Black Karma, White Karma, and Neither
Fascicle 16 continues Chapter 4 (分別業品第四之四, the Karma-nirdeśa) directly from fascicle 15's long survey of the sūtras' classifications of karma. It opens with the sūtras' fourfold division into black, white, mixed, and neither-black-nor-white karma, then moves through the three sages, the three purities, a genuine dispute over whether greed, hatred, and wrong view are themselves a form of mental karma, and the treatise's full, exhaustive technical treatment of the ten karma-paths — their preparatory action, root act, and follow-up action; the three roots behind each; and the precise definitions of all ten, ending with greed, hatred, and wrong view.
1. Black Karma, White Karma, Mixed, and Neither
Continuing directly from fascicle 15's long survey of the sūtras' classification schemes for karma, the treatise takes up one final, especially rich fourfold division: karma that is black with a black ripened result, karma that is white with a white ripened result, karma that is black-and-white with a black-and-white ripened result, and karma that is neither black nor white, having no ripened result at all, and capable of exhausting every other kind of karma. The Buddha teaches this division based on differences in the moral quality and character of karma's own result, and on the differing relationship between what is to be overcome and what overcomes it. All unwholesome karma is called black without exception, since it is defiled in nature and its ripened result is likewise black, being undesirable. Wholesome karma belonging to the form realm is called white without exception, since it is unmixed with anything unwholesome, and its ripened result is likewise white, being desirable. Desire-realm wholesome karma, meanwhile, is called black-and-white, since it is mixed together with unwholesome karma there, and its ripened result is likewise mixed — this label describes an entire continuum's mixed pattern of activity, not any single act or its single result, since no individual karmic act, and no individual ripened result, can itself be both black and white at once, these being mutually exclusive qualities. Finally, uncontaminated karma, capable of permanently exhausting all three of the preceding kinds, is called neither black — since it is undefiled — nor white, in the sense that it does not bring about a white ripened result, though this second "neither" is meant in a specifically qualified sense, since the Buddha elsewhere describes the qualities of one beyond training as themselves "purely wholesome, purely white, entirely without fault."
又經中說,業有四種,謂或有業黑黑異熟、或復有業白白異熟、或復有業黑白黑白異熟、或復有業非黑非白無異熟能盡諸業。其相云何?頌曰: 依黑黑等殊, 所說四種業, 惡色欲界善, 能盡彼無漏, 應知如次第, 名黑白俱非。 論曰:佛依業果性類不同,所治能治殊,說黑黑等四。諸不善業一向名黑,染污性故,異熟亦黑,不可意故。色界善業一向名白,不雜惡故,異熟亦白,是可意故。何故不言無色界善?傳說若處有二異熟謂中生有,具三種業謂身語意,則說非餘。然契經中有處亦說:欲界善業名為黑白,惡所雜故,異熟亦黑白,非愛果雜故。此黑白名依相續立,非據自性。所以者何?以無一業及一異熟是黑亦白,互相違故。豈不惡業果善業果雜故,是則亦應名為白黑。不善業果非必應為善業果雜,欲善業果必定應為惡業果雜,以欲界中惡勝善故。諸無漏業能永斷盡前三業者名為非黑,不染污故,亦名非白,以不能招白異熟故。此非白言是密意說,以佛於彼《大空經》中告阿難陀:諸無學法純善純白一向無罪。本論亦言:云何白法?謂諸善法無覆無記無異熟者,不墮界故、與流轉法性相違故。
Moreover, a sūtra states that karma is of four kinds: there is karma that is black with a black ripened result; there is karma that is white with a white ripened result; there is karma that is black-and-white with a black-and-white ripened result; and there is karma that is neither black nor white, without any ripened result, capable of exhausting all other karma. What is the character of these? Verse: with reference to these distinctions of black and the rest, four kinds of karma are spoken of — unwholesome karma, form-realm wholesome karma, desire-realm wholesome karma, and the uncontaminated capable of exhausting these — should, in this order, be understood as named black, white, mixed, and neither. Prose: the Buddha, with reference to differences in the nature and category of karma's result, and to the distinct relationship between what is to be overcome and its antidote, speaks of black and the other three. All unwholesome karma is uniformly called black, since it is defiled in nature, and its ripened result is likewise black, being undesirable. Wholesome karma of the form realm is uniformly called white, since it is unmixed with anything unwholesome, and its ripened result is likewise white, being desirable. [Objection:] Why is formless-realm wholesome karma not mentioned? [Reply:] It is said that this classification applies only where two kinds of ripened result exist — namely, in the intermediate state and at birth — and where all three kinds of karma are complete — namely, bodily, verbal, and mental; hence it is not spoken of with respect to any other case. Yet a sūtra elsewhere also states that desire-realm wholesome karma is called black-and-white, since it is mixed together with unwholesome karma there, and its ripened result is likewise black-and-white, being mixed with an undesirable result. This name "black-and-white" is established with reference to a continuum, not to any single act's own essential nature — why is this so? Because there is no single act of karma, and no single ripened result, that is itself both black and white, these being mutually opposed. [Objection:] Is it not the case that unwholesome karma's result is likewise mixed with wholesome karma's result — should this not, then, equally be called "white-and-black"? [Reply:] Unwholesome karma's result is not necessarily mixed with wholesome karma's result, whereas desire-realm wholesome karma's result is necessarily mixed with unwholesome karma's result, since, within the desire realm, unwholesome karma predominates over wholesome karma. Uncontaminated karma, capable of permanently exhausting the preceding three kinds of karma, is called "not black," since it is undefiled, and also called "not white," in that it is incapable of bringing about a white ripened result. This phrase "not white" is stated with hidden intent, since the Buddha, in the Great Emptiness Sūtra, tells Ānanda: "The dharmas of one beyond training are purely wholesome, purely white, entirely without fault." The root treatise likewise states: "What is a white dharma? It is wholesome dharmas that are not defiled-neutral and have no ripened result" — since these do not fall within any realm, and are opposed in nature to the dharmas of continued cyclic existence.
