No Creator, Only Karma
Fascicle 13 opens Chapter 4 (分別業品第四之一, the Karma-nirdeśa, "Discrimination of Karma") — one of the Abhidharmakośa's most important chapters. Everything distinctive about the world, from a being's own body to the physical cosmos surrounding it, is attributed entirely to karma, with no creator god required. From karma's basic definition as volition, the fascicle moves through the momentariness proof, the long unresolved debate over whether unmanifested karma (avijñapti) is real matter or a mental continuum, and karma's material basis and moral classification across realms.
1. The World's Differences Come From Karma, Not a Creator
Why does the world contain such stark contrasts — delightful things like saffron and sandalwood alongside a body that constantly discharges impurity through its own openings? The treatise's answer is direct: there is no single, prior, all-knowing creator behind any of it, only the distinctions among sentient beings' own karma, which can bring about both an unpleasant body and delightful possessions from a single mixed karmic cause. Karma itself is defined simply: it is volition, and it is what volition produces through body and speech.
如前所說有情世間及器世間各多差別,如是差別由誰而生?頌曰:世別由業生,思及思所作,思即是意業,所作謂身語。論曰:非由一主先覺而生,但由有情業差別起。若爾,何故俱從業生?欝金栴檀等甚可愛樂,而內身形等與彼相違。以諸有情業類如是,若造雜業感內身形,於九瘡門常流不淨。為對治彼,感外具生色香味觸甚可愛樂。諸天眾等造純淨業,故彼所招二事俱妙。此所由業其體是何?謂心所思及思所作。故契經說:有二種業,一者思業、二思已業,思已業者謂思所作。如是二業分別為三,謂即有情身、語、意業。
As previously discussed, the world of sentient beings and the container world each display many distinctions — by what are these distinctions produced? Verse: the world's distinctions arise from karma; karma is volition, and what volition produces; volition itself is mental karma; what is produced is bodily and verbal karma. Prose: the world does not arise from any single, prior, all-knowing lord, but arises solely through the distinctions among sentient beings' own karma. If this is so, why do both pleasant and unpleasant things all arise from karma alike? Saffron, sandalwood, and the like are exceedingly delightful, and yet the body's own inner form is the very opposite of this. This is because sentient beings' types of karma are of this kind: if one commits mixed karma, this brings about an inner bodily form that continuously discharges impurity through its nine openings; but, in order to counteract this, that same mixed karma also brings about external possessions — form, fragrance, flavor, and touch — that are exceedingly delightful. The various hosts of gods, having committed purely wholesome karma, therefore have both of these two things equally excellent. What is the essential nature of this karma that serves as the cause? It is the mental factor of volition, and what that volition produces. Hence a sūtra states: there are two kinds of karma — first, volitional karma; second, karma-after-volition; karma-after-volition refers to what volition produces. These two kinds of karma, further distinguished, become three: namely, sentient beings' bodily, verbal, and mental karma.
The saffron-and-sandalwood example is doing careful work: rather than explaining pleasant and unpleasant circumstances as arising from entirely separate causes, the treatise attributes both the impurity of one's own body and the delight of one's external possessions to a single "mixed" karma — the same act can plant seeds for opposite kinds of result, depending on which aspect of the result is in question. This sets up the chapter's governing thesis in the most economical way possible: no creator, no dual cosmic principle of good and evil, just the internal structure of karma itself producing every contrast the world contains.
2. Three Karmas, Three Different Reasons for Being Three
The three kinds of karma could, in principle, be counted by their support, their own essential nature, or their arising-condition — but each of these criteria, applied uniformly, would actually collapse all three into just one kind. The Vaibhāṣikas resolve this by applying a different criterion to each: bodily karma by its support, verbal karma by its own nature, and mental karma by its arising-condition — meaning volition itself simply is mental karma, while its bodily and verbal effects are what that same volition gives rise to.
如何建立此三業耶?為約所依、為據自性、為就等起?縱爾何違?若約所依應唯一業,以一切業並依身故。若據自性應唯語是業,以三種中唯語即業故。若就等起亦應唯一業,以一切業皆意等起故。毘婆沙師說立三業,如其次第由上三因。然心所思即是意業,思所作業分為身、語二業,是思所等起故。
How are these three kinds of karma established? Is it on the basis of their support, their essential nature, or their arising-condition? Even granting any of these, what fault would follow? If established on the basis of support, there ought to be only a single kind of karma, since all karma alike depends upon the body. If established on the basis of essential nature, only verbal karma ought to count as karma, since, among the three, only speech is itself literally an act. If established on the basis of arising-condition, there ought likewise to be only a single kind of karma, since all karma alike arises from the condition of mind. The Vaibhāṣikas say that the three kinds of karma are established, in that same order, by the three reasons stated above. Thus, the mental factor of volition itself is precisely mental karma, while the karma produced by that volition divides into the two, bodily and verbal, since these are what that volition gives rise to as its arising-condition.
The rhetorical move here is worth noticing: rather than defending a single, uniform criterion for "what makes something a kind of karma," the Vaibhāṣikas openly apply three different criteria to the three different kinds — support for the bodily, essential nature for the verbal, arising-condition for the mental — and justify this by showing that any single uniform criterion would collapse the threefold division entirely. This is presented not as an ad hoc patch but as the only way to preserve a real, meaningful distinction that everyone already accepts must exist.
3. Is Bodily Action a Real Shape, or Just Motion? The Momentariness Argument
Bodily and verbal karma each turn out to have two aspects, manifest and unmanifest — and the treatise opens a famous debate over what bodily manifestation actually is. Against a rival school holding that bodily manifestation simply is motion, the treatise insists on a real, distinct shape instead, grounding the argument in this tradition's core doctrine of momentariness: since every conditioned thing ceases the very instant it arises, nothing ever literally travels from one place to another, so "motion" cannot be what bodily action fundamentally is.
身語二業自性云何?頌曰:此身語二業,俱表無表性。論曰:應知如是所說諸業中,身語二業俱表無表性。且身語表其相云何?頌曰:身表許別形,非行動為體,以諸有為法,有剎那盡故。應無無因故,生因應能滅,形亦非實有,應二根取故,無別極微故,語表許言聲。論曰:由思力故,別起如是如是身形,名身表業。有餘部說:動名身表,以身動時由業動故。為破此故,說非行動,以一切有為皆有剎那故。剎那何謂?得體無間滅,有此剎那法,名有剎那,如有杖人名為有杖。諸有為法纔得自體,從此無間必滅歸無。若此處生即此處滅,無容從此轉至餘方,故不可言動名身表。若有為法皆有剎那,不至餘方義可成立。
What is the essential nature of bodily and verbal karma? Verse: these two, bodily and verbal karma, both have the nature of manifest and unmanifest forms. Prose: it should be understood that, among the karmas thus discussed, both bodily and verbal karma possess the nature of both manifest and unmanifest karma. What, then, is the character of bodily and verbal manifestation? Verse: bodily manifestation is accepted as a distinct shape, not motion, as its essential nature, since all conditioned dharmas are momentary. If motion were accepted as real, the very cause that produces something would, absurdly, also be capable of destroying it. Shape, too, is not truly real on the opposing view, since form would then have to be apprehended by two different faculties at once. Since there is no separate atom corresponding to shape as such, verbal manifestation is accepted as speech-sound instead. Prose: through the power of volition, one specific bodily configuration or another is brought about — this is called bodily manifestation-karma. There is a further school that holds: motion is what is called bodily manifestation, since, when the body moves, this is because karma itself moves. In order to refute this, it is stated that bodily manifestation is not motion, since everything conditioned is momentary. What does "momentary" mean? It means that, immediately upon attaining its own essential nature, a thing ceases without interruption — a dharma possessing this characteristic is called "having momentariness," just as a man carrying a staff is called "one who has a staff." Every conditioned dharma, the very instant it attains its own essential nature, immediately and necessarily ceases, returning to non-existence. If something arises in a given place, it likewise ceases in that very same place — there is no possibility of it then transferring to move to some other location; hence it cannot be said that motion is what constitutes bodily manifestation. If it is established that all conditioned dharmas are momentary, then the principle that nothing literally travels to another location can likewise be established.
This is one of this tradition's most consequential doctrines put to direct practical use: momentariness isn't just an abstract metaphysical claim about conditioned phenomena in general, but is here doing the specific work of ruling out an entire rival account of what bodily action even is. If nothing literally persists long enough to travel anywhere, then "motion" cannot be a basic, real category — what looks like a hand moving across space must actually be a rapid succession of distinct, momentary configurations, each arising and perishing in its own single location, never actually traveling at all. "Shape" survives this argument specifically because a shape is something that can be truly present in a single instant, without requiring any of the cross-instant persistence that "motion" would require.
The verse's opening also drops a striking related claim in passing — that the rival school's account of bodily action leads to the absurdity of "the cause that produces something also being capable of destroying it" — which will be unpacked in the argument that follows. This fascicle has now opened one of the Abhidharmakośa's longest sustained philosophical debates, and the full case for momentariness itself is still to come.
4. Why Everything Ceases Without a Cause: The Proof of Momentariness
The treatise's proof of universal momentariness rests on a single sharp distinction: cessation is a non-existence, and only a positive effect can require a cause, so cessation itself needs no trigger at all — meaning everything conditioned must already be ceasing at every single instant, not waiting for some later destructive event. Against the common-sense objection that fire visibly destroys firewood, the treatise argues that what actually happens is simply that the earlier firewood ceases on its own and nothing new arises to replace it — exactly like a flame, a sound, or a thought, which everyone already accepts vanish instantaneously without needing an external cause of their own disappearance.
諸有為法皆有剎那,其理極成後必盡故,謂有為法滅不待因。所以者何?待因謂果,滅無非果,故不待因。滅既不待因,纔生已即滅。若初不滅,後亦應然,以後與初有性等故。既後有盡,知前有滅。若後有異方可滅者,不應即此而名有異。即此相異,理必不然。豈不世間現見薪等,由與火合故致滅無?定無餘量過現量者,故非法滅皆不待因。如何知薪等,由火合故滅?以薪等火合,後便不見故。應共審思,如是薪等,為由火合滅故不見?為前薪等生已自滅,後不更生無故不見,如風手合燈焰鈴聲?故此義成應由比量。何謂比量?謂如前說,滅無非果故不待因。又若待因薪等方滅,應一切滅無不待因,如生待因,無無因者。然世現見覺焰音聲,不待餘因剎那自滅,故薪等滅亦不待因。
That all conditioned dharmas are momentary is a principle already well established, since everything conditioned must necessarily come to an end. Why is this? Because conditioned dharmas' cessation does not depend upon any cause. Why is this so? Because whatever depends upon a cause is called an effect, and cessation, being a non-existence, cannot be an effect; hence it does not depend upon a cause. Since cessation does not depend on a cause, a thing ceases the very moment it has arisen. If a thing did not cease at its very first moment, then it should likewise not cease later either, since its later state has the same essential nature as its initial state. But since it plainly does eventually come to an end, we may infer that it must have already been ceasing all along. If it could only cease once it had become "different" at some later point, then it should not be called "the same thing" that has become different — yet this very same thing becoming different is, in fact, not tenable. Is it not commonly observed in the world that firewood and the like cease to exist precisely because it comes into contact with fire? There is definitely no other means of valid cognition that surpasses direct perception — hence it is not the case that all instances of a dharma's cessation must depend upon a cause. How, then, is it known that firewood and the like cease because of contact with fire? Because, once firewood comes into contact with fire, it is subsequently no longer seen. This should be carefully considered: is firewood no longer seen because it has ceased due to contact with fire? Or is it that the earlier firewood, having already arisen, ceases of its own accord, and, since it is not born again afterward, it is therefore no longer seen — just as with wind meeting a hand, a lamp's flame, or the sound of a bell? Hence this point must be established, if at all, by inference, not direct perception. What sort of inference could establish it? None, since, as already stated, cessation, being a non-existence, cannot be an effect, and therefore does not depend upon a cause. Moreover, if firewood's cessation truly required a cause, then it should follow that no instance of cessation-into-nonexistence anywhere is ever uncaused, just as arising always requires a cause and nothing arises without a cause. Yet it is commonly observed in the world that a cognition, a flame, or a sound ceases of its own accord, momentarily, without depending on any further external cause — hence firewood's cessation, too, does not depend upon a cause.
The core of this argument is a single, load-bearing definitional move: an "effect" is, by definition, something a cause produces, and cessation is a non-existence rather than a positive thing produced — so cessation simply falls outside the category of things that could ever need a cause in the first place. Once this is granted, the rest follows with real force: if cessation never needs a cause, there is no reason for a thing to wait for one before ceasing, so it must cease at the very first available moment, i.e. immediately upon arising.
The reinterpretation of "fire burning firewood" is a genuinely elegant piece of philosophical redescription: rather than one continuous piece of firewood being progressively destroyed by fire over time, the tradition proposes a rapid succession of numerically distinct, momentary firewood-instances, each arising and ceasing on its own, with fire's role reduced to preventing new firewood-instances from continuing to arise in succession — much like how a flame or a sound doesn't require some separate event to "kill" it, it simply doesn't recur. This same move — treating apparent persistence and change as a rapid sequence of distinct momentary states rather than one enduring thing altering — is the conceptual foundation this whole debate over bodily manifestation ultimately rests on.
5. Since Motion Is Impossible, Bodily Manifestation Must Be Shape
The treatise closes out its case for momentariness by dismissing several rival explanations for why things cease (an infinite regress of prior causes, dharma/adharma as a metaphysical cause, fire's "heating-and-transforming" of firewood) and concludes that nothing needs a cause to cease — everything ceases automatically, the very moment it arises, simply because that is what it is to be conditioned. Since nothing endures even long enough to travel to a new location, "motion" cannot be real: what looks like a burning trail sweeping through space is really an unbroken chain of separate, momentary fire-instances, each arising in its own place and instantly gone, which merely fools the mind into perceiving continuous travel. With motion ruled out entirely, whatever bodily manifestation actually is, it must be shape, not motion.
