What Actually Makes One Thing Cause Another?

The formations dissociated from mind have now been fully explained. It was said earlier that, when the mark of arising generates the dharma it generates, this occurs only together with the coming-together of all other causes and conditions — what, then, are these causes and conditions? Causes are, in brief, of six kinds. What are the six? Verse: efficient and co-existent, homogeneous and associated, universal, together with ripening — causes are accepted to be of exactly six kinds. Prose: there are six kinds of cause: first, the efficient cause; second, the co-existent cause; third, the homogeneous cause; fourth, the associated cause; fifth, the universal cause; sixth, the ripening cause. The Abhidharma masters accept that causes are of exactly these six kinds, and no others. What, then, is the characteristic of the first, the efficient cause? Verse: excepting itself, everything else is an efficient cause. Prose: with the sole exception of its own essence, every conditioned dharma serves as the efficient cause for every other dharma, since, at the moment that other dharma arises, this dharma offers no obstruction to its arising and settling. Although the other five kinds of cause are, in a sense, also efficient causes, "efficient cause" has no separate name of its own beyond this — just as the sense field of form, and so on, is both a general and a specific name at once.

But is it not the case that, before one has understood the truth, the contaminants are bound to arise, whereas, once one has understood it, the contaminants no longer arise — meaning that wisdom is genuinely able to obstruct the arising of contaminants, the way sunlight is able to obstruct the visible appearance of the stars? How, then, can it be said that, with the sole exception of its own essence, every dharma whatsoever serves as an efficient cause for every other? It should be understood that, at the moment a given dharma arises, whatever else exists is simply not obstructing its settling into being — and it is with respect to this that all such other dharmas are called its efficient cause. Something that is genuinely capable of obstructing this arising, yet does not do so, may rightly be established as a cause of it. It is like the people of a country who, because their ruler does no harm to them, all say alike: "It is because of our ruler that we enjoy this peace and ease." But if a given dharma has no capacity to obstruct at all, then, since it was never going to obstruct anyway, how could its mere non-obstruction possibly qualify it as a cause? Consider, for instance, nirvana and other things that never themselves arise: with respect to the arising of any and every conditioned dharma throughout existence, and with respect to the arising of the aggregates of beings such as hell-dwellers within the continuum of the formless realm, whether such a capacity to obstruct is even present or not present, they still count as efficient causes despite lacking any actual capacity to obstruct at all — just as, even a genuinely powerless king may still be described in the very same way as above. This general account covers efficient causes as a whole; but, speaking of the more excellent instances specifically, it is not the case that these lack any actual generative power at all — as when the eye and visible form give rise to eye-consciousness, or food gives rise to the body, or a seed gives rise to a sprout.

Someone raises this objection: if all dharmas whatsoever are efficient causes simply because they do not obstruct, then why do not all dharmas arise simultaneously, all at once? When one being kills another, why does not everyone else, in the same way as the killer, likewise commit the very same act of killing? This objection does not actually hold. Dharmas are accepted as efficient causes simply on the basis of not obstructing — not on the basis of possessing any direct, productive causal power over that arising. There is another view, however: that every efficient cause does have some genuine productive power with respect to the arising of its result. Take nirvana, for instance, with respect to the arising of eye-consciousness — in what sense could it be said to have productive power there? Mental consciousness takes it as an object and thereby gives rise to either a wholesome or an unwholesome state; because of this mental consciousness, eye-consciousness subsequently arises in its proper sequence, through a chain of successive causal connections. It is in this sense that nirvana has productive power with respect to the arising of eye-consciousness — and, in the very same way, it should be understood that every other dharma likewise has, from its own particular angle, some form of generative power reaching the result through just such a chain of successive connections. With this, the characteristic of the efficient cause has now been fully explained.

What, next, is the characteristic of the co-existent cause? Verse: co-existent dharmas are mutually results of one another — as with the great elements and what bears their characteristics, and as with mind and what follows mind's course. Prose: if two dharmas are mutually each other's agent-efficacy result, those two dharmas are mutually each other's co-existent cause. What is this characteristic like? Just as the four great elements, considered in relation to one another, are mutually each other's co-existent cause, so too are a dharma's characteristics and the dharma that bears those characteristics, and mind and the dharmas that follow mind's course, likewise mutually causes of one another. Co-existent cause, then, through this relation of mutual resulting, extends across every conditioned dharma, each in its appropriate way. A dharma and its own secondary characteristics, however, are not mutually results of one another — a dharma and its secondary characteristics do indeed stand as a co-existent cause of one another, but this is not by virtue of the secondary characteristic itself being caused by the dharma in return.

Here, a further point should be clarified. What, exactly, are the dharmas that follow mind's course? Verse: mental factors, the two kinds of moral restraint, and the characteristics of these and of mind itself — these are the dharmas that follow mind's course. Prose: every dharma associated with mind, the two kinds of moral restraint belonging to dhyāna and to the uncontaminated, and the characteristics of arising and the rest belonging both to these dharmas and to mind itself — all of these are called dharmas that follow mind's course.

Why, then, are these dharmas called "dharmas that follow mind's course"? Verse: by reason of time, result, and moral quality. Prose: in brief, it is by reason of time, result, and moral quality that these dharmas are called dharmas that follow mind's course. As for "by reason of time": this means that they share, together with mind, one and the same moment of arising, abiding, and ceasing, and fall within one and the same time. As for "by reason of result": this means that they share, together with mind, one and the same karmic-ripening result and one and the same equal-outflow result. It should be understood that, here, the earlier "one" and the later "one" indicate co-occurrence and shared possession respectively, with somewhat different senses intended in each case. As for "by reason of moral quality": this means that they share the very same moral quality as mind — wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral, whichever it may be. By these criteria together, these dharmas are called dharmas that follow mind's course.

Here, mind itself, at the very least, still has fifty-eight dharmas as its co-existent cause: namely, the ten great-ground dharmas, together with their own forty primary characteristics, plus mind's own eight primary and secondary characteristics — these together number fifty-eight dharmas. Among these fifty-eight, excluding mind's own four secondary characteristics, the remaining fifty-four count as mind's co-existent cause. There is another view, that mind's cause-dharmas number only fourteen — namely, the ten great-ground dharmas, together with mind's own primary characteristics. This position is not correct. Why is this? Because it contradicts what the Prakaraṇapāda states. As that treatise says: "There is a case where the truth of suffering has the view of a self as its cause, without itself also serving as a cause for the view of a self" — this refers to every defiled instance of the truth of suffering, excepting a future instance of the view of a self and its associated dharmas, together with their characteristics of arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence. "There is also a case where the truth of suffering both has the view of a self as its cause, and also serves as a cause for the view of a self" — this refers to precisely the excepted dharmas just mentioned. Some other masters do not include the phrase "and its associated dharmas" in their recitation of this passage. The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika masters say: this passage must definitely be recited including that phrase — or, at the very least, one should understand from the sense of the passage that it implies something further beyond what is stated, namely, that whatever is established as a cause by virtue of being a co-existent cause must necessarily itself be co-existent with what it causes.

There are also cases of co-arising dharmas that are not, in fact, causes of one another by virtue of being a co-existent cause: namely, the various secondary characteristics, each with respect to its own primary dharma; these secondary characteristics considered in relation to one another; the secondary characteristics of dharmas that follow mind's course, considered in relation to mind; these secondary characteristics considered in relation to one another; every instance of co-arising resistant derived form considered in relation to one another; some instances of co-arising non-resistant derived form considered in relation to one another; every instance of co-arising derived form considered in relation to the great elements that produce it; and every instance of co-arising possession considered in relation to what it possesses. Although these various dharmas are indeed called "co-arising," they are not causes of one another by virtue of being a co-existent cause, since they do not share one and the same karmic-ripening result and one and the same equal-outflow result. Possession and what it possesses, moreover, are not even fixed as necessarily co-arising in every case, since possession may arise before, after, or together with what it possesses.