The "not white" qualification for uncontaminated karma is a genuinely delicate piece of scriptural reconciliation, and we want to flag exactly what tension it is resolving: on the one hand, this section's own definition calls uncontaminated karma "not white" because it produces no ripened result at all (white specifically meaning "productive of a desirable ripened result" in this classification); on the other hand, a separate, well-known sūtra passage has the Buddha himself describing an arhat's own qualities as "purely white." The treatise's resolution is that these two uses of "white" are simply operating in different technical registers — the fourfold black/white/mixed/neither scheme uses "white" in the narrow, ripening-specific sense just defined, while the Great Emptiness Sūtra passage uses "white" in a broader, more general sense of moral purity — and the root treatise's own citation is marshaled to confirm that "white dharma," properly defined, excludes exactly the kind of result-producing karma this section's fourfold scheme is concerned with.
The point about "black-and-white" describing "a continuum, not... any single act's own essential nature" is worth holding onto as a recurring methodological principle in this treatise: several classification schemes across this and the previous fascicle (recall, for instance, fascicle 13's "mixed karma" bringing about both a pleasant and unpleasant result at once) describe a *pattern across many acts and their results over time*, not some genuinely hybrid quality inhering in any single karmic act — a single act is always cleanly one thing or another, even when a person's overall karmic life story looks decidedly mixed.
2. Which Path-Moments Exhaust Which Kinds of Karma
The treatise now asks whether uncontaminated karma exhausts all three preceding kinds of karma in the very same way, and finds that it does not — different specific moments of uncontaminated attainment are responsible for exhausting different kinds. The four patience-attainments belonging to the path of seeing (direct insight into suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path itself), together with the first eight uninterrupted paths belonging to the path of cultivation as one progressively eliminates the desire realm's own defilements, comprise twelve total moments of uncontaminated volition, and these exhaust only purely black karma — that is, unwholesome karma. The ninth and final uninterrupted path in this same process of eliminating desire-realm defilement, however, involves a single further moment of uncontaminated volition that exhausts both mixed (black-and-white) karma and the last portion of purely black karma at once, since this is the very moment that finally and completely severs the desire realm's wholesome karma from any further unwholesome admixture, while simultaneously finishing off the ninth and final grade of unwholesome karma itself. Beyond this, the ninth uninterrupted path belonging to each of the four form-realm meditative absorptions, considered one level at a time, exhausts purely white karma — that is, form-realm wholesome karma — specifically at that level. This raises a natural question: why is it always specifically the very last of these paths, and none of the others along the way, that actually exhausts a given level's contaminated wholesome dharmas? The answer is that wholesome dharmas are not overcome by their own intrinsic nature the way afflictions are, and so, even after most of a level's affliction has already been severed, the corresponding wholesome dharmas belonging to that same level can still, in principle, actively manifest again and again — it is specifically the complete exhaustion of the afflictions that take those wholesome dharmas as their object that finally allows those wholesome dharmas to be said to be "severed," since it is only then that they become fully freed from the afflictive bondage that previously kept them tied to that level; so long as even one final grade of such affliction remains outstanding, the wholesome dharmas in question cannot yet be said to be severed, since they have not yet actually been freed from that bondage.
諸無漏業為皆能盡前三業不?不爾。云何?頌曰: 四法忍離欲, 前八無間俱, 十二無漏思, 唯盡純黑業, 離欲四靜慮, 第九無間思, 一盡雜純黑, 四令純白盡。 論曰:於見道中四法智忍及於修道離欲染位前八無間聖道俱行有十二思唯盡純黑,離欲界染第九無間聖道俱行一無漏思,雙令黑白及純黑盡,此時總斷欲界善故,亦斷第九不善業故。離四靜慮一一地染,第九無間道俱行無漏思,此四唯令純白業盡。何緣諸地有漏善法唯最後道能斷非餘?以諸善法非自性斷,已斷有容現在前故。然由緣彼煩惱盡時方說名為斷彼善法,爾時善法得離繫故。由此乃至緣彼煩惱餘一品在,斷義不成,善法爾時未離繫故。
Does uncontaminated karma exhaust all three of the preceding kinds of karma equally? It does not. How is this so? Verse: the four patience-attainments, and the first eight uninterrupted paths of eliminating desire — twelve uncontaminated volitions — exhaust only purely black karma; the ninth uninterrupted volition of eliminating desire exhausts both mixed and the remainder of purely black karma at once; and the [ninth uninterrupted volition] of eliminating each of the four meditative absorptions, four in number, causes purely white karma to be exhausted. Prose: within the path of seeing, the four patience-attainments of dharma-knowledge, together with, within the path of cultivation, the first eight uninterrupted noble paths accompanying the elimination of desire-realm defilement, comprise twelve volitions that exhaust only purely black karma. The ninth uninterrupted noble path accompanying the elimination of desire-realm defilement involves one further uncontaminated volition that exhausts both mixed karma and purely black karma at once, since this is the moment that entirely severs desire-realm wholesome karma [from further unwholesome admixture], and also exhausts the ninth grade of unwholesome karma. The ninth uninterrupted path accompanying the elimination of defilement belonging, one at a time, to each of the four meditative absorptions causes purely white karma to be exhausted. For what reason can contaminated wholesome dharmas belonging to any given level be severed only by the very last path there, and not by any other? Because wholesome dharmas are not severed by their own intrinsic nature, since, even once mostly severed, they still admit of manifesting again in the present. Rather, it is only once the affliction that takes them as its object has been exhausted that these wholesome dharmas are said to be severed, since it is at that point that the wholesome dharmas become freed from bondage. Hence, so long as even one further grade of the affliction taking them as its object still remains, the sense of "severing" is not yet established, since the wholesome dharmas have not yet actually become freed from bondage at that point.