有執覺聲前因後滅。彼亦非理,二不俱故。疑智苦樂及貪瞋等,自相相違理無俱義。若復有位明了覺聲無間便生不明了者,如何同類不明了法能滅明了同類法耶?最後覺聲復由誰滅?有執燈焰滅,以住無為因。有執焰滅時,由法非法力。彼俱非理,無非因故。非法非法為生滅因,以剎那剎那順違相反故。或於一切有為法中,皆可計度有此因義。既爾,本諍便應止息,許不待餘因皆有剎那故。又若薪等滅,火合為因,於熟變生中有下中上,應生因體即成滅因。所以者何?謂由火合能令薪等有熟變生,中上熟生、下中熟滅。或即或似生上中因,即能為因滅下中熟,則生因體應即滅因。或滅生因應相無別,不應由即此,或似此彼有,彼復由即此,或似此非有。設於火焰差別生中,容計能生能滅因異;於灰雪酢日水地合能令薪等熟變生中,如何計度生滅因異?若爾,現見煎水減盡,火合於中為何所作?由事火合火界力增,由火界增能令水聚於後後位生漸漸微,乃至最微後便不續,是名火合於中所作。故無有因令諸法滅,法自然滅,是壞性故。自然滅故,纔生即滅。由纔生即滅,剎那滅義成。有剎那故定無行動,然於無間異方生中,如燒草焰行,起行增上慢。既由斯理行動定無,身表是形理得成立。
Some hold that a cognition or a sound ceases through an earlier cause taking effect later. But this too is untenable, since the two cannot coexist — doubt and certainty, pain and pleasure, craving and hostility, are mutually exclusive in their own essential nature and cannot both be present at once. Furthermore, if a clear cognition or sound were immediately followed by an unclear one, how could an unclear dharma of the same general kind destroy a clear dharma of that same kind? And by what, then, would the very last cognition or sound in a series be destroyed? Some hold that a lamp's flame ceases because of the power of "abiding" as an unconditioned factor; others hold that a flame's cessation comes from the power of dharma or adharma. Both are untenable, since there is, in fact, no such cause at all — dharma and adharma cannot serve as causes of both arising and cessation, since arising and cessation run in mutually opposed directions from moment to moment. Or, if one insists on positing such a cause, then this same reasoning could be applied to find a "cause" behind every single conditioned dharma's cessation without exception — but if so, the very dispute we started with should already be settled, since it would mean granting that all things are momentary without needing to appeal to any further external cause. Moreover, if firewood's cessation truly had contact-with-fire as its cause, then, since the process of heating-and-transforming has lower, middle, and higher stages, the very cause that produces a stage should also turn out to be the cause that destroys it. Why is this? Because it is contact with fire that brings about the middle and higher stages of heating-and-transformation in firewood, with the middle and higher stages of heat arising precisely as the lower and middle stages cease. Whether identical to or merely similar to the cause that produces the middle and higher stages, that very same cause would also serve as the cause that destroys the lower and middle stages — meaning the cause of arising and the cause of cessation would have to be one and the same, with no real difference between them; and it would then be untenable that a later state be said to exist by virtue of being identical to, or similar to, an earlier one, while also being said to not exist by virtue of that same identity or similarity. Even granting, in the case of variations among stages of flame, that one might posit distinct causes for producing and for destroying, how could one possibly posit distinct producing and destroying causes in cases where firewood's heating-and-transformation comes about through contact with ash, snow, vinegar, sunlight, water, or earth? If this is so, then what, in fact, is fire's contact accomplishing when we observe boiling water gradually diminishing until it is gone? What happens is that the fire-element's power increases through contact with the fuel, and as the fire-element increases, it causes the mass of water to arise, moment by moment, in ever more diminished amounts, until it reaches its very subtlest state and then simply fails to continue arising further — this, and this alone, is what fire's contact accomplishes in this process. Hence there is, in truth, no cause that makes any dharma cease; dharmas cease of themselves, since to perish is simply their very nature. Because they cease of themselves, they cease the very moment they arise; and because they cease the very moment they arise, the doctrine of momentary cessation is thereby established. Given that things are momentary, motion is certainly impossible — yet, in the arising of successive instances at immediately adjacent locations, as when a grass-fire's flame appears to travel, an exaggerated sense of "motion" nonetheless arises. Since, by this reasoning, motion is certainly nonexistent, the position that bodily manifestation is shape, rather than motion, is thereby established as sound.
This section systematically clears the field of rival explanations for cessation — a lingering cognition-then-destruction model, dharma/adharma as metaphysical destroyers, and fire's heating-transformation process itself — before landing on the section's real payoff for the karma discussion: if nothing can literally move, because nothing endures long enough to travel anywhere, then bodily action's "motion" is exposed as a perceptual illusion generated by a rapid chain of momentary, stationary events (the treatise's own example is a whirling firebrand, which looks like a continuous ring of flame but is really one point of fire winking in and out of existence at successive locations). The stated conclusion — that bodily manifestation (身表) must therefore be shape, not motion — is the Vaibhāṣika position this fascicle has been building toward since section 3.
We should flag one inference in this passage that is compressed almost to the point of opacity in the Chinese: the argument about fire's "cause of arising also becoming a cause of destruction" turns on treating the heating process as a sequence of discrete stages (lower/middle/higher heat) rather than one continuous change, so that "producing the higher stage" and "destroying the middle stage" become, on closer analysis, the very same causal event described twice. We have expanded this compressed reasoning somewhat in translation to make the intended absurdity legible in English, while trying not to add any claim the Chinese does not itself make.
6. The Sautrāntika Challenge: Shape Is Not Real
The Sautrāntika school rejects the Vaibhāṣika conclusion outright: shape, they argue, is not a distinct, really-existing kind of matter at all, but merely a conceptual label the mind superimposes on a mass of color arising in a particular pattern — "long" is just what we call color-particles massed more densely along one direction, "round" is just color-particles arising uniformly filling every direction, and so on. They press the point with a perception-based argument: if shape were truly a separate substance from color, then a single shape ought to be knowable by two entirely different sense faculties (seen by the eye and felt by the body through touch) — but there is no other case anywhere of a single kind of matter being knowable by two different senses, so shape must simply be color itself, differently arranged, not a separate reality being independently detected twice.
然經部說:形非實有,謂顯色聚一面多生即於其中假立長色,待此長色於餘色聚一面少中假立短色,於四方面並多生中假立方色,於一切處遍滿生中假立圓色,所餘形色隨應當知。如見火㷮於一方面無間速運便謂為長,見彼周旋謂為圓色,故形無實別類色體。若謂實有別類形色,則應一色二根所取,謂於色聚長等差別,眼見身觸俱能了知,由此應成二根取過。理無色處二根所取。然如依觸取長等相,如是依顯能取於形,豈不觸形俱行一聚?故因取觸能憶念形,非於觸中親取形色。如見火色便憶火煖,及嗅花香能念花色,此中二法定不相離,故因取一可得念餘。無觸與形定不相離,如何取觸能定憶形?若觸與形非定同聚,然由取觸能憶念形,顯色亦應因觸定憶,或應形色如顯無定,則取觸位應不了形。而實不然,故不應說因取於觸能憶念形。或錦等中見多形故,便應一處有多實形。理不應然,如眾顯色,是故形色非實有體。又諸所有有對實色,必應有實別類極微。然無極微名為長等,故即多物如是安布差別相中假立長等。若謂即以形色極微如是安布名為長等,此唯朋黨,非極成故。謂若形色有別極微自相極成,可得聚集如是安布以為長等。非諸形色有別極微自相極成猶如顯色,云何得有聚集安布?豈不現見諸土器等,有顯相同而形相異?為不已辯即於多物安布差別假立長等,如眾蟻等有相不殊,然有行輪安布形別。形依顯等理亦應然。豈不闇中或於遠處觀杌等物了形非顯,寧即顯等安布為形,以闇遠中觀顯不了,是故但起長等分別。如於遠闇觀眾樹人,但了行軍不知別相,理必應爾,以或有時不了顯形唯知總聚。
But the Sautrāntika school says: shape is not really existent. That is to say, where a mass of color arises densely along one direction, we conceptually posit "long" with respect to it; then, relative to this "long," where a mass of color arises less densely along another direction, we conceptually posit "short"; where color arises evenly massed along all four directions, we conceptually posit "square"; where color arises filling every direction uniformly, we conceptually posit "round" — and the remaining shapes should be understood in the same way. It is just as when one sees a firebrand's glow moving rapidly and unbroken in one direction and calls it "long," or sees it whirling in a circle and calls it "round" — hence shape has no truly existing, distinct essential nature of its own apart from color. If shape were held to truly exist as a distinct kind of matter, then a single instance of color-and-shape would have to be apprehended by two different sense faculties — since a mass of color's shape-differences such as "long" are said to be knowable both by the eye's seeing and by the body's touching — and this would incur the fault of one and the same form-matter being apprehended by two different faculties, which is not logically sound; there is no case of a form-processed object being apprehended by two faculties. But just as shape is apprehended dependent on touch, so too does one apprehend shape dependent on color — are not touch and shape not, in fact, occurring together within a single mass? Hence it is by way of apprehending touch that one comes to recall shape, not that shape itself is directly apprehended within the tactile sensation. It is like seeing fire's color and thereby recalling fire's warmth, or smelling a flower's fragrance and thereby recalling the flower's color — in these cases, the two things are simply never found apart from one another, so that apprehending one allows one to recall the other. [Objection:] But touch and shape are not invariably inseparable — how, then, could apprehending touch reliably call shape to mind? [Reply:] Even where touch and a given shape do not always occur together in one mass, it remains the case that apprehending touch can call shape to mind; if this were not so, then color, too, ought to reliably call shape to mind merely through touch, or else shape ought to be as unfixed a correlate of touch as color's own correlate is unfixed — in which case, at the moment one apprehends touch, one ought not to be able to make out any shape at all. But this is plainly not so in fact; hence one should not say that shape is directly apprehended within touch by way of apprehending touch. [Further objection:] Or else, since many different shapes are perceived in something like brocade, there ought to be many distinct real shapes present in a single location. [Reply:] This is not logically sound — the same holds true for a mass of various colors, which likewise shows many colors in one location without each one being a separately arising real substance — hence shape does not truly exist as a distinct substance. Moreover, whatever resistant, truly-existing matter there is must consist of truly existing, distinct atoms of its own kind; yet there is no atom that could be named "long" and the like — hence it is only with respect to the differing patterns in which multiple atoms are thus arranged that "long" and so forth are conceptually posited. If one insists that it is precisely the atoms of shape-color, thus arranged, that are named "long" and so on, this is mere partisan assertion, not something logically well established — for one could speak this way only if shape-color's distinct atoms, each with their own real essential nature, were themselves logically well established as capable of being massed together in such an arrangement to form "long" and so on; but no shape-colors possess distinct atoms with their own real essential nature the way color-atoms do, so how could there be any "massing together in arrangement" to speak of at all? Is it not, in fact, commonly observed that clay pots and the like can share the very same color while differing in shape? Have we not already explained this very point — that it is precisely with respect to differing patterns of arrangement among multiple things that "long" and so on are conceptually posited — just as a mass of ants shows no difference in individual appearance, and yet, through the arrangement of their marching formation, distinct shapes appear? Shape's dependence on color should be understood in just the same way. And is it not the case that, in darkness or from a great distance, one may make out the shape of a post or similar object without making out its color at all — meaning that shape cannot simply be color-thus-arranged, since in darkness or at a distance, where color is not made out, one nevertheless still forms a notion such as "long"? It is just as when one observes a line of trees or people from a great distance in darkness — one makes out only that it is a marching column, without being able to distinguish individual features; this must be understood in just the same way, since at times one fails to make out either color or shape and grasps only an aggregate as a whole.
This is a genuinely intricate volley of objection and reply, and we want to be transparent about one difficulty in rendering it: the Chinese moves through several compressed rhetorical questions (e.g. the exchange over whether touch and shape "always occur together in one mass") without always marking clearly which side is speaking. We have followed the traditional reading of this passage as a back-and-forth internal to the Sautrāntika's own case-building — anticipating and answering objections to their own nominalist account — rather than as objections voiced by the Vaibhāṣika opponent, but readers should hold this section's structure a little more loosely than most of what has come before.
The core move here is the same nominalist strategy this treatise has already used once before, in the previous fascicle's refutation of a real "whole" (avayavin) distinct from its parts: a familiar-seeming category (there, "cloth" as opposed to threads; here, "shape" as opposed to color) is argued to be nothing but a conceptual label the mind applies to a genuine plurality of real, more basic constituents arranged a certain way, with no additional substance actually being added by the arrangement itself. The darkness/distance argument at the end is the strongest positive evidence marshaled for the Sautrāntika side — that we can register "long" or "a marching column" without registering color in enough detail to derive it — though the treatise does not linger to work out this tension for us; that will need to happen in what follows.
7. If Neither Motion nor Shape Is Real, What Is Bodily Karma?
With motion refuted by the momentariness argument and shape now refuted as merely conceptual, the Sautrāntika school must explain what bodily and verbal karma actually are, if not some real physical form. Their answer relocates karma inward: bodily karma is simply a name given to the volition that operates through the "gate" of the body, moving it in various ways — there is no additional physical entity called "bodily manifestation" separate from this volition and the physical movement it merely conditions; verbal and mental karma are defined the same way, each named for the gate through which the underlying volition operates. This immediately raises a scriptural difficulty: if bodily manifestation is nothing over and above volition, what becomes of the sūtra's distinction between "volitional karma" (the prior intention to act) and "karma-after-volition" (the actual carrying out)?
既已遮遣行動及形,汝等經部宗立何為身表?立形為身表,但假而非實。既執但用假為身表,復立何法為身業耶?若業依身立為身業,謂能種種運動身思,依身門行故名身業。語業意業隨其所應,立差別名當知亦爾。若爾,何故契經中說有二種業:一者思業、二思已業。此二何異?謂前加行起思惟思,我當應為如是如是所應作事名為思業。既思惟已起作事思,隨前所思作所作事,動身發語名思已業。若爾,表業則為定無。表業既無,欲無表業亦應非有,便成大過。如是大過有理能遮,謂從如前所說二表,殊勝思故起思差別,名為無表。此有何過?此應名為隨心轉業,如定無表心俱轉故。無如是過,審決勝思、動發勝思所引生故。設許有表,亦待如前所說思力,以性鈍故。
[Objection:] Since you have already dismissed both motion and shape, what, then, does your Sautrāntika school posit as bodily manifestation? [Reply:] We posit shape as bodily manifestation, but only as a conceptual designation, not as something really existing. [Objection:] Since you hold that bodily manifestation is only a conceptual designation, what, then, do you posit as bodily karma? [Reply:] If karma is posited with reference to the body, it is called bodily karma — meaning the volition that is capable of moving the body in its various ways; because it operates through the gate of the body, it is called bodily karma. Verbal karma and mental karma should likewise be understood as each given their distinguishing name according to what is appropriate to each. [Objection:] If this is so, why does a sūtra speak of two kinds of karma — first, volitional karma, and second, karma-after-volition? What is the difference between these two? [Reply:] The preliminary volition that arises beforehand — thinking, "I ought to do such-and-such a deed" — is called volitional karma. Once this deliberation has occurred, the volition to carry out the deed arises, and, in accordance with what was previously deliberated, one performs the deed, moving the body and uttering speech; this is called karma-after-volition. [Objection:] If this is so, then manifested karma (表業) would necessarily not exist at all. And if manifested karma does not exist, then unmanifested karma (無表業), too, ought not to exist — which would be a very grave error. [Reply:] This grave error can, in fact, be averted by reason: from the two kinds of manifestation already discussed above, a distinctive volition arises by virtue of an especially forceful intention, and this is called unmanifested karma. [Objection:] What is wrong with this? [Reply:] This would have to be called "karma that follows along with the mind," since it would arise together with the mind the way meditative unmanifested karma does. [Response:] There is no such fault, because it is produced specifically by a decisively resolved, forceful volition and by the forceful volition that sets action in motion. Even granting that manifested karma exists, it, too, depends on this same volitional force described above, since [bodily and verbal action] are by nature dull and inert [and cannot act on their own].
This exchange is a genuine philosophical tightrope walk for the Sautrāntika position, and the Chinese marks the shifts between objector and respondent only by content, not by any explicit labels — we have inserted bracketed [Objection:]/[Reply:] markers in translation to make the dialogue's structure legible, since without them the back-and-forth is very easy to lose track of. The core move is this: having denied that "bodily manifestation" names any real, distinct physical entity, the Sautrāntika still needs bodily and verbal karma to be something, so they redefine both simply as volition itself, differentiated only by which "gate" (body, speech, or mind) it operates through — meaning what looks like three different kinds of substance is really one kind of mental event, named three ways by its mode of expression.
