Is Ignorance Something, or Nothing?

What is the meaning of "ignorance"? One might say: its essential nature is simply "not wisdom." If that is so, then ignorance would have to include even things like the eye. Given this problem, the meaning should instead be: ignorance is the absence of wisdom. If that is so, then ignorance would have no essential nature of its own at all. In order to show that it does have its own essential nature, without this being confused with anything else, verse: ignorance is what is remedied by wisdom — comparable to "non-friend," "non-truth," and the like. Prose: just as, with respect to friends, that which stands opposed to friends — an enemy — is called "non-friend" precisely because it is contrary to friendship, this "non-friend" is neither something entirely different from "friend" nor simply the absence of a friend. Truthful speech is called "truth"; that which is remedied by this — deceptive, false speech — is called "non-truth." This, too, is neither something entirely different from truth, nor simply the absence of truth. The word "and so on" is meant to indicate "non-dharma," "non-benefit," "non-thing," and similar terms — these, too, are neither something entirely different from their positive counterparts, nor simply their absence. In just the same way, ignorance has its own separate, real essential nature: it is what is remedied by wisdom, being neither something entirely different from wisdom nor simply the absence of wisdom. How is this known to be so? Because it is said to condition formations. There is, moreover, further decisive evidence. Verse: because it is spoken of as a fetter and the like; because it is not identical to afflicted wisdom accompanied by views; because it is associated with views; and because it is said to be capable of defiling wisdom. Prose: a sutra describes ignorance as a fetter, a bond, a latent tendency, a canker, a yoke, a flood, a stream, and so on. Neither something like the eye, nor a complete absence of anything at all, could possibly be described in these terms as a fetter and the rest — hence there must be a separate, real dharma that is called "ignorance." Just as a bad wife might loosely be called "no wife at all," so too should bad, afflicted wisdom be called "ignorance," rather than positing a separate entity. That afflicted wisdom, however, is not itself ignorance, since it possesses views. Defiled forms of wisdom are called "bad wisdom"; since views are present within this category, it cannot itself be ignorance. If that is so, then at least defiled wisdom that lacks views ought to be accepted as ignorance. It is not so, since ignorance is instead associated with views. If ignorance were itself a form of wisdom, it ought not to be associated with views — but no two distinct essences of wisdom can be mutually associated with each other. Moreover, it is said that ignorance is capable of defiling wisdom, as a sutra states: "Desire defiles the mind, preventing liberation; ignorance defiles wisdom, preventing purity." Wisdom cannot defile its own essential nature. Just as desire, being of a different category from mind, is capable of defiling the mind, ignorance too, being of a different category from wisdom, should likewise be capable of defiling it — why would this not be accepted?

Defiled forms of wisdom, intermixed with wholesome wisdom, causing it to become impure — this is what is meant by "defiling," just as desire "defiling the mind and preventing liberation" — must desire necessarily be currently manifest and associated with the mind at that very moment in order to be said to "defile" it? Rather, it is through the power of desire that the mind is bound and damaged, preventing liberation; only later, once that desire's habitual imprinting is eliminated, does the mind become liberated. In just the same way, ignorance defiles wisdom and renders it impure without being associated with wisdom at all — it is simply that ignorance damages and muddies wisdom. What principle does this distinction actually violate? Who, indeed, could refute a distinction of one's own making? Rather, ignorance exists as something genuinely distinct in kind from wisdom, just as desire is distinct from mind — this account should be accepted as correct. There is a further view that holds all afflictions are simply ignorance — this too should be refuted by the very same reasoning as before. If all afflictions were simply ignorance, then, among the fetters and so forth, there ought to be no separate listing of other afflictions; nor should ignorance be said to be "associated with" views and the rest, since views could not be associated with themselves. Or, it ought also to be said that ignorance "defiles the mind" directly — and if it is claimed that these various statements are simply speaking with reference to specific distinctions, then a general name should not be applied to defiled wisdom specifically. Since it has now been established that ignorance has its own separate essential nature, its specific characteristic should be stated: it is the failure to correctly know the truths, karma, and its results. But what, precisely, does "failure to correctly know" amount to? Is it something distinct from correct knowing, or is it simply the absence of correct knowing? Either answer runs into the same difficulty already discussed regarding ignorance itself. This refers to the separate, real dharma that is remedied by correct knowing. But this, too, is difficult to pin down — what, exactly, is its characteristic? A dharma of this basic kind simply must be described in just this way. As is said elsewhere: "What is the eye? It is the pure form that serves as the basis for eye-consciousness." Ignorance is just the same — it, too, can only be characterized by its function. The Bhadanta Dharmatrāta states: this ignorance is sentient beings' "class-nature" of relying upon a self, distinct from the conceit of self. What is this "class-nature"? A sutra states: "Now that I have thus known, and thus seen, all craving, all views, all class-nature, all attachment to self and what belongs to self, all conceit of self, and all latent tendencies have been cut off through complete understanding, leaving no trace, utterly quiescent" — from this it is known that "class-nature" is distinct from "the conceit of self." But how is it known that this "class-nature" is precisely ignorance? Because it cannot be said to be any of the other afflictions. But could it not equally be said to be some other kind of conceit, and so on? If we were to investigate this matter down to its finest details, the discussion would become excessively elaborate — let us, for now, set it aside.

What is the meaning of "name-and-form"? Form has already been discussed earlier; only "name" remains to be discussed here. Verse: "name" refers to the four formless aggregates. Prose: why are the four formless aggregates called "name"? Because, in accordance with the power of whatever name is assigned to them by way of a faculty and its object, their meaning is transformed — hence they are called "name." How, then, are they "transformed by the power of a name"? In accordance with the various names commonly established by convention in the world, they are variously transformed and made to convey their respective meanings — just as with names like "cow," "horse," "color," "flavor," and so on. Why, then, are they specifically labeled with the term "name"? Because they turn and take hold of their respective objects. Moreover, they resemble a name, since they are revealed in accordance with a name. There is a further view held by other masters: the four formless aggregates, having relinquished this body, turn and proceed onward to another life — this turning is comparable to a name — hence they are labeled with the term "name."

