：且欲界中心品有五，謂善唯一。不善有二，謂不共無明相應及餘煩惱等相應。無記有二，謂有覆無記及無覆無記。然欲界心定有尋伺故，善心品必二十二心所俱生，謂十大地法、十大善地法，及不定二，謂尋與伺。非諸善心皆有惡作，有時增數至二十三。
Prose: Within the desire realm, mind-types are of five kinds: wholesome — just one type; unwholesome — two types, the exclusive type associated only with nescience, and the type associated with the other afflictions; neutral — two types, obscured-neutral and unobscured-neutral. Since desire-realm mind always has applied and sustained thought, a wholesome mind-type necessarily has twenty-two mental factors co-arising: the ten universal-ground dharmas, the ten universal-wholesome-ground dharmas, and the two indeterminate ones — applied and sustained thought. But not all wholesome minds have regret; sometimes the count increases to twenty-three.
惡作者何？惡所作體名為惡作。應知此中緣惡作法說名惡作，謂緣惡作心追悔性，如緣空解脫門說名為空，緣不淨無貪說為不淨。又見世間約所依處說能依事，如言一切村邑國土皆來集會。惡作即是追悔所依，故約所依說為惡作。
What is "regret"? The essential nature of a bad deed done is what is literally named "regret." One should understand that here, it is the mental state that takes the bad deed as its object that is named "regret" — that is, the mind's characteristic of remorse with respect to the bad deed as its object — just as taking emptiness as the object of the "gate of liberation" is itself called "emptiness," or taking the impure as the object of non-greed is called "contemplation of the impure." Moreover, it is observed that, in ordinary usage, one speaks of a dependent event by naming its supporting location — as when one says "the whole village, town, and country all came together for the assembly." Regret depends upon the bad deed as its basis, and so, by reference to that basis, it is named "regret."
"Regret" (惡作) literally means "a bad deed done," yet names not the deed itself but the mental state of remorse taking that deed as its object — the same naming-by-object pattern already seen with "the gate of emptiness" (named after emptiness, its object) and "contemplation of the impure" (named after impurity, its object). The village-assembly analogy adds a second layer: just as people are casually referred to by the place they come from, a mental state can be named after what it depends on or takes as its basis. Both patterns converge on the same point — the label "regret" tells you what the mind is thinking ABOUT, not what the mental factor itself literally is.
20. Two Kinds of Regret: A Nuanced Psychology of Remorse
The treatise extends "regret" to cover remorse over omissions as well as actions, then draws a genuinely subtle line between wholesome and unwholesome regret.
又於果體假立因名，如說此六觸處應知名宿作業。若緣未作事，云何名惡作？於未作事亦立作名，如追悔言我先不作如是事業，是我惡作。
Moreover, sometimes the name of a cause is conventionally applied to its result — as when it is said that the six kinds of contact-fields should be understood as named after "past karmic action." If regret takes as its object something not done, how can it still be called "regret" — literally, "bad-doing"? Even for something not done, the name "doing" can still be conventionally applied — as when someone says regretfully, "I did not previously do such-and-such a deed; this is my regret."
何等惡作說名為善？謂於善惡不作作中心追悔性。與此相違名為不善。此二各依二處而起。
Which kind of regret is called wholesome? The mind's characteristic of remorse with respect to unwholesome deeds done, or wholesome deeds left undone. The opposite of this is called unwholesome. These two each arise dependent on two bases.
The closing distinction is genuinely fine-grained psychology: "regret" as a bare mental factor is morally neutral in itself, taking on its moral character entirely from what it is regret ABOUT. Regretting an unwholesome deed one did, or a wholesome deed one failed to do, is wholesome regret — a healthy conscience functioning correctly. Regretting a wholesome deed one did, or an unwholesome deed one failed to do — wishing, in effect, that one had behaved worse — is unwholesome regret, a corrupted conscience. The same mental factor, aimed at different objects, becomes either a virtue or a vice.
21. Twenty Factors for Simple Delusion or Wrong View
The unwholesome-exclusive and view-associated mind-types share the same count, since "wrong view" turns out not to add anything genuinely new.
若於不善不共心品，必有二十心所俱生，謂十大地法、六大煩惱地法、二大不善地法，并二不定，謂尋與伺。何等名為不共心品？謂此心品唯有無明，無有所餘貪煩惱等。
For the unwholesome-exclusive mind-type, there are necessarily twenty mental factors co-arising: the ten universal-ground dharmas, the six universal-affliction-ground dharmas, the two universal-unwholesome-ground dharmas, together with the two indeterminate ones — applied and sustained thought. What is meant by the "exclusive" mind-type? A mind-type in which there is only nescience, with none of the other afflictions — greed and the rest — present.
於不善見相應心品，亦有二十心所俱生，名即如前不共品說。非見增故有二十一，以即於十大地法中慧用差別說為見故。言不善見相應心者，謂此心中或有邪見、或有見取、或戒禁取。
For the unwholesome view-associated mind-type, there also are twenty mental factors co-arising, named just as stated for the exclusive type above. It is not the case that adding "view" makes it twenty-one, because view is simply a particular functional manifestation of wisdom, already counted among the ten universal-ground dharmas. "Unwholesome view-associated mind" means a mind in which there is wrong view, view-clinging, or clinging to wrong precepts and rituals.
This is the same move seen twice already in this fascicle — non-delusion collapsing into wisdom, forgetfulness collapsing into defiled mindfulness — applied once more: wrong view is not a freestanding new factor requiring its own slot in the count, but simply wisdom itself operating in a distorted mode. Having already been counted once, among the universal ten, it does not get counted again just because it has gone astray.
22. Twenty-One Factors: The Root Afflictions, Secondary Afflictions, and Regret
Three more mind-types share the same total of twenty-one, each reaching it by adding a different single extra factor to the same base of twenty.
於四不善貪、瞋、慢、疑煩惱心品，有二十一心所俱生，二十如不共，加貪等隨一。於前所說忿等相應隨煩惱品，亦二十一心所俱生，二十如不共，加忿等隨一。不善惡作相應心品，亦二十一心所俱生，謂即惡作第二十一。略說不善不共及見相應品中唯有二十，餘四煩惱及隨煩惱相應品中有二十一。
For the mind-type associated with the four unwholesome root afflictions — greed, hatred, pride, doubt — there are twenty-one mental factors co-arising: the twenty as in the exclusive type, plus any one of greed and the rest. For the mind-type associated with the previously mentioned secondary afflictions — anger and the rest — there also are twenty-one co-arising: the twenty as in the exclusive type, plus any one of anger and the rest. For the unwholesome mind-type associated with regret, there also are twenty-one co-arising — regret itself being the twenty-first. In brief: the unwholesome-exclusive and view-associated types have only twenty; the remaining types, associated with the four root afflictions or the secondary afflictions, have twenty-one.
The pattern is elegantly uniform: the same base of twenty (the ten universal, the six universal-affliction, the two universal-unwholesome, plus applied and sustained thought) gets exactly one extra factor added, depending on which specific affliction is actually present in that moment — one of the four root afflictions, one of the ten minor afflictions, or regret itself. Only ever one such addition at a time, reflecting that a given moment of mind is typically dominated by one specific afflictive coloring rather than several simultaneously.
23. Eighteen and Twelve: The Two Neutral Mind-Types, and Sleep's Universal Compatibility
The counting exercise closes with the two neutral mind-types, and a final note on sleep's remarkable compatibility with every single type already discussed.
若於無記有覆心品唯有十八心所俱生，謂十大地法、六大煩惱地法，并二不定，謂尋與伺。欲界無記有覆心者，謂與薩迦耶見及邊執見相應，此中見不增，應知如前釋。於餘無記無覆心品，許唯十二心所俱生，謂十大地法并不定尋伺。外方諸師欲令惡作亦通無記，此相應品便有十三心所俱起。
For the obscured-neutral mind-type, there are only eighteen mental factors co-arising: the ten universal-ground dharmas, the six universal-affliction-ground dharmas, together with the two indeterminate ones — applied and sustained thought. The desire realm's obscured-neutral mind is that associated with the view of a substantial self and the extremist view; here too, view does not add to the count, for the reason already explained. For the remaining unobscured-neutral mind-type, only twelve mental factors are accepted as co-arising: the ten universal-ground dharmas, together with applied and sustained thought. Masters of the outer regions wish to hold that regret can also be neutral; under their view, this associated type would have thirteen mental factors co-arising instead.
應知睡眠與前所說一切心品皆不相違，通善不善無記性故。隨何品有即說此增，謂二十二至二十三，若二十三至二十四。不善無記如例應知。已說欲界心所俱生諸品定量，當說上界。
One should understand that sleep is not incompatible with any of the mind-types stated above, since it is common to wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral natures alike. Whatever type it occurs in, that type's count simply increases by one — so twenty-two becomes twenty-three, and, if regret is also present, twenty-three becomes twenty-four. The unwholesome and neutral cases should be understood by the same pattern. The fixed counts of mental factors co-arising in each type of desire-realm mind have now been explained; the upper realms should be discussed next.
The obscured-neutral type lacks the two universal-unwholesome factors that the outright-unwholesome types carry, landing at eighteen rather than twenty — a reminder that "obscured" (defiled, obstructing progress) is not the same as "unwholesome" in the strict karmic sense. The bare unobscured-neutral type, at twelve, is the leanest of all: just the ten universal factors plus applied and sustained thought, with nothing morally charged layered on top at all — ordinary, unremarkable mental activity like routine bodily movement or simple perception.
Sleep's role closes the whole exercise on a nice unifying note: unlike every other factor discussed, which is tied to specific mind-types, sleep simply adds one to whatever count it joins, wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral alike — a genuinely universal modifier rather than a category-specific one. With the desire realm's full combinatorics now complete, the treatise turns next to how these same counts shift in the form and formless realms.
24. The Realms Above: What Drops Away at Each Level of Absorption
Ascending through the meditative absorptions systematically strips away specific mental factors, starting with the coarsest — beginning with the first dhyāna losing hatred entirely.