All of this may well be granted as far as it goes — but in the ordinary world's well-established cases of causal generation, such as a seed producing a sprout, one never actually observes this kind of simultaneous cause and effect. This point should therefore now be addressed directly: how, exactly, can there be a genuine causal relationship among dharmas that all arise together within one single cluster? Is it not commonly observed, though, that a lamp's flame and the lamp's light, and a sprout and its shadow, exist simultaneously and are likewise cause and effect? This deserves careful examination. Is it that the lamp's flame itself is the cause of the light? Or is it, instead, that, through the coming-together of prior causes and conditions, flame and light simply arise together independently of one another, while some separate object merely obstructs the light, causing a shadow to appear? If the latter, how then could one even say that this shadow has the sprout as its cause at all? This should perhaps not be accepted this way — though the matter turns entirely on a further test, whether the one's existing or not existing tracks the other's.

Those skilled in logical reasoning state the mark of cause and effect thus: if the existing or not existing of this one thing is reliably tracked by the existing or not existing of that other, then this one is definitely its cause, and that other is definitely its effect. Among co-existent dharmas, if the presence of one entails the presence of all, and the absence of one entails the absence of all, this relationship rightly establishes them as cause and effect. Granting, then, that simultaneous cause and effect is coherent in principle, how can it also be said that two such dharmas are causes of one another, mutually? This, too, poses no real conflict, by the very same reasoning just given. If that is so, then, as stated earlier, since derived form is never actually separable from the great elements that produce it, they, too, ought to be causes of one another, mutually — and, in just the same way, derived form and the great elements, and the characteristics that follow mind's course together with mind and its other dharmas, being likewise never separable from one another, ought to be mutual causes as well. Suppose one holds this to be like three sticks propping each other up and thereby remaining standing — it is in just this way that the causal relationship among co-existent dharmas is established. This deserves careful reflection: do these three sticks remain standing purely through the mutual, reciprocal supporting power arising simultaneously among themselves? Or is it, rather, that the combined power of prior causes and conditions is what causes these three sticks to arise together and remain standing in the first place? And, moreover, in such a case there are also further, separate objects — a rope, a hook, the ground, and so on — that bind and hold them fast, and this, too, involves a further homogeneous cause and the like, on top of everything else — and it is by all of this together that the meaning of the co-existent cause is genuinely established. With this, the characteristic of the co-existent cause has now been fully explained.

The characteristic of the co-existent cause has now been fully explained. What, next, is the characteristic of the third, the homogeneous cause? Verse: homogeneous cause is similarity; within one's own category and level, an earlier dharma causes a later one; the [uncontaminated] path, however, reciprocally spans all nine levels; only an equal or superior result is produced this way; the same holds for what arises through effortful practice, and for what is accomplished through hearing, reflection, and the rest. Prose: homogeneous cause means that a similar dharma serves as the homogeneous cause for a similar dharma: that is, wholesome instances of the five aggregates, considered in relation to one another, serve as homogeneous cause for one another; and it should be understood that defiled instances in relation to defiled instances, and neutral instances in relation to neutral instances, of the five aggregates work in just the same way.

Some other masters say: among the undefiled-neutral five aggregates, form is only ever a result of the four mental aggregates, never their cause. Other masters say: the four mental aggregates are results of form, but form is never caused by the four. Yet other masters say: form and the four mental aggregates, considered in relation to one another, are never causes of one another in either direction at all. Moreover, consider this: within a single body, the kalala stage, the very first embryonic stage, is able to serve as the homogeneous cause for all ten of the stages that follow it. Each of the nine subsequent stages beginning with arbuda, in turn, excludes only the stage immediately before it, and serves as cause for all the remaining stages; and, when compared across different bodies, each of the ten corresponding stages likewise serves as cause for all ten corresponding stages in the other body. Following this same general pattern, one should apply extensive reflection to how external things such as wheat and rice grains likewise give rise to further instances of their own kind. If one does not accept that form serves as a homogeneous cause for form, this position directly contradicts what the root treatise itself states — for the root treatise states: "Past great elements, and future great elements, are causes in the sense of dominant condition," and so on.

Can it be said, then, that any similar dharma whatsoever may serve as homogeneous cause for any similar dharma whatsoever? No. Why not? Because a dharma serves as cause only for a similar dharma within its own category and its own level — this is why the verse specifies "own category, own level." "Category" refers to the five categories: that is, what is cut off by seeing suffering, by seeing its origin, by seeing its cessation, by seeing the path, and by cultivation. "Level" refers to the nine levels: that is, the desire realm counted as one, the four dhyānas of the form realm, and the four formless attainments, making eight more. Among these, a dharma cut off by seeing suffering serves as homogeneous cause only for another dharma cut off by seeing suffering, and for nothing else; and, in just the same way, up through a dharma cut off by cultivation, which serves as homogeneous cause only for another dharma cut off by cultivation, and for nothing else. Within each of these, moreover, a desire-realm dharma serves as homogeneous cause only for another desire-realm dharma; a first-dhyāna dharma serves as homogeneous cause only for another first-dhyāna dharma; and so on, up through a dharma of the Peak of Existence, which serves as homogeneous cause only for another dharma of the Peak of Existence — dharmas belonging to different levels, considered in relation to one another, never have any causal relationship of this kind at all.

Moreover, this is still not the whole picture. Why not? Because only an earlier-arisen dharma serves as the homogeneous cause for a later, similar dharma not yet arisen — never the reverse, and never a dharma of the very same moment. How is this known to be so? Because the root treatise states it. As the Jñānaprasthāna states: "What is the homogeneous cause? It means that an earlier-arisen wholesome root serves as the homogeneous cause for a later-arisen wholesome root belonging to its own realm, together with the dharmas associated with it." In just the same way, this should be stated at length for a past dharma in relation to the remaining two times, and for a past or present dharma in relation to a future one, and so on.

That same treatise, however, then poses this question: "If a dharma serves as cause for another dharma, is there ever a time when this dharma is not a cause of that other dharma?" It answers: "There is no time when it is not a cause." This statement should be understood as tacitly referring to the three causes — co-existent, associated, and ripening — and so involves no actual difficulty at all. There is a view that holds instead: a future dharma, at the very moment it is on the verge of arising, is already definitely able to serve as a homogeneous cause for that other dharma — and it is on this basis, referring tacitly to this final, verge-of-arising stage specifically, that the treatise's answer, "there is no time when it is not a cause," should be understood. But this is not a satisfactory way of resolving the difficulty. Why not? Because a future dharma, prior to the very moment it is on the verge of arising, is simply not yet a homogeneous cause at all — it only becomes one afterward, at that very moment.

Moreover, if that rejected reading were correct, consider this: that same treatise also poses a further question: "If a dharma serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for another dharma, is there ever a time when this dharma is not that condition for it?" It answers: "At the time when this dharma has not yet arrived at having already arisen." If the rejected reading's own logic held consistently, the treatise should likewise have answered here, "there is no time when it is not a condition" — so why, instead, does it answer, "at the time when this dharma has not yet arrived at having already arisen"? One might try to explain this away by saying that the two passages are simply presenting two different approaches — as stated in one passage, the other should be understood the same way, and as stated in the other, the first should be understood the same way. But what merit could composing a text this inconsistently possibly have? It would only show that the treatise's author was simply not skilled with words. For this reason, it should be understood that the earlier explanation is the correct one.

