Fascicle 14 · 阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十四 · Complete

Restraint, Non-Restraint, and the Vows Between

Fascicle 14 continues Chapter 4 (分別業品第四之二, the Karma-nirdeśa) directly from where fascicle 13 left off. Having spent the previous fascicle establishing what unmanifested karma is and whether it is real at all, the treatise turns to classifying it — restraint, non-restraint, and neither — then works through the full structure of the vow of individual liberation, from the upāsaka's five precepts to the bhikṣu's complete code, what taking refuge in the Three Jewels means, and the reasoning behind each precept the Buddha set for lay life.

Translator: Ru-Yi Meditation Center Status: fascicle 14 complete, 29 sections Source: Taishō T1558, vol. 29, fascicle 14 Author: Vasubandhu · Translator into Chinese: Xuánzàng

1. Three Kinds of Unmanifested Karma, and Three Kinds of Restraint

Picking up directly from fascicle 13's long inquiry into manifested and unmanifested karma, the treatise now classifies unmanifested karma into three basic types: restraint (律儀, saṃvara — karma that holds back wrongdoing), non-restraint (不律儀 — karma that commits one to wrongdoing), and a third category that is neither. Restraint itself earns its name because it is able to block and extinguish the continuity of bad conduct. The treatise then distinguishes three kinds of restraint by their source: the vow of individual liberation (別解脫律儀, prātimokṣa-saṃvara), tied to the desire realm's precepts; meditation-born restraint (靜慮生律儀), tied to the form realm's precepts, arising automatically alongside meditative absorption; and path-born restraint (道生律儀), the uncontaminated restraint that arises together with the noble path itself.

Chinese Source

傍論已了,復應辯前表無表相。頌曰: 無表三律儀, 不律儀非二。 論曰:此中無表,略說有三:一者律儀、二不律儀、三者非二謂非律儀非不律儀。能遮能滅惡戒相續故名律儀。如是律儀差別有幾?頌曰: 律儀別解脫, 靜慮及道生。 論曰:律儀差別,略有三種:一別解脫律儀,謂欲纏戒;二靜慮生律儀,謂色纏戒;三道生律儀,謂無漏戒。

Ru-Yi Translation

The digression having now concluded, we should further explain the characteristics of manifested and unmanifested karma discussed earlier. Verse: unmanifested karma is restraint, non-restraint, or neither. Prose: unmanifested karma, briefly stated, is of three kinds: first, restraint; second, non-restraint; third, neither of the two, meaning neither restraint nor non-restraint. It is called restraint because it is able to block and extinguish the continuity of bad conduct. How many distinctions does this restraint itself have? Verse: restraint is the vow of individual liberation, and that born of meditative absorption and of the [noble] path. Prose: restraint, briefly stated, is of three kinds: first, the restraint of individual liberation, meaning precepts bound to the desire realm; second, restraint born of meditative absorption, meaning precepts bound to the form realm; third, restraint born of the [noble] path, meaning uncontaminated precepts.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This section's opening line — "the digression having now concluded" — is the treatise's own acknowledgment that the entire previous fascicle's debate over whether unmanifested karma is real at all was itself a lengthy aside, prompted by the original question of what bodily manifestation is; the systematic classification promised back near the start of that debate resumes only now. Readers coming from fascicle 13 should understand this fascicle as continuing that same unresolved metaphysical backdrop: everything said here about unmanifested karma's threefold division and the three kinds of restraint is stated primarily from the Vaibhāṣika's own framework, without re-litigating the Sautrāntika's skepticism about whether any of this "unmanifested matter" exists as a separate substance in the first place.

The three kinds of restraint map cleanly onto this treatise's three-realm cosmology: the vow of individual liberation belongs to ordinary monastic and lay precepts taken by beings in the desire realm; meditation-born restraint arises automatically, without a separate ceremony, the moment one actually enters meditative absorption associated with the form realm; and path-born restraint arises automatically together with uncontaminated, liberating insight itself. The bulk of this fascicle, as its opening promises, will focus on the first of these three — the vow of individual liberation — in far greater structural detail than the other two.

2. Eight Named Vows, Four Real Substances

The vow of individual liberation carries eight traditional names — bhikṣu (fully ordained monk), bhikṣuṇī (fully ordained nun), śikṣamāṇā (probationary nun), śrāmaṇera (novice monk), śrāmaṇerī (novice nun), upāsaka (layman), upāsikā (laywoman), and upavāsa (one-day precept-holder) — but only four genuinely distinct underlying substances, since a bhikṣu and bhikṣuṇī vow, a śrāmaṇera/śikṣamāṇā and śrāmaṇerī vow, and an upāsaka and upāsikā vow are each really the same vow, differing only by the practitioner's sex. The proof offered is a striking one: should a person's sex organs change — a recognized possibility in this cosmology — their vow's underlying substance is never actually relinquished and reacquired, only renamed, showing that the difference between the paired vows was never a difference in substance at all, only in the label attached according to the practitioner's bodily form at the time.

Chinese Source

初律儀相差別云何?頌曰: 初律儀八種, 實體唯有四, 形轉名異故, 各別不相違。 論曰:別解脫律儀,相差別有八:一苾芻律儀、二苾芻尼律儀、三正學律儀、四勤策律儀、五勤策女律儀、六近事律儀、七近事女律儀、八近住律儀。如是八種律儀相差別,總名第一別解脫律儀。雖有八名,實體唯四:一苾芻律儀、二勤策律儀、三近事律儀、四近住律儀。唯此四種別解律儀皆有體實,相各別故。所以者何?離苾芻律儀,無別苾芻尼律儀;離勤策律儀,無別正學、勤策女律儀;離近事律儀,無別近事女律儀。云何知然?由形改轉,體雖無捨得,而名有異故。形謂形相,即男女根。由此二根男女形別,但由形轉,令諸律儀名為苾芻、苾芻尼等,謂轉根位,令本苾芻律儀名苾芻尼律儀,或苾芻尼律儀名苾芻律儀;令本勤策律儀名勤策女律儀,或勤策女律儀及正學律儀名勤策律儀;令本近事律儀名近事女律儀,或近事女律儀名近事律儀。非轉根位有捨先得得先未得律儀因緣,故四律儀非異三體。

Ru-Yi Translation

What are the distinctions among the characteristics of the first kind of restraint [the vow of individual liberation]? Verse: the first restraint has eight characteristics, but its real substance is only four; because the bodily form changes, the names differ, and there is no contradiction in each being distinct. Prose: the vow of individual liberation, in terms of its distinguishing characteristics, is of eight kinds: first, the bhikṣu vow; second, the bhikṣuṇī vow; third, the śikṣamāṇā vow; fourth, the śrāmaṇera vow; fifth, the śrāmaṇerī vow; sixth, the upāsaka vow; seventh, the upāsikā vow; eighth, the upavāsa vow. These eight kinds of restraint, distinguished by their characteristics, are collectively named the first kind, the vow of individual liberation. Although there are eight names, the real substance is only four: first, the bhikṣu vow; second, the śrāmaṇera vow; third, the upāsaka vow; fourth, the upavāsa vow. Only these four vows of individual liberation each have a real substance, since their characteristics are each genuinely distinct. Why is this so? Apart from the bhikṣu vow, there is no separate bhikṣuṇī vow; apart from the śrāmaṇera vow, there is no separate śikṣamāṇā or śrāmaṇerī vow; apart from the upāsaka vow, there is no separate upāsikā vow. How is this known? Because, when the bodily form changes, although the substance [of the vow] is neither relinquished nor newly acquired, its name nevertheless differs. "Form" here means bodily form, namely the male or female organ. Because of these two organs, male and female bodily forms differ, and it is solely by virtue of a change in bodily form that these restraints come to be named bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, and so on — that is, at the moment the faculty changes, what was originally the bhikṣu vow comes to be named the bhikṣuṇī vow, or the bhikṣuṇī vow comes to be named the bhikṣu vow; what was originally the śrāmaṇera vow comes to be named the śrāmaṇerī vow, or the śrāmaṇerī vow and the śikṣamāṇā vow come to be named the śrāmaṇera vow; what was originally the upāsaka vow comes to be named the upāsikā vow, or the upāsikā vow comes to be named the upāsaka vow. Apart from the occasion of the faculty changing, there is no cause or condition for relinquishing what was previously obtained or obtaining what was not previously obtained — hence the four restraints are not different from these three pairs' substance.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The sex-change argument here is a genuinely distinctive piece of Abhidharma reasoning, and worth being explicit about: this treatise's broader cosmology treats a person's sex as a physical faculty (根) that can, in certain circumstances, change during a single lifetime, and the argument exploits this directly — since the underlying vow-substance persists continuously through such a change, with only its label switching to match the new bodily form, this is offered as proof that the vow's substance was never sex-specific to begin with, only conventionally renamed according to whichever sex the vow-holder currently has. We have translated 苾芻/苾芻尼 as "bhikṣu"/"bhikṣuṇī" and 正學 as "śikṣamāṇā" (the intermediate probationary ordination a novice nun undertakes before full ordination) rather than using looser English equivalents, since these are established technical terms in Buddhist monastic law with no single-word English equivalent that fully captures their specific status.

We should flag that this passage's logic works specifically for the paired vows it names (bhikṣu/bhikṣuṇī, śrāmaṇera-śikṣamāṇā/śrāmaṇerī, upāsaka/upāsikā) and does not extend to the fourth vow, upavāsa (the one-day lay precept), which has no male/female pairing at all in the traditional eightfold list — it stands as its own, singular vow-type from the start, which is presumably why the treatise's arithmetic ends at four real substances rather than needing to explain away a fifth.

3. Three Vows Held at Once, Never in Conflict

A practitioner typically progresses through the vow of individual liberation in stages — first taking the upāsaka vow, then the śrāmaṇera vow, then the full bhikṣu vow — and the treatise asks whether these three should really count as three separate substances, or as one substance simply expanded by degrees. It settles on three genuinely separate substances, illustrated by an analogy to coinage: much as single and double gold coins, and pieces of fifty or twenty [smaller denomination], are each their own distinct substance even though a larger one is obtained after a smaller one, so too do the three restraints each arise in full completeness, without mixing into one another. Each level shares the same basic precepts (all three include abstaining from killing, up through abstaining from alcohol), yet they differ by degree of scope — the same underlying precept becomes progressively more comprehensive as one advances to more numerous and more demanding trainings, cutting off "occasions of heedlessness" (the circumstances that give rise to wrongdoing) ever more broadly. Because the three vows are, in this sense, genuinely distinct, relinquishing the highest one (the bhikṣu vow) does not cause the lower two to be relinquished as well, even though the higher vow is typically taken while the lower ones are still in force — all three coexist simultaneously within a single person, without a later vow ever displacing an earlier one.

Chinese Source

若從近事律儀受勤策律儀,復從勤策律儀受苾芻律儀,此三律儀為由增足遠離方便立別別名,如隻雙金錢及五十二十,為體各別具足頓生。三種律儀體不相雜,其相各別具足頓生。三律儀中具三離殺,乃至具足三離飲酒,餘數多少隨其所應。既爾相望同類何別?由因緣別,相望有異。其事云何?如如求受多種學處,如是如是能離多種憍逸處時,即離眾多殺等緣起。以諸遠離依因緣發,故因緣別遠離有異。若無此事,捨苾芻律儀,爾時則應三律儀皆捨,前二攝在後一中故。既不許然,故三各別。然此三種互不相違,於一身中俱時而轉,非由受後捨前律儀,勿捨苾芻戒便非近事等。

Ru-Yi Translation

If one takes the śrāmaṇera vow from the upāsaka vow, and then takes the bhikṣu vow from the śrāmaṇera vow, are these three restraints given separate names merely by way of an expanded means of renunciation [i.e., the same substance simply enlarged], or [are they genuinely distinct substances, comparable] to a single gold coin and a double gold coin, and to pieces of fifty and of twenty, each having its own distinct substance and each arising in full completeness [rather than one being merely an expansion of the other]? [Reply:] The substances of the three kinds of restraint are not mixed together; each has its own distinct characteristic and arises in full completeness. Among the three restraints, each is complete with the abstention from killing, and so on up through complete abstention from drinking alcohol; the remaining number [of precepts each includes] varies as is appropriate to each. [Objection:] Given this, how, then, do these restraints differ from one another when compared as belonging to the same general category? [Reply:] They differ from one another because of a difference in their causes and conditions. [Objection:] How is this so? [Reply:] Just as, the more numerous kinds of training one seeks to undertake, the more numerous the occasions of heedlessness one is thereby able to renounce, one thereby cuts off correspondingly more numerous occasions giving rise to killing and the like. Since each renunciation arises depending on its own causes and conditions, and these causes and conditions differ, the renunciations themselves differ. If this were not the case, then, at the moment one relinquished the bhikṣu vow, all three restraints would have to be relinquished together, since the first two would be subsumed within the last. But since this is not accepted to be so, the three are each distinct. Yet these three kinds are mutually non-conflicting, operating together simultaneously within a single person — it is not the case that taking a later vow causes an earlier restraint to be relinquished, or else relinquishing the bhikṣu precepts would mean one was no longer even an upāsaka and so on.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The coin analogy is doing careful work distinguishing two models that might otherwise look identical from the outside: on one model, taking the śrāmaṇera vow after the upāsaka vow would just be "the same restraint, now bigger" — like adding more water to the same cup; on the treatise's actual model, it is "a wholly new, complete restraint, arising alongside the still-intact earlier one" — like acquiring a second, larger coin without losing the first. The practical payoff, spelled out in the closing lines, is significant for monastic law: if a monk's higher ordination is later invalidated or relinquished, this does not strip away the more basic upāsaka and śrāmaṇera-level restraints underneath it, since those were never actually absorbed into or replaced by the bhikṣu vow in the first place — they were always separate, coexisting substances.

We should note that the "same precepts, different scope" account given here (each level shares the same core prohibitions — killing, stealing, and so on — but differs in how many total training-rules and heedlessness-occasions it covers) is somewhat compressed in the source, and later in this fascicle the treatise will spell out the exact precept-counts for each of the four levels (five, eight, ten, and the full monastic code) in much more explicit detail — this section's claim that "the remaining number varies as is appropriate to each" is essentially a forward pointer to that fuller breakdown.

4. The Precise Precepts Behind Each of the Four Levels

The treatise now names the exact precepts underlying each of the four levels of restraint. The upāsaka (lay follower) vow consists of abstaining from five things: killing, taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, false speech, and drinking alcohol. The upavāsa (one-day precept-holder) vow expands this to eight: killing, taking what is not given, all sexual activity (a stricter standard than the upāsaka's "misconduct" alone), false speech, alcohol, adorning oneself with scent and garlands and attending song and dance, sleeping or sitting on high and luxurious beds, and eating at improper times. The śrāmaṇera (novice) vow expands to ten by splitting the sixth upavāsa precept into two separate rules and adding a tenth: handling gold, silver, and other valuables. The bhikṣu (fully ordained monk) vow, finally, consists of abstaining from every bodily and verbal act that ought to be abstained from — the complete monastic code.

Chinese Source

近事、近住、勤策、苾芻四種律儀云何安立?頌曰: 受離五八十, 一切所應離, 立近事近住, 勤策及苾芻。 論曰:應知此中如數次第,依四遠離立四律儀。謂受離五所應遠離,安立第一近事律儀。何等名為五所應離?一者殺生、二不與取、三欲邪行、四虛誑語、五飲諸酒。若受離八所應遠離,安立第二近住律儀。何等名為八所應離?一者殺生、二不與取、三非梵行、四虛誑語、五飲諸酒、六塗飾香鬘舞歌觀聽、七眠坐高廣嚴麗床座、八食非時食。若受離十所應遠離,安立第三勤策律儀。何等名為十所應離?謂於前八塗飾香鬘舞歌觀聽開為二種,復加受畜金銀等寶以為第十。若受離一切應離身語業,安立第四苾芻律儀。

Ru-Yi Translation

How are the four kinds of restraint — upāsaka, upavāsa, śrāmaṇera, and bhikṣu — established? Verse: undertaking the abstention from five, eight, ten, or all that should be abstained from establishes the upāsaka, upavāsa, śrāmaṇera, and bhikṣu [restraints, respectively]. Prose: one should understand that, in this matter, the four restraints are established, in numerical order, based on four kinds of renunciation. That is, undertaking the abstention from the five things that should be abstained from establishes the first, the upāsaka restraint. What are the five things that should be abstained from? First, killing living beings; second, taking what is not given; third, sexual misconduct; fourth, false speech; fifth, drinking alcohol. If one undertakes the abstention from the eight things that should be abstained from, this establishes the second, the upavāsa restraint. What are the eight things that should be abstained from? First, killing living beings; second, taking what is not given; third, unchaste conduct; fourth, false speech; fifth, drinking alcohol; sixth, adorning oneself with scent and garlands, and dancing, singing, and watching or listening [to such performances]; seventh, sleeping or sitting upon a high, broad, or ornately adorned bed or seat; eighth, eating food at an improper time. If one undertakes the abstention from the ten things that should be abstained from, this establishes the third, the śrāmaṇera restraint. What are the ten things that should be abstained from? It is [the same eight as above, except that] the sixth item — adorning oneself with scent and garlands, and dancing, singing, and watching or listening — is divided into two separate items, and, further, accepting and keeping gold, silver, and other such valuables is added as the tenth. If one undertakes the abstention from every bodily and verbal act that ought to be abstained from, this establishes the fourth, the bhikṣu restraint.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We want to flag one precise but easy-to-miss distinction the Chinese draws between the third precept at the upāsaka level and the corresponding precept at the upavāsa and higher levels: the upāsaka vow's 欲邪行 specifically targets sexual *misconduct* (i.e., certain kinds of sexual activity, appropriate to a layperson's ordinary household life), whereas the upavāsa and higher vows' 非梵行 targets "unchaste conduct" more broadly — effectively all sexual activity without exception — reflecting the more renunciate, temporary-monastic character of the upavāsa vow and above. We have deliberately used different English phrasing ("sexual misconduct" vs. "unchaste conduct") to preserve this distinction, since collapsing both into a single English phrase would erase a real difference in scope between the lay and monastic-adjacent precepts.