已說欲界心所俱生諸品定量，當說上界。頌曰：初定除不善，及惡作睡眠，中定又除尋，上兼除伺等。
The fixed counts of mental factors co-arising in each type of desire-realm mind have now been explained; the upper realms should be discussed next. A verse states: the first absorption excludes the unwholesome, and regret and sleep; the intermediate absorption further excludes applied thought; above that, also excludes sustained thought, and so on.
論曰：初靜慮中於前所說諸心所法，除唯不善惡作、睡眠，餘皆具有。唯不善者，謂瞋煩惱。除諂、誑、憍所餘忿等及無慚愧，餘皆有者，如欲界說。
Prose: Within the first dhyāna, among all the mental factors previously discussed, excluding only the exclusively-unwholesome, regret, and sleep, all the rest are present in full. "The exclusively unwholesome" refers to the affliction of hatred. As for the remaining minor afflictions — anger and the rest, apart from flattery, deceit, and arrogance — together with shamelessness and lack of conscientiousness, all the rest are present, just as explained for the desire realm.
Ascending through the levels of meditative absorption strips away specific mental factors one by one, starting with the coarsest. The first dhyāna already loses hatred entirely — aversion has no place once one is genuinely absorbed in meditative bliss — along with regret and sleep, both tied to ordinary, un-absorbed waking activity. It still retains the seven other minor afflictions, along with shamelessness and lack of conscientiousness, matching the full desire-realm profile otherwise.
This passage's compressed grammar leaves some room for how exactly its scope is read; the interpretation followed here — that flattery, deceit, and arrogance remain present at the first dhyāna, only dropping away starting at the second — is the reading supported by the vivid anecdote the very next section tells, which is offered as direct scriptural evidence for exactly this point.
25. A Deity's White Lie: Scriptural Proof That Flattery Persists Into the Brahma World
A famous, almost comic anecdote about a Great Brahmā caught out by an unanswerable question is cited as direct proof that flattery and deceit occur even among first-dhyāna deities.
中間靜慮除前所除，又更除尋，餘皆具有。第二靜慮以上乃至無色界中除前所除，又除伺等。等者顯除諂、誑，餘皆如前具有。
The intermediate dhyāna excludes what was excluded before, and additionally excludes applied thought; all the rest are present. From the second dhyāna upward, through to the formless realm, everything already excluded continues to be excluded, and additionally, sustained thought and so on is excluded. "And so on" indicates the further exclusion of flattery and deceit; all the rest remain present as before.
經說：諂誑極至梵天，眾相依故，上地無有。以大梵王處自梵眾，忽被馬勝苾芻問言：此四大種當於何位盡滅無餘？梵王不知無餘滅位，便矯亂答：我於此梵眾是大梵，自在作者、化者、生者、養者，是一切父。作是語已，引出眾外諂言愧謝，令還問佛。
A sutra says: flattery and deceit occur at most up to the Brahma-heaven, since beings there still depend on one another; the higher levels have none of this. The Great Brahmā King, dwelling amidst his own retinue, was suddenly asked by the monk Aśvajit: "At what stage do the four great elements come to be utterly extinguished without remainder?" The Brahmā King, not knowing the stage of their utter extinction, gave an evasive, deceptive answer instead: "Among this assembly, I am the Great Brahmā, the sovereign creator, transformer, generator, and nourisher — the father of all." Having said this, he then drew the monk outside the assembly and, with a flattering, apologetic tone, confessed his ignorance and sent him back to ask the Buddha.
This is a version of a well-known early Buddhist story, cited here for a precise doctrinal purpose: it serves as direct scriptural evidence that flattery and deceit genuinely occur even among Brahma-world deities, at the first-dhyāna level, which is exactly why the treatise excludes these two afflictions only starting at the second dhyāna, not the first. The story itself is almost comic in its very human dynamics — a cosmic deity, grand enough to call himself "father of all" in front of his own court, is caught out by a direct question he cannot answer, and resorts to the same face-saving flattery and evasion any embarrassed authority figure might use, quietly admitting the truth only once safely out of his retinue's earshot. Note, too, the closing methodological detail: "and so on" is glossed as covering flattery and deceit specifically, but conspicuously not arrogance, which persists even further up the ladder of absorption — one of the most tenacious afflictions in this entire system.
26. Shamelessness and Lack of Conscientiousness: A Careful Distinction
Two factors named much earlier in this fascicle, as the pair unique to every unwholesome mind, now get the careful distinction between them that a bare list could not provide.
如是已說於諸界地諸心品中心所數量，今次當說於前所辯諸心所中少分差別。無慚無愧、愛之與敬差別云何？頌曰：無慚愧不重，於罪不見怖，愛敬謂信慚，唯於欲色有。
Thus the counts of mental factors across the various realms and mind-types have now been explained. Next, some fine distinctions among the previously discussed mental factors should be addressed. What is the difference between shamelessness and lack of conscientiousness, and between love and reverence? A verse states: shamelessness is not holding others in esteem; lack of conscientiousness is not perceiving wrongdoing as fearful. Love and reverence are identified with faith and modesty; these exist only in the desire and form realms.
論曰：此中無慚無愧別者，於諸功德及有德者，無敬無崇、無所忌難、無所隨屬，說名無慚，即是恭敬所敵對法。為諸善士所訶厭法說名為罪，於此罪中不見怖畏說名無愧。
Prose: The distinction between shamelessness and lack of conscientiousness is this: with respect to virtuous qualities and virtuous persons, having no esteem, no reverence, no sense of restraint, and no willingness to defer to them — this is called "shamelessness," the direct opposite of reverence. That which is condemned and disdained by virtuous persons is called "wrongdoing"; not perceiving fear with respect to such wrongdoing is called "lack of conscientiousness."
These are the two universal-unwholesome-ground factors named earlier in this fascicle — present in every unwholesome mind without exception — now finally given the careful distinction a bare list couldn't provide. Shamelessness is about failing to hold virtue and virtuous people in the esteem they deserve; lack of conscientiousness is about failing to feel the dread that wrongdoing itself ought to inspire. Two closely related but genuinely distinct failures of moral sensitivity, one outward-facing toward what is admirable, the other forward-facing toward the consequences of one's own conduct.
27. A Genuine Ambiguity, Resolved — And a Second View on Self Versus Other
The treatise carefully rules out two tempting misreadings of its own definition before landing on a subtler answer, then records a rival explanation entirely.
此中怖言，顯非愛果能生怖故。不見怖言欲顯何義？為見而不怖名不見怖、為不見彼怖名不見怖？若爾何失？二俱有過。若見而不怖應顯智慧，若不見彼怖應顯無明。此言不顯見與不見，何所顯耶？此顯有法是隨煩惱為彼二因，說名無愧。
Here, the word "fearful" indicates that this thing can produce a disagreeable result. What does the phrase "not perceiving fear" intend to convey? Does it mean "seeing the wrongdoing but not being afraid," or "not perceiving that fearfulness at all"? Either way, is there a problem? Both have one: if it means "seeing but not afraid," this should really indicate wisdom; if it means "not perceiving the fearfulness at all," this should indicate plain nescience. This phrase does not intend to indicate either "seeing" or "not seeing" in that sense — what, then, does it indicate? It indicates that there is a genuine dharma, a secondary affliction, that serves as the cause for both wrongdoing and this failure to fear it — and this distinct factor is what is named "lack of conscientiousness."
有餘師說：於所造罪自觀無恥名曰無慚，觀他無恥說名無愧。若爾，此二所觀不同，云何俱起？不說此二一時俱起別觀自他。然有無恥，觀自時勝說名無慚。復有無恥，觀他時增說為無愧。慚愧差別翻此應知，謂翻初釋有敬有崇、有所忌難、有所隨屬說名為慚，於罪見怖說名為愧。翻第二釋，於所造罪自觀有恥說名為慚，觀他有恥說名為愧。已說無慚無愧差別。
Other masters say instead: with respect to a wrongdoing one has committed, the absence of a sense of shame when reflecting on oneself is called "shamelessness"; the absence of a sense of shame when reflecting on others is called "lack of conscientiousness." If that is so, since these two involve reflecting on different things, how can they arise together simultaneously? It is not that these two, arising together, each separately reflect on self and other at once — rather, there is a single shamelessness that, when reflecting on oneself, predominates, and is called "shamelessness" in that aspect; the same underlying shamelessness, when reflecting on others, predominates, and is called "lack of conscientiousness" in that aspect. The distinction between modesty and conscientiousness should be understood as the reverse of this in both explanations. The distinction between shamelessness and lack of conscientiousness has now been explained.
The first explanation ties the difference to the OBJECT of concern — shamelessness fails to respect virtue itself, lack of conscientiousness fails to fear wrongdoing's consequences — and the treatise carefully rules out two tempting but wrong readings of "not perceiving fear" along the way: confident indifference to wrongdoing would actually sound like wisdom, not a flaw, while genuine ignorance of the danger is already covered by a different factor entirely. The real answer is that this names its own distinct causal factor, not reducible to either.
The rival explanation ties the difference instead to the DIRECTION of shame — toward oneself, or toward how others would judge one — and resolves the "how can both arise together" objection the same way the earlier torpor-and-restlessness debate was resolved: not two literally simultaneous acts of reflection, but a single underlying quality that simply predominates in one direction or the other at any given moment.
28. Love and Reverence: Each Identified with a Familiar Factor, and a Fourfold Map of Relationships
A second pair of related terms gets the same careful treatment — and both turn out, at their wholesome core, to be nothing other than factors already named, simply directed at a person.
愛敬別者，愛謂愛樂，體即是信。然愛有二：一有染污、二無染污。有染謂貪，如愛妻子等。無染謂信，如愛師長等。有信非愛，謂緣苦集信。有愛非信，謂諸染污愛。有通信愛，謂緣滅道信。有非信愛，謂除前三相。有說：信者忍許有德，由此為先方生愛樂，故愛非信。
As for the distinction between love and reverence: "love" means fondness, its essential nature being precisely faith. Yet love is of two kinds — defiled and undefiled. The defiled kind is actually greed, as in loving one's spouse and children. The undefiled kind is genuine faith, as in loving one's teachers and elders. There is faith that is not love — faith taking suffering and its origin as its object. There is love that is not faith — all defiled love. There is what is both — faith taking cessation and the path as its object. There is what is neither — excluding the three cases already named. Some say: faith is acceptance of what is virtuous; based on this as a preceding condition, love then arises — hence love is not faith, but its effect.