The distinction drawn here between how afflictions are severed and how wholesome dharmas are "severed" is conceptually important and easy to blur: an affliction is eliminated by its own antidote acting directly on its own intrinsic nature, moment by moment, until nothing remains — but a wholesome dharma is never itself the target of any antidote (nothing needs to "cure" a wholesome state), so its disappearance from a given level cannot work the same way. Instead, wholesome dharmas become "severed" only in the indirect, relational sense of becoming permanently freed from the affliction that had been binding them to that level — meaning the wholesome dharma's own continuity is only broken as a side effect of the affliction's own complete elimination, which is why it takes until the very last moment of that elimination process (the ninth uninterrupted path) for this severing to actually occur, no matter how much progress has already been made against the affliction beforehand.
This section's careful path-by-path bookkeeping (twelve volitions for purely black karma, one further volition for mixed-and-remaining-black, four more for purely white, one per meditative absorption) is characteristic of this treatise's precision when mapping doctrine onto the technical structure of the path of seeing and path of cultivation — structures already established in earlier fascicles' discussion of the nine grades of affliction-elimination and the uninterrupted-versus-liberation-path distinction (see, for instance, fascicle 13's discussion of the "nine uninterrupted paths" underlying severing restraint).
3. Alternative Views on Black and Mixed Karma, and the Three Sages
The treatise records two further, alternative proposals for how to understand "purely black" and "mixed" karma, distinct from the account already given. Some teachers hold that karma conducive to a hell-rebirth, and desire-realm karma conducive to any other kind of rebirth, should respectively be called purely black and mixed karma — since hell's own ripened result is brought about only by unwholesome karma, karma conducive to that rebirth is called purely black, while every other kind of ripened result within the desire realm is brought about by both wholesome and unwholesome karma alike, so karma conducive to those other rebirths is called black-and-white. Other teachers hold instead that karma abandoned through seeing the truths, and all remaining desire-realm karma, should respectively be called purely black and mixed karma — since karma abandoned through seeing involves no admixture of anything wholesome at all, it is called purely black, while karma abandoned through cultivation within the desire realm includes both wholesome and unwholesome instances, and so is called mixed. The treatise then turns to a related sūtra classification: the three sages, and the three purities, both said to comprise body, speech, and mind. The manifested bodily and verbal karma of one beyond training (an arhat) is called the bodily sage and the verbal sage; the "mental sage," however, refers not to any manifested mental karma at all, but simply to the arhat's own mind beyond training as such — since, in the ultimate sense, a sage's essential nature is mind alone, something inferred indirectly through the evidence of bodily and verbal karma, and since bodily and verbal karma alone possess the character of active renunciation (there being no unmanifested mental karma to speak of), it is specifically through this quality of renunciation that the name "sage" is established, meaning it is really the mind itself, expressed through body and speech, that earns this name. This designation is reserved for one beyond training alone, since only the arhat is a sage in the fullest, truest sense, all afflictions having been permanently stilled without remainder. The three kinds of good conduct — bodily, verbal, and mental — are, correspondingly, called the three purities, since they represent a temporary or permanent freedom from every stain of afflicted misconduct. Both of these designations — sage and purity — exist specifically to correct beings who might otherwise mistake some other, false teacher or false discipline for genuine sagehood or purity.
頌曰: 有說地獄受, 餘欲業黑雜, 有說欲見滅, 餘欲業黑俱。 論曰:有餘師說:順地獄受及欲界中順餘受業,如次名為純黑雜業。謂地獄異熟唯不善業感,故順彼受名純黑業。唯除地獄,餘欲界中異熟皆通善惡業感,故順彼受名黑白業。有餘師說:欲見所斷及欲界中所有餘業,如次名為純黑俱業。謂見所斷無善雜故名純黑業,欲修所斷有善不善故名俱業。又經中說有三牟尼,又經中言有三清淨,俱身語意。相各云何?頌曰: 無學身語業, 即意三牟尼, 三清淨應知, 即諸三妙行。 論曰:無學身語業,名身語牟尼,意牟尼即無學意非意業。所以者何?勝義牟尼唯心為體,謂由身語二業比知。又身語業是遠離體,意業不然,無無表故。由遠離義建立牟尼,是故即心由身語業能有所離,故名牟尼。何故牟尼唯在無學?以阿羅漢是實牟尼,諸煩惱言永寂靜故。諸身語意三種妙行,名身語意三種清淨。暫永遠離一切惡行煩惱垢故名為清淨。說此二者為息有情計邪牟尼,邪清淨故。
Verse: some say karma conducive to hell-rebirth and other desire-realm karma are, respectively, purely black and mixed; others say karma abandoned through seeing and the rest of desire-realm karma are, respectively, purely black and mixed. Prose: other teachers say: karma conducive to a hell-rebirth, and desire-realm karma conducive to any other rebirth, are, in this order, called purely black karma and mixed karma. That is, since hell's ripened result is brought about only by unwholesome karma, karma conducive to that rebirth is called purely black karma; excluding hell alone, every other ripened result within the desire realm is brought about by both wholesome and unwholesome karma, so karma conducive to those rebirths is called black-and-white karma. Other teachers say: karma abandoned through seeing, and all remaining desire-realm karma, are, in this order, called purely black karma and mixed karma. That is, karma abandoned through seeing has no admixture of anything wholesome, and so is called purely black karma; karma abandoned through cultivation within the desire realm has both wholesome and unwholesome instances, and so is called mixed karma. Moreover, a sūtra speaks of three sages, and a sūtra speaks of three purities, both comprising body, speech, and mind. What is the character of each? Verse: the bodily and verbal karma of one beyond training are the bodily and verbal sages; the mind is the mental sage; the three purities should be understood as the three kinds of good conduct. Prose: the manifested bodily and verbal karma of one beyond training are called the bodily sage and the verbal sage. The mental sage, however, is the mind of one beyond training, not manifested mental karma. Why is this so? Because, in the ultimate sense, a sage's essential nature is mind alone, which is known indirectly through bodily and verbal karma. Moreover, bodily and verbal karma possess the essential nature of renunciation, whereas mental karma does not, since there is no unmanifested [mental karma]. It is by this meaning of renunciation that the designation "sage" is established — hence it is the mind itself that, through bodily and verbal karma, is capable of renunciation, and is thereby called "sage." Why is the designation "sage" reserved for one beyond training alone? Because the arhat is a true sage, all afflictions having been permanently stilled. The three kinds of good conduct — bodily, verbal, and mental — are called the three kinds of purity of body, speech, and mind, since they represent temporary or permanent freedom from the stain of every bad conduct and affliction. These two designations are spoken of in order to still sentient beings' mistaken notions of a false sage or false purity.