What is the meaning of "contact"? Verse: there are six kinds of contact, produced by a threefold union. Prose: contact is of six kinds — namely, eye-contact, up through mind-contact. What, then, is this contact? It is produced by a threefold union: that is, because faculty, object, and consciousness come together in union, a distinct contact is produced. As for the first five kinds of contact, their threefold union is unproblematic, since faculty, object, and consciousness are accepted as arising simultaneously in these cases. But the mind-faculty belongs to the past, its object may belong to the future, and mental consciousness belongs to the present — how, then, can these three unite? This very relationship is itself what is meant by "union": that is, the relationship of cause and result is thereby established between them. Or, alternatively, they are called "united" because they share a single common result: that is, faculty, object, and consciousness, all three together, jointly conduce to producing contact.

On this point, the masters' understanding differs. There is a view that holds: the threefold union itself is precisely what is called "contact." This view cites a sutra as evidence, which states: "These three dharmas, gathered together in union, are called contact." There is a further view that holds: contact is a separate dharma, associated with mind, produced by the threefold union. This view, too, cites a sutra as evidence, which states: "What are the six sixes? First, the six internal sense-bases; second, the six external sense-bases; third, the six consciousness-bodies; fourth, the six contact-bodies; fifth, the six feeling-bodies; sixth, the six craving-bodies." In this sutra, six kinds of contact are described separately, beyond faculty, object, and consciousness — hence contact must be a separate, real entity. Those who hold that the threefold union itself is what is called "contact" explain the latter citation by saying: it is not the case that, simply because something is stated separately, it must therefore have a separate essential nature. Then feeling and craving, too, should not be subsumed under the dharma-sense-field — yet no such fault is found in their case, since, apart from craving and feeling, contact still has a further, remaining essential nature belonging to the dharma-sense-field. In your own position, apart from contact there is nothing further beyond the three — so contact could, at most, be spoken of as merely a way of referring to the distinction among these three. But although there can be faculty and object without consciousness being produced, there is never consciousness without it relying on faculty and object; hence, since the three have already been mentioned, to additionally and separately mention "contact" would render it entirely superfluous. There is a further attempt at rescue: not every instance of eye and form serves as a cause for eye-consciousness, and not every instance of eye-consciousness is a result of eye and form. Whatever does not stand in this specific causal relationship is spoken of separately as merely "the three"; whatever is actually subsumed under this cause-and-result relationship is collectively established as "contact." Those who hold that contact is a separate entity apart from the threefold union explain the earlier-cited sutra passage differently: they say the sutra recited in their own school's tradition differs from this citation; or, alternatively, even granting the citation, the name of the result may be figuratively applied to its cause, as when it is said "the arising of Buddhas is bliss." In this way, each side raises further objections and counter-explanations against the other, back and forth — since the discussion would become excessively elaborate, let us, for now, set it aside.

Nevertheless, the Ābhidharmikas maintain that contact is indeed a separate, real entity, and the six kinds of contact already discussed can be further recombined into two. Verse: the first five are associated with resistance; the sixth, together with them, is designation-contact. Prose: the contact of the eye and the other four physical senses is called "resistant contact," because it depends on faculties that possess resistance. The sixth, mind-contact, is called "designation-contact." Why is this so? "Designation" refers to a name, and a name is the extended object that mind-contact takes as its object; hence, specifically with reference to this, it is called "designation-contact." As is said: eye-consciousness is able only to apprehend blue but cannot apprehend that "this is blue," whereas mental consciousness apprehends blue and also apprehends that "this is blue" — hence it is called "extended." Thus "resistant contact" is named from what it depends on, while "designation-contact" is named from what it takes as its object. There is a further view: mental speech serves as the dominant factor by which the mind turns toward its object, which the five sense-consciousnesses do not do; therefore mental consciousness alone is called "designation," and what is associated with it is called "designation-contact." On this view, too, "resistant contact" is named from what it depends on, while "designation-contact" is named from what it is associated with. These same six kinds of contact, further divided according to their distinct associations, in turn become eight kinds. Verse: associated with clarity, with ignorance, or with neither of the two; the remainder is the contaminated-wholesome and the non-obscuring-neutral; associated with craving and with hostility are two more; and conducing to pleasure and the rest are three further kinds. Prose: through association with clarity, ignorance, and so on, contact becomes three kinds — first, clarity-contact; second, ignorance-contact; third, contact that is neither clarity nor ignorance. These three, respectively, should be understood as contact associated with the uncontaminated, with the afflicted, and with the remainder. "The remainder" means what is left over after the uncontaminated and the afflicted — namely, the contaminated-but-wholesome and the non-obscuring-neutral. Within ignorance-contact, a certain portion arises repeatedly; on this basis, craving-contact and hostility-contact are further established, since the latent tendencies of craving and hostility are, respectively, associated with it. Gathering all of these together, contact further becomes three more kinds: first, contact conducive to pleasant feeling; second, contact conducive to painful feeling; third, contact conducive to neither-painful-nor-pleasant feeling. These three are called "conducive to feeling" because they give rise to pleasant feeling and the rest, or because they are, in a sense, apprehended by pleasant feeling and the rest, or because they serve as the supporting basis for feeling's own mode of activity. How is it that contact is "apprehended" by feeling's mode of activity? Because feeling's supporting mode of activity closely resembles contact, since it arises in dependence upon contact. In this way, altogether, contact is combined into sixteen kinds.