The śrāmaṇera vow's arithmetic is worth spelling out plainly, since the Chinese states it tersely: it does not add two entirely new precepts to the upavāsa's eight to reach ten, but rather splits one existing precept (the sixth, covering both self-adornment and entertainment-watching) into two separate precepts, and then adds only one genuinely new rule (avoiding money and valuables) — meaning the śrāmaṇera's ten precepts share nine-tenths of their actual content with the upavāsa's eight, differing mainly in the added prohibition against handling gold and silver, which marks the transition from a temporary lay observance to an ongoing monastic identity with no personal property.

5. Why Only the First Instant of a Vow Is Called "Prātimokṣa"

The treatise now works through several names applied to the vow of individual liberation, unpacking each one's etymology. It is called śīla ("moral discipline") because it levels out the dangerous terrain of bad karma — glossed, in a verse, as being "cool," since one who upholds this precept-happiness experiences no bodily distress. It is called sadācāra ("wholesome conduct") because the wise praise it. It is called karma because it is a self-standing, completed act — and, addressing an apparent puzzle, the treatise clarifies that even unmanifested karma, though sometimes called "non-doing," still counts as a completed act, since a person with a sense of shame relies on unmanifested karma's power specifically in order to refrain from committing evil, which is itself a kind of doing. It is called restraint because it guards against wrongdoing in body and speech. Most strikingly, the treatise holds that the names "prātimokṣa" (individual liberation) and "karma-path" apply, strictly speaking, only to the very first instant of taking a vow — the moment various evils are each individually renounced for the first time and the karmic act reaches its completion — while every moment after that first one, though the vow continues unbroken, is technically named only "restraint of individual liberation," not "prātimokṣa" itself, and "what arises afterward," not "karma-path."

Chinese Source

別解律儀名差別者,頌曰: 俱得名尸羅, 妙行業律儀, 唯初表無表, 名別解業道。 論曰:能平險業故名尸羅。訓釋詞者,謂清涼故。如伽他言:受持戒樂,身無熱惱,故名尸羅。智者稱揚,故名妙行。所作自體,故名為業。豈不無表亦名不作,如何今說所作自體?有慚恥者受無表力不造眾惡,故名不作。表思所造,得所作名。有餘釋言:是作因故、是作果故,名作無失。能防身語,故名律儀。如是應知,別解脫戒通初後位無差別名,唯初剎那表及無表,得別解脫及業道名。謂受戒時初表無表,別別棄捨種種惡故。依初別捨義,立別解脫名。即於爾時所作究竟,依業暢義立業道名,故初剎那名別解脫,亦得名曰別解律儀,亦得名為根本業道。從第二念乃至未捨,不名別解脫,名別解律儀;不名業道,名為後起。

Ru-Yi Translation

As for the distinctions among the names for the restraint of individual liberation, verse: all of these are called śīla, wholesome conduct, karma, and restraint; only the first manifested and unmanifested karma is called individual liberation and karma-path. Prose: it is called śīla because it is able to level out dangerous karma. As for its etymological gloss, it means "cool" — as a verse states: "One who upholds precept-happiness has a body free of feverish distress; hence it is called śīla." It is called wholesome conduct because the wise praise it. It is called karma because it is a self-standing, completed act. [Objection:] But is unmanifested karma not also called "non-doing"? How, then, can it now be said to be a self-standing, completed act? [Reply:] One possessing a sense of shame relies on the power of unmanifested karma to refrain from committing many evils; hence it is called "non-doing" [in that specific sense]. What manifested [karma], produced by volition, [directly does] is what earns the name "doing." Other explanations say: it is because it serves as the cause of an act, and as the result of an act, that the name "act" involves no error [when applied to it]. It is called restraint because it is able to guard against bodily and verbal [wrongdoing]. One should understand it in this way: the precept of individual liberation, spanning both its initial and later stages, carries no distinguishing name [between these stages] in most respects — it is only the very first instant's manifested and unmanifested karma that earns the names "individual liberation" and "karma-path." That is, at the time of receiving the precept, the initial manifested and unmanifested karma individually and distinctly renounces various evils; based on this meaning of an initial, distinct renunciation, the name "individual liberation" (prātimokṣa) is established. And it is at that very moment that the karmic act reaches its completion; based on this meaning of the act's fulfillment, the name "karma-path" is established. Hence the first instant is named "individual liberation," and may also be named "restraint of individual liberation," and may also be named "root karma-path." From the second moment onward, until the vow is relinquished, it is not called "individual liberation," but is called "restraint of individual liberation"; it is not called "karma-path," but is called "what arises afterward."

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This is a fine but genuinely significant technical distinction, and it is easy to read past it: "prātimokṣa" (個別解脫/別解脫, "individual liberation," so named because each precept individually liberates the holder from a specific kind of wrongdoing) and "karma-path" (業道) name only the singular founding instant of taking a vow — the dramatic moment various evils are renounced all at once and the karmic act is completed — while the entire subsequent stretch of a monastic's or layperson's life spent actually upholding that vow is given the humbler names "restraint of individual liberation" and "what arises afterward." The distinction is not merely terminological trivia: it reflects a substantive Abhidharma view that the vow's founding act and its ongoing maintenance are, in some sense, different in kind, even though they share one uninterrupted causal continuity — the founding moment does something (an active renunciation) that its later maintenance, strictly speaking, no longer does in the same way.

The "cool" etymology for śīla is a nice, concrete illustration of how Sanskrit Buddhist vocabulary was explained by its Chinese translators and commentators using folk-etymological glosses rather than strict historical linguistics — the actual Sanskrit śīla is not linguistically related to any word for "coolness," but the gloss captures an experiential point the tradition wanted to make: that moral discipline brings a felt ease and freedom from remorse's "heat," which is presented here as the reason for calling it what it is called, regardless of the term's actual etymological history.

6. Who Possesses Which Kind of Restraint

The treatise now asks who is actually capable of possessing each of the three kinds of restraint. The vow of individual liberation belongs to the eight assemblies — from the bhikṣu down to the upavāsa precept-holder — and to no one outside this circle: non-Buddhist ascetics do take their own vows, but these are never called "restraint of individual liberation," since their vows lack the capacity to permanently free the holder from evils they remain attached to. Meditation-born restraint belongs to anyone who has actually attained meditative absorption, including its neighboring, preliminary stages (extending the name "meditative absorption" to its borders the way a village's name is extended to its surrounding rice fields). Path-born restraint belongs only to noble ones (āryas) — those in either the stage of training or the stage beyond training. Of these three, only meditation-born and path-born restraint are said to "follow the mind" moment by moment, continuing even through different or absent states of mind, unlike the vow of individual liberation.

Chinese Source

誰成就何律儀?頌曰: 八成別解脫, 得靜慮聖者, 成靜慮道生, 後二隨心轉。 論曰:八眾皆成就別解脫律儀,謂從苾芻乃至近住。外道無有所受戒耶?雖有,不名別解脫戒。由彼所受無有功能永脫諸惡依著有故。靜慮生者,謂此律儀從靜慮生、或依靜慮。若得靜慮者,定成此律儀。諸靜慮邊亦名靜慮,如近村邑得村邑名故。有說言於此村邑有稻田等,此亦應然。道生律儀聖者成就,此復有二:謂學、無學。於前分別俱有因中說二律儀是隨心轉,於此三內其二者何?謂靜慮生及道生二,非別解脫。所以者何?異心無心亦恒轉故。

Ru-Yi Translation

Who possesses which restraint? Verse: the eight [assemblies] possess the restraint of individual liberation; those who have attained meditative absorption and noble ones possess meditation-born and path-born restraint respectively; the latter two follow the mind. Prose: all eight assemblies possess the restraint of individual liberation — that is, from the bhikṣu down through the upavāsa precept-holder. [Objection:] Do non-Buddhist ascetics not also receive precepts? [Reply:] Although they do, these are not called the precept of individual liberation, since what they receive lacks the capacity to permanently free them from evils to which they remain attached. "Meditation-born" means that this restraint is either born from meditative absorption, or depends on meditative absorption. If one has attained meditative absorption, one certainly possesses this restraint. The neighboring, preliminary stages of the meditative absorptions are also called "meditative absorption," just as a place near a village comes to be called by the village's own name. Some say that this is so in the same way that one speaks of "this village's rice paddies" [extending the village's name to what surrounds it]; this should be understood the same way here. Path-born restraint is possessed by noble ones — this, again, divides into two: those still in training, and those beyond training. In the earlier discussion of co-existent causes, it was stated that two kinds of restraint "follow the mind" — which two, among these three, are meant? Meditation-born and path-born restraint, not the restraint of individual liberation. Why is this so? Because these two continue on even through a different state of mind, or through the absence of mind altogether, whereas [the restraint of individual liberation does not continue in quite the same automatic way].

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The village-and-rice-paddies analogy is explaining a genuinely useful piece of Abhidharma terminology-extension: rather than requiring a separate technical term for the preliminary, "not-yet-arrived" (未至, anāgamya) stage that precedes full meditative absorption proper, the tradition simply extends the word "meditative absorption" itself to cover this neighboring stage too, the way a village's name naturally extends to the fields surrounding it without needing a new word for "near-the-village." This lets the treatise say simply that "meditation-born restraint" is possessed by "those who have attained meditative absorption" without having to separately specify that the preliminary access-concentration stage counts as well.

The distinction between restraints that "follow the mind" and the vow of individual liberation, which does not, is worth flagging since it will matter for the material still ahead: meditation-born and path-born restraint are tied moment-by-moment to an underlying meditative or noble state of mind and persist automatically as long as that state persists (even through a differently-occupied or temporarily absent mind, in certain technical senses), whereas the vow of individual liberation, once taken, continues as its own independent unmanifested karma stream regardless of what the mind is currently doing — a difference in how each kind of restraint is causally sustained, not merely a difference in name.

7. "Severing Restraint": A Fourfold Classification

Meditation-born and uncontaminated restraint are also given a further name: "severing restraint" (斷律儀), so called because they are capable of permanently cutting off the desire realm's bad conduct and the afflictions that give rise to it. The treatise specifies exactly when this name applies: at the nine uninterrupted paths (無間道) occurring within the preliminary access-concentration stage (未至定), the meditative and uncontaminated restraint that arises together with them earns the name "severing restraint," since it is precisely at these moments that afflictions are being actively cut off. This means some instances of meditative restraint are "severing restraint" and some are not, and the treatise works this out as a fourfold classification: ordinary meditative restraint outside these nine specific moments (severing but not at those moments); uncontaminated restraint specifically at these nine moments (severing restraint proper); contaminated restraint specifically at these nine moments (this case, though occurring at the right moment, is not itself doing the severing); and all remaining uncontaminated restraint outside these nine moments (uncontaminated, but not severing). A parallel fourfold classification is offered for uncontaminated restraint that is not "severing restraint" as well.

Chinese Source

靜慮、無漏二種律儀,亦名斷律儀。依何位建立?頌曰: 未至九無間, 俱生二名斷。 論曰:未至定中九無間道,俱生靜慮無漏律儀,以能永斷欲纏惡戒及能起惑名斷律儀。由此或有靜慮律儀非斷律儀,應作四句。第一句者,除未至定九無間道有漏律儀,所餘有漏靜慮律儀。第二句者,依未至定九無間道無漏律儀。第三句者,依未至定九無間道有漏律儀。第四句者,除未至定九無間道無漏律儀,所餘一切無漏律儀。如是或有無漏律儀非斷律儀,應作四句,准前四句如應當知。

Ru-Yi Translation

Meditative and uncontaminated restraint are also called "severing restraint." At what stage is this name established? Verse: at the nine uninterrupted paths of the preliminary access-concentration stage, the two [kinds of restraint] arising together [with them] are called "severing." Prose: at the nine uninterrupted paths within the preliminary access-concentration stage, the meditative and uncontaminated restraint arising together with them is called "severing restraint," since it is able to permanently sever the desire realm's bad conduct and the afflictions capable of giving rise to it. Because of this, there may be instances of meditative restraint that are not severing restraint, which should be set out in four cases. The first case is contaminated meditative restraint apart from that of the nine uninterrupted paths within the preliminary access-concentration stage. The second case is uncontaminated restraint occurring at the nine uninterrupted paths within the preliminary access-concentration stage. The third case is contaminated restraint occurring at the nine uninterrupted paths within the preliminary access-concentration stage. The fourth case is all remaining uncontaminated restraint, apart from that of the nine uninterrupted paths within the preliminary access-concentration stage. In the same way, there may be instances of uncontaminated restraint that are not severing restraint, which should likewise be set out in four cases, to be understood by analogy with the four cases just given.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The "nine uninterrupted paths" (九無間道) refer to a standard Abhidharma framework in which the process of cutting off afflictions tied to any given meditative level is divided into nine successive degrees of intensity, each paired with an "uninterrupted path" (the moment of actively severing that degree of affliction) and a "liberation path" (the moment immediately after, when the severing is confirmed complete) — this ninefold division recurs throughout Abhidharma soteriology wherever affliction-elimination is being tracked with precision, and this passage is applying it specifically to the preliminary access-concentration stage that precedes full absorption in the first dhyāna.

The four-case classification here is a standard Abhidharma logical device (catuṣkoṭi-style fourfold analysis) for precisely mapping which members of one category (meditative restraint) fall inside versus outside another category (severing restraint) — worth noting because this same four-case structure will recur through the rest of this fascicle's technical material. We have kept the translation of each case as literal and parallel in structure as the Chinese itself, since the whole point of this device is the systematic exhaustiveness of the four combinations, and any paraphrase risks obscuring which logical slot each case is meant to fill.

8. The Buddha's Fourfold Restraint Verse, and What Guards the Sense Faculties

The treatise now addresses a verse of the Buddha's own summarizing restraint into four kinds: bodily restraint, verbal restraint, mental restraint, and "pervasive" restraint (a comprehensive restraint covering all three together). This raises a question, since a separate sūtra passage speaks of "restraint of the eye faculty" and the other sense faculties, urging that they be well guarded and well established — what, then, is the essential nature of this "mental root-faculty restraint"? The treatise rules out identifying it with unmanifested matter, since restraining the eye and the other sense faculties is not itself a bodily or verbal act with a physical basis. Instead, it identifies this restraint with the combined operation of two mental factors acting together: clear awareness (正知, saṃprajanya) and mindfulness (正念, smṛti) — the coordinated capacity to know clearly what one is perceiving and to keep that awareness continuously present, which together constitute what actually guards the senses against being drawn into unwholesome reactions to what they perceive.

Chinese Source

若爾,世尊所說略戒: 身律儀善哉, 善哉語律儀, 意律儀善哉, 善哉遍律儀。 又契經說:應善守護、應善安住眼根律儀。此意根律儀,以何為自性?此二自性非無表色。若爾,是何?頌曰: 正知正念合, 名意根律儀。 論曰:為顯如是二種律儀,俱以正知正念為體,故列名已復說合言,謂意律儀慧念為體,即合二種為根律儀。故離合言顯勿如次。

Ru-Yi Translation

If this is so, then, as the Blessed One has stated in a summary of the precepts: "Excellent is bodily restraint; excellent, too, is verbal restraint; excellent is mental restraint; excellent, too, is pervasive restraint." Moreover, a sūtra states: one should well guard, and should well establish, restraint of the eye faculty [and the other sense faculties]. What is the essential nature of this restraint of the mental faculty [as it applies to the senses]? The essential nature of these two [i.e., what is called "mental restraint" in the summary verse, and this "sense-faculty restraint"] is not unmanifested matter. If this is so, what is it? Verse: clear awareness and mindfulness, combined, are called restraint of the sense faculties. Prose: in order to show that these two kinds of restraint [mental restraint and sense-faculty restraint] both have clear awareness and mindfulness as their essential nature, the verse, having listed the names, further adds the word "combined" — meaning that mental restraint has wisdom [clear awareness] and mindfulness as its essential nature, and it is by combining these two that "restraint of the [sense] faculties" is formed. The word "combined" is stated separately precisely to make clear that one should not assume these correspond one-to-one, in strict order [to the two named factors].