If that is so, then why does the Prakaraṇapāda state: "There is a case where the truth of suffering has the view of a self as its cause, without itself also serving as a cause for the view of a self" — referring to every defiled instance of the truth of suffering, except a future instance of the view of a self and its associated truth of suffering; "and there is a case where the truth of suffering both has the view of a self as its cause, and also serves as a cause for the view of a self" — referring to precisely those excepted dharmas? That passage should, strictly speaking, have said "except a future instance of the truth of suffering associated with the view of a self." Even granting that it is stated as it is, one should understand, by the sense of the passage, that this is not actually inconsistent with the position just established. How, moreover, should this be reconciled with the Prajñaptiśāstra? That treatise states that all dharmas are determined by four factors: namely, cause, effect, basis, and object. It should be understood that, in that passage, "cause" refers to the efficient, co-existent, associated, and ripening causes; "effect" refers to the dominant-condition result, the agent-efficacy result, and the ripening result; "basis" refers to the six faculties, the eye and the rest; and "object" refers to the six objective fields, form and the rest.

If that is so, then homogeneous cause would have to be something that was formerly absent and only later comes to exist. This is accepted, and involves no real difficulty. This is a matter of standing, not of substance: it is by virtue of the coming-together and functioning of a dharma at its proper stage that it stands as a cause and a result — not by virtue of its own bare substance alone. If homogeneous cause were present already in the future, the way the ripening cause is, what fault would follow from that? If it were genuinely present in the future, the root treatise ought to have stated so. But the root treatise only ever speaks of homogeneous causes with respect to what has already actually received its result — hence there is no actual failure here. There is no such possibility as this: that a homogeneous cause could bring about an equal-outflow result while that result still remains merely future — this could never hold, since there would then be no genuine before-and-after relationship between them at all. It should not be said that an already-arisen dharma serves as the equal-outflow result of something not yet arisen — just as a past dharma is never the result of a present one. In order to avoid the fault of having a result precede its own cause, homogeneous cause is therefore said not to exist in the future.

If that is so, then the ripening cause, too, should not exist in the future, since its ripening result should likewise never precede its own cause, or be simultaneous with it. Future dharmas, however, have no genuine before-and-after relationship among themselves — and so this same fault does not arise for the ripening cause, because the two cases are not actually similar. That is: homogeneous cause and its result genuinely resemble one another in kind — and, if there were no before-and-after relationship between them, they would then have to be mutual causes of one another, and, being mutual causes, would then also have to be mutual results of one another, which directly contradicts reason. The ripening cause and its result, by contrast, do not resemble one another in kind at all — so, even setting aside any before-and-after relationship between them, this same fault does not arise. For this reason, homogeneous cause is established, by standing, as not existing in the future, while ripening cause is established, by its very essence, as not being absent even in the future.

As for the statement that homogeneous cause is confined to one's own level alone — with respect to what, exactly, is this said to hold definitely? It holds definitely only with respect to contaminated dharmas. If, instead, one considers the uncontaminated path in relation to itself, then each and every instance of it, across all nine levels, serves as cause for every other — that is: the stage of not-yet-attained concentration, the intermediate dhyāna, the four fundamental dhyānas, and the three fundamental formless attainments — the truth of the path, across these nine levels, are all mutual causes of one another. Why is this? Because, with respect to every level, the uncontaminated path dwells within it only as a guest, never falling under that level's own possession, and is never clung to and appropriated by any level as truly belonging to it. For this reason, the path, across these nine levels, though the levels themselves differ, still serve as causes for one another, precisely because they remain genuinely homogeneous in kind. Even so, the path can only serve as cause for a result that is its equal or its superior, never for an inferior result, since this cross-level causation applies specifically to what arises through effortful practice.

Consider, for instance: an already-arisen instance of the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of suffering serves as homogeneous cause for a future instance of that same forbearance — this is what is called "equal." And this same forbearance is also able to serve as homogeneous cause for everything that follows it later, from the dharma-cognition of suffering all the way up through the knowledge of non-arising — this is what is called "superior." This pattern should be understood at length in just the same way throughout, up to the point where an already-arisen instance of the knowledge of non-arising can only serve as homogeneous cause for something equal to it in kind, since there is nothing more superior left for it to cause.

Moreover, an already-arisen instance of the path of seeing, of the path of cultivation, and of the path of no-more-learning serve, in this same order, as homogeneous cause for three, two, and one further kind of path, respectively. Moreover, within this scheme, a path belonging to one of dull faculties serves as homogeneous cause for both a dull-faculty and a sharp-faculty path alike; whereas a path belonging to sharp faculties serves as cause only for a further sharp-faculty path. Thus, the path belonging to a faith-follower, to one of faith-resolved conviction, and to one timely liberated serve, in this same order, as homogeneous cause for six, four, and two further kinds of path, respectively. The path belonging to a dharma-follower, to one who has arrived at right view, and to one non-timely liberated serve, in this same order, as homogeneous cause for three, two, and one further kinds of path, respectively. A path belonging to a higher level never serves as cause for a path belonging to a lower level.

In what sense, exactly, is something called "equal" or "superior" here? It is by reason of the increasing strength of the cause, and by reason of the practitioner's faculties. That is: beginning from the lowest grade of the path of seeing and so on, the causal power grows increasingly stronger at each successive stage. And although it is not possible for both the faith-follower's path and the dharma-follower's path to actually manifest together within a single continuum, an already-arisen instance of either still serves as cause for a corresponding future instance.

Is it only the noble path that serves as homogeneous cause exclusively for something equal or superior to itself? No. What else is there? Other, ordinary worldly dharmas produced through effortful practice likewise serve as cause only for something equal or superior, never for something inferior. What, exactly, is the essential nature of a dharma produced through effortful practice? It refers to what is accomplished through hearing, and what is accomplished through reflection — "and so on" here also takes in what is accomplished through cultivation. The merit produced through hearing, reflection, and cultivation is called what is "accomplished" by each of these respectively; and, because these are produced through effortful practice, they too serve as cause only for something equal or superior, never for something inferior. For instance, within the desire realm, a dharma accomplished through hearing is able to serve as homogeneous cause for a dharma of its own realm accomplished through hearing or through reflection, but never for one accomplished through cultivation, since the desire realm has no dharmas accomplished through cultivation at all. A dharma accomplished through reflection serves as homogeneous cause for a dharma accomplished through reflection, but never for one accomplished through hearing, since hearing-accomplished dharmas are inferior to it. If it is a form-realm dharma accomplished through hearing, it is able to serve as homogeneous cause for a dharma of its own realm accomplished through hearing or through cultivation, but never for one accomplished through reflection, since the form realm has no dharmas accomplished through reflection at all. A dharma accomplished through cultivation serves as homogeneous cause only for a dharma of its own realm accomplished through cultivation, never for one accomplished through hearing, since hearing-accomplished dharmas are inferior to it. A formless-realm dharma accomplished through cultivation serves as homogeneous cause only for a dharma of its own realm accomplished through cultivation, never for one accomplished through hearing or through reflection, since the formless realm has neither of these, and, in any case, they would be inferior to it.