What is the meaning of "feeling"? Verse: from these six kinds of contact arise six feelings; five belong to the body, the remaining one to the mind. Prose: from the six kinds of contact discussed above, six feelings are produced — namely, the feeling produced by eye-contact, up through the feeling produced by mind-contact. Of these six, the first five are called "bodily feelings," because they depend on the physical faculties. The feeling produced by mind-contact is called "mental feeling," because it depends only on the mind. Does feeling arise after contact, or simultaneously with it? The Vaibhāṣikas hold that the two arise at the same time, because contact and feeling reciprocally serve as each other's co-existent cause. But how can two dharmas that arise simultaneously stand in a relationship of producer and produced? This relationship can indeed be established. How can it be established? Because a thing has no causal efficacy — with respect to a dharma that has already arisen, no other dharma has any further capacity to produce it. This is no different in meaning from the very position being asserted — merely restating that two dharmas which arise simultaneously cannot be established as producer and produced, and that with respect to an already-arisen dharma no other dharma has capacity, says the same thing over again; what use is there in repeating it? If that is so, then there follows the fault of the two mutually producing each other. This is granted, and so it is no fault at all: our own school accepts that the two serve as each other's co-existent cause, and are also mutually each other's result. Though you may grant this, the sūtras do not accept that these two serve as cause and result for each other. The sūtras state only: "eye-contact serves as a condition producing the feeling produced by eye-contact" — never has any sūtra stated that "eye-feeling serves as a condition producing the contact produced by eye-feeling." Moreover, this position is unreasonable, since it transgresses the principle that a producing dharma must be distinct in time from what it produces. Whenever a dharma is definitively established as capable of producing another dharma, this dharma and that dharma are definitively established as occurring at distinct times — as with seed preceding sprout, milk preceding curd, striking preceding sound, mental contact preceding consciousness, and so forth: cause preceding result in this way is not without definitive precedent. But there are also definitively established cause-and-result relationships that are simultaneous — as with eye-consciousness and the rest, which occur together with eye and form. It is likewise accepted here that the four great elements occur together with the derived form they produce, and that the preceding faculty-and-object condition is able to give rise to the subsequent consciousness, just as a preceding aggregation of great elements gives rise to a subsequent derived form. By what principle could this be denied? Is a shadow not simultaneous with the body that casts it?

There is a further view: feeling arises only after contact. Faculty and object come first; consciousness then arises; and it is the union of these three that is called "contact" — then, in a third moment, feeling arises in dependence on contact. If that is so, then not every instance of consciousness would have feeling, and not every instance of consciousness would be contact. No such fault follows. Because of contact occurring at a prior moment, feeling arises at the moment of the subsequent contact; hence at every moment of contact, feeling is invariably present, and there is no instance of consciousness's essential nature that is not contact. This is not tenable. What principle does it violate? Namely: there are sometimes cases where two moments of contact have different objects, yet feeling is said, on this account, to arise from the prior moment's contact at the position of the subsequent contact. How could feeling with a different object arise from contact with a different object? It should instead be accepted that feeling is associated with this particular mind without needing to share an identical object with this mind. Given this, then, if it is accepted that only three things need combine to constitute contact, consciousness could be contact without feeling. Even prior to this position, there could be consciousness together with feeling whose essential nature is nevertheless not contact, simply because of a deficiency in the necessary conditions — what fault would this entail? If that is so, this would undermine the ten mahābhūmika dharmas, which are definitively held to invariably accompany every class of mind. On what scriptural authority is this "invariable accompaniment" established? It is established on the authority of the foundational treatise. We take only the sūtras as our authoritative standard; the foundational treatise is not an authoritative standard — what fault is there in undermining it? For the World-Honored One has said: one should rely on the authority of the sūtras. Or else, perhaps the doctrine of the mahābhūmika dharmas need not require that they pervade every class of mind. If that is so, then what does "mahābhūmika dharma" even mean? There are three grounds: first, the ground possessing both investigation and analysis; second, the ground lacking investigation but possessing only analysis; third, the ground lacking both investigation and analysis. There are, further, three grounds: first, the wholesome ground; second, the unwholesome ground; third, the neutral ground. There are, further, three grounds: first, the ground of the trainee; second, the ground of the one beyond training; third, the ground that is neither trainee nor beyond training. A dharma present in all of the aforementioned grounds is called a "mahābhūmika dharma." A dharma present only within the wholesome grounds is called a "great wholesome-ground dharma." A dharma present only within the afflicted grounds is called a "great afflicted-ground dharma." Dharmas of these kinds each arise in succession as appropriate, rather than all arising together at once. Other masters say that the so-called "great unwholesome-ground dharmas" were brought in through textual recitation and represent a later addition, not part of the original recitation. Returning to the main debate: if feeling arises only after contact, how is the following sūtra passage to be explained? As the sūtra states: "eye and form serve as conditions producing eye-consciousness; the union of the three is contact, together with which feeling, perception, and volition arise." The passage merely says they "arise together" — it does not say that contact itself is among what arises together with feeling and the rest; how does this conflict with our own position, such that it would need to be explained away? Moreover, the word "together" is also used even for what is merely immediately successive, as the sūtra states: "cultivating the mindfulness awakening-factor, practiced together with loving-kindness" — hence that passage does not prove simultaneity. If that is so, then why does the sūtra state: "this is feeling, this is perception, this is volition, this is consciousness — these dharmas, being intermixed, are inseparable; hence there is no consciousness apart from feeling" and so on? This should now be carefully considered — what does "intermixed" actually mean? This same sūtra further states: "whatever is felt is exactly what is thought; whatever is thought is exactly what is perceived; whatever is perceived is exactly what is cognized." It is not yet clear here whether this is said with reference to a shared object, or with reference to a single moment. Since a similarly "intermixed" way of speaking is also used for the simultaneous arising of lifespan and vital warmth, it can be inferred by analogy that this statement, too, must be made with reference to a single moment rather than strict identity. Moreover, the sūtra speaks of contact as "the union of the three" — how, then, could there be consciousness that is not part of this threefold union? Or, conversely, might there be a threefold union not yet called "contact"? For these reasons, it should be definitively accepted that every instance of consciousness invariably has contact accompanying it, and that no instance of contact whatsoever fails to arise together with feeling and the rest.