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The closing clause here is subtle and worth spelling out plainly, since the Chinese states it almost too tersely to parse on a first pass: one might assume, from the verse's phrasing ("clear awareness and mindfulness, combined"), that clear awareness alone constitutes mental restraint while mindfulness alone constitutes sense-faculty restraint (i.e., a simple one-to-one pairing) — but the treatise explicitly blocks this reading, clarifying that both restraints are constituted by the *combination* of both factors together, not by splitting the two factors between the two restraints. We have added the bracketed clarification "[i.e., what is called 'mental restraint'... and this 'sense-faculty restraint']" to make explicit which "two" the passage means, since the referent is only implicit in the Chinese.

This section marks an interesting expansion of what "restraint" (律儀) can mean in this treatise's system: up to this point, restraint has always been a form of karma, whether manifested or unmanifested — but sense-faculty restraint, identified here as simply the joint operation of two ordinary mental factors (wisdom/clear awareness and mindfulness), is not itself a form of karma at all, but rather a state of attentive vigilance that happens to share the functional role of "guarding against wrongdoing" that motivates the term "restraint" in the first place. This is presumably why the treatise felt the need to explicitly rule out unmanifested matter as its essential nature before offering the alternative account.

9. Possessing Restraint Across Past, Present, and Future

The treatise now asks a temporal question: across past, present, and future, exactly when does a person "possess" a given kind of unmanifested karma? A person upholding the vow of individual liberation possesses it continuously in the present for as long as it is unrelinquished; from the second moment onward, that same unmanifested karma also comes to be possessed as something now past (since the earlier instant, though gone, is not simply erased); and, because this kind of restraint is not "meditation-linked" and its causal force is comparatively weak, it is never possessed as something future. Non-restraint (committed wrongdoing) works exactly the same way. Meditation-born restraint, once attained, is possessed continuously as both past and future for as long as it is unrelinquished, since even after losing it in one lifetime, the very first instant of regaining meditative absorption in a later life necessarily reconnects to that same prior attainment. Uncontaminated (path-born) restraint is possessed as both past and future by every noble one without exception, with one difference: at its very first instant of arising, it is necessarily possessed only as future, never as past, since that particular noble path has, by definition, never arisen before that moment. A noble one currently and actually absorbed in meditation or in the path itself possesses the corresponding restraint as present as well — but this "present" possession does not continue once one has emerged from that absorption.

Chinese Source

今應思擇,表及無表誰成就何?齊何時分?且辯成無表律儀不律儀。頌曰: 住別解無表, 未捨恒成現, 剎那後成過, 不律儀亦然。 得靜慮律儀, 恒成就過未, 聖初除過去, 住定道成中。 論曰:住別解脫補特伽羅,未捨以來恒成現世,此別解脫律儀無表。初剎那後亦成過去,前未捨言遍流至後,無散無表有成未來,不隨心色勢微劣故。如說安住別解律儀,住不律儀應知亦爾,謂至未捨惡戒以來恒成現世,惡戒無表初剎那後亦成過去。諸有獲得靜慮律儀,乃至未捨恒成過未,餘生所失過去定律儀,今初剎那必還得彼故。一切聖者無漏律儀,過去未來亦恒成就,有差別者,謂初剎那必成未來非成過去,此類聖道先未起故。若有現住靜慮彼道,如次成現在靜慮道律儀,非出觀時有成現在。

Ru-Yi Translation

We should now carefully consider: who possesses which manifested and unmanifested karma, and up to what point in time? Let us first discuss the possession of unmanifested restraint and non-restraint. Verse: one abiding in the restraint of individual liberation constantly possesses it as present, for as long as it is unrelinquished; from the [second] instant onward, it is also possessed as past; non-restraint is the same. One who has attained meditative restraint constantly possesses it as past and future; a noble one, at the first instant, possesses it as future only, excluding the past; abiding in absorption or in the path, one possesses it as present as well. Prose: a person abiding in the vow of individual liberation constantly possesses this unmanifested restraint of individual liberation as present, for as long as it remains unrelinquished. From the instant after its first arising, it is also possessed as past — the phrase "for as long as it remains unrelinquished" carries through to apply here as well. It is never possessed as future, since it is not a "non-scattered" [meditation-linked] kind of unmanifested karma, and its force is comparatively weak. Just as has been said for one abiding in the restraint of individual liberation, one abiding in non-restraint should be understood the same way — that is, for as long as the bad precept-vow remains unrelinquished, it is constantly possessed as present, and from the instant after its first arising, this unmanifested bad-precept karma is also possessed as past. All those who have attained meditative restraint constantly possess it as past and future, for as long as it is unrelinquished, since, even if it was lost in another lifetime, the present first instant of [regaining meditative absorption] necessarily reconnects to that same prior attainment. All noble ones constantly possess uncontaminated restraint as both past and future; the difference is that, at the very first instant, it is necessarily possessed only as future, not as past, since this particular kind of noble path has not previously arisen. If one is presently and actually abiding in that meditative absorption or that path, one possesses, in due order, the corresponding meditative or path restraint as present as well — but this is not the case once one has emerged from that absorption.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This section is establishing a technical Abhidharma doctrine of "possession" (成就, prāpti) across the three times that will recur throughout the rest of this fascicle's classifications, so it is worth being explicit about the underlying picture: a dharma can be "possessed" as present (currently manifesting), as past (having previously arisen and not yet fully relinquished from one's continuum, even though it is no longer actively occurring), or as future (guaranteed or disposed to arise again, given the right conditions) — and different kinds of restraint have different "possession profiles" across these three times depending on their underlying causal structure. The vow of individual liberation, once its founding instant passes into the past, is never possessed as future because — as an earlier section already explained — it belongs to the causally weaker, non-meditative category, unlike meditation-born and path-born restraint, which are tied to a stronger, self-reinforcing causal continuity that guarantees their future recurrence once first attained.

The claim that meditation-born restraint is "constantly possessed as past and future... even if it was lost in another lifetime" is a striking one, and worth drawing out: it means that someone who attained deep meditative absorption in a past life, then was reborn in different circumstances and lost that attainment, does not start from zero if they take up meditation again — the very first instant of regaining absorption is treated as reconnecting to, rather than newly creating, that same underlying capacity, which is why the "future" possession of that restraint is said to hold continuously even through an intervening lifetime in which it is not actively possessed as present at all.

10. The "Neither" Category, and Unmanifested Karma That Crosses Moral Lines

Having covered restraint and non-restraint, the treatise turns to the intermediate "neither" category — actions that are neither restraint nor non-restraint. Such actions do not necessarily generate any unmanifested karma at all, but when they do, that unmanifested karma is possessed only as present at its very first instant, and, from then on, as both past and present (since "neither" karma, unlike the vow of individual liberation, never carries the special weight needed to be possessed as future either). A related and practically important case follows: what happens when someone already holding restraint (or non-restraint) performs an act of the opposite moral quality — a precept-holder who, overcome by a strong affliction, commits an unwholesome deed such as killing or binding another person, or a non-restrained person who, moved by sincere faith, performs a wholesome act such as venerating the Buddha? Either case generates its own additional unmanifested karma, of the opposite moral color to the person's underlying restraint or non-restraint, which continues for as long as the triggering mental state persists — possessed as present only at its first instant, and thereafter as both past and present, exactly like the ordinary "neither" case.

Chinese Source

已辯安住善惡律儀,住中云何?頌曰: 住中有無表, 初成中後二。 論曰:言住中者,謂非律儀非不律儀,彼所起業未必一切皆有無表。若有無表,即是善戒或是惡戒種類所攝,彼初剎那但成現在。然現在世處過未中,故以成中說成現在。初剎那後未捨以來,恒成過現二世無表。若有安住律不律儀,亦有成惡善無表不。設有成就,為經幾時?頌曰: 住律不律儀, 起染淨無表, 初成中後二, 至染淨勢終。 論曰:若住律儀,由勝煩惱作殺縛等諸不善業,由此便發不善無表住不律儀。由淳淨信作禮佛等諸勝善業,由此亦發諸善無表。乃至此二心未斷來,所發無表恒時相續,然其初念唯成現在,自茲以後通成過現。

Ru-Yi Translation

Having discussed abiding in wholesome or unwholesome restraint, what of abiding in "neither"? Verse: for one abiding in "neither," if there is unmanifested karma, its first instant is possessed as present, and thereafter as both. Prose: "abiding in neither" refers to being neither restraint nor non-restraint; the karma that arises from this state does not necessarily always have unmanifested karma. If there is unmanifested karma, it is subsumed under the wholesome or unwholesome precept-type; its first instant is possessed only as present — and, since the present occupies the middle position between the past and future, this is expressed by saying its "middle" instant is possessed as present. From the instant after its first arising, for as long as it remains unrelinquished, it is constantly possessed as both past and present. [Question:] If one abiding in restraint or non-restraint also comes to possess unwholesome or wholesome unmanifested karma [of the opposite quality], for how long is this possessed, granting that it is possessed at all? Verse: for one abiding in restraint or non-restraint, unmanifested karma arising from a defiled or pure mind has its first instant possessed as present, and thereafter as both, until the force of that defiled or pure state comes to an end. Prose: if one abiding in restraint, overcome by a powerful affliction, commits unwholesome deeds such as killing or binding another, this gives rise to unwholesome unmanifested karma [despite one's restraint]. If one abiding in non-restraint, moved by pure and sincere faith, performs superior wholesome deeds such as venerating the Buddha, this likewise gives rise to wholesome unmanifested karma. For as long as these two [respectively defiled or pure] states of mind remain uninterrupted, the unmanifested karma thus generated continues without interruption; yet its very first moment is possessed only as present, and from that point onward, it is possessed as both past and present.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This section captures something ethically significant about how this system understands moral character: holding a precept vow or lacking one does not lock a person into a single moral trajectory — a precept-holder can, under the force of strong affliction, generate genuinely unwholesome karma layered on top of their underlying restraint, and an otherwise unrestrained person can, moved by real faith, generate genuinely wholesome karma layered on top of their underlying non-restraint. The two streams (the person's baseline restraint/non-restraint, and this episode-specific opposite-quality karma) run concurrently rather than one overriding or erasing the other — a person's ongoing vow is not "suspended" by a single lapse, nor is an unrestrained person's occasional virtue folded into some formal restraint they never took.

We should note that "possessed as present only at its first instant, and thereafter as both past and present" is a technical possession-pattern this section shares exactly with the intermediate "neither" case described just before it — both are grouped together because both lack the special reinforcing structure (meditative or path-linked continuity) that would let them additionally be possessed as future, unlike meditation-born and path-born restraint discussed in the previous section.

11. Manifested Karma's Own Possession Pattern

Having finished with unmanifested karma, the treatise turns to manifested karma's own possession across the three times. For anyone — whether abiding in restraint, non-restraint, or neither — manifested karma is possessed as present for exactly as long as the bodily or verbal act is actually being carried out; from the instant after that act, for as long as it remains unrelinquished, it is possessed as past; but manifested karma is never possessed as future, following the same reasoning already given for unmanifested karma. Defiled-neutral and undefiled-neutral manifested karma, however, are singled out as a special case: these two are never possessed as past or future at all, only ever as present, since a morally neutral dharma's causal force is inherently weak, and the capacity to obtain something from the past requires a correspondingly strong force. This weakness, the treatise clarifies, belongs to the manifested karma itself rather than to the underlying neutral mind that produces it — an important distinction, since a neutral mind itself can indeed be possessed as past or future, while the manifested karma that mind produces cannot, precisely because manifested karma is inherently duller and more derivative than the mind that gives rise to it, making a neutral act's karma weaker still than the already-weak neutral mind behind it.

Chinese Source

已辯無表,成表云何?頌曰: 表正作成中, 後成過非未, 有覆及無覆, 唯成就現在。 論曰:諸有安住律不律儀及住中者,乃至正作諸表業來恒成現表。初剎那後至未捨來恒成過去,必無成就未來表者,如無表釋。有覆無覆二無記表,定無有能成就過未,法力既劣得力亦微,是故無能逆追成者。此法力劣誰之所為?是心所為。若爾,有覆無記心等勿成過未。此責非理,表昧鈍故、依他起故;心等不然,無記表業從劣心起,其力倍劣彼能起心,故表與心成有差別。

Ru-Yi Translation

Having discussed unmanifested karma, what of the possession of manifested karma? Verse: manifested karma, while actually being carried out, is possessed as present; afterward, it is possessed as past, not as future; defiled-neutral and undefiled-neutral [manifested karma] are possessed only as present. Prose: for all those abiding in restraint, non-restraint, or neither, manifested karma is constantly possessed as present for as long as the manifested act is actually being carried out. From the instant after this, for as long as it remains unrelinquished, it is constantly possessed as past; it is never possessed as future, for the same reason already explained for unmanifested karma. The two kinds of neutral manifested karma — defiled-neutral and undefiled-neutral — definitely cannot be possessed as either past or future, since the dharma's force is weak, and the capacity to obtain [something] retroactively is likewise feeble; hence there is nothing capable of reaching backward or forward to be possessed. [Objection:] To whom does this weakness of the dharma's force belong? [Reply:] It belongs to the mind that produces it. [Objection:] If this is so, then a defiled-neutral mind and the like should likewise fail to be possessed as past or future. [Reply:] This objection is not sound, since manifested karma is dull and inert, and arises dependent on something else, whereas mind and the like are not so; unwholesome-neutral manifested karma arises from an [already] inferior mind, and its force is doubly inferior to that of the mind capable of giving rise to it — hence manifested karma and mind differ in this respect regarding what can be possessed.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The key move in this passage's closing exchange is a "doubly inferior" (倍劣) causal chain: an already-weak neutral mind produces an even weaker manifested karma, since matter (which is what manifested karma is) is inherently "dull and inert" (昧鈍) and entirely dependent on the mind that shapes it, rather than being an independently active cause in its own right. This lets the treatise hold two claims that might otherwise seem to be in tension: a neutral mind itself is strong enough to be possessed as past and future (minds, in this system, are generally capable of this), but the bodily or verbal act that neutral mind produces is not, because that act inherits its cause's weakness and then compounds it further through its own dependent, matter-based nature.

We should note this passage completes a pattern that has now appeared twice in this fascicle: both unmanifested and manifested defiled/undefiled-neutral karma are singled out as uniquely unable to be possessed as past or future, tying back to this fascicle's and the previous fascicle's repeated emphasis on neutral mental states' comparative causal weakness (see, for example, fascicle 13's explanation of why unmanifested karma is never morally neutral at all, for the same underlying reason).

12. The Five Names for Non-Restraint

Mirroring the naming scheme already given for the vow of individual liberation, the treatise now gives non-restraint its own five names, each with its own etymology. It is called "bad conduct" because the wise despise and reject it, and because its result is undesirable. It is called "bad precept-vow" because it obstructs pure śīla. It is called "karma" because it is produced through body and speech. It is called "karma-path" because it is subsumed under the root [of the karmic act]. And it is called "non-restraint" because it fails to guard body and speech from wrongdoing. As with the vow of individual liberation, the name "karma-path" applies strictly only to the very first instant of committing to a course of bad conduct, while the other four names extend across both the initial and every later moment for as long as the bad vow continues.

Chinese Source

如前所說住不律儀,此不律儀名差別者,頌曰: 惡行惡戒業, 業道不律儀。 論曰:此惡行等五種異名,是不律儀名之差別,是諸智者所訶厭故、果非愛故立惡行名。障淨尸羅故名惡戒、身語所造故名為業。根本所攝故名業道。不禁身語名不律儀。然業道名唯目初念,通初後位立餘四名。

Ru-Yi Translation

As for the distinctions among the names for non-restraint, discussed above as "abiding in non-restraint," verse: bad conduct, bad precept-vow, karma, karma-path, and non-restraint. Prose: these five different names — bad conduct and so on — are the distinguishing names of non-restraint. It is named "bad conduct" because the wise despise and reject it, and because its result is not desirable. It is named "bad precept-vow" because it obstructs pure śīla. It is named "karma" because it is produced through body and speech. It is named "karma-path" because it is subsumed under the root [of the karmic act]. It is named "non-restraint" because it fails to guard body and speech [from wrongdoing]. However, the name "karma-path" applies only to the very first moment, whereas the remaining four names extend across both the initial and later stages.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This naming scheme is a precise mirror image of the vow of individual liberation's five names from earlier in this fascicle (śīla, wholesome conduct, karma, restraint, and the special "prātimokṣa"/"karma-path" reserved for the first instant) — down to the same underlying structural distinction, where one name ("karma-path" on both sides) is reserved specifically for the founding instant of commitment, while the other names extend across the entire ongoing duration of the vow or anti-vow. This structural symmetry is itself instructive: the treatise treats wholesome and unwholesome commitment as governed by exactly parallel logic, differing only in moral content, not in their underlying temporal or causal architecture.

