Where Does a Formless Being Live?

Mind and the rest have already been discussed by reference to the three realms. It should next be explained: what, exactly, are the three realms, and how many distinct places does each contain? Verse: the hells, animals, and hungry ghosts, together with humans and the six desire-heavens, are called the desire realm's twenty — owing to the distinctions among the hells and the continents. Above these are seventeen places called the form realm, within which the first three dhyānas each have three, and the fourth dhyāna has eight. The formless realm has no place at all; owing to birth, it is of four kinds — relying on class-commonality and the life faculty to sustain the continuity of mind and the rest.

Prose: the four destinies beginning with the hells, together with the six desire-heavens and the receptacle world that contains them, are called the desire realm. The six desire-heavens are: first, the Heaven of the Four Great Kings; second, the Heaven of the Thirty-Three; third, the Yama Heaven; fourth, the Tuṣita Heaven; fifth, the Heaven of Enjoying Transformations; sixth, the Heaven of Mastery over Others' Transformations. How many distinct places, then, does the desire realm contain, in detail? Owing to the distinctions among the hells and the continents, there come to be twenty in all. The eight great hells are called the hells' distinction: first, the Reviving Hell; second, the Black-Rope Hell; third, the Crushing-Together Hell; fourth, the Wailing Hell; fifth, the Great Wailing Hell; sixth, the Scorching Hell; seventh, the Great Scorching Hell; eighth, the Hell of Uninterrupted Suffering. As for the continents' distinction: there are four great continents: first, Jambudvīpa; second, Pūrvavideha; third, Aparagodānīya; fourth, Uttarakuru. These twelve, together with the six desire-heavens, the animals, and the hungry ghosts, make twenty. Whether one speaks of the world of sentient beings, from the Heaven of Mastery over Others' Transformations down to the Hell of Uninterrupted Suffering, or of the receptacle world, down to the wheel of wind, all of it is subsumed under the desire realm.

Above the desire realm there are seventeen places: the first three dhyāna-levels each have three, and the fourth dhyāna-level alone has eight; the receptacle world and its inhabitants together are called the form realm. The first dhyāna-level's three are: first, the Heaven of Brahma's Retinue; second, the Heaven of Brahma's Ministers; third, the Great Brahma Heaven. The second dhyāna-level's three are: first, the Heaven of Lesser Light; second, the Heaven of Immeasurable Light; third, the Heaven of Light-Sound. The third dhyāna-level's three are: first, the Heaven of Lesser Purity; second, the Heaven of Immeasurable Purity; third, the Heaven of All-Pervasive Purity. The fourth dhyāna-level's eight are: first, the Cloudless Heaven; second, the Heaven of Merit-Born Beings; third, the Heaven of Great Reward; fourth, the Heaven Without Affliction; fifth, the Heaven Without Heat; sixth, the Heaven of Skillful Appearance; seventh, the Heaven of Skillful Vision; eighth, the Heaven of the Ultimate Form. The great treatise-masters of Kashmir all say that the form realm has only sixteen places: they hold that, within the Heaven of Brahma's Ministers, there is a lofty tower-pavilion called the Great Brahma Heaven — a single ruler's dwelling place, not a genuinely separate ground of its own, comparable to a venerable one's throne encircled by the four assemblies of disciples.

Within the formless realm, there is no place at all, since formless dharmas have no spatial location — past and future unmanifest form, and formless dharmas generally, do not reside in any location; this is a matter of settled principle. But, based on the distinction in what karmic-ripening is produced, there are four kinds: first, the sphere of infinite space; second, the sphere of infinite consciousness; third, the sphere of nothing-at-all; fourth, the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. These four kinds are called the formless realm. These four are not distinguished by any higher or lower spatial location, but rather by birth itself, through which there is a difference of superior and inferior. How, moreover, is it known that these have no spatial location at all? Because whoever attains that concentration in a given place dies and is reborn in that very same place; and, when passing away from that state to be reborn in the desire or form realm, the intermediate-existence being arises in that very same place as well.

Just as every sentient being possessing form necessarily relies upon a physical body for the continuity of mind and the rest, for a sentient being reborn in the formless realm, what does the continuity of mind and the rest rely upon as its basis? The Ābhidharmika masters say that mind and the rest, for such beings, achieve continuity by relying upon class-commonality and the life faculty. If that is so, then why do sentient beings possessing form not likewise rely on only these two alone for the continuity of their mind and the rest? Because, for beings born with form, these two are of inferior strength. Why, then, are these same two strong in the formless realm? Because, in that realm, these two arise from a superior concentration, since that attainment is able to subdue the perception of form. If that is so, then, since it is the superior concentration itself that explains their continuity, what need is there for any further, separate basis at all? Moreover, it should now be asked: just as, for a sentient being born with form, class-commonality and the life faculty operate in dependence on form, in the formless realm, what do these same two rely upon as their basis? These two operate by relying on each other, mutually. Why, then, do these two not likewise rely on each other in the case of beings possessing form? Because, for beings born with form, these two are of inferior strength. Why, then, are these same two strong in the formless realm? Because, in that realm, these two kinds arise from a superior concentration. But it was already said that this attainment is able to subdue the perception of form — and this simply returns us to the very same difficulty already raised about the continuity of mind. Alternatively, mind and its mental factors simply rely on each other alone — and so the Sautrāntika masters say that, in the formless realm, the continuity of mind and the rest requires no separate, additional basis at all. That is: if there is a cause whereby one has not yet become free of affection for form, and mind and the rest are thereby brought about, then this induced mind and the rest arise together with form, and operate in dependence on form. But if, through some cause, one has already become free of affection toward form, being wearied of and turned away from form, then this induced mind and the rest do not arise together with form, and do not operate in dependence on form.