The digression has now concluded; the main topic should be addressed. Verse: this further becomes eighteen, on account of the differences among the mental examinations. Prose: within the single mental feeling briefly discussed earlier, on account of the differences among the "mental examinations," it further divides into eighteen. It should be understood that the word "further" here indicates that this builds upon, and follows on from, what came before. What are these eighteen mental examinations? Namely, joy, grief, and equanimity, each with six examinations. Why, then, are these established as eighteen? If classified by essential nature, there ought to be only three, since joy, grief, and equanimity differ in essential nature. If classified by association, there ought to be only one, since all of them alike are associated with mind. If classified by object, there ought to be only six, since form and the other five objects serve as their objects. Since this instead becomes eighteen, the classification is complete precisely by way of all three factors together. Among these, fifteen of them — the examinations concerning form and the rest — are called "non-mixed-object" examinations, because their objects are each distinct; the three dharma-examinations, by contrast, are of both kinds. What does the term "mental examination" mean to indicate? Tradition holds: joy and the rest serve as a proximate condition for the mind, because the mind, by their power, repeatedly roams about among its objects. There is a further view: joy and the rest are themselves capable of serving as this proximate condition, causing the mind to repeatedly roam about its object. Why is bodily feeling not a mental examination? It is not called "proximate" to mind, since it does not depend on mind alone; and it is also not "roaming," since it lacks discrimination. Why is the pleasure faculty of the mental ground in the third dhyāna not included among the mental examinations? Tradition holds: because, at that level, there is no pleasure faculty associated with mental consciousness, and also because there is no mental-ground examination classed under a corresponding pain faculty to pair it with. If mental examination pertains only to the mental ground, then why does the sūtra state: "having seen form with the eye, one gives rise to a joy-examination with regard to agreeable form," and so on as fully explained in the sūtra? This refers to mental-ground examinations of joy and the rest that are induced by way of the five sense-consciousness bodies; hence it is spoken of in this way — just as the contemplation of impurity is induced by way of eye-consciousness, even though this contemplation of impurity itself belongs exclusively to the mental ground. Moreover, that sūtra passage says "having seen form with the eye," and so on as fully explained — hence this should not be raised as an objection. Even where there is no seeing at all, joy, grief, and equanimity that arise once mere contact has occurred are likewise mental examinations. Were it otherwise, then within the desire realm there could be no mental examinations taking form belonging to the form realm as their object; and within the form realm there could be no mental examinations at all taking desire-realm smell, taste, or touch objects as their object. The phrase "having seen form," and so on, is spoken merely for the sake of clear illustration; joy, grief, and equanimity arising with regard to sound and the rest, once form and the like have already been seen, are likewise mental examinations — this is said merely to avoid confusion, since it is specifically with regard to this that the fixed correspondence between faculty and object is being established. Is it the case that form and the like can, respectively, give rise to only a single one among joy and the other two examinations? There is a view that this should be understood in terms of continuity across a mental stream, rather than strictly in terms of the object itself.

Among the mental examinations, how many are bound to the desire realm? How many objects can the desire realm's mental examinations take? The same question should be asked regarding the form and formless realms. Verse: desire-bound, taking desire-realm objects: eighteen; taking form-realm objects: twelve; taking what is above: three. The two [first two dhyānas], taking desire-realm objects: twelve; eight take their own realm, two take the formless. The latter two [dhyānas], taking desire-realm objects: six; four take their own realm, one takes what is above. The first formless sphere's proximate stage, taking form-realm objects: four, of which one [pertains to its own]. The four fundamental [formless attainments] and the three peripheral [levels], each has only one, taking only its own object. Prose: what is bound to the desire realm possesses all eighteen; the number of these that take desire-realm objects is likewise eighteen. Those taking form-realm objects number only twelve, excluding the six associated with smell and taste, since the form realm has no such objects. Those taking formless-realm objects number only three, since the formless realm has none of the five objects such as form. Having discussed what is bound to the desire realm, what is bound to the form realm should now be discussed. The first two dhyānas possess only twelve, that is, excluding the six associated with grief. Those taking desire-realm objects are likewise reckoned at twelve; excluding the four associated with smell and taste, the remaining eight take their own realm as object, and two of these — the dharma-examinations — take the formless realm as object. The third and fourth dhyānas possess only six, namely equanimity-examinations; taking desire-realm objects, this too can number six. Excluding the two associated with smell and taste, the remaining four take their own realm as object, and one of these — the dharma-examination — takes the formless realm as object. Having discussed what is bound to the form realm, what is bound to the formless realm should now be discussed. The proximate stage of the sphere of infinite space possesses only four kinds, namely equanimity-examinations taking only form, sound, touch, and dharma as their objects. Those taking the fourth dhyāna as object likewise possess these same four kinds — this is said according to the position that accepts a distinct object for each; if one holds that this ground takes only what is below it as a single undifferentiated object, then there is only a single mixed-object dharma-examination. Taking the formless realm as object, there is only one, namely the dharma-examination accompanying any of the four faculties; the fundamental grounds and the three peripheral spheres have only one, namely the dharma-examination, which takes only its own realm as object, since none of the formless realm's fundamental attainments take what is below as object, and since the three peripheral spheres do not take form as object. The meaning of "not taking what is below as object" will be discussed later. Do these mental examinations extend to the uncontaminated? Verse: the eighteen are exclusively contaminated. Prose: since no mental examination extends to the uncontaminated, it is said that all eighteen are exclusively contaminated.

Who possesses how many of the mental examinations? Namely, for one born in the desire realm: if one has not yet attained a wholesome mind of the form realm, one possesses all of the desire-realm examinations, eight belonging to the first two dhyānas, four belonging to the third and fourth dhyānas, and one belonging to the formless realm — since whatever is possessed in these higher realms never takes what is below as object, being exclusively afflicted in that capacity. If one has already attained a wholesome mind of the form realm but has not yet become free of desire-realm craving, one possesses all of the desire-realm examinations, and ten belonging to the first dhyāna; the rest are as stated above. Within the first dhyāna, one possesses only the four joy-examinations, since the afflicted type does not take the lower smell and taste objects as object. The equanimity-examinations are possessed in full, as six, since a wholesome mind in the stage of access concentration is able to take smell and taste as objects. The remaining cases should be understood accordingly, by the same principle. If one is born in the form realm, one possesses only a single desire-realm equanimity dharma-examination, namely the one accompanying a mind capable of producing effects in the lower realm.