We should note plainly that this section records three genuinely distinct, competing proposals for what "purely black" and "mixed" karma mean (this fascicle's own initial account tying them to realm — unwholesome vs. desire-realm wholesome — plus these two further alternatives tying them instead to destiny and to the seeing/cultivation distinction respectively), without the treatise itself declaring any one of the three correct. This is consistent with the pattern already well established across the previous several fascicles: this treatise is often more interested in preserving the full range of received scholastic opinion on a given scriptural term than in adjudicating between the options.
The "mental sage" discussion turns on a genuinely subtle point already familiar from this treatise's broader system: since mental karma, unlike bodily and verbal karma, never generates any unmanifested residue (there is no such thing as "unmanifested mental karma" in this system), mental karma alone lacks the specific quality of active "renunciation" that earns the name "sage" — and so, rather than the arhat's mental karma being called the mental sage, it is instead the arhat's very mind itself, the underlying reality that bodily and verbal karma merely give indirect evidence of, that receives this designation. This lets the treatise preserve its threefold parallel structure (bodily/verbal/mental sage) while still respecting the deeper asymmetry between mental karma and the other two kinds that this whole treatise has maintained since fascicle 13.
4. Are Greed, Hatred, and Wrong View Themselves Mental Karma?
The treatise turns to the sūtras' threefold division of bad conduct and good conduct, each spanning body, speech, and mind. All unwholesome bodily, verbal, and mental karma are named, in turn, bodily, verbal, and mental bad conduct — but mental bad conduct itself further divides into three: greed, hatred, and wrong view, none of which is identical to volition itself, each instead possessing its own distinct essential nature apart from volition. The Dārṣṭāntika masters disagree, holding that greed, hatred, and wrong view simply are mental karma directly, appealing to the Thought Sūtra's own statement that these three constitute mental karma. This provokes an immediate objection: if greed, hatred, and wrong view just are karma, then karma and affliction would collapse into one and the same thing — and if this is accepted, what actual problem would that create? The Vaibhāṣika insist this is untenable, since accepting it would contradict a great deal of established reasoning and scripture, leading to serious difficulties. As for the Thought Sūtra's own statement that these three constitute mental karma, the Vaibhāṣika explain this differently: it is meant to show that volition operates through greed, hatred, and wrong view as its "gateway," that volition is thereby able to bring about an undesirable result, and that this conduct is condemned and rejected by the wise — and it is precisely because this conduct is itself bad that it earns the name "bad conduct," not because greed, hatred, and wrong view are literally identical to the karma itself. The three kinds of good conduct should be understood as the exact reverse of this: all wholesome bodily, verbal, and mental karma, with mental good conduct itself comprising non-greed, non-hatred, and right view. Since right view and wrong view do not, in themselves, constitute volition's aim to benefit or harm another, one might ask how they could count as wholesome or unwholesome at all — but they qualify precisely because they serve as the very root from which the intention to benefit or to harm springs.
又經中說有三惡行,又經中言有三妙行,俱身語意。相各云何?頌曰: 惡身語意業, 說名三惡行, 及貪瞋邪見, 三妙行翻此。 論曰:一切不善身語意業,如次名身語意惡行。然意惡行復有三種,謂非意業貪、瞋、邪見,貪等離思別有體故。譬喻者言:貪瞋邪見即是意業,故《思經》中說此三種為意業故。若爾,則應業與煩惱合成一體。許有煩惱即是意業,斯有何失?毘婆沙師說彼非理。若許爾者,便與眾多理教相違,成大過失。然契經說是意業者,顯思以彼為門轉故、由此能感非愛果故、是聰慧者所訶厭故。此行即惡,故名惡行。三妙行者,翻此應知。謂身語意一切善業。非業無貪、無瞋、正見。正見邪見既無故思欲益他損他,如何成善惡?能與損益為根本故。
Moreover, a sūtra speaks of three kinds of bad conduct, and a sūtra speaks of three kinds of good conduct, both comprising body, speech, and mind. What is the character of each? Verse: unwholesome bodily, verbal, and mental karma are called the three kinds of bad conduct; together with greed, hatred, and wrong view; the three kinds of good conduct are the reverse of this. Prose: all unwholesome bodily, verbal, and mental karma are, in this order, called bodily, verbal, and mental bad conduct. Mental bad conduct, however, is further of three kinds: greed, hatred, and wrong view, which are not themselves volition, since greed and the others possess their own distinct essential nature apart from volition. The Dārṣṭāntika masters say: greed, hatred, and wrong view simply are mental karma, since the Thought Sūtra states that these three constitute mental karma. [Objection:] If this is so, then karma and affliction would merge into a single essential nature. [Response, from the Dārṣṭāntika:] If one accepts that affliction simply is mental karma, what fault would this incur? The Vaibhāṣika say this is not sound reasoning — if one accepts this, it would contradict a great deal of reasoning and scripture, incurring serious faults. As for the sūtra's statement that these are mental karma, this is meant to show that volition operates through these as its gateway, that volition is thereby able to bring about an undesirable result, and that this conduct is condemned and rejected by the wise. Since this conduct is itself bad, it is named bad conduct. The three kinds of good conduct should be understood as the reverse of this — namely, all wholesome bodily, verbal, and mental karma. [Objection:] Non-greed, non-hatred, and right view are not themselves volition — how, then, could they be considered wholesome or unwholesome? [Reply:] Because they serve as the root for the intention to benefit or to harm another.
