Fascicle 15 · 阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十五 · Complete

What Restraint Is Obtained From

Fascicle 15 continues Chapter 4 (分別業品第四之三, the Karma-nirdeśa) directly from fascicle 14. It works out the precise scope of restraint and non-restraint across beings, branches, and causes, how each is gained and lost — including an extended debate over grave offenses and the withered-palm-tree simile — which beings across the cosmos can hold precepts at all, and closes with the sūtras' many classifications of karma: wholesome/unwholesome, merit/non-merit, feeling-conducive, ripening-time, and more.

Translator: Ru-Yi Meditation Center Status: fascicle 15 complete, 29 sections Source: Taishō T1558, vol. 29, fascicle 15 Author: Vasubandhu · Translator into Chinese: Xuánzàng

1. Does Receiving One Restraint Grant the Other Two?

The treatise opens this fascicle by asking whether receiving any one of the three kinds of restraint — the vow of individual liberation, meditation-born restraint, or path-born restraint — automatically brings the other two along with it. The answer is no: each is obtained separately, from its own distinct scope of karmic action. The vow of individual liberation (bound to the desire realm) is obtained from every root karma-path together with its preparatory and follow-up actions; it is obtained with respect to two categories of object (sentient and non-sentient beings) and two categories of offense (root and proscribed); and it is obtained only with respect to the present aggregates, sense-bases, and elements — never the past or future — since this restraint operates specifically within the domain of currently-existing sentient beings, and the past and future do not themselves constitute such a domain. Meditation-born and uncontaminated restraint, by contrast, are obtained only from the root karma-path itself — not even from its preparatory or follow-up actions, let alone from proscribed offenses — but they are obtained with respect to all three times: past, present, and future aggregates, sense-bases, and elements alike.

Chinese Source

此別解脫、靜慮、無漏三種律儀,從彼得一亦餘二不?不爾。云何?頌曰: 從一切二現, 得欲界律儀, 從根本恒時, 得靜慮無漏。 論曰:欲界律儀謂別解脫,此從一切根本業道及從加行後起而得。從二得者,謂從二類,即情非情、性罪遮罪。從現得者,謂從現世蘊處界得,非從去來。由此律儀有情處轉,去來非是有情處故。若得靜慮無漏律儀,應知但從根本業道。尚不從彼加行後起得此律儀,況從遮罪。從恒時者,謂從過去現在未來蘊處界得。

Ru-Yi Translation

Does obtaining one of these three restraints — the restraint of individual liberation, meditative restraint, and uncontaminated restraint — also bring about obtaining the other two? It does not. How is this so? Verse: desire-realm restraint is obtained from all, from two, and from the present; meditative and uncontaminated restraint are obtained from the root [karma-path alone], across all three times. Prose: desire-realm restraint refers to the restraint of individual liberation; this is obtained from every root karma-path, together with its preparatory and follow-up actions. "Obtained from two" means obtained with respect to two categories: sentient and non-sentient, and root offenses and proscribed offenses. "Obtained from the present" means it is obtained with respect to the present aggregates, sense-bases, and elements, not the past or future, since this restraint operates within the domain of sentient beings, and the past and future are not themselves such a domain. As for obtaining meditative and uncontaminated restraint, one should understand that this is only from the root karma-path — it is not even obtained from its preparatory or follow-up actions, let alone from proscribed offenses. "Across all times" means it is obtained with respect to the aggregates, sense-bases, and elements of the past, present, and future alike.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This section's technical vocabulary rewards a little unpacking. A "root karma-path" (根本業道) is the actual completed act of wrongdoing or virtue itself (the moment of killing, say), while its "preparatory action" (加行) is everything leading up to that moment, and its "follow-up action" (後起) is what continues afterward — a threefold division of any karmic act's full temporal extent that this treatise has used elsewhere. The claim that the vow of individual liberation draws on all three of these stages, while meditative and uncontaminated restraint draw only on the root act itself, marks a real structural difference: the prātimokṣa vow's restraining power is calibrated to block wrongdoing across its entire potential unfolding, while the deeper meditative and path-based restraints operate with surgical precision on the completed act alone.

The claim that desire-realm restraint operates only "in the present" while meditative and uncontaminated restraint span all three times connects back to material from the previous two fascicles: since ordinary sentient beings, as objects of the prātimokṣa vow's protection, only exist in the present (the past and future not being active "domains" a currently-living vow-holder can be said to be protecting), this restraint's very definition ties it to present beings only — whereas meditative and uncontaminated restraint, tracking a more abstract class of karma-paths rather than currently-existing beings as such, are not limited this way.

2. A Fourfold Classification, and Why Restraint Only Ever Guards the Future

Building on the previous section's claim that the vow of individual liberation is obtained "from the present" specifically, the treatise now maps out four possible combinations of time (past/future vs. present) and karmic stage (preparatory-and-follow-up vs. root act) to show exactly which yield only the vow of individual liberation, to the exclusion of meditative and uncontaminated restraint. Present-tense preparatory and follow-up actions, together with all proscribed offenses, yield only the vow of individual liberation; past or future root karma-paths yield only meditative and uncontaminated restraint; present-tense root karma-paths yield the vow of individual liberation as well as meditative and uncontaminated restraint together; and past or future preparatory and follow-up actions yield neither. The treatise adds an important clarification: since one cannot literally already possess a completed unwholesome karma-path in the present moment while simultaneously receiving a wholesome restraint against it, all this talk of restraint being "obtained from" root karma-paths and the rest must really be understood as protection extended toward the future — strictly speaking, restraint should never be described as guarding against the past or present at all, only against what is yet to come.

Chinese Source

由此差別應作四句,有蘊處界從彼唯得別解律儀非餘二等。第一句者,謂從現世加行後起及諸遮罪。第二句者,謂從去來根本業道。第三句者,謂從現世根本業道。第四句者,謂從去來加行後起。非於正得善律儀時可有現世惡業道等,是故應言從現處得。理應但說防護未來,定不應言防護過現。

Ru-Yi Translation

By virtue of this distinction, one should set out four cases: there are aggregates, sense-bases, and elements from which one obtains only the restraint of individual liberation and not the other two, and so on. The first case is present-tense preparatory and follow-up actions, together with all proscribed offenses. The second case is past or future root karma-paths. The third case is present-tense root karma-paths. The fourth case is past or future preparatory and follow-up actions. It cannot be that, at the very moment one is properly obtaining a wholesome restraint, a present-tense unwholesome karma-path [that restraint is meant to prevent] already exists — hence, though it is said to be "obtained from the present," in principle one should only speak of it as guarding the future; one should certainly not say that it guards the past or the present.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The closing clarification here is doing careful, precise work to avoid a real logical trap: if restraint were said to "guard against" a present-tense unwholesome act, this would absurdly imply that the wrongdoing and its prevention could coexist at the very same moment. The resolution is to recognize that "obtained from the present" describes only the temporal location of the *class of karma-path* (root act, as opposed to preparatory/follow-up stages, or past/future instances) that defines the restraint's scope, not a claim that the restraint is simultaneously blocking an act happening right now — the actual protective function always points forward, toward future occasions when a similar act might otherwise occur.

This fourfold classification is a good example of how this treatise regularly turns a single distinction (here, time × karmic stage) into an exhaustive grid of possibilities, systematically checking each cell rather than leaving any combination unaddressed — a method that recurs constantly throughout this fascicle and the two before it.

3. Restraint Is Always Universal in Scope, Though Its Branches and Causes Vary

The treatise now asks whether restraint and non-restraint, when obtained, differ in scope with respect to the class of beings involved, the precept-branches received, and the underlying mental causes at work — and finds that they do differ, but not in the way one might expect. Restraint is always obtained with respect to every single sentient being without exception; there is no such thing as partial restraint covering only some beings. What does vary is the number of branches involved (a bhikṣu's restraint draws on the complete precept code, while other restraints draw only on a subset of four core branches) and the underlying wholesome roots at work (sometimes all three — non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion — arise together as the cause, since these three necessarily co-occur; but restraint can also be classified more narrowly by just one of the three intensity-grades — lower, middling, or superior — since these three grades of mind, unlike the three wholesome roots, never occur simultaneously). Combining these two independent variables (branches and grades) yields four distinct patterns of practitioner: someone receiving the upāsaka or śrāmaṇera vow with a lower, middling, or superior mind (universal in beings, but neither universal in branches nor in grades); someone receiving the full bhikṣu vow with just one grade of mind (universal in beings and branches, but not grades); someone receiving upāsaka, śrāmaṇera, and bhikṣu vows in succession using all three grades of mind (universal in beings, branches, and grades together); and someone receiving upāsaka, upavāsa, and śrāmaṇera vows using all three grades (universal in beings and grades, but not branches). In every single case, however, the restraint obtained pervades every sentient being without exception, since restraint can only be obtained by cultivating a superior, non-harming disposition of mind toward literally all beings at once — falling short of this universal scope would mean one's harmful disposition toward the excluded beings had never actually been fully stilled.

Chinese Source

諸有獲得律不律儀,從一切有情支因有異不?此定有異。相云何?頌曰: 律從諸有情, 支因說不定, 不律從一切, 有情支非因。 論曰:律儀定從一切有情得。無少分理,支因說不定。支不定者,有從一切得,謂苾芻律儀。有從四支得,謂所餘律儀,唯根本業道名律儀支故。因不定者,謂或有義從一切因,或約餘義唯許從一。從一切者,謂從無貪瞋癡,必俱起故。唯從一者,謂從下中上心,不俱起故。此中且就後三因說。或有一類住律儀者,於一切有情得律儀,非一切支非一切因,謂以下心或中或上受近事勤策戒。或有一類住律儀者,於一切有情得律儀,由一切支非一切因,謂以下心或中或上受苾芻戒。或有一類住律儀者,於一切有情得律儀,由一切支及一切因,謂以三心受近事勤策苾芻戒。或有一類住律儀者,於一切有情得律儀,由一切因非一切支,謂以三心受近事近住勤策戒。無有不遍於諸有情得律儀者,以於一切諸有情所住善意樂方得律儀,異則不然,以惡意樂不全息故。

Ru-Yi Translation

For those who obtain restraint or non-restraint, is there a difference with respect to all sentient beings, the branches, and the causes? There is certainly a difference. What is its character? Verse: restraint is obtained from all sentient beings, but its branches and causes are not fixed; non-restraint is obtained from all sentient beings and all branches, but not [necessarily all] causes. Prose: restraint is certainly obtained with respect to all sentient beings; there is no possibility of a partial case. Its branches and causes, however, are not fixed. As for the branches not being fixed: some restraint is obtained with respect to all [precept-branches] — namely, the bhikṣu restraint; some is obtained with respect to only four branches — namely, the remaining restraints — since it is only the root karma-path that is called a "restraint-branch." As for the causes not being fixed: in one sense, restraint may be obtained from all causes at once; in another sense, it may be obtained from only one. "From all" means from non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion, since these necessarily arise together. "From only one" means from a lower, middling, or superior mind, since these do not arise together — this is stated here specifically with reference to these latter three causes. There is one kind of person abiding in restraint who obtains restraint with respect to all sentient beings, but not with respect to all branches nor all causes — namely, one who receives the upāsaka or śrāmaṇera precept with a lower, middling, or superior mind. There is another kind who obtains restraint with respect to all sentient beings, by way of all branches but not all causes — namely, one who receives the bhikṣu precept with a lower, middling, or superior mind. There is another kind who obtains restraint with respect to all sentient beings, by way of all branches and all causes — namely, one who receives the upāsaka, śrāmaṇera, and bhikṣu precepts using all three [grades of] mind. There is another kind who obtains restraint with respect to all sentient beings, by way of all causes but not all branches — namely, one who receives the upāsaka, upavāsa, and śrāmaṇera precepts using all three [grades of] mind. There is no case of obtaining restraint that does not pervade all sentient beings, since restraint is obtained only by abiding in a superior, wholesome disposition toward all sentient beings without exception; otherwise, it is not obtained, since a harmful disposition [toward the excluded beings] would not have been entirely stilled.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The distinction between the two kinds of "cause" being discussed here is worth making explicit, since the Chinese moves between them without much signposting: one sense of "cause" refers to the three wholesome roots (non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion), which always arise together as a fixed trio and so are never a source of variation; the other sense refers to the three intensity-grades of mind (lower, middling, superior) introduced back in fascicle 14, which are mutually exclusive at any given moment of vow-reception and so genuinely vary from one vow-taking occasion to the next. The four-case classification that follows is built entirely around this second, grade-based sense of "cause," combined with the branch-count variable, to produce a complete map of how a practitioner's restraint-profile can differ even though its scope across beings never does.

The closing line's insistence that restraint is "obtained only by abiding in a superior, wholesome disposition toward all sentient beings without exception" is the deep principle underlying this section's entire argument, and it reappears, worded almost identically, in the next section's discussion of why one can still obtain restraint even toward beings one has no actual power to harm (such as gods or beings in other realms) — the universality of restraint is grounded not in any practical capacity to affect every being, but purely in the totality of the mental resolve behind it.

4. Five Self-Imposed Limits That Block Genuine Restraint

The treatise now names five specific ways someone might unknowingly fail to obtain real restraint even while going through the motions of taking a vow: fixing a limit on which beings the vow covers ("I shall abstain from killing only with respect to such-and-such class of beings"), on which precept-branches it covers ("I shall only keep such-and-such branch, not the others"), on which places it applies to ("I shall abstain from killing only while residing in such-and-such region"), on which time it covers ("I shall abstain from killing only for the duration of one month," and so on), or on which circumstances it applies to ("I shall abstain from killing except in circumstances such as warfare"). Anyone who receives their vow with any one of these five limitations attached does not actually obtain restraint at all — they obtain only an imitation of virtuous conduct that merely resembles restraint without being the real thing. This raises a natural question: given restraint's requirement of covering literally every sentient being without exception, how could anyone obtain restraint with respect to beings entirely outside their own power to affect at all — such as beings in realms or circumstances the vow-taker could never actually reach or harm? The answer is that restraint arises simply through generating a supreme, universal disposition of not wishing to take any being's life, extended to every sentient being alike, regardless of whether one could ever actually act on that intention toward any particular one of them.

Chinese Source

若人不作五種定限,方可受得別解律儀,謂有情、支、處、時、緣定。有情定者,念我唯於某類有情當離殺等。言支定者,念我唯於某律儀支當持不犯。言處定者,念我唯住某類方域當離殺等。言時定者,念我唯於一月等時能離殺等。言緣定者,念我唯除鬪戰等緣能離殺等。如是受者不得律儀,但得律儀相似妙行。於非所能境,如何得律儀?由普於有情發起增上不損命意樂,故得律儀。

Ru-Yi Translation

Only if a person does not impose any of five kinds of fixed limits can they properly receive the restraint of individual liberation — namely, limits with respect to beings, branches, places, times, and circumstances. A limit with respect to beings means thinking, "I shall abstain from killing and the like only with respect to such-and-such class of beings." A limit with respect to branches means thinking, "I shall only uphold and not transgress such-and-such restraint-branch." A limit with respect to places means thinking, "I shall abstain from killing and the like only while residing in such-and-such region." A limit with respect to times means thinking, "I shall be able to abstain from killing and the like only for the duration of one month," and so on. A limit with respect to circumstances means thinking, "I shall be able to abstain from killing and the like except under circumstances such as warfare." One who receives the precept in any of these ways does not obtain restraint, but only obtains virtuous conduct that merely resembles restraint. [Question:] With respect to an object outside one's own power, how could restraint be obtained? [Reply:] It is obtained through generating a supreme disposition, universally extended to all sentient beings, of not wishing to harm life — this is how restraint is obtained.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

These five limitations are worth holding up against the earlier fascicles' discussion of what makes the vow of individual liberation different from an ordinary act of virtue: a limited commitment ("I will not kill, except in wartime") might still be a genuinely good thing to do, but this treatise insists it does not count as the specific, technical achievement called "restraint," precisely because restraint's defining feature is its totality — a single carved-out exception, in any of these five dimensions, reveals that the underlying harmful disposition toward the excepted case was never actually extinguished, only suppressed under certain conditions.

The reply to the "objects outside one's power" question echoes almost verbatim the closing principle of the previous section — restraint depends entirely on the totality of one's inner disposition, not on any actual capacity to act on it — which is precisely why a vow-taker who will, in practice, never encounter (say) a being in a distant hell-realm or an unreachable heaven can still be said to genuinely extend restraint to that being: the disposition of universal non-harm is what constitutes the restraint, independent of whether an opportunity to violate it could ever actually arise.

5. Why Restraint Doesn't Fluctuate as Beings Die and New Ones Are Born

An objection is raised against the claim that restraint is obtained with respect to every sentient being: since beings constantly move between the category of "reachable" and "unreachable" — through death, birth, and other transitions — shouldn't restraint's own scope and strength constantly increase and decrease along with these changes, and shouldn't a vow-holder therefore experience restraint being gained and lost even without any deliberate act of relinquishment on their part? The Vaibhāṣika reject this, offering an analogy: sprouting grass that has not yet grown, or has already withered away, causes no increase or decrease whatsoever in an already-established restraint covering it — and beings moving between reachable and unreachable status should be understood the very same way. When pressed further — why should this analogy actually hold, given that sentient beings' continuity across time seems importantly different from grass's? — the treatise clarifies that the disanalogy is not fatal, since even grass changes its own nature over time (rather than remaining one fixed, unchanging thing), just as sentient beings do; the deeper point is that restraint's scope was never tied to any particular being's ongoing individual existence in the first place, but rather to the totality of the karmic-object domain as such. This becomes especially clear in an extreme case: even once a being has passed into final nirvāṇa and their prior mode of existence is now entirely gone, this causes no decrease in restraint either, since a later buddha's own restraint is understood to be obtained with respect to all sentient beings in general — including, hypothetically, that being, had they still existed — so no actual loss of scope occurs even across such a fundamental change.