Why are these called the desire realm, and so forth, the three realms? Because it is able to hold its own particular characteristic, it is called a "realm" — or, in the sense of "lineage," as already explained before. The realm to which desire belongs is called the desire realm; the realm to which form belongs is called the form realm — the middle word being elided in this manner of speaking, just as "pepper-drink" means a drink flavored with pepper, and "vajra-ring" means a ring set with a vajra-gem. Within that realm, form does not exist at all — hence it is called "formless." What is meant by "form" here is the sense of resistant obstruction, or the sense of manifestation and display. Since that realm's own essential nature is simply not form, the name "formless" is established for it — it is not that this realm's essence is merely "the absence of form" taken as its defining substance. The realm to which formlessness belongs is called the formless realm — the middle word being elided, by the same analogy already given. Moreover, "the realm of desire" is called the desire realm because this realm's own power is able to sustain and hold desire. The form realm and the formless realm should be understood in just the same way.

What, exactly, does the word "desire" refer to here? Briefly stated: the craving induced by physical nourishment and by sexual union. As a scriptural verse states: "The world's wondrous objects are not true desire; true desire is a person's own discriminating craving. The wondrous objects remain in the world just as they always were; the wise, with respect to them, have already removed desire." An Ājīvika heretic then challenged the Venerable Śāriputra, saying: "If the world's wondrous objects are not true desire, and desire is said to be a person's own discriminating craving, then a monk ought to be called one who indulges in desire, since he too gives rise to unwholesome discriminating thought." Śāriputra then countered him in return, saying: "If the world's wondrous objects were true desire, and desire were not a person's own discriminating craving, then your own teacher ought to be called one who indulges in desire, since he constantly gazes upon agreeable, wondrous forms."

If a dharma currently manifests within one of the three realms, is that dharma thereby said to be bound to that realm? No, it is not. How, then, should it be put? A dharma with respect to which the craving belonging to one of the three realms lies latent and increases — that is what is bound to that realm. What, then, is meant here by "the craving of the three realms"? If one simply says, "it is whatever lies latent and increases within each of the three realms," this answer is like the answer given about who ties up the horse: it is just as if someone asked, "Who is it that ties up the horse?" and were answered, "The horse's owner." If that person then asked further, "Who, then, is the horse's owner?" and were answered, "The one who ties it up" — both of these answers fail to actually clarify anything. What is said here, however, is not like that circular answer: that is, with respect to the desire realm's various places already discussed, for one who has not yet become free of craving, the craving is called desire-craving, and whatever this craving lies latent in and increases upon is called "bound to the desire realm." With respect to the form and formless realms already discussed, it should be understood, correspondingly, to work in just the same way. Alternatively: craving belonging to the unfixed level is called desire-craving, and whatever this lies latent in and increases upon is called "bound to the desire realm." Craving belonging to any of the dhyāna levels is called form-craving, and whatever this lies latent in and increases upon is called "bound to the form realm." Craving belonging to any of the formless levels is called formless-craving, and whatever this lies latent in and increases upon is called "bound to the formless realm." How, then, can desire-craving arise with respect to a desire-realm transformation-mind? Either through hearing it from another, or through one's own falling back and regressing, a taste for it arises; or, through observing the sovereign power of the one who performs the transformation, craving and affection arise with respect to that transformation-mind. If a mind is able to transform and produce the two dharmas of fragrance and flavor, this transformation-capable mind is bound to the desire realm, since a form-realm mind cannot transform and produce fragrance or flavor.

Are these three realms, then, only a single set — is there only one universe? The three realms are without limit, measureless like space itself; hence, although sentient beings have no beginning, and immeasurable, boundless Buddhas have appeared in the world, each one converting and liberating countless sentient beings and bringing them to realize the sphere of nirvana without remainder, this is still never exhausted, just like space itself. How, then, should it be said that world-systems are arranged? It should be said that they are arranged side by side. Hence a sutra states: "It is like rain from the sky, its drops as thick as cart-axles, falling without interruption or break." In just this way, to the east, without interruption or break, immeasurable world-systems are either being destroyed or being formed; and just as in the east, so too in the south, west, and north — but nothing is said of above or below. There is a further view that there are also the two directions of above and below, since the sutras of other schools speak of the ten directions. Above the Heaven of the Ultimate Form, there is once again a desire realm; and below that desire realm, there is once again a Heaven of the Ultimate Form. When one becomes free of craving for one desire realm, one thereby becomes free of craving for every desire realm at once. Becoming free of craving for the form and formless realms should be understood in just the same way. When one relies on the first dhyāna to give rise to supernormal wisdom, the supernormal power thereby produced can only travel as far as the Brahmā-world of the very universe into which one was born, and no further; the same should be understood to hold for supernormal wisdom relying on the other dhyānas as well. The three realms have now been fully explained.