This debate has real philosophical stakes worth drawing out clearly: the Vaibhāṣika maintain a sharp categorical distinction between karma (volition and what it produces) and affliction (the mental factors, like greed and hatred, that motivate and accompany unwholesome volition) — collapsing the two, as the Dārṣṭāntika propose, would blur a distinction this entire treatise has depended on since fascicle 13's opening definition of karma as "volition, and what volition produces." The Vaibhāṣika's resolution treats the sūtra's "these three are mental karma" as a looser, functional statement (these afflictions are how volition operates, and are judged by the same standard used to judge karma) rather than a strict identity claim.
The final objection-and-reply here quietly resolves an important asymmetry in how this classification works: bodily and verbal good/bad conduct are named directly after actual karmic acts (killing, stealing, and so on), but mental good/bad conduct is named instead after mental factors (greed, hatred, wrong view, and their opposites) that are not themselves acts of volition at all — the reply's answer, that these factors count as wholesome or unwholesome because they are the root from which harmful or beneficial volition springs, is the same "causal root" logic already used elsewhere in this treatise (compare the fourfold wholesome/unwholesome framework from fascicle 13, where the wholesome roots were likewise treated as wholesome by intrinsic nature, prior to and independent of any associated volition).
5. The Ten Karma-Paths, and Which Require Both Manifested and Unmanifested Karma
The treatise now turns to a sūtra teaching of ten karma-paths, each either wholesome or unwholesome. These ten are drawn from the fuller bad-conduct and good-conduct classifications just discussed, but only from whatever is coarse, prominent, and easily recognized within them — unwholesome karma-paths correspond to bad conduct, wholesome karma-paths to good conduct, but neither set of ten actually exhausts its corresponding fuller category. On the unwholesome side, the bodily karma-path picks out only the completed act itself, excluding the preparatory buildup toward it; the verbal karma-paths exclude both the preparatory and follow-up stages, along with any comparatively minor instances; and the mental karma-paths exclude any lesser forms of greed and the like that fall short of full-blown affliction. On the wholesome side, the bodily karma-path excludes preparatory and follow-up action as well as other wholesome bodily acts, such as abstaining from alcohol or making an offering; the verbal karma-path excludes such things as kind, encouraging speech that falls short of the specific listed categories; and the mental karma-path excludes ordinary wholesome intentions that do not rise to the specific listed roots. This raises a further, more technical question: do the first seven of these ten karma-paths (the bodily and verbal ones) all necessarily involve both manifested and unmanifested karma together? The answer is more nuanced than a simple yes: six of the seven unwholesome bodily and verbal karma-paths definitely involve unmanifested karma, but whether they also involve manifested karma depends on whether the offender acts personally or commissions someone else; sexual misconduct alone, among the unwholesome seven, always necessarily involves both, since it can only ever be completed by the offender's own body, never delegated to an agent. All seven wholesome karma-paths, when they arise from formally receiving a precept, likewise necessarily involve both — since precept-based śīla always depends on an actual manifested act of reception — while the specific case of meditation-born or uncontaminated restraint involves only unmanifested karma, arising as it does purely through the power of mind, without needing any manifested act at all.
又經中言:有十業道,或善或惡。其相云何?頌曰: 所說十業道, 攝惡妙行中, 麁品為其性, 如應成善惡。 論曰:於前所說惡妙行中,若麁顯易知,攝為十業道。如應若善攝前妙行,不善業道攝前惡行。不攝何等惡妙行耶?且不善中身惡業為業道,令遠離故。語惡業道於語惡行,不攝加行後起及輕。意惡業道於意惡行,不攝惡思及輕貪等。善業道中身善業道,於身妙行不攝一分,謂加行後起及餘善身業,即離飲酒施供養等。語善業道於語妙行不攝一分,謂愛語等。意善業道於意妙行不攝一分,謂諸善思。十業道中前七業道為皆定有表無表耶?不爾。云何?頌曰: 惡六定無表, 彼自作婬二, 善七受生二, 定生唯無表。 論曰:七惡業道中,六定有無表,謂殺生、不與取、虛誑語、離間語、麁惡語、雜穢語。如是六種若遣他為,根本成時自表無故。若有自作彼六業道,則六皆有表無表二,謂起表時彼便死等;後方死等與遣使同,根本成時唯無表故。唯欲邪行必具二種,要是自身所究竟故,非遣他作,如自生喜。七善業道若從受生,必皆具二,謂表、無表,受生尸羅必依表故。靜慮無漏所攝律儀名為定生,此唯無表,但依心力而得生故。
Moreover, a sūtra speaks of ten karma-paths, some wholesome and some unwholesome. What is the character of these? Verse: these ten karma-paths spoken of are subsumed under bad and good conduct; their essential nature is the coarse portion of these, becoming wholesome or unwholesome as appropriate. Prose: among the bad and good conduct discussed above, whatever is coarse, prominent, and easily recognized is subsumed as the ten karma-paths. As appropriate, the wholesome karma-paths are subsumed under the good conduct discussed above, and the unwholesome karma-paths under the bad conduct discussed above. What portions of bad and good conduct are not subsumed? Among the unwholesome, the bodily karma-path is limited to the actual completed bodily karma, [chosen] for the sake of enabling its avoidance; the verbal karma-paths do not include the preparatory or follow-up stages of verbal bad conduct, nor its minor instances; the mental karma-paths do not include [minor] bad intention, nor minor instances of greed and the like. Among the wholesome karma-paths, the bodily karma-path does not include one portion of bodily good conduct — namely, preparatory and follow-up action, and other wholesome bodily acts such as abstaining from alcohol or making offerings; the verbal karma-path does not include one portion of verbal good conduct — namely, kind speech and the like; the mental karma-path does not include one portion of mental good conduct — namely, [ordinary] wholesome intentions. Among the ten karma-paths, must all of the first seven necessarily have both manifested and unmanifested karma? Not necessarily. How is this so? Verse: six of the unwholesome definitely have unmanifested karma; sexual misconduct, [when] done personally, has both; the seven wholesome, when arising from formal reception, have both; those arising through meditative attainment have only unmanifested karma. Prose: among the seven unwholesome karma-paths, six definitely have unmanifested karma — namely, killing living beings, taking what is not given, false speech, divisive speech, harsh speech, and frivolous speech. If these six are done by commissioning another, there is no manifested karma of one's own at the moment the root act is completed. If one personally performs these six karma-paths oneself, then all six have both manifested and unmanifested karma — that is, at the moment one initiates the manifested act, the victim then dies or the like; but if death or the like occurs only afterward, this is the same as commissioning another, since at the moment the root act is completed, there is only unmanifested karma. Sexual misconduct alone necessarily comprises both, since it must be completed by one's own body, and cannot be delegated to another, just as one cannot delegate the arising of one's own pleasure. The seven wholesome karma-paths, if arising from formal reception, necessarily comprise both manifested and unmanifested karma, since śīla arising from formal reception necessarily depends upon a manifested act. Restraint comprised within meditative or uncontaminated attainment is called "arising through meditative attainment," and this has only unmanifested karma, since it arises solely through the power of mind.