There is a view that these mental examinations are established by the Vaibhāṣikas according to their own systematic reasoning. However, my own reading of the sūtra's meaning differs from this. Why is this? It is not the case that, merely because a given ground has already attained freedom from affliction with respect to a certain object, a mental examination arises taking that object — hence it is not the case that all contaminated instances of joy, grief, and equanimity are included among the mental examinations. Only when these feelings are afflicted, drawing the mind along and causing it to repeatedly move toward its object, are they mental examinations. What does it mean for a feeling to draw the mind along and cause it to repeatedly move toward an object? It is through craving, or through aversion, or through an indiscriminate equanimity. In order to counteract this, the six constant abodes are taught: namely, having seen a form, one feels neither joy nor grief, the mind constantly abiding in equanimity, endowed with mindfulness and correct discernment — and so it is fully explained, up through, likewise, cognizing a dharma. It is not that the arhat has no worldly joy at all arising with reference to wholesome dharmas — this is stated only in order to preclude afflicted examination. Moreover, joy and the rest constitute what is called the thirty-six master-verses, namely, distinguished according to whether they serve as a basis for indulgence or for renunciation. This distinction in wording comes from the Great Teacher's own statement. "Basis for indulgence" refers to afflicted feelings; "basis for renunciation" refers to wholesome feelings. The feeling thus discussed should be understood as belonging among the links.

The distinctions in meaning across the twelve links are limitless — why, then, does the treatise not discuss the remaining links in similar detail? Verse: the rest have already been discussed, or will be discussed later. Prose: the remaining links have either already been discussed, or will be discussed later; hence they are not treated here. Among these, the consciousness-link has already been discussed earlier — consciousness means each respective act of discernment, and this is precisely what is called the mind-sense-field and so forth. The six-sense-bases link has likewise already been discussed earlier — the pure form on which consciousness depends is called the eye and the other four faculties, and so on. The formations-link has two aspects, to be discussed in the chapter on karma. The craving- and grasping-links will be discussed in the chapter on the latent afflictions.

These twelve links of dependent origination, in condensed form, can be established as three: affliction, karma, and the matter of ripened result. External similes should be adduced to reveal their distinct functions. Verse: here, affliction is spoken of as like a seed, and also like a dragon, like a grass-root or a tree-trunk, and like husk wrapping rice; karma is like husked rice, like a medicinal herb, and like a flower; the matter of ripened result is like cooked food. Prose: how do these three resemble one another, the way sprout and leaf and the rest arise from a seed? From affliction, affliction and the matter of karma are produced, just as a dragon dwelling in a pool keeps its water perpetually from drying up. Affliction dwells over karma, causing birth to continue on without end, just as a grass-root, if not uprooted, will sprout again and again no matter how many times its shoots are cut. If affliction's root is not uprooted, then even once it tends toward cessation, it arises again — just as a tree-trunk repeatedly puts forth branches, flowers, and fruit. From afflictions repeatedly arising, the matter of delusion and karma is produced — just as husk wrapping rice is able to produce a sprout and the rest, though the rice inside is not alone able to do so; or, once karma has acquired its wrapping of affliction, it is able to bring about a further rebirth, though karma alone is not able to bring this about. Affliction's likeness to a seed and the rest should be understood in this way. Just as rice, when it has its husk, is able to produce a sprout and the rest, so karma, when it has affliction, is able to invite a ripened result. Just as a medicinal herb reaches maturity as the final stage of a fruit's ripening, so, once karma's result has ripened, it does not invite any further ripened result. Just as a flower serves as the proximate cause for a fruit's production, so karma serves as the proximate cause capable of producing a ripened result. Karma's likeness to rice and the rest should be understood in this way. Just as cooked food is only meant to be consumed, and cannot be turned back into some other kind of food, so, once the matter of ripened result has already ripened, it cannot bring about a further rebirth's ripened result. If ripened results could bring about further rebirths, and those further rebirths could bring about still further ones, there would be no liberation at all. Ripened result's likeness to food should be understood in this way.

In this way, dependent origination's matters of affliction and karma, in their birth-after-birth continuation, never exceed the four states of existence: the intermediate, the birth, the fundamental, and the death states, as already explained earlier. The question of whether these are afflicted or unafflicted, and whether they exist in the three realms, should now be briefly discussed. Verse: among the four kinds of existence, the birth-state alone is invariably afflicted, through affliction belonging to its own realm; the other three, in the formless realm, are three. Prose: among the four states of existence, the birth-state alone is afflicted. Through what affliction? Through the afflictions belonging to its own realm — that is, wherever this state is born, all of that realm's afflictions defile this state's birth-existence. Hence the Ābhidharmikas all uniformly say: among all afflictions, there is not a single one that lacks the capacity to nourish the position of rebirth-linking. Yet this rebirth-linking occurs solely through the power of affliction, not through afflictions currently manifesting and arising by their own power — for even though, at this juncture, mind and body are dim and weak, affliction nevertheless becomes manifest through the power induced by its own repeated past arising, or by what is currently proximate. It should be understood that the very first moment of the intermediate-existence's continuity must likewise necessarily be afflicted, just like the birth-existence. However, each of the other three states of existence — the fundamental, the death, and the intermediate — is, individually, of all three moral qualities: wholesome, afflicted, and neutral. In the formless realm, the intermediate existence is excluded from these three, since, in that realm, there is no place set apart from another in the way that would allow for an intermediate existence traveling toward some other place to be posited. The verse does not mention the desire and form realms, and from this it is known that all four states of existence are accepted as present within them.