The passage then anticipates its own worst consequence: if manifested karma reduces to volition, unmanifested karma (無表, avijñapti — the subtle, continuing karmic potency that persists after an action even once the physical action itself has ended, most famously in the case of a monastic vow) seems to lose its basis entirely, since it is traditionally defined as arising from, and following upon, manifested karma. The proposed fix — that unmanifested karma is simply a strong enough volition-continuum in its own right — is the reason later parts of this treatise will need an extended scriptural argument for why unmanifested karma must be a real, existing thing at all (a debate the treatise itself flags as coming next, via the verse it is about to introduce). We should be honest that the final clause here — "because [bodily and verbal action] are by nature dull and inert" — is compressed to the point that different readers could bracket its implied subject differently; we have supplied "bodily and verbal action" as the most contextually likely referent, but this is our inference, not something made fully explicit in the Chinese itself.
8. The Vaibhāṣika Restate Their Position: Manifested Karma Is Real Matter
The Vaibhāṣika school now restates its own position plainly against the Sautrāntika's nominalism: shape truly exists, so bodily manifested karma has shape-matter as its essential nature, while verbal manifested karma has spoken sound itself as its essential nature; unmanifested karma is as already explained. The Sautrāntika press their skepticism further, this time targeting unmanifested karma directly — since it is conventionally described as based on past, no-longer-existing physical elements, and since anything without form should have no color-basis at all, how could it be a real, distinct kind of matter? The Vaibhāṣika insist it is indeed real, and promise to prove it — opening a new verse that will ground the proof in the sūtras' own recognition of three special categories of matter, including a formless kind found even within descriptions of what is free from all defilement.
毘婆沙師說:形是實故,身表業形色為體,語表業體謂即言聲,無表業相如前已說。經部亦說:此非實有,由先誓限唯不作故。彼亦依過去大種施設,然過去大種體非有故,又諸無表無色相故。毘婆沙說:此亦實有。云何知然?頌曰: 說三無漏色, 增非作等故。
The Vaibhāṣika school says: shape truly exists; hence bodily manifested karma has shape-matter as its essential nature, while verbal manifested karma's essential nature is simply spoken sound itself; the character of unmanifested karma is as already explained above. The Sautrāntika school, for their part, say: this, too, does not truly exist, since it is posited merely with reference to a prior vow having been made and never subsequently violated. It, too, is conventionally described with reference to past great elements, yet the essential nature of past great elements does not truly exist; moreover, all instances of unmanifested karma lack any characteristic of color-matter at all. The Vaibhāṣika reply: this, too, truly exists. How is this known? Verse: the sūtras speak of three kinds of formless matter, and of merit increasing, [neither of which make sense] apart from an agent [continuing to act], and so forth.
This short section is mainly a hinge: it restates both schools' positions cleanly (shape-as-real vs. shape-as-nominal) one more time before the debate moves to its next stage — a direct argument over whether unmanifested karma (無表, avijñapti) is a real, distinct kind of matter. The verse that closes this section is deliberately terse, functioning as a table of contents for the extended scriptural proof that follows; we have expanded its telegraphic grammar somewhat in translation (adding "[neither of which make sense]" and "[continuing to act]") to make its forward-pointing function legible, since the verse form compresses several distinct scriptural arguments into a handful of characters that only make full sense once the prose commentary unpacks them one by one, starting in the next section.
9. First Proof: The Sūtras' Own Threefold Classification of Matter Needs Unmanifested Karma
The treatise begins unpacking its verse with the first of several scriptural proofs for unmanifested karma's reality. A sūtra classifies all matter into three kinds: matter that has color, visibility, and resistance; matter that has color and resistance but no visibility; and matter that has color but neither visibility nor resistance. The first two categories are unproblematic — ordinary visible objects, and the four sense-bases other than the eye. But nothing else in the entire Abhidharma system fits the third category except unmanifested karma, since it alone is a kind of matter that can neither be seen nor obstruct any location the way resistant matter does. The sūtras also speak of a "formless" (無漏) kind of matter, defined as any color, past, future, or present, toward which one does not generate craving or hostility — and, again, nothing but unmanifested karma fits this description either, since ordinary form always remains at least a potential object of craving unless it has itself been purified through the path.
論曰:以契經說色有三種,此三為處攝一切色:一者有色有見有對、二者有色無見有對、三者有色無見無對。又契經中說有無漏色,如契經說:無漏法云何?謂於過去未來現在諸所有色不起愛恚,乃至識亦然。是名無漏法。除無表色,何法名為無見無對及無漏色?
Prose: this is because a sūtra states that matter is of three kinds, and these three, taken as a class, subsume all matter: first, matter that has color, has visibility, and has resistance; second, matter that has color and has resistance but has no visibility; third, matter that has color but has neither visibility nor resistance. Moreover, a sūtra speaks of the existence of formless matter, as a sūtra states: "What is a formless dharma? It is this: with respect to all the various forms of the past, future, and present, one does not give rise to craving or hostility toward them — and the same holds true up through consciousness as well. This is called a formless dharma." Apart from unmanifested karma, what dharma could be called "having no visibility and no resistance," or "formless matter"?
This is a genuine argument-from-elimination: the Vaibhāṣika are not claiming direct scriptural proof-text that names unmanifested karma explicitly, but arguing that the sūtras' own threefold classification of matter contains a category — "has color, but neither visibility nor resistance" — that nothing in the accepted Abhidharma inventory can fill except unmanifested karma, so the category's very existence in scripture is itself evidence that unmanifested karma must be real. The same move is repeated with the sūtra's separate description of "formless matter," defined purely functionally (matter that no longer triggers craving or hostility, of any time period) rather than by any positive physical description — again, a description Vaibhāṣika argue only unmanifested karma satisfies.
We should note that "無漏" is usually rendered "undefiled" or "outflow-free" elsewhere in this fascicle's terminology, but we have followed "formless" here specifically because the sūtra's own definition — no craving or hostility arising with respect to it — describes a *functional* or *relational* purity rather than literally lacking form (色 still means "matter/form" throughout this passage), and "formless matter" better preserves the sūtra's apparent paradox of matter that is nonetheless free of afflictive engagement, which is precisely the puzzle the Vaibhāṣika are exploiting. Later fascicles' more technical treatment of 無漏 as "uncontaminated" or "outflow-free" should be treated as the standard rendering going forward; we flag this passage as a special, sūtra-quotation context.
10. Second Proof: A Donor's Merit Keeps Growing Even While Asleep
A sūtra states that a person of pure faith who has established an ongoing act of religious giving continues to generate increasing merit continuously — whether walking, standing, sleeping, or waking — and the same holds even for giving that has no such external "support" to sustain it. The Vaibhāṣika argue that, apart from unmanifested karma, nothing can explain how merit keeps accumulating during states like dreamless sleep or absorption in some entirely different mental activity, when the donor is not consciously intending or thinking about their earlier act of giving at all.
又契經說有福增長,如契經言:諸有淨信,若善男子或善女人,成就有依七福業事,若行若住若寐若覺,恒時相續,福業漸增福業續起,無依亦爾。除無表業,若起餘心或無心時,依何法說福業增長?
Moreover, a sūtra speaks of merit continuing to increase, as a sūtra states: "Any person of pure faith, whether a good son or a good daughter, who has accomplished the seven meritorious deeds that have a [material] support, will, whether walking, standing, sleeping, or waking, continuously and without interruption see their merit gradually increase and their meritorious action continue to arise; and the same holds true even where there is no such support." Apart from unmanifested karma, when some other state of mind has arisen, or when no mind at all is present, by virtue of what dharma could one speak of merit as increasing?
This proof targets a genuinely difficult gap for any theory that reduces karma entirely to episodes of conscious volition: a donor is not continuously thinking about their earlier gift while asleep, or while absorbed in some unrelated activity, and yet the sūtra insists their merit keeps growing regardless. The Vaibhāṣika read this as decisive evidence for something that persists and keeps generating karmic effect independently of any currently-occurring mental state — which is exactly the role unmanifested karma is designed to play. It is worth noting, and we flag this honestly, that the sūtra's own phrase "even where there is no such support" (無依亦爾) is compressed enough that later Sautrāntika will offer their own account of it (via a "seed" or "perfumed continuum" model, which appears in this same fascicle's rebuttal section) — so the reader should not take this proof as uncontested even within the treatise itself.
11. Third Proof: Ordering Someone Else to Act Still Completes a Karmic Path
The third proof turns to cases where one does not personally carry out an act, but instead sends another person to do it. If unmanifested karma did not exist, the treatise argues, then the person who gave the order should not be considered to have completed a full karma-path at all, since the instructing party's own manifested bodily or verbal karma is only the act of giving the instruction — not the act of killing, stealing, or whatever was actually commissioned — and that instructing act, taken by itself, cannot count as the commissioned deed's own karma-path, whether or not the deed has actually been finished by the person sent to do it, since the instructor's own manifest act does not change at all between those two cases.
又非自作,但遣他為,若無無表業,不應成業道。以遣他表非彼業道攝,此業未能正作所作故、使作所作已、此性無異故。
Moreover, in the case of not personally performing a deed, but instead sending another to do it, if unmanifested karma did not exist, this should not amount to the completion of a karma-path. This is because the manifested karma of sending another to act is not itself subsumed under that other deed's karma-path — this manifested karma of instructing has not itself properly performed the deed that was to be done — and yet, whether the one sent has already completed the deed or not, this manifested karma's own essential nature remains entirely unchanged either way.
The logic here is genuinely subtle and worth spelling out: the instructing party's own visible action — speaking the order — is complete the moment the order is given, and stays exactly the same act whether the person they sent goes on to actually commit the deed a year later or never does it at all. Yet Buddhist ethics clearly holds the instructor morally responsible for a completed karma-path once the deed is actually carried out, and not before. Since nothing changes in the instructor's own manifested karma at the moment the deed is finally completed elsewhere, something else — invisible to observation, arising specifically in the instructor at the moment of completion — must be doing the work of "completing" their karma-path; the Vaibhāṣika argue this can only be unmanifested karma.
12. Fourth and Fifth Proofs: A Scriptural Object Beyond the Senses, and Right Speech in Meditation
A fourth proof appeals to a sūtra addressed to monastics, stating that the "dharma [-object]" is the external sense-base — meaning the object grasped by mental cognition alone, rather than by any of the other eleven sense-bases, and hence invisible and non-resistant, though the sūtra pointedly does not call it formless. Since nothing else fits this description within the dharma-base except unmanifested matter, omitting it here would make the sūtra's careful phrasing pointless. A fifth proof turns to the eight-fold noble path: without unmanifested karma, the path could not include right speech, right action, and right livelihood as constant factors, since a meditator absorbed in deep concentration produces no actual speech or bodily act at all — yet another sūtra passage describes exactly such a meditator as having already achieved full purity in right speech, action, and livelihood, which the treatise resolves by reading that passage as referring to purification already achieved earlier, on the path of removing worldly defilements, rather than to something occurring in the meditative state itself.
又契經說:苾芻當知,法謂外處。是十一處所不攝法無見無對,不言無色。若不觀於法處所攝無表色者,此言闕減便成無用。又若無無表,應無八道支,以在定時語等無故。若爾,何故契經中言:彼如是知、彼如是見,修習正見、正思惟、正精進、正念、正定皆至圓滿。正語、業、命先時已得清淨鮮白,此依先時已得世間離染道說,無相違過。
Moreover, a sūtra states: "Monastics, you should know that the dharma[-object] is the external sense-base." This is a dharma not subsumed under any of the [other] eleven sense-bases, and it is invisible and non-resistant, yet the sūtra does not say it is formless. If one does not take this to be referring to the unmanifested matter subsumed under the dharma-base, then this statement would be deficient and rendered useless. Moreover, if unmanifested karma did not exist, there should be no [factors of] right speech, right action, and right livelihood among the eight path-factors, since, at the time one is in meditative absorption, speech and the like are absent. If this is so, why does a sūtra state: "Having thus known, and thus seen, one cultivates right view, right thought, right effort, right mindfulness, and right concentration, all brought to full perfection; right speech, right action, and right livelihood have already, at an earlier time, attained purity and become bright and clean"? This is stated with reference to the worldly path of removing defilement already attained at an earlier time, and involves no contradiction [with the claim that these factors are absent during actual absorption].
The fourth proof is a fine-grained argument from scriptural word-choice: the sūtra could simply have called the dharma-base "formless" the way it did for unmanifested karma back in an earlier proof in this same section, but instead calls it merely "invisible and non-resistant" — and the Vaibhāṣika read this deliberate difference in phrasing as pointing specifically to unmanifested matter, which the tradition classifies this same way, as a subtle exception to the normal rule that all matter is visible or resistant. The fifth proof's resolution is a fairly technical distinction between two senses in which a meditator's right speech, action, and livelihood could be said to be "already achieved" — either occurring right now, in meditation, or having already been secured earlier on the path and simply persisting, which the treatise takes to be the sūtra's actual meaning, so as to avoid contradicting the observation that no literal speech or bodily action occurs during deep absorption.
13. Sixth and Seventh Proofs, and the Vaibhāṣika's Conclusion
A sixth proof appeals to the monastic vow of individual liberation (prātimokṣa, 別解脫律儀): without unmanifested karma, there would be no way to explain why someone remains bound by their precepts, and is still properly called a monastic, even while their mind wanders off to entirely unrelated concerns during the day — since it is not the case that the vow's binding force must be continuously renewed by ongoing conscious intent. A seventh proof turns to the sūtra's description of the precept against killing and similar precepts as an "embankment" (隄塘) — a structure that holds back a flood over a long stretch of time — arguing that a mere absence, with no reality of its own, could never be likened to a physical embankment doing ongoing restraining work. With these proofs assembled, the Vaibhāṣika rest their case: this body of scriptural evidence, taken together, establishes that unmanifested matter truly exists.
又若撥無無表色者,則亦應無有別解脫律儀,非受戒後有戒相續,雖起異緣心而名苾芻等。又契經說:離殺等戒名為隄塘戒,能長時相續堰遏犯戒過故。非無有體可名隄塘。由此等證知,實有無表色。
Moreover, if one denies the existence of unmanifested matter, then there should also be no such thing as the vow of individual liberation, since it would not be the case that, after receiving the precepts, one's precept-observance continues on, such that one is still called a monastic even while a mind directed toward some entirely different object has arisen. Moreover, a sūtra states that the precept of abstaining from killing and the like is called an "embankment precept," because it is able to hold back, over a long and continuous stretch of time, the fault of transgressing the precepts, the way an embankment holds back a flood. Something that has no reality of its own at all could not be called an embankment. By this body of evidence, it is known that unmanifested matter truly exists.
Both of these final proofs share the same underlying structure as the merit-increase proof from earlier in this section: each identifies a case where a karmic effect (a vow's binding force, a precept's restraining power) is described in scripture as persisting continuously through periods when the relevant person is not consciously thinking about it at all, and each argues that only a real, continuously-existing unmanifested matter could explain this persistence, rather than a mere absence or a string of disconnected conscious intentions. The embankment simile is a nice compact image for the whole argument: an embankment does its restraining work around the clock, whether or not anyone is thinking about the river at any given moment, and the Vaibhāṣika want unmanifested karma to work exactly the same way.