Chinese Source

毘婆沙師有作是說:若謂一向於所能境方可受得別解律儀,則此律儀應有增減,以所能境與非所能二類有情有轉易故,如是便有別解律儀離得捨緣有得捨過。彼說不然。如生草等先無後起或起已枯,於彼律儀無增無減。能不能境所得律儀,境轉易時例亦應爾。彼言不爾。所以者何?以諸有情前後性等、草等前後性不同故。若爾,有情般涅槃已,如前性類今時既無,於彼律儀如何無減?故如是釋,於理不然。前所說因於理為善。若爾,前佛及所度生已涅槃者,後佛於彼既不發得別解律儀,如何尸羅無減前過?以一切佛別解律儀,皆從一切有情處得。設彼有情今猶在者,後佛從彼亦得律儀,故後尸羅無減前過。

Ru-Yi Translation

The Vaibhāṣika offer this account: if one held that the restraint of individual liberation could only be received with respect to reachable objects, then this restraint would have to increase and decrease, since beings constantly shift between the two categories of reachable and unreachable — and this would incur the fault of the restraint of individual liberation being gained and lost apart from any actual condition of gaining or relinquishing it. [Response:] This is not so. Just as sprouting grass that did not exist before, or that has arisen and then withered, causes neither increase nor decrease in restraint already obtained with respect to it, restraint obtained with respect to reachable and unreachable objects should likewise be understood, when such objects shift, in just the same way. [Objection:] This is not comparable. Why is this so? Because sentient beings' earlier and later natures, and grass's earlier and later natures, are not alike. [Further objection:] If this is so, then once a being has attained final nirvāṇa, and their prior mode of existence no longer exists at present, how could this cause no decrease in restraint with respect to them? [Reply:] Hence such an explanation is not sound in principle; the reason stated earlier remains the sound one. [Objection:] If this is so, then, with respect to a former buddha and the beings he liberated who have already attained final nirvāṇa, a later buddha does not generate the restraint of individual liberation toward them — so how could there be no decrease in the later buddha's śīla compared to the former? [Reply:] This is because every buddha's restraint of individual liberation is obtained with respect to sentient beings in general; even supposing that being still existed, the later buddha would likewise obtain restraint with respect to them — hence there is no fault of the later śīla being diminished relative to the former.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This is a genuinely subtle metaphysical move, and we want to flag it plainly: the Vaibhāṣika's final resolution effectively de-couples restraint's "universal scope" from any actual, currently-existing population of beings at all — restraint covers the general category "sentient being" (understood almost counterfactually, as "any being that does or could exist, reachable or not, existing now or not") rather than a running tally of particular individuals that would need constant updating as beings are born, die, or attain nirvāṇa. This is what allows the treatise to say, without contradiction, that a later buddha's restraint suffers no "deficit" relative to an earlier buddha's, even though the specific individuals covered by each buddha's restraint are, strictly speaking, not identical sets.

We should note honestly that the dialogue's structure here (with several rounds of objection, partial concession, and further objection) leaves the grass analogy itself somewhat under strain by the end — the text acknowledges the disanalogy between grass and sentient beings without fully resolving it point-by-point, instead pivoting to the deeper "restraint tracks the general category, not the individual" principle as the real answer. We have preserved this dialectical structure rather than smoothing it into a cleaner resolution than the source itself provides.

6. Non-Restraint's Universal Scope, and Who Lives in It

Having finished with how restraint is obtained, the treatise turns to non-restraint, and finds a structural parallel: non-restraint, too, is always obtained with respect to every single sentient being and every single karma-path branch at once — there is no such thing as partial non-restraint covering only some beings or omitting some branches — since the three grades of intensity (lower, middling, superior) never co-occur simultaneously as causes. This last point has a striking practical consequence: someone who originally took up a life of wrongdoing with only a lower-grade intensity of mind, but later, on a specific occasion, kills a being with a superior-grade intensity of mind, still counts, overall, as possessing only the lower-grade non-restraint as their basic condition, even while that one particular act of killing itself counts as a superior-grade manifested act — the same pattern holding for middling-grade cases as well. The treatise then names exactly who counts as "living in non-restraint": those who slaughter sheep, chickens, or pigs for a living; bird-catchers and fishermen; hunters; robbers; executioners; prison wardens; snake-charmers who bind and handle serpents; those who boil dogs [for meat]; trap-setters; and, by extension, kings and officials who administer corporal punishment, along with anyone else whose role involves passing judgment and inflicting punishment on others — provided they carry out these roles with a constant, underlying intention to harm. Someone earns the specific designation "non-restraint" by belonging, as a settled way of life, to one of these categories; to illustrate with the example of a sheep-butcher specifically, this means someone who has committed, for the sake of their livelihood, to a lifelong intention to kill sheep — and every other occupation on the list should be understood analogously.

Chinese Source

已說從彼得諸律儀。得不律儀定從一切有情業道,無少分境及不具支不律儀者。此定無有,由一切因下品等心無俱起故。若有一類由下品心得不律儀,後於異時由上品心斷眾生命,彼但成就下不律儀,亦成殺生上品表等。中品上品例此應知。此中何名不律儀者,謂諸屠羊屠鷄屠猪捕鳥捕魚、獵獸劫盜魁膾典獄、縛龍煮狗及罝弶等。等言類顯王典刑罰及餘聽察斷罪等人,但恒有害心。名不律儀者,由彼一類住不律儀。或有不律儀名不律儀者,言屠羊者,謂為活命要期盡壽恒欲害羊。餘隨所應當知亦爾。

Ru-Yi Translation

We have already discussed how these restraints are obtained. Non-restraint is certainly obtained with respect to all sentient beings and all karma-path branches; there is no case of non-restraint covering only a partial object or lacking complete branches. This is certainly so, because a lower-grade mind and the others [middling, superior] never arise together as causes all at once. If there is a person who obtains non-restraint through a lower-grade mind, and, on some later occasion, kills a sentient being through a superior-grade mind, that person still only possesses the lower-grade non-restraint as their basic condition, while also having accomplished a superior-grade manifested killing act on that particular occasion. The same should be understood, by analogy, for middling- and superior-grade cases. What, in this context, is meant by "living in non-restraint"? It refers to those who slaughter sheep, slaughter chickens, slaughter pigs, catch birds, catch fish, hunt beasts, rob and steal, act as executioners, oversee prisons, bind serpents, boil dogs, and set traps, and so on. The word "and so on" is meant to include kings who administer corporal punishment and others engaged in hearing cases and pronouncing judgment, so long as they constantly harbor a mind bent on harm. One earns the name "non-restraint" by belonging, as one of this class, to a settled state of non-restraint. As for what makes a "sheep-butcher" specifically earn the name "non-restraint": it refers to one who, for the sake of their livelihood, has committed with a fixed resolve, for their entire remaining life, to a constant wish to kill sheep. The rest, as appropriate, should be understood in just the same way.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This section's opening point mirrors, in reverse, the earlier discussion of restraint's own uniform scope from a few sections back — just as taking a partial, limited vow (only some beings, only some branches) fails to generate real restraint at all, only an imitation of good conduct, committing to a life of wrongdoing with any partial exception would likewise fail to generate real non-restraint. The parallel is not accidental: both restraint and non-restraint, in this system, are defined by the totality of an underlying disposition, not by any partial or occasional pattern of behavior.

The lower/middling/superior-grade distinction here produces a genuinely counter-intuitive but carefully argued result: a habitual wrongdoer's baseline non-restraint is fixed by the intensity of mind present when they first committed to their way of life, and does not get upgraded merely because a specific later act happens to be carried out with unusually intense resolve — the specific act's own manifested karma can be graded independently (superior-grade, in this example), while the person's ongoing underlying condition of non-restraint remains whatever grade was originally established. This is the mirror image of the earlier point (in fascicle 14) that an arhat's original vow-grade does not retroactively upgrade even after later spiritual attainment — grade, once fixed at the moment of commitment, persists as a stable background condition largely independent of what happens afterward.

7. Why a Butcher's Non-Restraint Covers Even Their Own Kin

A pointed objection now challenges the claim that non-restraint, like restraint, must cover every sentient being without exception: a sheep-butcher plainly harbors no wish to harm their own close family, and would not wish to kill even to save their own life — so how can their non-restraint really be said to extend to literally everyone, including their own most beloved relatives? The treatise answers that non-restraint's universality rests on the totality of a corrupted disposition (阿世耶, āśaya) willingly adopted for the sake of profit, not on a moment-by-moment inventory of who the person would actually be willing to harm right now — and drives the point further with two even sharper test cases. Might the butcher's close relative, in a future life, actually be reborn as a sheep? If so, doesn't the butcher's non-restraint have to extend even to that future rebirth, and, by symmetry, doesn't a future noble one's present-life self also fall within the butcher's non-restraint's scope now, precisely because that future noble one was once, hypothetically, an ordinary sheep? The treatise resolves this apparent absurdity by insisting non-restraint is not actually indexed to any being's particular future continuum at all — it targets currently-existing sheep as such, in the present, which is precisely why a noble one's present body, never having been and never going to be an actual sheep, falls outside its scope, while an actual present-day sheep falls within it regardless of any relationship the butcher might unknowingly have to it.

Chinese Source

遍於有情界得諸律儀,其理可爾,由普欲利樂勝阿世耶而受得故,非屠羊等不律儀人於己至親有損害意,乃至為救自身命緣亦不欲殺,如何可說普於一切得不律儀?由彼至親若為羊等,於彼亦可有損害心。既知至親現非羊等,如何於彼可有害心?又聖必無作羊等理,如何於彼得不律儀?若觀未來羊等自體,於現相續得不律儀。是則羊等於未來世,亦有至親及聖自體,於彼決定無損害心。是則應觀未來自體,不於現在得不律儀。於羊等現身既有害意,如何不於彼得不律儀?於母等現身既無害意,如何亦於彼得不律儀?於等事中應求異理。

Ru-Yi Translation

That restraint is obtained universally with respect to the realm of sentient beings makes sense, since it is received by virtue of a supreme disposition wishing benefit and happiness for all universally. [Objection:] But a person living in the non-restraint of, say, a sheep-butcher, harbors no intention to harm their own closest kin, and would not wish to kill even to save their own life — how, then, can it be said that they obtain non-restraint universally with respect to all beings? [Reply:] Because, were that close relative to become a sheep or the like, there could indeed be a harmful intention toward them as well. [Objection:] But since one knows one's close relative is not presently a sheep or the like, how could there be a harmful intention toward them [now]? Moreover, a noble one could certainly never become a sheep or the like — so how could non-restraint be obtained with respect to them? [Reply, offering one possible resolution:] If one considers the future embodiment of that sheep and the like, non-restraint is obtained with respect to it within the present continuum. [Objection to this resolution:] But then a sheep and the like, in some future life, would also have close relatives and noble beings among them, toward whom there could certainly be no harmful intention — so, by this logic, one would have to consider a future embodiment [in every direction], and non-restraint would not, in fact, be obtained in the present at all. [Further pressing the point:] Since there is indeed harmful intent toward the present body of an actual sheep, how could non-restraint fail to be obtained with respect to it? And since there is no harmful intent toward the present body of one's mother and the like, how could non-restraint also be obtained with respect to them? A different resolution should be sought for these parallel cases.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We should be transparent that this passage, as translated here, ends on an unresolved note — the final line explicitly calls for "a different resolution," acknowledging that the "future embodiment" solution just proposed does not actually work, without yet supplying the resolution that does. This is consistent with this treatise's broader willingness to let a difficult philosophical puzzle sit open for a beat before continuing, and we have preserved that open ending rather than importing a premature resolution the Chinese itself does not yet provide at this point in the text.

The deeper principle at stake, even without a fully worked-out answer yet, is the same one already seen in the earlier discussion of restraint's own universal scope (section 5 of this fascicle): moral commitments in this system are not indexed to a case-by-case inventory of the specific beings one happens to currently recognize or care about, but to a totalizing disposition (whether wholesome or corrupted) extended, as a matter of logical structure, to the entire category of relevant beings — present, actual sheep in this case — regardless of the person's own incomplete or mistaken beliefs about which individuals fall into that category. The puzzle here is precisely about how to state that totalizing structure precisely enough to include current sheep without absurdly including hypothetical future or past embodiments of every being whatsoever.

8. The Mute Butcher, and Whether Non-Restraint Can Ever Be Partial

A further puzzle presses the completeness of non-restraint from another angle: a sheep-butcher who, throughout their entire life, never once takes what is not given, remains content with their own spouse, and — being mute and physically incapable of speech — commits none of the four kinds of verbal wrongdoing at all, would seem to lack any actual basis for the seven bodily-and-verbal branches of bad conduct their non-restraint is supposed to comprise in full. The treatise resolves this by insisting that non-restraint's completeness tracks the totality of a corrupted underlying disposition, not the actual physical performance of every branch of wrongdoing — even a mute person still forms the bodily gestures corresponding to whatever meaning they would have wished to express in speech, and this is sufficient to complete the full branch-count. This immediately raises a mirroring question in the opposite direction: if someone first formally commits to only two or three training-points and only later, informally, takes up killing as well without ever explicitly renouncing goodness with respect to the other branches, how could they be said to have generated the complete sevenfold bad precept? Here the treatise records a genuine, unresolved disagreement: the Vaibhāṣika hold firmly that there is no such thing as a partially-branched or partially-scoped person "living in non-restraint" — it is always complete or not present at all — while the Sautrāntika masters hold instead that non-restraint, like restraint, precisely tracks whatever scope was actually committed to, whether complete or partial, with only the upavāsa vow exempted from this flexibility, since its wholesome and unwholesome character is fixed by mutual exclusion at a specific measure.

Chinese Source

又屠羊等不律儀人,於一生中不與不取,於己妻妾住知足心,瘂不能言無語四過,如何彼亦得具支不律儀?彼遍損善阿世耶故。雖瘂不言,而身表語所欲說義,故得具支。若爾,彼人或時先受二三學處,後但受殺,於餘不損善阿世耶,如何具發七支惡戒?毘婆沙者作如是言:必無缺支及餘一分可得名住不律儀人。經部諸師作如是說:隨所期限支具不具及全分一分皆得不律儀。律儀亦然,唯除八戒,由隨彼量善惡尸羅性相相違互相遮故。

Ru-Yi Translation

Moreover, a person living in the non-restraint of a sheep-butcher who, throughout a single lifetime, never takes what is not given, remains content with their own spouse, and, being mute and unable to speak, commits none of the four faults of speech — how could such a person still obtain complete non-restraint across all its branches? [Reply:] Because they have thoroughly ruined their wholesome disposition across the board. Although mute and unable to speak, the bodily gesture corresponding to whatever meaning they would wish to express through speech is still present, and hence the branches are obtained in full. [Objection:] If this is so, then such a person might, at some point, first receive two or three training-points, and only later take up killing alone, without having ruined their wholesome disposition with respect to the remaining branches — how, then, could the complete sevenfold bad precept be generated? The Vaibhāṣika state: there is certainly no such thing as a person "living in non-restraint" who is missing branches or possesses only a partial portion. The Sautrāntika masters state: in accordance with whatever limit was actually committed to, whether the branches are complete or incomplete, and whether the full scope or only a partial scope, non-restraint is obtained accordingly. The same holds for restraint as well, except for the eightfold [upavāsa] precept, since its wholesome or unwholesome character, matched to its own fixed measure, is mutually exclusive and blocks the other from arising.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We want to flag this as a genuinely unresolved, named disagreement between two schools, exactly as this treatise records it — the Vaibhāṣika's all-or-nothing view and the Sautrāntika's scope-matches-commitment view are simply set side by side, with the text moving on to the next topic without adjudicating between them. This mirrors the pattern already seen repeatedly in fascicle 13's debate over unmanifested karma's very existence: rather than treat every doctrinal question as settled Vaibhāṣika orthodoxy, this fascicle continues to preserve visible cracks in the tradition's own internal consensus, and we have kept both positions stated in full rather than silently favoring one.

The mute-butcher resolution — that a bodily gesture "corresponding to whatever meaning [the mute person] would wish to express through speech" substitutes for actual speech in completing the verbal branches — is a fascinating extension of this treatise's much earlier discussion (fascicle 13) of manifested verbal karma as fundamentally about intended meaning rather than the literal physical act of vocalizing; here that same principle is put to work explaining how someone physically incapable of speech can nonetheless be said to have "spoken" wrongly in the technical, karma-relevant sense, purely through the gestural expression of an intended verbal meaning.

9. How Non-Restraint Is Obtained, and Three Causes of Ordinary Merit

The treatise now explains the mechanics by which non-restraint itself actually comes to be obtained, identifying two distinct routes. The first is being born into a family already engaged in a livelihood built on wrongdoing (a family of hunters or butchers, say) and then, for the first time, actually carrying out the preparatory actions leading to killing or the like. The second route does not require such a family background at all: anyone, regardless of birth, who makes a firm, forward-looking commitment — resolving, "I shall take up such-and-such an occupation, in order to acquire wealth and sustain my own life" — thereby generates the bad precept-vow at that very moment of commitment, prior to ever actually performing the act itself. The treatise then turns to a related but distinct topic: the three separate causes by which other kinds of unmanifested karma, such as ordinary merit, can arise outside the context of restraint or non-restraint altogether. The first is a "field" of merit — making a donation, such as a garden or grove, to a worthy recipient, which generates wholesome unmanifested karma the very instant the gift is given, matching material discussed earlier regarding merit tied to a material support. The second is a formal vow — resolving, for instance, "I shall not eat before first paying homage to the Buddha," or setting a recurring commitment to provide food offerings on fast days, half-month intervals, or annual occasions. The third is repeated, wholeheartedly earnest intention — cultivating a habitually solemn and dedicated resolve, whether directed toward wholesome or unwholesome ends. These three causes, distinct from the mechanisms behind restraint and non-restraint proper, are what give rise to this broader category of "other" unmanifested karma.