What, then, are the five destinies? Verse: within these realms, the hells and the rest, each under its own name, are said to be the five destinies; their nature is only uncovered-neutral; they belong to sentient beings, not to the intermediate-existence being. Prose: within the three realms, there are said to be five destinies — namely, the hells and the rest, each spoken of under its own name: that is, the previously-discussed hells, animals, and ghosts, together with humans and gods, are called the five destinies. Only in the desire realm are four of the destinies found in their entirety; the god-destiny, however, has one portion in each of the three realms. Is there, then, anything within the three realms that is not subsumed under any destiny, even though the five destinies are said to exist within these realms? There is: namely, wholesome and defiled dharmas, the external receptacle world, and the intermediate-existence being — although these all belong to the nature of the three realms, they are not subsumed under any destiny. The essential nature of the five destinies is only uncovered-neutral. If it were otherwise, the destinies would become mixed together, since a single destiny would then contain within it the karma and afflictions belonging to all five destinies at once. The five destinies are subsumed only under what belongs to the category of sentient beings; their essential nature is not the intermediate-existence being.

The Prajñaptiśāstra states as follows: the four kinds of birth subsume the five destinies, but the five destinies do not subsume the four kinds of birth. What is it, then, that is not subsumed? Namely, the intermediate-existence being. The Dharmaskandha-śāstra likewise states: what is the eye-element? It is the pure form produced by the four great elements that constitutes the eye — the eye-faculty, the eye-sense-field, and the eye-element — found among the destinies of hell-beings, animals, ghosts, humans, and gods, and also cultivated and completed in the intermediate-existence being. A sutra, too, distinguishes the intermediate-existence being from the destinies. Which sutra is this? The Sūtra of the Seven Kinds of Existence. That sutra speaks of seven kinds of existence: hell-existence, animal-existence, hungry-ghost-existence, god-existence, human-existence, karma-existence, and intermediate-existence. That sutra, in speaking of the five destinies together with their cause and the means by which one arrives at a destiny, thereby firmly establishes the principle that destiny is only uncovered-neutral. Karma-existence, functioning as the cause, is distinguished from the destinies precisely because it is different in kind from every one of them.

The Kashmiri tradition recites a sutra in which the Venerable Śāriputra states as follows: "Venerable ones! If there is one for whom, through the manifest presence of the contaminants belonging to hell, hell-conducive karma is performed and increased, and whose bodily, verbal, and mental actions are thereby crooked and defiled — such a one, within the hells, undergoes the karmic-ripening of the five aggregates; and it is only once this ripening has arisen that one is called a hell-being. Apart from the dharmas of the five aggregates, no such hell-being whatsoever can be found." Hence destiny is only uncovered-neutral. If that is so, then how is the Prakaraṇapāda-śāstra to be reconciled with this? For it states that all latent tendencies lie latent and increase upon the five destinies. That treatise means that, within the mind of rebirth-continuity belonging to the five destinies, all the afflictions of the five categories may indeed be present, entering into that mind as well as into the destiny. Speaking of this loosely as "the destiny" involves no real contradiction — just as a village and the area surrounding a village are both loosely called "the village." There is a further view: the essential nature of destiny extends to the wholesome and defiled as well. But as for the Sūtra of Seven Existences separating out karma-existence — since it is not thereby separately excluded, it does not definitely follow that affliction is excluded from destiny either. This is comparable to how, among the five defilements, affliction and view are stated separately as defilements, yet this separate statement does not mean that view is definitely not subsumed under affliction. In just the same way, karma-existence, although it too is in some sense a destiny, is stated separately in order to highlight it specifically as the cause of destiny.

If that is so, then the intermediate-existence being, too, ought to be a destiny. It is not, since the meaning of "destiny" would not correspond to it. "Destiny" means "that to which one goes" — and one cannot say that the intermediate-existence being is "that to which one goes," since it arises right at the very place of death. If that is so, then the formless realm should also not count as a destiny, since beings born there are likewise reborn right at the very place of death. Given this, the intermediate-existence being is named "intermediate-existence" — therefore it should not be called a "destiny." It is because it stands between two destinies that it is named "intermediate-existence"; if it were itself included among the destinies, it would then no longer be something standing between two destinies, and so it would then be inappropriate to call it "intermediate-existence" at all. As for the Venerable Śāriputra's own statement that one is called a hell-being only once karmic-ripening has arisen — this states that the name "hell-being" applies only once ripening has arisen; it does not state that a hell-being is nothing but karmic-ripening in every respect. And as for the further statement that, apart from the dharmas of the five aggregates, no such hell-being can be found at all — this is stated in order to refute the idea that there is a genuinely real "person" capable of traveling to the various destinies; it is not stated in order to deny that other aggregates might also be present. The Vaibhāṣika masters say: destiny is only uncovered-neutral. There is a further view: it is exclusively karmic-ripening. Yet another view holds: it extends to nourished-and-grown aggregates as well.