The principle that "the ten karma-paths pick out only the coarse portion" of the fuller bad-conduct/good-conduct classification is worth stating plainly, since it explains why this treatise needs both a broader threefold scheme (bodily/verbal/mental bad and good conduct) and this narrower tenfold scheme side by side: the ten karma-paths function as a practical, easily-taught summary of the clearest, most recognizable cases of wrongdoing and virtue, while the broader threefold scheme captures the full range including subtler preparatory stages, minor instances, and follow-up actions that the tenfold list deliberately sets aside for the sake of clarity and teachability.
The sexual-misconduct exception is a nice illustration of a point this treatise has made before in a different context (recall fascicle 13's discussion of completing a karma-path by commissioning another): most bodily and verbal offenses can, in principle, be carried out through an intermediary, with the instigator's own karma completing only once the deed is actually done elsewhere — but sexual misconduct is structurally different, since it is, by its very nature, an act that only the offender's own body can perform, making delegation simply impossible, which is why it alone among the unwholesome seven is guaranteed to always involve both manifested and unmanifested karma together.
6. Preparatory Action, Root Act, and Follow-Up: The Sheep-Butcher Example
The treatise now specifies, with precision, when manifested and unmanifested karma occur across a karma-path's three stages. Preparatory action always necessarily involves manifested karma, but whether it also involves unmanifested karma depends on the intensity of the mind behind it: if a fierce affliction, or an unusually sincere and pure intention, is present, unmanifested karma arises alongside it; otherwise, it does not. Follow-up action is the reverse: it necessarily involves unmanifested karma, but its manifested karma is variable — if a later act continues in keeping with the original karma, manifested karma is present; otherwise, it is not. To see exactly how these three stages are established in practice, the treatise offers the paradigm case of killing, illustrated through a sheep-butcher's entire process: from the moment the intention to kill first arises and the butcher rises from bed, going to negotiate a price at the sheep-market, touching and paying for the animal, leading it home to be fed, bringing it into the slaughterhouse, and finally striking or stabbing it with knife or staff, once or repeatedly, up until the moment life has not yet actually ended — every one of these actions is called the preparatory action of killing. The precise instant the victim's life actually ends, coinciding with the manifested act occurring at that very moment, together with its accompanying unmanifested karma, is what constitutes the root karma-path of killing itself — brought about jointly by two conditions: the preparatory action, and the completion of the intended result. From the instant immediately following this root act onward, the unmanifested karma of killing continues on without interruption, and this ongoing continuation is called the follow-up action of killing; later actions, too — skinning, cutting, cleaning, weighing, selling, cooking, eating, or praising the meat's flavor — are, at each such moment their accompanying manifested karma occurs, likewise called follow-up action. The remaining six bodily and verbal karma-paths should each be understood to divide into these same three stages by analogy, with appropriate adjustments. Greed, hatred, and wrong view are different: the very moment they actually manifest is itself already called the root karma-path directly, with no separate preparatory or follow-up stage to speak of.
業道加行必定有表,此位無表或有或無。若猛利纏淳淨心起則有無表,異此則無。後起翻前,定有無表,此位表業或有或無。謂若後時起隨前業則有表業,異此便無。於此義中如何建立加行根本後起位耶?且不善中最初殺業,如屠羊者將行殺時,先發殺心從床而起,執持價直趣賣羊廛,㨊觸羊身酬價捉取,牽還養飯將入屠坊,手執杖刀若打若刺,或一或再至命未終,如是皆名殺生加行。隨此表業彼正命終,此剎那頃表無表業,是謂殺生根本業道。由二緣故,令諸有情根本業道殺罪所觸:一由加行、二由果滿。此剎那後殺無表業隨轉不絕,名殺後起。及於後時剝截治洗,若稱若賣或煮,或食讚述其美表業剎那,如是亦名殺生後起。餘六業道隨其所應三分不同,准例應說。貪瞋邪見纔現在前,即說名為根本業道,故無加行後起差別。
A karma-path's preparatory action necessarily has manifested karma; at this stage, unmanifested karma may or may not be present. If a fierce afflictive fixation, or a sincere and pure mind, arises, then unmanifested karma is present; otherwise, it is not. Follow-up action is the reverse of this: it necessarily has unmanifested karma, while at this stage manifested karma may or may not be present — that is, if a later act arises in accordance with the earlier karma, manifested karma is present; otherwise, it is not. In this connection, how are the stages of preparatory action, root act, and follow-up action to be established? Consider, among the unwholesome, the very first act of killing — as when a sheep-butcher, about to carry out killing, first gives rise to the intention to kill, rises from bed, takes hold of the payment and proceeds to the sheep-market, touches the sheep's body, pays for it and takes hold of it, leads it back and feeds it, brings it into the slaughterhouse, and, with staff or knife in hand, strikes or stabs it once or repeatedly, up until the point that life has not yet ended — all of this is called the preparatory action of killing. Precisely at the moment that manifested act occurs together with the victim's actual death, this instant's manifested and unmanifested karma is called the root karma-path of killing. It is by two conditions that a sentient being's root karma-path comes to be touched by the fault of killing: first, the preparatory action; second, the completion of the result. From the instant immediately following this, the unmanifested karma of killing continues on without interruption; this is called the follow-up action of killing. Later actions as well — skinning, cutting, cleaning, weighing, selling, cooking, or eating and praising its flavor — at whatever instant their manifested karma occurs, are likewise called the follow-up action of killing. The remaining six karma-paths, as appropriate, should each be explained by analogy as dividing into these same three parts. Greed, hatred, and wrong view are called the root karma-path the very instant they manifest — hence there is no distinction of preparatory or follow-up action for these.