These dharmas, moreover, are further divided into nine grades: the very lowest grade serves as cause for all nine grades; the second-lowest grade serves as cause for the remaining eight; and so on, up through the very highest grade, which serves as cause only for itself, since it excludes every grade beneath it as inferior. Innately-acquired wholesome dharmas, considered across their own nine grades, serve as causes for one another in just this same pattern, and defiled dharmas work in just the same way. Undefiled-neutral dharmas are of four kinds altogether: karmic-ripening dharmas, dharmas belonging to ordinary bodily deportment, dharmas belonging to skilled crafts, and dharmas belonging to the transformation-mind, each considered by its own grade — these serve, in this same order, as cause for four, three, two, and one of these kinds, respectively. Moreover, a desire-realm transformation-mind can produce results belonging to any of the four dhyānas, yet a result belonging to a higher dhyāna is never the cause of a result belonging to a lower dhyāna, since a dharma produced through effortful practice is never the cause of an inferior result — just as one who labors with great effort to plant rice or wheat should never, by that very same effort, end up with an inferior yield instead. Let not one's toil be spent for nothing at all.

Given this principle, the following question arises: is there any case of an already-arisen uncontaminated dharma that is not the cause of some not-yet-arisen uncontaminated dharma? There is: an already-arisen instance belonging to the class of the dharma-cognition of suffering, with respect to a not-yet-arisen instance belonging to the class of the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of suffering — since this would mean something superior causing something inferior, and every superior dharma fails to cause every inferior one. Is there any case, within a single continuum, of an uncontaminated dharma definitely already attained that does not serve as cause for a later-arisen one? There is: a future instance belonging to the class of the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of suffering, with respect to a later, already-arisen instance belonging to the class of the dharma-cognition of suffering — since a result can never precede its own cause, and, moreover, since homogeneous cause does not exist in the future at all. Is there any case of an earlier-arisen uncontaminated dharma that is not the cause of a later, already-arisen uncontaminated dharma? There is: an earlier-arisen, superior uncontaminated dharma, with respect to a later-arisen, inferior uncontaminated dharma — as when one falls back from a higher fruit and a lower fruit currently manifests instead. Moreover, an earlier-already-attained possession of the dharma-cognition of suffering, with respect to a later-already-attained possession of the forbearance of the dharma-cognition of suffering, is not a homogeneous cause, since the latter is inferior to it. With this, the characteristic of the homogeneous cause has now been fully explained.

What, next, is the characteristic of the fourth cause, the associated cause? Verse: the associated cause is definitely this — mind and mental factors sharing the same basis. Prose: only mind and mental factors count as the associated cause. If that is so, then even mind and mental factors that differ in their object and their mode of apprehension ought still to be able to serve as mutual associated causes for one another. No — only mind and mental factors that share the same object and the same mode of apprehension can rightly be called "associated." If that is so, then mind and mental factors occurring at different times, yet sharing the same object and mode of apprehension, ought to be said to serve as associated cause for one another. No — it is specifically required that the object, the mode of apprehension, and the time all be the same before they can be called "associated." If that is so, then mind and mental factors belonging to different bodies, sharing the same object, mode of apprehension, and time, ought to be said to be "associated" as well — as when a crowd of people all together observe the new moon at the very same moment. In order to block this whole cluster of objections at once with a single further word, the treatise adds "sharing the same basis" — meaning that only mind and mental factors that share one and the same basis can rightly serve as mutual associated causes for one another. Here, the word "same" indicates that the basis itself is one and the same: that is, if eye-consciousness, at a given moment, relies upon a given instance of the eye faculty as its basis, then the feeling and other mental factors associated with it likewise rely upon that very same instance of the eye faculty as their basis — and it should be understood that the same holds, up through mental consciousness and its associated dharmas, which likewise share one and the same instance of the mental faculty as their basis.

The essential substance of the associated cause is simply the co-existent cause. If that is so, what difference is there in meaning between these two causes? Co-existent cause is established with respect to the meaning of being mutually a result of one another — like merchant-companions relying on each other as they travel together through a dangerous road. Associated cause is established with respect to the meaning of being equally, jointly associated in five respects — precisely like merchant-companions who together receive and together perform the same tasks, such as preparing and eating food together, where the absence of even a single one of them would mean the whole joint activity fails to come together properly — and it is for this reason that the meaning of being mutual causes of one another is most fully and completely established here. With this, the characteristic of the associated cause has now been fully explained.

What, next, is the characteristic of the fifth cause, the universal cause? Verse: universal cause means the earlier-arisen universal dharmas, serving as cause for defiled dharmas of their own level. Prose: universal cause means that earlier-arisen universal dharmas serve as universal cause for later, defiled dharmas belonging to the same level. The full account of what "universal" means with respect to these dharmas will be given at length in the chapter on the latent afflictions. Because these particular dharmas serve as a cause that runs through defiled dharmas quite generally, a separate category is established for them here, beyond homogeneous cause. They also serve as cause for defiled dharmas belonging to other categories, since, through their power, the afflictions belonging to those other categories, together with their attendant dharmas, are likewise able to grow and increase.

But do the defiled dharmas that arise within a noble one's own continuum likewise make use of this as a universal cause? The Kashmiri Vaibhāṣika masters say: for every defiled dharma whatsoever, what is cut off by seeing serves as its cause. Hence the Prakaraṇapāda states as follows: "What are the dharmas that have as their cause what is cut off by seeing? They are all defiled dharmas, together with the karmic-ripening results brought about by what is cut off by seeing." "What are the dharmas that have the neutral as their cause? They are all neutral conditioned dharmas, together with unwholesome dharmas." "There is a case where the truth of suffering has the view of a self as its cause, without itself also serving as a cause for the view of a self" — and so on, at length, up through "excepting a future instance of the view of a self and its associated dharmas, together with their characteristics of arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, this holds for every other defiled instance of the truth of suffering." If that is so, how is this to be reconciled with what the Prajñaptiśāstra states? As that treatise states: "Is there any dharma that is unwholesome and has only the unwholesome as its cause?" "There is: the case of a noble one who, having become free of desire, falls back, and for the very first time gives rise to a defiled volition." This is stated tacitly with reference to a cause not yet cut off. Although what is cut off by seeing does indeed serve as this dharma's cause too, the passage simply omits mentioning it, since it has already been cut off. With this, the characteristic of the universal cause has now been fully explained.

The characteristic of the universal cause has now been fully explained. What, next, is the characteristic of the sixth cause, the ripening cause? Verse: the ripening cause is the unwholesome, and the wholesome specifically when contaminated. Prose: only unwholesome dharmas, and wholesome dharmas that are contaminated, count as the ripening cause, since only these are dharmas that actually ripen. Why is it that neutral dharmas do not bring about a ripened result? Because their power is too weak, like a rotten, spoiled seed. Why is it that uncontaminated dharmas do not bring about a ripened result? Because they lack the moistening of craving, like a genuinely sound seed that lacks the moistening of water. Moreover, being unbound to any realm, how could they possibly bring about a result that is bound to a realm at all? The remaining dharmas possess both sufficient power and the moistening of craving, and are therefore able to bring about a ripened result — like a genuinely sound seed that has been moistened by water.

How, exactly, should the meaning of "ripening cause" be understood? Does it mean "the cause of ripening"? Or does it mean "that which, itself a ripening, serves as a cause"? The meaning may be taken either way at once — what fault would there be in that? If it meant only "the cause of ripening," then scripture should not speak of "an eye born from ripening." If it meant only "that which, itself a ripening, serves as a cause," then scripture should not speak of "karma's ripening." Both readings can be reconciled together, as already discussed earlier.