Chinese Source

已說從彼得不律儀。得不律儀及餘無表,如何方便未說當說。頌曰: 諸得不律儀, 由作及誓受, 得所餘無表, 由田受重行。 論曰:諸不律儀,由二因得:一者生在不律儀家,由初現行殺等加行;二者雖復生在餘家,由初要期受殺等事,謂我當作如是事業,以求財物養活自身,當於爾時便發惡戒。得餘無表由三種因:一者由田,謂於如是諸福田所施園林等,彼善無表初施便生,如說有依諸福業事。二者由受,謂自誓言:若未禮佛不先食等。或作誓限:於齋日月半月及年常施食等。三由重行,謂起如是殷重作意行善行惡。由此三因起餘無表。

Ru-Yi Translation

We have discussed how non-restraint is obtained from this. As for how non-restraint and other unmanifested karma are obtained by what means, this has not yet been discussed and should now be explained. Verse: non-restraint is obtained through performance or through vowed reception; other unmanifested karma is obtained through a field, through a [formal] undertaking, or through solemn conduct. Prose: non-restraint is obtained through two causes. First, being born into a family of non-restraint, through the initial actual performance of preparatory actions leading to killing and the like. Second, even when born into some other family, through initially making a firm commitment to undertake matters such as killing — thinking, "I shall engage in such-and-such an undertaking, in order to seek wealth and sustain my own life" — at which very moment the bad precept-vow is generated. Other unmanifested karma is obtained through three causes. First, through a field — meaning that, with respect to a worthy field of merit to whom a garden, grove, or the like is given, wholesome unmanifested karma arises the very instant the gift is given, as already discussed with respect to meritorious deeds having a support. Second, through a formal undertaking — meaning making a personal vow, such as, "I shall not eat before first paying homage to the Buddha," or establishing a fixed commitment, such as regularly providing food offerings on fast days, half-month intervals, and annual occasions. Third, through solemn conduct — meaning giving rise to earnest, solemn intention in carrying out wholesome or unwholesome conduct. These three causes give rise to this other kind of unmanifested karma.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The distinction between non-restraint's two routes of origin — inherited family occupation versus a deliberate, individual vow to take up wrongdoing — mirrors, almost exactly, the earlier fascicle's discussion of how the vow of individual liberation is obtained "through another's instruction": in both cases, the treatise is careful to specify the precise moment a lasting karmic disposition actually crystallizes, rather than leaving it as a vague matter of gradually drifting into a way of life. Someone born into a family of hunters does not automatically possess non-restraint from birth — it is only generated at the moment they themselves first actually perform the relevant preparatory action — while someone from any background at all can generate the very same non-restraint purely through an internal, forward-looking resolution, with no actual act yet performed.

This section's three causes for "other" unmanifested karma (field, vow, solemn conduct) directly cross-reference material discussed at length in fascicle 13's proof of unmanifested karma's existence — specifically the "merit continuing to increase even without conscious thought" proof, which relied on exactly this kind of donation-based merit generation. Readers who recall that earlier discussion will notice this section is filling in the mechanical "how" behind a phenomenon that fascicle 13 had, at that point, only been arguing must exist at all.

10. Four Causes by Which the Vow of Individual Liberation Is Lost

Having finished with how restraint and non-restraint are gained, the treatise turns to how they are lost, beginning with the vow of individual liberation. For every one of its seven kinds except the upavāsa vow, the restraint is lost through any of four causes: deliberately renouncing the training-points, through a manifested verbal act performed in the presence of someone capable of understanding that renunciation; discarding one's present existence altogether, that is, dying; a spontaneous, simultaneous arising of both sexual characteristics in one body; or having one's wholesome roots entirely severed. The upavāsa vow is lost through these same four causes, plus a fifth unique to it: the simple passing of the night, marking the natural end of its fixed one-day duration. Hence, taken together, the vow of individual liberation as a whole is said to be lost through five possible causes. Each cause disrupts the restraint in a structurally distinct way: a manifested act contrary to the original act of reception directly reverses it; death removes the very physical basis the restraint depended on; the sex-change scenario alters that basis without removing it entirely; the severing of wholesome roots eliminates the underlying cause that sustained the restraint; and, for the upavāsa vow alone, the fixed time-limit set at reception simply expires.

Chinese Source

已說得律儀等,捨律儀等未說當說。且云何捨別解律儀?頌曰: 捨別解調伏, 由故捨命終, 及二形俱生, 斷善根夜盡。 論曰:言調伏者,意顯律儀,由此能令根調伏故。唯除近住,所餘七種別解律儀,由四緣捨:一由意樂對有解人發有表業捨學處故、二由棄捨眾同分故、三由二形俱時生故、四由所因善根斷故。捨近住戒由前四緣及由夜盡,是故總說別解律儀由五緣捨。何緣捨戒由此五緣?與受相違表業生故、所依捨故、所依變故、所因斷故、過期限故。

Ru-Yi Translation

We have discussed how restraint and the others are obtained; how they are relinquished has not yet been discussed, and should now be explained. First, how is the restraint of individual liberation relinquished? Verse: "taming" [restraint] of individual liberation is relinquished through deliberate renunciation, death, the simultaneous arising of both sexual characteristics, the severing of wholesome roots, and, [for upavāsa alone,] the passing of the night. Prose: the word "taming" is meant to indicate restraint, since restraint is able to bring the [sense] faculties under control. Except for the upavāsa precept, the remaining seven kinds of restraint of individual liberation are relinquished through four causes: first, through generating a manifested verbal act, in the presence of someone capable of understanding, that renounces the training-points, in accordance with one's own intention; second, through discarding one's present class of existence [i.e., dying]; third, through the simultaneous arising of both sexual characteristics; fourth, through the severing of the wholesome roots on which the restraint depends. The upavāsa precept is relinquished through these same four causes, plus the passing of the night — hence, taken as a whole, the restraint of individual liberation is said to be relinquished through five causes. For what reason is the precept relinquished through these five causes? Because a manifested act contrary to the act of reception arises; because the physical basis [the restraint] depends on is discarded; because that basis is altered; because the cause [the restraint] depends on is severed; and because the fixed time-limit has elapsed.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We have kept "taming" (調伏) as the verse's own chosen term for restraint here, since the prose immediately explains why this particular word was selected over the more usual 律儀 — it emphasizes restraint's active, ongoing function of bringing the sense faculties under control, rather than simply naming the vow as a static possession. This is a small but deliberate stylistic choice on the treatise's part, using a more dynamic near-synonym specifically at the point where the vow's eventual loss is being discussed, perhaps to underscore that what is being lost is precisely this active, controlling function.

The five-cause structure is worth holding in mind as a template, since each cause maps onto a different one of the four explanatory factors introduced earlier in this fascicle for why restraint is obtained (support, cause, act of reception) plus the special time-boundary unique to upavāsa — a manifested renunciation is simply the reception act's exact mirror image; death removes the physical support restraint depends on; sex-change alters (without destroying) that same support; and severed wholesome roots remove the causal condition sustaining the restraint altogether. This systematic one-to-one correspondence between causes of gain and causes of loss is characteristic of this treatise's method throughout the fascicle.

11. Grave Offenses, the Disappearance of the Dharma, and the Debt Analogy

Beyond the four (or five) causes already given, other schools propose additional ways the vow of individual liberation might be lost. Some hold that committing even one of the four gravest offenses (the pārājika offenses, which incur expulsion from the monastic community) also causes a bhikṣu or śrāmaṇera to lose their restraint entirely. Others hold that the eventual disappearance of the true Dharma itself brings an end to the vow of individual liberation for everyone still holding it, since, once the Dharma has vanished, all its institutional supports — the bounded monastic territories, formal procedures, and the like — cease to function altogether. The Vaibhāṣika of Kashmir reject the first of these additions outright: committing a grave offense, they argue, does not actually cause the restraint itself to be lost — otherwise, the traditional biweekly recitation of the monastic code would not include the specific provision that a monk who has committed a grave offense should "receive the remaining restraints anew," since this instruction presupposes that some restraint survives the offense to be added to. They offer a vivid analogy: committing a grave offense is like a debt that has gone unpaid — even though the debt has technically lapsed, if the debtor later comes into the means to repay it, the earlier debt does not need to be created anew from scratch. In just the same way, a monk who has committed a grave offense still retains their underlying restraint; if they properly confess before the assembly according to the correct procedure, their earlier transgression is simply cleared, without any need to take the full ordination vow over again from the beginning.

Chinese Source

有餘部說:於四極重感墮罪中若隨犯一,亦捨勤策苾芻律儀。有餘部言:由正法滅亦能令捨別解律儀,以法滅時一切學處結界羯磨等悉皆止息故。迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師言:犯根本罪不捨律儀,若不爾者半月半月說戒經中不應說言:犯根本罪苾芻應更受得所餘律儀。犯根本罪如負財捨,雖負財捨而彼於後力還財時,前債即無重興債法。如是苾芻雖犯重罪而律儀在,若更如法對僧懺悔,先過即除,不新受戒。

Ru-Yi Translation

Other schools say: committing even one of the four extremely grave offenses that incur expulsion also causes the śrāmaṇera or bhikṣu restraint to be relinquished. Other schools say: the disappearance of the true Dharma is also able to cause the restraint of individual liberation to be relinquished, since, once the Dharma has disappeared, all training-points, bounded territories, formal procedures, and the like entirely cease to function. The Vaibhāṣika of Kashmir say: committing a root offense does not cause the restraint to be relinquished — if it did, then the biweekly recitation of the precepts should not state that a bhikṣu who has committed a root offense should receive the remaining restraints anew. Committing a root offense is like a debt being relinquished: although the debt is relinquished, when the debtor later has the means to repay it, there is no need to newly re-establish the earlier debt. In just this way, although a bhikṣu has committed a grave offense, the restraint remains; if they properly confess before the saṅgha in accordance with the proper method, the earlier transgression is thereby removed, without newly receiving the precept.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The debt analogy is doing precise conceptual work worth spelling out: it distinguishes between a debt (or vow) being formally "written off" in some technical sense and the underlying relationship being entirely dissolved — a written-off debt can still be honored later without the parties needing to draft an entirely new loan agreement, and, similarly, a monk's restraint survives a grave offense in some underlying sense even while the offense itself is a serious violation requiring formal confession to resolve. The scriptural evidence marshaled for this view is a nice piece of close textual reasoning: the very existence of a formal procedure for "receiving the remaining restraints anew" after a grave offense presupposes that something of the original restraint must still be there to be added to or restored, since one cannot "add to" or "restore" something that has been completely and simply annihilated.

We should note that this section presents three genuinely distinct positions on what ends the vow of individual liberation — the base four-or-five-cause list from the previous section, an additional "grave offense" cause proposed by unnamed other schools, and a further "disappearance of the Dharma" cause from yet other schools — with the Kashmir Vaibhāṣika explicitly rejecting the middle position while remaining silent, in this passage at least, on the third. Readers should not assume the debt analogy is meant to also refute the Dharma-disappearance view; the text simply does not address that question here.

12. The Withered Palm Tree: Why a Grave Offense Still Severs Everything

The Kashmir masters now confront a direct scriptural challenge to their own debt-analogy position: the Buddha himself states that one who commits any of the four gravest offenses is "not a bhikṣu, not a śramaṇa, not a son of the Śākyas" — language that sounds like total, irreversible expulsion, not a recoverable debt. Rather than deny this, the Kashmir masters offer a careful reading: the Buddha's statement is not a merely provisional, figurative teaching requiring interpretation, but his own considered, literal meaning — since the Vinaya itself distinguishes four types of "bhikṣu" (a bhikṣu in name only, one who merely calls himself a bhikṣu, one who is a "beggar" in the loose sense, and one who has actually destroyed the afflictions), and "not a bhikṣu" here specifically means not a bhikṣu in the sense of someone who received full ordination through the proper formal procedure — which such a person indeed no longer is. They then take up the Buddha's own famous simile: just as a palm tree, once its crown is cut off, can never again grow or flourish, a monk who commits a grave offense is likewise permanently unable to make their remaining training-points "grow and flourish," since the grave offense violates the very root of monastic conduct and is bound up with an extremely intense loss of shame and conscience — meaning, when the root itself is severed this way, it stands to reason that every restraint the person holds must be relinquished across the board, not merely diminished in one respect while continuing intact in others.

Chinese Source

若爾,何緣薄伽梵說犯四重者不名苾芻、不名沙門非釋迦子?破苾芻體、害沙門性,壞滅墮落立他勝名。依勝義苾芻,密意作是說。此言兇勃。兇勃者何?謂於世尊了義所說,以別義釋令成不了,與多煩惱者為犯重罪緣。寧知此言是了義說。由律自釋有四苾芻:一名想苾芻、二自稱苾芻、三乞匃苾芻、四破惑苾芻。此義中言非苾芻者,謂非白四羯磨受具足戒苾芻。非此苾芻先是勝義,後由犯重成非苾芻,故知此言是了義說。然彼所說,非犯一邊一切律儀應遍捨者,彼言便是徵詰大師。大師此中立如是喻,如多羅樹若被斷頭必不復能生長廣大,諸苾芻等犯重亦然。大師此中喻顯何義?意顯於戒隨犯一邊根本重罪,令餘所受必不復能生長廣大。謂彼毀犯諸重罪時,違越苾芻根本行故、與極猛利無慚無愧共相應故。行根既斷,理應遍捨一切律儀。

Ru-Yi Translation

[Objection:] If this is so, then for what reason does the Blessed One state that one who commits one of the four grave offenses is not called a bhikṣu, not called a śramaṇa, and is not a son of the Śākyas? He destroys the substance of a bhikṣu, injures the nature of a śramaṇa, is ruined and fallen, and is given the name "one defeated" — this is said with hidden intent, referring to a bhikṣu in the ultimate sense. [Response:] This statement is reckless. What makes it reckless? It takes the Blessed One's own definitive, literal teaching and, through a different interpretation, renders it non-literal, thereby providing an occasion for those with many afflictions to commit grave offenses. [Question:] How is it known that this statement is meant literally? [Reply:] Because the Vinaya itself explains that there are four kinds of bhikṣu: first, a bhikṣu in name only; second, one who merely calls himself a bhikṣu; third, a "beggar" bhikṣu; fourth, a bhikṣu who has destroyed the afflictions. In this context, "not a bhikṣu" means not a bhikṣu in the sense of one who has received the full precept through the formal white-and-fourfold procedure — this person, who was formerly this kind of bhikṣu, later becomes not this kind of bhikṣu through committing a grave offense; hence it is known that this statement is meant literally. As for the claim that non-restraint from one particular grave offense should not require relinquishing every restraint entirely — this claim is itself a challenge to the Teacher's own words. The Teacher himself gave this simile here: just as a palm tree, once its crown has been severed, can never again grow tall and flourish, so too is it with monastics who commit a grave offense. What does the Teacher's simile here mean to show? It means to show that, upon violating even one root, grave offense within the precepts, the rest of what was received can never again grow and flourish. That is, at the moment such grave offenses are violated, one transgresses the very root conduct of a bhikṣu, and this is bound up with an extremely intense lack of shame and conscience. Since the very root of conduct is thereby severed, it stands to reason that every restraint should be relinquished across the board.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We want to flag something notable about this section's argumentative posture: the Kashmir Vaibhāṣika, having spent the previous section defending a relatively lenient reading of grave offenses (the debt analogy, where restraint survives and can be restored through confession), now pivot to a much stricter position — the palm-tree simile argues that grave offenses do, in fact, sever everything, all at once, contradicting what looked like their own earlier position. We suspect (though the text itself does not flag this explicitly) that these two positions are addressing two different questions: the debt analogy concerns ordinary, lesser precept-violations that can be resolved through confession without full re-ordination, while this section's palm-tree argument concerns specifically the four gravest pārājika offenses, which the Kashmir masters treat as categorically different and irreversible. Readers should not assume these two sections describe a single consistent view without this distinction in mind.

The phrase "reckless" (兇勃) is a notably strong word for this treatise to apply to a rival interpretation, and we have kept its force in translation rather than softening it — the accusation being made is serious: that reading the Buddha's "not a bhikṣu" language as merely figurative would remove a genuine deterrent against grave misconduct, effectively lowering the stakes for anyone tempted toward such offenses. The fourfold taxonomy of "bhikṣu" cited to settle the literal-vs-figurative question (nominal, self-declared, mendicant, and afflictions-destroyed) is a standard piece of Vinaya hermeneutics used to pin down exactly which sense of a polysemous term a given scriptural statement intends.

13. The Burnt Seed: Why a Grave Offender Is Never Re-Ordained

The Kashmir masters continue building their case for the severity of grave offenses: the Buddha does not even permit someone who has committed such an offense to eat so much as a single mouthful of communal monastic food, or to set even one heel upon monastery grounds, and expels them from every monastic function entirely — comparing them, in the Buddha's own words, to weeds that must be swiftly uprooted from a rice field, rotten roof-beams that must be swiftly discarded, and chaff that must be swiftly winnowed away: people who are, in truth, not real bhikṣus at all despite still bearing the name. Yet some trace of monastic identity evidently persists even in such a person, since the Buddha elsewhere teaches that there are exactly four kinds of śramaṇa, no more and no fewer (one who has attained the path, one who merely points the way to it for others, one who lives by the outward forms of the path without inner attainment, and one who actively corrupts the path) — and even a grave offender retains, at minimum, the outward remnant of a śramaṇa's characteristics, comparable to charred wood, an artificial parrot, a dried-up pond, a spoiled seed, a spinning firebrand, or a corpse: things that resemble the real article in some superficial respect while being entirely hollowed out within. This raises the practical question of why such a person is never permitted to be re-ordained, even under the probationary "śaikṣa-bhikṣu" status available to certain other offenders. The Kashmir masters explain that this is not because the person retains actual bhikṣu-restraint that a second ordination would improperly duplicate, but because their mental continuum has become so overwhelmed by an extremely intense loss of shame and conscience that it has, quite simply, lost the very capacity to generate the restraint of monastic ordination at all — like a seed that has been thoroughly scorched by fire, which can never again sprout no matter how it is planted or watered. Since even later insisting one still counts as a bhikṣu and formally relinquishing the training would gain such a person nothing (renewed ordination being permanently foreclosed to them either way), the entire matter is settled: if such a person genuinely still possessed some hidden bhikṣu-nature, in principle even other bhikṣus ought to be paying reverence to them as one of their own — which no one holds to be the case.