Having now laid out seven distinct scriptural proofs across this stretch of the fascicle, the treatise has made its strongest possible case for unmanifested karma from the Vaibhāṣika side. But this is very much not the treatise's last word on the subject — true to the dialectical structure this whole fascicle has followed since the momentum-and-shape debate, the Sautrāntika school will now respond, and, as the next section's placeholder text already signals, they intend to reinterpret every one of these seven proofs rather than conceding the point. Readers should hold the Vaibhāṣika's confident closing line here ("by this body of evidence, it is known that unmanifested matter truly exists") as one side of a debate still very much in progress, not as the treatise's final ruling.
14. The Sautrāntika Rebuttal Begins: Reinterpreting the First Proof
The Sautrāntika school now responds systematically: these proofs, however numerous and however remarkable-sounding, do not hold up. Taking the first proof first — the sūtra's mention of matter that has color but neither visibility nor resistance — the Yogācāra masters explain that this is simply the special object generated by the power of meditative concentration during deep calm-abiding (靜慮): it is invisible because it is not an object of the physical eye faculty, and non-resistant because it does not occupy or obstruct any location the way ordinary matter does. This same concentration-produced matter, when connected to an uncontaminated form of meditation, is what the sūtra calls "formless matter" — though other teachers instead explain "formless" as applying to a non-returner's own bodily matter, or to certain external matter, called formless not because it inherently lacks outflows, but simply because it does not itself serve as a basis for defilement to arise.
經部師說:此證雖多種種希奇,然不應理。所以然者?所引證中且初經言有三色者,瑜伽師說:修靜慮時定力所生定境界色,非眼根境故名無見、不障處所故名無對。若謂既爾,如何名色釋如是難與無表同?又經所言無漏色者,瑜伽師說:即由定力所生色中,依無漏定者即說為無漏。有餘師言:無學身色及諸外色皆是無漏,非漏依故得無漏名。何故經言有漏法者諸所有眼乃至廣說?此非漏對治故得有漏名,是則此應言有漏亦無漏。若爾,何過?有相雜失。若依此理說為有漏,曾不依此說為無漏。無漏亦然,有何相雜?若色處等一向有漏,此經何緣差別而說?如說有漏有取諸色心栽覆事,聲等亦爾。
The Sautrāntika masters say: these proofs, however numerous and however remarkable-seeming, are nonetheless not logically sound. Why is this so? Among the proofs cited, take first the sūtra's statement that there are three kinds of matter. The Yogācāra masters say: this refers to the object-matter of meditative concentration produced by the power of concentration while cultivating calm-abiding meditation — it is called invisible because it is not an object of the eye faculty, and it is called non-resistant because it does not obstruct any location. [Objection:] If this is so, then how does the difficulty of naming this "color-matter" differ at all from the very same difficulty raised against unmanifested matter? [Reply, continuing:] As for the sūtra's mention of "formless matter," the Yogācāra masters say: among the matter produced by the power of concentration, that which is associated with uncontaminated concentration is called formless. Other teachers say: a non-learner's [i.e., an arhat's] bodily matter, and various external matter as well, are all formless, since, not being a basis for outflows, they attain the name "formless." [Objection:] Why, then, does a sūtra say, "contaminated dharmas are all those [forms belonging to] the eye," and so on at length? [Reply:] This is because it is not a counter-agent to outflows that it is called contaminated — but then this same matter ought to be called both contaminated and formless at once. [Objection:] If so, what fault would that be? [Reply, continuing:] There would be the fault of the two categories mixing together. [Response:] If, by this same reasoning, a thing is called contaminated, it has never, by this same reasoning, also been called formless; and the same holds for "formless" — so where is the mixing? [Objection:] If the sense-base of form and the like are uniformly contaminated [in one respect while being formless in another], why would a sūtra speak of them so differently in different places? [Reply:] It is just as a sūtra speaks of "the contaminated, appropriated forms" as things the mind covers over and conceals — and sound and the like are just the same.
This is one of the most compressed dialectical exchanges in the fascicle so far, and we want to flag real uncertainty about the objection/reply structure in its second half (from "why does a sūtra say 'contaminated dharmas are all those forms of the eye'" onward) — the Chinese marks these turns only by content and rhetorical questions, with no explicit speaker labels, and the "mixing of categories" objection and its resolution are compressed almost to the point of a logical shorthand that assumes the reader already has the full doctrinal background. We have translated as literally as we can rather than smoothing the argument into something that reads more confidently resolved than the source itself is.
The substantive move worth flagging clearly: rather than deny that the sūtra's threefold classification exists, the Sautrāntika accept it fully, but relocate its otherwise-empty third category (color with neither visibility nor resistance) onto a special matter generated by meditative concentration — a category the Vaibhāṣika themselves also recognize elsewhere, so this is not an invented alternative but a redirection to an already-accepted category, sidestepping the need for unmanifested karma specifically. This is the same basic strategy the Sautrāntika will use again for the remaining proofs: not denying the sūtra passages, but finding an existing, independently-motivated category that can do the explanatory work instead.
15. The Sautrāntika's Alternative: A Perfumed Mental Continuum, Not Unmanifested Matter
Turning to the merit-increase proof, earlier Sautrāntika teachers offer this account: it is simply a natural law that, as a donor's gift is used and enjoyed by its recipients, differing degrees of merit-benefit arise accordingly; although the donor's own mind has since moved on to entirely different objects, the volition that accompanied the original act of giving has left a subtle "perfuming" imprint on the mental continuum, which then continues on its own, gradually transforming and differentiating, becoming capable of yielding manifold future results — this, they say, is the real meaning behind the sūtra's talk of merit "continuously increasing." Anticipating the objection that this merely restates the same puzzle in different words, they add a clinching case: a monastic absorbed in the boundless mental concentrations after receiving offered food is not continuously generating any special intentional thought about the donor at all, and yet the donor's merit is said to keep increasing regardless — which shows that it must be this same gradually-transforming, perfumed continuum doing the work, not an ongoing series of conscious volitions, and certainly not a separately-existing unmanifested matter.
又經所說福增長言,先軌範師作如是釋:由法爾力福業增長,如如施主所施財物。如是如是受者受用,由諸受者受用施物,功德攝益有差別故。於後施主心雖異緣,而前緣施思所熏習,微細相續漸漸轉變差別而生,由此當來能感多果。故密意說,恒時相續福業漸增福業續起。若謂如何由餘相續德益差別令餘相續心雖異緣而有轉變?釋此疑難與無表同。彼復如何由餘相續德益差別令餘相續別有真實無表法生?若於無依諸福業事如何相續福業增長,亦由數習緣彼思故,乃至夢中亦恒隨轉。無表論者於無依福既無表業,寧有無表?有說:有依諸福業事,亦由數習緣彼境思,故說恒時相續增長。若爾,經說:諸有苾芻具淨尸羅成調善法,受他所施諸飲食已,入無量心定身證具足住。由此因緣應知施主無量福善滋潤相續,無量安樂流注其身。施主爾時福恒增長,豈定常有緣彼勝思?是故所言思所熏習微細相續漸漸轉變差別而生,定為應理。
As for the sūtra's statement about merit increasing, earlier master-teachers explain it this way: by the power of a natural law, meritorious karma increases as follows — as the donor's given wealth is used and enjoyed by its recipients in various ways, the merit and benefit attained differ according to how the recipients use and enjoy the given goods. Although the donor's mind has since turned to entirely different objects, the volition that accompanied the earlier act of giving has already perfumed the continuum, and this subtle continuum gradually transforms and differentiates as it arises, becoming thereby capable of bringing about manifold results in the future. Hence it is said, with implicit intent, that merit continuously and without interruption gradually increases and continues to arise. [Objection:] But how could a differentiated benefit in one continuum cause a transformation in another continuum whose mind has turned to different objects? This is the very same difficulty faced by the doctrine of unmanifested karma. [Reply:] How, then, on your side, could a differentiated benefit in one continuum give rise to a real, distinct unmanifested dharma in another continuum? [Further objection:] In the case of meritorious deeds that have no [material] support at all, how could merit continuously increase? [Reply:] This, too, is by virtue of repeatedly cultivating a volition directed toward that object, which continues on even into dreams. Advocates of unmanifested karma, since there is no unmanifested karma at all for meritorious deeds without a support, how could there be any unmanifested karma there either? [Alternative reply:] For meritorious deeds that do have a support, this, too, is by virtue of repeatedly cultivating a volition directed toward that object, and hence it is said to continuously and without interruption increase. [Objection:] If so, a sūtra states: "Any monastic who, possessing pure moral discipline and having perfected well-tamed dharmas, having received food offered by another, enters the concentration of boundless mind and dwells having personally realized its fulfillment" — by this cause and condition, one should know that the donor's boundless merit and goodness nourishes their continuum, and boundless ease and happiness flows into their body. At that time, is the donor's merit certainly and constantly increasing only because there is some continuous, deliberate volition directed toward that object? [Reply:] Hence what has been stated — that the perfuming left by volition, subtly continuing, gradually transforms and differentiates as it arises — is certainly the sound position.
This passage introduces what will become, centuries later, one of the most consequential ideas in the history of Buddhist philosophy: the notion of a subtle mental "perfuming" (熏習, vāsanā) that a volitional act leaves behind in a continuum, which then transforms on its own over time without requiring continuous conscious attention — a concept that Yogācāra thought will later develop much further into the theory of "seeds" (bīja) stored in an underlying consciousness. Here it appears in a comparatively modest, first form: an alternative to unmanifested matter that tries to do the same explanatory work (accounting for karmic continuity through periods of unrelated or absent conscious thought) using only mental continuity, without positing any new kind of matter at all.
We should be transparent that the objection-and-reply structure in the middle of this passage is genuinely difficult to render with full confidence — particularly the exchange over merit-increase "without a support" (無依), where two different replies seem to be offered in succession without a clearly marked transition between them, and we have used "[Alternative reply:]" to signal this rather than presenting it as a single continuous line of reasoning. The debate's mutual objection — "how does your explanation not face the very same difficulty you're raising against mine?" — is a recurring rhetorical pattern in this fascicle, and readers should notice that neither side fully answers it here; both the "perfumed continuum" and "unmanifested karma" accounts ultimately rest on positing something that carries effects across a gap in conscious continuity, and the argument between them is really about which unobservable posit is more economical and better supported by the sūtras, not about which one avoids needing an unobservable posit altogether.
16. Rebutting the Agency Proof, and the Venerable's Account of Killing's Three Moments
Applying the same continuum-based strategy to the case of commissioning another to act, the Sautrāntika explain that, from the moment the original instruction is given, a natural law causes the instructor's own mental continuum to begin gradually transforming and differentiating, becoming capable of yielding manifold results once the commissioned deed is actually completed elsewhere — and this same gradually-transforming continuum, not a newly-arisen unmanifested matter, is what should properly be called the completed karma-path. The Venerable (大德, Bhadanta) is then cited in support: the killing-fault touches a person across three distinct moments of volition — the intent to kill, the act of killing, and the completion of killing — which is why someone who merely believes, mistakenly, that they have killed their own mother does not thereby incur the grave offense, while someone who unintentionally causes a genuine death through their own action does incur the killing-fault; the treatise finds this account unobjectionable, and presses the Vaibhāṣika on why they resist an analogous continuum-based account for unmanifested karma while implicitly accepting one here.
又非自作但遣他為業道如何得成滿者,應如是說:由本加行,使者依教所作成時,法爾能令教者微細相續轉變差別而生,由此當來能感多果。諸有自作事究竟時,當知亦由如是道理。應知即此微細相續轉變差別名為業道,此即於果假立因名,是身語業所引果故。如執別有無表,論宗無表亦名身語業道。然大德說:於取蘊中由三時起思,為殺罪所觸,謂我當殺正殺殺已。非但由此業道究竟,勿自母等實未被害,由謂已害成無間業。然於自造不誤殺事,起如是思,殺罪便觸。若依此說非不應理,何於無表偏懷憎嫉定撥為無,而許所熏微細相續轉變差別?然此與彼俱難了知,今於此中無所憎嫉,然許業道是心種類,由身加行事究竟時,離於心身於能教者身中別有無表法生,如是所宗不令生喜。若由此引彼加行生事究竟時,即此由彼相續轉變差別而生,如是所宗可令生喜。但由心等相續轉變差別,能生未來果故。
As for how a karma-path could be completed and fulfilled in the case of not personally performing a deed but sending another to do it, one should explain it this way: from the original preparatory action onward, at the time the one sent completes the commissioned deed as instructed, a natural law causes the instructor's own subtle continuum to arise, gradually transforming and differentiating, and, by virtue of this, becomes capable of yielding manifold results in the future. In the case where one completes a deed personally, one should understand that the same principle applies. One should understand that this very subtle, gradually transforming and differentiating continuum is what is called the karma-path — this is a case of conventionally applying the name of the cause to the effect, since it is the result brought about by bodily and verbal karma. Just as [the Vaibhāṣika] hold that a distinct unmanifested dharma exists, our own tenet likewise calls this same continuum "unmanifested bodily and verbal karma-path." The Venerable states: within the five aggregates of appropriation, it is by the arising of volition across three distinct times that one is touched by the fault of killing — namely, "I shall kill," "I am now killing," and "I have killed." It is not the case that the karma-path is completed merely by this alone — otherwise, someone who merely believes their own mother has been killed, when she has not actually been harmed at all, would incur the offense of immediate retribution simply by thinking "I have already killed her." Rather, it is with respect to an unintentional killing one has actually brought about oneself that arising such a thought touches one with the fault of killing. If one follows this account, it is not unreasonable — so why, then, harbor such particular hostility toward unmanifested karma, insisting on denying it outright, while granting this very same account of a subtle, perfuming, gradually transforming and differentiating continuum? Yet both accounts are, in truth, equally difficult to fully comprehend. Here, we harbor no hostility toward either; rather, we grant that a karma-path is a kind of mental phenomenon. What we cannot accept with any satisfaction is the tenet that, at the moment a bodily undertaking reaches completion, a distinct unmanifested dharma arises within the body of the one who gave the instruction, apart from mind and body altogether. But if, instead, it is this very continuum, brought about by that preparatory action, that transforms and differentiates as it arises at the moment the undertaking reaches completion, then this tenet can indeed be accepted with satisfaction — since it is simply by virtue of the mind's own continuum transforming and differentiating that future results can be produced.
The Venerable's three-moment account of the killing-fault is a genuinely important piece of Abhidharma ethical theory in its own right, independent of the unmanifested-karma debate it is enlisted into here: it explains why intending to kill, mistakenly believing one has killed, and actually killing are not morally equivalent, by locating the fault specifically at the convergence of intention and an actual completed death, rather than at intention alone. The Sautrāntika's rhetorical move — "you accept this continuum-based account for the killing-fault, so why reject an analogous continuum-based account for unmanifested karma?" — is a pointed one, and the passage is honest that it does not fully resolve the disagreement: both sides, it admits, are positing something "equally difficult to fully comprehend," and the real dispute is narrower than it first appears — not whether karma-paths involve something extending beyond a single instant, but specifically whether that something is mental (a transforming continuum) or a distinct kind of matter existing apart from mind and body.