敬謂敬重，體即是慚，如前解慚謂有敬等。有慚非敬，謂緣苦集慚。有通慚敬，謂緣滅道慚。有說：敬者有所崇重，由此為先方生慚恥，故敬非慚。望所緣境補特伽羅，愛敬有無應作四句。有愛無敬，謂於妻子共住門人等。有敬無愛，謂於他師有德貴人等。有愛有敬，謂於自師父母伯叔等。無愛無敬，謂除前三相。
"Reverence" means esteem, its essential nature being precisely modesty, as explained before. There is modesty that is not reverence — modesty taking suffering and origin as its object. There is what is both — modesty taking cessation and the path as its object. Some say: reverence is holding something in high esteem; based on this as a preceding condition, a sense of modesty then arises — hence reverence is not modesty, but its cause. With respect to the person taken as an object, the presence or absence of love and reverence should be analyzed fourfold. Love without reverence: as toward one's spouse, children, cohabiting household members, and disciples. Reverence without love: as toward another's teacher, or an honored, virtuous person not one's own. Both love and reverence: as toward one's own teacher, parents, uncles, and aunts. Neither: excluding the three cases already named.
The identification at the heart of this section is elegant: "love," at its wholesome core, turns out to be nothing other than faith itself, directed at a person rather than the Dharma abstractly; "reverence" is similarly just modesty, directed outward at a person rather than inward at one's own conduct. Running this through the four noble truths produces a nice asymmetry — faith or modesty directed at suffering and its origin is sober, unloving acceptance of hard truths, while directed at cessation and the path it becomes genuinely loving and reverent, since these are things worth aspiring to rather than merely enduring. A rival view reverses the causal direction entirely, treating love and reverence as EFFECTS of faith and modesty rather than identical with them.
The closing fourfold map grounds all this abstraction in ordinary relationships anyone would recognize: one's own family and students draw love without necessarily reverence; a respected outsider's teacher draws reverence without personal affection; one's own parents and teachers draw both; strangers draw neither. It's a small, humanizing touch in an otherwise highly technical passage.
29. Why Love and Reverence Vanish in the Formless Realm
A clean resolution closes the topic: the underlying capacity for love and reverence never disappears, only its interpersonal occasion for expression.
如是愛敬欲色界有，無色界無。豈不信慚大善地法無色亦有？愛敬有二，謂緣於法補特伽羅，緣法愛敬通三界有。此中意說緣補特伽羅者，故欲色有，無色界無。如是已說愛敬差別。
Thus, love and reverence exist in the desire and form realms, but not in the formless realm. But do not faith and modesty, being universal-wholesome-ground dharmas, also exist in the formless realm? Love and reverence are of two kinds: that which takes dharmas as its object, and that which takes persons as its object. Love and reverence taking dharmas as their object are common to all three realms. What is meant here specifically concerns love and reverence taking persons as their object — hence these exist in the desire and form realms, but not in the formless realm. The distinction between love and reverence has now been explained.
The resolution is clean: faith and modesty themselves, as universal-wholesome factors, persist even in the bodiless formless realm, directed at abstract dharmas and teachings. But "love" and "reverence" as specifically interpersonal emotions require another person to be directed at — and the formless realm's beings, lacking bodies and any embodied social context, simply have no occasion for person-directed love or reverence to arise, even though the underlying faith and modesty that would ground such feelings remain fully intact. The capacity persists; only its interpersonal expression has nowhere left to land.
30. Coarse and Subtle Within One Mind: A Vivid Simile, and a Sharp Objection
A beautiful image of ghee floating on cold water under hot sun tries to explain how a single mind can be both coarse and subtle at once — before a sharp objection threatens to undo it.
論曰：尋伺別者，謂心麁細，心之麁性名尋，心之細性名伺。云何此二一心相應？有作是釋：如冷水上浮以熟酥，上烈日光之所照觸，酥因水日非釋非凝。如是一心有尋有伺，心由尋伺不遍細麁，故於一心俱有作用。
Prose: The distinction between applied and sustained thought is this: they are the mind's coarseness and subtlety — the mind's coarse nature is called applied thought, its subtle nature is called sustained thought. How can these two be associated within a single mind? Some offer this explanation: it is like ghee floating atop cold water, further touched by intense sunlight from above — the ghee, because of both the water and the sun, is neither fully melted nor fully solidified. In just this way, a single mind has both applied and sustained thought: the mind, due to applied and sustained thought, is neither uniformly subtle nor uniformly coarse — hence within a single mind, both qualities have their function together.
若爾，尋伺是麁細因，非麁細體，如水日光是凝釋因，日體非凝釋。又麁細性相待而立，界地品別上下相形，乃至有頂應有尋伺。又麁細性無別體類，不可依之以別尋伺。
If that is so, applied and sustained thought would be the cause of coarseness and subtlety, not identical with coarseness and subtlety itself — just as water and sunlight are the cause of solidifying and melting, while the water and sun's own essence is not itself solidifying or melting. Moreover, coarse and subtle are established relatively — so across the different realms, levels, and types of mind, comparing higher to lower, this relation should hold all the way up to the Peak of Existence, and it should follow that even that highest level should have applied and sustained thought. Moreover, coarse and subtle have no distinct essential nature of their own, so one cannot rely on them alone to differentiate applied thought from sustained thought as genuinely separate things.
The ghee simile is genuinely vivid: cold water below keeps it from fully melting, hot sun above keeps it from fully solidifying, so it settles into a real, blended, intermediate state — neither purely liquid nor purely solid. Offered as an image for how one moment of mind can carry both coarseness and subtlety together, not as two properties fighting for space but as a single blended quality.
The objection is sharp on two fronts. First, the simile actually proves too little: water and sun CAUSE the ghee's intermediate state without themselves BEING that state, so by the same logic applied and sustained thought would merely CAUSE coarseness and subtlety rather than being identical to them — undermining the very definition just given. Second, and more seriously: if "coarse" and "subtle" are purely relative terms, then by the same logic they should apply recursively at every single level, all the way up to the absolute peak of existence — implying even that most refined level should have its own internal coarse-and-subtle split, and therefore its own applied and sustained thought. But this flatly contradicts established doctrine that these two vanish well before that point. A genuinely hard problem for the simile to answer.
31. A Second Attempt, and the Treatise's Honest Uncertainty
A rival explanation tries treating applied and sustained thought as two genuinely separate dharmas rather than two aspects of one — and the treatise is remarkably candid about how hard this is to fully defend.
復有釋言：尋伺二法是語言行，故契經言：要有尋伺方有語言，非無尋伺此語言行。麁者名尋，細者名伺，於一心內別法是麁、別法是細，於理何違？
There is a further explanation: applied and sustained thought are, as two distinct dharmas, the formations of speech — as a sutra says, "only when there is applied and sustained thought is there speech; without applied and sustained thought, there is no formation of speech." The coarse factor is named applied thought, the subtle factor is named sustained thought — within a single mind, one distinct dharma is coarse, and a separate distinct dharma is subtle. What contradiction is there in this, logically speaking?
若有別體類，理實無違；然無別體類，故成違理，一體類中無容上下俱時起故。若言體類亦有差別，應說體類別相云何。此二體類別相難說，但由上下顯其別相，非由上下能顯別相，一一類中有上下故。
If they have separate essential natures, then logically there is indeed no contradiction. But if it is insisted they have no separate essential nature, remaining just two aspects of one thing, then a contradiction does arise, since within one single category it is not possible for higher and lower to arise simultaneously. If one says they do have distinct essential categories after all, then one should be able to state what that distinct characteristic actually is. But this distinct characteristic is hard to state — it can only be indicated via the higher-lower comparison, and it is not the case that the higher-lower comparison itself constitutes a genuinely distinct characteristic, since within any single category there can also be internal gradations of higher and lower.
This second attempt sidesteps the earlier objection by treating applied and sustained thought as two genuinely distinct dharmas sitting side by side within the same mind, rather than two relative aspects of one underlying quality — a move backed by a sutra tying them specifically to the capacity for speech. But the treatise is unusually candid about how shaky this still is: if the two really do have separate essential natures, the contradiction dissolves cleanly, but nobody can actually say what that distinguishing essence IS beyond the same "coarser versus subtler" comparison already shown to be inadequate on its own. This is a rare moment of a technical text admitting its own explanatory tool is running low, without pretending otherwise.
32. The Treatise's Real Answer: Not Actually Simultaneous After All
After all this back-and-forth, the treatise's considered position turns out to overturn the premise the whole discussion started from.
由是應知，尋伺二法定不可執一心相應。若爾，云何契經中說：於初靜慮具足五支。具五支言就一地說，非一剎那，故無有過。如是已說尋伺差別。
From this, one should understand that applied and sustained thought, as two dharmas, definitely cannot be held to be associated within a single mind-moment. If that is so, how does a sutra say that the first dhyāna is fully endowed with five factors? The statement that it is "endowed with five factors" refers to the level as a whole, not to a single instant — hence there is no fault in this. The distinction between applied and sustained thought has now been explained.
This is a genuinely striking conclusion: after entertaining the ghee simile's picture of simultaneous co-presence, the treatise's actual final position is that applied and sustained thought cannot literally co-occur within the very same instant of mind at all. The famous description of the first dhyāna as "endowed with five factors" — applied thought, sustained thought, joy, pleasure, and one-pointedness — is reinterpreted accordingly: it characterizes the dhyāna as a sustained level of practice, different moments within which may feature different combinations of these five, rather than claiming all five are simultaneously present in every single instant of absorption. A more nuanced reading than the popular one might assume, arrived at only after honestly working through, and ultimately setting aside, two more intuitive explanations first.
33. Pride Versus Arrogance: Comparing Oneself to Others, or Simply Getting Drunk on One's Own Worth
The fourth and final pair in this stretch gets a clean, memorable distinction: one is fundamentally comparative, the other fundamentally self-absorbed.