Chinese Source

又犯重人,世尊不許食僧祇食下至一摶、踐毘訶羅一足跟地,擯出一切苾芻事業。大師依彼說如是言:應速拔除稻禾稗莠,應速簡棄腐朽棟梁,應速簸颺種中穅秕,如是應速驅擯眾中實非苾芻稱苾芻者。彼苾芻體其相如何,隨相是何體必應有。以世尊說,准陀當知有四沙門,更無第五。所言四者:一勝道沙門、二示道沙門、三命道沙門、四污道沙門。雖有此說,而彼唯有餘沙門相,故名沙門。如被燒材假鸚鵡涸池敗種火輪死人。若犯重人非苾芻者,則應無有授學苾芻。不說犯重人,皆成他勝罪;但成他勝罪,定說非苾芻。謂或有人相續殊勝,雖犯極重戒而非他勝罪,由彼無有一念覆心。法主世尊制立如是,若犯他勝便非苾芻。何不重令出家受戒?由彼相續已為極重無慚愧懷,無力能發出家律儀,如焦種故;非觀彼有苾芻律儀,故不重令出家受戒。所以然者,設彼後時謂是苾芻更捨所學,亦不許彼重出家故。於此無義,苦救何為?若如是人猶有苾芻性,應自歸禮如是類苾芻。正法滅時雖無一切結界羯磨及毘奈耶,未得律儀無新得理,而先得者無有捨義。

Ru-Yi Translation

Moreover, one who has committed a grave offense is not permitted by the Blessed One to eat so much as a single mouthful of communal monastic food, or to set even one heel upon monastery grounds, and is expelled from every monastic function. The Teacher, with reference to such a person, says: one should swiftly uproot the weeds among the rice; one should swiftly discard rotten roof-beams; one should swiftly winnow away the chaff among the grain; in just this way, one should swiftly expel from the assembly those who, though called bhikṣus, are in truth not bhikṣus at all. What, then, is the character of that [remaining] bhikṣu-nature, whatever characteristic it retains, that must still be present? For the Blessed One states: "Cunda, you should know there are four kinds of śramaṇa, and no fifth." What are the four? First, the śramaṇa who has attained the path; second, the śramaṇa who points out the path; third, the śramaṇa who lives by the path's outward form; fourth, the śramaṇa who corrupts the path. Although this is stated, such a person retains only the remaining outward characteristic of a śramaṇa, and is thus still called a śramaṇa — like charred wood, an artificial parrot, a dried pond, a spoiled seed, a spinning firebrand, or a corpse. [Objection:] If one who has committed a grave offense were not a bhikṣu, then there should be no such thing as a probationary śaikṣa-bhikṣu. [Reply:] It is not said that committing a grave offense always constitutes the offense of defeat; only when it does constitute the offense of defeat is it definitively said that the person is not a bhikṣu. That is, there may be a person of exceptional continuum who, though committing an extremely grave precept-violation, does not thereby incur the offense of defeat, because they have not concealed it in their mind for even a single moment. This is how the Dharma-Lord, the Blessed One, established it: committing an offense of defeat means one is no longer a bhikṣu. [Question:] Why, then, is such a person not permitted to go forth and receive ordination again? [Reply:] Because their continuum has already become an extremely intense state of shamelessness and lack of conscience, they lack the capacity to generate the restraint of going-forth, like a scorched seed; it is not that they are seen as still possessing bhikṣu-restraint, and this is why they are not permitted to go forth and receive ordination again. Why is this so? Because, even were such a person to later claim to be a bhikṣu and formally relinquish the training, they would still not be permitted to go forth again — there being no point in this, what use would there be in laboring to rescue such a case? If such a person still possessed a bhikṣu-nature, then other bhikṣus ought to pay homage and take refuge in this kind of bhikṣu. At the time the true Dharma disappears, although there is no longer any bounded territory, formal procedure, or Vinaya, there is no possibility of newly obtaining restraint not yet obtained — yet for restraint already obtained, there is no question of it being relinquished.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We should flag a genuinely technical Vinaya distinction embedded in this passage's objection-and-reply: not every grave precept-violation automatically counts as an "offense of defeat" (他勝罪, pārājika, the specific category triggering permanent expulsion) — the passage notes that someone who violates a grave precept but never conceals it, even for a single moment, escapes this categorization, since concealment of a known violation is itself part of what elevates an offense to this most severe tier under traditional Vinaya procedure. This is a fine but consequential point: the "not a bhikṣu" status this whole extended argument has been defending applies specifically to confirmed pārājika cases, not to every serious lapse in monastic conduct.

The closing line here — restraint already obtained is never relinquished merely because the Dharma itself later disappears, even though no new restraint could be received in that period — is worth flagging as the Kashmir masters' answer to the second alternative view raised two sections back (that the Dharma's disappearance ends all vows). Though the text does not explicitly frame it as a direct rebuttal, this closing statement functions as one: the disappearance of institutional Vinaya machinery blocks new ordinations, the argument goes, but does not retroactively strip existing restraint from those who already hold it.

14. How Meditative and Uncontaminated Restraint Are Lost

The treatise turns next to how meditation-born and uncontaminated restraint are each relinquished. Wholesome states bound to a given meditative level are lost through two causes: changing levels — either rising to be reborn in a higher level, or falling from a higher level back down to a lower one — or falling back from previously attained meditative accomplishment, losing ground one had already secured. The verse's closing "and so on" signals that this same twofold pattern (change of level, and falling back) also governs the loss of one's very class of existence and any lesser portion of superior wholesome roots, and that exactly the same two causes apply equally to the form realm's wholesome states and the formless realm's, the only difference being that the formless realm, unlike the form realm, has no restraint at all to speak of in the first place. Uncontaminated wholesome states, meanwhile, are lost through three distinct causes: attaining a fruit, since attaining a given fruit of realization causes one to relinquish both the path leading toward that fruit and the path constituting the fruit's own attainment; sharpening one's faculties, since advancing from dull to sharp faculties at a given stage causes the dull-faculty path to be relinquished in favor of the sharp-faculty path; and falling back, since regressing from an attained state causes one to lose both the path of the fruit itself and the superior path built upon it.

Chinese Source

靜慮、無漏二律儀等,云何當捨?頌曰: 捨定生善法, 由易地退等, 捨聖由得果, 練根及退失。 論曰:諸靜慮地所繫善法,由二緣捨:一由易地,謂從下地生上地時,或上地沒來生下地;二由得退,謂從已獲勝定功德還退失時。等言為顯捨眾同分亦捨少分殊勝善根,如色界中所有善法由易地退捨,無色界亦然,唯無律儀與色界異。無漏善法由三緣捨:一由得果,謂得果時捨前向道及果道故;二由練根,謂練根位由得利道捨鈍道故;三由退失,謂得退時退失果道勝果道故。

Ru-Yi Translation

How are meditative and uncontaminated restraint and the like relinquished? Verse: meditation-born wholesome dharmas are relinquished through changing levels, falling back, and so on; noble ones' [uncontaminated dharmas] are relinquished through attaining a fruit, sharpening the faculties, and falling back. Prose: wholesome dharmas bound to the meditative levels are relinquished through two causes: first, through changing levels — that is, when one rises from a lower level to be born in a higher one, or falls from a higher level to be born in a lower one; second, through falling back — that is, when one regresses from meditative merit already attained. The word "and so on" is meant to indicate that relinquishing one's class of existence also relinquishes a lesser portion of superior wholesome roots, and that, just as wholesome dharmas in the form realm are relinquished through changing levels and falling back, the same holds for the formless realm as well, the only difference being that it lacks restraint, unlike the form realm. Uncontaminated wholesome dharmas are relinquished through three causes: first, through attaining a fruit — that is, upon attaining a fruit, one relinquishes both the preceding path leading toward that fruit and the path of the fruit itself; second, through sharpening the faculties — that is, at the stage of sharpening one's faculties, attaining the sharp-faculty path causes the dull-faculty path to be relinquished; third, through falling back — that is, upon regressing, one loses both the path of the fruit and the superior path built upon the fruit.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The "sharpening the faculties" (練根) cause deserves a brief gloss, since it names a distinctively Abhidharma soteriological process: a practitioner who has attained a fruit of realization with comparatively "dull" faculties can, through further practice, convert to the same attainment via "sharp" faculties instead — not advancing to a higher fruit, but achieving the same level of realization on a more capable cognitive basis, which the treatise treats as relinquishing the dull-faculty path in favor of the sharp-faculty version of the very same attainment. This is a distinct mechanism from either advancing to a new fruit or regressing from one already held, and rounds out the three ways an uncontaminated path can change hands within this system.

The passing clarification that the formless realm lacks restraint entirely (while having the same change-of-level and falling-back loss-mechanisms for its other wholesome states) connects directly back to fascicle 14's own discussion of why the formless realm cannot support unmanifested karma at all, since it lacks the great elements any restraint would need to depend on, and its meditative absorption actively suppresses the perception of form altogether — this section simply confirms that the same absence carries through consistently into this fascicle's discussion of how restraint, where it exists, is eventually lost.

15. How Non-Restraint Is Lost, and Whether Upavāsa Only Suspends It

Having covered how restraint is lost, the treatise turns to non-restraint. It is relinquished through three causes: death, since this removes the very physical basis non-restraint depended on; obtaining wholesome restraint, since receiving the restraint of individual liberation or attaining meditative restraint automatically extinguishes non-restraint entirely — wholesome and unwholesome precept-vows being mutually opposed in nature, with the wholesome side always prevailing in this contest — and a spontaneous, simultaneous arising of both sexual characteristics, which alters the underlying physical basis. A further point is added: someone living in non-restraint who has, for now, simply set aside the tools of their trade (the knife, the net) without ever having actually taken up wholesome restraint has not yet genuinely relinquished their non-restraint at all — much as avoiding whatever triggered an illness does not itself cure that illness without the proper medicine. This raises a puzzle: if such a person temporarily receives the one-day upavāsa vow, does non-restraint's underlying condition become good restraint, or merely become the neutral "in-between" state (neither restraint nor non-restraint), once that single day has passed? Some hold that this person still counts as retaining their basic non-restraint throughout, since a corrupted underlying disposition is not permanently extinguished merely by one day's formal observance — comparable to hot iron cooling to a dull glow without actually returning to its original color. Others hold that, absent any subsequent action to actually resume their trade, there is no remaining basis for continuing to call them "living in non-restraint" at all, since non-restraint depends specifically on manifested karma to be sustained.

Chinese Source

如是已說捨諸律儀。不律儀云何捨?頌曰: 捨惡戒由死, 得戒二形生。 論曰:諸不律儀,由三緣捨:一者由死捨所依故。二由得戒,謂若受得別解律儀,或由獲得靜慮律儀,惡戒便捨。由因緣力得律儀時,諸不律儀一切皆斷,以善惡戒其性相違,善戒於中勢力強故。三由相續二形俱生,以於爾時所依變故。住惡戒者,雖或有時起不作思捨刀網等,若不受得諸善律儀,諸不律儀無容棄捨。譬如雖避發病因緣,不服良藥病終難愈。不律儀者受近住戒,至夜盡位捨律儀時,為得不律儀、為名處中者?有餘師說:得不律儀,惡阿世耶非永捨故,如停熱鐵赤滅青生。有餘師言:若不更作,無緣令彼得不律儀,以不律儀依表得故。

Ru-Yi Translation

Having discussed how restraint is relinquished in this way, how is non-restraint relinquished? Verse: bad precept-vow is relinquished through death, through obtaining restraint, or through the simultaneous arising of both sexual characteristics. Prose: non-restraint is relinquished through three causes. First, through death, since this relinquishes the physical basis it depends on. Second, through obtaining restraint — that is, if one receives the restraint of individual liberation, or attains meditative restraint, the bad precept-vow is thereby relinquished; when restraint is obtained through the power of its causes and conditions, all non-restraint is entirely cut off, since wholesome and unwholesome precept-vows are opposed in nature, and the wholesome precept's force prevails between the two. Third, through the simultaneous arising of both sexual characteristics in one's continuum, since the physical basis is thereby altered at that moment. For one abiding in a bad precept-vow, even if they at some point give rise to the intention not to act and set aside the knife, the net, and the like, if they have not received any wholesome restraint, their non-restraint cannot be said to be relinquished — just as, though one may avoid whatever triggered an illness, without taking the proper medicine, the illness will ultimately be difficult to cure. [Question:] For one living in non-restraint who receives the upavāsa precept, once the point of the night's passing arrives and the restraint is relinquished, does this person then obtain non-restraint again, or should they be called one in the "in-between" state? Some teachers say: they obtain non-restraint again, since the corrupted underlying disposition is not permanently relinquished — like hot iron whose glow dims from red to a duller color [without actually returning to its original state]. Other teachers say: if the person does not act again, there is no cause for them to obtain non-restraint, since non-restraint depends on manifested karma to be obtained.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The hot-iron analogy and its rival, "no cause without renewed action" position, present a genuinely unresolved question about moral identity that the treatise leaves open rather than settling: does someone's habitual, corrupted disposition persist as a standing background condition even through a temporary lapse in actual wrongdoing (like iron that never truly returns to its unheated state, only cooling in appearance), or does the technical status of "non-restraint" require some ongoing manifested basis to remain in force at all, such that a genuine pause (even brief) removes the classification entirely until the person resumes their trade? We have preserved this as a recorded disagreement between unnamed groups of teachers, consistent with the treatise's practice elsewhere in this fascicle of leaving certain fine-grained disputes visibly unsettled.

The three causes for losing non-restraint mirror, in reverse, the earlier three causes for losing restraint from a few sections back (death, obtaining the opposite state, and sex-change) — a symmetry consistent with this fascicle's overall method, where restraint and non-restraint are consistently treated as structural mirror images of one another, differing only in moral valence, not in the underlying causal architecture governing how each is gained and lost.

16. Six Causes for Losing "In-Between" Unmanifested Karma

The treatise now turns to how the "in-between" category's unmanifested karma (such as ordinary merit generated outside the context of restraint or non-restraint) is eventually lost, naming six distinct causes. First, through revoking one's original intention — deliberately deciding, "from this time on, I abandon what I previously committed to." Second, through the underlying force behind it being exhausted — since unmanifested karma driven by the power of faith or affliction has a natural limit to its momentum, and once that momentum is spent, the unmanifested karma ceases, much like a shot arrow or a potter's wheel eventually stops once the force that set it moving runs out. Third, through the relevant action itself ceasing — simply no longer doing what one had previously been doing. Fourth, through the destruction of the object involved — meaning the physical thing given, such as a donated monastery building, furnishings, shrine, garden, or grove, or the equipment used for wrongdoing, such as traps and nets, ceasing to exist. Fifth, through the end of one's lifespan, since this changes the very physical basis the karma depended on. Sixth, through the severing of one's wholesome roots, since this cuts off the unmanifested, non-material wholesome karma of the desire realm along with every other non-material defiled dharma at the same time.

Chinese Source

處中無表捨復云何?頌曰: 捨中由受勢, 作事壽根斷。 論曰:處中無表,捨由六緣:一由受心斷壞故捨,謂捨所受,作是念言:我從今時棄先所受。二由勢力斷壞故捨,謂由淨信煩惱勢力所引無表,彼二限勢若斷壞時無表便捨,如所放箭及陶家輪,弦等勢力盡時便止。三由作業斷壞故捨,謂如所受後更不作。四由事物斷壞故捨。事物者何?謂所捨施寺舍敷具制多園林,及所施為罝網等事。五由壽命斷壞故捨,謂所依止有轉易故。六由善根斷壞故捨,謂起加行斷善根時,便捨善根所引無表欲非色善,及餘一切非色染法。

Ru-Yi Translation

How, then, is "in-between" unmanifested karma relinquished? Verse: the in-between category is relinquished through the breakdown of intention, force, action, object, lifespan, or wholesome roots. Prose: "in-between" unmanifested karma is relinquished through six causes. First, through the breakdown of the intention behind its reception — that is, relinquishing what one had committed to, thinking, "from this time on, I abandon what I previously committed to." Second, through the breakdown of its underlying force — that is, unmanifested karma drawn forth by the force of pure faith or of affliction is relinquished once that force's own natural limit breaks down, just as a released arrow, or a potter's wheel, comes to a stop once the force of the bowstring or the like is exhausted. Third, through the breakdown of the action itself — that is, no longer performing afterward what one had previously undertaken. Fourth, through the breakdown of the object involved. What is meant by "object"? It refers to a donated monastery building, furnishings, shrine, garden, or grove, as well as equipment set up for wrongdoing, such as traps and nets. Fifth, through the breakdown of one's lifespan — that is, because the physical basis one depends on undergoes change. Sixth, through the breakdown of one's wholesome roots — that is, when one undertakes the deliberate effort of severing one's wholesome roots, this relinquishes the desire realm's non-material wholesome unmanifested karma drawn forth by those wholesome roots, along with every other non-material defiled dharma at the same time.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The arrow-and-potter's-wheel analogy for the "breakdown of force" cause is a nice, concrete illustration of a subtle point: some unmanifested karma is not sustained by an ongoing, actively-renewed intention at all, but simply by the residual momentum of an earlier act of faith or affliction, which naturally exhausts itself over time the way physical momentum does — no further deliberate decision to "stop" is needed for this kind of unmanifested karma to end, unlike the first cause (revoking one's intention), which does require an active decision.

This sixfold list should be read as a comprehensive counterpart to the various individual causes named earlier for restraint and non-restraint's own loss — where restraint and non-restraint were each governed by three or four fairly specific causes tailored to their particular nature (a vow's ceremonial character, a livelihood's ongoing performance), this "in-between" category, being a broader and more heterogeneous class of unmanifested karma, requires a correspondingly broader sixfold list to cover every way its more varied instances (a one-time donation, a habitual vow, an occasional act of solemn intention) might each come to an end.

17. Losing Wholesome and Defiled Non-Material Dharmas

The treatise now generalizes beyond unmanifested karma specifically to address the loss of non-material dharmas more broadly. All of the desire realm's wholesome non-material dharmas are lost through two causes: severing one's wholesome roots outright, or being reborn into a higher realm, which leaves the desire realm's own wholesome states behind. Defiled non-material dharmas, across all three realms alike, are lost through a single cause: the arising of the specific antidote-path capable of overcoming them. Whatever class of affliction a given antidote-path is capable of severing, that path's arising causes exactly those afflictions, together with their accompanying mental factors, to be relinquished — and by no other means, since nothing short of the actual antidote itself can accomplish this severing.