Within the three realms and the five destinies, correspondingly, there are seven abodes of consciousness. What are the seven? Verse: body-variety together with perception-variety; body-variety with a single, unified perception; the reverse of this, a single body with perception-variety; a single body and a single perception; together with the lower three formless spheres — these make the seven abodes of consciousness; the rest are not abodes, since they have something that damages consciousness. Prose: a sutra states that there are form-possessing sentient beings with bodily variety and perceptual variety — such as humans, and a portion of the gods — and this is the first abode of consciousness. "A portion of the gods" means the desire-realm gods and the first dhyāna, excepting those who arose at the very start of the eon. "Bodily variety" means that their physical bodies differ in coloring, shape, and appearance; because of this, such sentient beings are said to have bodily variety. "Perceptual variety" means that their perceptions of pleasure, pain, and neither-pleasure-nor-pain differ; because of this, such sentient beings are said to have perceptual variety. Form-possessing sentient beings with bodily variety but a single, unified perception — such as the Heaven of Brahmā's Retinue at the very start of the eon — constitute the second abode of consciousness. Why is this? Because, at the very start of the eon, all the members of Brahmā's Retinue give rise to this same thought: "We are all brought into being by the Great Brahmā." Great Brahmā, at that time, likewise gives rise to this same thought: "All these members of my retinue are brought into being by me." Since they share a single, common thought as their single cause, this is called "a single perception." The body of the Great Brahmā king is vast in stature; his appearance, majesty, speech, radiance, garments, and crown, each and every one, differs from those of his retinue — hence it is called "bodily variety." A sutra states: the members of Brahmā's Retinue think to themselves, "We have previously seen a being of this kind, long-lived and abiding for a long time," and so on, up to the point of forming this wish: "How might other sentient beings come to be born within my own class-commonality?" At the very moment that being forms this wish in mind, we ourselves then come to be born within that same class-commonality. But where could the members of Brahmā's Retinue have previously seen the Brahmā king? There is a further view: they had previously dwelt in the Heaven of Light-Sound, and, passing away from that heaven, come to be born here. But how could they, not currently having attained the second dhyāna, nevertheless be able to remember past-life events belonging to that level? And if they had indeed already attained the second dhyāna, how could they still give rise to the wrong grasping of rules and vows with respect to the Great Brahmā? There is a further view: they dwelt within the intermediate-existence state. But one dwelling within the intermediate-existence state has no sense of dwelling there for a long time, given that there is no obstruction to being reborn — so how, then, could the members of Brahmā's Retinue think, "We have previously seen a being of this kind, long-lived and abiding for a long time"? For this reason, the members of Brahmā's Retinue, while dwelling in their own heaven, remember events they themselves experienced earlier within this very same life: that is, they first saw that being long-lived and abiding for a long time, and later, upon seeing him again, gave rise to this same thought.

Form-possessing sentient beings with a single, unified body but perceptual variety — such as the Heaven of Light-Sound — constitute the third abode of consciousness. Here, citing the last heaven of the second dhyāna is meant to include the first two as well — it should be understood that this fully encompasses the whole of the second dhyāna. If it were not so, then which abode of consciousness would the Heaven of Lesser Light and the Heaven of Immeasurable Light be subsumed under? The coloring, shape, and appearance of that heaven's inhabitants do not differ — hence it is called "a single body." The two perceptions of pleasure and of neither-pleasure-nor-pain intermingle there — hence it is called "perceptual variety." Tradition holds that, in that heaven, when one grows weary of the root-level's joy faculty, the neighboring-level's equanimity faculty then manifests in its place; and when one grows weary of the neighboring-level's equanimity faculty, the root-level's joy faculty then manifests in its place once again — like a wealthy person who, growing weary of sensual pleasure, takes up the pleasure of the Dharma, and, growing weary of the pleasure of the Dharma, takes up sensual pleasure once again. But should this not likewise hold for the perception in the Heaven of All-Pervasive Purity? No — the gods of All-Pervasive Purity never grow weary of their pleasure at all, since that pleasure is calm and still, and there is never a time of weariness toward it; joy, however, is not like this, since it agitates and disturbs the mind. The Sautrāntika masters say: there is a further sutra that explains the meaning of "perceptual variety" within that heaven differently. It states that, among the gods of Light-Sound, there are those newly born who have not yet properly come to understand the world's process of formation and dissolution. They see the blazing flames of the lower levels burning fiercely, and, upon seeing this, become frightened and fearful, thinking: "May those flames not burn up the Brahmā-palaces, leaving them entirely empty, and rise up to invade my own abode!" Among the gods of Light-Sound, there are also those long since born there, who have already properly come to understand the world's process of formation and dissolution; they then comfort and reassure those frightened gods, saying: "Pure sages, pure sages! Do not be afraid, do not be afraid! In the past, too, those flames burned up the Brahmā-palaces, leaving them entirely empty — and yet they were extinguished there, going no further." It is because these gods hold differing perceptions regarding the flames — whether they will come or not come, and correspondingly whether to be afraid or not afraid — that this is called "perceptual variety," not on account of pleasure and neither-pleasure-nor-pain perceptions intermingling.

Form-possessing sentient beings with a single body and a single perception — such as the Heaven of All-Pervasive Purity — constitute the fourth abode of consciousness. Since there is only the perception of pleasure there, it is called "a single perception." Within the first dhyāna, it is on account of a defiled perception that it is called "single"; within the second dhyāna, it is on account of two wholesome perceptions that it is called "varied"; within the third dhyāna, it is on account of a karmic-ripening perception that it is called "single." The lower three formless spheres are named separately, just as a sutra states; these make up the seven abodes of consciousness. What, then, is meant here by "abode of consciousness"? It is the five aggregates, or, in the formless spheres, the four aggregates, bound up with that level, each according to what is appropriate — this is what is called an abode of consciousness. Why, then, are the remaining places not abodes of consciousness? Because, in every one of those remaining places, there is something that damages consciousness. What are these remaining places? They are the evil destinies, the fourth dhyāna, and the Peak of Existence. Why is this? Because those places contain something that damages consciousness, they are not abodes of consciousness. What, exactly, is meant by "something that damages consciousness"? In the evil destinies, there is intense suffering capable of damaging consciousness; in the fourth dhyāna, there is the attainment of non-percipience and the state of non-percipient beings; and at the Peak of Existence, there is the attainment of cessation, capable of damaging consciousness by cutting off its continuity — hence these are not abodes of consciousness. It is further said: a place is called an abode of consciousness if sentient beings from other places are glad to come and settle there, and, once having arrived there, no longer seek to leave. In the evil destinies, neither of these two conditions holds at all. In the fourth dhyāna, the mind constantly seeks to leave: ordinary beings there seek to enter non-percipience, while noble ones there are glad to enter the pure abodes or the formless spheres, and the pure-abode gods there are glad to realize final quiescence. The Peak of Existence, being dim and weak, is likewise not an abode of consciousness. With this, the seven abodes of consciousness have been fully distinguished.