13. Who Has Manifested Karma Without Unmanifested, or Unmanifested Without Manifested

The treatise now works through a fourfold classification of exactly how manifested and unmanifested karma can occur separately. Someone abiding in neither restraint nor non-restraint who performs a weak, feeble act of wholesome or unwholesome volition possesses manifested karma but no corresponding unmanifested karma at all, since such a weak intention only barely manages to produce the manifested act itself, let alone anything further — and this applies all the more to manifested karma produced by a morally neutral intention, except in the special cases of merit tied to a material support (discussed back in fascicle 13's proofs for unmanifested karma) or an act that completes a full karma-path. Conversely, a noble one predisposed toward easy rebirth [into a higher state] who has not yet generated manifested karma — or who has generated it but has since relinquished it — possesses unmanifested karma without any accompanying manifested karma. The remaining two logical possibilities (both, or neither) should be filled in by analogy with what has already been established.

Chinese Source

或成表業非無表等,應作四句。其事云何?頌曰: 成表非無表, 住中劣思作, 捨未生表聖, 成無表非表。 論曰:唯成就表非無表者,謂住非律儀非不律儀,以微劣思造善造惡,唯發表業尚無無表,況無記思所發表業,除有依福及成業道。唯成無表非表業者,謂易生聖補特伽羅,表業未生或生已捨,俱成非句如應當知。

Ru-Yi Translation

There may be cases of possessing manifested karma but not unmanifested karma, and so forth — this should be set out in four cases. How does this work? Verse: possessing manifested karma but not unmanifested karma occurs for one abiding in "neither," acting from a feeble intention; possessing unmanifested karma but not manifested karma occurs for a noble one who has relinquished, or not yet generated, manifested karma. Prose: possessing only manifested karma, and not unmanifested karma, refers to one abiding in neither restraint nor non-restraint who, through a feeble intention, does something wholesome or unwholesome — this only barely gives rise to manifested karma, without yet having any unmanifested karma at all, and this applies all the more to manifested karma arising from a morally neutral intention — except in the case of merit tied to a [material] support, and in the case of completing a karma-path. Possessing only unmanifested karma, and not manifested karma, refers to a noble one of the type disposed toward easy [favorable] rebirth, whose manifested karma has either not yet arisen, or has arisen and then been relinquished; the remaining two cases — possessing both, or possessing neither — should be understood accordingly.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The phrase "易生聖補特伽羅" (a noble one of the type disposed toward easy rebirth) is technical enough to warrant a note: this refers to a particular category of noble person, within this tradition's detailed taxonomy of the stages of realization, whose remaining karma predisposes them toward a smooth, favorable further rebirth without requiring extensive additional bodily or verbal karma to secure it — hence such a person can possess significant unmanifested karma (the residue of their spiritual attainment) without necessarily having any currently active manifested karma standing behind it. We have kept this rendering close to the technical term rather than expanding it into a full doctrinal explanation, since the text itself does not elaborate on this category further here.

This four-case classification quietly resolves something that might otherwise seem puzzling from earlier in this fascicle: earlier sections established general "possession profiles" for restraint, non-restraint, and the "neither" category as if manifested and unmanifested karma always traveled together, but this section makes explicit that the two can, in fact, come apart in either direction — a point the earlier discussion of the "neither" category's own unmanifested karma ("not necessarily always") had already flagged in passing without fully spelling out the mechanism, which this section now supplies.

14. How Each Kind of Restraint Is Actually Obtained

The treatise now asks how each of the three kinds of restraint comes to be obtained in the first place. Meditative restraint is obtained automatically, the instant one attains the mind of either the root meditative absorption or its neighboring preliminary stage — since this restraint necessarily arises together with that very mind, with no separate act of receiving it required. Uncontaminated restraint works the same way, arising together with an uncontaminated mind at either the root or preliminary stage of any of the six levels capable of uncontaminated mental states (the preliminary access-concentration stage, the "intermediate" stage between the first and second absorptions, and the four root absorptions themselves — though not the three higher preliminary stages, for reasons to be explained later). The vow of individual liberation, by contrast, is obtained only "through another's instruction" — meaning through the guiding power of someone else who administers the vow — and divides into two further kinds depending on who administers it: the bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, and śikṣamāṇā vows must be received from the saṅgha (the monastic community as a body), while the remaining five vows may be received from a single individual.

Chinese Source

說住律儀不律儀等成就表業無表業已,此諸律儀由何而得?頌曰: 定生得定地, 彼聖得道生, 別解脫律儀, 得由他教等。 論曰:靜慮律儀由得有漏根本近分靜慮地心,爾時便得,與心俱故。無漏律儀由得無漏根本近分靜慮地心,爾時便得,亦心俱故。彼聲為顯前靜慮心。復說聖言簡取無漏,六靜慮地有無漏心,謂未至、中間及四根本定,非三近分,如後當辯。別解脫律儀由他教等得,能教他者說名為他,從如是他教力發戒,故說此戒由他教得。此復二種,謂從僧伽、補特伽羅有差別故。從僧伽得者,謂苾芻苾芻尼及正學戒。從補特伽羅得者,謂餘五種戒。

Ru-Yi Translation

Having discussed abiding in restraint, non-restraint, and so forth, and possessing manifested and unmanifested karma, by what means are these various restraints obtained? Verse: meditation-born restraint is obtained upon attaining the meditative level; that of noble ones, path-born restraint; the restraint of individual liberation is obtained through another's instruction, and so on. Prose: meditative restraint is obtained the very moment one attains the mind of either the root or the neighboring preliminary stage of contaminated meditative absorption, since it arises together with that very mind. Uncontaminated restraint is obtained the very moment one attains the mind of either the root or the neighboring preliminary stage of uncontaminated meditative absorption, likewise because it arises together with that mind. The word "that" [in the verse] serves to indicate the meditative mind just discussed. The further mention of "noble" specifies that only the uncontaminated case is meant. There are six meditative levels possessing an uncontaminated mind: the preliminary access-concentration stage, the intermediate stage, and the four root absorptions — not the [other] three preliminary stages, as will be explained later. The restraint of individual liberation is obtained through another's instruction; one capable of instructing another is called "another," and, since the precept is generated through the power of such another's instruction, this precept is said to be obtained through another's instruction. This, again, divides into two kinds, distinguished by whether it comes from the saṅgha or from an individual. What is obtained from the saṅgha refers to the bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, and śikṣamāṇā precepts. What is obtained from an individual refers to the remaining five kinds of precepts.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This section draws a clean line between two fundamentally different modes of obtaining restraint that this fascicle has been implicitly building toward: meditative and path-born restraint are obtained automatically and impersonally, arising the instant the corresponding mental state itself arises, with no ceremony, teacher, or social component required at all — while the vow of individual liberation is, by definition, a social and relational act, requiring another person's instruction and administration. This is why the vow of individual liberation alone, among the three restraints, needs the elaborate apparatus of ordination procedure that the fascicle is about to describe in detail (the ten traditional modes of full ordination), whereas meditative and path-born restraint need no such procedure at all.

The saṅgha-versus-individual distinction here maps directly onto monastic hierarchy: the higher, more binding vows (bhikṣu, bhikṣuṇī, and the intermediate śikṣamāṇā stage a woman passes through on her way to full ordination) require the formal, collective authority of the monastic community itself to confer, reflecting their greater weight and the community's collective responsibility for admitting new full members — while the lower five vows (śrāmaṇera, śrāmaṇerī, upāsaka, upāsikā, upavāsa) may be administered by any single qualified individual, since they carry a correspondingly lighter institutional weight.

15. The Ten Traditional Ways Full Ordination Has Been Granted

The Vinaya masters record ten distinct historical modes by which full monastic ordination has, at different times, been granted — a list the verse's closing "and so on" is meant to gesture toward. First, by nature itself: the Buddha and the pratyekabuddhas, who require no external ordination at all. Second, by entering the state of correct assurance (i.e., attaining the fruit of stream-entry directly): the first five disciples. Third, by the Buddha's own summons, "Come, monk": Yaśas and others. Fourth, through faithfully accepting the Buddha as one's teacher: Mahākāśyapa. Fifth, through skillfully answering questions put to oneself: Sudāyin. Sixth, through respectfully accepting the eight special rules: Mahāprajāpatī. Seventh, through a sent messenger: the nun Dharmadatta (法授尼, literally "Dharma-Bestowing Nun"). Eighth, through a quorum of five including a Vinaya-holder: for those in a border region. Ninth, through a quorum of ten: for those in the Middle Country. Tenth, through the threefold recitation of taking refuge in Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha: the sixty worthy companions who received full ordination together in one assembly.

Chinese Source

諸毘柰耶毘婆沙師,說有十種得具戒法,為攝彼故復說等言。何者為十?一由自然,謂佛獨覺。二由得入正性離生,謂五苾芻。三由佛命善來苾芻,謂耶舍等。四由信受佛為大師,謂大迦葉。五由善巧酬答所問,謂蘇陀夷。六由敬受八尊重法,謂大生主。七由遣使,謂法授尼。八由持律為第五人,謂於邊國。九由十眾,謂於中國。十由三說歸佛法僧,謂六十賢部共集受具戒。

Ru-Yi Translation

The Vinaya masters state that there are ten ways of obtaining full ordination; the verse's word "and so on" is meant to encompass these. What are the ten? First, by nature itself — namely, the Buddha and the pratyekabuddhas. Second, by attaining entry into correct assurance — namely, the five monks [the first five disciples]. Third, by the Buddha's command, "Come, monk" — namely, Yaśas and others. Fourth, by faithfully accepting the Buddha as the great teacher — namely, Mahākāśyapa. Fifth, by skillfully answering questions posed to oneself — namely, Sudāyin. Sixth, by respectfully accepting the eight special rules of reverence — namely, Mahāprajāpatī. Seventh, by way of a sent messenger — namely, the nun Dharmadatta (法授尼). Eighth, by a quorum with a Vinaya-holder as the fifth member — namely, for those in border regions. Ninth, by a quorum of ten — namely, for those in the Middle Country. Tenth, by the threefold recitation of taking refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha — namely, the assembly of sixty worthy ones who together received full ordination.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This list is a compact index of well-known episodes from early Buddhist narrative literature, and we want to flag that the treatise itself does not retell any of these stories — it simply names the mode of ordination and the person or persons associated with it, assuming the reader already knows the fuller account. A few identifications worth being explicit about, since the Chinese transliterations and epithets could otherwise be opaque: "the five monks" (五苾芻) are the first five disciples (including Aśvajit/Koṇḍañña) who heard the Buddha's first sermon at Sarnath; "Yaśas" (耶舍) was an early lay convert who requested ordination directly; "Mahākāśyapa" (大迦葉) became one of the Buddha's most senior disciples and later presided over the first monastic council; "Sudāyin" (蘇陀夷, Sk. Svāgata or similar) is remembered for a notably deft exchange with the Buddha; "Mahāprajāpatī" (大生主, "Great Progenitress") was the Buddha's foster mother and the first woman ordained, accepting the "eight special rules" (八尊重法, aṣṭau gurudharmāḥ) as a condition of the nuns' order being established; the nun named 法授尼 ("Dharma-Bestowing," which we render as "Dharmadatta" though we are not fully confident this corresponds to any single, independently well-attested figure under that Sanskrit name) received ordination via a sent messenger rather than in person, evidently due to some circumstance preventing direct attendance — we flag this identification as tentative rather than settled.

The ninth and tenth modes are worth noting because they describe what became the standard, ongoing procedure rather than a one-time historical exception: a quorum of ten monks (or five, in remote "border regions" where ten qualified monks might not be available) administering ordination is the mechanism by which the monastic community has continued to induct new members ever since the earliest period described by modes one through eight — meaning items one through eight are historically closed categories (they can no longer occur, since the specific circumstances, like the Buddha's own presence, no longer exist), while items nine and ten remain the live, ongoing basis for ordination. We should also flag that "the sixty worthy ones" in the tenth case appears to be presented as its own distinct precedent alongside the ninth mode, though the text does not fully explain why this particular episode is not simply subsumed under the ordinary ten-monk quorum procedure — we leave this open rather than supplying a resolution the text itself does not give.

16. Lifetime Vows Versus the One-Day Vow, and Whether Upavāsa Could Be Extended

Continuing directly from the ten modes of ordination — noting in passing that the resulting vow of individual liberation does not necessarily depend on an actual manifested karmic act to arise — the treatise asks over what span of time this vow must be undertaken. The seven assemblies other than the one-day precept-holder must commit to their vow for their entire remaining lifetime; only the upavāsa vow is undertaken for a single day and night. This is fixed for a structural reason: a precept's temporal boundary can only be set at one of two points — the boundary of one's lifespan, or the boundary of a day and night — and taking a vow for even an intermediate span, such as half a month, is not an option, since a vow taken to expire at the moment of death cannot actually arise after death has already occurred, there being no further physical basis, deliberate effort, or capacity for continued intention in that different existence. This raises a further question: since a person could, in principle, take the upavāsa vow again after the first day-night ends, and again after that, is there some real obstacle blocking multiple consecutive upavāsa vows from ever combining into something longer? The Vaibhāṣika conclude firmly that there is no scriptural basis for any such extended reception — the Buddha's own teaching specifies only the single day-night span, and no other span is ever described.

Chinese Source

如是所得別解律儀,非必定依表業而發。又此所說別解律儀,應齊幾時要期而受?頌曰: 別解脫律儀, 盡壽或晝夜。 論曰:七眾所持別解脫戒,唯應盡壽要期而受。近住所持別解脫戒,唯一晝夜要期而受。此時定爾。所以者何?戒時邊際但有二種:一壽命邊際、二晝夜邊際,重說晝夜為半月等。時名是何法?謂諸行增語。於四洲中光位闇位,如其次第立晝夜名,二邊際中盡壽可爾。於命終後雖有要期而不能生別解脫戒,依身別故,別依身中無加行故、無憶念故。一晝夜後或五或十晝夜等中受近住戒。何法為障,令彼眾多近住律儀非亦得起?必應有法能為障礙,以薄伽梵於契經中說近住律儀唯一晝夜故。於如是義應共尋思,為佛正觀一晝夜後理無容起近住律儀,故於經中說一晝夜?為觀所化根難調者,旦應授與一晝夜戒?依何理教作如是言?過此戒生,不違理故。毘婆沙者作如是言:曾無契經說過晝夜有別受得近住律儀,是故我宗不許斯義。

Ru-Yi Translation

The restraint of individual liberation thus obtained does not necessarily depend on manifested karma to arise. Moreover, over what span of time should this restraint of individual liberation, as described, be undertaken? Verse: the restraint of individual liberation is undertaken for one's whole life, or for a single day and night. Prose: the precept of individual liberation held by the seven assemblies [other than the upavāsa precept-holder] must be undertaken with a commitment for one's whole remaining life. The precept of individual liberation held by the upavāsa precept-holder must be undertaken with a commitment for a single day and night only. This span of time is fixed in exactly this way. Why is this so? A precept's temporal boundary has only two possibilities: the boundary of one's lifespan, and the boundary of a day and night; to speak again of a boundary such as half a month would be [an unnecessary further division of the day-night boundary, not a genuine third category]. What sort of thing is "time"? It is a conventional expression for conditioned phenomena themselves. Across the four continents, periods of light and periods of darkness are, in due order, given the names "day" and "night"; among the two [possible] boundaries, the whole-life boundary may be so [straightforwardly fixed]. After death has occurred, even if one had made such a commitment beforehand, the restraint of individual liberation cannot then arise, since it depends on a different body [in the next existence] — a different bodily basis lacking the necessary preparatory effort and lacking the capacity for continued intention. [Objection:] After one day and night, could one not undertake the upavāsa precept again, for another five or ten days and nights [in succession]? What factor would obstruct this, preventing such multiple upavāsa restraints from also being able to arise [as one continuous whole]? There must be some factor capable of obstructing this, since the Blessed One states in a sūtra that the upavāsa restraint lasts only a single day and night. [Further inquiry:] On this point, we should jointly consider: did the Buddha, seeing correctly that it is in principle impossible for an upavāsa restraint to arise beyond a single day and night, therefore state "one day and night" in the sūtra? Or, seeing that those to be guided have faculties difficult to tame, did he simply grant, for the time being, only a one-day-and-night precept? By what reasoning or teaching should this statement be understood? Arising beyond this span would not contradict reason. [Reply:] The Vaibhāṣika state: there has never been any sūtra stating that a separate reception could obtain the upavāsa restraint beyond a single day and night — hence our own school does not accept this notion.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We should be transparent about one compressed clause in this passage: "to speak again of a boundary such as half a month would be [an unnecessary further division]" is our expansion of a very terse original ("重說晝夜為半月等"), which seems to be dismissing the idea of an intermediate time-boundary (like half a month) as simply a repeated multiple of the day-night unit rather than a genuinely distinct third category of vow-boundary — but the Chinese is compressed enough that a different reading is possible, and we flag this as our best interpretive judgment rather than a certain rendering.