Chinese Source

捨復云何?頌曰: 捨欲非色善, 由根斷上生, 由對治道生, 捨諸非色染。 論曰:欲界一切非色善法,捨由二緣:一斷善根、二生上界。三界一切非色染法捨由一緣,謂彼但由對治道起。若此品類能斷道生,當捨此中所有煩惱及彼助伴,非餘方便。

Ru-Yi Translation

How, then, is this relinquished? Verse: the desire realm's non-material wholesome dharmas are relinquished through severing the roots or rebirth in a higher realm; non-material defiled dharmas are relinquished through the arising of the antidote-path. Prose: all of the desire realm's non-material wholesome dharmas are relinquished through two causes: first, severing the wholesome roots; second, being reborn into a higher realm. All non-material defiled dharmas across the three realms are relinquished through a single cause: namely, that they arise [as objects to be overcome] specifically through the antidote-path. Whenever this particular class of path capable of severing them arises, the afflictions comprised within it, together with their supporting companions, are relinquished — and by no other means.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This section functions as a brief but important generalizing bridge in the treatise's overall argument: having spent many sections working through the specific, technical loss-conditions for restraint, non-restraint, and "in-between" unmanifested karma (all of which are matter, on the Vaibhāṣika view), the treatise now steps back to note that ordinary mental dharmas — wholesome states of mind and afflictions themselves — follow a much simpler pattern of loss, governed respectively by the wholesome-root/realm-change distinction already used elsewhere in this fascicle, and by the direct action of the specific antidote-path corresponding to each affliction. This sets up a clean contrast: unmanifested karma requires an elaborate, multi-causal account of its loss precisely because it is a subtle form of matter with its own independent causal history, whereas ordinary mental afflictions are relinquished by nothing more complicated than the direct application of their designated remedy.

The phrase "and by no other means" is a small but important closing qualification: it forecloses the possibility that an affliction could simply fade away through neglect, distraction, or the passage of time alone — within this system, only the specific antidote-path matched to a given class of affliction can actually sever it, a point with real practical stakes for how this tradition understands the necessity of systematic meditative and doctrinal training on the path to liberation.

18. Which Beings Can Hold Good or Bad Precepts

The treatise now surveys, systematically, exactly which beings across the cosmos are even capable of holding restraint or non-restraint at all. Non-restraint exists only within the human realm, and even there, only in three of the four continents — never in Uttarakuru — and, within those three continents, never among two further categories: those born without functioning sexual organs (paṇḍaka) and hermaphrodites possessing both sexual characteristics at once. The same exclusions apply to restraint, which exists among humans (minus these same exclusions) and additionally among gods, making restraint possible in two realms of existence rather than one. Scripture itself, the treatise argues, confirms that paṇḍakas and hermaphrodites cannot hold restraint: the sūtra addressed to Mahānāman specifies that only someone "whose male faculties are complete" can properly declare themselves an upāsaka, and the Vinaya separately instructs that such persons should be excluded from the community altogether. The treatise offers a two-part rationale for why this class of persons cannot hold restraint: the afflictions arising from their dual or absent physical basis operate with unusual intensity within a single continuum, and this same condition leaves them incapable of sound, deliberate reflection and without the capacity for a sufficiently intense sense of shame and conscience. Yet, if this is so, one might ask why they also lack non-restraint — and the answer is that their minds, even with respect to unwholesome conduct, remain too unsettled and inconstant to sustain a fixed, totalizing commitment to wrongdoing either; since restraint and non-restraint are defined as structural opposites of one another, wherever one is genuinely possible, so is the other, and wherever one is impossible, so is the other. Uttarakuru's inhabitants, similarly, lack both wholesome and unwholesome precepts, since they lack the capacity for any formal ceremony of reception, lack meditative concentration, and lack any superior, totalizing intention to commit wrongdoing. And beings in the unfortunate destinies (hell-beings, hungry ghosts, and animals) likewise have neither, since they lack the intense sense of shame and conscience that restraint and non-restraint alike require as their necessary condition — much as salty, alkaline soil, observably incapable of nourishing either fine crops or noxious weeds, is equally unable to produce either wholesome or unwholesome precepts. A sūtra's mention of an egg-born nāga periodically leaving its palace to seek the eightfold upavāsa precept among humans is explained as describing the attainment of virtuous conduct resembling restraint, not restraint itself. In sum: restraint exists only among humans and gods, with humans alone possessing all three kinds of restraint, while gods possess only meditative and uncontaminated restraint — extending to every heaven except the formless realm (which lacks restraint altogether), and excluding, even within the form and desire realms, the heaven of no-perception and the intermediate meditative state between the first and second absorptions.

Chinese Source

善惡律儀何有情有?頌曰: 惡戒人除北, 二黃門二形, 律儀亦在天, 唯人具三種。 生欲天色界, 有靜慮律儀, 無漏并無色, 除中定無想。 論曰:唯於人趣有不律儀,然除北洲唯三方有。於三洲內,復除扇搋及半擇迦具二形者。律儀亦爾,謂於人中除前所除,并天亦有,故於二趣容有律儀。復以何緣知扇搋等所有相續非律儀依?由經律中有誠證故。謂契經說,佛告大名:諸有在家白衣男子男根成就,歸佛法僧起殷淨心發誠諦語,自稱我是鄔波索迦,願尊憶持慈悲護念。齊是名曰鄔波索迦。毘奈耶中亦作是說:汝應除棄此色類人。故知律儀非彼類有。復由何理彼無律儀?由二所依所起煩惱,於一相續俱增上故、於正思擇無堪能故、無有極重慚愧心故。若爾,何故無不律儀?彼於惡中心不定故。又若是處有善律儀,則惡律儀於彼亦有,由此二種相翻立故。北俱盧人無受及定,及無造惡勝阿世耶,是故彼無善戒惡戒。猛利慚愧惡趣中無,故律不律儀於彼亦非有。與勝慚愧相應相違,方有律儀不律儀故。又扇搋等如醎鹵田,故不能生善戒惡戒。世間現見諸醎鹵田,不能滋生嘉苗穢草。若爾,何故契經中言有卵生龍,半月八日每從宮出來至人間,求受八支近住齋戒。此得妙行,非得律儀。是故律儀唯人天有,然唯人具三種,於天唯有靜慮無漏二種律儀,除無色界,通餘天有,唯除無想及靜慮中間。

Ru-Yi Translation

Which sentient beings possess wholesome or unwholesome restraint? Verse: bad precept-vow exists only among humans, excluding Uttarakuru, paṇḍakas, and hermaphrodites; restraint exists among these same [humans] and also among gods, but only humans possess all three kinds; among those born in the desire and form-realm heavens, there is meditative restraint, and, together with the formless realm, uncontaminated restraint, excluding the intermediate absorption and the heaven of no-perception. Prose: non-restraint exists only within the human realm, and, even there, only in three of the four continents, excluding Uttarakuru. Within these three continents, it is further excluded for paṇḍakas and those possessing both sexual characteristics. Restraint is the same — that is, among humans, excluding those just excluded, and also existing among gods; hence restraint is possible within these two realms of existence. [Question:] By what means is it known that the continua of paṇḍakas and the like are not a basis for restraint? [Reply:] Because there is clear scriptural and Vinaya evidence for this. A sūtra states, the Buddha addressing Mahānāman: "Any layperson clothed in white whose male faculties are complete, who takes refuge in the Buddha, the Dharma, and the Saṅgha with a sincere and pure mind, and, with truthful speech, declares, 'I am an upāsaka' ... to this extent is called an upāsaka." The Vinaya likewise states: "You should exclude this kind of person." Hence it is known that restraint is not possessed by this class of being. [Question:] By what reasoning do they lack restraint? [Reply:] Because the afflictions arising from their dual physical basis operate with intensified force within a single continuum, because they lack the capacity for sound, deliberate reflection, and because they lack an intense sense of shame and conscience. [Objection:] If this is so, why do they also lack non-restraint? [Reply:] Because their minds, even with respect to wrongdoing, are unsettled and inconstant. Moreover, wherever wholesome restraint is possible, unwholesome restraint is possible there as well, since the two are established as mutual opposites. The people of Uttarakuru lack both the capacity for formal reception and for meditative concentration, and lack any superior, totalizing disposition toward wrongdoing; hence they possess neither wholesome nor unwholesome precepts. Intense shame and conscience are absent in the unfortunate destinies; hence restraint and non-restraint are likewise absent there, since restraint and non-restraint exist only where they can be associated with, or opposed to, an intense sense of shame and conscience. Moreover, paṇḍakas and the like are like salty, alkaline soil, and hence cannot generate either wholesome or unwholesome precepts — just as salty, alkaline soil is observed in the world to be incapable of nourishing either fine crops or noxious weeds. [Objection:] If this is so, why does a sūtra speak of an egg-born nāga who, on the eighth day of each half-month, leaves its palace to come among humans and seek to receive the eightfold upavāsa precept? [Reply:] This attains virtuous conduct, not restraint itself. Hence restraint exists only among humans and gods; only humans, however, possess all three kinds. Among gods, there is only meditative and uncontaminated restraint — extending, together with the formless realm, to the remaining heavens, excluding only the heaven of no-perception and the intermediate meditative state.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We want to be transparent about what this section is: a faithful record of this treatise's own historical, cosmological reasoning about which beings can hold monastic and lay precepts, reflecting categories and assumptions specific to ancient Indian Buddhist scholasticism rather than a claim we are endorsing or updating for a contemporary audience. The terms 扇搋 (paṇḍaka, typically glossed as someone lacking functioning male sexual organs) and 半擇迦/二形 (a person possessing both sexual characteristics) are technical categories from the Vinaya's own ordination-eligibility rules, which this treatise inherits and rationalizes rather than originates; we have translated them as literally and neutrally as the source allows, without softening or amplifying the text's own reasoning, consistent with this project's commitment to translating exactly what the treatise says.

The salt-flat analogy is the treatise's own chosen illustration for its claim that certain classes of beings are constitutionally incapable of the "totalizing," singularly-directed mental disposition this fascicle has argued, at length, underlies both restraint and non-restraint alike (see sections 3–8 of this fascicle) — the argument is symmetrical by the treatise's own design: since restraint and non-restraint are treated as structural mirror-opposites requiring the same underlying capacity for total, unwavering commitment, whatever excludes a being from one automatically excludes them from the other. The nāga anecdote is handled the same way this treatise handled a similar case back in fascicle 8 — a scriptural detail that looks, on its surface, like a counterexample is resolved by distinguishing genuine restraint from mere "virtuous conduct resembling restraint," a distinction this fascicle has used more than once already for borderline cases (compare the mute-butcher discussion earlier in this same fascicle).

19. Closing the Restraint Survey, and a New Topic: Sūtra Classifications of Karma

The treatise closes out its survey of restraint by realm: anyone born in the desire-realm heavens or the form realm can possess meditative restraint; this is never possible for anyone born in the formless realm, since it lacks any physical basis for it. Uncontaminated restraint, however, is also possible in the formless realm — those born in the desire-realm heavens or the form realm can possess uncontaminated restraint (excluding, once again, the intermediate absorption and the heaven of no-perception), while those born in the formless realm can merely possess it in the sense of an abstract capacity, without it ever actually manifesting there, since the formless realm's very nature precludes anything manifesting in an active, present sense at all. Having now finished distinguishing the different natures and characteristics of karma across these many sections, the treatise turns to a new task: explaining several further, distinct classifications of karma given directly in the sūtras themselves, beginning with the sūtra's own threefold division into wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral karma. Wholesome karma is so named because it is "secure" — capable of yielding a desirable ripened result, or nirvāṇa itself, and thereby rescuing beings from suffering, whether temporarily or permanently. Unwholesome karma is the reverse, bringing about an undesirable ripened result, opposite in nature to the secure quality of wholesome karma. Neutral karma is named for being neither of the first two, since it cannot properly be classified as either wholesome or unwholesome.

Chinese Source

若生欲天及生色界,皆容得有靜慮律儀,生無色界彼必非有,無漏律儀亦在無色。謂若生在欲界天中及生色界中,除中定無想,皆容得有無漏律儀。生無色中唯得成就,以無色故必不現起。因辯諸業性相不同,當釋經中所摽諸業。且經中說業有三種,善、惡、無記。其相云何?頌曰: 安不安非業, 名善惡無記。 論曰:如是名為善等業相,謂安隱業說名為善,能得可愛異熟涅槃,暫永二時濟眾苦故。不安隱業名為不善,由此能招非愛異熟,與前安隱性相違故。非前二業立無記名,不可記為善不善故。

Ru-Yi Translation

If one is born in the desire-realm heavens or in the form realm, one may possess meditative restraint; if born in the formless realm, this is certainly not possible. Uncontaminated restraint also exists with respect to the formless realm. That is, if born in the desire-realm heavens or in the form realm, excluding the intermediate absorption and the heaven of no-perception, one may possess uncontaminated restraint; if born in the formless realm, one merely possesses it [as an abstract capacity], since, being formless, it certainly does not manifest in an active, present sense there. Having thus distinguished the different natures and characteristics of these various karmas, we should now explain the various kinds of karma indicated in the sūtras. A sūtra states that karma is of three kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral. What are their characteristics? Verse: what is secure and what is insecure, and what is neither, are named wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral karma. Prose: these are the characteristics named wholesome and the rest. "Secure" karma is called wholesome, since it is capable of obtaining a desirable ripened result, or nirvāṇa, thereby rescuing beings from suffering, whether temporarily or permanently. "Insecure" karma is called unwholesome, since it brings about an undesirable ripened result, being opposite in nature to the "secure" quality described above. Karma that is neither of the first two is given the name "neutral," since it cannot be classified as either wholesome or unwholesome.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The choice to gloss "wholesome" (善) through the word "secure" (安隱, roughly "safe," "settled," or "free from danger") is a distinctive etymological move worth flagging: rather than defining wholesome karma primarily by its moral content (non-harm, generosity, and the like, as earlier fascicles' discussions of the wholesome roots did), this definition characterizes it functionally, by its effect — karma is wholesome precisely insofar as it leads somewhere secure, whether a pleasant rebirth or, at the far end of the scale, liberation itself. This mirrors a move already seen in fascicle 13's fourfold framework for wholesome/unwholesome dharmas (ultimate reality / intrinsic nature / association / initiation), where "wholesome by ultimate reality" was likewise defined through nirvāṇa's own quality of complete security rather than through any specific moral content.

This section marks a genuine pivot point in the fascicle's structure: everything from the beginning of this fascicle through the previous section has been building a systematic account of restraint and non-restraint specifically, but the treatise now steps back to address several independent, sūtra-derived classification schemes for karma in general — wholesome/unwholesome/neutral here, with at least two more schemes (merit/non-merit/the "unmoving," and karma sorted by the kind of feeling it yields) explicitly flagged as still to come in the material immediately following this section.

20. Merit, Non-Merit, and "Unmoving" Karma

A second sūtra classification divides karma into merit, non-merit, and "unmoving" karma. Desire-realm wholesome karma is called meritorious, since it brings about a desirable result that benefits sentient beings; unwholesome karma is called non-meritorious, since it brings about an undesirable result that harms sentient beings; wholesome karma belonging to the two higher realms (form and formless) is called "unmoving." This raises an immediate objection: doesn't the Buddha himself describe the lower three meditative absorptions as still involving "movement," since the noble ones describe the subtle mental activity of investigation and analysis present there as a kind of disturbance not yet fully stilled? The treatise resolves this by distinguishing two different senses of "movement": the lower three absorptions are called "moving" specifically because that residual mental activity has not yet been quieted, but they are nonetheless called "unmoving" in the sense relevant here, which concerns whether the karma's resulting ripened effect is fixed or variable, not whether the meditative state itself still contains subtle disturbance. The key difference is this: ordinary desire-realm karma can ripen in an entirely different destiny than originally set in motion, redirected by other conditioning factors — karma initially oriented toward a heavenly rebirth with certain wealth, status, physical form, strength, and pleasure might, under other influences, instead ripen among humans — whereas karma belonging to the form and formless realms can never be redirected this way; it always ripens exactly within the specific realm and level for which it was generated, with no possibility of transfer elsewhere, and it is precisely this fixed, non-transferable correspondence between karma and its result that earns it the name "unmoving."

Chinese Source

又經中說:業有三種,福非福等。其相云何?頌曰: 福非福不動, 欲善業名福, 不善名非福, 上界善不動, 約自地處所, 業果無動故。 論曰:欲界善業說名為福,招可愛果益有情故。諸不善業說名非福,招非愛果損有情故。上二界善說名不動。豈不世尊說下三定皆名有動?聖說此中有尋伺等名為動故。由下三定有尋伺等,災患未息故立動名;不動經中據能感得不動異熟說名不動。如何有動定招無動異熟?雖此定中有災患動,而業對果非如欲界有動轉故,立不動名。謂欲界中餘趣處業,由別緣力異趣處受。以或有業能感外內財位形量色力樂等,於天等中此業應熟;由別緣力所引轉故,於人等中此業便熟。色無色界餘地處業,無容轉令異地處受,業果處定立不動名。

Ru-Yi Translation

Moreover, a sūtra states that karma is of three kinds: merit, non-merit, and the unmoving. What are their characteristics? Verse: merit, non-merit, and the unmoving — desire-realm wholesome karma is called merit, unwholesome karma is called non-merit, and the upper realms' wholesome karma is called unmoving, with respect to its own level and location, since its karmic result has no movement. Prose: desire-realm wholesome karma is called merit, since it brings about a desirable result that benefits sentient beings. Unwholesome karma is called non-merit, since it brings about an undesirable result that harms sentient beings. Wholesome karma of the two upper realms is called unmoving. [Objection:] Does the Blessed One not state that the lower three meditative absorptions are all called "moving"? [Reply:] The noble ones speak of investigation and analysis present within these as being called "movement" [in that specific sense]. Because the lower three absorptions still have investigation and analysis, since their disturbance has not yet been stilled, they are given the name "moving" [in that sense]; but in the sūtra concerning "the unmoving," the name is given with reference to their capacity to bring about a fixed, unmoving ripened result. [Objection:] How could an absorption that still has movement bring about an unmoving ripened result? [Reply:] Although this absorption still has the disturbance of movement, with respect to how its karma corresponds to its result, it does not shift about the way desire-realm karma does, and hence it is given the name "unmoving." That is, karma belonging to other destinies within the desire realm can, through the power of other conditioning factors, ripen in a different destiny than originally directed — since there is karma capable of bringing about external and internal wealth, status, physical form, strength, pleasure, and the like, which, though it ought to ripen among the gods, is instead redirected by the power of other conditions and ripens among humans instead. Karma belonging to the other levels of the form and formless realms admits of no such redirection to ripen at a different level; since the karma's result and its own level are thus fixed, it is given the name "unmoving."