What, then, is the actual meaning of "ripening"? The Vaibhāṣika masters first explain it this way: "ripening" means maturing into something of a different kind — that is, the ripening cause specifically ripens into a result of a different kind, whereas the co-existent cause and the like ripen only into a result of the same kind, and the efficient cause alone spans both the same-kind and different-kind cases; hence this name, "ripening cause," is given specifically and only to this one, sixth cause. A genuinely ripened result should not be attributed to any of the other causes, since a true ripened result must satisfy two conditions before it earns that name: first, that its own essence comes into being specifically through a distinct transformation occurring across a continuum; second, that it arises only at a definite, bounded time, tracking the relative strength of the cause that produces it. Results produced by the co-existent and associated causes do not satisfy the first condition, since they need not arise through any distinct transformation across a continuum at all — they are given together with their cause the very moment that cause takes hold. Nor do results produced by the efficient, homogeneous, and universal causes satisfy the second condition, since wholesome, unwholesome, and similar results, extending to the very furthest limits of saṃsāra, arise again and again, at no definite, bounded time at all. For this reason, one should instead explain it this way: "ripening" means maturing through a genuine transformation — and it is not correct to distinguish it from the other causes merely by appeal to "a different kind" alone.

Within the desire realm, there are cases where a single aggregate serves as ripening cause, jointly bringing about a single result — namely, a morally determinate possession, together with its characteristics of arising and the rest. There are cases where two aggregates serve as ripening cause, jointly bringing about a single result — namely, wholesome or unwholesome bodily and vocal action, together with their characteristics of arising and the rest. There are cases where four aggregates serve as ripening cause, jointly bringing about a single result — namely, wholesome or unwholesome mind and its mental factors, together with their characteristics of arising and the rest. Within the form realm, there are cases where a single aggregate serves as ripening cause, jointly bringing about a single result — namely, a morally determinate possession, or the attainment of non-percipience, together with their characteristics of arising and the rest. There are cases where two aggregates serve as ripening cause, jointly bringing about a single result — namely, a wholesome manifest act belonging to the first dhyāna, together with its characteristics of arising and the rest. There are cases where four aggregates serve as ripening cause, jointly bringing about a single result — namely, wholesome mind and mental factors not within meditative equipoise, together with their characteristics of arising and the rest. There are cases where five aggregates serve as ripening cause, jointly bringing about a single result — namely, mind and mental factors within meditative equipoise, together with the form that follows their course, and their characteristics of arising and the rest. Within the formless realm, there are cases where a single aggregate serves as ripening cause, jointly bringing about a single result — namely, a morally determinate possession, or the attainment of cessation, together with their characteristics of arising and the rest. There are cases where four aggregates serve as ripening cause, jointly bringing about a single result — namely, every kind of wholesome mind and mental factor, together with their characteristics of arising and the rest. There is karma that brings about ripening in only a single sense field — namely, karma that brings about the dharma sense field specifically, such as the life faculty and the like. If karma brings about the mental sense field, it definitely also brings about two sense fields together — the mental and the dharma sense fields. The same holds for karma that brings about the tactile sense field. If karma brings about the body sense field, it definitely also brings about three sense fields together — the body, the tactile, and the dharma sense fields. The same holds for karma that brings about the sense fields of form, fragrance, or flavor. If karma brings about the eye sense field, it definitely also brings about four sense fields together — the eye sense field, together with the body, tactile, and dharma sense fields. The same holds for karma that brings about the ear, nose, or tongue sense fields. There is karma capable of bringing about five, six, seven, eight, nine, ten, or eleven sense fields together, since karma may produce either a smaller or a larger result — just as, among external seeds, the resulting fruit may likewise be smaller or larger: a seed with a smaller resulting fruit is like a grain of rice or wheat, while a seed with a larger resulting fruit is like a lotus, a pomegranate, or a banyan fig.

There is karma belonging to a single time that produces ripening spread across all three times, but there is no karma belonging to all three times that produces ripening within only a single time — lest the effort expended come to exceed the resulting fruit, diminishing the cause's own scope. There is karma occupying a single moment of thought that produces a ripening spanning many moments, but there is no karma spanning many moments that produces a ripening within only a single moment — the reasoning here should be understood in the same way as just given. A ripened result, however, is never simultaneous with the karma that produces it, since one does not experience the result at the very same moment one performs the karmic act. Nor does it arise in the immediately following moment, since it is drawn forth only through the power of the immediately-antecedent condition operating across the intervening moments in sequence. Moreover, since the ripening cause brings about a result of a different kind from itself, this can only be accomplished by means of an extended continuum. In which of the three times, then, does each of these six causes definitely reside? The time in which each cause resides is indeed fixed — though this point, while already implicit in what has been said, has not yet been gathered into verse, and so should now be restated. Verse: universal cause and homogeneous cause reside in two times; the remaining three causes reside in all three times. Prose: universal cause and homogeneous cause reside only in the past and the present; they do not exist in the future, for the reasoning already given above. The associated cause, the co-existent cause, and the ripening cause — these three causes — are all present throughout all three times without exception. Since the verse does not separately state where the efficient cause resides, it should be understood, by inference, that it applies across all three times, and also to what stands outside all three times altogether. With this, the characteristics of the six causes, and the specific times to which each belongs, have now been fully explained.

What, then, counts as a result, correlative to which each cause is established as such? Verse: results belong to the conditioned, and to freedom-from-bondage; the unconditioned itself has neither cause nor result. Prose: as the root treatise states, "What dharmas are results? All conditioned dharmas, together with cessation-through-discernment." If that is so, then, since the unconditioned is accepted as a result, it ought to have a cause, since it is only correlative to that cause that it can be called a result at all. And, moreover, since this unconditioned dharma is accepted as a cause, it too ought to have a result, since it is only correlative to that result that it can be called a cause at all. Only conditioned dharmas genuinely have both a cause and a result; the unconditioned does not. Why is this? Because it lacks all six causes, and lacks all five kinds of result. Why, then, is it not accepted that the uninterrupted path serves as an efficient cause for the result of freedom-from-bondage? Efficient cause is established simply with respect to not obstructing something's arising — but the unconditioned never arises at all, so what could the path possibly be doing with respect to it? If that is so, then whose result is it? What, exactly, does "result" mean here? It means that it is the path's result, since it is attained through the path's power. If that is so, then the path's result should be only the possession of it, since the path has genuine power with respect to possession, but not with respect to cessation-through-discernment itself. Not so — the path's power, with respect to possession and with respect to cessation-through-discernment, differs in kind. In what sense does the path have power with respect to possession? In the sense that it produces it. In what sense does the path have power with respect to cessation? In the sense that it realizes it. For this reason, although the path is not the cause of cessation, cessation-through-discernment can still rightly be said to be the path's result. But, given that the unconditioned has no dominant-condition result at all, how can it possibly be said to serve as an efficient cause? Because the unconditioned, simply by not obstructing another dharma's arising, is thereby established as an efficient cause. Yet it has no result of its own in return, since, being apart from all conditioned dharmas, it lacks the very capacity to either receive a result or bestow one.