Sentient beings' dependent origination has now been fully discussed; by what do these sentient beings subsist? Verse: sentient beings subsist by nutriment. Edible food, in the desire realm, has only three as its essential nature; not form — it cannot benefit the faculties, and one who is liberated is exempted from it. Contact, volition, and consciousness — these three nutriments, being contaminated, extend throughout the three realms. The one called "mind-made," and "one seeking birth," feeding on fragrance, arises with the arising of the intermediate existence. The first two nutriments benefit this present existence — the support, and what is supported, respectively; the latter two, with respect to a future existence, draw it forth and cause it to arise, in that same order. Prose: a sūtra states: the World-Honored One, having himself awakened to a single dharma, correctly and fully awakened to it and correctly proclaimed it, namely, that there is not a single sentient being who does not subsist by nutriment. What are these nutriments? Nutriment is of four kinds: first, edible food; second, contact; third, volition; fourth, consciousness. Edible food is of two kinds, namely, subtle and coarse. "Subtle" refers to the food of intermediate-existence beings, since fragrance serves as their food, and also to the food of the gods at the eon's beginning, since it undergoes no impure transformation — like oil poured onto sand, which disperses and permeates every part. Or, the food of subtle, impure insects and infants may also be called "subtle"; the opposite of this is called "coarse." Edible food of this kind exists only in the desire realm, since one is reborn into the higher realms precisely by becoming free of craving for edible food; hence it is bound exclusively to the desire realm.

Fragrance, flavor, and touch — all three of these constitute edible food's own essential substance, since they can be divided into discrete morsels and eaten, being received bit by bit through the mouth and nose. How can light, shadow, warmth, and coolness constitute food? Tradition holds that this way of speaking is stated with reference to the majority of cases. Moreover, even though they are not eaten or drunk, they are nevertheless able to sustain the body, and so are likewise included among subtle food — as with anointing or bathing the body. Visible form, too, could seem to be divisible into morsels and eaten — why, then, is it not counted as food? Because it is unable to benefit the faculty it corresponds to, and because one who is liberated is exempted from it. Now, what is properly called "food" must first nourish and benefit one's own faculties and their great elements, only afterward extending to anything else. When form is eaten or drunk, it does not even benefit one's own faculty and its great elements, much less extend any benefit further, since the various faculties and their respective objects are each entirely distinct from one another. When it sometimes happens that seeing a form gives rise to joy and pleasure, this arises from the contact conditioned by that form — it is this contact that is the nutriment, not the form itself. Moreover, non-returners and arhats, being free of craving for food, gain no benefit even when they see all manner of exquisite food and drink.

Contact refers to whatever kinds of contact are produced from the threefold union; volition refers to mental karma; consciousness refers to the consciousness aggregate. These three are exclusively contaminated, yet they are present throughout all three realms. How is it that the essential nature of nutriment does not extend to the uncontaminated? The Vaibhāṣikas explain it thus: to be capable of sustaining continued existence is precisely what it means to be nutriment, whereas the arising of uncontaminated cultivation is for the sake of extinguishing all forms of existence. Moreover, a sūtra states: nutriment is of four kinds, capable of causing already-born sentient beings to abide, and capable of sustaining those who seek birth. The uncontaminated is not like this; hence it does not belong to nutriment's essential nature. The term "already-born" indicates the sense of having-already-arisen: once born into any destiny, one is universally said to be "already-born." What, then, does "one seeking birth" refer to? This refers to the intermediate-existence being, since the Buddha, the World-Honored One, described the intermediate existence by five names.

What are these five? First, "mind-made," since it is produced from mind, not brought about through the union of external conditions such as sperm and blood and the like. Second, "one seeking birth," since it constantly delights in seeking out its coming place of birth. Third, "one who feeds on fragrance," since its body is sustained by fragrance-food as it travels to its place of birth. Fourth, "intermediate existence," since it consists of the aggregates present between two destinies. Fifth, "arising," since it arises only briefly, oriented toward the birth it is about to undergo. As a sūtra states: "there is the arising of a decaying own-body, and there is the birth of a decaying world" — "arising" here refers to the intermediate existence.

Moreover, a sūtra states: there is a kind of person who has cut off the fetter of "arising" but has not yet cut off the fetter of "birth." In this sūtra, four alternatives are explained in full: those who have become free of craving for both the form and formless realms and stream upward to a higher rebirth constitute the first alternative; those who attain nirvana in the interval constitute the second alternative; arhats constitute the third alternative; and whatever remains, excluding the aforementioned characteristics, constitutes the fourth alternative. Moreover, "already-born" refers to arhats, while those who still have craving remaining are called "seekers of birth."

How many nutriments cause already-born beings to abide? How many nutriments sustain those who seek birth? The Vaibhāṣikas say both are fully endowed with all four. Those who still have craving are also sustained by edible food as a condition, which brings about a further existence, since the World-Honored One said all four nutriments serve as conditions for disease, boils, the arrow of affliction, aging, and death. It is also observed that volition-food alone is capable of sustaining the present body.

It is a traditionally transmitted account: once, there was a father who, encountering a time of famine, wished to travel to another region. Being himself famished and weak, and having two small infant children whom he wished to bring along but lacked the strength to carry, he filled a bag with ash and hung it on the wall, comforting his two children by telling them it was a bag of roasted flour. The two children, hoping for this food, thereby prolonged their lives for a long while; later, someone came, took down the bag, and opened it — the children, seeing it was only ash, lost all hope and immediately died. Again, there were merchants at sea who, meeting with disaster, lost their ship along with all their food and drink; gazing into the distance at a mass of foam, they mistook it for the shore, and, hoping to reach it swiftly, thereby prolonged their lives for a time — but once they came close enough to touch it and realized it was not what they had hoped, they lost all hope and immediately died. The Saṃgītiparyāya states: in the great ocean there is a great creature that comes ashore to lay its eggs, buries them in the sand, and returns to the sea; if the mother continually thinks of her eggs, they do not spoil, but if she loses this thought, the eggs immediately decay and perish. This should not be taken literally, since it would violate the very meaning of "nutriment" — how could another being's volition sustain one's own body? The correct principle should instead state that it is the eggs' own continual thought of their mother that keeps them from rotting, and that when this thought is forgotten, they perish. The arising of this thought of the mother occurs at the stage of contact, and it is precisely all contaminated dharmas of this kind that nourish and extend existence.