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The resolution of the "moving absorption yielding an unmoving result" puzzle hinges on a distinction well worth stating plainly, since the same Chinese character (動, "movement") is doing two quite different jobs in the same discussion: one sense describes a meditative state's own internal quality (whether subtle discursive mental activity is still present, as it is in the first three absorptions), while the other sense describes the reliability of the correspondence between a karmic cause and its eventual location of ripening (whether the result can be redirected elsewhere by other conditions, as ordinary desire-realm karma can). A meditative state can be "moving" in the first sense while its resulting karma is "unmoving" in the second, precisely because these are simply two unrelated properties that happen to share a common label in Buddhist technical vocabulary.

The underlying picture here — that desire-realm karma is comparatively "loose," its results capable of being redirected across different destinies by intervening conditions, while form- and formless-realm karma is "locked" to its originating level with no such flexibility — connects to a broader theme already visible elsewhere in this treatise's karma theory: the desire realm is consistently treated as the domain of contingency and mixture (recall fascicle 13's discussion of "mixed karma" bringing about both a delightful and an unpleasant result at once), while the higher meditative realms are consistently treated as domains of much greater causal determinacy, precisely because they are reached only through sustained, uniform meditative cultivation rather than the far more variable conditions of ordinary desire-realm conduct.

21. Karma Conducive to Pleasant, Painful, or Neutral Feeling

A third sūtra classification sorts karma by the kind of feeling it is conducive to yielding. Wholesome karma from the desire realm up through the third meditative absorption is called "conducive to pleasant feeling," since pleasant feeling itself extends only that far and no further; unwholesome karma is called "conducive to painful feeling"; and wholesome karma belonging to levels above the third absorption is called "conducive to neither painful nor pleasant feeling," since no pleasant or painful feeling exists anywhere above that point at all — with the general principle that such karma brings about not only the feeling itself as its result, but also everything that supports and accompanies that feeling. A dispute then arises over the intermediate absorption (positioned between the first and second root absorptions): some hold that even the lower levels, at this specific intermediate stage, possess a third kind of karma "conducive to neither" feeling, since the intermediate absorption's own karma must yield some ripened result — for otherwise, either this karma would have no ripened result at all, or it would not count as karma in the first place, given that it lacks any painful or pleasant ripened result to point to; and the Abhidharma's own root treatise confirms, through several explicit examples, that a single karmic cause can yield distinct manifested, mental, and non-associated-formation results without needing to ripen in sequential order, supporting the conclusion that lower-level "neither" karma genuinely exists, appropriately classified as wholesome, if comparatively weak.

Chinese Source

又經中說:業有三種,順樂受等。其相云何?頌曰: 順樂苦非二, 善至三順樂, 諸不善順苦, 上善順非二, 餘說下亦有, 由中招異熟。 論曰:諸善業中始從欲界至第三靜慮名順樂受業,以諸樂受唯至此故。諸不善業名順苦受。過三靜慮上地諸善業,說名為順不苦不樂受,此上都無苦樂受故。非此諸業唯感受果,應知亦感彼受資糧,受及資糧此中名受。有餘師說:下諸地中亦有第三順非二業,由中定業招異熟故。若異此者,中間定業應無異熟;或應無業,以無苦樂異熟果故。有餘師說:此業能感根本地中樂根異熟。有說:此業不感受果。二說俱與本論相違。故本論言:頗有業感心受異熟非身耶?曰:有,謂善無尋業。又本論說:頗有三業非前非後受異熟耶?曰:有,謂順樂受業色,順苦受業心心所法,順不苦不樂受業心不相應行,乃至廣說。由此證知,下地亦有順非二業,非離欲界有此三業俱時熟故。此業為善、為不善耶?是善而劣。

Ru-Yi Translation

Moreover, a sūtra states that karma is of three kinds: conducive to pleasant feeling, and so on. What are their characteristics? Verse: conducive to pleasant, painful, and neither: wholesome karma up through the third [absorption] is conducive to pleasant feeling; unwholesome karma is conducive to painful feeling; wholesome karma of the levels above is conducive to neither; other teachers say the lower levels also have this, since the intermediate absorption's karma yields a ripened result. Prose: among wholesome karmas, those from the desire realm up through the third meditative absorption are called conducive to pleasant feeling, since pleasant feelings extend only this far. Unwholesome karmas are called conducive to painful feeling. Wholesome karmas of the levels above the third absorption are called conducive to neither painful nor pleasant feeling, since above this point there is no painful or pleasant feeling at all. These karmas do not bring about only the feeling itself as their result; one should understand that they also bring about that feeling's supporting conditions — both the feeling and its supporting conditions are here called "feeling." Other teachers say: the lower levels also possess a third kind of karma conducive to neither, at the specific stage of the intermediate absorption, since the intermediate absorption's karma yields a ripened result. If this were not so, the intermediate absorption's karma would have no ripened result at all — or else it would not count as karma, since it would have no painful or pleasant ripened result. Other teachers say: this karma is capable of bringing about the pleasure-faculty ripened result belonging to the root level [above it]. Others say: this karma brings about no feeling-result at all. Both of these latter two positions contradict the root treatise. For the root treatise states: "Is there karma that brings about a mental-feeling ripened result but not a bodily one?" Answer: "There is — namely, wholesome, investigation-free karma." The root treatise further states: "Are there three kinds of karma that do not ripen in sequential order relative to one another?" Answer: "There are — namely, karma conducive to pleasant feeling ripening as matter, karma conducive to painful feeling ripening as mind and mental factors, and karma conducive to neither ripening as a non-associated formation," and so on at length. By this, it is confirmed that the lower levels, too, possess karma conducive to neither, since it is not the case that these three karmas ripen simultaneously only outside the desire realm. [Question:] Is this karma wholesome or unwholesome? [Reply:] It is wholesome, though weak.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The intermediate absorption (靜慮中間, dhyānāntara) referenced repeatedly throughout this fascicle is a specific, narrow meditative stage positioned between the first and second root absorptions, distinguished by retaining sustained investigation (vicāra) while having already abandoned initial application of mind (vitarka) — its unusual, transitional character is precisely why this treatise keeps returning to it as a special case requiring separate treatment (recall its repeated exclusion, alongside the heaven of no-perception, from various restraint- and karma-classifications throughout this fascicle). This section's dispute is essentially about whether this narrow, transitional stage's own karma needs an equally narrow, third category of feeling-conduciveness to accommodate it, given that it does not comfortably fit either the "pleasant" or standard "neither" categories mapped onto the levels around it.

The root-treatise citations here (from the Abhidharma foundational texts this Kośa is built to systematize and comment upon) are being used in their classic function throughout this literature: as authoritative proof-texts settling a live dispute by direct citation, rather than through further independent argument — the pattern of citing a rhetorical question-and-answer format ("Is there X? Answer: there is, namely...") is a recognizable citation style from the Abhidharma's own canonical treatises, and its appearance here signals that the treatise regards this specific technical point as already settled by prior authoritative scripture, even while other points in this same section remain open to genuine debate between named and unnamed teachers.

22. Five Senses of "Conducive to Feeling"

An objection presses on the very terminology used throughout this classification: since "conducive to pleasant feeling" was said to apply only up through the third absorption, does this contradict the wholesome karma existing at the intermediate absorption and other lower levels — and, more fundamentally, since karma and the feeling it produces are not identical in essential nature, how can karma properly be called "conducive to" a feeling at all? The treatise answers that the earlier definition was speaking only in a general, majority sense, and, on the deeper question, offers two compatible ways of understanding the relationship: karma can serve as the cause that brings about and benefits a subsequent feeling, or the feeling itself can be understood as what karma "receives" as its own ripened fruit, the way we speak of a purifying bath-powder as "conducive to bathing" even though the powder and the bathing are not the same thing. This terminological question opens onto a broader, fivefold analysis of exactly what "conducive to" a given feeling can mean: by intrinsic nature (any feeling at all, as feeling itself); by association (any contact, since a specific contact is inherently paired with a specific feeling); by object (any sense-object at all, since objects are what feeling takes as its target); by ripened result (specifically, karma that brings about a feeling as its ripened fruit — the sense actually intended throughout this classification); and by present manifestation (feeling actually occurring right now, since only currently-arising feeling can truly be said to be "received" in the fullest sense, as one feeling always ceases before another type can arise in its place).

Chinese Source

若爾,便與所說相違,謂善至三名順樂受,得可愛果名為善業。應知彼據多分為言。此業與受體性既殊,如何說為順樂受等?業與樂受體性雖殊,而能為因利益樂受。或復此業是樂所受。彼樂如何能受於業?樂是此業異熟果故。或復彼樂是業所受,由此能受樂異熟故。如順浴散,此亦應然。是故名為順樂受業。順餘二業,應知亦爾。總說順受略有五種:一自性順受,謂一切受,如契經說:受樂受時如實了知受於樂受,乃至廣說。二相應順受,謂一切觸,如契經說:順樂受觸,乃至廣說。三所緣順受,謂一切境,如契經說:眼見色已,唯受於色不受色貪,乃至廣說,由色等是受所緣故。四異熟順受,謂感異熟業,如契經說:順現受業,乃至廣說。五現前順受,謂正現行受,如契經言:受樂受時二受便滅,乃至廣說。非此樂受現在前時有餘受能受此樂受,但據樂受自體現前即說名為受於樂受。此中但說異熟順受,由業能招受異熟故。雖業與受體性有殊,而得名為順樂受等。

Ru-Yi Translation

[Objection:] If this is so, this contradicts what was already said — that wholesome karma up through the third [absorption] is called conducive to pleasant feeling, since obtaining a desirable result is what is called wholesome karma. [Reply:] One should understand that this earlier statement was made with reference to the majority of cases. [Further objection:] Since karma and feeling differ in essential nature, how can karma be called conducive to pleasant feeling and the like? [Reply:] Although karma and pleasant feeling differ in essential nature, karma is nonetheless able to serve as a cause that benefits pleasant feeling. Or, alternatively, this feeling may be understood as what is "received" by the karma. [Objection:] How could that feeling "receive" the karma? [Reply:] Because that feeling is this karma's own ripened fruit. Or, alternatively, that feeling may be understood as what the karma itself "receives," since it is by this that the feeling as ripened fruit comes to be received — just as one speaks of a bathing-powder as "conducive to bathing"; this should be understood the same way. Hence it is called karma conducive to pleasant feeling; the other two kinds of karma should be understood likewise. In general, "conducive to feeling" may be briefly stated as fivefold: first, conducive-to-feeling by intrinsic nature, referring to feeling itself in general, as a sūtra states, "at the time of experiencing a pleasant feeling, one truly understands that one is experiencing a pleasant feeling," and so on at length; second, conducive-to-feeling by association, referring to contact in general, as a sūtra states, "contact conducive to pleasant feeling," and so on at length; third, conducive-to-feeling by object, referring to sense-objects in general, as a sūtra states, "having seen form with the eye, one experiences only the form, not craving for the form," and so on at length, since form and the like are what feeling takes as its object; fourth, conducive-to-feeling by ripened result, referring to karma that brings about a ripened result, as a sūtra states, "karma conducive to feeling in this very life," and so on at length; fifth, conducive-to-feeling by present manifestation, referring to feeling actually occurring in the present, as a sūtra states, "at the moment of experiencing a pleasant feeling, the other two feelings have already ceased," and so on at length — it is not that, while this pleasant feeling is currently manifest, some other feeling is also able to be experienced at that same moment; rather, it is simply with reference to the pleasant feeling's own presence in the moment that one speaks of "experiencing pleasant feeling." What is discussed in the present context is specifically conducive-to-feeling by ripened result, since it is karma's capacity to bring about feeling as its ripened result that is at issue — and although karma and feeling differ in essential nature, karma can nonetheless properly be called conducive to pleasant feeling and the like.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The bathing-powder analogy is a small but useful illustration of a broader linguistic point this treatise makes repeatedly across many fascicles: ordinary language regularly uses a "conducive to X" or "X-producing" construction to link two things that are not identical in kind but stand in a specific causal or object relationship to one another (the powder is not the bath, but enables it), and this same loose, causally-grounded usage is what licenses calling karma "conducive to pleasant feeling" even though karma, as a form of volition or physical action, is a completely different kind of thing from feeling itself.

The fivefold breakdown here is a good example of this treatise's characteristic move of taking a single scriptural phrase and showing it can bear several genuinely distinct technical senses depending on context, each with its own supporting citation — a technique used to prevent readers from collapsing what look like similar statements in different sūtras into a single, oversimplified meaning. Only the fourth sense (by ripened result) is actually the one at stake in this section's karma-classification discussion; the other four are laid out mainly to sharpen, by contrast, exactly what that fourth sense does and does not include.

23. Karma Classified by When It Ripens

The treatise now classifies karma by the determinacy of its ripening time. Each of the three feeling-conducive karmas just discussed further divides into determinate and indeterminate varieties, "indeterminate" meaning simply that the karma is not guaranteed to actually ripen at all. Determinate karma itself divides into three: karma that ripens within this very life, karma that ripens in the immediately following life, and karma that ripens only from the third life onward. Together with indeterminate karma, this yields four categories overall — though some propose a fifth, further splitting indeterminate karma into two varieties (determinate as to its eventual ripening but indeterminate as to timing, versus indeterminate on both counts) alongside the three determinate categories. "Ripening in this very life" means karma created and ripened within one and the same lifetime; "ripening in the next life" means karma created in this life that ripens in the second life following; "ripening later" means karma created in this life that ripens only from the third life onward, in due sequence. Other teachers propose a different definition entirely: karma "ripening in this life" can, in fact, also ripen in a later life, with the category-name simply reflecting whichever occasion the karma happens to ripen first, since otherwise an unusually powerful act of karma would seem to yield only a comparatively minor result by being artificially confined to a single lifetime. The Vaibhāṣika reject this alternative, since some karma's result is close at hand without necessarily being especially powerful, and other karma's result is delayed despite arising from an act that seems, if anything, more intense — comparable to how, among ordinary plant seeds, mallow fruits within a mere month and a half, while wheat requires a full six months to mature. The Dārṣṭāntika masters, meanwhile, offer their own fourfold analysis: karma determinate in timing but indeterminate in whether it ripens at all (the three named "ripens-in" categories); karma determinate in that it will ripen but indeterminate in timing (ordinary indeterminate karma that nonetheless is certain to eventually bear fruit); karma determinate in both respects (the three named categories when they are, in fact, certain to ripen); and karma indeterminate in both respects — yielding, on their reckoning, eight kinds of karma overall, since even "ripens-in-this-life" karma splits further into determinate and indeterminate varieties, and so on for the rest.

Chinese Source

如是三業有定不定,其相云何?頌曰: 此有定不定, 定三順現等, 或說業有五, 餘師說四句。 論曰:此上所說順樂受等,應知各有定不定異,非定受故立不定名。定復有三:一順現法受、二順次生受、三順後次受。此三定業并前不定總成四種。或有欲令不定受業復有二種,謂於異熟有定不定,并定業三合成五種。順現法受者,謂此生造即此生熟。順次生受者,謂此生造第二生熟。順後次受者,謂此生造從第三生後次第熟。有餘師說:順現法受業,餘生亦得熟。隨初熟位建立業名為順現等,勿強力業異熟果少。毘婆沙師不許此義,以或有業果近非勝或有相違。譬如外種經三半月葵便結實,要經六月麥方結實。譬喻者說業有四句:一者有業於時分定、異熟不定,謂順現等三非定得異熟。二者有業於異熟定、時分不定,謂不定業定得異熟。三者有業於二俱定,謂順現等定得異熟。四者有業於二俱不定,謂不定業非定得異熟。彼說諸業總成八種,謂順現受有定不定,乃至不定亦有二種。

Ru-Yi Translation

Do these three kinds of karma each have determinate and indeterminate varieties? What is their character? Verse: these have determinate and indeterminate varieties; the determinate kind is threefold, ripening-in-this-life and the rest; some speak of karma as fivefold; other teachers speak of a four-part analysis. Prose: each of the feeling-conducive karmas discussed above should be understood to have both determinate and indeterminate varieties, the latter so named because it is not guaranteed to actually ripen. The determinate kind is, in turn, threefold: first, ripening in this very life; second, ripening in the immediately following life; third, ripening later still. These three determinate karmas, together with the indeterminate kind, make four categories in all. Some wish to further divide indeterminate-ripening karma into two kinds — determinate or indeterminate as to its ripened result — which, together with the three determinate karmas, make five categories in all. "Ripening in this very life" means karma created in this life that ripens in this very same life. "Ripening in the next life" means karma created in this life that ripens in the second life following. "Ripening later" means karma created in this life that ripens only from the third life onward, in due sequence. Other teachers say: karma that "ripens in this life" can also ripen in a later life; the karma is simply named according to whichever occasion it happens to ripen first, lest a powerful karma should otherwise be said to yield only a diminished ripened result [by being artificially confined]. The Vaibhāṣika do not accept this position, since some karma's result is close at hand without being especially powerful, and some is otherwise, contrary to expectation — just as, among external seeds, the mallow bears fruit after three half-months, while wheat requires a full six months before bearing fruit. The Dārṣṭāntika masters speak of a four-part analysis of karma: first, karma determinate in its timing but indeterminate in its ripened result — namely, the three "ripens-in" categories, which are not guaranteed to actually ripen; second, karma determinate in its ripened result but indeterminate in timing — namely, indeterminate karma that is nonetheless certain to ripen; third, karma determinate in both respects — namely, the "ripens-in" categories when certain to ripen; fourth, karma indeterminate in both respects — namely, indeterminate karma not certain to ripen. They hold that karma thus comes to eight kinds in total, since "ripening in this life" itself has both determinate and indeterminate varieties, and the indeterminate category likewise has two varieties.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The mallow-and-wheat analogy is a genuinely elegant piece of empirical reasoning marshaled against a purely a priori assumption (that a "powerful" karma must always ripen quickly): the Vaibhāṣika point out that, in ordinary agricultural experience, a fast-maturing seed is not thereby a more potent one, and a slow-maturing seed is not thereby a weaker one — maturation speed and inherent potency are simply independent variables, and there is no reason karmic ripening should behave any differently. This lets them preserve the more intuitive, literal reading of the three named categories (fixed strictly by which life the karma actually ripens in) against the rival view that would redefine "ripens in this life" more loosely as "ripens whenever it first happens to ripen."