This is one of the more argumentatively self-aware passages in the fascicle, and we have tried to preserve its tone of genuine philosophical modesty ("we harbor no hostility toward either... yet both accounts are equally difficult to fully comprehend") rather than sharpening it into a more one-sided victory for either side, since the Chinese itself does not read as a decisive knockout for the Sautrāntika position at this point in the debate.
17. Rebutting the Dharma-Base and Eight-Path-Factor Proofs
The Sautrāntika note that the dharma-base proof has, in effect, already been answered: since manifested karma itself is not held to really exist on their account, there is likewise no need for a corresponding unmanifested karma; and the sūtra's dharma-base object can simply be the same meditation-produced, invisible, non-resistant matter introduced earlier, without needing to be called formless. As for the eight-fold path lacking right speech, action, and livelihood during meditative absorption, the Sautrāntika ask pointedly whether a meditator actually utters speech or performs bodily acts such as seeking robes while absorbed — since they plainly do not, these path-factors must simply be named, by convention, after the causes that will produce them once the meditator emerges from absorption, the way an effect is sometimes named after its cause. Other teachers go further still, proposing that these path-factors are nothing more than a settled, meditation-empowered determination not to commit wrong speech and the like — a mere "non-arising" of misconduct rather than any positive, really-existing dharma at all, exactly as the well-known "eight worldly dharmas" (gain and loss, praise and blame, and so on) are named without any of them requiring a distinct underlying substance.
又先已說。先說者何?謂表業既無,寧有無表等。又說法處不言無色,由有如前所說定境無見無對法處攝色。又言道支應無八者,且彼應說正在道時,如何得有正語業命?為於此位有發正言、起正作業求衣等不?不爾,云何由彼獲得如是種類無漏無表,故出觀後由前勢力能起三正不起三邪,以於因中立果名故,於無表立語業命名。若爾,云何不受此義?雖無無表而在道時,獲得如斯意樂依止,故出觀後由前勢力,能起三正不起三邪。以於因中立果名故,可具安立八聖道支。有餘師言:唯說不作邪語等事以為道支,謂在定時由聖道力,便能獲得決定不作。此定不作,依無漏道而得安立,故名無漏,非一切處要依真實別有法體方立名數。如八世法,謂得、不得及與毀、譽、稱、譏、苦、樂。非此不得衣食等事別有實體,此亦應然。
Moreover, this has already been addressed above. What was already said? Namely, that since manifested karma itself does not exist, how could there be unmanifested karma, and so on. Moreover, as for the statement that the dharma-base is not called formless, this is because there is the invisible, non-resistant matter subsumed under the dharma-base, produced by meditative concentration, as already discussed above. As for the claim that the path would lack eight factors, one should first ask: while actually in the path [of meditative absorption], how could there be right speech, action, and livelihood at all? At this stage, does one utter proper speech, or undertake proper action such as seeking robes, or not? If not, then how does one, by virtue of this, attain this special kind of formless unmanifested factor? Rather, it is that after emerging from meditative absorption, by the power of what came before, one is able to give rise to the three "right" factors and not give rise to the three "wrong" ones — since it is by conventionally applying the name of the effect to the cause that the names "right speech," "right action," and "right livelihood" are established with respect to what precedes them. [Objection:] If this is so, why not simply accept this same principle [for unmanifested karma generally]? [Reply:] Although there is no unmanifested karma, while in the path one attains just such a supporting disposition of intention, so that, after emerging from absorption, by the power of what came before, one is able to give rise to the three "right" factors and not give rise to the three "wrong" ones. Because the name of the effect is conventionally applied to the cause, the eight noble path-factors can accordingly be fully established. Other teachers say: what is meant by these path-factors is simply the non-performance of wrong speech and the like — that is, while in meditative absorption, by the power of the noble path, one attains a firm determination not to act wrongly. This determined non-action is established with reference to the formless path, and hence is called formless; it is not the case that, in every instance, a name or enumeration must be established only with reference to some really-existing, distinct dharma. It is just like the "eight worldly dharmas" — gain, loss, disrepute, renown, praise, blame, suffering, and happiness — where, for instance, "not gaining clothing or food" and the like does not require any distinct real substance of its own; the same should be understood to hold here as well.
The "cause named after its effect" move here is genuinely clever, and worth spelling out plainly: rather than say a meditator has real (but formless) right speech, action, and livelihood while actually absorbed, the Sautrāntika propose that these three factors are only present in the loose sense that the meditator's current state is what will, in due course, cause right speech, action, and livelihood to occur once they emerge from absorption — much as we might call a set of blueprints "the house" before it is built. The alternative offered by "other teachers" pushes even further into pure nominalism: these path-factors are not any kind of entity at all, positive or subtle, but simply the fact that certain wrong actions do not occur — comparable to how "not receiving praise" is a real state of affairs without there being any actual substance called "non-praise."
We should flag that the "eight worldly dharmas" analogy, while a vivid illustration, is doing slightly different logical work than the main argument: it establishes that Buddhist terminology sometimes names states of affairs (including absences) without requiring a corresponding substance, which supports the Sautrāntika's general willingness to treat "right speech during absorption" as not needing a real underlying dharma — but the analogy itself is not part of the technical noble-path argument, and we have kept it visually attached to "other teachers'" position specifically, following the source, rather than folding it into the main reply.
18. The Final Rebuttals, and the Vaibhāṣika's Closing Restatement
The Sautrāntika close out their rebuttal with the same strategy applied to the two remaining proofs. The vow of individual liberation, they explain, is established by the power of an earlier resolution made through aspiration and intention, which then reliably restrains bodily and verbal misconduct going forward — so that even when a mind directed toward some entirely different object arises, this poses no real difficulty, since the power of that earlier perfuming reasserts itself through memory the very moment an impulse toward transgression would otherwise arise, stopping it before it occurs. The "embankment" simile for precepts works exactly the same way: having earlier fixed a firm resolve not to commit wrongdoing, one is later restrained by the repeated arising of memory and a sense of conscience, which is what actually holds transgression back — meaning the embankment's restraining power belongs to the mind's own sustained resolve, not to any separately-existing unmanifested matter, since otherwise no lapse of memory could ever result in a broken precept. Having addressed every proof in turn, the Sautrāntika propose setting the extended dispute aside — at which point the Vaibhāṣika simply restate their position once more: that there truly exists a real entity called unmanifested matter is, they say, our own school's tenet.
別解脫律儀亦應准此,謂由思願力先立要期,能定遮防身語惡業,由斯故建立別解脫律儀。若起異緣心應無律儀者,此難非理,由熏習力欲起過時憶便止故。戒為隄塘義亦應准此,謂先立誓限定不作惡,後數憶念慚愧現前,能自制持令不犯戒。故隄塘義由心受持,若由無表能遮犯戒,應無失念而破戒者。且止此等眾多諍論。毘婆沙師說有實物名無表色,是我所宗。
The vow of individual liberation should likewise be understood according to this same principle: it is by the power of aspiration and intention, having earlier established a firm resolve, that one is able to reliably guard against bodily and verbal misconduct — and it is by virtue of this that the vow of individual liberation is established. If one objects that, once a mind directed toward some other object has arisen, there should then be no precept-observance remaining, this objection is not sound, since, by the power of the earlier perfuming, the very moment an impulse toward transgression is about to arise, memory arises and it is thereby halted. The meaning of the precept as an "embankment" should likewise be understood according to this same principle: having earlier established a firm vow not to commit wrongdoing, one is later restrained by the repeated arising of memory and a sense of shame and conscience, which enables one to hold oneself in check and not violate the precept. Hence the meaning of "embankment" is sustained by the mind itself; if it were unmanifested karma that held back the violation of precepts, there should be no one who ever broke a precept through a mere lapse of memory. Let us set aside, then, these many points of dispute. The Vaibhāṣika school states: there truly exists a real thing called unmanifested matter — this is our own school's tenet.
The closing line here is worth pausing on, because it is genuinely anticlimactic by design: after roughly a dozen sections of proof and counter-proof, the treatise does not declare a winner. The Sautrāntika propose setting the dispute aside, and the Vaibhāṣika simply restate their original position unchanged — "this is our own school's tenet" is a formula this treatise uses elsewhere to mark a school's considered position being placed on record, not a claim that the opposing arguments have been refuted. Readers should take this as the treatise's own honest signal that the debate has been laid out for the reader to weigh, rather than resolved in either direction; the text moves on to a different question (what unmanifested matter, if real, would be made of) without ever actually declaring the reality-of-unmanifested-karma question settled.
One small but real interpretive point in the Sautrāntika's final rebuttal: their objection that unmanifested karma would predict "no one should ever break a precept through mere forgetfulness" is a genuinely strong argument on its own terms — it identifies a case (accidental precept violation through simple lapse of attention) that a purely mental, memory-based account explains naturally, but that a separately-existing, automatically-restraining unmanifested matter arguably should rule out. The Vaibhāṣika, so far as this passage shows, do not answer this specific objection before restating their tenet; we flag this rather than supplying an answer the text itself does not give.
19. What Is Unmanifested Karma Made Of? A Different Set of Great Elements
Having established their tenet that unmanifested matter is real, the Vaibhāṣika now turn to a new question: since unmanifested karma, like all matter in this system, is said to be constructed from the four great elements (earth, water, fire, and wind), does it share the very same instance of great elements that constructs its corresponding manifested karma, or does it arise from a distinct set of great elements of its own? The treatise answers that unmanifested karma arises from a different set of great elements than manifested karma does, because it would be unreasonable for a single, unified combination of great elements to simultaneously produce two effects of such different character — one coarse (manifested karma, perceptible to the senses) and one subtle (unmanifested karma, imperceptible). Just as manifested karma necessarily arises together, at the same moment, with its own supporting great elements, unmanifested karma likewise arises together with its own — the difference lying only in which great elements each one depends on.
前說無表大種所造性,為表大種造、為有異耶?頌曰: 此能造大種, 異於表所依。 論曰:無表與表異大種生。所以者何?從一和合有細麁果,不應理故。如表與大必同時生,無表亦然,為有差別。一切所造色多與大種俱時而生,然現在未來亦有少分依過去者。
It was stated earlier that unmanifested karma has the four great elements as what constructs it — is it constructed by the same great elements as manifested karma, or is there a difference? Verse: the great elements that construct this [unmanifested karma] differ from those that manifested karma depends on. Prose: unmanifested karma arises from great elements different from those of manifested karma. Why is this so? Because it is unreasonable for a single, unified combination [of great elements] to produce both a subtle and a coarse effect at once. Just as manifested karma necessarily arises together, at the same time, with its [own] great elements, so too does unmanifested karma — the difference lies only in this [which great elements each depends on]. All constructed matter, for the most part, arises together with the great elements at the very same time; yet, with respect to the present and future, there is also a small portion that depends on past [great elements].
This marks a shift in the fascicle's argumentative register: the preceding many sections argued over whether unmanifested karma exists at all, and now, the reality question apparently set aside (at least for the sake of argument), the treatise moves into a much more technical Abhidharma physics of exactly how unmanifested karma is materially constructed. The "one combination cannot produce two different effects" argument is a general Abhidharma principle about causation from the four great elements, applied here to explain why a visible, coarse bodily posture (manifested karma) and its accompanying invisible, subtle karmic residue (unmanifested karma) cannot share a single underlying material cause, even though they arise from the same karmic act at the same moment.
The final sentence's mention of "a small portion that depends on past [great elements]" is a genuine loose thread the treatise leaves dangling at the end of this section, to be picked up by the very next verse — we have kept it exactly as compressed as the original, since unpacking it now would get ahead of the text's own argument, which addresses it directly in what follows.
20. The Desire-Realm Exception, and Which Realm's Elements Construct Which Karma
The treatise now explains the small exception flagged at the end of the previous section: in the desire realm specifically, unmanifested karma depends on present great elements only for its very first moment of arising; from the second moment onward, it depends on past great elements instead. The present body's great elements serve only as an ongoing support and a condition for what follows in sequence — much as a cart-wheel rolling forward depends on the ground, or a hand's continued motion depends on it resting against some surface, without the ground or surface itself being what actually produces the wheel's or the hand's motion moment to moment. A further verse then answers a related question: contaminated bodily and verbal karma in any given realm — desire realm through the fourth level of meditative absorption — is constructed only by that same realm's own great elements; but uncontaminated bodily and verbal karma is instead constructed by the great elements of whatever realm one happens to be born into at the time, since uncontaminated dharmas, by their very nature, do not belong to any one realm's exclusive domain, and there is, in principle, no such thing as an inherently "uncontaminated" great element in itself — the uncontaminated character of such karma comes entirely from the power of what it depends upon, not from the great elements themselves.
欲後念無表, 依過大種生。 論曰:唯欲界繫初剎那後,所有無表從過大生,此為所依無表得起。現身大種但能為依,為轉隨轉因隨其次第,如輪行於地,手地為依。何地身語業?何地大所造?頌曰: 有漏自地依, 無漏隨生處。 論曰:欲界所繫身語二業,唯欲界繫大種所造。如是乃至第四靜慮身語二業,唯是彼地大種所造。若身語業是無漏者,隨生此地應起現前,即是此地大種所造,以無漏法不墮界故、必無大種是無漏故、由所依力無漏生故。
Verse: unmanifested karma bound to the desire realm, from the moment after its first instant onward, arises depending on past great elements. Prose: it is only in the case of unmanifested karma bound to the desire realm that, after its very first instant, it arises from past great elements — the present body's great elements serve merely as its ongoing support, functioning as the condition for what proceeds and what follows in due sequence, just as a wheel rolls upon the ground, or a hand depends upon the ground [or surface it rests against] to move. Which realm's bodily and verbal karma is constructed by which realm's great elements? Verse: contaminated karma depends on its own realm; uncontaminated karma follows the place of birth. Prose: bodily and verbal karma bound to the desire realm is constructed only by great elements bound to the desire realm; and so on, up through bodily and verbal karma at the level of the fourth meditative absorption, which is constructed only by that same level's great elements. If bodily and verbal karma is uncontaminated, then, wherever one is born into this realm, it should arise manifestly there, constructed precisely by that realm's great elements — since uncontaminated dharmas do not fall within the exclusive domain of any one realm, since there is certainly no such thing as an uncontaminated great element in itself, and since the uncontaminated quality [of such karma] arises through the power of what it depends upon.
The wheel-and-ground, hand-and-surface analogy is doing careful conceptual work: it distinguishes between a cause that actually produces something and a condition that merely supports or enables an already-ongoing process, which is exactly the distinction needed to explain why desire-realm unmanifested karma can outlast the specific great elements that first produced it — the present body keeps supplying support the way solid ground keeps supporting a rolling wheel, without either one being said to generate the wheel's motion anew at every instant.
The second verse's logic is worth spelling out because it resolves what looks like a puzzle: if karma is always constructed by great elements, and every set of great elements belongs to some specific realm, how can there be a truly "uncontaminated" (liberating, path-related) form of bodily or verbal karma at all, given that "contaminated" and "realm-bound" seem to go together? The treatise's answer is that the great elements themselves are never inherently uncontaminated or contaminated — realm-boundness is a feature only of contaminated dharmas — so uncontaminated karma can be built from perfectly ordinary, realm-specific great elements (those of wherever the practitioner happens to be born) while still counting as uncontaminated, because what makes it uncontaminated is the power of the mental state it depends on, not any special property of its underlying matter.