The Sautrāntika masters say: the unconditioned is not a cause at all, since no sutra states that a cause can be unconditioned, while there is a sutra that states a cause must always be conditioned. Where does a sutra say this? As a sutra states: "All causes and conditions capable of producing form are themselves impermanent" — extending this at length, up through consciousness as well. If that is so, then the unconditioned, too, should be unable to serve even as an objective condition for a cognizing consciousness. The sutra speaks only of what is capable of producing — that is why the unconditioned can still serve as an objective condition. That is: the sutra states only that causes and conditions capable of producing consciousness are all impermanent; it does not state that everything that serves consciousness as a condition in any sense whatsoever is impermanent. Hence no real difficulty arises here. But does not this same argument also merely show that a productive cause specifically is impermanent — meaning it does not actually rule out the unconditioned still counting as an efficient cause in the merely non-obstructing sense? There are sutra passages that state the unconditioned serves as an objective condition; there are no sutra passages that state the unconditioned serves as an efficient cause. It should not be concluded that the unconditioned can only ever be an efficient cause in the sense of not obstructing, merely because no sutra states this — the absence of a scriptural statement is not itself a scriptural prohibition. Moreover, countless sutras have by now been lost entirely — how can one definitively conclude, simply from this silence, that no sutra ever said so?

If that is so, then what dharma is called "freedom-from-bondage"? It is precisely what the root treatise calls cessation-through-discernment. But is this not circular? Earlier, the question was asked, "What is cessation-through-discernment?" — and the answer given was, "It is freedom-from-bondage." Now the question is asked, "What dharma is called freedom-from-bondage?" — and the answer given is, "It is cessation-through-discernment." These two answers simply depend on one another reciprocally, and in the end fail to reveal this dharma's actual essential nature at all — so its essential nature should be disclosed through some other approach instead. This dharma's essential nature is, in truth, genuinely real, yet beyond the reach of words; it is something only each noble one individually directly realizes within. One can only, as a skillful expedient, describe it in the most general terms — saying that it is wholesome, and that it is permanent — while affirming that there is indeed a separate, real entity, called cessation-through-discernment, also called freedom-from-bondage.

The Sautrāntika masters say: none of the unconditioned dharmas are genuinely, substantially real at all — unlike form, feeling, and so on, which do have a separate real substance, these have nothing of the kind. If that is so, then why is something called "space," and so on? It is simply that, wherever there is nothing tangible to be encountered, this is called "space" — that is, when in darkness one encounters nothing to touch or bump against, one simply says, "this is space." As for "cessation-through-discernment": at the stage where the seed capable of generating an already-arisen latent affliction is eliminated, such that, through the power of discerning wisdom, it no longer arises again, this is called "cessation-through-discernment." Apart from the power of discerning wisdom, when something simply fails to arise again due to the absence of the necessary conditions, this is called "cessation-not-through-discernment" — as with the remaining, never-realized aggregates belonging to a shared class-commonality, in the case of a being who dies prematurely.

Other schools say: it is through the power of wisdom that a latent affliction fails to arise again — this is what is called cessation-through-discernment. When a latent affliction fails to arise because its supporting conditions are simply absent, and not through the power of wisdom, this is called cessation-not-through-discernment; apart from the power of discerning wisdom, this kind of cessation could not otherwise be established, and so this particular non-arising is subsumed under cessation-through-discernment instead. There is a further view: all dharmas, once they have arisen, subsequently cease to exist, ceasing entirely of their own accord — and this alone should be called cessation-not-through-discernment. But, on this view, the very substance of cessation-not-through-discernment ought to be impermanent, since it did not exist prior to the cessation and only exists once the cessation has occurred. But is it not the case that cessation-through-discernment, too, is preceded by an act of discerning wisdom, and so likewise did not exist before and comes to exist only afterward — should it not, then, equally have to be impermanent? Cessation-through-discernment is not preceded by anything in that same sense — it is only in the special sense that "discernment" precedes it that cessation-through-discernment comes to be. How, then, could cessation-through-discernment somehow also be impermanent, on the same reasoning? Because it is not the case that there was first an act of discerning wisdom, and then, afterward, some not-yet-arisen dharma comes to have the property of "not-arising" newly added onto it. What, then, is this "non-arising"? It has always, from the very beginning, existed in its own right. If there were no discerning wisdom, these afflicted dharmas would indeed arise; but at the very moment discernment arises, these dharmas become permanently unable to ever arise again. With respect to this non-arising, discernment does have a genuine function — namely, that whereas previously there was no obstruction to their arising, now there is an obstruction to their arising. Discernment does not manufacture the non-arising itself; it merely brings the obstruction into place.

If nirvana were nothing more than mere non-arising, how could the following sutra passage be properly reconciled with this? A sutra states: "The five faculties, whether cultivated, whether practiced, whether extensively cultivated and practiced, are able to bring about the permanent cutting-off of past, future, and present suffering, all together." If the very substance of this "permanent cutting-off" is simply nirvana, and the meaning of "non-arising" applies only to the future, and not to the past or present, is this not a direct contradiction? Although this textual passage exists, it does not actually conflict with the intended meaning. What this sutra intends to say is that, because the afflictions that take past and present suffering as their object are cut off, this is called "suffering, all together, being cut off." As the World-Honored One states: "You should cut off craving and desire with respect to form; at the moment craving and desire are cut off, this is then called 'form is cut off' and 'the complete understanding of form'" — and so on, at length, up through consciousness as well, stated the same way. The meaning of "past and present suffering being cut off" should be understood in just the same fashion. Suppose there is a further sutra passage that speaks of "cutting off past, future, and present afflictions" — this, too, should be reconciled by the very same reasoning just given, with no actual conflict in meaning. Or, alternatively, this sutra passage may carry a somewhat different intention of its own: "past afflictions" may refer to afflictions that arose in a past life, and "present afflictions" to afflictions arising in the present life — just as, among the eighteen modes of craving-behavior, those said to have arisen "in the past" refer to a past life, and it should be understood that "future" and "present" work the same way. Afflictions arising within these two times, in order to generate future afflictions, draw forth and give rise to a seed continuing within the present continuum — and it is because this seed is cut off that those future afflictions are also called "cut off." Just as, when karmic ripening is exhausted, this is also called "karma being exhausted," so too, future suffering and afflictions, lacking any seed at all, definitively never arise — and this is what is called being "cut off." Were it otherwise, why would the past and present even need to be "cut off" at all? One does not need to exert effort to bring about the cessation of something that has already ceased, or that is in the very process of ceasing right now.

If the unconditioned dharmas have no substance whatsoever, why does a sutra state: "Among all dharmas, whether conditioned or unconditioned, cessation-from-attachment is foremost among them all"? How could something that does not exist at all be established as "foremost" among things that likewise do not exist? I, too, am not saying that the unconditioned dharmas have absolutely no substance whatsoever — they exist, but only in the particular sense I have already described. It is like saying of a given sound: "it existed before, and later does not exist" — one cannot, from this, conclude that "non-existence" should simply be spoken of as "existence," since the sense of "existing" can still be meaningfully established in a suitably qualified way. The same should be understood to hold when it is said that the unconditioned "exists." Even though it does not exist in the fullest sense, it can still rightly be praised — hence, the fact that every kind of calamity and disaster is definitively absent is called "cessation-from-attachment." Among all cases of existence and non-existence, this is the most excellent and superior of all, and, in order to inspire deep joy in those being taught, it is rightly praised as "foremost."

If the unconditioned dharmas are simply non-existent, then, being nothing at all, should this not mean that "cessation" cannot rightly be called a "noble truth"? What, then, is the actual meaning of "noble truth"? Is this term not meant to convey the sense of being free from distortion? A noble one's insight, whether directed at what exists or at what does not exist, is equally free from distortion in either case — that is, with respect to suffering, a noble one sees it simply as suffering, which exists; and with respect to the non-existence of suffering, a noble one sees it simply as non-existence — in what way does this conflict with the meaning of "noble truth"? But how, still, could something that is simply non-existent possibly be established as the third noble truth?