On this basis, it is further said that there are nine abodes of sentient beings. What are the nine? Verse: it should be understood that, together with the Peak of Existence and the non-percipient beings, these make the nine abodes of sentient beings; the rest are not, since beings are not glad to dwell there. Prose: the seven abodes of consciousness already discussed, together with the foremost existence and the non-percipient beings, make nine in all. Sentient beings are glad and delighted to dwell only within these nine, and so these are established as the abodes of sentient beings. All other places are not such abodes, since beings are not glad to dwell there. "Other places" refers to the evil destinies: sentient beings do not willingly dwell there of their own accord — it is their own evil karma, like a rākṣasa demon, that forces and compels them to remain. These are like a prison, and so are not established as abodes of sentient beings. Within the fourth dhyāna, excepting the Heaven of Non-Percipience, the rest are not abodes of sentient beings, exactly as already explained under the abodes of consciousness.

The sutra cited earlier speaks of seven abodes of consciousness; there is, however, a further sutra that speaks of four abodes of consciousness. What are these four? Verse: the four abodes of consciousness should be understood as the four aggregates, each belonging only to its own level; consciousness alone, it is said, is not itself an abode; how this relates to the sevenfold scheme is subsumed under a fourfold case, since both concern only the contaminated. Prose: as a sutra states: consciousness abides in dependence on form, consciousness abides in dependence on feeling, consciousness abides in dependence on perception, consciousness abides in dependence on formations — these are called the four kinds. What, then, is the essential nature of these four kinds? They are, respectively and in order, the four contaminated aggregates. Moreover, these exist only within their own level, not elsewhere, since it is specifically what consciousness depends upon and clings to that is called an abode of consciousness. It is not the case that, within the form and other aggregates belonging to a different level, consciousness could, through the power of craving, depend upon and cling to those instead. Why, then, is consciousness itself not said to be an abode of consciousness? Because that which is abided in is established precisely by being distinct from that which abides. Consciousness, being that which abides, cannot itself be named that which is abided in — just as the king himself cannot be called the king's throne. Alternatively: whatever dharma consciousness rides upon and is borne by — comparable, in principle, to a person and a boat — is what is called an abode of consciousness. Consciousness is not itself the very thing that rides and is borne, and so consciousness itself is not said to be an abode of consciousness. This is what the Vaibhāṣika masters state. If that is so, then why does another sutra state: "Within the nutriment of consciousness, there is delight and there is attachment; because there is delight and attachment, consciousness abides within it and is borne by it"? And how, moreover, can it be said that the seven abodes of consciousness discussed earlier have all five aggregates as their essential nature? Although this is indeed stated, it is because, within the aggregates subsumed under a given place of birth, no separate analysis is made, since delight and attachment arise toward the whole together; when consciousness itself operates, this too is loosely called "an abode of consciousness," not that consciousness alone, by itself, is being named as a genuine, distinct abode. But form and the other aggregates, each individually, are capable of giving rise to various kinds of delight and attachment that cause consciousness to depend upon and cling to them; consciousness alone, by itself, is not like this — hence it is said not to be an abode. For this reason, within these four abodes of consciousness, consciousness is not itself an abode of consciousness, though it may loosely be spoken of as such elsewhere. Moreover, the Buddha's intent, it is held, was to speak of these four abodes of consciousness as being like a fertile field, while speaking generally of all consciousness bound up with clinging as being like a seed — and a seed cannot itself be established as the fertile field. This, as far as can be inferred, is the intent of the World-Honored One's teaching. Moreover, a dharma capable of arising simultaneously together with consciousness, and capable of serving as consciousness's fertile field, can be established as an abode of consciousness. The aggregate of consciousness itself is not like this, and so it is not an abode of consciousness.

Thus, the seven kinds and the four kinds just discussed, although the abodes of consciousness they describe differ, are both, in every case, contaminated. Does the sevenfold scheme subsume the fourfold, or does the fourfold subsume the sevenfold? Neither subsumes the other completely. This should be treated as a fourfold case: upon careful examination, it should be understood that the essential scope of the two schemes is mutually broader and narrower in different respects, yielding a fourfold case — that is, there may be something subsumed under the seven but not under the four, and so on. The first case: consciousness within the seven. The second case: within the evil destinies, the fourth dhyāna, and the Peak of Existence, the remaining aggregates excepting consciousness. The third case: the four aggregates within the seven. The fourth case: excepting all the aforementioned characteristics.