21. Classifying Manifested and Unmanifested Karma by Four Technical Criteria
The treatise now sorts manifested and unmanifested karma using several technical Abhidharma distinctions at once: whether something has a "physical basis capable of being grasped" (執受, upādāna — roughly, whether it is bound up with a sentient body's own sensitivity) or lacks one; whether it counts as a "natural outflow" (等流, niṣyanda — arising from a directly similar prior cause of the same type) or as something produced through a more special process; and whether its underlying great elements are shared with, or distinct from, other karma arising alongside it. Ordinary desire-realm unmanifested karma turns out to lack any physical basis capable of being grasped, counts as a natural outflow (except in its very first, initiating instant), belongs only to sentient beings since it arises through an internal process, and is built from great elements distinct from those of the other six kinds of karmic action alongside it. Unmanifested karma arising from meditative absorption — whether ordinary meditative discipline or uncontaminated path-discipline — is nourished by concentration itself, lacks a graspable physical basis, and, unlike the desire-realm case, shares one single, undifferentiated set of great elements across all seven of its bodily and verbal branches, just as the single mind supporting it is undifferentiated. Manifested karma, by contrast, is a natural outflow, and, since it is bound up with the body, does have a graspable physical basis — in every other respect resembling ordinary desire-realm unmanifested karma.
此表無表其類是何?復是何類大種所造?頌曰: 無表無執受, 亦等流情數, 散依等流性, 有受異大生, 定生依長養, 無受無異大, 表唯等流性, 屬身有執受。 論曰:今此頌中先辯無表是無執受,無變礙故。亦等流性,亦言顯此有是剎那,謂初無漏。餘皆等流性,謂同類因生。此唯有情,依內起故。於中欲界所有無表,等流有受別異大生。異大生言顯身語七一一是別大種所造,定生無表差別有二。謂諸靜慮無漏律儀。此二俱依定所長養。無受無異大種所生。無異大言顯此無表七支同一具四大種所生。所以者何?所依大種,如心唯一,無差別故。應知有表唯是等流,此若屬身是有執受,餘義皆與散無表同。
What kind of category do manifested and unmanifested karma each belong to? And what kind of great elements construct each of them? Verse: unmanifested karma has no graspable physical basis, and belongs only to sentient beings, and is a natural outflow; ordinary [desire-realm] unmanifested karma depends on distinct great elements for [each of] its seven [bodily and verbal branches] that have a graspable-physical-basis quality; meditation-produced unmanifested karma is nourished by [meditative] cultivation, has no graspable physical basis, and has no distinct great elements [across its branches]; manifested karma is only a natural outflow, and, belonging to the body, has a graspable physical basis. Prose: in this verse, first, unmanifested karma is explained as having no graspable physical basis, since it undergoes no alteration or obstruction. It is also [called] a natural outflow — though the word "also" indicates that there is a momentary exception, namely, its very first, uncontaminated instant [of arising]; apart from this, all the rest is of the nature of a natural outflow, meaning it arises from a cause of the same general kind. This [unmanifested karma] belongs only to sentient beings, since it arises through an internally-based process. Among these, unmanifested karma belonging to the desire realm is a natural outflow, has a graspable-physical-basis quality, and arises from distinct great elements. "Arises from distinct great elements" indicates that each of the seven branches of bodily and verbal [unmanifested karma] is constructed by its own separate great elements. Meditation-produced unmanifested karma divides into two kinds: the discipline of the meditative absorptions, and uncontaminated discipline. Both of these are nourished by [the power of] meditative concentration, lack a graspable physical basis, and are not produced from distinct great elements. "Not from distinct great elements" indicates that these seven branches of unmanifested karma are all produced together from a single, shared set of the four great elements. Why is this so? Because the great elements they depend on, like the single mind [supporting them], are themselves undifferentiated. One should understand that manifested karma is only of the nature of a natural outflow; if it belongs to the body, it has a graspable physical basis; in every other respect, its meaning is the same as that of ordinary [desire-realm] unmanifested karma.
This is dense technical Abhidharma classification, and we want to be upfront about our rendering choices for two recurring terms. "執受" (upādāna in this technical sense) we render "graspable physical basis" — it designates matter that is bound up with a living body's own capacity for sensation, such that damaging it produces feeling, as opposed to matter (like a fingernail clipping, or unmanifested karma itself) that is physically present but outside this sensitive, felt domain. "等流" (niṣyanda) we render "natural outflow" — a technical Abhidharma category for an effect that resembles its immediate cause closely enough to count as the same general type continuing forward, contrasted with effects produced by more specialized processes (such as being freshly "nourished" by meditative cultivation, mentioned later in this same passage).
The key substantive distinction this section draws is between desire-realm unmanifested karma, where each of the seven traditional bodily/verbal precept-branches has its own separate underlying great elements, and meditation-produced unmanifested karma, where all seven branches share one single, undifferentiated set of great elements — explained by analogy to the single, undifferentiated mind that supports meditative discipline as a whole. We have tried to keep this analogy's logic visible in translation (a shared, unified mental basis implies a shared, unified material basis) even though the Chinese states it in extremely compressed form.
22. Does Manifested Karma Require the Body's Original Shape to Break Apart?
A sharp puzzle now arises: when manifested karma occurs — say, a hand forming a fist — does this require the body's own prior shape to actually break apart and be replaced, or not? Both answers create trouble. If the original shape does break apart, then the body's ripened matter (a continuous causal inheritance from past karma) would be interrupted and would then have to somehow resume afterward, which conflicts with the Vaibhāṣika's own tenet that ripened matter is never actually severed. But if the original shape does not break apart, how can one and the same bodily location come to have two different shapes established in it at once — the old one and the new one? The treatise resolves this by proposing that a distinct, newly-arisen set of great elements, of the "natural outflow" type, produces the manifested karma without breaking apart the body's original matter at all; the two simply coexist in the same space, since the body itself contains enough pores and interstices to accommodate both without the new matter needing to spread and enlarge the body beyond its original size.
表業生時為要破壞本身形量、為不爾耶?若爾,何失?若破壞者,異熟色斷應可更續,是則違越毘婆沙宗。若不破壞,如何得有一身處所二形量成?有別新生等流大種,造有表業不破本身。若爾,隨依何身分處起有表業應大於本,新生大種遍增益故。若不遍增益,如何遍生表?身有孔隙,故得相容。
[Question:] When manifested karma arises, must it necessarily break apart the body's original shape, or not? If so, what fault would follow either way? If it does break apart the original shape, then ripened matter [which is supposed to continue without interruption] would be cut off and would then have to resume again afterward — but this would contradict the Vaibhāṣika school's own tenet. If it does not break apart the original shape, how could one and the same bodily location come to have two shapes both established there at once? [Reply:] There is a distinct, newly-arisen set of great elements of the natural-outflow type, which constructs manifested karma without breaking apart the original body. [Objection:] If this is so, then wherever, in whatever part of the body, manifested karma arises, that part should become larger than it originally was, since the newly-arisen great elements would be adding to it everywhere they occur. [Reply:] If they did not spread and add to it everywhere, how could manifested karma arise pervasively throughout [the relevant part]? [Further reply:] The body has pores and interstices, and so it is able to accommodate both [the old and the new matter together, without any overall increase in size].
This short puzzle is a nice example of the treatise working out the physical implications of its own prior commitments rather carefully: having already established (a few sections back) that manifested karma depends on a distinct set of great elements from the body's ordinary matter, it must now explain how those two sets of great elements can occupy the same bodily location simultaneously without either displacing the other or visibly inflating the body — the "pores and interstices" solution treats the body's matter as porous enough at a fine-grained level to interpenetrate with the newly-arisen karma-matter, an answer that stays consistent with this fascicle's broader atomistic picture of matter as composed of countless tiny units rather than one smooth continuous substance.
23. Unmanifested Karma Is Never Morally Neutral, and the Desire Realm's Special Restrictions
The treatise now asks about the moral quality of karma across the three realms: unmanifested karma, it turns out, is always either wholesome or unwholesome, never morally neutral, because a morally neutral state of mind is simply too weak a force to generate the strong karmic momentum needed to produce an effect that continues on even after its originating cause has ceased. Manifested karma and volition, by contrast, can be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral alike — though unwholesome karma occurs only in the desire realm, since beings in higher realms have already eliminated the shamelessness and lack of conscience that unwholesome action requires. Unmanifested karma itself occurs only in the desire and form realms, never the formless realm, since the formless realm altogether lacks the great elements unmanifested karma depends on for its material basis — and, since it is impossible to establish a genuine monastic vow of restraint anywhere bodily and verbal action cannot even occur, the formless realm has no place for such a vow at all, even though one might expect an analogous "uncontaminated unmanifested karma" to arise there the way uncontaminated mental states can, since properly realm-transcendent uncontaminated dharmas do not depend on any realm-specific great elements the way contaminated ones must, and meditative absorption in the formless realm specifically involves suppressing the very perception of form altogether.
已辯業門二三五別。此性界地差別云何?頌曰: 無表記餘三, 不善唯在欲, 無表遍欲色, 表唯有伺二, 欲無有覆表, 以無等起故。 論曰:無表唯通善不善性,無有無記。所以者何?以無記心勢力微劣,不能引發強業令生,可因滅時果仍續起。所言餘者,謂表及思。三謂皆通善、惡、無記。於中不善在欲非餘,已斷不善根無慚無愧故。善及無記諸地皆有,以於頌中不別遮故。欲色二界皆有無表,以無色中無大種故。隨於何處有身語轉,唯是處有身語律儀。若爾,身生欲色二界入無色定應有律儀,如起無漏心有無漏無表。不爾,以彼不墮界故。於無色界若有無表,應有無表非大種生。不可說言有漏無表以別界地大種為依。又背諸色入無色定,故彼定中不能生色,由彼定有伏色想故。毘婆沙師作如是說:為治惡戒故起尸羅。唯欲界中有諸惡戒,無色於欲具四種遠:一所依遠、二行相遠、三所緣遠、四對治遠,故無色中無無表色。
Having already explained the two-, three-, and five-fold distinctions among the categories of karma, what are the distinctions of moral quality, realm, and level [that apply to karma]? Verse: unmanifested karma is [wholesome or] unwholesome, not neutral; unwholesome karma exists only in the desire realm; unmanifested karma pervades the desire and form realms; manifested karma exists only in the two levels that have investigation; the desire realm has no defiled-neutral manifested karma, since it lacks the mental state that initiates it. Prose: unmanifested karma is only ever wholesome or unwholesome in nature; there is no morally neutral unmanifested karma. Why is this so? Because a morally neutral mind's force is too weak and feeble to give rise to a strong enough karmic force to bring about an effect that continues on even once its cause has ceased. By "the rest," manifested karma and volition are meant. These three [volition, manifested karma, and unmanifested karma taken generally] can each be wholesome, evil, or neutral — except that, among these, unwholesome karma exists only in the desire realm and nowhere else, since [beings in higher realms] have already eliminated the unwholesome roots, having neither shamelessness nor lack of conscience. Wholesome and neutral karma exist at every level, since the verse does not specifically exclude them anywhere. Both the desire and form realms have unmanifested karma, since the formless realm has no great elements at all. Wherever bodily and verbal action occurs, only there can there be a corresponding vow of bodily and verbal restraint. [Objection:] If this is so, then a being born in the desire or form realm who enters formless absorption ought to retain such a vow, just as one who gives rise to an uncontaminated mind has uncontaminated unmanifested karma [even without ordinary great elements to depend on]. [Reply:] This is not so, because that [formless-realm case] does not fall within [the domain of] any realm [the way contaminated things do]. If there were unmanifested karma in the formless realm, it would have to be unmanifested karma not produced from great elements — yet one cannot say that contaminated unmanifested karma depends on the great elements of some other, unrelated realm or level. Moreover, entering formless absorption specifically means turning away from all form altogether, and so, within that absorption, form cannot be generated, since that very absorption involves suppressing the perception of form. The Vaibhāṣika explain it this way: precepts (śīla) arise specifically as a counter-agent to bad conduct, and bad conduct exists only in the desire realm; the formless realm is, relative to the desire realm, distant in four respects — distant in its basis, distant in its mode of activity, distant in its object, and distant in its counter-agent — and hence the formless realm has no unmanifested matter at all.
The "four kinds of distance" explanation for why the formless realm lacks unmanifested matter is a distinctively Abhidharma style of argument — rather than a single knockdown reason, it stacks up several independent respects in which the formless realm and the desire realm's bad conduct are simply too far apart (in underlying basis, mode of mental activity, object of attention, and available counter-agent) to make a vow against desire-realm misconduct meaningful for a being who has left the desire and form realms behind entirely. We have kept all four terms in their compressed, parallel form rather than expanding each one individually, since the text itself does not elaborate on them further at this point.
This passage also revisits, in a new context, the relationship between uncontaminated dharmas and realm-restriction already established a few sections back: since uncontaminated (path-related) mental states are not confined to any one realm's exclusive domain, one might reasonably expect an uncontaminated unmanifested karma to be possible even in the formless realm, mirroring how uncontaminated bodily/verbal karma elsewhere in this fascicle was said to depend on whatever realm one is born into. The treatise blocks this specific extension for a distinct reason: it is not about realm-transcendence at all, but about the formless realm's absorption itself actively suppressing the perception of form, making any form-based karma — contaminated or not — simply impossible to generate there.
24. Manifested Karma's Two Levels, and the Puzzle of Mahābrahmā's Deceptive Speech
Manifested karma, the treatise explains, exists only at the two levels that still possess investigative thought (vitarka) — the desire realm and the first meditative absorption — and not at any higher level. Ordinarily, the desire realm is said to have no defiled-yet-morally-neutral manifested karma, since neutral states of mind are too weak to initiate any manifest bodily or verbal action at all. But a traditional account is then raised as an apparent counterexample: Mahābrahmā is remembered as having spoken deceptively and flatteringly to a certain disciple — dodging an awkward question posed within his own assembly by falsely praising himself — which sounds very much like defiled speech occurring at a meditative level where manifested karma should not exist at all, and raises a further puzzle: since higher meditative levels are said to lack the external great elements that produce sound, how could speech even be possible there? The treatise answers that Mahābrahmā's speech is produced through other, external great elements serving as its cause. Some teachers go still further, proposing that the second through fourth meditative absorptions do, in fact, possess a morally neutral manifested karma of the "not-covered" (undefiled) kind, though never wholesome or defiled karma there, since a being born at a higher level lacks the capacity to generate the inferior wholesome or defiled mental states of a lower level strong enough to produce bodily or verbal manifestation — the treatise favors this latter account as the more defensible position.