The passage's central open question — did the Buddha limit upavāsa to one day-night because it is metaphysically impossible to extend it, or merely because that is what ordinary practitioners can manage? — is a genuinely interesting piece of hermeneutics that the treatise raises explicitly and then declines to resolve through reasoning alone, instead simply appealing to the absence of any contrary scriptural precedent. This is characteristic of how this treatise generally settles disputes about religious practice specifically (as opposed to disputes about metaphysics): scriptural silence on an alternative practice is treated as decisive against inventing that practice, even where pure logic might not obviously rule it out.

17. Why Non-Restraint Has No One-Day Version

The treatise now asks over what temporal boundary non-restraint (bad conduct) is obtained, and finds an asymmetry with the vow of individual liberation: committing to a lifetime of unwholesome deeds produces non-restraint, but there is no "one day and night" version of non-restraint corresponding to the upavāsa vow, because non-restraint is not received the way a wholesome precept is received. No one formally commits before a teacher, setting a fixed limit, to "definitely undertake non-restraint for one day and night" — such a thing would itself be an object of contempt to any wise person, whereas a formal, teacher-witnessed commitment to a lifetime of bad conduct is likewise never actually made; rather, non-restraint arises simply through generating an intention that thoroughly and irreversibly ruins one's own wholesome disposition, sustained without a teacher's involvement, unlike the upavāsa vow's brief, teacher-administered commitment which produces restraint even without any such thoroughgoing ruin of intention. Since only a thoroughly ruinous intention — not a merely temporary one — can generate non-restraint at all, and such an intention has no natural "one day and night" boundary the way a formally administered vow does, non-restraint simply never comes packaged in a one-day form. The treatise closes this discussion by briefly noting the Sautrāntika's alternative account: just as they deny any real unmanifested matter behind wholesome restraint, they likewise deny it behind non-restraint, holding instead that non-restraint just is the sustained, unrelinquished continuation of an intention to commit evil — meaning even someone who later experiences a wholesome thought can still be said to "possess" non-restraint throughout, simply because that underlying intention has never actually been abandoned.

Chinese Source

依何邊際得不律儀?頌曰: 惡戒無晝夜, 謂非如善受。 論曰:要期盡壽造諸惡業得不律儀,非一晝夜如近住戒。所以者何?謂此非如善戒受故。謂必無有立限對師受不律儀如近住戒,我一晝夜定受不律儀,此是智人所訶厭業故。若爾,亦無有立限對師我乃至命終定受惡戒,勿盡形壽得不律儀。雖無對師要期盡壽作諸惡業,由起畢竟壞善意樂得不律儀,非起暫時壞善意樂無師令彼得不律儀,故不律儀無一晝夜。然近住戒,由現對師要期受力,雖無畢竟壞惡意樂而得律儀,設有對師要期暫受不律儀者亦必應得。然未曾見,故不立有。經部師說:如善律儀無別實物名為無表,此不律儀亦應非實。即欲造惡不善意樂相續不捨名不律儀,由此後時善心雖起而名成就不律儀者,以不捨此阿世耶故。

Ru-Yi Translation

Over what boundary is non-restraint obtained? Verse: bad precept-vow has no [one] day-and-night [version], since it is not received the way a wholesome one is. Prose: committing to a lifetime of unwholesome deeds obtains non-restraint; there is no one-day-and-night version, unlike the upavāsa precept. Why is this so? Because this is not received the way a wholesome precept is received. That is, there is certainly no case of formally committing before a teacher, with a fixed limit, to receive non-restraint the way one receives the upavāsa precept — declaring, "I shall definitely undertake non-restraint for one day and night" — since this would itself be an action despised and rejected by the wise. [Objection:] If this is so, then there should also be no case of formally committing before a teacher, with a fixed limit, "I shall definitely undertake bad conduct until the end of my life" — so how could one obtain non-restraint for one's whole life either? [Reply:] Although there is no formal commitment before a teacher to commit unwholesome deeds for one's whole life, one obtains non-restraint by generating an intention that thoroughly and irreversibly ruins what is wholesome — it is not the case that generating a merely temporary intention that ruins what is wholesome, without a teacher, causes one to obtain non-restraint; hence non-restraint has no one-day-and-night version. The upavāsa precept, however, by the power of a formal commitment made in the actual presence of a teacher, produces restraint even without any thoroughly ruinous intention toward evil; and if someone were to formally commit, in the presence of a teacher, to a brief reception of non-restraint, this, too, would necessarily have to be obtainable — yet this has never actually been observed, and so it is not held to exist. The Sautrāntika school says: just as there is no separate real entity called unmanifested matter behind wholesome restraint, this non-restraint, too, should likewise not be real. Rather, the continuous, unabandoned intention to commit evil is what is called non-restraint; hence, even if a wholesome mind later arises, one is still said to possess non-restraint, since this underlying disposition has not been abandoned.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The logic distinguishing why a lifetime commitment to non-restraint works while a one-day commitment does not is genuinely subtle, and worth restating plainly: the treatise's claim is that non-restraint is generated purely by the strength and totality of the underlying corrupting intention (a decision to irreversibly abandon wholesome conduct), with no formal, teacher-witnessed ceremony playing any causal role at all — whereas the upavāsa vow's restraint is generated specifically by the formal ceremony itself, even absent any such totalizing intention. Since it is the ceremony (which can be brief) that makes a one-day wholesome vow possible, and non-restraint by definition has no such ceremony doing any of the causal work, there is simply no mechanism available to produce a "one-day" version of non-restraint — the only thing capable of producing non-restraint (a thorough, life-ruining intention) is, by its very nature, not the kind of thing that comes in a one-day size.

The Sautrāntika's closing remark here briefly echoes the exact same nominalist strategy already seen at length in fascicle 13's extended debate over unmanifested karma generally — reducing restraint and non-restraint alike to a persisting intention or disposition rather than a separate species of matter. We flag that this passage does not restage that full debate, but simply notes, in passing, that the same disagreement applies symmetrically to non-restraint as it did to restraint; readers wanting the fuller back-and-forth should look back to fascicle 13's extended treatment.

18. The Upavāsa Ceremony, and Why It Is Called "Near-Dwelling"

The treatise now specifies exactly how the upavāsa vow must be received. It must be taken at dawn, at sunrise, since the vow's duration is fixed at one full day and night from that point — though someone who has already resolved in advance to observe this vow on a fixed recurring date (such as the eighth day of each month) may still receive it later that same day if some obstacle prevented the morning reception. The precept-receiver must sit in a lower seat than the teacher — crouching, kneeling, bowing, palms joined — except when illness prevents this, since a lack of outward reverence would fail to actually generate the restraint at all. The vow must always be received from a teacher, never taken on one's own initiative, partly because the resulting sense of shame before that same teacher later helps the precept-holder resist any temptation to break the vow; and the receiver must recite the words after the teacher, never before or simultaneously, since only this order actually constitutes "receiving from a teacher's instruction." All eight precept-branches must be received together as a complete set — omitting even one means the upavāsa restraint fails to arise at all — and all customary bodily ornamentation must be set aside, since it is itself an "occasion of heedlessness" (though ordinary permanent adornments need not be removed, since they lack the power to inspire indulgence the way something novel and unfamiliar would). The vow's fixed duration of a full day and night, ending precisely at the next sunrise, together with its comprehensive prohibition against those living by hunting, killing, adultery, or theft, is what makes the upavāsa restraint genuinely effective in practice. As for its name: "upavāsa" (近住, "near-dwelling") means that this restraint dwells near the conduct of an arhat, since the precept-holder is training in imitation of that model — though some instead explain it as "dwelling near" the fuller lifetime precepts held by those in the other seven assemblies. This restraint is also called "long-nourishing" (長養), since it nourishes and gradually increases the meager wholesome roots of beings who have very little to begin with, as a verse states: because this is able to nourish one's own and others' wholesome, pure mind, the Blessed One therefore calls this restraint "long-nourishing."

Chinese Source

說一晝夜近住律儀,欲正受時當如何受?頌曰: 近住於晨旦, 下座從師受, 隨教說具支, 離嚴飾晝夜。 論曰:近住律儀於晨旦受,謂受此戒要日出時,此戒要經一晝夜故。諸有先作如是要期,謂我恒於月八日等,必當受此近住律儀。若旦有礙緣,齋竟亦得受。言下座者,謂在師前居卑劣座,或蹲或跪曲躬合掌,唯除有病,若不恭敬不發律儀。此必從師,無容自受。以後若遇諸犯戒緣,由愧戒師,能不違犯。受此戒者,應隨師教受者後說,勿前勿俱,如是方成從師教受,異此授受二俱不成。具受八支方成近住,隨有所闕近住不成。受此律儀必離嚴飾,憍逸處故。常嚴身具不必須捨,緣彼不能生甚憍逸如新異故。受此律儀必須晝夜,謂至明旦日初出時。若不如斯依法受者,但生妙行不得律儀。又若如斯盡晝夜受,具制屠獵姦盜有情,近住律儀深成有用。言近住者,謂此律儀近阿羅漢住,以隨學彼故。有說:此近盡壽戒住。如是律儀或名長養,長養薄少善根有情,令其善根漸增多故。如有頌言: 由此能長養, 自他善淨心, 是故薄伽梵, 說此名長養。

Ru-Yi Translation

Having discussed the one-day-and-night upavāsa restraint, how should it be properly received? Verse: upavāsa is received at dawn, from a lower seat, from a teacher, following the instruction, reciting the complete precept-branches, and setting aside adornment, for a full day and night. Prose: the upavāsa restraint is received at dawn, meaning that receiving this precept requires the time of sunrise, since this precept must last a full day and night. Those who have already made an advance commitment — such as, "I shall always receive this upavāsa restraint on the eighth day of the month" — may still receive it after the meal-time is complete, if some obstacle prevents receiving it in the morning. "Lower seat" means occupying a humble seat before the teacher — crouching, kneeling, bowing at the waist, with palms joined — except in the case of illness; without such reverence, the restraint does not arise. This must be received from a teacher; there is no possibility of receiving it on one's own. This is because, afterward, should one encounter circumstances tempting one to break the precept, a sense of shame before one's precept-teacher enables one not to transgress. One receiving this precept should recite after the teacher's instruction, never before it or simultaneously with it; only in this way does it properly constitute receiving from a teacher's instruction — otherwise, neither the giving nor the receiving is accomplished. Only by receiving all eight branches in full is the upavāsa restraint accomplished; if any is lacking, the upavāsa restraint is not accomplished. Receiving this restraint necessarily requires setting aside adornment, since it is an occasion for heedless indulgence. One's ordinarily worn adornments need not be discarded, since, being familiar rather than novel, they are not capable of giving rise to great heedless indulgence. Receiving this restraint necessarily spans a full day and night, meaning until the following dawn, at the moment of sunrise. If one does not receive it in accordance with this method, one merely generates good conduct without obtaining the restraint itself. Moreover, only when received in this way, spanning the full day and night, does the upavāsa restraint, together with its comprehensive prohibition against those who live as butchers, hunters, adulterers, or thieves, become genuinely effective in practice. As for the name "upavāsa" (近住): this restraint dwells near the conduct of an arhat, since one trains in accordance with that model. Some say: this dwells near the lifetime precept [of the other seven assemblies]. This restraint is also called "long-nourishing," since it nourishes the meager wholesome roots of beings who have little of them, causing their wholesome roots to gradually increase. As a verse states: because this is able to nourish one's own and others' wholesome, pure mind, the Blessed One therefore calls this restraint "long-nourishing."

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We have rendered 近住 as "upavāsa" throughout, following the standard Sanskrit term for this one-day precept-observance, rather than translating the Chinese literally as "near-dwelling" in the main text — but the literal meaning is precisely what the etymological explanation here is unpacking, so we have kept "near-dwelling" as a gloss in that specific explanatory sentence. The treatise offers two different explanations of what the "near" refers to (dwelling near an arhat's conduct, or dwelling near the fuller lifetime precepts of ordained and lay life) without choosing between them, which is consistent with this fascicle's general willingness to record multiple explanatory traditions side by side rather than adjudicating between them.

The ceremonial details here (reciting only after the teacher, never before or simultaneously; sitting in a lower seat; requiring all eight branches together as an indivisible whole) collectively make a point about the vow's essentially relational, ceremony-dependent nature that connects back to an earlier section's distinction between how the vow of individual liberation and meditation-born/path-born restraint are each obtained — this passage is filling in exactly why the ceremonial form matters so precisely for a restraint that (unlike meditative restraint) does not arise automatically from any internal mental attainment alone.

19. Why Exactly Eight Branches, Grouped in Threes

The treatise now explains why the upavāsa vow requires precisely eight precept-branches, organized into three functional groups. The first four branches — abstaining from killing, stealing, sexual misconduct, and false speech — are called the "śīla branches," since these four alone directly counter the root offenses (性罪, acts that are inherently wrong regardless of any formal precept). The fifth branch — abstaining from alcohol — is the single "heedfulness branch," since drinking alcohol scatters the mind and directly undermines one's ability to keep the four śīla branches at all; without it, someone could technically hold the other four precepts while alcohol itself erodes their capacity to actually keep them. The final three branches — abstaining from self-adornment and entertainment, from high and luxurious beds, and from eating at improper times — are called the "restraining branches," since each addresses a different way that indulgence and heedless mental scattering can arise and gradually undermine one's resolve, even without technically breaking any of the first five precepts outright.

Chinese Source

何緣受此必具八支?頌曰: 戒不逸禁支, 四一三如次, 為防諸性罪, 失念及憍逸。 論曰:八中前四是尸羅支,謂離殺生至虛誑語,由此四種離性罪故。次有一種是不放逸支,謂離飲諸酒生放逸處。雖受尸羅,若飲諸酒則心放逸,犯尸羅故。後有三種是禁約支,謂離塗飾香鬘乃至食非時食,以能隨順厭離心故。何緣具受如是三支?若不具支,便不能離性罪失念憍逸過失。謂初離殺至虛誑語能防性罪,離貪瞋癡所起殺等諸惡業故。次離飲酒能防失念,以飲酒時能令忘失應不應作諸事業故。後離三種能防憍逸,以若受用種種香鬘高廣床座習近歌舞心便憍舉尋即毀戒,由遠彼故心便離憍。若有能持依時食者,以能遮止恒食時故,便憶自受近住律儀,能於世間深生厭離。若非時食二事俱無,數食能令心縱逸故。

Ru-Yi Translation

For what reason must this precept be received with exactly eight branches? Verse: śīla, heedfulness, and restraint are the branches, in the order of four, one, and three, in order to guard against root offenses, lapses of mindfulness, and heedless indulgence. Prose: among the eight, the first four are the śīla branches — namely, from abstaining from killing living beings through abstaining from false speech — since these four kinds counter root offenses. The next single branch is the heedfulness branch — namely, abstaining from drinking alcohol, the basis that gives rise to heedlessness. Although one has received śīla, if one drinks alcohol, the mind becomes heedless, and one transgresses śīla because of this. The final three are the restraining branches — namely, from abstaining from self-adornment and fragrant garlands through abstaining from eating at improper times — since these are able to accord with a mind inclined toward renunciation. For what reason must one receive all three of these branches together? If the branches are not received in full, one cannot avoid the faults of root offenses, lapses of mindfulness, and heedless indulgence. That is, the first group — from abstaining from killing through abstaining from false speech — guards against root offenses, since it removes the unwholesome acts, such as killing, that arise from greed, hatred, and delusion. The next — abstaining from alcohol — guards against lapses of mindfulness, since drinking alcohol causes one to forget what ought and ought not to be done. The final three guard against heedless indulgence, since indulging in various fragrances, garlands, high and broad beds and seats, and becoming accustomed to song and dance causes the mind to become conceited and heedless, quickly leading to breaking the precept; by keeping distant from these, the mind is thereby kept free of such conceit. One who is able to keep to eating only at the proper time, since this restrains the habit of constant eating, is thereby reminded of having undertaken the upavāsa restraint, and is able to give rise to a deep sense of renunciation with respect to the world. If both improper-time eating and this restraint were absent, frequent eating would cause the mind to become indulgent and unrestrained.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This threefold structure (śīla / heedfulness / restraint) gives a genuinely coherent rationale for what could otherwise look like an arbitrary list of eight rules: the first four target root wrongdoing directly; the fifth targets the specific psychological vulnerability (intoxication) that would otherwise erode one's ability to keep the first four; and the final three target subtler forms of indulgence that, while not root offenses in themselves, gradually cultivate the very heedlessness and self-satisfaction that makes root offenses and lapses of mindfulness more likely to occur in the first place. In this sense, the eight branches are not eight independent prohibitions but a layered defense system, with each layer addressing a different point at which discipline could break down.