慢憍別者，慢謂對他心自舉性，稱量自他德類差別，心自舉恃陵蔑於他故名為慢。憍謂染著自法為先，令心傲逸無所顧性。有餘師說：如因酒生欣舉差別說名為醉，如是貪生欣舉差別說名為憍。是謂慢憍差別之相。如是已說諸心心所品類不同俱生異相。
The distinction between pride and arrogance is this: pride means the mind's self-elevating nature relative to others — comparing and measuring the difference in virtue between oneself and others, the mind elevates itself, relying on this to look down upon and disdain others, hence it is named "pride." Arrogance means: preceded by attachment to one's own qualities, causing the mind to become haughty, dissolute, and heedless in nature. Other masters say: just as, from alcohol, a distinctive elation arises called "intoxication," so too, from craving, a distinctive elation arises called "arrogance." This is the characteristic distinguishing pride from arrogance. Thus the different categories of mind and mental factors, and their varying co-arising characteristics, have now been explained.
The distinction is clean and genuinely useful: pride (慢) is fundamentally comparative, requiring another person to measure oneself against and look down upon — it cannot exist in a vacuum. Arrogance (憍) is fundamentally self-absorbed, a kind of intoxication with one's own qualities that needs no comparison to anyone else at all — the same simple exhilaration alcohol produces, but generated by craving for one's own attributes instead. One looks outward and down; the other simply looks inward and up.
The closing line marks a real structural milestone: this sentence closes not just the pride-and-arrogance pair, but the entire extended stretch running back through the five categories of mental factors, the indeterminate factors, the realm-by-realm counting exercise, and these four fine distinctions — the whole systematic survey of mind and mental factors' varying characteristics.
34. Mind, Mental Faculty, Consciousness: Three Names, One Essence
A new topic opens on a note that reaches back to the very earliest fascicles of this translation: the classic identification of citta, manas, and vijñāna as three names for a single underlying reality.
然心心所於契經中隨義建立種種名想，今當辯此名義差別。頌曰：心意識體一，心心所有依，有緣有行相，相應義有五。論曰：集起故名心，思量故名意，了別故名識。復有釋言：淨不淨界種種差別故名為心，即此為他作所依止故名為意，作能依止故名為識。故心、意、識三名所詮，義雖有異而體是一。
However, mind and mental factors, in various sutras, are given various different names according to context; now the distinctions in these names and their meanings should be explained. A verse states: mind, mental faculty, and consciousness are one in essence; mind and mental factors have "support," have "object," have "aspect"; "association" has five meanings. Prose: Because it accumulates and gives rise to experience, it is named "mind"; because it deliberates, it is named "mental faculty"; because it discerns, it is named "consciousness." There is a further explanation: because of its various distinctions across pure and impure realms, it is named "mind"; because it serves as a support for a later moment, it is named "mental faculty"; because it functions as something that itself depends on a support, it is named "consciousness." Hence, although the three names "mind," "mental faculty," and "consciousness" convey different meanings, their essential nature is one and the same.
This is one of Abhidharma's most famous points, and it connects directly back to material from much earlier in this translation: citta, manas, and vijñāna — often used almost interchangeably in ordinary speech — are given genuinely distinct functional glosses (accumulating experience; deliberating; discerning objects, in one explanation; or mind as itself, manas as what supports a later moment, consciousness as what depends on a support, in another) while the treatise insists all three name one and the same underlying reality. This is precisely the doctrine explored at length in fascicles 1 and 2 regarding the mind element: the very same stream of consciousness is called "consciousness" when considered as an active present cognition, and "manas" when considered specifically as the immediately-past moment supporting what comes next — one thing, three roles, three names.
35. What Makes Mind and Mental Factors "Associated"? A Fivefold Test
The same three-names-one-essence logic extends to four more technical terms, culminating in the classic fivefold definition of what it means for mental factors to be genuinely "associated" with mind.
如心意識三名所詮義異體一，諸心心所名有所依所緣、行相相應亦爾，名義雖殊而體是一。謂心心所皆名有所依，託所依根故。或名有所緣，取所緣境故。或名有行相，即於所緣品類差別等起行相故。或名相應，等和合故。
Just as the three names mind, mental faculty, and consciousness convey different meanings while sharing one essence, so too the terms "having a support," "having an object," "having an aspect," and "association," as applied to mind and mental factors, are the same: though the names differ in meaning, the underlying essence is one. That is: mind and mental factors are all said to "have a support," because they rely on a supporting faculty. Or, they are said to "have an object," because they take hold of an object. Or, they are said to "have an aspect," because, with respect to the object, they give rise to a mode of cognizing its various distinguishing features. Or, they are said to be "associated," because they combine together equally.
依何義故名等和合？有五義故，謂心心所五義平等故說相應，所依所緣行相時事皆平等故。事平等者，一相應中如心體一，諸心所法各各亦爾。已說心心所廣分別義。
By what meaning is it called "combining together equally"? Because of five respects: mind and mental factors are called "associated" because they are equal in five respects — support, object, aspect, time, and entity are all equal among them. As for "equal in entity": within a single act of association, just as mind's own essential nature is one, so too each and every mental factor accompanying it is likewise one. The extensive analysis of mind and mental factors' meaning has now been explained.
This gives the classic fivefold test for whether mental factors are genuinely "associated" with a given mind — a foundational technical definition used throughout Abhidharma psychology: they must share the same supporting faculty, the same object, the same mode of cognizing that object, the same moment in time, and the same "count" — exactly one instance of mind and exactly one instance of each accompanying factor, never two of the same factor crowding into a single moment. Fail any one of these five and the factors in question are not truly "associated" in the technical sense, whatever else might link them.
The closing line marks another major structural milestone: the treatise's entire extensive analysis of mind and mental factors — spanning their five (or six, counting the indeterminate group) categories, their combinatorics across every realm and mind-type, the fine distinctions among closely related factors, and now the technical vocabulary of naming and association itself — is complete. The treatise turns next to an entirely different category of dharma it has referenced many times already without yet explaining directly: the formations dissociated from mind.
36. A Category Long Promised: The Formations Dissociated from Mind
A category this translation has quietly built toward for a long time — the life faculty and "class-commonality" were both named in it back in fascicle 3 — finally gets its own direct, systematic treatment, beginning with the most famous and contested member of all.
頌曰：心不相應行，得非得同分，無想二定命，相名身等類。論曰：如是諸法心不相應，非色等性，行蘊所攝，是故名心不相應行。於中且辯得非得相。頌曰：得謂獲成就，非得此相違，得非得唯於，自相續二滅。
Verse: the formations dissociated from mind are: possession, non-possession, class-commonality, non-percipience, the two attainments, life, the characteristics, and the collections of names, and so on. Prose: These various dharmas are dissociated from mind, are not of the nature of form and so on, yet are subsumed under the aggregate of formations — hence they are named "formations dissociated from mind." Among these, let us first discuss the characteristics of possession and non-possession. Verse: "Possession" means acquisition and continued ownership; "non-possession" is the reverse. Possession and non-possession exist only with respect to one's own mental continuum and the two cessations.
論曰：得有二種，一者未得已失今獲、二者得已不失成就，應知非得與此相違。於何法中有得非得？於自相續及二滅中。謂有為法若有墮在自相續中有得非得，非他相續，無有成就他身法故。非非相續，無有成就非情法故。且有為法決定如是，無為法中唯於二滅有得非得。一切有情無不成就非擇滅者，故對法中傳說如是：誰成無漏法？謂一切有情，除初剎那具縛聖者及餘一切具縛異生，諸餘有情皆成擇滅。決定無有成就虛空，故於虛空不言有得，以得無故非得亦無。
Prose: "Possession" is of two kinds: acquiring now what was previously not possessed or had been lost, and having already obtained something and not yet lost it. "Non-possession" is the reverse of these. With respect to which dharmas do possession and non-possession exist? Within one's own continuum, and with respect to the two cessations. For conditioned dharmas, if they fall within one's own continuum, there is possession and non-possession of them — not with respect to another's continuum, since one cannot possess dharmas belonging to another; not with respect to non-continuum things, since one cannot possess dharmas belonging to inanimate matter. This holds definitely for conditioned dharmas; among unconditioned dharmas, possession and non-possession exist only with respect to the two cessations. There is no sentient being who does not possess at least some cessation-not-through-discernment — hence an Abhidharma text traditionally states: "Who possesses uncontaminated dharmas? All sentient beings except for noble ones still fully bound at their very first moment, and all other ordinary beings still fully bound — all remaining beings possess cessation-through-discernment." There is definitely no one who possesses empty space, so with respect to space one does not speak of possession at all — and since there is no possession of it, there is also no non-possession of it.
This is a category this translation has been quietly building toward for a long time: the life faculty, explained back in fascicle 3, and "class-commonality" (眾同分), mentioned there too, both belong here — a distinctive category of dharmas that are neither physical form, nor mind, nor mental factors, yet are still genuinely real, conditioned things in their own right within this system. First up is "possession" (得, prāpti) — arguably the single most philosophically famous and contested member of this whole category, as the debate about to unfold will show.
Its basic scope is precise: possession only applies within one's own continuum — one cannot meaningfully "possess" another being's qualities — and, among unconditioned dharmas, only to the two cessations, never to empty space, which nobody meaningfully "has" or "lacks" in any sense at all.
37. Is "Possession" Even a Real Thing? The Case Against
One of the most historically significant debates in Abhidharma philosophy opens: does "possession" name a genuinely real, distinct entity, or is it merely a manner of speaking?
宗明得非得，相翻而立故。諸有得者亦有非得，義准可知，故不別釋。何緣知有別物名得？契經說故。如契經言：聖者於彼十無學法，以生以得以成就故，已斷五支，乃至廣說。
The school's teaching establishes possession and non-possession as mutually opposed. Whatever has possession also has non-possession available as its opposite; this should be understood by inference and is not separately explained. How do we know there is a genuinely separate entity called "possession"? Because a sutra says so — as a sutra states: "The noble one, with respect to those ten factors of no-more-learning, by generating, by possessing, and by attaining them, has already cut off the five lower fetters," and so on, as stated at length.