Within the three realms and destinies already discussed, it should be understood that birth is, in brief, of four kinds. What are these four, and which occurs where? Verse: among these, there are four kinds of birth for sentient beings — namely, egg-birth and the rest. Humans and animals possess all four; the hells and the gods, and the intermediate-existence being, are only transformation-birth; ghosts extend to both womb-birth and transformation-birth. Prose: sentient beings are of the egg-born, womb-born, moisture-born, and transformation-born kinds — these are called the four. "Birth" here means a class or category of birth. Among sentient beings, although other categories may be intermixed, they are nevertheless alike in belonging to one of these classes of birth. What is egg-birth? Sentient beings born from an eggshell are called egg-born — such as geese, peacocks, parrots, and wild geese. What is womb-birth? Sentient beings born from a womb are called womb-born — such as elephants, horses, cattle, pigs, sheep, and donkeys. What is moisture-birth? Sentient beings born from moisture are called moisture-born — such as worms, moths, mosquitoes, and centipedes. What is transformation-birth? Sentient beings born without relying on anything at all are called transformation-born — such as hell-beings, gods, and the intermediate-existence being; their faculties are complete, lacking nothing, and their limbs and parts arise all at once, suddenly coming into being from nothing whatsoever — hence it is called "transformation." The human and animal destinies each possess all four kinds. As for humans born from eggs: for instance, Śaila and Upaśaila, born from a crane's egg; the thirty-two sons born of Mṛgī; and King Pañcāla's five hundred sons, and so on. As for humans born from a womb: such as people of the present age. As for humans born from moisture: such as Māndhātṛ, Cāru and Upacāru, Kapotamālā, and Āmrapālī, and so on. As for humans born by transformation: only the people at the very beginning of the eon. The three kinds of animal birth are commonly witnessed directly; as for transformation-born animals, such as nāgas and garuḍas, and so on. All hell-beings, gods, and intermediate-existence beings are exclusively transformation-born. The ghost-destiny extends only to womb-birth and transformation-birth.

As for ghosts born from a womb: for instance, a hungry-ghost woman said to Maudgalyāyana: "At night I give birth to five children, and each one, as soon as born, I devour myself; by day I give birth to five more, and it is just the same — though I consume them entirely, I am never satisfied." Among all the kinds of birth, which is supreme? It should be said that transformation-birth alone is supreme. If that is so, then why does the bodhisattva in his final body, who has attained mastery over his own birth, nevertheless undergo womb-birth? Because undergoing womb-birth in that life brings great benefit: namely, in order to guide the great Śākya clan's own kinsmen, bound to him by blood relation, to enter the true Dharma. Moreover, it draws in other kinds of beings as well, letting them know that the bodhisattva is born of the lineage of a wheel-turning king, giving rise to a heart of reverence and admiration, through which they come to abandon wrong paths and turn toward the true Dharma. Moreover, it inspires in those to be converted a heightened resolve: "Since he, too, is a human being, and yet was able to accomplish so great a purpose — we ourselves are likewise human; why, then, should we not likewise be able, through arousing right diligence, to single-mindedly cultivate the true Dharma?" Moreover, if it were not so, his clan and lineage would be difficult to establish, and there would be cause to doubt and suspect that he was merely a magical apparition, a god or a ghost in disguise — comparable to how certain heretical treatises falsely and slanderously assert that, after a hundred eons have passed, a great illusory being will appear in the world and devour it. It is in order to put an end to all such doubts and slanders that he undergoes womb-birth. There is a further view: he undergoes womb-birth in order to leave behind relics of his body in the world, so that immeasurable humans and beings of other kinds, by making even a single offering to them, might be reborn in heaven a thousand times over, and ultimately attain liberation. If he had instead undergone transformation-birth, then, lacking any external, physical seed of origin, his body, the very moment it perished, would leave behind no remaining trace at all — like a lamp's flame going out, after which there is nothing further to be seen. If someone believes that the Buddha, through the sustaining power of his vow and his supernormal mastery, could cause his body to remain for a long time regardless, this does not succeed in actually resolving the question being raised here. If a transformation-born body, upon death, truly leaves nothing behind at all, like a lamp's flame going out, then why does a sutra state that a transformation-born garuḍa seizes a transformation-born nāga to satisfy its hunger? It is out of ignorance that the garuḍa seizes the nāga intending to eat it — the sutra does not actually say that its hunger is thereby satisfied. What fault is there in this? Or, alternatively: while the nāga has not yet died, the garuḍa may indeed obtain temporary satisfaction of its hunger, but once the nāga has died, it becomes hungry once again — what fault could there be in a merely temporary feeding? Among the four kinds of birth, which is the most numerous? Transformation-birth alone, since a portion of three destinies, the entirety of two destinies, and every intermediate-existence being are all transformation-born.

What, then, is meant here by "intermediate existence"? Why is intermediate existence not simply called "birth"? Verse: between the two states of the existence of death and the existence of birth, the five aggregates are called intermediate existence; since it has not yet reached the place it is to reach, intermediate existence is therefore not birth. Prose: after the existence of death, and before the existence of birth, an essential body arises precisely within that interval — this body arises specifically in order to reach the place of birth, and, since it stands between two destinies, it is called "intermediate existence." Since this body has already arisen, why is it not called "birth"? "Birth" refers to the place one is to reach in the future — the name "birth" is established specifically on the basis of the sense of "having arrived." Although the essential body of this intermediate-existence being has indeed already arisen, it has not yet arrived at that place, and so it is not called "birth." What, then, is meant by "the place one is to reach in the future"? It is the place where the karmic-ripening that has been induced becomes fully and distinctly manifest — this is what is meant by "the place one is to reach in the future."