We should flag that this section, in the source text, continues directly into a separate scholastic dispute over whether "abstaining from eating at improper times" specifically constitutes the upavāsa vow's core "essence" (體) with the other seven merely being its supporting "branches" (支) — a debate the Vaibhāṣika explicitly reject, along with several other schools' competing proposals about which branch, if any, deserves this special status. We have not included that further debate in this section, since it shifts to a narrower technical dispute about how to parse "essence" versus "branch" terminology (illustrated by analogies to a chariot's parts, a four-division army, and the sevenfold factors of awakening) that would need its own dedicated treatment; it remains for a future section.

20. Who Can Receive Upavāsa, and Whether Refuge Alone Makes One an Upāsaka

The treatise asks whether only someone already established as an upāsaka can receive the upavāsa restraint, or whether others can as well — and answers that anyone who has not yet received the upāsaka precept can still receive the upavāsa restraint, provided they take the threefold refuge (in the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha) within that same day-and-night period; apart from this, there is no way to obtain it, except through simple ignorance of the requirement. This raises a related question, prompted by a sūtra passage in which the Buddha describes a lay follower simply as someone with functioning male faculties who takes refuge in the Three Jewels and, with sincere and pure intention, truthfully declares themselves an upāsaka: does this declaration of refuge alone suffice to make one a genuine upāsaka? Non-Indian teachers hold that it does; but the masters of Kashmir insist that without also taking on the upāsaka restraint itself, one is not truly an upāsaka at all — which might seem to conflict with the sūtra's own wording, except that, as the treatise clarifies, the declaration itself already generates the restraint, so there is no actual conflict.

Chinese Source

為唯近事得受近住、為餘亦有受近住耶?頌曰: 近住餘亦有, 不受三歸無。 論曰:諸有未受近事律儀,一晝夜中歸依三寶,說三歸已受近住戒,彼亦受得近住律儀。異此則無,除不知者。如契經說:佛告大名:諸有在家白衣男子男根成就,歸佛法僧起殷淨心,發誠諦語自稱我是鄔波索迦,願尊憶持慈悲護念,齊是名曰鄔波索迦。為但受三歸即成近事?外國諸師說:唯此即成。迦濕彌羅國諸論師言:離近事律儀則非近事。若爾,應與此經相違。此不相違,已發戒故。

Ru-Yi Translation

Can only an upāsaka receive the upavāsa restraint, or can others receive it too? Verse: others may also receive upavāsa, provided they take the threefold refuge; without this, they cannot. Prose: anyone who has not yet received the upāsaka restraint may, within that same day and night, take refuge in the Three Jewels, and, having recited the threefold refuge, receive the upavāsa precept — such a person, too, thereby obtains the upavāsa restraint. Apart from this, it cannot be obtained, except in the case of someone unaware [of the requirement, who is not held culpable for the omission]. As a sūtra states: the Buddha told Mahānāman: "Any layperson, clothed in white, whose male faculties are complete, who takes refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha with a sincere and pure mind, and, with truthful speech, declares, 'I am an upāsaka; may the Honored One bear this in mind, and, with compassion, watch over and protect me' — to this extent is one called an upāsaka." [Question:] Does merely receiving the threefold refuge alone thereby make one an upāsaka? Teachers from outside [India] say: this alone suffices. The treatise-masters of Kashmir say: apart from the restraint of the upāsaka, one is not an upāsaka. [Objection:] If this is so, this should contradict the sūtra just cited. [Reply:] This is not a contradiction, since the precept has already been generated [by that very declaration].

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We have translated 大名 as "Mahānāman" — a proper name appearing in early Buddhist texts (most famously one of the original group of five ascetics, though the Mahānāman addressed in lay-precept contexts like this one may be a different figure of the same name; the Chinese itself does not distinguish which Mahānāman is meant, and we have not been able to verify this identification with full confidence from the passage alone) rather than leaving it as the literal "Great Name," since it functions here as a proper name being directly addressed by the Buddha, not as a description.

The Kashmir masters' resolution here is a clean example of this treatise's overall method: rather than deny the sūtra's apparently minimal description of what makes an upāsaka (simply the act of taking refuge and declaring oneself one), they instead argue that the sincere, truthful declaration described in the sūtra is not merely a verbal formality but is itself the very act that generates the restraint — meaning the sūtra's brief wording and the Kashmir view's insistence on restraint as necessary are actually describing the very same event from two different angles, not making two different claims that could conflict. The next section will explain the precise mechanics of exactly when, within that declaration, the restraint is generated.

21. The Exact Moment the Upāsaka Vow Takes Effect

The treatise now pinpoints exactly when the upāsaka's restraint is generated: at the very instant one, with sincere and pure intention, truthfully declares "I am an upāsaka; may the Honored One bear this in mind and, with compassion, watch over and protect me" — this declaration itself, and nothing beyond it, is what generates the restraint, just as a bhikṣu's or śrāmaṇera's restraint is generated at a specific instant during their own ordination formulas. This raises a question, since the same sūtra passage continues with the words "from this time until the end of my life, I renounce the taking of life" — does this mean the actual five precepts are only granted afterward, separately from the initial declaration? The treatise clarifies that this later clause is simply the sūtra's own abbreviated way of referring to the renunciation of killing and the other four root offenses (using "renounce life" as shorthand for the fuller list), meaning the five precepts were, in fact, already obtained at the earlier moment of self-declaration. The explicit recitation of the five precepts that follows is not what generates the restraint a second time, but instead serves a purely pedagogical purpose: to make sure the newly-minted upāsaka clearly understands and firmly retains exactly which training rules they are now committed to — precisely as happens when a newly ordained bhikṣu, having already obtained the full monastic precept through the ordination ceremony itself, is then separately taught the detailed training rules so as to understand and retain them, and precisely as happens for the śrāmaṇera as well. Hence the upāsaka's restraint, like these others, is necessarily accompanied by real restraint from the moment of declaration onward — it is never a case of the declaration alone, without any restraint following from it.

Chinese Source

何時發戒?頌曰: 稱近事發戒, 說如苾芻等。 論曰:起殷淨心發誠諦語,自稱我是鄔波索迦,願尊憶持慈悲護念。爾時即發近事律儀。稱近事等言,便發律儀故。以經復說:我從今時乃至命終捨生言故。此經意說捨殺生等,略去殺等但說捨生,故於前時已得五戒。彼雖已得近事律儀,為令了知所應學處故,復為說離殺生等五種戒相令識堅持。如得苾芻具足戒已,說重學處令識堅持。勤策亦然。此亦應爾,是故近事必具律儀。

Ru-Yi Translation

At what moment is the precept generated? Verse: the precept is generated upon declaring oneself an upāsaka, as is stated for the bhikṣu and the others. Prose: at the moment one gives rise to a sincere, pure mind, utters truthful speech, and declares, "I am an upāsaka; may the Honored One bear this in mind, and, with compassion, watch over and protect me" — at that very moment, the upāsaka restraint is generated, since it is the declaration of "upāsaka" and the accompanying words that generate the restraint. [Objection:] But the sūtra further states, "from this time until the end of my life, I renounce the taking of life," and so on. [Reply:] The intent of this sūtra passage is to state the renunciation of killing and the other [four root offenses]; it abbreviates "killing" and the rest, stating only "renounce life," and hence the five precepts had already been obtained at the earlier point [of the initial declaration]. Although this person had already obtained the upāsaka restraint, in order to let them clearly understand the training points they should observe, the five precept-characteristics — abstaining from killing and so on — are further explained to them, so that they may recognize and firmly uphold them. This is just as, once a bhikṣu has already obtained the full precept, the detailed training points are then explained, so that they may recognize and firmly uphold them; the same holds for the śrāmaṇera as well. This case should be understood the same way — hence the upāsaka necessarily possesses restraint [from the moment of the initial declaration, not only once the detailed precepts are later recited].

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This section resolves what would otherwise be a real scriptural puzzle by drawing a clean line between the act that generates a vow and the subsequent teaching that clarifies its content — the same pattern the treatise now points out recurs across all three levels of ordination discussed in this fascicle (upāsaka, śrāmaṇera, and bhikṣu): the founding, restraint-generating moment is always a specific, singular declaration or ceremonial act, while any subsequent recitation of detailed rules is purely instructional, ensuring the newly-vowed person actually understands what they have already committed to, rather than being the moment that commitment itself takes effect.

This closing line — "hence the upāsaka necessarily possesses restraint" — directly resolves the disagreement from the previous section between the "outside teachers" (who held that mere refuge-taking suffices to make one an upāsaka) and the Kashmir masters (who insisted restraint was additionally required): by locating restraint's generation at the very moment of the refuge-and-declaration formula itself, rather than treating it as a separate, later-added requirement, the treatise shows both camps were describing the same single event, just emphasizing different aspects of it.

22. The Four Grades of Upāsaka: A Difference in Practice, Not in Vow

An objection now presses hard on the previous section's conclusion: if every upāsaka necessarily possesses the complete restraint of all five precepts, why does the Buddha elsewhere speak of four distinct kinds of upāsaka — one able to train in only a portion, one able to train in a small portion, one able to train in most, and one able to train in the complete set? The treatise resolves this by insisting these four grades describe differing capacities to actually keep precepts already fully received, not differing amounts of precept received in the first place — "able to train" in the Buddha's statement means "able to uphold what was previously undertaken." An alternative reading, that the Buddha's statement instead describes people receiving a genuinely partial restraint (some receiving only one precept, some several, and so on), is rejected as contradicting scripture: no sūtra anywhere describes the founding declaration itself ("I am an upāsaka...") as generating only a fraction of the five precepts, and the passage sometimes cited in support of a partial reading is, on the treatise's analysis, actually about something else — the sincere and total commitment of a stream-enterer who has directly seen the truths, not a technical description of how the upāsaka precept itself is received.

Chinese Source

頌曰: 若皆具律儀, 何言一分等? 謂約能持說。 論曰:若諸近事皆具律儀,何緣世尊言有四種:一能學一分、二能學少分、三能學多分、四能學滿分?謂約能持故作是說。能持先所受,故說能學言。不爾,應言受一分等。理實約受等具律儀,以具律儀故名近事。如是所執違越契經。如何違經?謂無經說自稱我是近事等言便發五戒,此經不說我從今者乃至命終捨生言故。經如何說?如《大名經》。唯此經中說近事相,餘經不爾,故違越經。然餘經說:我從今時乃至命終捨生歸淨,是歸三寶發誠信言。此中顯示以見諦者,由得證淨舉命自要,表於正法深懷愛重,乃至為救自生命緣,終不捨於如來正法。非彼為欲說近事相故說如是捨生等言,設說亦非分明理教。誰能准此不明了文,便信前時已發五戒?又約持犯戒說學一分等尚不應問,況應為答。誰有已解近事律儀必具五支,而不能解於所學處持一非餘,乃至具持名一分等?由彼未解近事律儀受量少多,故應請問:凡有幾種鄔波索迦能學學處?答言:有四鄔波索迦,謂能學一分等。猶未能了。復問何名能學一分?乃至廣說,若闕律儀得名近事。苾芻勤策,闕亦應成。彼既不成,此亦應爾。

Ru-Yi Translation

Verse: if all [upāsakas] possess full restraint, why does [the Buddha] speak of a partial [kind] and so forth? [Reply:] This is stated with reference to their capacity to uphold [what they received]. Prose: if all upāsakas possess complete restraint, for what reason does the Blessed One speak of four kinds — first, able to train in a portion; second, able to train in a small portion; third, able to train in most; fourth, able to train in the complete set? This is stated with reference to their capacity to uphold what they previously received; hence it speaks of "able to train." If it were otherwise, it should instead say "receiving a portion," and so on. In reality, it is with reference to receiving that one has complete restraint, since it is by virtue of complete restraint that one is called an upāsaka. [Objection:] This position contradicts a sūtra. [Reply:] How does it contradict the sūtra? [Objection:] There is no sūtra stating that the mere declaration "I am an upāsaka" and so forth generates all five precepts, since that sūtra does not [immediately] say "from this time until the end of my life, I renounce the taking of life," and so on. [Reply:] What does the sūtra actually say? It is as in the Mahānāman Sūtra. Only this sūtra describes the character of an upāsaka; other sūtras do not, and hence [your citation] contradicts that sūtra. [Response to a further objection:] But another sūtra states: "From this time until the end of my life, I renounce the taking of life and take refuge in purity" — this is the utterance of sincere faith in taking refuge in the Three Jewels. What this passage shows is that one who has seen the truths, having attained confirmed purity, stakes their very life on this commitment, expressing profound love and reverence for the true Dharma, to the point that, even for the sake of saving their own life, they would never abandon the Tathāgata's true Dharma. This is not stated in order to describe the character of an upāsaka as such; and even if it were, it is not a clear or decisive scriptural basis. Who could, on the strength of such an unclear passage, come to believe that the five precepts had already been generated at some earlier point [merely partially]? Moreover, speaking of "training in a portion" and so forth, with reference to upholding or transgressing precepts already received, should not even need to be asked about, let alone answered. Who, having already understood that the upāsaka restraint necessarily comprises five branches in full, would fail to understand that upholding one but not the others, up through upholding all of them, is what is meant by "a portion" and so forth? It is precisely because such a person has not understood how much restraint the upāsaka receives that the question would need to be asked: "Exactly how many kinds of upāsaka are capable of training in the training-points?" The answer: "There are four kinds of upāsaka — namely, those able to train in a portion," and so on. [Objection, still unsatisfied:] But this still leaves it unclear. One might then further ask, "What is meant by 'able to train in a portion'?" and so on at length — [and this is answered by explaining upholding one, several, most, or all of the precepts, not by explaining a partial reception]. [Further objection:] If restraint were lacking, could one still be called an upāsaka? [Reply:] The bhikṣu and the śrāmaṇera, too, would then have to be so named even lacking restraint — but since this is not accepted for them, the same must hold here as well.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This is a genuinely intricate scriptural dispute, and we have marked the objection-and-reply structure with bracketed labels at several points since the Chinese shifts speaker without any explicit marker, relying entirely on content and rhetorical question-form to signal the turn — readers should treat our bracketed insertions as an aid to following the argument's shape, not as part of the original text itself. The core move, stated plainly: the Buddha's "four kinds of upāsaka able to train in a portion, a small portion, most, or all" is being read by the treatise as a statement about differential *practice* of an already-complete vow (someone may only actually manage to keep one of their five precepts reliably, while remaining, in vow-status, a full upāsaka bound by all five), not as a menu of differently-sized vows a person could choose to receive at the outset.

The closing analogy to the bhikṣu and śrāmaṇera is doing real argumentative work: since no one disputes that a bhikṣu who breaks some of the monastic rules is still a bhikṣu (just a transgressing one, not a non-bhikṣu), the same logic, the treatise argues, must extend to the upāsaka — imperfect observance does not revoke or partially constitute the underlying vow-status, which remains an all-or-nothing matter established once, at the moment of the founding declaration.

23. Why Precept-Scope Is Fixed by the Buddha's Authority, and the Three Grades of Restraint

The treatise now asks why the scope of restraint at each level — five branches for the upāsaka, eight for the upavāsa, ten for the śrāmaṇera, the complete code for the bhikṣu — is fixed at exactly these specific amounts rather than any other. The answer offered is simply that this is how the Buddha's own teaching has established it: there is no further, independent reason beyond the Buddha's authority itself for why these particular boundaries were drawn where they were. This immediately raises a pointed follow-up: if the Buddha's authority alone is sufficient to fix these scopes, why not simply let that same authority declare that someone lacking restraint entirely could still be called an "upāsaka," the way this fascicle has been arguing that a full upāsaka's vow cannot be partial? The Kashmir masters hold firm: lacking restraint entirely simply disqualifies someone from being an upāsaka in the first place, no matter what discretion the Buddha's authority might otherwise have. The treatise then turns to a related question: how does the very same vow come to differ in strength — lower, middling, or superior grade — from one person to another? The answer is that this variation tracks nothing but the strength of the mind present at the moment of taking the vow, which is why even a fully liberated arhat might, in principle, hold only a lower-grade restraint, while an ordinary, unenlightened person could hold a superior-grade one, depending entirely on the intensity of intention each brought to their own reception of the vow.

Chinese Source

何緣近事乃至苾芻,所受律儀支量定爾?由佛教力施設故然。若爾,何緣不許由佛教力施設,雖闕律儀而名近事非苾芻等?迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師,不許闕律儀得成近事。此近事等一切律儀,由何得成下中上品?頌曰: 下中上隨心。 論曰:八眾所受別解脫律儀,皆隨受心有下中上品。由如是理,諸阿羅漢或有成就下品律儀,然諸異生或成上品。為有但受近事律儀不受三歸成近事不?不成近事,除有不知。

Ru-Yi Translation

For what reason are the precise number and scope of the restraint received, from the upāsaka up through the bhikṣu, fixed in exactly this way? It is so simply because it has been established by the power of the Buddha's own teaching. [Objection:] If this is so, then for what reason is it not likewise permitted, by that same power of the Buddha's teaching, that one lacking restraint entirely could still be called an upāsaka, rather than requiring this only for the bhikṣu and the others? [Reply:] The Vaibhāṣika of Kashmir do not accept that one lacking restraint could become an upāsaka. By what means does this restraint of the upāsaka and the others come to be of a lower, middling, or superior grade? Verse: lower, middling, and superior grade follow the mind. Prose: the restraint of individual liberation received by the eight assemblies is, in every case, of a lower, middling, or superior grade depending on the mind present at the time of its reception. By this same principle, some arhats may come to possess only a lower-grade restraint, while some ordinary, unenlightened beings may come to possess a superior-grade restraint. [Question:] Can one who receives only the upāsaka restraint without taking the threefold refuge still become an upāsaka? [Reply:] One does not become an upāsaka this way, except in the case of someone unaware [of the requirement].