若爾，非情及他相續亦應成就。所以者何？契經說故。如契經說：苾芻當知，有轉輪王成就七寶，乃至廣說。此中自在說名成就，謂轉輪王於彼七寶有自在力，隨樂轉故。此既自在說名成就，餘復何因知有別物？許有別物有何非理？如是非理，謂所執得無體可知，如色聲等或貪瞋等；無用可知，如眼耳等，故無容有別物名得。執有別物，是為非理。
If that is so, then inanimate things and other beings' continuums should also be "possessed." Why? Because a sutra also says so — as a sutra states: "Monks, you should know: there is a Wheel-Turning King who possesses the seven treasures," and so on, as stated at length. Here, "mastery" is what is called "possession" — the King has sovereign power over the seven treasures, which operate according to his will. Given that this kind of mastery is also legitimately called "possession," by what further reasoning do we know there is a genuinely separate entity, also called "possession," in the other sense? What is wrong with accepting there is such a separate entity? This is precisely what is wrong: the claimed "possession" has no perceptible essence, unlike form, sound, and so on, or even greed and hatred; and it has no detectable function, unlike the eye, the ear, and so on. There is no room to accept a separate entity called "possession." Insisting there is one is simply improper.
This opens one of the most historically significant debates in all of Abhidharma philosophy: whether "possession" (prāpti) names a genuinely real, distinct dharma, or is merely a conventional way of describing continuity with nothing separate corresponding to it. The objector's move is sharp — cite sutra language proving the reality of internal spiritual possession, then immediately turn the same citation strategy against itself, pointing to a different sutra passage that uses identical "possession" language for a king's mere sovereign control over external treasures, obviously not implying any mysterious metaphysical bond. If that ordinary usage doesn't require a real "possession" entity, why should the other?
The case is then pressed further with this school's own standard tests for reality: unlike physical form, or even the (subtle but still somehow manifest) afflictions, "possession" has neither a perceivable nature nor an observable function — the two criteria this very tradition uses elsewhere to justify believing something genuinely exists.
38. Does Possession Cause Arising? A Battery of Objections
One specific theory of what "possession" does — that it causes the dharmas it possesses to arise — meets a relentless, cumulative demolition.
若謂此得亦有作用，謂作所得諸法生因，是則無為應無有得。又所得法未得已捨，界地轉易及離染故。彼現無得，當云何生？若俱生得為生因者，生與生生復何所作？又非情法應定不生。又具縛者，下中上品煩惱現起差別應無，得無別故。若由餘因有差別者，即應由彼諸法得生，得復何用？故彼所言得有作用，謂作所得諸法生因，理不成立。
If one holds that this "possession" also has a function — serving as the causal condition for the arising of the possessed dharmas — then the unconditioned should have no possession at all, since unconditioned dharmas never "arise" through causes. Moreover, for a possessed dharma not yet obtained, already relinquished, belonging to a different realm or level, or absent through freedom from defilement — if possession is presently absent in these cases, how could the dharma ever arise again? If "possession," co-arising with a dharma, serves as that dharma's cause of arising, then what would "birth" and "the birth of birth" still be needed for? Moreover, inanimate dharmas, lacking possession entirely, should then definitely never arise at all. Moreover, for a being still fully bound by afflictions, there should be no difference between the manifestation of lower, middle, and upper grades of affliction, since possession itself provides no such distinction. If some other cause accounts for that difference instead, then that cause alone should be sufficient to produce the dharmas' arising — so what use would possession even have? Therefore, the claim that possession functions as the causal condition for the arising of possessed dharmas cannot be established.
The objections pile up relentlessly against one specific theory of what possession does: it cannot explain possession of the uncontaminated cessations, which never arise causally at all; it creates an impossible bootstrapping problem for how a dharma's very first possession could itself ever get established; it would make the already-established "birth" and "birth-of-birth" causal machinery entirely redundant; it cannot explain why inanimate matter, which has no possession at all, manages to arise anyway; and it cannot explain why afflictions manifest at varying intensities, since mere possession does not distinguish degrees of anything. Each objection targets a different practical failure of the same theory, building toward its wholesale rejection.
39. The Real Function of Possession: Not Causing, But Distinguishing
Having let the objector demolish a strawman, the actual Sarvāstivāda defense finally states what possession was meant to explain all along.
誰言此得作法生因？若爾，此得有何作用？謂於差別為建立因。所以者何？若無有得，異生聖者起世俗心，應無異生及諸聖者建立差別。豈不煩惱已斷、未斷有差別故，應有差別？若執無得，如何可說煩惱已斷及與未斷？許有得者斷未斷成，由煩惱得離未離故。
Who ever said that this "possession" serves as the cause for a dharma's arising? If that is so, then what function does this "possession" actually have? It serves as the basis for establishing distinctions. Why is this? If there were no possession, then when an ordinary being and a noble one both give rise to an identical worldly state of mind, there would be no way to establish any distinction between them. But is it not the case that there already is a difference — whether afflictions have been cut off or not — so should not that difference already establish the distinction? If one insists there is no such thing as possession, how can one meaningfully say that afflictions have been cut off or not yet cut off at all? Accepting that there is possession allows this to be established coherently, since it describes whether one has become free from an affliction's possession or not.
Here the real Sarvāstivāda position finally comes into view: possession was never meant to explain causal arising — that was never the actual claim, and the entire previous section's demolition was aimed at a position nobody genuinely held. Its real job is to explain personal status and identity: an ordinary being and a noble one might, at a given moment, have outwardly indistinguishable mundane thoughts, yet genuinely differ underneath — and "possession," specifically of the attainments marking noble progress, is what accounts for that difference even when it is not currently manifesting as any active mental state at all.
The rival immediately presses back with a competing explanation of its own for what "cutting off an affliction" really means — setting up the next section's genuinely striking counter-theory.
40. A Rival Theory: Burnt Seeds and Transformed Foundations
An alternative to "possession" is offered — one that locates the whole difference in a real transformation of one's underlying basis, using an image that would echo through later Buddhist philosophy.
此由所依有差別故，煩惱已斷未斷義成。謂諸聖者見修道力，令所依身轉變異本，於彼二道所斷惑中無復功能令其現起。猶如種子火所焚燒，轉變異前無能生用。如是聖者所依身中無生惑能名煩惱斷。或世間道損所依中煩惱種子亦名為斷，與上相違名為未斷。
This can be established, instead, through a difference in one's underlying support — and by this, the meaning of "afflictions cut off" and "not yet cut off" can also be accounted for. That is: through the power of the paths of seeing and cultivation, noble ones cause their underlying support to be transformed, different from what it was before, such that, with respect to the afflictions eliminated by those two paths, there is no longer any capacity for them to manifest again. It is like a seed that has been burned by fire — transformed, different from before, no longer able to produce its former generative function. In just the same way, within a noble one's transformed support, there is no capacity left to generate afflictions — this is what is named "the afflictions being cut off." Or, alternatively: the mundane path damages the affliction-seeds within one's support, which is also called "cutting off." The reverse of this is called "not cut off."
This is a genuinely striking alternative, and historically significant: rather than positing a separate "possession" entity that comes and goes, this rival explanation locates the whole difference in a real transformation of one's underlying psychophysical basis, illustrated with the vivid image of a seed burned by fire — outwardly perhaps still seed-shaped, but permanently stripped of its capacity to sprout. "Cutting off an affliction," on this view, simply means one's foundation has been altered such that the affliction can no longer arise from it at all — no extra metaphysical entity required.
The seed-and-transformation language is worth noting for readers familiar with later Buddhist thought: it anticipates, in miniature, the kind of "seed" (bīja) theory that Yogācāra philosophy would develop at far greater length centuries later, regarding the storehouse-consciousness and the karmic potentials it carries. The contest between these two models — a real "possession" marking status, versus a genuinely transformed underlying basis — is far from settled here, and the treatise still has more ground to cover working through it.
41. The Seed Model Extended: What It Means to "Cut Off" Wholesome Roots
The seed-and-transformation model just proposed is immediately put to work explaining a second, notoriously difficult pair of terms: what it really means to have one's wholesome roots "cut off."
諸未斷者說名成就，諸已斷者名不成就，如是二種但假非實。善法有二：一者不由功力修得、二者要由功力修得，即名生得及加行得。不由功力而修得者，若所依中種未被損名為成就，若所依中種已被損名不成就。謂斷善者由邪見力損所依中善根種子應知名斷，非所依中善根種子畢竟被害說名為斷。要由功力而修得者，若所依中彼法已起生彼功力自在無損說名成就，與此相違名不成就。如是二種亦假非實。
Those not yet cut off are called "possessed," and those already cut off are called "not possessed" — yet both of these two terms are merely conventional labels, not real entities. Wholesome dharmas are of two kinds: first, those cultivated without effort; second, those that must be cultivated through effort — these are called, respectively, "innately acquired" and "acquired through effortful practice." As for wholesome dharmas cultivated without effort: if, within one's support, the seed has not yet been damaged, this is called "possessed"; if, within one's support, the seed has already been damaged, this is called "not possessed." That is: when someone is said to have "cut off wholesome roots," it is the power of wrong view damaging the wholesome-root seed within their support that should be understood by "cut off." It does not mean that the wholesome-root seed within the support has been utterly destroyed once and for all. As for wholesome dharmas that must be cultivated through effort: if, within one's support, that dharma has already arisen and the power to generate it remains self-sufficient and undamaged, this is called "possessed"; the reverse of this is called "not possessed." Both of these two kinds are likewise merely conventional, not real.
This passage does careful, important work distinguishing two very different senses of losing a wholesome root. "Cutting off wholesome roots" (斷善根) — a serious condition traditionally associated with extreme wrong view — does not mean the seed itself is annihilated beyond recovery; it means the seed has been damaged, its capacity suppressed, which is why such a person can, at least in principle, eventually regenerate wholesome qualities rather than being permanently barred from them. The same seed-model is then extended to the second category of wholesome dharmas, those requiring effortful cultivation (such as meditative attainments): here, "possession" just means the capacity to produce that dharma remains intact and undamaged, and "non-possession" its opposite.
Possession and non-possession, on this rival account, are only ever ways of describing the condition of an underlying seed — never separate metaphysical entities layered on top of it. That claim is about to receive its own precise technical definition.