We should flag that "Dārṣṭāntika" (譬喻者, literally "those who argue by analogy/example") is generally understood in this literature as an earlier or related strand closely associated with, though not always perfectly identical to, the Sautrāntika school that has featured throughout this fascicle's other debates — the text itself treats their fourfold analysis as a distinct, named position rather than simply restating the Sautrāntika's usual view, and we have kept the name as its own school-label accordingly, without assuming the two labels are strictly interchangeable at every point in this literature.

24. Who Can Produce Which Combinations of Ripening-Time Karma

Working from the four-category division just established (ripening in this life, the next life, later lives, and indeterminately), the treatise takes up several further technical questions. First: can all four kinds of karma actually be produced together, at the very same moment? Yes — this can occur, for instance, when someone dispatches three separate messengers to carry out wrongdoing on their behalf while simultaneously and personally completing an act of sexual misconduct, generating all four ripening-categories of karma in that single moment. Second: how many of these four kinds of karma are capable of drawing forth a new class of rebirth-existence? Only three are capable of this — every category except karma ripening in this very life, since one's present class of existence was already drawn forth by earlier karma before this present life's own "ripens-in-this-life" karma could even begin operating. Third: which realms and destinies are capable of producing which of these four kinds? In general, every realm and destiny, whether inclined toward wholesome or unwholesome conduct, is capable of producing all four — but this general rule admits specific exceptions. Hell specifically cannot produce wholesome karma that ripens in this very life, since hell offers no prospect of a desirable result there; every other combination remains open to it. Those whose noble attainment is irreversible ("firm" ones) are considered specifically with respect to levels where desire has already been eliminated: ordinary, unenlightened beings at such levels cannot produce karma ripening in the next life, only the other three kinds; noble ones at such levels cannot produce karma ripening in either the next life or later lives, being left with only the remaining two kinds — since an ordinary being not yet free from backsliding could still, in principle, fall back and be reborn in a lower state in sequence, while an irreversible noble one can never again be reborn into any lower level once having left it. Every being, in any realm they are presently reborn into, remains capable of producing karma that ripens in this very life, and indeterminate karma is never restricted anywhere at all. There is, however, a further subtlety: noble ones who have already become free from desire with respect to the desire realm or the peak of existence, even if they should later fall back from that attainment, still do not produce karma ripening in a subsequent life, since anyone who falls back from such an attainment is guaranteed to eventually fall back to the very same fruit they originally attained — and, as will be explained later, one who has thus fallen back from a fruit can never actually die before regaining it.

Chinese Source

於此所說業差別中,頌曰: 四善容俱作, 引同分唯三, 諸處造四種, 地獄善除現。 堅於離染地, 異生不造生, 聖不造生後, 并欲有頂退。 論曰:順現法受等三業,唯定并不定為四。是說為善,此中唯顯時定不定,釋經所說四業相故。頗有四業俱時作耶?容有。云何?遣三使已,自行邪欲俱時究竟。幾業能引眾同分耶?能引唯三,除順現受,現身同分先業引故。何界何趣能造幾業?諸界諸趣或善或惡,隨其所應皆容造四。總開如是,若就別遮,於地獄中善除順現,無愛果故,餘皆得造。不退姓名堅,彼於離染地。若異生類,除順生受可造餘三。聖者雙除順生順後,可造餘二。異生不退,無次更生後還生下,不退聖者必無還生下諸地故。隨所生地容造順現受,造不定業一切處無遮。然諸聖者若於欲界及有頂處已得離染,雖有退墮而亦不造順生後業,從彼退者必退果故。諸退果已必不命終,如後當辯。

Ru-Yi Translation

Among these distinctions of karma just discussed, verse: it is good to say that all four can be produced together; only three can draw forth a new class of existence; every realm and destiny can produce all four; hell excludes wholesome karma ripening in this life; for the firm ones, at levels free from desire, ordinary beings do not produce karma ripening in the next life, and noble ones produce neither karma ripening in the next life nor karma ripening in later lives, together with falling back from the desire realm or the peak of existence. Prose: ripening-in-this-life and the other three kinds — determinate together with indeterminate — make four. This is stated as good, since it clarifies only the determinacy of timing, in order to explain the character of the four kinds of karma spoken of in the sūtras. Can all four kinds of karma be produced at once? This can indeed occur. How so? Having dispatched three messengers to carry out wrongdoing, one might, at that very same moment, personally complete an act of sexual misconduct. How many of these kinds of karma are capable of drawing forth a class of existence? Only three are capable of this, excluding karma ripening in this life, since one's present class of existence in this very body was already drawn forth by earlier karma. Which realm or destiny is capable of producing how many kinds of karma? Every realm and destiny, whether wholesome or unwholesome as appropriate, is capable of producing all four. This is the general rule; as for specific exceptions, hell excludes wholesome karma ripening in this life, since there is no desirable result there; it is capable of producing all the rest. "Firm" refers to those whose attainment is irreversible, considered here with respect to levels free from desire. Ordinary beings there can produce the remaining three, excluding karma ripening in the next life. Noble ones exclude both karma ripening in the next life and karma ripening in later lives, and are capable of producing only the remaining two. This is because an ordinary being not yet free from backsliding could, in due sequence, be reborn again in a lower state, whereas an irreversible noble one can certainly never again be reborn into any of the lower levels. In whatever level one is presently reborn, one is capable of producing karma ripening in this life; producing indeterminate karma is nowhere restricted at all. Yet, if noble ones have already attained freedom from desire with respect to the desire realm or the peak of existence, then, even should they fall back from this, they still do not produce karma ripening in a subsequent life, since one who falls back from such an attainment is certain to fall back all the way to that same fruit. Once one has thus fallen back from a fruit, one certainly cannot die [before regaining it], as will be explained later.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The claim that "one who falls back from a fruit can never actually die before regaining it" is a striking doctrinal point that the treatise explicitly flags as needing later, fuller explanation — we have kept it exactly as compressed as the source presents it, as a forward-pointing claim rather than a fully argued one at this stage, consistent with our practice of not supplying resolutions the text itself defers to a later point.

The messenger example for producing all four kinds of karma simultaneously is a nice illustration connecting back to fascicle 13's earlier discussion of causal versus momentary initiation and commissioned wrongdoing: dispatching agents to act on one's behalf generates karma that will only ripen once and if they actually complete their task (an indeterminate or delayed-ripening karma, depending on circumstance), while one's own simultaneous, personal act of misconduct can generate karma ripening in this very life — showing how a single moment of intention and action can fan out into multiple, independently-timed karmic consequences at once.

25. Karma in the Intermediate State, and What Makes Karma "Determinate"

The treatise asks whether karma is even produced during the intermediate state between death and rebirth — and confirms that it is: within the desire realm's intermediate state, twenty-two distinct kinds of karma can be produced, corresponding to the ten stages of a being's development (the intermediate state itself, five stages within the womb — kalala, arbuda, peśī, ghana, and praśākhā — and five stages after birth — infant, child, adolescent, middle-aged, and elderly), each admitting both determinate and indeterminate karma except that the intermediate state itself allows only determinate karma, all classified as ripening in this very life specifically because the intermediate-state being and the resulting embodied being share one and the same class of existence, drawn forth by one and the same karmic act — which is why no separate category of "karma ripening specifically in the intermediate state" needs to be named at all, since it is already subsumed under the existing "ripens-in-this-life" category. The treatise then explains what actually makes any karma "determinate" in the first place, identifying four conditions, any one of which suffices: karma performed under the grip of an unusually intense affliction; karma performed with an unusually pure, wholehearted mind; karma performed as a constant, habitual practice; or karma performed with respect to an especially exalted field of merit (the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha, or an exceptionally accomplished individual who has attained a superior fruit or superior meditative state) — and, separately, any act of serious harm directed at one's own parents, whether performed with a lighter or heavier degree of intent, is likewise always determinate karma. Everything falling short of these specific conditions remains merely indeterminate.

Chinese Source

住中有位亦造業耶?亦造。云何?頌曰: 欲中有能造, 二十二種業, 皆順現受攝, 類同分一故。 論曰:於欲界中住中有位,容有能造二十二業。謂中有位及處胎中、出胎以後各有五位。胎中五者:一羯剌藍、二頞部曇、三閉尸、四鍵南、五鉢羅奢佉。胎外五者:一嬰孩、二童子、三少年、四中年、五老年。住中有位能造中有乃至老年定不定業。應知如是中有所造十一種定業,皆順現受攝,由類同分無差別故。謂此中有位與自類十位,一眾同分一業引故。由此不別說順中有受業,即順生等業所引故。諸定受業其相云何?頌曰: 由重惑淨心, 及是恒所造, 於功德田起, 害父母業定。 論曰:若所造業,由重煩惱、或淳淨心、或常所作、或於增上功德田起。功德田者,謂佛法僧,或勝補特伽羅,謂得勝果勝定。於此田所,雖無重惑及淳淨心亦非常行,若善不善所起諸業,或於父母隨輕重心行損害事,如是一切皆定業攝,餘非定受。

Ru-Yi Translation

Is karma also produced while abiding in the intermediate state? It is indeed produced. How is this so? Verse: the intermediate state within the desire realm can produce twenty-two kinds of karma, all subsumed under ripening-in-this-life, since the classes of existence involved are without distinction. Prose: within the desire realm, while abiding in the intermediate state, one is capable of producing twenty-two kinds of karma — that is, the intermediate state itself, together with five stages while in the womb and five stages after leaving the womb. The five stages within the womb are: first, kalala; second, arbuda; third, peśī; fourth, ghana; fifth, praśākhā. The five stages outside the womb are: first, infant; second, child; third, adolescent; fourth, middle-aged; fifth, elderly. While abiding in the intermediate state, one is capable of producing both determinate and indeterminate karma with respect to the intermediate state itself through to old age. One should understand that these eleven kinds of determinate karma produced [across all these stages, since the intermediate state's determinate karma is not separately counted] are all subsumed under ripening-in-this-life, since the classes of existence involved are without distinction — that is, the intermediate state and its own ten subsequent stages are drawn forth by one and the same karmic act, as a single class of existence. This is why no separate karma "ripening specifically in the intermediate state" is spoken of, since it is already subsumed under karma ripening in this life and the other categories. What is the character of determinate karma? Verse: through heavy affliction, a pure mind, being constantly performed, or arising with respect to a field of merit; karma harming one's parents is [always] determinate. Prose: if karma performed is done through heavy affliction, or a wholehearted and pure mind, or is constantly performed, or arises with respect to an especially exalted field of merit — "field of merit" meaning the Buddha, Dharma, and Saṅgha, or an exceptional person who has attained a superior fruit or superior meditative concentration — then, even absent heavy affliction, a pure mind, or constant practice, whatever wholesome or unwholesome karma arises with respect to such a field is determinate. Likewise, any act of harm performed against one's parents, whether with a lighter or heavier degree of intent, is subsumed under determinate karma in every case. All karma that falls short of these conditions is not determinate in its ripening.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The five embryonic stages (kalala, arbuda, peśī, ghana, praśākhā) are standard technical terms in classical Indian embryology as adopted into Buddhist Abhidharma literature, describing successive stages of gestational development from a barely-formed clot through to a fully limbed fetus; we have kept them transliterated rather than translated, since their precise developmental correspondence to modern embryological stages is inexact and any English gloss risks implying a false precision the terms themselves do not carry.

The four conditions for "determinate" karma outlined here are worth holding together as a unified picture: three of the four conditions (intense affliction, pure intention, habitual repetition) describe something about the strength or consistency of the actor's own mental state, while the fourth (an exalted field of merit) locates the determining factor instead in the nature of the object or recipient of the action — meaning even a relatively ordinary act of generosity or harm, performed without any special intensity of mind, becomes determinate simply by virtue of being directed at the Three Jewels or an accomplished practitioner. The special, standalone mention of harming one's parents (rather than folding it into the "field of merit" category, even though parents are elsewhere treated as a significant object of moral consideration) signals that this treatise treats the parent-child relationship as its own independently weighty category of karmic consequence, not reducible to the same logic governing offerings to monastics or the Three Jewels.

26. Karma That Ripens in This Very Life, and the Five Fields of Merit

The treatise identifies what specifically causes karma to yield its ripened result within this very same life, naming several distinct routes. One is an exceptional field: tradition records more than one account of a monk who spoke disparagingly, using a woman's manner of speech, before the assembled community, and was transformed into a woman within that very same lifetime as a direct result. Another is an exceptional intention: tradition likewise records more than one account of an emasculated person who rescued cattle from being castrated, and was transformed into a full-fledged man within that same lifetime. A further route concerns freedom from affliction itself: when a being is reborn into a given level and there permanently frees themselves from that level's own defilements, any wholesome or unwholesome karma performed at that level whose ripened timing was not otherwise fixed will necessarily yield its result within this very life, since, once permanently freed from that level's afflictions, there could be no other later occasion within that same level left for the karma to ripen; but karma whose timing was already otherwise fixed retains that fixed timing regardless, since attaining freedom from affliction never actually eliminates a karma's own already-determined ripening. This raises a further, more precise question: within which specific fields of merit does karma become guaranteed to yield its result immediately? Five specific occasions are named, each defined by a person just emerging from a particular attainment: emerging from the attainment of cessation (a state of such profound stillness that it closely resembles nirvāṇa itself); emerging from the attainment of freedom from conflict (a state pervaded by an overriding intention to benefit countless beings); emerging from the attainment of loving-kindness (a state pervaded by an overriding intention toward countless beings' ease and happiness); emerging from the path of seeing (having just permanently severed every affliction abandoned through direct insight into the truths); and emerging from the path of cultivation (having just permanently severed every affliction abandoned through sustained meditative practice). Karma of harm or benefit performed with respect to a person in any of these five states is guaranteed to yield its result immediately, since anyone emerging from a lesser attainment lacks this same exceptional quality, their own continuum not yet having brought a given cultivation to full completion or permanently exhausted every affliction abandoned through cultivation, and hence not qualifying as this superior kind of field of merit.

Chinese Source

現法果業其相云何?頌曰: 由田意殊勝, 及定招異熟, 得永離地業, 定招現法果。 論曰:由田勝者,聞有苾芻於僧眾中作女人語,彼於現世轉作女人。此等傳聞其類非一。由意勝者,聞有黃門救脫諸牛黃門事故,彼於現世轉作丈夫。此等傳聞事亦非一。或生此地永離此地染,於此地中諸善不善業。於異熟定位不定者,此業必能招現法果。若有餘位順定受業,彼必定無永離染義,必於餘位受異熟果。若於異熟亦不定者,永離染故不受異熟。何田起業定即受耶?頌曰: 於佛上首僧, 及滅定無諍, 慈見修道出, 損益業即受。 論曰:於如是類功德田中,為善惡業定即受果。功德田者,謂佛上首僧。約補特伽羅差別有五:一從滅定出,謂此定中得心寂靜,此定寂靜似涅槃故。若從此定初起心時,如入涅槃還復出者。二從無諍出,謂此定中有緣無量有情為境,增上利益意樂隨逐。出此定時,有為無量最勝功德所熏修身相續而轉。三從慈定出,謂此定中有緣無量有情為境,增上安樂意樂隨逐。出此定時,有為無量最勝功德所熏修身相續而轉。四從見道出,謂此道中永斷一切見所斷惑得勝轉依,從此出時淨身續起。五從修道出,謂此道中永斷一切修所斷惑得勝轉依,從此出時淨身續起。故說此五名功德田。若有於中為損益業,此業必定能招即果。若從餘定餘果出時,由前所修定非殊勝,修所斷惑未畢竟盡,故彼相續非勝福田。

Ru-Yi Translation

What is the character of karma yielding its fruit in this very life? Verse: through an exceptional field, an exceptional intention, or a determinate ripening, and through karma performed upon attaining permanent freedom from a given level's defilement, karma is guaranteed to yield its fruit in this very life. Prose: as for an exceptional field, it is heard that a monastic, speaking disparagingly with a woman's manner of speech before the assembled saṅgha, was transformed into a woman in that very lifetime — traditions of this kind are not singular. As for an exceptional intention, it is heard that an emasculated person, having rescued cattle from castration, was transformed into a full-fledged man in that very lifetime — traditions of this sort, too, are not singular. Or again: if one is born into a given level and there permanently attains freedom from that level's own defilement, then any wholesome or unwholesome karma performed at that level whose ripening-timing was not already otherwise determinate will necessarily yield its fruit in this very life. If there remains some other, already-determinate karma fixed to ripen elsewhere, this necessarily retains no possibility of "permanent freedom" changing it, and it will necessarily yield its ripened result at that other, already-fixed occasion. If the karma's ripening were indeterminate even in this further respect, then, due to attaining permanent freedom from defilement, it would simply not yield a ripened result at all. In which field of merit does karma performed become guaranteed to yield its result immediately? Verse: with respect to the Buddha as foremost among the saṅgha, and to one emerging from the attainment of cessation, of freedom from conflict, of loving-kindness, of the path of seeing, or of the path of cultivation — karma of harm or benefit is received immediately. Prose: with respect to fields of merit of this kind, wholesome or unwholesome karma is guaranteed to yield its fruit immediately. "Field of merit" here refers to the Buddha as foremost among the saṅgha, distinguished, with respect to the type of person involved, into five: first, one emerging from the attainment of cessation — that is, this attainment brings the mind to such stillness that it closely resembles nirvāṇa, and the very first moment of mind arising upon emerging from this attainment is like someone entering and then returning from nirvāṇa itself. Second, one emerging from the attainment of freedom from conflict — that is, this attainment takes countless sentient beings as its object, pervaded by an overriding intention to benefit them; upon emerging from this attainment, one's continuum carries forward a body imbued and cultivated by countless, most excellent qualities. Third, one emerging from the attainment of loving-kindness — that is, this attainment takes countless sentient beings as its object, pervaded by an overriding intention toward their ease and happiness; upon emerging from this attainment, one's continuum likewise carries forward a body imbued and cultivated by countless, most excellent qualities. Fourth, one emerging from the path of seeing — that is, this path permanently severs every affliction abandoned through seeing, attaining a superior transformation of basis; upon emerging from it, a purified body-continuum arises. Fifth, one emerging from the path of cultivation — that is, this path permanently severs every affliction abandoned through cultivation, attaining a superior transformation of basis; upon emerging from it, a purified body-continuum likewise arises. Hence these five are called fields of merit. Karma of harm or benefit performed with respect to any of these is guaranteed to yield its result immediately. If one emerges instead from some other attainment or fruit, then, since the concentration previously cultivated was not of this exceptional kind, and the afflictions abandoned through cultivation have not yet been entirely exhausted, that continuum does not qualify as a superior field of merit.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We should flag the two traditional narratives cited here (the disparaging monk transformed into a woman, and the emasculated cattle-rescuer transformed into a man) as exactly what the text itself presents them as — received oral tradition ("it is heard...traditions of this kind are not singular"), not eyewitness report or doctrinal certainty, and the treatise's own phrasing signals this secondhand, semi-legendary status rather than asserting these events as settled historical fact. We have preserved this same hedged framing in translation rather than either overstating or downplaying the text's own evidentiary caution.