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The claim that an arhat could hold only a "lower-grade" restraint while an ordinary person holds a "superior-grade" one is worth pausing on, since it might seem to invert the expected moral hierarchy — but the point being made is narrower and more precise than it first appears: "grade" here measures only the intensity of the specific mental resolve present at the singular moment of taking the vow, not the person's overall spiritual attainment or moral character more broadly. An arhat who took their upāsaka vow long before attaining liberation, in a moment of only moderate resolve, would carry that same lower-grade restraint-quality forward regardless of their subsequent awakening, since the grade was fixed once, at reception, and does not retroactively upgrade itself as the person's spiritual condition later improves.

The unresolved tension flagged in this section — why the Buddha's teaching authority is treated as sufficient to fix numerical precept-counts (five, eight, ten, all) but not sufficient to license restraint-free "upāsaka" status — is left exactly as the source presents it: an assertion by the Kashmir school rather than an independently derived logical necessity. We have not smoothed over this asymmetry, since the text itself does not resolve why one exercise of the Buddha's authority is treated as absolute while the hypothetical other is refused.

24. What "Taking Refuge" in the Three Jewels Actually Means

The treatise now asks, with technical precision, exactly what one takes refuge in when taking refuge in the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha. Refuge in the Buddha means refuge specifically in the qualities of one beyond training that make a buddha a buddha — chiefly the exhaustive knowledge that ends all outflows, together with its accompanying qualities — not refuge in his particular physical body, since it is by possessing these superior qualities that a body earns the name "buddha" in the first place, or because it is by attaining these very qualities that a buddha awakens to all things. And since all buddhas share an identical realization, one properly takes refuge in every buddha at once, not merely the historical Buddha alone. Refuge in the Saṅgha means refuge in the training and beyond-training qualities that make the eight kinds of noble persons a genuine, indestructible community, and likewise extends to every such community across time, not merely those alive in the present. Refuge in the Dharma means refuge in nirvāṇa itself — specifically the cessation attained through discernment, which extinguishes the afflictions and suffering of both oneself and others in the very same undifferentiated way, which is precisely why refuge in this one Dharma can be taken universally by all beings alike.

Chinese Source

諸有歸依佛法僧者,為歸何等?頌曰: 歸依成佛僧, 無學二種法, 及涅槃擇滅, 是說具三歸。 論曰:歸依佛者,謂但歸依能成佛無學法,由彼勝故身得佛名,或由得彼法佛能覺一切。何等名為佛無學法?謂盡智等及彼隨行。非色等身,前後等故。為歸一佛、一切佛耶?理實應言歸一切佛,以諸佛道相無異故。歸依僧者,謂通歸依諸能成僧學無學法,由得彼故僧成八種補特伽羅,不可破故。為歸一佛僧、一切佛僧耶?理實通歸一切佛僧,以諸僧道相無異故。然契經說,當來有僧汝應歸者,彼經但為顯示當來現見僧寶。歸依法者,謂歸涅槃。此涅槃言唯顯擇滅自他相續煩惱及苦,寂滅一相,故通歸依。

Ru-Yi Translation

For those who take refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, what exactly do they take refuge in? Verse: refuge is in the two kinds of dharmas — those of training and beyond training — that constitute a buddha and the saṅgha, and in nirvāṇa, the cessation attained through discernment; this is called the complete threefold refuge. Prose: refuge in the Buddha means refuge specifically in the dharmas of one beyond training that constitute a buddha, since it is by virtue of the superiority of these that a body earns the name "buddha," or because it is by attaining these dharmas that a buddha awakens to all things. What are these dharmas of one beyond training that constitute a buddha? They are the knowledge of the exhaustion [of outflows] and so forth, together with what accompanies it — not the physical body and the like, since these [dharmas, unlike the body] are not subject to earlier and later change. Does one take refuge in a single buddha, or in all buddhas? In truth, one should say that one takes refuge in all buddhas, since all buddhas' paths have identical characteristics without exception. Refuge in the Saṅgha means refuge broadly in the dharmas, of training and beyond training, that constitute the saṅgha, since it is by attaining these that the saṅgha comes to consist of the eight kinds of persons, an indestructible [community]. Does one take refuge in a single buddha's saṅgha, or in all buddhas' saṅgha? In truth, one takes refuge broadly in all buddhas' saṅgha, since all saṅghas' paths have identical characteristics without exception. As for the sūtra passage stating, "there will be a saṅgha in the future; you should take refuge in it" — that sūtra merely intends to point toward the Jewel of the Saṅgha as it will come to be directly seen in the future. Refuge in the Dharma means refuge in nirvāṇa. This word "nirvāṇa" refers specifically to the cessation attained through discernment, which extinguishes the afflictions and suffering of both one's own and others' continuum in one and the same undifferentiated mode of stillness — hence refuge in it is taken universally [by all beings alike].

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This is a genuinely striking technical claim, and worth stating plainly since it runs against a more intuitive, devotional reading of "taking refuge in the Buddha": the treatise insists that what one actually takes refuge in is an impersonal set of qualities — exhaustive, outflow-ending knowledge and its accompaniments — rather than the historical person, teacher, or physical body of Śākyamuni as such. Since these qualities are, by definition, identical across every buddha who has ever attained them, this yields the further striking conclusion that taking refuge in "the Buddha" is, properly understood, indistinguishable from taking refuge in all buddhas without exception — there being no qualitative difference among them to single any one out for refuge over the others.

The Saṅgha refuge extends this same universalizing logic in a slightly different direction: rather than referring to any specific, currently living community of monks and nuns, "refuge in the Saṅgha" refers to the training and beyond-training qualities that constitute the eight recognized types of noble persons (stream-enterer through arhat, divided into those approaching and those having attained each fruit) as a category — which is why the treatise reads a sūtra's talk of "a saṅgha yet to come" not as describing some future community not yet in existence, but simply as pointing toward this same timeless category of noble persons as it will be encountered and directly witnessed at a future time.

25. The Shedding-Blood Puzzle, and the Famous Verse on True and False Refuge

The previous section's claim — that refuge in the Buddha is refuge in his beyond-training qualities, not his physical body — immediately invites a sharp objection: if this is so, why does drawing the Buddha's blood with malicious intent count as one of the five gravest possible offenses (acts of immediate retribution), when this act damages only his physical body, not the beyond-training qualities themselves? The Vaibhāṣika resolve this by arguing that the qualities' physical support is thereby damaged, and the qualities are damaged along with it — though the treatise notes, on closer inspection of the root text, that it never actually claimed the beyond-training qualities alone constitute "the Buddha" in some exclusive sense; it only said these qualities are what makes a buddha a buddha, without denying that the physical body, as the qualities' indispensable support, is also part of what the term encompasses. The treatise adds a helpful analogy: just as someone wishing to make an offering to "a bhikṣu" is understood to be making an offering to the bhikṣu-precept that constitutes his bhikṣu-status specifically, without this meaning the bhikṣu's body is somehow irrelevant to the offering, so too does refuge in "the Buddha" work the same way. Some other teachers hold instead that refuge in the Buddha means refuge in the eighteen unique qualities exclusive to a Tathāgata. As for what taking refuge itself consists of and what purpose it serves: its essential nature is manifested verbal karma (the actual spoken words of commitment), and its purpose is rescue — since relying on the Three Jewels is what permanently frees a being from all suffering, unlike the false refuges people turn to out of fear, memorably contrasted in a well-known verse: many, driven by terror, take refuge in mountains, groves, parks, and solitary shrine-trees — but such refuge is neither excellent nor noble, and grants no true freedom from suffering; only one who takes refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha, and constantly examines the Four Noble Truths with wisdom — seeing suffering, its origin, its final transcendence, and the Noble Eightfold Path leading to the peace of nirvāṇa — has found the refuge that is truly excellent and noble, the one refuge that actually and necessarily liberates from all suffering. Refuge in the Three Jewels is, accordingly, the universal gateway through which every kind of restraint, at every level, must first be entered.

Chinese Source

若唯無學法即是佛者,如何於佛所惡心出血,但損生身成無間罪?毘婆沙者作是釋言:壞彼所依,彼隨壞故。然尋本論,不見有言唯無學法即名為佛,但言無學法能成於佛。既不遮佛體亦攝依身,故於此中不容前難。若異此者,應佛與僧住世俗心非僧非佛。又應唯執成苾芻戒即是苾芻。然如有欲供養苾芻者,彼唯供養成苾芻尸羅。如是有欲歸依佛者,亦應但歸成佛無學法。有餘師說:歸依佛者,總歸依如來十八不共法。此能歸依何法為體?語表為體。如是歸依以何為義?救濟為義。由彼為依,能永解脫一切苦故。如世尊言: 眾人怖所逼, 多歸依諸山, 園苑及叢林, 孤樹制多等。 此歸依非勝, 此歸依非尊, 不因此歸依, 能解脫眾苦。 諸有歸依佛, 及歸依法僧, 於四聖諦中, 恒以慧觀察。 知苦知苦集, 知永超眾苦, 知八支聖道, 趣安隱涅槃。 此歸依最勝, 此歸依最尊, 必因此歸依, 能解脫眾苦。 是故歸依,普於一切受律儀處為方便門。

Ru-Yi Translation

[Objection:] If it is only the beyond-training dharmas that constitute the Buddha, how could a malicious mind that draws blood at the Buddha, merely damaging his physical body, constitute the offense of immediate retribution? The Vaibhāṣika explain it this way: this damages the support of those [beyond-training dharmas], and they are damaged along with it. Yet, upon examining the root treatise itself, one finds no statement that only the beyond-training dharmas are called "the Buddha" — it states only that the beyond-training dharmas are what constitute a buddha. Since this does not exclude the physical body from also being encompassed within what constitutes the Buddha's essential nature, the earlier objection does not actually arise here. If it were otherwise, then the Buddha and the Saṅgha, while abiding in an ordinary worldly state of mind, would have to be neither Saṅgha nor Buddha at all. It would likewise follow that only the precept constituting a bhikṣu is "the bhikṣu" — yet, just as one who wishes to make an offering to a bhikṣu is understood to be offering specifically to the precept that constitutes his status as a bhikṣu [without this excluding his person], so too should one wishing to take refuge in the Buddha be understood as taking refuge specifically in the beyond-training dharmas that constitute buddhahood [without this excluding his person]. Other teachers say: refuge in the Buddha means refuge, altogether, in the Tathāgata's eighteen dharmas exclusive to him alone. What is the essential nature of the capacity that takes refuge? Its essential nature is manifested verbal karma. What is the meaning of such refuge? Its meaning is rescue, since, by relying on this, one is able to permanently free oneself from all suffering. As the Blessed One has stated: "Many people, driven by terror, take refuge in mountains, in parks and groves, in solitary trees and shrines — but this refuge is not excellent, this refuge is not noble; not by means of this refuge is one able to be freed from manifold suffering. But those who take refuge in the Buddha, and take refuge in the Dharma and the Saṅgha, who constantly examine, with wisdom, the Four Noble Truths — knowing suffering, knowing suffering's origin, knowing the final transcending of manifold suffering, knowing the Noble Eightfold Path that leads to the peace of nirvāṇa — this refuge is truly excellent, this refuge is truly noble; necessarily by means of this refuge is one able to be freed from manifold suffering." Hence taking refuge serves, universally, as the gateway of skillful means for every place where restraint is received.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This verse is one of the most widely known in the whole Buddhist canon, appearing (in close variant forms) in the Dhammapada and other early texts across multiple traditions, and its inclusion here does real argumentative work beyond simple exhortation: it grounds the entire preceding technical discussion of what refuge "really" consists in (abstract qualities, not persons or places) in a concrete, memorable contrast between refuges that merely offer psychological comfort under fear (mountains, groves, shrines) and the one refuge the treatise has just spent several sections carefully defining as capable of actually, permanently ending suffering. We have translated it as directly and plainly as the philosophical prose surrounding it, resisting the temptation to render it in a more elevated register that would set it apart stylistically from the technical argument it is capping off — the verse is doing the same explanatory work as the prose, just in condensed, memorable form.

The bhikṣu-offering analogy resolving the shedding-blood puzzle is a nice piece of ordinary-language philosophy: it points out that we regularly use possessive, identity-implying language ("I am making an offering to the bhikṣu") to pick out a specific defining quality of a person (their monastic status) without this implying we think the quality exists independently of, or excludes, the person's actual body — and the treatise argues "the Buddha" works exactly the same way in ordinary and technical usage alike, resolving what looked like a real inconsistency into simply a point about how reference and identity-language function.

26. Why the Upāsaka Precept Targets Only Sexual Misconduct, Not Full Chastity

Having established refuge as the universal gateway into every level of restraint, the treatise returns to a practical question about the upāsaka precepts specifically: why does the Buddha require complete chastity (abstention from all sexual activity) in every other level of restraint, yet require only abstention from sexual misconduct — not full chastity — from the upāsaka alone? Sexual misconduct earns the world's harshest censure, since it violates another's spouse and leads to unfortunate rebirth, and, unlike full chastity, it is realistically achievable — householders, deeply attached to sensory desire, would find full chastity impossible to sustain over a lifetime, and the Buddha, recognizing they could not maintain such a demanding standard long-term, declined to impose it. There is also a deeper reason: every noble one, without exception, has already permanently attained the restraint of never committing sexual misconduct, even across successive lifetimes as a noble being — but this is not true of full chastity, which even noble householders may not maintain. Hence the upāsaka's restraint is set at the level guaranteed never to be violated by any noble one across rebirths, so that a noble one reborn as a lay follower could never be said to have broken their upāsaka vow. This raises a further practical question: does someone who marries after already having received the upāsaka vow actually possess restraint with respect to that later spouse from the very moment of the original vow? The treatise answers yes — but resolves an apparent tension (since one clearly can still marry without this counting as a violation) by clarifying that the vow's scope was never a blanket commitment covering every being in the universe, but precisely mirrors the original wording of the vow itself: abstention from sexual misconduct specifically, universally applied to all beings — meaning a later marriage is simply an instance of licit conduct falling outside that same narrower scope, not a breach of an earlier, broader promise.

Chinese Source

何緣世尊於餘律儀處立離非梵行為其所學?唯於近事一律儀中但制令其離欲邪行。頌曰: 邪行最可訶, 易離得不作。 論曰:唯欲邪行世極訶責,以能侵毀他妻等故、感惡趣故非非梵行,又欲邪行易遠離故。諸在家者耽著欲故,離非梵行難可受持,觀彼不能長時修學,故不制彼離非梵行。又諸聖者於欲邪行一切定得不作律儀,經生聖者亦不行故。離非梵行則不如是,故於近事所受律儀,但為制立離欲邪行。勿經生聖者犯近事律儀。不作律儀謂定不作,諸有先受近事律儀後娶妻妾,於彼妻妾先受戒時得律儀不?理實應得。勿但於一分得別解律儀。若爾,云何後非犯戒?頌曰: 得律儀如誓, 非總於相續。 論曰:如本受誓而得律儀。本受誓云何?謂離欲邪行。非於一切有情相續言我皆當離非梵行,由此普於有情相續唯得離欲邪行戒。非離非梵行律儀故,後納妻妾非毀犯前戒。

Ru-Yi Translation

For what reason does the Blessed One establish abstention from all sexual activity as the training in every other restraint, while, only in the single restraint of the upāsaka, he restricts this to abstention from sexual misconduct alone? Verse: sexual misconduct is most reprehensible, and easily abstained from, and non-performance of it is attainable. Prose: it is sexual misconduct alone that the world most severely condemns, since it violates another's spouse and the like, and brings about rebirth in an unfortunate destiny — unlike [full] non-chastity — and, moreover, sexual misconduct is easily abstained from. Householders, being deeply attached to desire, find abstention from all sexual activity difficult to undertake and maintain; observing that they would be unable to sustain such training over a long period, the Blessed One did not require abstention from all sexual activity of them. Moreover, every noble one, without exception, has attained the restraint of never performing sexual misconduct, since this holds even for a noble one across successive lifetimes; abstention from all sexual activity, however, is not so [reliably maintained by every noble one]. Hence, in the restraint received by the upāsaka, only abstention from sexual misconduct is established — lest a noble one reborn again [as a layperson] should be said to violate the upāsaka restraint. "Restraint of non-performance" means definite non-performance. [Question:] For one who first receives the upāsaka restraint and afterward marries a wife or takes a concubine, does one, with respect to that spouse, already possess this restraint from the time of the original reception? In reality, one should indeed possess it — lest the restraint of individual liberation be obtained only with respect to a portion [of beings, rather than universally]. [Objection:] If this is so, how does the later act not then constitute breaking the precept? Verse: restraint is obtained exactly as vowed, not as a blanket commitment covering the [entire] continuum [of all beings without distinction of relation]. Prose: restraint is obtained exactly according to the original vow taken. What was the original vow? Abstention from sexual misconduct. It was not a statement that, with respect to the continuum of every sentient being, "I shall abstain from all sexual activity with each of them" — rather, by this vow, one universally obtains, with respect to the continuum of every sentient being, only the precept of abstaining from sexual misconduct. Since this is not the restraint of abstaining from all sexual activity, later taking a wife or concubine does not violate the earlier precept.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The claim that "every noble one has attained the restraint of never performing sexual misconduct, even across successive lifetimes" is a striking piece of moral psychology worth drawing out: it treats certain ethical achievements (freedom from ever violating another's marriage through desire, specifically) as so deeply and permanently secured by the attainment of any level of noble realization that they persist automatically across rebirths without needing to be re-vowed each lifetime — while other, more demanding practices (complete lifelong chastity) are not guaranteed this same automatic carry-over, even for noble householders. This is offered as the deeper reason (beyond mere practical accommodation) for why the upāsaka precept is calibrated exactly to the level that tracks this permanent noble attainment, rather than set higher or lower.