42. Defining "Seed": Continuum, Transformation, Distinction
Having leaned on the word "seed" throughout the preceding argument, the text finally stops to define it precisely — a compact formula that would become one of the most influential technical definitions in later Buddhist philosophy.
故所依中唯有種子未拔未損增長自在，於如是位立成就名，無有別物。此中何法名為種子？謂名與色於生自果所有展轉隣近功能，此由相續轉變差別。何名轉變？謂相續中前後異性。何名相續？謂因果性三世諸行。何名差別？謂有無間生果功能。
Therefore, within one's support, there is only ever a seed — not yet uprooted, not yet damaged, growing in a self-sufficient way — and it is with respect to this state that the name "possession" is established; there is no separate entity involved at all. Here, what sort of thing is called a "seed"? It refers to the proximate capacity possessed by name-and-form for producing their own effect — a capacity constituted through the continuum, its transformation, and its distinction. What is meant by "transformation"? It means that, within a continuum, the earlier and later states differ from one another. What is meant by "continuum"? It means the causally connected formations of the three times. What is meant by "distinction"? It means the capacity to produce an effect with no intervening interval.
This is the famous formula usually referred to by its Sanskrit shorthand, santati-pariṇāma-viśeṣa — "continuum, transformation, distinction." A "seed," on this model, is not a literal object sitting somewhere in the body; it is simply the name given to a causal capacity possessed by an ongoing psychophysical continuum (name-and-form, i.e. the five aggregates), identified through three components: the continuum itself (the causally linked series of moments across past, present, and future), its transformation (any difference between an earlier moment in that series and a later one), and its distinction (specifically, the point at which the capacity to produce its effect becomes immediate, with nothing left to intervene).
This reductive account — explaining a "seed's" apparent reality entirely in terms of a changing continuum, without positing it as any separate substance — is characteristically Sautrāntika, and stands in careful tension with the Vaibhāṣika insistence, defended several sections ago, that possession names a genuinely distinct real dharma. The same three-part formula would later be developed at far greater length in Yogācāra thought, where it helps explain how karmic seeds ripen within the storehouse-consciousness.
43. One Last Objection, and the Treatise's Two-Sided Verdict
A final scriptural wrinkle is addressed before the whole debate over whether possession is real or merely conventional reaches an unusually even-handed close.
然有處說，若成就貪便不能修四念住者。彼說：耽著貪煩惱者，不能厭捨，故名成就。由隨耽著貪愛時分，於四念住必不能修。如是成就遍一切種，唯假非實。唯遮於此名不成就，亦假非實。毘婆沙師說：此二種皆有別物實而非假。如是二途皆為善說。所以者何？不違理故、我所宗故。
However, there is a passage elsewhere that states: if one "possesses" desire, one is then unable to cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness. That passage explains this as follows: one who clings to and is addicted to the affliction of desire is unable to grow weary of it and abandon it — this is what is meant by "possessing" it. Because, throughout the period one remains caught up in such clinging and craving, one is necessarily unable to cultivate the four foundations of mindfulness. Understood this way, "possession," extended to cover every kind of case without exception, is merely a conventional label, not a real entity — and the mere negation of this, called "non-possession," is likewise merely conventional. The Vaibhāṣika masters, however, hold that these two are both genuinely separate, real entities, not merely conventional labels. Both of these two positions may be considered well argued. Why is that? Because neither contradicts reason — and because the latter is our own school's tenet.
The objection is subtle: a passage says that "possessing" desire prevents someone from cultivating the four foundations of mindfulness — but if "possession" just names a seed's undamaged capacity, as the previous two sections argued, this usage does not obviously fit, since a person absorbed in craving is not managing some seed's status but is simply caught up in an active mental state. The response reinterprets "possession" here as loosely covering any case of persistent attachment, again without positing any separate real entity — "possession," on this reading, is purely conventional through and through, and so is its negation.
Then comes a striking authorial move. Rather than adjudicate between the seed-based account just developed at length and the Vaibhāṣika position that possession and non-possession are genuinely separate real dharmas — the very position defended earlier, and the entire reason this debate began — Vasubandhu simply declares both defensible: "neither contradicts reason." He then sides with the Vaibhāṣika position anyway, but for an admittedly institutional reason, "because it is our own school's tenet," not because it has been shown to be correct. This moment of visible authorial distance — presenting a rival account with evident sympathy, then affirming orthodoxy while all but conceding the matter is unsettled — is characteristic of how this treatise operates throughout, and is part of why later tradition reads Vasubandhu as leaning Sautrāntika even while composing a nominally Sarvāstivāda textbook. With this, the reality debate over possession closes, and the treatise turns to systematically classifying it instead.
44. Classifying Possession: The Three Times, Moral Quality, and Realm
Having spent several sections establishing that possession is real at all, the treatise now turns to systematically classifying it, opening with a compressed verse covering five distinct classification schemes at once.
已辯自性，差別云何？且應辯得。頌曰：三世法各三，善等唯善等，有繫自界得，無繫得通四，非學無學三，非所斷二種。
Its essential nature has now been explained — what of its distinctions? Let us first discuss possession. Verse: The dharmas of the three times each have three kinds of possession; possession of a wholesome, and so on, dharma belongs only to that same category; possession of a realm-bound dharma belongs only to its own realm; possession of an unbound dharma extends through all four; sorted by trainee, non-trainee, or neither, possession is of three kinds; sorted by whether it is cut off or not, it is of two kinds.
論曰：三世法得各有三種，謂過去法有過去得、有未來得、有現在得，如是未來及現在法各有三得。又善等法得唯善等，謂善不善及無記法，如其次第，有善不善無記三得。又有繫法得唯自界，謂欲色界無色界法，如其次第唯有欲色無色三得。若無繫法得通四種，謂無漏法總而言之得有四種，即三界得及無漏得。別分別者，非擇滅得，通三界繫。若擇滅得，色無色繫及與無漏。道諦得，唯無漏故。無繫法得，有四種。
Prose: Possession of dharmas of the three times is itself of three kinds: that is, a past dharma has a past possession, a future possession, and a present possession; likewise, future and present dharmas each have three kinds of possession. Furthermore, possession of a wholesome, and so on, dharma belongs only to that same category: that is, for wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral dharmas, there are, in that same order, wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral possession. Furthermore, possession of a dharma bound to a particular realm belongs only to that same realm: that is, for dharmas of the desire realm, form realm, and formless realm, there is, in that same order, only desire-realm, form-realm, and formless-realm possession, respectively. If a dharma is unbound to any realm, its possession extends through all four kinds: that is, for uncontaminated dharmas taken altogether, possession is of four kinds — the three realms' possession, plus uncontaminated possession. Analyzed individually: possession of cessation-not-through-discernment extends through the bondage of all three realms. Possession of cessation-through-discernment belongs to the form realm, the formless realm, and to the uncontaminated. Possession of the truth of the path belongs only to the uncontaminated. Possession of an unbound dharma is thus of four kinds.
This verse packs five separate classification schemes for possession into six lines; three are worked out here, and the remaining two — trainee status and susceptibility to being cut off — follow in the next section. The first is straightforward multiplication: since a dharma existing at any one of the three times can itself be possessed by a past, future, or present possession, each dharma generates three kinds of possession. The second and third simply mirror the possessed dharma's own moral quality (wholesome, unwholesome, neutral) and realm (desire, form, formless) onto its possession — a wholesome dharma's possession is itself wholesome, a desire-realm dharma's possession is itself desire-realm-bound, and so on; there is no cross-category possession where a wholesome dharma could somehow carry unwholesome possession.
The interesting complication comes with uncontaminated dharmas, which are unbound to any of the three realms and so admit four kinds of possession rather than three. The two cessations distribute unevenly across this four-way split: cessation-not-through-discernment can belong to any of the three realms, while cessation-through-discernment's possession is bound only to the form realm, the formless realm, or the uncontaminated — never the desire realm specifically. The text does not pause to explain this asymmetry here; it is one of several finely grained classificatory rules the treatise simply states rather than justifies at this point.
45. Classifying Possession, Continued: Trainee Status and Susceptibility to Being Cut Off
The verse's remaining two classification schemes are worked out, each following the same pattern already seen: possession generally mirrors the status of the dharma it possesses, except where a further distinction is needed for how a cessation was actually attained.
又有學法得唯有學，若無學法得唯無學，非學非無學得有差別，謂此法得總說有三，別分別者一切有漏及三無為皆名非學非無學法。且有漏法唯有非學非無學得，非擇滅得。及非聖道所引擇滅得亦如是，若有學道所引擇滅得即有學，若無學道所引擇滅得即無學。又見修所斷法，如其次第有見修所斷得。非所斷法得有差別，謂此法得總說有二，別分別者，諸無漏法名非所斷，非擇滅得唯修所斷。若非聖道所引擇滅得亦如是。聖道所引擇滅之得及道諦得，皆非所斷。
Furthermore, possession of a trainee's dharma belongs only to a trainee, and possession of a non-trainee's dharma belongs only to a non-trainee. Possession of a dharma that is neither a trainee's nor a non-trainee's has its own distinctions: stated broadly, possession of this kind of dharma is of three kinds; analyzed individually, all contaminated dharmas, together with the three unconditioned, are called "neither trainee's nor non-trainee's" dharmas. Now, a contaminated dharma has only "neither" possession — and so does possession of cessation-not-through-discernment. Possession of a cessation-through-discernment not brought about by the noble path is likewise "neither"; but if a cessation-through-discernment is brought about by a trainee's path, its possession is a trainee's, and if brought about by a non-trainee's path, its possession is a non-trainee's. Furthermore, for dharmas cut off by the path of seeing and by the path of cultivation, there is, respectively, a possession cut off by the path of seeing and one cut off by the path of cultivation. Possession of a dharma not subject to being cut off has its own distinctions: stated broadly, possession of this kind is of two kinds; analyzed individually, all uncontaminated dharmas are called "not subject to being cut off" — yet possession of cessation-not-through-discernment belongs only to what is cut off by the path of cultivation, and so does possession of a cessation-through-discernment not brought about by the noble path. But the possession of a cessation-through-discernment brought about by the noble path, and possession of the truth of the path, are both not subject to being cut off.