This passage's vivid, step-by-step narration of the sheep-butcher's entire process — from rising out of bed through to the final meal and its praise — is one of the more concretely detailed illustrations in this whole treatise, and it is doing careful conceptual work: it shows that "preparatory action" can span an enormous stretch of ordinary, seemingly unremarkable activity (haggling over a price, walking home) that only retroactively counts as part of a killing's preparatory buildup once the root act is actually completed, while "follow-up action" extends symmetrically forward in time to include activities (butchering, cooking, even praising the meat) that occur well after the moment of death itself, so long as they still generate manifested karma continuous with the original act.
The special treatment of greed, hatred, and wrong view — lacking any preparatory or follow-up stage, with only a bare "root act" moment — follows directly from the previous fascicle's and this fascicle's shared premise that these three are mental states rather than physical or verbal acts extended through time: since they have no manifested karma at all (mental karma generates no unmanifested residue in this system, as established since fascicle 13), there is no ongoing physical or verbal continuum for a "preparatory" or "follow-up" phase to attach to — the affliction simply arises, in full, at the single moment it manifests, with nothing before or after it to count as part of the same karma-path.
7. Exactly When Is the Killer's Karma-Path Completed?
A genuinely difficult puzzle now confronts the treatise's own account: precisely when, relative to the victim's death, does the killer's manifested and unmanifested karma actually constitute the completed root karma-path — exactly at the moment the victim enters the state of death, or only afterward? Either answer creates a serious problem. If the killer's karma-path is completed exactly at the moment the victim enters the state of death, then killer and victim would have to be dying at one and the same instant, which the tradition simply does not accept as how karma-paths are completed. But if the killer's karma-path is instead completed only after the victim's death has already occurred, this directly contradicts the very account just given — that the root karma-path consists precisely of the manifested and unmanifested karma occurring at the instant of death itself — and would also conflict with the Vaibhāṣika's own established reading of a passage from the root treatise, which states that there can be a case where a being has already been killed while the killing itself has not yet ceased, explained as referring to a killer whose preparatory action has not yet ended even after the victim's death — with the Vaibhāṣika specifically insisting that "preparatory action" in this passage actually refers to the root act, not literally to preparatory action, since it must be conceded that even after death occurs, the root act has not yet finished. The resolution the treatise offers is this: at the very moment of death, the manifested act occurring then, though by itself insufficient to constitute the completed root karma-path (since it would serve no further purpose on its own), together with the follow-up unmanifested karma actually reaching its full completion only slightly afterward, jointly and only together constitute the root karma-path — meaning the root act is not pinned to any single sharp instant at all, but is properly understood as the combined completion of the preparatory action and the fully-ripened result taken together.
此中應說。為所殺生住死有時,能殺生者彼剎那頃表無表業即成業道?為死後耶?若爾何失?二俱有過。若所殺生正住死有,能殺生者業道即成,即能殺者與所殺生,俱時命終應成業道。然宗不許彼業道成。若所殺生命終以後,能殺生者業道方成,是則不應先作是說:隨此表業彼正命終。此剎那頃表無表業,是謂殺生根本業道。又應違害毘婆沙師釋本論中加行未息,謂本論說:頗有已害生殺生未滅耶?曰:有,如已斷生命彼加行未息。毘婆沙者釋此文言:此中於後起,以加行聲說。應言於根本說加行聲,許命終後根本未息故。如無有過此中應說。此中說何名為無過?謂於根本說加行聲。若爾,于時所有表業如何可成根本業道?何為不成?以無用故。無表於此有何用耶?故業道成非由有用,但由加行果圓滿時,此二俱成根本業道。
This point should now be addressed. At the moment the victim actually enters the state of death, does the killer's manifested and unmanifested karma at that very instant thereby constitute the completed karma-path — or is it completed only after death? If so, either way, what fault would follow? Both possibilities incur a fault. If the killer's karma-path is completed exactly at the moment the victim enters the state of death, then the killer and the victim would be dying at the very same moment, and this should then constitute the completed karma-path — yet our own tenet does not accept that the karma-path is completed in this way. If, instead, the killer's karma-path is completed only after the victim's death has occurred, then it should not have been stated earlier that, at the very instant the victim actually dies, that instant's manifested and unmanifested karma is what constitutes the root karma-path of killing — and this would also conflict with the Vaibhāṣika's own interpretation of the root treatise's statement about preparatory action not yet having ceased. For the root treatise states: "Is there a case where a being has already been killed, yet the killing has not yet ceased?" Answer: "There is — as when, though life has already been cut off, the killer's preparatory action has not yet ceased." The Vaibhāṣika explain this passage as follows: here, what pertains to follow-up action is being spoken of using the word "preparatory action" — one should understand that the word "preparatory action" here is actually being used to refer to the root act, since it must be granted that, even after death has occurred, the root act has not yet ceased. If understood this way, there is no fault, and this is what should be stated here. [Question:] What, in this context, makes this reading free of fault? [Reply:] It is that the word "preparatory action" here refers to the root act. [Objection:] If this is so, how, then, could the manifested karma present at that time constitute the root karma-path? [Reply:] Why should it not? [Objection:] Because it would serve no purpose. [Reply, continuing:] What purpose, then, does the unmanifested karma serve here? [Response:] Hence the karma-path's completion does not depend on serving any particular purpose — rather, it is precisely at the moment the preparatory action and its result are jointly brought to full completion that both the manifested and unmanifested karma together constitute the root karma-path.