The resolution of the marriage puzzle is a fine piece of precise thinking about what a vow's "scope" actually covers: rather than being a promise made toward specific individuals (which would then need updating or exception-carving as one's life circumstances change, such as through marriage), the vow is universally scoped by *content* (abstaining from misconduct, applied to literally everyone) rather than by *person* (a blanket promise of total abstinence toward everyone), meaning later licit marital relations were never within the vow's prohibited scope to begin with — nothing about the vow needs to be revised or partially relinquished when one later marries.

27. Why Lying Alone Is Singled Out, and the Case for Prohibiting Alcohol

The treatise asks why only outright lying, among the four kinds of unwholesome speech, is prohibited for the upāsaka — not divisive speech, harsh speech, or idle chatter. The same three reasons already given for the sexual-misconduct precept apply here as well (lying is most reprehensible, easily avoided by householders, and never committed by any noble one), but a further, sharper reason is added: permitting a precept-holder to lie would let them simply deny any transgression when questioned about it, unraveling the entire disciplinary structure that depends on accurate self-disclosure to function. This raises a related question: since the vow of individual liberation is generally understood to cover only "root offenses" (inherently wrong acts), why does the upāsaka's restraint also include abstention from alcohol, which is merely a "proscribed offense" (wrong only because it is prohibited, not inherently wrong in itself)? The treatise firmly denies the premise — the upāsaka restraint does, in fact, include exactly one proscribed offense: abstaining from alcohol — and explains why: those who drink alcohol become heedless and lose the capacity to safeguard every other precept they hold, so the alcohol prohibition exists specifically to protect the other four precepts from being carelessly broken while intoxicated.

Chinese Source

何緣但制離虛誑語?非離間語等為近事律儀,亦由前說三種因故。謂虛誑語最可訶故,諸在家者易遠離故,一切聖者得不作故。復有別因,頌曰: 以開虛誑語, 便越諸學處。 論曰:越諸學處被檢問時,若開虛誑語,便言我不作,因斯於戒多所違越。故佛為欲令彼堅持,於一切律儀制離虛誑語。復以何緣不於遠離遮罪建立近事律儀?誰言此中不離遮罪。離何遮罪?謂離飲酒。何緣於彼諸遮罪中不制離餘,唯遮飲酒?頌曰: 遮中唯離酒, 為護餘律儀。 論曰:諸飲酒者心多縱逸,不能守護諸餘律儀,故為護餘令離飲酒。

Ru-Yi Translation

For what reason is only abstention from false speech established, and not abstention from divisive speech and the others, as part of the upāsaka's restraint? This is likewise due to the three reasons stated before: false speech is most reprehensible, householders find it easy to abstain from, and every noble one has attained non-performance of it. There is, moreover, a further, distinct reason. Verse: because permitting false speech would let one transgress every training-point. Prose: when questioned after having transgressed a training-point, if false speech were permitted, one could simply say "I did not do it," and thereby go on to violate the precepts extensively. Hence, in order to make precept-holders hold firm, the Buddha established abstention from false speech across every kind of restraint. [Objection:] Moreover, for what reason is the upāsaka's restraint not established with respect to abstaining from proscribed offenses [in general]? [Reply:] Who says it does not include abstention from a proscribed offense here? Which proscribed offense is abstained from? Abstention from drinking alcohol. [Further objection:] Why, among the various proscribed offenses, is abstention not established with respect to the others, prohibiting only alcohol? Verse: among proscribed offenses, only alcohol is abstained from, in order to protect the other restraints. Prose: those who drink alcohol have, for the most part, an indulgent and unrestrained mind, and are unable to safeguard their other restraints; hence, in order to protect the others, abstention from alcohol is required.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The distinction between "root offenses" (性罪, acts wrong in themselves, like killing or stealing, which would be wrong even absent any formal precept) and "proscribed offenses" (遮罪, acts wrong only because a precept-giver has specifically forbidden them, without any inherent wrongness of their own) is a standard and important Abhidharma/Vinaya category, and this passage's opening exchange is establishing that the upāsaka's five precepts are not, in fact, a pure list of root offenses — alcohol is smuggled in as the sole proscribed-offense exception, precisely because of its unique, corrosive effect on one's capacity to keep every other precept.

The lying-precept's special reasoning here is worth flagging as distinctively structural rather than purely moral: unlike the other three śīla-branch precepts (killing, stealing, sexual misconduct), which are prohibited primarily because the acts themselves are harmful, false speech is prohibited here specifically because of its second-order, system-undermining effect — a liar can retroactively erase any of their own violations under questioning, which would make the entire apparatus of precept-accountability collapse. This is presumably why lying, uniquely among all four kinds of unwholesome speech, appears in every single level of restraint discussed in this fascicle, from the upāsaka up through the full bhikṣu code.

28. Is Drinking Alcohol a Root Offense, or Merely Proscribed?

The treatise now defends its own classification of alcohol as a merely proscribed offense, not a root one: unlike root offenses, which are always committed with a defiled state of mind, alcohol taken medicinally, in a measured amount that produces no intoxication, involves no such defilement, showing that drinking as such lacks the essential mark of a root offense. But this classification is directly disputed. The Vinaya masters hold that drinking alcohol is, in fact, a root offense, citing the Buddha's own reply to the Venerable Upāli, who asked how he should care for sick monks: the Buddha instructed that anything may be provided except what constitutes a root offense — yet, even for an ailing member of the Śākya clan who needed alcohol medicinally, the Buddha still did not permit it, and a sūtra elsewhere states that any monk who calls the Buddha "teacher" should never drink alcohol, not even a drop as small as what clings to a single blade of grass — evidence, the Vinaya masters argue, that drinking alcohol must be a root offense, since even noble ones across many lifetimes never commit it, exactly like killing, and since a sūtra calls it a bodily misdeed. The Abhidharma masters, however, maintain their original position: it is not a root offense, but was made a universally proscribed precept specifically because of the danger it poses to the sick — restricted at other times because indulgence in it, even a small amount, could all too easily lead on to committing genuine root offenses, given that the exact quantity capable of causing intoxication has no fixed measure and therefore must be prohibited down to the smallest trace; every noble one abstains from it entirely because noble ones possess a keen sense of shame, and alcohol destroys correct mindfulness; and it is called a "bodily misdeed" specifically because it is the universal basis of heedlessness — a distinction other proscribed offenses do not share, since, unlike alcohol, they are all, in fact, root offenses themselves. The scriptural warning that habitual drinking leads to unfortunate rebirth is explained as showing only that repeated drinking sustains unwholesome tendencies and can indirectly give rise to, or intensify, karma leading to bad rebirth — not that drinking is itself, directly, that kind of karma.

Chinese Source

寧知飲酒遮罪攝耶?由此中無性罪相故,以諸性罪唯染心行。為療病時雖飲諸酒,不為醉亂能無染心。豈不先知酒能醉亂,而故欲飲即是染心。此非染心由自知量,為療病故分限而飲,不令醉亂故非染心。諸持律者言:飲酒是性罪。如彼尊者鄔波離言:我當如何供給病者?世尊告曰:唯除性罪,餘隨所應皆可供給。然有染疾釋種須酒,世尊不開彼飲酒故。又契經說:諸有苾芻稱我為師不應飲酒,乃至極少如一茅端所霑酒量亦不應飲。故知飲酒是性罪攝。又諸聖者雖易多生亦不犯故,如殺生等。又經說是身惡行故。對法諸師言非性罪,然為病者總開遮戒。復於異時遮飲酒者,為防因此犯性罪故。又令醉亂量無定限,故遮乃至飲茅端所霑量。又一切聖皆不飲者,以諸聖者具慚羞故,飲酒能令失正念故。乃至少分亦不飲者,以如毒藥量無定故。又經說是身惡行者,酒是一切放逸處故。由是獨立放逸處名,餘不立此名,皆是性罪故。然說數習墮惡趣者,顯數飲酒能令身中諸不善法相續轉故,又能引發惡趣業故,或能令彼轉增盛故。

Ru-Yi Translation

How is it known that drinking alcohol is subsumed under proscribed offenses? Because it lacks the mark of a root offense, since all root offenses are performed only with a defiled mind. When drinking alcohol for the sake of curing illness, one is capable of having no defiled mind at all, so long as it is not to the point of intoxication. [Objection:] Is it not the case that, knowing in advance that alcohol can cause intoxication, deliberately wishing to drink it is itself already a defiled mind? [Reply:] This is not a defiled mind, since one knows the proper measure oneself, and drinks a limited amount for the sake of curing illness, without allowing intoxication — hence it is not a defiled mind. The Vinaya masters say: drinking alcohol is a root offense. As the Venerable Upāli asked: "How should I provide for the sick?" The Blessed One replied: "Excepting only root offenses, provide whatever else is appropriate." Yet there was a Śākya clansman afflicted with illness who required alcohol, and the Blessed One did not permit him to drink it. Moreover, a sūtra states: "Any monastic who calls me teacher should not drink alcohol, down to as little as the amount that clings to a single blade of grass." Hence it is known that drinking alcohol is subsumed under root offenses. Moreover, noble ones, even across many lifetimes, never transgress this, just as with killing and the like. Moreover, a sūtra states that it is a bodily misdeed. The Ābhidharmika masters say: it is not a root offense, but was universally established as a proscribed precept for the sake of the sick. That it is prohibited on other occasions is in order to guard against thereby committing a root offense, since the quantity that would cause intoxication has no fixed measure, and so it is prohibited down to the amount clinging to a blade of grass. Moreover, that all noble ones abstain from it entirely is because noble ones are possessed of a sense of shame, and drinking alcohol is able to cause the loss of correct mindfulness. That even the smallest amount is abstained from is because, like a poison, its proper measure has no fixed limit. As for the sūtra's statement that it is a bodily misdeed, this is because alcohol is the universal basis of heedlessness; it is on this account alone that it is given the distinct name "basis of heedlessness," a name not given to any of the other [proscribed offenses], since all the others are, in fact, root offenses. As for the statement that habitual practice of it leads to rebirth in an unfortunate destiny, this shows only that habitual drinking causes unwholesome dharmas within the body to continue on, and that it is capable of giving rise to karma leading to an unfortunate destiny, or of causing such karma to become increasingly potent.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We should be honest that the treatise presents this as a genuine, unresolved disagreement between two named groups (持律者, "the Vinaya-upholders," and 對法諸師, "the Ābhidharmika masters") rather than settling it — the Vinaya masters marshal three separate pieces of evidence (the Buddha's specific refusal to except alcohol from the "no root offenses" medical-care rule even for an ailing kinsman, a sūtra's absolute zero-tolerance statement, and the parallel to killing in never being committed by noble ones across lifetimes) for classifying alcohol as a root offense, while the Ābhidharmika masters offer a point-by-point reinterpretation of each piece of evidence to preserve their own proscribed-offense classification. The treatise does not step outside this dispute to declare one side correct; readers should treat this fascicle's own earlier discussions (which followed the Ābhidharmika position throughout) as belonging to one side of a debate the tradition itself continued to have, not as the settled final word on alcohol's moral status.

The etymological point at the end — that alcohol alone, among proscribed offenses, earns the special name "basis of heedlessness" precisely because every other proscribed offense is secretly a root offense in its own right — is a subtle piece of category-maintenance: it explains why the Ābhidharmika masters can maintain a clean twofold division (root offenses vs. one single proscribed exception, alcohol) without their scheme collapsing into needing many more categories for other "supposedly proscribed but actually root" offenses.

29. The Three Scriptural Terms for Alcohol, and Why It Alone Is "the Basis of Heedlessness"

The fascicle closes by unpacking a sūtra's specific terminology for the alcohol precept: surā, maireya, and madya, all named as "bases of heedlessness." Surā refers to alcohol fermented from grain or cooked food; maireya refers to alcohol fermented from other substances. If either of these has not yet properly fermented, or has already spoiled, and is therefore incapable of causing intoxication, it is not called madya; only once it is actually capable of causing intoxication does either kind earn this further name — a distinction drawn specifically to exclude any fermented substance too weak or spoiled to matter from the scope of the precept. Since substances like areca nut or millet can also cause intoxication, the sūtra specifically names surā and maireya to make clear that the precept concerns alcohol as such, not intoxication from just any substance whatsoever. Though drinking alcohol is, as this fascicle has just finished debating, only a proscribed offense rather than a root one, it is singled out with the special name "basis of heedlessness" precisely because it leads to heedlessness so readily and enables such an extensive range of further wrongdoing — a severity that calls for the precept to be stated with special emphasis, since alcohol serves as the very foundation upon which heedless conduct of every kind is built.

Chinese Source

如契經說:窣羅、迷麗耶、末陀放逸處。依何義說?醞食成酒名為窣羅,醞餘物所成名迷麗耶酒。即前二酒未熟已壞,不能令醉不名末陀,若令醉時名末陀酒。簡無用位重立此名。然以檳榔及稗子等亦能令醉,為簡彼故,須說窣羅、迷麗耶酒。雖是遮罪,而令放逸廣造眾惡,為令殷重遮斷故說放逸處言,酒是放逸所依處故。 說一切有部俱舍論卷第十四

Ru-Yi Translation

As a sūtra states: surā, maireya, and madya are bases of heedlessness. What is the meaning behind these terms? Alcohol fermented from cooked grain is called surā; alcohol fermented from other substances is called maireya. If either of these first two kinds of alcohol has not yet properly fermented, or has already spoiled, such that it cannot cause intoxication, it is not called madya; only once it is capable of causing intoxication is it called madya — this further name is established specifically to exclude the useless, non-intoxicating state. Since areca nut, millet, and the like are also capable of causing intoxication, in order to distinguish alcohol from these, it is necessary to specifically name surā and maireya alcohol. Although this is a proscribed offense, it gives rise to heedlessness and the extensive commission of manifold evils, and so, in order to bring about its especially firm prohibition, it is called "a basis of heedlessness" — since alcohol is the very basis upon which heedlessness depends. [Thus ends] Fascicle Fourteen of the Abhidharmakośa of the Sarvāstivāda School.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We have kept 窣羅, 迷麗耶, and 末陀 as their standard Sanskrit transliterations (surā, maireya, madya) rather than translating them into English equivalents, since the passage itself is explicitly doing definitional work distinguishing these three specific terms from one another and from ordinary intoxication generally — collapsing them into a single English word like "alcohol" or "wine" throughout would erase exactly the technical distinctions (fermentation source, and whether actual intoxicating potency has been reached) that this closing passage exists to draw.

This closing passage returns, in its final line, to the Ābhidharmika position defended in the previous section (alcohol as a proscribed rather than root offense) without revisiting the Vinaya masters' contrary view — readers should recall that this classification remains, as the prior section documented, a genuine point of disagreement within the tradition, even though this fascicle's own closing words settle comfortably into the Ābhidharmika side of that debate.

Fascicle 14 has carried this treatise's inquiry into karma from the abstract classification of unmanifested karma into restraint, non-restraint, and neither, through the full structural detail of the vow of individual liberation — its eight named vows reducing to four real substances, the ten historical modes of ordination, the exact precept-counts and ceremonial procedures for each level, what taking refuge in the Three Jewels technically means, and finally the specific rationale behind each of the upāsaka's five precepts. Where this fascicle's source material presented live, unresolved disputes between schools — most notably whether alcohol is a root or merely proscribed offense — we have tried to preserve that openness in translation rather than silently resolving it in either direction.

Fascicle 14 Complete

This concludes our translation of Fascicle 14 of the Abhidharmakośa (阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十四), continuing Chapter 4 on karma (分別業品第四之二). Thank you for reading. Fascicle 15 will continue this chapter's inquiry into karma.