表色唯在二有伺地,謂通欲界初靜慮中,非上地中可言有表。有覆無記表,欲界定無,唯於梵世中可得說有。曾聞大梵有誑諂言,謂自眾中為避馬勝所徵問故矯自歎等。上地既無言,何得有聲處?有外大種為因發聲。有餘師言:上三靜慮亦有無覆無記表業,無善無染。所以者何?非上地生能起下地善及染心發身語表,劣故斷故。前說為善。
Manifested karma exists only at the two levels that possess investigative thought — that is, spanning the desire realm and the first meditative absorption; one cannot speak of manifested karma existing at any level above these. Defiled, morally neutral manifested karma certainly does not exist in the desire realm; it can only be said to exist within the Brahmā world. It has been heard that Mahābrahmā once spoke with deceptive flattery — namely, that, within his own assembly, in order to avoid a question posed by Aśvajit [Mahānāma, here rendered by his traditional epithet "Horse-Victor"], he falsely praised himself, and so on. Since higher levels have no speech, how could there be a sound sense-base there at all? [Reply:] There are external great elements that serve as the cause producing sound [there]. Other teachers say: the second through fourth meditative absorptions also possess a morally neutral, "not-covered" kind of manifested karma, though they have neither wholesome nor defiled manifested karma. Why is this so? Because one born at a higher level cannot give rise to the inferior wholesome or defiled mental states of a lower level so as to produce bodily or verbal manifestation there, since such states are too weak, and have already been abandoned. The previously stated position is held to be sound.
We should flag an identification we have made in translation: the Chinese transliteration "馬勝" (literally "Horse-Victor") is the standard Chinese rendering of Aśvajit, one of the Buddha's first five disciples, well known in early Buddhist literature for a separate episode in which his serene bearing famously converted Śāriputra. The story alluded to here — Mahābrahmā resorting to a face-saving, self-flattering deception when questioned by Aśvajit in front of his own divine assembly — is a well-known episode in Buddhist cosmological literature illustrating that even a high deity is not free of subtle vanity and evasiveness, and it is being used here purely as a test case for the Abhidharma's technical claim that manifested karma should not exist above the first meditative absorption, since Mahābrahmā's world is traditionally located there.
The debate's resolution is characteristically cautious rather than triumphant: rather than simply denying the traditional account of Mahābrahmā's speech, the treatise accepts it as real and instead adjusts its own theory to accommodate it (external great elements can produce sound even without an internal speech-faculty at that level), while separately noting that other teachers would go even further and grant an ordinary, undefiled manifested karma to the higher absorptions generally — a position the treatise endorses as the better one, though without fully spelling out why the "external great elements" explanation for Mahābrahmā specifically is then still needed once this broader concession is made. We flag this as a point where the text's own resolution is somewhat compressed rather than fully reconciled.
25. The Fourfold Framework: What Makes Anything Wholesome or Unwholesome
Rather than treating "wholesome" and "unwholesome" as a single undifferentiated label, the treatise now distinguishes four distinct ways a dharma can earn either designation. Wholesome by ultimate reality (勝義善) means nirvāṇa itself — true liberation — since it is the single most secure and stable state there is, with all suffering permanently stilled, like the state of complete health compared to sickness. Wholesome by intrinsic nature (自性善) means the three wholesome roots — the absence of greed and, specifically here, shame and conscience — which count as wholesome simply by their own essential character, without needing to be paired with anything else, like an inherently effective medicine. Wholesome by association (相應善) means any mental factor that becomes wholesome only by being paired with shame, conscience, and the wholesome roots — mental states that are not wholesome on their own, but become so through this pairing, like water mixed with medicine. Wholesome by initiation (等起善) means bodily and verbal karma (a "non-associated formation," since it is matter, not mind) that is wholesome only because it is set in motion by an intrinsically wholesome or associatively wholesome mental state, the way medicine-infused liquid can, in turn, produce milk with medicinal properties in a nursing infant. Unwholesomeness mirrors this fourfold structure exactly in reverse.
欲界中無有覆無記表,為但由等起令諸法成善不善性等?不爾。云何?由四種因成善性等:一由勝義、二由自性、三由相應、四由等起。何法何性由何因成?頌曰: 勝義善解脫, 自性慚愧根, 相應彼相應, 等起色業等, 翻此名不善, 勝無記二常。 論曰:勝義善者,謂真解脫,以涅槃中最極安隱、眾苦永寂猶如無病。自性善者,謂慚愧根,以有為中唯慚與愧及無貪等三種善根,不待相應及餘等起,體性是善猶如良藥。相應善者,謂彼相應,以心心所要與慚愧善根相應方成善性,若不與彼慚等相應,善性不成,如雜藥水。等起善者,謂身語業不相應行,以是自性及相應善所等起故,如良藥汁所引生乳。若異類心所起得等,云何成善?此義應思,如說善性四種差別,不善四種與此相違。云何相違?勝義不善,謂生死法。由生死中諸法皆以苦為自性,極不安隱猶如痼疾。自性不善,謂無慚愧三不善根,由有漏中唯無慚愧及貪瞋等三不善根,不待相應及餘等起,體是不善猶如毒藥。相應不善,謂彼相應,由心心所法要與無慚愧不善根相應方成不善性,異則不然,如雜毒水。等起不善,謂身語業不相應行,以是自性相應不善所等起故,如毒藥汁所引生乳。若爾,便無一有漏法是無記或善,皆生死攝故。若據勝義誠如所言,然於此中約異熟說。諸有漏法若不能記異熟果者立無記名,於中若能記愛異熟說名為善,故無有過。勝義無記,謂二無為,以太虛空及非擇滅唯無記性更無異門。
[Question:] Given that the desire realm has no defiled-neutral manifested karma, is it only by way of what initiates it that dharmas come to have a wholesome or unwholesome nature and so forth? [Reply:] It is not so. [Question:] How, then? [Reply:] Wholesome nature and the like are established by four causes: first, by ultimate reality; second, by intrinsic nature; third, by association; fourth, by initiation. Which dharma has which nature by which cause? Verse: wholesome by ultimate reality is liberation; wholesome by intrinsic nature is shame, conscience, and the [wholesome] roots; wholesome by association is what is associated with these; wholesome by initiation is matter, karma, and the like; reversing this gives "unwholesome"; the remaining case is the two constant neutrals. Prose: wholesome by ultimate reality means true liberation, since, within nirvāṇa, there is the most complete security, with all forms of suffering eternally stilled, just like being free of illness. Wholesome by intrinsic nature means shame, conscience, and the [wholesome] roots, since, among conditioned dharmas, only shame, conscience, and the three wholesome roots [non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion] are wholesome in their own essential nature, without depending on association or on anything else that initiates them — like an inherently effective medicine. Wholesome by association means whatever is associated with these, since a mind or mental factor becomes wholesome in nature only by being associated with shame, conscience, and the wholesome roots; if not associated with these, its wholesome nature does not come about — like water mixed with medicine. Wholesome by initiation means bodily and verbal karma, a non-associated formation, since it is initiated by what is wholesome by intrinsic nature or by association — like medicine-infused liquid that, in turn, gives rise to milk [with medicinal properties, in a nursing infant]. [Objection:] But if it is initiated by a different kind of mental state, how could it become wholesome? [Reply:] This point should be carefully considered. As has been explained for the four distinctions of wholesome nature, the four distinctions of unwholesome nature are the reverse of these. How are they the reverse? Unwholesome by ultimate reality means the dharmas of saṃsāra, since, within saṃsāra, all dharmas have suffering as their essential nature, being extremely insecure, just like a chronic illness. Unwholesome by intrinsic nature means the absence of shame and conscience and the three unwholesome roots, since, among contaminated dharmas, only the absence of shame and conscience, together with greed, hatred, and the three unwholesome roots, are unwholesome in their own essential nature, without depending on association or anything else that initiates them — like a poison. Unwholesome by association means whatever is associated with these, since a mind or mental factor becomes unwholesome in nature only by being associated with the absence of shame and conscience and the unwholesome roots; otherwise, it does not — like water mixed with poison. Unwholesome by initiation means bodily and verbal karma, a non-associated formation, since it is initiated by what is unwholesome by intrinsic nature or by association — like poisoned liquid that, in turn, gives rise to [tainted] milk. [Objection:] If this is so, then no contaminated dharma at all could be morally neutral or wholesome, since all of them would be subsumed under saṃsāra. [Reply:] With respect to ultimate reality, this is indeed exactly as stated; but here, the discussion is framed in terms of karmic ripening specifically. Among contaminated dharmas, those that are incapable of yielding a ripened result are given the name "neutral," while, among these, those capable of yielding a desirable ripened result are called "wholesome" — hence there is no fault here. Neutral by ultimate reality refers to the two unconditioned dharmas, since empty space and cessation-not-through-discernment are, by their nature, purely neutral, with no other possible category for them.
This fourfold framework (ultimate reality / intrinsic nature / association / initiation) is one of the more elegant pieces of systematic Abhidharma classification in this fascicle, and the medicine-and-poison imagery is doing real conceptual work, not just decoration: it distinguishes an intrinsically wholesome factor (medicine itself) from something that merely picks up wholesome quality by being mixed with it (medicine-water) from something further downstream still that inherits wholesome quality only because it was produced by the mixture (milk from a mother who drank the medicine-water) — three progressively more indirect ways of "being wholesome," with bodily/verbal karma occupying this third, most indirect position, since karma itself is matter and cannot itself be a mental factor.
We should flag one genuine terminological subtlety: "等起" (here "initiation") has appeared earlier in this same fascicle in the more specific sense of "the mental state that triggers manifested karma to occur" (see, for example, the desire realm's lack of neutral manifested karma, discussed two sections back); here it broadens into a general causal category applicable across the wholesome/unwholesome framework as a whole. We have kept the same English word, "initiation" / "initiated," in both places since the underlying Chinese term and its core meaning (something set in motion by, and inheriting its character from, a prior cause) are consistent — but readers should note the second usage here is the more general, technical sense the term is given within this fourfold schema specifically.
26. Why the Great Elements Themselves Are Never Wholesome or Unwholesome
An objection arises: if a mental state's moral quality can be inherited downstream by the karma it initiates, shouldn't the same apply to the great elements that physically construct that karma, making them wholesome or unwholesome too? The treatise blocks this: what the actor's mind actually intends to set in motion is the karmic action itself, not the four great elements as such, so the parallel does not hold. A further difficulty concerns unmanifested karma that arises and continues moment-by-moment through meditative absorption itself, rather than through either the deliberate mental application that occurs while actually settling into concentration, or through the ordinary preparatory effort of an undistracted mind — since it belongs to neither familiar category, how does it come to count as wholesome at all? The treatise acknowledges this is a genuinely difficult point requiring careful effort to resolve, comparing it to the similarly puzzling question of how the divine eye and divine ear (supernatural faculties arising from deep meditation) come to be wholesome. It then returns to a point made earlier — that a view-related affliction operates too inwardly, absorbed in its own object, to ever directly trigger manifested karma — and answers an apparent scriptural objection to this (a sūtra's statement that wrong view gives rise to wrong thought, wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood) by promising that a forthcoming distinction between two different senses of "initiation" will show there is no real contradiction here.
若等起力令身語業成善不善,則諸大種例亦應然。以作者心本欲起業,非四大種,故不成例。若爾,定心隨轉無表,非正在定作意引生,亦非散心加行引發,不同類故。如何成善?或天眼耳應成善性,於如是義應設劬勞。如上所言,見所斷惑內門轉故不能發表。若爾,何緣契經中說:由邪見故起邪思惟、邪語、邪業及邪命等。此不相違。何以故?
[Objection:] If the power of what initiates a thing makes bodily and verbal karma become wholesome or unwholesome, then this same reasoning should also apply to the great elements. [Reply:] This is because what the actor's mind originally intends to set in motion is the karmic action, not the four great elements — hence the parallel does not hold. [Further objection:] If this is so, then unmanifested karma that continues moment by moment while in meditative concentration is neither produced by the deliberate mental application occurring precisely while settling into concentration, nor initiated by the preparatory effort of an ordinary, undistracted mind, since it does not belong to either of these same categories — how, then, does it come to be wholesome? Or, similarly, how do the divine eye and divine ear come to be of a wholesome nature? With respect to this point, considerable effort should be devoted. As stated above, an affliction abandoned through seeing [the truths] operates too inwardly, absorbed in its own object, and therefore cannot give rise to manifested karma. [Objection:] If this is so, then for what reason does a sūtra state that, by virtue of wrong view, wrong thought, wrong speech, wrong action, and wrong livelihood arise? [Reply:] This is not actually a contradiction. Why is this so? [The answer follows in the next verse.]
We should be transparent that the treatise itself flags this passage as unusually difficult ("considerable effort should be devoted" to the question of how meditation-continuous unmanifested karma and the divine eye/ear become wholesome), and it does not actually resolve this particular puzzle before moving on — the text raises it, acknowledges its difficulty, and then pivots to a different but related question (the view-affliction and scripture problem) that the next section's verse will resolve instead. We have preserved this as an open point the treatise itself leaves unresolved here, rather than supplying a false sense of closure.
The wrong-view objection sets up what turns out to be the fascicle's final major technical distinction: between a cause that merely establishes the conditions for future wrongdoing at some earlier point (holding a wrong view can predispose someone toward wrong action later) and a cause that is actually, presently operating at the very moment wrongdoing occurs. The upcoming verse's two kinds of "initiation" — causal initiation and momentary initiation — are designed precisely to let the treatise affirm both claims at once: a view-affliction can, in the loose causal sense, be part of why wrong speech eventually happens, without it being true that the view-affliction itself is directly, moment-by-moment producing that speech the way an ordinary desire or aversion does.
27. Two Kinds of Initiation, and Which States of Mind Can Serve as Which
The treatise now draws the promised distinction: "initiation" is of two kinds — causal initiation, which occurs earlier and functions as a distant cause, and momentary initiation, which is present at the very instant the karmic act itself occurs. A view-related affliction (like the wrong view in the earlier scriptural objection) can indeed serve as a causal initiation, planting the seed for wrong speech or action to occur later, without needing to be a momentary initiation actively co-occurring with the act itself — which resolves the apparent scriptural contradiction without difficulty. The treatise then maps this distinction across the different kinds of consciousness: afflictions abandoned through seeing the truths can only ever serve as causal initiation, never momentary initiation, since they are too inwardly absorbed to be present at the actual moment of outward action; the five sense-consciousnesses (eye, ear, and so on), by contrast, can only ever serve as momentary initiation, never causal, since they lack the capacity for the discriminative deliberation causal initiation requires; ordinary mental consciousness of the kind abandoned through cultivation can serve as either; and uncontaminated states of mind, along with morally neutral ripened-consciousness, serve as neither, since they arise independently of ordinary deliberate effort altogether.