The trainee/non-trainee classification behaves exactly as expected for dharmas that are unambiguously one or the other, but needs a third catch-all category — "neither trainee's nor non-trainee's" — to cover everything else: all contaminated dharmas (which belong to no stage of the noble path at all) plus the three unconditioned. Within that catch-all, cessation-through-discernment turns out to be the one genuinely variable case: attained through a trainee's practice of the path, its possession counts as a trainee's; attained only after completing the path, its possession counts as a non-trainee's; but if it never resulted from noble-path cultivation at all — a mundane severing, of the kind mentioned earlier where the ordinary path merely damages an affliction's seed — its possession remains "neither," alongside cessation-not-through-discernment, which is never the product of noble insight in the first place.
The final scheme, sorting possession by whether it is subject to being cut off, follows the identical logic. Uncontaminated dharmas are, in general, "not subject to being cut off" — but possession of cessation-not-through-discernment is a curious exception, itself classed as something the path of cultivation cuts off, alongside possession of any cessation-through-discernment reached by non-noble means. Only when a cessation-through-discernment is genuinely the fruit of the noble path — and, naturally, the truth of the path itself — does its possession finally earn the status of something no longer subject to being cut off at all. The pattern running through both schemes is the same: possession tracks not just what a dharma is, but how it came to be possessed in the first place.
46. When Possession Can — and Cannot — Precede Its Dharma
The "three times each three" rule from two sections ago gets an important qualification: for most undefiled-neutral dharmas, possession cannot actually run ahead of or behind the dharma it possesses — with a few striking exceptions.
前雖總說三世法各三，今應簡別其中差別相。頌曰：無記得俱起，除二通變化，有覆色亦俱，欲色無前起。論曰：無覆無記得唯俱起，無前後生，勢力劣故。法若過去得亦過去，法若未來得亦未來，法若現在得亦現在。一切無覆無記法得皆如是耶？不爾。云何？除眼耳通及能變化。謂眼耳通慧及能變化心，勢力強故、加行差別所成辦故，雖是無覆無記性收，而有前後及俱起得。若工巧處及威儀路極數習者，得亦許爾。
Although it was said broadly above that dharmas of the three times each have three kinds of possession, a further distinction among them should now be made. Verse: the possession of a neutral dharma only co-arises with it — except for two supernormal faculties and the mind of transformation; defiled-neutral form also only co-arises; desire-realm and form-realm [wholesome and unwholesome possession] have no prior arising. Prose: the possession of an undefiled-neutral dharma only co-arises with it, never arising before or after, because its power is weak. If the dharma is past, its possession is also past; if the dharma is future, its possession is also future; if the dharma is present, its possession is also present. Does the possession of every undefiled-neutral dharma work this way? No. What is the exception? The divine-eye and divine-ear faculties, and the mind capable of transformation, are excepted. That is: the wisdom of the divine eye and divine ear, and the mind capable of transformation, being of strong power and accomplished through distinct effortful practice, although classed as undefiled-neutral in nature, nevertheless have possession that arises before or after the dharma, as well as co-arising with it. Skill in the crafts, and bodily deportment, when practiced to the point of great mastery, are likewise granted this same allowance for their possession.
This section quietly narrows a rule that might otherwise sound too generous. Yes, in principle a dharma existing at any of the three times can have a possession existing at any of the three times — but for most undefiled-neutral dharmas, that freedom collapses in practice: their possession only ever co-arises with them, moving in lockstep, because such dharmas are too weak in causal power to sustain a possession that runs ahead of or behind their own actual presence. The exceptions are telling: the divine eye and divine ear (two of the six supernormal faculties), the mind capable of magical transformation, and expert-level craft or deportment skills are all singled out precisely because they are effortfully cultivated and unusually powerful — strong enough that one can, in a real sense, "possess" the capacity for them even at a moment when they are not currently manifesting.
47. Two More Refinements: Defiled Form, and Desire-Realm Wholesome and Unwholesome Form
The same question is asked of two further categories, each landing on a slightly different answer.
唯有無覆無記法得但俱起耶？不爾。云何？有覆無記色得亦爾。謂諸有覆無記表色得亦如前，但有俱起。雖有上品而亦不能發無表故勢力微劣，由此定無法前後得。如無記法得有別異，善不善得亦有異耶？亦有。云何？謂欲界繫善不善色得無前起，唯有俱生及後起得。
Is it only the possession of undefiled-neutral dharmas that merely co-arises? No. What else? The possession of defiled-neutral form is likewise so. That is, the possession of defiled-neutral manifest form is also as described above, having only co-arising possession. Even at its strongest grade, it is still unable to give rise to unmanifest form, so its power is slight, and for this reason there is definitely no possession of it that arises before or after the dharma. Just as the possession of neutral dharmas has this special distinction, does the possession of wholesome and unwholesome dharmas also have a distinction? It does. What is it? Possession of a wholesome or unwholesome desire-realm-bound form has no prior arising — there is only co-arising possession and subsequent-arising possession.
Defiled-neutral manifest form — bodily or vocal expression driven by an afflicted but karmically neutral state of mind, such as the view of a self — turns out to be even weaker than the undefiled-neutral dharmas just discussed: not even its strongest grade can produce unmanifest form (the lingering karmic residue ordinary wholesome or unwholesome bodily and vocal acts leave behind), so its possession is confined strictly to co-arising, with no exception at all. Desire-realm wholesome and unwholesome form gets a different, intermediate treatment: its possession can trail behind the dharma (persisting as "possessed" after the act itself has ceased, which is exactly how karmic responsibility for a past deed is tracked) but can never run ahead of it — one cannot, even in principle, possess an unmanifest karmic residue before the act that generates it has actually occurred.
48. Classifying Non-Possession: Nature, Time, and Realm
Having finished classifying possession, the treatise turns to non-possession's own classification — and immediately flags the single most consequential case: the noble path's non-possession is what the tradition calls "ordinary-being-nature."
非得如得，亦有如上品類別耶？不爾。云何？頌曰：非得淨無記，去來世各三，三界不繫三，許聖道非得，說名異生性，得法易地捨。
Does non-possession, like possession, also have the same kinds of distinctions described above? No. What, then, is its case? Verse: non-possession is [always] undefiled-neutral; for past and future dharmas, it is each of three kinds; for dharmas bound to the three realms, or unbound, it is [each] of three kinds; it is accepted that the noble path's non-possession is what is called "ordinary-being-nature"; when the dharma is attained, or the level changes, [this non-possession] is relinquished.
論曰：性差別者，一切非得皆唯無覆無記性攝。世差別者，過去未來各有三種，謂現在法決定無有現在非得，唯有過去未來非得，過去未來一一各有三世非得。界差別者，三界繫法及不繫法各三非得，謂欲界繫法有三界非得，色無色界繫及不繫亦爾。定無非得是無漏者。所以者何？由許聖道非得，說名異生性故。
Prose: as for the distinction by nature, all non-possession is subsumed only under the undefiled-neutral nature. As for the distinction by time, past and future dharmas each have three kinds of non-possession: that is, a present dharma definitely has no present non-possession — there is only past and future non-possession of it — and each of the past and future dharmas individually has three kinds of non-possession spanning the three times. As for the distinction by realm, dharmas bound to the three realms, and dharmas unbound to any realm, each have three kinds of non-possession: that is, a desire-realm-bound dharma has non-possession spanning all three realms, and the same holds for a form-realm-bound or formless-realm-bound dharma, and for an unbound dharma as well. There is definitely no non-possession that is uncontaminated. Why is that? Because it is accepted that the noble path's non-possession is what is called "ordinary-being-nature."
Non-possession turns out to be simpler than possession in one respect and stranger in another. Simpler: its moral quality never varies — it is always undefiled-neutral, full stop, with none of possession's wholesome/unwholesome/neutral three-way split. Stranger: unlike possession, a present dharma can never have a present non-possession — if a dharma is genuinely present in one's continuum right now, one cannot simultaneously fail to possess it — so non-possession only ever applies to past or future dharmas. And realm-wise, non-possession of a desire-realm dharma is not confined to the desire realm the way possession of it would be; it can span all three realms alike, since not-possessing something says nothing about which realm one currently occupies.
The most consequential line, though, is the last: there is no such thing as an uncontaminated non-possession — full stop — and yet the non-possession of the noble path itself is given a special name of tremendous weight: "ordinary-being-nature" (異生性, pṛthagjanatva). Simply by not yet having attained any noble dharma at all, an unawakened being's entire condition as an "ordinary being," as opposed to a noble one, is defined negatively, as a kind of non-possession — one further undefiled-neutral case rather than some special third category. What exactly this "not having obtained" amounts to, though, turns out to be a genuinely contested question, taken up next.
49. What Exactly Is "Ordinary-Being-Nature"? A Debate in Successive Refinements
A famous, genuinely difficult question is worked through by successive refinement — each proposed definition facing an objection, until the treatise ultimately prefers the Sautrāntika's reductive answer over its own school's more literal one.
如本論言：云何異生性？謂不獲聖法。不獲即是非得異名，非說異生性是無漏應理。不獲何聖法名異生性？謂不獲一切，不別說故。此不獲言，表離於獲。若異此者，諸佛世尊亦不成就聲聞獨覺種性聖法，應名異生。若爾，彼論應說純言不要須說，此一句中含純義故，如說此類食水食風。
As the root treatise states: "What is ordinary-being-nature? It is not having obtained the noble dharmas." "Not having obtained" is simply another name for "non-possession"; it would not be correct to say that ordinary-being-nature is itself uncontaminated. Not having obtained which noble dharmas is called "ordinary-being-nature"? Not having obtained any of them at all, since no separate specification is given. This phrase "not having obtained" expresses being entirely apart from obtaining. If it meant otherwise, then the Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, who also do not possess the noble dharmas belonging to the lineage of the śrāvaka or the pratyekabuddha, would then have to be called "ordinary beings" as well. If that is so, then the root treatise should have said the word "entirely" — there was no need to leave it unsaid, since this single clause would need to carry that sense of "entirely" explicitly, just as it is said elsewhere that a certain class of beings "lives purely on water" or "lives purely on wind."