If this is so, then how is it that the World-Honored One spoke of only four nutriments? Even so, speaking in terms of what is most excellent, stating four involves no error. That is: the first two nutriments are able to benefit this body's support and what is supported by it, while the latter two are able to draw forth a future existence and cause it to arise. By "support" is meant the physical body endowed with faculties; edible food is able to nourish this. By "what is supported" is meant mind and mental factors; contact-food is able to nourish these. These two nutriments, with respect to an existence already brought into being, have the most excellent nourishing function. By "future existence" is meant a birth yet to come; with respect to that coming birth, volition-food is able to draw it forth. Once volition has drawn it forth, the power of the seed of consciousness, perfumed by karma, is able to bring about the subsequent existence. These two nutriments, with respect to an existence not yet brought into being, have the most excellent function of drawing forth and giving rise. Hence, although all contaminated dharmas nourish existence, in terms of their most excellent function, only four are spoken of as nutriment. The first two are like a nursing mother, since they nourish what has already been born; the latter two are like a birth mother, since they give birth to what has not yet been born.

Is everything that is edible-substance necessarily nutriment? There is edible-substance that is not nutriment — a four-cornered analysis should be made. The first alternative: that which, as a condition of being eaten or drunk, damages the faculties and the great elements. The second alternative: the remaining three nutriments. The third alternative: that which, as a condition of being eaten or drunk, nourishes and benefits the faculties and the great elements. The fourth alternative: excluding the aforementioned characteristics. In the same way, contact and the rest, each as appropriate, should likewise be understood to each admit of a fourfold analysis. Could there be a case of contact and the rest serving as a condition that nourishes and benefits the faculties and great elements, and yet is not nutriment? There is: namely, uncontaminated contact and the like belonging to a different ground. Even the body of one who has already eaten and then abstains from food is still called "nutriment," since it continues to provide initial benefit. The Vaibhāṣikas state: food performs the function of nutriment at two distinct times, and is called nutriment in both cases — first, at the moment of eating, when it removes hunger and thirst; second, once it has been digested, when it nourishes the faculties and the great elements.

How many nutriments does each destiny and each kind of birth possess? All five destinies and four kinds of birth possess all four nutriments. But how can hell possess edible food at all? Are not molten iron balls and boiling copper themselves edible food? If whatever is capable of causing harm could also be nutriment, this would contradict the fourfold analysis stated earlier. The Prakaraṇapāda, moreover, states: what is edible food? It is that which is capable of nourishing and benefiting the faculties and the great elements — and so on in full detail, up through consciousness-food as well. That statement speaks only with reference to what is capable of nourishing and benefiting, when it calls something "nutriment"; hence there is no actual contradiction. However, the molten iron balls and the like found in hell, even though they cause harm once eaten, are nevertheless able to temporarily relieve hunger and thirst, and so, having acquired the characteristic mark of food in this respect, they too are called nutriment. Moreover, the edible food of the solitary hells is like that of human beings. Hence all five destinies possess all four nutriments.

The World-Honored One has said: if a person is able to give food to a hundred non-Buddhist ascetics who are free of desire, and if one is able to give food to a single ordinary being dwelling in the Jambudvīpa forest, the result of this latter gift surpasses the former. What does "an ordinary being dwelling in the Jambudvīpa forest" refer to? There is an explanation offered: it refers to any and all embodied beings who dwell in Jambudvīpa. This explanation is unreasonable, since the passage speaks of a single particular individual. Moreover, if this reading were correct, then giving food to countless ordinary beings would reasonably surpass giving food to a mere handful of non-Buddhist desireless ascetics — but what would be remarkable about comparing and praising this as superior? There is a further view: this refers to a bodhisattva close to buddhahood. This, too, is unreasonable, since giving to such a being would obtain merit surpassing even giving to a hundred million arhats. The Vaibhāṣikas say: this ordinary being is one who has already attained the aids to penetration. This name and its meaning likewise do not correspond to each other: there has never been any sūtra or foundational treatise that states one who has attained the aids to penetration dwells in the Jambudvīpa forest — it should be understood that this is merely their own personal supposition.

It is the bodhisattva in his final existence, dwelling in the Jambudvīpa forest, who is called this "ordinary being." This explanation accords with reason: at that time, the bodhisattva is comparable to those desireless ascetics, and so the sūtra compares and praises giving to him as superior in relation to those ascetics — even though giving to the bodhisattva actually produces boundless, immeasurable merit. Building on the preceding comparison, the sūtra simply says it surpasses a hundred ascetics; this must necessarily be the reason for putting it this way. Afterward, the World-Honored One, setting aside this "ordinary being" comparison, instead compared non-Buddhist ascetics against a stream-enterer-candidate in order to assess their relative superiority. If it were not so, the World-Honored One would instead have had to compare that same "ordinary being" directly against the stream-enterer-candidate.