It is precisely because the second truth is directly realized in immediate succession by noble insight, and spoken of accordingly, that it comes to be established as the third. If the unconditioned dharmas have, as their very essence, nothing but sheer non-existence, then a consciousness directed toward emptiness or toward nirvana ought to be taking a non-existent object as its object. Even granting that such a consciousness does take a non-existent object, this involves no actual fault; the full treatment of this point belongs properly to the later discussion of past and future dharmas, and should be considered there. If one were to accept that the unconditioned does have a further, separate real substance, what fault would follow from this? And, conversely, what merit would there be? Accepting this would indeed have the "merit" of protecting and upholding the Vaibhāṣika school's own tenets — if there is something worth protecting in the first place, the guardian spirits will surely already know to protect it on their own. But accepting it as genuinely real also has this fault: it amounts to affirming an empty, mistaken conception as though it were true. Why is this? Because this supposed entity has no perceivable substance the way form, feeling, and so on do, nor any perceivable function the way the eye, the ear, and so on do.

Moreover, if this were indeed a separate, real entity, how could the possessive, sixth grammatical case be applied to it, as in "the cessation of that thing"? Because cessation and the thing it is the cessation of are not mutually correlated that way — the two do not actually stand to one another as cause and result. It is only in the sense of the negation of that thing that the sixth grammatical case can rightly apply, since it is precisely the non-existence of that thing which is called its "cessation." But even granting that cessation is a separate real entity, it is only by virtue of that particular thing being cut off that this cessation comes to be attained — so it can rightly be said that this cessation "belongs to" that thing. By what reasoning, then, is this cessation necessarily bound up with this attainment? As a sutra states: "A monk attains nirvana visible in this very life." How could something non-existent possibly be spoken of as something "attained"? Because, through attaining the antidote, one thereby gains permanent freedom from the afflictions, while a support for future existence still remains — this is what is called "attaining nirvana." There is, moreover, further canonical testimony that clearly reveals nirvana's essential nature to be nothing but non-existence. As a sutra states: "All manner of suffering, without remainder, is cut off; individually relinquished, exhausted, freed from attachment, extinguished, calmed, and permanently gone. No further suffering continues, is grasped at, or arises. This is the utmost stillness; this is the utmost excellence" — meaning: the relinquishing of every support, together with the complete exhaustion of all craving, freedom from attachment, and extinction — this is what is called nirvana.

Why should one not accept that the phrase "because of this, non-arising" simply means "non-arising occurs on the basis of this"? We observe that this locative grammatical case has, in fact, no genuine explanatory power at all with respect to establishing cessation as something real. What, then, is actually meant by "on the basis of this, non-arising"? If this phrase is meant to describe something that already exists, then suffering's non-arising ought to have already existed from the very start, since nirvana is eternal. If, instead, this phrase is meant to describe something already attained, then it should be accepted that it describes something attained on the basis of the path — meaning that it is only on the basis of the path, or on the basis of the path's own attainment, that suffering is made not to arise. You should accept this reading. By this reasoning, the sutra's own illustrative saying can be properly explained: "Just as a lamp's flame is extinguished, so too are nirvana and the mind's liberation alike." What this sutra intends to say is: just as, when a lamp goes out, it is simply the lamp's flame itself that has ceased, with no further separate thing involved at all — in just the same way, when the World-Honored One's mind attains liberation, it is simply that the aggregates have ceased, with nothing further, nothing else, remaining at all. The Abhidharma texts themselves also state as much: "What are the dharmas without basis?" "They are the unconditioned dharmas." The phrase "without basis" means having no essential substance at all. The Vaibhāṣika masters do not accept this reading. If not, then what, on their reading, does "basis" actually mean? They say that "basis," in this context, is, in brief, of five kinds: first, the basis of essential nature; second, the basis of an objective condition; third, the basis of bondage; fourth, the basis that is a cause, as when it is said elsewhere, "What are the dharmas that are a basis? They are all conditioned dharmas"; and fifth, the basis that is a possession, as when it is said elsewhere, "the basis of a field, the basis of a house, the basis of a wife and children." Here, in this present context, "basis" specifically means "cause" — showing that the unconditioned dharmas altogether lack any cause whatsoever. For this reason, although the unconditioned is indeed a genuinely real entity, since it is permanently without function, it has neither cause nor result. The general discussion is now complete.

The general discussion is now complete. What, then, should be said about which result is attained through which cause? Verse: the later cause's result is the ripening result; the earlier cause's result is the dominant-condition result; the homogeneous cause and universal cause attain the equal-outflow result; the co-existent cause and associated cause attain the agent-efficacy result. Prose: "the later cause" refers to the ripening cause, since it is named last among the six causes — its result, obtained through this cause, is the ripening result. "The earlier cause" refers to the efficient cause, since it is named first among the six causes — its result, obtained through this cause, is called the dominant-condition result, since it is a result belonging to what is dominant. But since this cause consists merely in not obstructing, what "dominance" could it possibly have? It is precisely by virtue of this very non-obstruction that it earns the name "dominant." Alternatively, the efficient cause may also possess a genuinely superior kind of power: as with the ten sense fields and elements with respect to the five sense-consciousness bodies, or the karma of sentient beings with respect to the receptacle-world, or the ear and the rest with respect to the arising of eye-consciousness, and so on — these, too, possess a mutually reinforcing, dominant generative power, since, upon hearing something, one then gives rise to joy or to the desire to see it. Such instances of dominance should be considered case by case, as appropriate. The homogeneous cause and universal cause attain the equal-outflow result, since the results of these two causes both resemble their cause. The co-existent cause and associated cause attain the agent-efficacy result — for there is no separate "agent-efficacy" that exists apart from the agent's own substance; it is precisely what is obtained through this relationship that is called the "agent-efficacy result." What, exactly, does this term "agent-efficacy" refer to? It refers to the function or effect that any dharma possesses — since it is like an agent's efficacy, it earns the name "agent-efficacy," just as ordinary speech refers to "crow's-foot medicinal herb," "a maddened elephant," or "a general," names drawn from a thing's characteristic function. Is it only these two causes that have an agent-efficacy result, or do the others as well? There is a view that the remaining causes, too, have this same kind of result, with the sole exception of the ripening cause, since the agent-efficacy result arises either simultaneously with its cause or immediately following it, whereas the ripening result does not work this way. There is a further view, however, that the ripening cause, too, has an agent-efficacy result, only a distantly separated, far-removed one — comparable to the fruit a farmer eventually harvests.

What, then, is the defining characteristic of the ripening result, and the rest? Verse: the ripening result is an undefiled-neutral dharma, generated by what is morally determinate in a sentient being; the equal-outflow result resembles its own cause; freedom-from-bondage comes about through the exhaustion effected by wisdom; whatever arises through a given dharma's power is called the agent-efficacy result; and every conditioned dharma, except what has already arisen as one of the above, is the dominant-condition result. Prose: the ripening result exists only among undefiled-neutral dharmas. Does this result, then, also extend to what is not sentient-being-based, or is it confined strictly to sentient beings? Does it also extend to the equal-outflow and nourished-and-grown categories? It should be understood that it arises solely from what is morally determinate — that is, all unwholesome dharmas, and all contaminated wholesome dharmas, are capable of determining a ripening result, and this is why they are called "morally determinate." Only afterward, at a later time, does the ripening result then arise — it is neither simultaneous with its cause nor immediately following it — and this is what is meant by "generated by what is morally determinate." This, then, is the defining characteristic of the ripening result. But things that are not sentient-being-based are also produced from karma — why are these not likewise called "ripening"? Because of the criterion of shared usage: that is, others besides the one who performed the karma are also able to make use of and enjoy such things. A genuine ripening result, however, can never be shared and enjoyed by anyone else in this way — one being's own performed karma can never be the basis for a different being to experience its ripening result instead. But the dominant-condition result, too, is produced by karma — how, then, can it be shared? Because it is produced by the collective karma of many beings together.