有說：不獲苦法智忍及俱生法名異生性。不可難言道類智時捨此法故應成非聖，前已永害彼非得故。若爾，此性既通三乘，不獲何等名異生性？此亦應言不獲一切。若爾，此應同前有難。此難復應如前通釋。若爾，重說唐捐其功。如經部師，所說為善。經部所說其義云何？謂曾未生聖法相續分位差別名異生性。
There is another explanation: not having obtained the forbearance that is the dharma-cognition of suffering — the very first moment of the path of seeing — together with its co-arisen dharmas, is called "ordinary-being-nature." One should not object that, at the time of the subsequent cognition of the path — the final moment of the path of seeing — this dharma is relinquished, so that one would then have to become "not noble" once again, because the non-possession of that dharma has already been permanently destroyed well before that point. If that is so, then, since this nature of no longer being ordinary applies alike across all three vehicles, what exactly has not been obtained that constitutes "ordinary-being-nature" for each? This too would have to be stated as "not having obtained any of them at all." If that is so, this account faces the same objection raised above, and that objection must likewise be resolved in the same way as before. If that is so, then restating it this way only wastes effort to no purpose. The explanation given by the Sautrāntika masters is the better one. What does the Sautrāntika explanation say? It says: "ordinary-being-nature" is simply the name given to the particular phase of a continuum in which the noble dharmas have never yet arisen.
The root Abhidharma text's own definition — "not having obtained the noble dharmas" — sounds simple, but immediately raises a hard question: not obtained which ones, exactly? Reading it as "not one single noble dharma, without exception" avoids an absurd consequence (a Buddha, who does not possess a śrāvaka's or pratyekabuddha's specific attainments, would otherwise wrongly count as "ordinary"), but then invites a fair complaint: if that sweeping reading were intended, why didn't the text simply say "entirely," the way comparable canonical passages do when they mean to be exhaustive?
A second, narrower proposal tries instead to pin "ordinary-being-nature" to one precise moment: the very first instant of insight into the truth of suffering, at the opening of the path of seeing. This handles one objection neatly (the momentary mental event itself is long gone by the path's final moment, yet one does not thereby revert to being "ordinary," because non-possession — once destroyed — never comes back merely because the originating dharma is no longer present). But it then runs straight into the very same problem as the first proposal, since each of the three vehicles has its own distinct entry-moment, forcing the same "not obtained at all" formulation back in through the side door.
Vasubandhu's verdict is unusually candid: having chased this refinement in a circle, restating the Sarvāstivāda position more carefully accomplishes nothing new, so the Sautrāntika's account is simply better. That account dissolves the whole puzzle by refusing to ask what specifically is "not obtained" at all: "ordinary-being-nature" just names a phase of one's ongoing continuum — before any noble dharma has ever yet arisen in it — with no separate entity, and no need to specify precisely what is missing, required at all. It is the same reductive move already seen applied to "seed," now applied to the very definition of what it means to be an unawakened being.
50. When Non-Possession Itself Is Relinquished — And Does It Need Its Own Possession?
The treatise closes the loop on non-possession, then poses one final, sharp question: if possession and non-possession are themselves real dharmas, do they too need to be possessed?
如是非得何時當捨？此法非得，得此法時或轉易地捨此非得。如聖道非得說名異生性，得此聖道時或易地便捨。餘法非得，類此應思。若非得得斷，非得非得生，如是名為捨於非得。得與非得，豈復有餘得與非得？應言此二各復有餘得及非得。若爾，豈不有無窮過？無無窮過，許得展轉更相成故。
When, then, is this non-possession relinquished? When one attains this dharma, or changes to a different level, this non-possession of it is relinquished. Just as the noble path's non-possession is called "ordinary-being-nature," when one attains this noble path, or changes level, it is then relinquished. Non-possession of other dharmas should be understood in the same way. When this non-possession is itself cut off, and a non-possession of that non-possession arises, this is what is called "relinquishing non-possession." But do possession and non-possession themselves, in turn, have any further possession or non-possession of their own? It should be said that both of these two each have, in turn, a further possession and non-possession. If that is so, is this not an infinite regress? There is no infinite regress, since it is accepted that possessions establish one another reciprocally, one after another.
Non-possession is relinquished exactly the way one would expect: either by finally attaining the dharma one previously lacked, or by moving to a different level or realm where the whole question no longer applies. Applied to "ordinary-being-nature" specifically, this is simply what it means to attain the noble path — one's non-possession of it is relinquished, and with it, one's status as an "ordinary being."
But the closing question is the sharper one, and it is the same objection any theory positing possession as a genuinely real, separate dharma must eventually face: if possession is real, presumably one must also "possess" that possession — and then possess the possession of that possession, and so on forever. The treatise flatly denies the regress, promising instead that possessions "establish one another reciprocally." What that actually means is worked out, in full, in the fascicle's final section.
51. Stopping the Regress: Three Dharmas at a Time, and a Closing Image of Boundless Possessions
The fascicle's climactic answer to the possession-of-possession puzzle, followed by a startling arithmetic of proliferation and one final, calming image — this closes both the possession debate and fascicle 4 itself.
以法生時并其自體三法俱起，第一本法、第二法得、第三得得。謂相續中法得起故成就本法及與得得，得得起故成就法得，是故此中無無窮過。如是若善若染污法，一一自體初生起時并其自體三法俱起，第二剎那六法俱起，謂三法得及三得得，第三剎那十八俱起，謂於第一第二剎那所生諸法，有九法得及九得得。如是諸得後後轉增。
When a dharma arises, three dharmas arise together along with its own essence: first, the root dharma itself; second, the possession of that dharma; third, the possession of that possession. That is: within the continuum, because the possession of the dharma arises, it establishes possession of both the root dharma and of the possession-of-possession; and because the possession-of-possession arises, it establishes possession of the possession of the dharma. For this reason, there is no infinite regress here. In the same way, for both wholesome and defiled dharmas, at the very first moment each one's own essence arises, three dharmas arise together with it. At the second moment, six dharmas arise together — that is, three possessions-of-dharma and three possessions-of-possession. At the third moment, eighteen arise together — that is, with respect to the dharmas produced at the first and second moments, there are nine possessions-of-dharma and nine possessions-of-possession. In this way these possessions increase more and more, moment after moment.
一切過去未來煩惱及隨煩惱并生得善剎那剎那相應，俱有無始無終生死輪轉有無邊得，且一有情生死相續剎那剎那起無邊得，如是一切有情相續一一各別，剎那剎那無量無邊諸得俱起。如是諸得極多集會，無對礙故互相容受。若不爾者，一有情得虛空不容，況第二等。
All past and future afflictions and secondary afflictions, together with innately acquired wholesome dharmas, are correlated with possession moment by moment; and since the wheel of birth and death turns with neither beginning nor end, there are boundless, limitless possessions. Even for a single sentient being alone, across the moment-by-moment continuum of birth and death, boundless possessions arise. In just this way, across the continuum of every single sentient being, each one distinct from all the others, moment by moment, immeasurable and boundless possessions all arise together. Such possessions, gathered together in the very greatest numbers, being without any obstructive resistance to one another, mutually accommodate one another without limit. Were it not so, a single sentient being's possessions would not even be accommodated by the whole of empty space — let alone a second being's, and all the rest.
The resolution is genuinely elegant: the regress never truly starts, because a dharma's arising is always accompanied by exactly three simultaneous companions — itself, its possession, and the possession of that possession — with the last two possessing each other reciprocally rather than each needing yet another possession stacked on top. The possession-of-possession does not need a fourth-level possession, because it is already possessed by the ordinary possession sitting right beside it, just as that ordinary possession is possessed by it in turn. Two mutually possessing dharmas close the loop that would otherwise run on forever.
The proliferation arithmetic that follows — three dharmas at the first moment, six at the second, eighteen at the third — is presented without much further comment, and the jump from six to eighteen (rather than a steadier progression) has long struck readers as one of this passage's genuinely odd details; the text does not pause to walk through exactly how each of the second moment's six dharmas comes to require three further companions apiece. Taken as a whole, though, the point does not depend on the precise arithmetic holding up to full scrutiny: given beginningless saṃsāra, and every affliction, secondary affliction, and innate wholesome dharma across every sentient being's continuum each generating its own proliferating chain of possessions moment by moment, the sheer number involved is already frankly unimaginable.
The fascicle's very last line supplies the only fitting response to that vastness: since none of this proliferation causes the slightest obstruction, possessions must be understood as utterly without physical extension, capable of infinite mutual accommodation the way physical objects never could be — otherwise, the text says plainly, even one single being's possessions could not be contained by the whole of space, let alone the possessions of every being there has ever been. It is a striking, almost cosmological close to what began, many sections ago, as a comparatively dry question: is "possession" even a real thing at all?
Fascicle 4 Complete
This closes fascicle 4 of Ru-Yi's translation, and with it, the second installment of Chapter 2 (根品第二之二至三, the Indriya-nirdeśa). The fascicle opened by asking which dharmas must always arise together in fixed clusters — from the minimal atomic grouping of matter, up through the full architecture of mind and its accompanying mental factors, cross-classified across every meditative level and moral quality. It then turned to the formations dissociated from mind, and gave itself over almost entirely to one of Abhidharma philosophy's most consequential debates: is "possession" (得, prāpti) a genuinely real, distinct dharma, or merely a conventional way of describing continuity with nothing separate corresponding to it? The case against possession was pressed hard — first on its lack of any perceivable nature or function, then through a battery of objections to the idea that it causes a dharma's arising — before the treatise's own defense reframed possession's real job as establishing personal distinctions rather than causing anything, and a genuinely striking rival theory proposed explaining the same phenomena instead through a transformed underlying basis and burnt seeds, a formula (continuum, transformation, distinction) that would echo for centuries in later Yogācāra thought. The debate closed on an unusually candid, two-sided verdict — both accounts "well argued" — before the treatise worked through possession's and non-possession's full classification schemes, including the genuinely difficult question of what "ordinary-being-nature" itself really means, and ended on a striking image of boundlessly proliferating, mutually unobstructed possessions filling every sentient being's continuum across beginningless birth and death. Fascicle 5 turns next to class-commonality (同分), the treatise's next formation dissociated from mind. Ru-Yi's translation will continue there.