Sentient beings' dependent origination and sustenance have now been discussed. As previously mentioned regarding the exhaustion of the lifespan and death, this should now be properly addressed: which consciousness is present, and which feeling is associated, at death, birth, and so forth? Verse: severing wholesome roots and their continuation, becoming free of affliction, retrogression, death, and birth — these are accepted as occurring only in mental consciousness. Death and birth are associated only with equanimous feeling. Neither occurs in meditative absorption, nor in the two mindless states. The two states of entering nirvana are neutral. In gradual dying, consciousness ceases last at the feet, navel, or heart; non-returners are not reborn. The severing of the vital point, and water and the rest. Prose: severing wholesome roots, their continuation, becoming free of affliction with respect to a given realm or ground, retrogressing from that freedom, dying, and taking rebirth — with respect to these six positions, it is a matter of natural principle that only mental consciousness, and no other kind, is accepted as being present. The term "birth" mentioned here should be understood to also include the initial moment of rebirth-linking in the intermediate existence. Death and birth are accepted as being associated only with equanimous feeling, since a mind associated with equanimity is not clear and sharp, whereas the other feelings, being clear and sharp, do not accord with dying or being born. Moreover, these two moments occur only in a scattered state, never in meditative absorption — wherever there is a position with mind at all, it must never be a mindless one. There is no sense in which death or birth could occur within an absorbed mind, since absorption belongs to a distinct realm or ground, since it arises only through preparatory effort, and since it is capable of drawing in only benefit.

Nor is there any sense in which death or birth could occur in a mindless state, since, within a mindless position, life necessarily suffers no damage. If the body one depends on is about to undergo destruction, the mind belonging to that support must necessarily re-arise first, and only then does life actually come to an end — there is no other way to account for it. Moreover, one who is mindless cannot take rebirth, since there would be no cause for it — apart from the arising of affliction, there is no taking of rebirth. Although it is said that the state of death is compatible with minds of all three moral qualities, entering nirvana is possible only through one of two neutral kinds of mind. Those who hold that the desire realm has a neutral karmic-ripening feeling say that the mind entering nirvana in the desire realm is endowed with both deportment-related and karmic-ripening-related neutral qualities. Those who hold that the desire realm lacks a neutral karmic-ripening feeling say that the mind entering nirvana in the desire realm has only the deportment-related quality, and lacks the karmic-ripening-related one. Why is it that only a neutral mind can enter nirvana? Because a neutral mind's force is faint, and thereby accords with the mind's own cessation.

At the position of life's ending, in which part of the body does consciousness cease last? For one who dies suddenly, mental consciousness and the body faculty vanish together all at once. But for one who dies gradually, going to a lower destiny, becoming a human, or being reborn in heaven, consciousness ceases, respectively, at the feet, the navel, or the heart, in that order. That is: for one falling into a bad destiny, called "going downward," consciousness ceases last at the location of the feet; for one going to the human destiny, consciousness ceases at the navel; for one going to be reborn in heaven, consciousness ceases at the location of the heart. Arhats are called "not reborn," and their final mind likewise ceases at the location of the heart. There is a further view held by other masters: that this cessation occurs at the crown of the head. At the very moment life ends, because the body faculty ceases at the feet and so on, mental consciousness ceases along with it. As life approaches its end, the body faculty gradually ceases, until, upon reaching the feet or wherever, it vanishes entirely all at once — like a small amount of water placed upon a scorching-hot stone, which gradually diminishes and evaporates until, in one final spot, it is entirely exhausted.

Moreover, one who dies gradually is, as life approaches its end, mostly beset by the painful feeling of the severing of a vital point. There is no separate substance actually called a "vital point"; rather, there is, within the body, a particular juncture which, once touched, brings about death — this is what is called the "vital point." If any one among water, fire, or wind becomes excessively predominant, it is as if a sharp blade were to touch this vital point; because of this, an intensified painful feeling arises, and from this, before long, death results. This is not "severing" in the sense of chopping firewood — it is called "severing" in the sense that, once severed, there is no more sensation. Why is it that the earth element has no such severing function? Because there is no fourth internal calamity corresponding to it. The three internal calamities are wind-disorder, heat-disorder, and phlegm-disorder, arising respectively from an excess of wind, fire, or water, as is appropriate to each. There is a view that these resemble the external world's three calamities.

This severing of the vital point does not occur among the gods. However, when a divine son is about to die, five kinds of minor decay-signs first appear: first, his clothing and ornaments emit unpleasant sounds; second, his own bodily radiance suddenly dims and weakens; third, at the time of bathing, water droplets cling to his body; fourth, his originally restless, wandering nature now becomes fixed on a single object; fifth, his eyes, originally still and unmoving, now blink repeatedly. The appearance of these five signs does not necessarily mean death is certain. There are, further, five kinds of major decay-signs: first, his garments become stained with dust; second, his flower garland withers; third, sweat appears from both armpits; fourth, a foul odor enters his body; fifth, he no longer delights in his own seat. The appearance of these five signs means death is certainly and definitely imminent.

With respect to sentient beings' arising, abiding, and perishing within this world, the World-Honored One established three assemblies. What are these three assemblies? Verse: the rightly-determined, the wrongly-determined, and the indeterminate assemblies — the noble ones, those who have committed a heinous crime, and the rest. Prose: first, the assembly rightly determined in nature; second, the assembly wrongly determined in nature; third, the assembly of indeterminate nature. What is called "right nature"? A sūtra states: craving is cut off without remainder, hatred is cut off without remainder, delusion is cut off without remainder. When all afflictions are cut off entirely without remainder, this is called "right nature." "Determined" refers to the noble ones — "noble" meaning one in whom the uncontaminated path has already arisen; because they are far removed from all evil dharmas, they are called "noble," having obtained the possession of ultimate freedom from bondage. Since they are certain to exhaust all affliction, they are called "rightly determined." Those who have already attained the aids to liberation are also certain to attain nirvana — why, then, are they not classified as "rightly determined"? Because they might still afterward fall into the wrongly-determined assembly. Moreover, the time at which they will attain nirvana is not yet fixed, unlike a stream-enterer, who is fixed at a maximum of seven more rebirths and so forth. Moreover, they have not yet been able to abandon the wrong nature; hence they are not called "rightly determined." What is called "wrong nature"? It refers to hell-beings, animals, and hungry ghosts — this is called "wrong nature." "Determined" here refers to the heinous crimes: one who commits a heinous crime is certain to fall into hell; hence this is called "wrongly determined." Whatever remains, apart from the rightly-determined and the wrongly-determined, is called "indeterminate nature," since it depends on two further conditions, being capable of becoming either of the two.