There is a further school that holds: from death to the place of rebirth, there may be a genuine interval and interruption — hence there is no intermediate existence. This should not be accepted. Why is this? Because it goes against both reasoning and scriptural teaching. What are this reasoning and teaching? Verse: just as grain and the like continue in succession, rebirth arises in immediate succession at the very place of death, without interruption; the reflected-image analogy does not hold up as genuinely real, and, being dissimilar, fails as an analogy; no two things can occupy a single place at once; what continues is not two separate arisings in succession; and the Gandharva Sutra, and the sutras of the five and seven existences, affirm it. Prose: let us first consider, on the basis of correct reasoning, that intermediate existence is not non-existent. It is directly observed, in the ordinary world, that continuously-transforming dharmas necessarily arise in the very next moment, at the very same place, without interruption. Just as, in the ordinary world, grain and the like continue in succession, the continuity of sentient beings should, by the same principle, work in just the same way: arising in immediate succession, moment by moment, necessarily without interruption at that place. But is it not directly observed that there are dharmas which continue to arise in succession, and yet an interval of place does exist between them? For instance, a reflected image arises from an object by way of a mirror or the like. In just the same way, could not a sentient being's existence-of-death and existence-of-birth continue in succession despite an interval of place, without any contradiction?

This analogy fails, since it cannot be established, by reasoning, that reflected images are genuinely real entities at all; and, moreover, even granting that they were, the analogy would still fail due to dissimilarity. That is: the claim that a separate form-dharma arises in the mirror and is called "the image" cannot be established as genuinely real by reasoning — and even granting, for argument's sake, that it were established, it would still be dissimilar, and so still fail as an analogy. As for saying that the analogy fails because the image cannot be established as real: this is because no single place can hold two things existing side by side at once. That is: at one and the same place, both the mirror's own color-form and the image are seen to appear together at once — yet two distinct form-dharmas ought not to exist together, side by side, in the very same place, since each depends on its own distinct set of great elements. Moreover, upon the surface of a narrow stream, the forms and shapes of both banks appear together, as two images, at the very same place, at the very same time — those standing on either bank see each other clearly and distinctly, yet there has never been a case of two distinct colors being seen side by side occupying one and the same place; it should not be said, therefore, that these two reflected colors genuinely co-arise as real, distinct entities. Moreover, shadow and light have never been observed to occupy the same place at once, and yet a mirror hung within a shaded area has indeed been observed to display, clearly and plainly, a bright reflected image upon its surface; it should not be said, in this case either, that the two genuinely arise side by side as real, co-located entities. Or again, regarding the claim that no single place holds two things side by side: the mirror's surface and the moon's reflected image would then have to be regarded as two separate, really-existing things, seen as near and far, just as when gazing into a well of water — but if they genuinely arose side by side as two real entities, how could they be seen as separate at all? Hence it is known that reflected images, by reasoning, have no real existence whatsoever. Rather, it is simply the combined power of various causes and conditions coming together that produces such an appearance, since the distinct functional capacities inherent in the nature of dharmas are difficult to fully fathom. With this, the reason why reflected images cannot be established as real — and so cannot serve as a valid analogy — has been explained. As for saying that the analogy also fails on account of dissimilarity: this is because the object and its image do not stand in a relation of continuity at all. That is: the object and the image do not belong to a single continuous series, since the image appears only in dependence on a mirror or the like, and the image exists at the very same time as the original object itself — whereas the existence-of-death and the existence-of-birth belong to a single continuous series, arising in immediate succession, one after another without interruption, in another place. The object and the image, considered in relation to one another, have no such continuous-series relationship at all; since they are not truly comparable, the analogy fails to hold. Moreover, the appearing image arises from two causes — that is, images come to arise through two conditions: first, the original object; second, the mirror or the like. Of these two, the image arises specifically in dependence on whichever is the dominant one. But the existence-of-birth cannot possibly arise from two such conditions in this way — it has only the existence-of-death, with no separate dominant support distinct from it. Hence the analogy offered does not correspond to the actual case. Nor can it be said that external, non-sentient conditions such as the parents' reproductive fluids serve as this "dominant support," since a transformation-born being arises suddenly in open space — in such a case, what could possibly be reckoned as its dominant support? Having thus refuted, on the basis of correct reasoning, that other school's position that there may be an interval and interruption between death and the place of rebirth, it is hereby established that intermediate existence is definitely not non-existent.

Next, let intermediate existence be proven on the basis of the noble teaching: a sutra states that existence is of seven kinds — namely, the five destinies' existences, karma-existence, and intermediate-existence. If that school does not recite this sutra, does it, then, also fail to recite the Gandharva Sutra? As that sutra states: entry into a mother's womb requires three things to be simultaneously present — first, that the mother's body is, at that time, in a suitable condition; second, that the father and mother have united in mutual affection; and third, that a gandharva is currently present. Apart from the intermediate-existence body, what could this "gandharva" possibly be? The aggregates of the prior existence having already perished, what could possibly be "currently present" at all? If that school does not recite this sutra either, then how does it explain the Sūtra of the Horse-Clan Chieftain? As that sutra states: "Do you now know whether this gandharva currently present is a brahmin, a kṣatriya, a vaiśya, or a śūdra? Does it come from the east, or from the south, west, or north?" Since the aggregates of the prior existence have already perished, one cannot speak of anything "coming" from them — this reference to "coming," then, can surely only refer to the intermediate-existence being.