A dharma that resembles its own cause is called the equal-outflow result — meaning it resembles either the homogeneous cause or the universal cause. If the universal cause, too, produces an equal-outflow result, why should this not simply be accepted as itself a case of homogeneous cause? Because this particular result resembles its cause only by virtue of shared level and defilement, not by virtue of belonging to the same category — whereas, if the resemblance were by virtue of belonging to the same category, this would then be precisely what earns the name "homogeneous cause." This is why the following question is raised: is whatever counts as a homogeneous cause also a universal cause? This should be treated as a fourfold case. The first case: a dharma that is not universal serves as homogeneous cause. The second case: a universal dharma belonging to a different category serves as universal cause. The third case: a universal dharma belonging to its own category serves as universal cause. The fourth case: excluding all the preceding characteristics. As for the dharma exhausted through the power of wisdom, this is called the freedom-from-bondage result — "exhausted" names its cessation, and "wisdom" names the discernment through which it comes about; this is simply cessation-through-discernment, called the freedom-from-bondage result. Whatever arises through a given dharma's power is called the agent-efficacy result: as when, through the power of an effortful mind belonging to a lower level, an uncontaminated or contaminated meditative attainment belonging to a higher level arises, or when, through the power of a pure dhyāna-mind, a transformation-mind arises. Cessation-through-discernment, too, should be said to be obtained through the path's power. Every conditioned dharma, except what has already arisen as one of the results above, is the dominant-condition result. What, then, distinguishes the agent-efficacy result from the dominant-condition result? The name "agent-efficacy result" applies only with respect to the specific agent that actually produced it; the name "dominant-condition result" applies more broadly, extending to this same result and to everything else besides. As with something crafted by an artisan: with respect to the artisan who actually made it, the object earns both the name "agent-efficacy result" and "dominant-condition result" at once; but with respect to anyone else who is not that artisan, it earns only the name "dominant-condition result."

Among the six causes described above, at which stage does each cause acquire its result, and at which stage does it bestow its result? Verse: five causes acquire their result only in the present; two of these likewise bestow their result only in the present; two causes bestow their result across the past and the present alike; and one cause bestows its result only in the past. Prose: five of the causes acquire their result only in the present — definitely not in the past, since a past cause has already acquired its result; nor in the future, since a future cause has no function yet. The efficient cause is not discussed here, since it does not definitely have a result of its own in this specific sense. The co-existent cause and the associated cause likewise bestow their result only in the present, since, for these two causes, acquiring and bestowing their result must always be simultaneous. The homogeneous cause and the universal cause, however, bestow their result across both the past and the present. How can a present cause bestow an equal-outflow result? Because an equal-outflow result can indeed arise in the immediately following moment. But once a result has already arisen, its cause has by then already become past, and is said to have "already bestowed" its result — it should not be said to "bestow" it once again at that point.

A wholesome homogeneous cause sometimes acquires its result without bestowing it — this should be treated as a fourfold case. The first case: at the very last moment before wholesome roots are cut off, the possession that is relinquished at that final moment. The second case: at the very first moment wholesome roots are regenerated, the possession newly obtained at that moment — it should be understood that, at that time, the one regenerating them acquires an earlier possession, restored from before. The third case: for one whose wholesome roots remain uncut, every other stage besides these two. The fourth case: excluding all the preceding characteristics. There is likewise a fourfold case for the unwholesome homogeneous cause. The first case: at the very last moment before becoming free of desire and craving, the possession relinquished at that final moment. The second case: at the very first moment of falling back into desire and craving, the possession newly obtained at that moment — it should be understood that, at that time, the one falling back acquires an earlier possession. The third case: for one not yet free of desire and craving, every other stage besides these. The fourth case: excluding all the preceding characteristics.

There is likewise a fourfold case for the defiled-neutral homogeneous cause: with respect to when arhatship is attained, when it is lost through falling back, when it has not yet been attained, and all other circumstances — this should be stated according to the corresponding logic already given. Within the undefiled-neutral homogeneous cause, there is a case that always follows a fixed pattern: whenever it bestows its result, it necessarily also acquires a result at the same time. There is, however, a case of acquiring a result without bestowing one: namely, an arhat's very last aggregates, distinguished with respect to the object-possessing moments involved. There is also a fourfold case for the wholesome homogeneous cause, considered from a different angle: the first case is where a wholesome mind is immediately followed by a defiled or neutral mind; the second case is the reverse of this; the third case is where a wholesome mind is immediately followed by a further wholesome mind; the fourth case is excluding the preceding characteristics. The unwholesome mind, and so on, should likewise be stated with a corresponding fourfold case, following this same pattern. What, then, is the actual meaning of "acquiring a result" and "bestowing a result"? Being capable of serving as that result's seed is what is called "acquiring a result"; directly bestowing that result's actual power is what is called "bestowing a result." The ripening cause bestows its result only in the past, since a ripening result is never simultaneous with its cause, nor does it arise in the immediately following moment.

There is a further view: beyond the five results already given, four further results should be separately named — first, the establishment result, as when the wheel of water serves as the result of the wheel of wind, and so on, up through vegetation serving as the result of the great earth; second, the effortful-practice result, as when the knowledge of non-arising, and the like, serves, at a great remove, as the result of contemplating the impure and similar practices; third, the combination result, as when the eye faculty, and the like, serves as the result that combines to produce eye-consciousness and so on; fourth, the cultivation result, as when the transformation-mind, and the like, serves as the result of the various dhyānas. All four of these results, however, are simply subsumed under the agent-efficacy result and the dominant-condition result already established. With this, causes and results have both now been explained. There remains a further point to consider: with respect to these, how many causes produce each kind of dharma? Dharmas may, in brief, be divided into four categories: defiled dharmas, karmic-ripening dharmas, the very first uncontaminated dharma, and the remaining kinds of dharma. What are these "remaining" dharmas? They are neutral dharmas other than karmic-ripening ones, and wholesome dharmas other than the very first uncontaminated one. Regarding these four categories, a verse states: defiled and karmic-ripening dharmas, the remaining, and the first noble one, in that order — the first excepting ripening; the next, excepting both universal and ripening; and homogeneous, and the remaining — this refers to mind and its mental factors; the rest, further excepting the associated cause. Prose: all defiled dharmas are produced by the remaining five causes, excepting the ripening cause. Karmic-ripening dharmas are produced by the remaining five causes, excepting the universal cause. The remaining three kinds of dharma are produced by the remaining four causes, excepting both the ripening cause and the universal cause together. The very first uncontaminated dharma is produced by the remaining three causes, excepting the preceding two as well as the homogeneous cause. What, exactly, do these four categories of dharma refer to? They refer to mind and its mental factors, the formations dissociated from mind, and the four categories of form. How many causes, then, produce these latter categories? Just as with mind and its mental factors, but further excepting the associated cause, it should be understood that the remaining dharmas are produced by four, three, or two of the remaining causes, respectively. Among these: defiled dharmas and karmic-ripening dharmas of this latter kind are produced by the remaining four causes; the remaining three kinds of dharma are produced by the remaining three causes; the very first uncontaminated dharma is produced by the remaining two causes. There is definitely no dharma produced by only a single cause.