The "attainment of freedom from conflict" (無諍, araṇā-samāpatti) and "attainment of loving-kindness" (慈定) named among the five fields of merit are advanced meditative accomplishments specific to highly realized practitioners (traditionally associated with arhats capable of specifically preventing any affliction from arising in those around them, in the first case), and their inclusion alongside the more familiar path-of-seeing and path-of-cultivation attainments signals that this fivefold list is not simply "stages of the path" in the ordinary sense, but a curated set of especially potent meditative and realizational states, each independently qualifying as an exceptional field of merit whose surrounding karma is guaranteed to ripen without delay.

27. Karma Yielding Only Mental Feeling, or Only Bodily Feeling

Among the various kinds of ripened results, feeling is the most significant, and the treatise now asks whether any karma yields only a mental feeling as its result, with no bodily feeling at all, or the reverse. Both cases do occur. Wholesome karma free of investigation and analysis — that is, wholesome karma belonging to the intermediate absorption up through the peak of existence — when it does yield a feeling as its ripened result, yields only mental feeling, never bodily feeling, since bodily feeling always requires investigation and analysis to accompany it, and these coarser mental factors are, by definition, absent at these more refined levels. Unwholesome karma capable of yielding a feeling, conversely, yields only bodily feeling, never mental feeling, since unwholesome karma's own fruit is specifically painful feeling as its result, and painful feeling accompanied by mental engagement is properly called sorrow — but sorrow, as already explained earlier in this fascicle, is not itself a ripened result at all, only a byproduct arising alongside one.

Chinese Source

異熟果中受最為勝,今應思擇,於諸業中頗有唯招心受異熟,或招身受非心受耶?亦有。云何?頌曰: 諸善無尋業, 許唯感心受, 惡唯感身受, 是感受業異。 論曰:善無尋業,謂從中定乃至有頂所有善業,於中能招受異熟者,應知但感心受非身,身受必與尋伺俱故。諸不善業能感受者,應知但感身受非心,以不善因苦受為果,心俱苦受。決定名憂,憂非異熟,如前已辯。

Ru-Yi Translation

Among ripened results, feeling is the most significant. We should now consider: among the various kinds of karma, is there any that brings about only a mental-feeling ripened result, or a bodily-feeling result without a mental one? There is indeed. How is this so? Verse: wholesome, investigation-free karma is held to bring about only mental feeling; unwholesome karma brings about only bodily feeling — this is the distinction among karmas capable of bringing about feeling. Prose: wholesome, investigation-free karma refers to wholesome karma belonging to the intermediate absorption up through the peak of existence; among these, whatever is capable of bringing about a feeling as its ripened result should be understood to bring about only mental feeling, not bodily feeling, since bodily feeling is necessarily accompanied by investigation and analysis. Whatever unwholesome karma is capable of bringing about feeling should be understood to bring about only bodily feeling, not mental feeling, since the fruit of an unwholesome cause is painful feeling, and painful feeling accompanied by mental engagement is definitively called sorrow — and sorrow is not itself a ripened result, as already explained earlier.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

This section's reasoning depends on a technical point from earlier in this treatise's broader system: investigation and analysis (尋伺, vitarka-vicāra), the coarser discursive mental factors present in ordinary desire-realm and first-absorption consciousness, are specifically what make bodily feeling possible at all — meaning any level of mind that has left these factors behind (the intermediate absorption and everything above the first absorption) is, by that very fact, no longer capable of generating bodily feeling as a karmic result, only mental feeling. This is why wholesome karma from these more refined levels is confined to yielding mental feeling alone.

The unwholesome side of this pairing rests on a careful distinction already established in this fascicle: painful feeling itself can be a genuine ripened karmic result, but the additional layer of mental distress that typically accompanies painful bodily feeling — what this treatise calls sorrow (憂) — does not count as a ripened result in its own right, but only as a secondary mental reaction arising alongside one. This is why unwholesome karma is said to bring about only bodily (painful) feeling as its actual result, even though such karma is, in ordinary experience, almost always accompanied by mental suffering as well.

28. The Five Causes of Mental Derangement, and Who Remains Susceptible to It

The treatise now examines mental derangement (心狂) itself: it occurs only within mental consciousness, never within any of the five sense-consciousnesses, since these lack the capacity for the kind of discriminative judgment derangement requires. Five distinct causes can bring it about. First, the ripening of one's own past karma — as when someone has previously used drugs or incantations to derange another's mind, forced unwanted poison or alcohol upon someone, terrified animals through an intimidating display, set fire to mountains and marshes, dug pits to trap other beings, or otherwise, through some similar act, caused another to lose their presence of mind; such karma brings about, in a future life, a specifically corresponding ripened result capable of deranging the mind. Second, sheer terror — as when a non-human being appears in a frightening form and presses upon someone, and the fright itself brings about derangement. Third, physical injury — as when a non-human being, angered by some prior offense against it, damages a person's vital points out of spite, and the injury itself brings about derangement. Fourth, elemental imbalance — as when the body's internal wind, heat, and phlegm elements fall into mutual conflict, and this physical disharmony itself brings about derangement. Fifth, grief — as when the loss of a loved one or similar misfortune fills the heart with such consuming sorrow that derangement results, as in the traditional account of Vāsiṣṭhī. This raises a subtle point: if derangement occurs only within mental consciousness, and karmic ripening is said to be one of its causes, why was it stated earlier that unwholesome karma yields only bodily feeling, with mental feeling itself never being a direct ripened result? The resolution is that derangement itself is not said to be a direct ripened result of karma, only something that arises from a ripened result: unwholesome karma brings about an unevenly-composed set of great elements as its actual ripened result, and it is in dependence on these elements that the mind then loses its presence of mind, which is what is meant by "derangement." Derangement should further be distinguished from mere defilement of mind through a fourfold analysis: some are deranged without being defiled (a deranged person's mind that happens not to be afflicted at that moment); some are defiled without being deranged (an underanged person's ordinary afflicted mind); some are both deranged and defiled (a deranged person's afflicted mind); and some are neither (an underanged person's unafflicted mind). Excluding Uttarakuru, every other class of being within the desire realm remains susceptible to derangement — even desire-realm gods can become deranged, so how much more so humans and beings in the unfortunate destinies? Hell-beings are constantly deranged, overwhelmed as they are by such relentless suffering — assailed without pause by every manner of agonizing instrument striking their vital points, they can scarcely even recognize themselves under such unbearable pain, let alone distinguish right from wrong, which is why tradition records their anguished, deranged wailing as they run about in torment. Among noble ones within the desire realm — excluding only buddhas themselves — derangement remains possible, but only through elemental imbalance, never through karmic ripening: if such a person has any determinate karma of this kind, they would necessarily have had to experience it before ever attaining noble status in the first place; and if the karma is indeterminate, the very attainment of noble status renders it incapable of yielding any result at all. Nor can a noble one experience derangement through terror, since they have transcended every one of the five kinds of fear; nor through injury, since no non-human being harbors hostility toward a noble one; nor through grief, since a noble one has directly realized the true nature of phenomena.

Chinese Source

有情心狂,何識因處?頌曰: 心狂唯意識, 由業異熟生, 及怖害違憂, 除北洲在欲。 論曰:有情心狂唯在意識,若在五識必無心狂,以五識身無分別故。由五因故有情心狂:一由有情業異熟起,謂由彼用藥物呪術令他心狂,或復令他飲非所欲若毒若酒,或現威嚴怖禽獸等,或放猛火焚燒山澤,或作坑穽陷墜眾生,或餘事業令他失念,由此業因,於當來世感別異熟能令心狂。二由驚怖,謂非人等現可怖形來相逼迫,有情見已遂致心狂。三由傷害,謂因事業惱非人等,由彼瞋故傷其支節遂致心狂。四由乖違,謂由身內風熱痰界互相違反,大種乖適故致心狂。五由愁憂,謂因喪失親愛等事,愁毒纏懷心遂發狂,如婆私等。若在意識方有心狂,復許心狂業異熟起,如何心受非異熟耶?不說心狂是業異熟,但言是業異熟所生。謂惡業因感不平等異熟大種,依此大種心便失念,故說為狂。如是心狂對於心亂應作四句,謂有心狂而非心亂,乃至廣說。狂非亂者,謂諸狂者不染污心。亂非狂者,謂不狂者諸染污心。狂亦亂者,謂諸狂者諸染污心。非狂亂者,謂不狂者不染污心。除北俱盧,所餘欲界諸有情類容有心狂。謂欲天心尚有狂者,況人惡趣得離心狂?地獄恒狂,多苦逼故。謂諸地獄恒為種種異類苦具傷害末摩猛利難忍,苦受所逼尚不自識,況了是非。故地獄中怨心傷歎,猖狂馳叫世傳有文。欲界聖中唯除諸佛,大種乖適容有心狂,無異熟生。若有定業,必應先受後方得聖。若非定業,由得聖故,能令無果亦無驚怖,超五畏故。亦無傷害,以諸聖者無非人等憎嫌事故,亦無愁憂證法性故。

Ru-Yi Translation

With respect to what basis of consciousness does mental derangement in sentient beings occur? Verse: mental derangement occurs only in mental consciousness, arising from karmic ripening, fright, injury, elemental discord, or grief, excluding Uttarakuru, within the desire realm. Prose: mental derangement in sentient beings occurs only within mental consciousness; if it occurred within any of the five sense-consciousnesses, this would certainly not be derangement, since the fivefold sense-consciousnesses lack discriminative judgment. Derangement arises from five causes. First, arising from the ripening of a being's own karma — that is, from having used drugs or incantations to derange another's mind, or forced another to drink poison or alcohol against their will, or displayed an intimidating manner to terrify birds and beasts, or set loose a fierce fire to burn mountains and marshes, or dug pits to trap sentient beings, or through some other undertaking caused another to lose their presence of mind — through this karmic cause, one draws forth, in a future life, a specifically corresponding ripened result capable of deranging the mind. Second, from fright — that is, when a non-human being appears in a frightening form and presses upon one, and the sentient being, upon seeing this, is thereby brought to derangement. Third, from injury — that is, due to some undertaking that troubles a non-human being, that being, out of anger, damages one's vital points, and one is thereby brought to derangement. Fourth, from discord — that is, when the body's internal wind, heat, and phlegm elements mutually conflict, and the great elements' discord brings about derangement. Fifth, from grief — that is, due to the loss of a loved one or similar matters, sorrow's poison fills the heart and derangement results, as with Vāsiṣṭhī and others. [Objection:] If derangement occurs only within mental consciousness, and derangement is also held to arise from karmic ripening, how is it that mental feeling was said not to be a ripened result? [Reply:] It is not said that derangement itself is a ripened result of karma, only that it arises from a ripened result of karma — that is, an unwholesome karmic cause brings about an unevenly-composed set of ripened great elements, and, in dependence on these great elements, the mind then loses its presence of mind; this is what is called derangement. Derangement, considered against mental disturbance [more broadly], should be analyzed into four cases: there is derangement without disturbance, and so on at length. "Deranged, not disturbed" refers to a deranged person's undefiled mind. "Disturbed, not deranged" refers to an underanged person's defiled mind. "Both deranged and disturbed" refers to a deranged person's defiled mind. "Neither" refers to an underanged person's undefiled mind. Excluding Uttarakuru, every other class of sentient being within the desire realm may be susceptible to derangement — that is, even the minds of desire-realm gods can become deranged, so how much more so humans and those in the unfortunate destinies? Hell-beings are constantly deranged, being overwhelmed by so much suffering — that is, hell-beings are constantly struck at their vital points by all manner of foreign instruments of suffering, fierce and unbearable, and, overwhelmed by this painful feeling, can scarcely even recognize themselves, let alone discern right from wrong; hence it is recorded in tradition that, in hell, resentful hearts wail in anguish, running about deranged and screaming. Among noble ones within the desire realm, excluding only the buddhas, derangement remains possible through elemental discord, but not through karmic ripening: if there is determinate karma of this kind, it must necessarily have already been experienced before attaining noble status; if the karma is indeterminate, then, by virtue of having attained noble status, it is rendered incapable of yielding any result and is also free from fright, since noble ones have transcended the five kinds of fear. Nor is there injury, since no non-human being harbors hostility toward noble ones. Nor is there grief, since noble ones have realized the true nature of phenomena.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

We have kept "Vāsiṣṭhī" as the traditional name for the grief-example cited here — a well-known figure in early Buddhist literature remembered for being driven to distraction by the death of her child before later attaining awakening — rather than translating it descriptively, since the text cites her as a specific, recognized case rather than a generic illustration. The "five kinds of fear" mentioned as something noble ones have transcended is a standard technical list elsewhere in this literature (typically including fear of not sustaining oneself, fear of disrepute, fear of death, fear of unfortunate rebirth, and fear of public speaking before an assembly), which the treatise assumes its reader already knows rather than re-explaining here.

The careful distinction between "derangement is not itself a ripened result, only something arising from one" is doing important systematic work: it preserves this fascicle's earlier, hard-won conclusion (unwholesome karma yields only bodily, not mental, feeling as its direct result) by locating derangement one causal step further downstream — karma directly produces disordered physical elements, and it is this physical disorder, not the karma itself, that then disrupts the mind's clarity. This is a good example of how this treatise is willing to complicate a causal chain rather than simply abandon an earlier systematic claim when a new phenomenon (derangement) threatens to contradict it.

29. Crooked, Tainted, and Turbid Karma — The Fascicle's Final Classification

The fascicle closes with one final sūtra classification: karma described as crooked, tainted, or turbid. Each of the three kinds of karma — bodily, verbal, and mental — in turn divides into these same three qualities, corresponding respectively to flattery, hatred, and greed as their underlying source. Bodily, verbal, or mental karma arising from flattery is called "crooked" karma, sharing flattery's own bent, deceptive character. Bodily, verbal, or mental karma arising from hatred is called "tainted" karma, sharing hatred's own corrosive character. Bodily, verbal, or mental karma arising from greed is called "turbid" karma, sharing greed's own muddying character. With this final threefold classification, the fascicle's long survey of karma's many sūtra-derived classification schemes — wholesome/unwholesome/neutral, merit/non-merit/unmoving, the three feeling-conducive types, determinate and indeterminate ripening, karma in the intermediate state, mental-only and bodily-only feeling, and now crooked/tainted/turbid — comes to its conclusion.

Chinese Source

又經中說:業有三種,謂曲、穢、濁。其相云何?頌曰: 說曲穢濁業, 依諂瞋貪生。 論曰:身語意三各有三種,謂曲、穢、濁。如其次第,應知依諂、瞋、貪所生。謂依諂生身語意業名為曲業,諂曲類故。若依瞋生身語意業名為穢業,瞋穢類故。若依貪生身語意業名為濁業,貪濁類故。 說一切有部俱舍論卷第十五

Ru-Yi Translation

Moreover, a sūtra states that karma is of three kinds: crooked, tainted, and turbid. What are their characteristics? Verse: crooked, tainted, and turbid karma are said to arise from flattery, hatred, and greed. Prose: each of the three — bodily, verbal, and mental karma — has three kinds in turn, namely crooked, tainted, and turbid, arising, in this same order, from flattery, hatred, and greed, respectively. That is, bodily, verbal, or mental karma arising from flattery is called crooked karma, sharing flattery's own bent character. Bodily, verbal, or mental karma arising from hatred is called tainted karma, sharing hatred's own corrosive character. Bodily, verbal, or mental karma arising from greed is called turbid karma, sharing greed's own muddying character. [Thus ends] Fascicle Fifteen of the Abhidharmakośa of the Sarvāstivāda School.

Reading note — Ru-Yi

The three underlying afflictions singled out here — flattery (諂, māyā, a specific kind of deceptive self-presentation distinct from lying itself), hatred, and greed — are each matched to an evocative physical metaphor (bent, corroded, muddied) that mirrors the affliction's own character: flattery bends the truth without technically breaking it, much as crooked karma is described; hatred corrodes and damages, like a tainting agent; and greed clouds and obscures clear judgment, like sediment stirred into clear water. This is a smaller-scale example of the same etymological method this treatise has used throughout — matching a technical term's connotative meaning to the psychological quality of what it names — seen earlier, for instance, in fascicle 14's "cool" etymology for śīla.

This closing classification brings to an end a very long stretch of this fascicle devoted entirely to cataloguing the different ways scripture itself sorts and names karma — a stretch that began with the straightforward wholesome/unwholesome/neutral division many sections back and has since worked through merit and its opposite, karma's relationship to different kinds of feeling, the timing of karmic ripening, karma produced in the intermediate state between lives, the special case of karma yielding only bodily or only mental feeling, and the causes of mental derangement as a special downstream effect of certain unwholesome karma. Having surveyed all of these named classification schemes, the treatise has completed its systematic account of how the sūtras themselves describe and divide karma, distinct from — though building directly upon — the earlier sections' equally extensive treatment of manifested and unmanifested karma, restraint, and non-restraint.

Fascicle 15 Complete

This concludes our translation of Fascicle 15 of the Abhidharmakośa (阿毘達磨俱舍論卷第十五), continuing Chapter 4 on karma (分別業品第四之三). Thank you for reading. Fascicle 16 will continue this chapter's inquiry into karma.