If that school, moreover, does not recite this sutra, then how does it explain the Sūtra of the Five Non-Returners? As that sutra states: there are five kinds of non-returner: first, one who attains final nirvana in the interval; second, one who attains it upon birth; third, one who attains it without exertion; fourth, one who attains it through exertion; fifth, one who streams upward. If intermediate existence did not exist, how could there be one who attains final nirvana in the interval? There is a further view held by some masters: there is a heaven called "the Intermediate Heaven," and one who dwells there attains final nirvana — hence it is called "attaining nirvana in the interval." But this would then require accepting that there is likewise such a heaven as "Birth," and so on for the others; and since this is not accepted, this position is not sound. Moreover, a sutra states that there are seven destinations of the good practitioner: that is, of the five non-returner types already mentioned, the "attains-in-the-interval" type divides into three, owing to differences in place and time — near, middle, and far. It is comparable to a small spark thrown off from burning kindling: the moment it flies up, it is extinguished close by — the first good practitioner is just the same. It is comparable to a small spark thrown off from burning iron: once it flies up, it travels a middling distance before being extinguished — the second good practitioner is just the same. It is comparable to a large spark thrown off from burning iron: it travels far, and is extinguished before ever falling to the ground — the third good practitioner is just the same. It is not the case that there is some separate "Intermediate Heaven," as that rival view held — rather, there are these three grades of difference in time and place; hence that rival position is definitely not in accordance with correct principle. There is yet a further view: whether at the midpoint of one's lifespan, or near the midpoint before reaching the heavenly realm, one cuts off the remaining afflictions and becomes an arhat — this is called "attaining nirvana in the interval." Depending on whether one attains final nirvana upon reaching the realm's level, or through remaining perception, or through remaining discursive thought, there are three grades: if one attains final nirvana immediately upon taking on the form realm's class-commonality, this is the first; if, following this, one attains final nirvana only after having experienced heavenly pleasure, this is the second; if, following this in turn, one attains final nirvana only after entering the heavenly assembly of the Dharma, this is the third. If, having entered the assembly of the Dharma, a great deal of time passes before one attains final nirvana, this is called "attaining nirvana upon birth" — or, alternatively, if one attains final nirvana only after a great portion of one's lifespan has been spent, rather than at the very moment of birth, this too is called "attaining nirvana upon birth." What is said in this account, however, does not correspond at all to the spark analogy. Why is this? Because, in this account, there is no difference at all in terms of place. Moreover, if this account were correct, the formless realm too ought to be said to have "attaining nirvana in the interval," since there, too, one may attain final nirvana at the midpoint of one's lifespan — yet it is not said that the formless realm has this "interval" type, as stated in the summary verses: "Gathering together all the noble and worthy ones: each of the four dhyānas has ten, each of the three lower formless spheres has seven, while the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception has only six." Hence that position is entirely groundless.

If, moreover, one does not recite sutras such as these — the unsurpassed Dharma-king has long since passed into final nirvana, and the great generals of the Dharma have likewise entered final nirvana; the noble teaching has since fragmented into many different schools, each running headlong after its own divergent interpretations of the text and its meaning, picking and choosing according to personal inclination, and this tendency has, by now, grown ever more pronounced. How lamentable it is that you cling stubbornly to confusion, going against reason and rejecting the teaching — this is a matter for the deepest sorrow. For anyone who relies on the reasoning and teaching already set forth as the standard of judgment, the real existence of intermediate existence is thereby firmly established. If that is so, then how does a sutra explain that one who commits the most extreme evil karma, overpowering Māra, plunges in his very present body straight into the hell of Uninterrupted Suffering? The intent of this sutra is that, before this person's life has even been given up, the fierce flames of hell have already begun to burn his body; it is on this basis that, once his life ends, he takes on that intermediate existence, and, riding upon this, then falls into the hell of Uninterrupted Suffering. Because the power of his evil karma has grown so overwhelmingly strong, the signs of suffering arrive even before his life has ended — he first undergoes an experience received in this very life, and only afterward undergoes the experience received in his next birth. Why, then, does a sutra state that a certain kind of sentient being who has performed and increased any of the five acts of immediate retribution will, without interval, definitely be reborn in the hells? The intent of this sutra is to rule out that such a person could instead go to a different destiny, and to make clear that such karma definitely conduces to a result received in the very next birth. If one clings only to the literal wording, one would then have to hold that all five such acts must be completed together before rebirth in hell occurs, and that lacking even one, or substituting some other karmic cause, would not produce that result — which would then constitute a very serious error. Moreover, as for the statement "without interval, one is reborn in the hells" — if read too literally, this would have to mean that rebirth occurs instantaneously, without even waiting for the body to break apart. Or, alternatively: who does not accept that intermediate existence is itself a kind of "birth"? The name "hell-being" extends to the intermediate-existence being as well, since, in immediate succession after the existence of death, when intermediate existence arises, this too may be called "birth," being the very means by which birth is accomplished. The sutra states that one is "reborn in the hells without interval" — it does not state that this is, at that very moment, already the existence of birth proper. If that is so, then how is a further scriptural verse to be reconciled with this? As a scriptural verse states: "Twice-born one, you have now passed beyond your prime, and, in decline, draw near to King Yama; though you wish to set out upon the road ahead, you have no provisions for the journey, and, seeking to rest in the interval, you find no place to stay." If intermediate existence truly exists, how could the World-Honored One say that, in that interval, there is no place to stay at all? The intent of this verse is to show that, within human existence, one swiftly returns to dissolution, with no momentary pause at all. Or, alternatively: that very intermediate-existence being, in journeying toward its place of rebirth, likewise has no momentary pause, since its movement encounters no obstruction whatsoever. How, then, can it be known that the sutra's intent is as I have just explained, and not otherwise? But equally: how can you, in turn, know that it is otherwise, and not as I have explained? Since these two challenges are equally matched, why should you press the objection only in one direction? Both of these two readings are entirely consistent with the sutra, without any contradiction — how, then, can this verse be used to prove, one-sidedly, that intermediate existence does not exist? Whenever a citation is offered as proof, its reasoning ought to admit of no other possible interpretation; since this citation clearly admits of another interpretation, it fails to serve as valid proof.