頌曰: 等起有二種, 因及彼剎那, 如次第應知, 名轉名隨轉。 見斷識唯轉, 唯隨轉五識, 修斷意通二, 無漏異熟非。 論曰:表無表業等起有二,謂因等起、剎那等起,在先為因故、彼剎那有故。如次初名轉,第二名隨轉。謂因等起將作業時,能引發故說名為轉。剎那等起正作業時,不相離故名為隨轉。隨轉於業有何功能?雖有先因為能引發,若無隨轉者如死業應無。若爾,無心如何發戒?諸有心者業起分明,故隨轉心於業有用。見所斷識於發表中唯能為轉,於能起表尋伺生中為資糧故不為隨轉,於外門心正起業時此無有故。又見所斷若發表色,此色則應是見所斷。若許見斷,斯有何失?是則違越阿毘達磨,又明無明不相違故。有漏業色非見所斷,如是道理應更成立。若爾大種亦應見斷,俱見斷心力所起故。無如是過失,如非善不善。或復許爾,理亦無違。不應許然,以諸大種定非見斷及非所斷,以一切種不染污法與明無明不相違故。彼經但據前因等起而作是說,故不相違。若五識身唯作隨轉,無分別故、外門起故。修斷意識通為二種,有分別故、外門起故。一切無漏異熟生心非轉隨轉,唯在定故、不由加行任運轉故。是如即成四句差別。有轉非隨轉,謂見所斷心。有隨轉非轉,謂眼等五識。有轉亦隨轉,謂修所斷三性意識。有非轉隨轉,謂諸無漏異熟生心。
Verse: initiation is of two kinds — causal, and that of the [present] instant; these should be understood, in order, as "causal-initiating" and "momentary-initiating." Afflictions abandoned through seeing [the truths] are only causal-initiating; the five [sense-]consciousnesses are only momentary-initiating; mental consciousness abandoned through cultivation is both; uncontaminated and ripened-arising [consciousness] are neither. Prose: manifested and unmanifested karma's initiation is of two kinds — causal initiation and momentary initiation — since the former exists earlier as a cause, and the latter exists at that very instant [of action]. In order, the first is called "causal-initiating," the second "momentary-initiating." That is, causal initiation, at the time one is about to perform an action, has the capacity to draw it forth, and so is called causal-initiating. Momentary initiation, at the very moment the action is actually performed, is inseparable from it, and so is called momentary-initiating. [Question:] What function does momentary initiation serve with respect to the action? [Reply:] Although there is an earlier cause capable of drawing the action forth, if there were no momentary initiation, the action would be like a dead thing, lacking [present force]. [Objection:] If so, how could one without any mind [i.e., in a mindless state] give rise to precepts? [Reply:] For those who do have mind present, the arising of the action is clear and distinct, and so a momentarily-initiating mind does have a function with respect to the action [in the ordinary case]. Consciousness abandoned through seeing [the truths], with respect to giving rise to manifested karma, can only ever be causal-initiating; with respect to the investigative and deliberative process that gives rise to manifested karma, it serves as a supporting condition, but not as momentary initiation, since it is not present at the very moment an outwardly-directed mind actually gives rise to the action. Moreover, if [an affliction] abandoned through seeing gave rise to manifested matter, this matter would then have to be [classified as] abandoned through seeing as well. [Objection:] If one grants that it is abandoned-through-seeing, what fault would follow? [Reply:] This would contradict the Abhidharma, and would also mean that knowledge and ignorance are not mutually opposed [after all, since both would produce the very same kind of matter]. That contaminated karmic matter is not abandoned through seeing must therefore be established all the more firmly on this basis. [Objection:] If this is so, then the great elements too should be abandoned through seeing, since they likewise arise through the power of a mind abandoned through seeing. [Reply:] There is no such fault, just as [the great elements] are neither wholesome nor unwholesome [despite arising from a wholesome or unwholesome mind]. [Alternative reply:] Or, one might even grant this point, and there would still be no contradiction in doing so. [Further reply:] One should not grant this, however, since the great elements are, without exception, neither abandoned-through-seeing nor abandoned-through-anything-else, because undefiled dharmas of every kind are never in contradiction with either knowledge or ignorance. That sūtra [cited earlier] speaks only with reference to prior causal initiation, and so there is no contradiction. As for the fivefold group of [sense-]consciousnesses, since they lack discriminative deliberation and arise only outwardly-directed, they serve only as momentary initiation. Mental consciousness abandoned through cultivation is capable of both, since it has discriminative deliberation and arises outwardly-directed as well. All uncontaminated and morally-neutral ripened-arising states of mind are neither causal-initiating nor momentary-initiating, since they occur only within meditative concentration [in the former case] or arise spontaneously, not through deliberate effort [in the latter]. In this way, four distinct combinations result: there is causal-initiating without momentary-initiating — namely, consciousness abandoned through seeing; there is momentary-initiating without causal-initiating — namely, the eye and the other [four sense-]consciousnesses; there is both causal- and momentary-initiating — namely, mental consciousness of the three moral qualities that is abandoned through cultivation; and there is neither — namely, all uncontaminated and ripened-arising states of mind.
The "dead action" (死業, literally something like "a corpse of an action") image is a vivid way of stating a fairly precise technical point: causal initiation alone (a wrong view planted long ago) is not enough to make an action happen right now — something has to be actively present at the moment of action itself, supplying it with the force of a currently-operating mind, or else the earlier cause would simply sit inert. We have rendered this literally as "like a dead thing, lacking [present force]" rather than smoothing it into a blander English phrase, since the vividness of the image is doing real explanatory work.
We want to flag genuine uncertainty in the objection-and-reply chain concerning whether the great elements should be classified as "abandoned through seeing" — the passage seems to present two different replies in quick succession ("there is no such fault... / or, one might even grant this point... / one should not grant this, however...") without a fully clear resolution of which the treatise actually endorses, and we have marked this with bracketed [Alternative reply:] and [Further reply:] labels to signal the structure rather than silently picking one reading as authoritative. This is consistent with this fascicle's broader pattern of leaving some fine-grained scholastic disputes visibly unsettled rather than manufacturing false resolution.
28. The Buddha's Uniquely Matched Minds, and the Verse of the Nāga in Constant Meditation
The treatise now asks whether a causal-initiating mind and its corresponding momentary-initiating mind must always share the same moral quality — and answers that, for ordinary beings, they need not: a wholesome causal-initiating mind can be followed by a wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral momentary-initiating mind, and the same holds for unwholesome and neutral initiation as well. Only in the case of the Buddha does this pattern tighten dramatically: for the Blessed One, causal-initiating and momentary-initiating consciousness are almost always of matching quality, with only rare exception — a wholesome causal mind is followed by a wholesome momentary mind, and a neutral causal mind by a neutral momentary mind, but never the reverse pairing, since the Buddha, while teaching Dharma and engaged in similar activities, has a mind that only ever grows and never withers. Some schools go still further, holding that Buddhas are constantly in meditative absorption without exception, so that their minds are always wholesome and never neutral at all — citing a well-known verse praising the "Nāga" (a traditional honorific for the Buddha, likening him to a great serpent or elephant) as being in meditation whether walking, standing, sitting, or lying down.
轉隨轉心定同性不?此不決定。其事云何?謂前轉心若是善性,後隨轉識通善等三,不善無記隨轉亦爾。唯牟尼尊轉隨轉識,多分同性少有不同。謂轉若善心隨轉亦善,轉心若無記隨轉亦然。而或有時善隨無記轉,曾無無記為善隨轉時。以佛世尊於說法等,心或增長無萎歇故。有餘部說:諸佛世尊常在定故,心唯是善,無無記心。故契經說: 那伽行在定, 那伽住在定, 那伽坐在定, 那伽臥在定。 毘婆沙師作如是釋:此顯佛意若不樂散心,則於四威儀能常在定,然於餘位非無威儀及異熟生通果心起。
Must a causal-initiating mind and its momentary-initiating mind necessarily be of the same moral quality? This is not fixed. How is this so? If the preceding causal-initiating mind is wholesome, the following momentary-initiating consciousness may be wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral; the same holds for an unwholesome or a neutral causal-initiating mind. Only in the case of the Sage, the Blessed One, are the causal-initiating and momentary-initiating consciousnesses mostly of matching quality, with only a small number of exceptions — that is, if the causal-initiating mind is wholesome, the momentary-initiating mind is also wholesome, and if the causal-initiating mind is neutral, the momentary-initiating mind is likewise so. Yet there are, at times, cases where a wholesome causal mind is followed by a neutral momentary-initiating mind, though there is never a case of a neutral causal mind being followed by a wholesome momentary-initiating mind. This is because, while the Buddha, the Blessed One, is teaching Dharma and engaged in similar activities, his mind either continues to grow, and never withers away. Certain other schools hold: since Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, are constantly in meditative absorption, their minds are only ever wholesome, and there is no neutral mind at all. Hence a sūtra states: "The Nāga walks in meditation; the Nāga stands in meditation; the Nāga sits in meditation; the Nāga lies down in meditation." The Vaibhāṣika explain it this way: this shows that the Buddha's intention, if he does not wish for a distracted mind, is such that he can remain constantly in meditative absorption throughout all four bodily postures — yet, at other times, it is not the case that he lacks ordinary deportment, or that a neutral, ripened-arising, universally-effective mind does not also arise in him.
"那伽" (Nāga) is a transliteration we have kept as a proper term rather than translating, since the term carries a double meaning in Indian tradition — both the mythic serpent-being and, honorifically, a great elephant or a being of immense, unshakeable power — and Buddhist verse regularly uses it as an epithet for a fully awakened being or an arhat specifically because of these connotations of imperturbable strength and dignity; translating it as simply "serpent" or "great one" would lose the term's traditional resonance without adding clarity.
This section preserves a genuine, unresolved difference of opinion between two positions, and we want to flag it clearly rather than let it read as settled: the Vaibhāṣika's own view is that the Buddha's mind is almost always matched in quality between causal and momentary initiation, but does still, on rare occasion, include an ordinary neutral mind; "certain other schools," by contrast, hold that the Buddha is without exception in meditative absorption, with no neutral mental state at all, and read the Nāga verse literally as proof of constant, unbroken absorption in every posture. The Vaibhāṣika's closing gloss on the verse — that it means the Buddha simply has the capacity to remain absorbed whenever he chooses not to be distracted, not that he is invariably and exclusively so — is offered as a rebuttal to this stronger reading, and the fascicle does not resolve this dispute any further before its final section.
29. The Fascicle's Final Question: Does Manifested Karma Follow Causal or Momentary Initiation?
The fascicle's closing question asks whether manifested karma's own moral quality should be determined by its causal-initiating mind or by its momentary-initiating mind — and both options create immediate trouble. If manifested karma took its moral quality from the causal-initiating mind, then the desire realm should have defiled-neutral manifested karma after all, since afflictions like the view of a real self or an extreme view can serve as causal initiation — directly contradicting the position established earlier in this fascicle. If it instead took its quality from the momentary-initiating mind, then an unwholesome or neutral mind occurring at the very moment one carries out a previously undertaken vow of monastic restraint would strip that manifested karma of its wholesome quality entirely, which is absurd. The treatise resolves this with a careful compromise: manifested karma does take its moral quality from the causal-initiating mind, but not from just any causal-initiating mind — specifically not from a causal-initiating mind that is itself abandoned through seeing the truths, since a causal-initiating mind abandoned through cultivation always intervenes as an intermediate step in between. This lets the treatise preserve both its scriptural reading (the sūtra it cited on wrong view's causal role refers only to this intervening, cultivation-abandoned kind of causal initiation, not the view-affliction directly) and its earlier ruling that the desire realm has no defiled-neutral manifested karma — bringing to a close this fascicle's long inquiry into the nature, material basis, and moral character of karma.
諸有表業成善等性,為如轉心、為如隨轉?設爾,何失?若如轉者,則欲界中應有有覆無記表業,身見邊見能為轉故。或應簡別,非一切種見所斷心皆能為轉,若如隨轉惡無記心俱得別解脫表應非善性。於此徵難應設劬勞,應言如轉心表成善等性,然非如彼見斷轉心,修斷轉心為間隔故。若表不由隨轉心力成善等者,則不應言:彼經但據前因等起非據剎那,故欲界中定無有覆無記表業。但應說言:彼經唯據餘心所間因等起說,故見斷心雖能為轉,而於欲界定無有覆無記表業。 阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十三
Does manifested karma come to have a wholesome or other moral quality following the pattern of the causal-initiating mind, or that of the momentary-initiating mind? Suppose either is the case — what fault would follow? If it follows the causal-initiating mind, then the desire realm should have defiled-neutral manifested karma after all, since the view of a [real, substantial] self and extreme views are capable of serving as causal initiation. Or, one might attempt to make a further distinction — that not every kind of consciousness abandoned through seeing is capable of causal initiation — yet if manifested karma instead follows the momentary-initiating mind, then an unwholesome or neutral mind occurring together with the manifestation of the vow of individual liberation ought to make that manifested karma fail to be wholesome. With respect to this difficulty, considerable effort should be devoted. One should say: manifested karma comes to have a wholesome or other moral quality following the causal-initiating mind — but not that causal-initiating mind which is itself abandoned through seeing, since a causal-initiating mind abandoned through cultivation always intervenes in between. If manifested karma did not come to have a wholesome or other moral quality through the power of the momentary-initiating mind, then it would be incorrect to have said that the sūtra [cited earlier] speaks only with reference to prior causal initiation, not with reference to the [present] instant, so that the desire realm certainly has no defiled-neutral manifested karma. Rather, one should say instead: that sūtra speaks only with reference to a causal initiation with some other mind intervening in between — hence, although consciousness abandoned through seeing can serve as causal initiation, the desire realm still certainly has no defiled-neutral manifested karma. Abhidharmakośa, Fascicle Thirteen [ends here].
This closing argument is genuinely intricate, and we want to state plainly what its final position amounts to, since the double-negative construction in the Chinese ("not that causal-initiating mind which is itself abandoned through seeing, since a cultivation-abandoned causal-initiating mind always intervenes in between") is easy to misread: the treatise's settled view is that a view-affliction (abandoned through seeing) can plant the distant seed for wrongdoing, but it never directly, by itself, determines a manifested karmic act's moral quality — there is always an intervening, more ordinary cultivation-abandoned mental state standing between the original view and the resulting bodily or verbal act, and it is this intervening state's moral quality, not the original view's, that actually governs the manifested karma. This is what allows the treatise to hold both that wrong view has genuine causal responsibility for downstream wrongdoing (honoring the sūtra it quoted earlier) and that the desire realm strictly has no defiled-yet-morally-neutral manifested karma (honoring its own systematic classification from earlier in this fascicle) without contradiction.
This fascicle has now reached its close in the source text, marked by the traditional colophon repeating the fascicle's own title — an unusual closing formula compared to several other fascicles in this treatise, which more typically close with a formula naming the next fascicle's affiliated Abhidharma school tradition, but consistent with what we found when first locating this fascicle's boundaries in the source. Fascicle 13 has carried us through the opening of Chapter Four (分別業品, the Karma-nirdeśa): from the claim that karma alone, not any creator god, accounts for every distinction in the world, through the long and genuinely undecided Vaibhāṣika–Sautrāntika debate over whether unmanifested karma (avijñapti) is a real, distinct kind of matter or merely a name for a transforming mental continuum, into the technical questions of what unmanifested karma is materially constructed from, and finally into its moral classification across realms and levels of meditative attainment. True to this treatise's spirit and to Ru-Yi's own standing commitment to honest translation, we have tried throughout to preserve the places where the text itself leaves a question genuinely open, rather than smoothing every debate into a false resolution — several threads here (the reality of unmanifested karma chief among them) are presented by the Abhidharmakośa as live disputes between schools, not settled doctrine, and our translation has aimed to keep that openness visible rather than resolve it on the treatise's behalf.
Fascicle 13 Complete
This concludes our translation of Fascicle 13 of the Abhidharmakośa (阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十三), the opening of Chapter Four on karma (分別業品第四之一). Thank you for reading. Fascicle 14 will continue this chapter's inquiry into karma.