We want to be transparent that this passage's closing exchange is genuinely difficult to parse with full confidence — the rapid volley of short questions and replies ("why should it not?" / "because it would serve no purpose" / "what purpose does the unmanifested karma serve, then?") compresses what is likely a longer dialectical exchange in the tradition's oral commentary into a bare minimum of text, and we have rendered it as literally as possible while marking the turn-structure with bracketed labels, rather than smoothing it into a more confident-sounding resolution than the Chinese itself provides.
The underlying puzzle here is a genuine philosophical one worth stating plainly: this treatise's entire momentariness framework (established at length in fascicle 13) insists that causation happens strictly moment by moment, with no blurring across instants — yet the completion of a karma-path like killing seems to require correlating two separate events (the killer's own manifested act, and the victim's death) that do not obviously occur at exactly the same instant. The proposed resolution — that the root karma-path is constituted by the *joint* completion of preparatory action and result, rather than pinned to one sharp, isolated moment — is a genuinely interesting refinement of the treatise's momentariness commitments, treating "completion" as a relational fact obtaining between two events rather than a property any single instant possesses on its own.
8. When All Ten Karma-Paths Serve a Single Act of Killing
The treatise now observes that the ten karma-paths can serve as each other's preparatory and follow-up actions in striking combinations, illustrated through an elaborate scenario centered on a single act of killing an enemy. Someone wishing to destroy an enemy might scheme and conspire to assemble the conditions for killing (false speech and divisive speech among the karma-paths); might kill other beings and pray to spirits for their assistance (killing); might steal others' property to fund the undertaking (theft); might seduce the enemy's wife specifically in order to bring about the husband's death (sexual misconduct); might spread slanderous rumors to alienate the enemy from friends and family, sowing suspicion through harsh or divisive speech; might, having the power to help but withholding it, let the enemy come to harm; might covet the enemy's wealth outright (greed); might harbor outright hatred toward the enemy (hatred); or might cultivate the killing itself through a wrong view that somehow justifies it (wrong view) — before actually carrying out the killing. In this way, all ten karma-paths together can serve as the preparatory action for a single act of killing. And after the enemy has been killed, one might go on to kill the enemy's own family members, seize their remaining property, violate loved ones left behind, and continue generating greed, hatred, and wrong view in succession — these same ten thereby also serving as the killing's follow-up action. The remaining karma-paths should be understood by analogy to admit similar combinations, though greed, hatred, and wrong view themselves cannot properly serve as anyone else's "preparatory action," strictly speaking, since a karma-path's preparatory action requires an actual undertaking beyond the bare arising of a mental state, and these three are complete the very moment the corresponding mental state itself arises, with no further deed yet performed.
又諸業道展轉相望,容有互為加行後起。今且應說殺生業道以十業道為起加行。謂如有人欲害怨敵,設諸謀計合搆殺緣,或殺眾生祈請助力,或盜他物以資殺事,或婬彼婦令殺其夫,或為乖離彼親友故起語四過令生猜阻。設有勢力無救護心,或於彼財心生貪著,或即於彼起瞋恚心,或起邪見長養殺業然後方殺,如是名為以十業道為殺加行。殺怨敵已,復於後時誅其所親,收其財物婬彼所愛,乃至復起貪瞋邪見次第現前,此十名為殺生後起。所餘業道如應當知。貪等不應能為加行,非唯心起加行即成,唯起心時未作事故。
Moreover, when the karma-paths are considered in relation to one another, they may serve as each other's preparatory and follow-up actions. We should now discuss how the karma-path of killing can take all ten karma-paths as its preparatory action. That is, suppose someone wishes to destroy an enemy: they might scheme and conspire to assemble the conditions for killing; or kill other living beings and pray to spirits for assistance; or steal others' property to fund the undertaking; or seduce that person's wife in order to bring about the husband's death; or, in order to estrange that person from their family and friends, commit the four faults of speech to sow suspicion between them; or, possessing the power to rescue but harboring no wish to do so; or give rise to a covetous mind toward that person's wealth; or give rise to a mind of hatred toward that very person; or give rise to a wrong view that cultivates the killing, and only then actually carry out the killing — in this way, all ten karma-paths are said to serve as the preparatory action for killing. Having killed the enemy, one might then, afterward, go on to put the enemy's own family to death, seize their property, violate those they loved, and further give rise, in succession, to greed, hatred, and wrong view — these ten are called the follow-up action of killing. The remaining karma-paths should be understood accordingly. Greed and the others should not be capable of serving as anyone's preparatory action, since a mere arising of mind does not by itself constitute preparatory action — at the very moment such a mind arises, no [further] deed has yet been performed.
This scenario is a striking piece of moral casuistry, and it is worth being clear about what work it is doing: rather than illustrating a typical case, it is deliberately constructing a maximal, worst-case scenario in which literally every one of the ten karma-paths gets folded into the buildup and aftermath of a single killing, precisely in order to demonstrate the full combinatorial flexibility of the "preparatory action" and "follow-up action" categories established two sections earlier — any karma-path, in principle, can serve as the preparatory or follow-up stage for any other, so long as it is causally and temporally connected to the root act in the right way.
The closing point about greed, hatred, and wrong view never serving as anyone's "preparatory action" reconnects directly to this fascicle's earlier observation (two sections back) that these three lack any preparatory or follow-up stage of their own, since they are complete the instant the corresponding mental state arises — the same reasoning is now shown to cut the other way as well: not only do these three lack their own preparatory phase, they also cannot function as another karma-path's preparatory phase, since "preparatory action" requires an actual extended undertaking, and a bare mental arising, however vivid, does not by itself constitute one.
9. The Three Roots Behind Killing and Theft
A sūtra teaches that killing is of three kinds — arising from greed, from hatred, or from delusion — and states that the same threefold division applies all the way through to wrong view as well. This raises a technical question: since not every karma-path is actually completed through all three roots equally, how does the preparatory action leading up to each differ in this respect? The treatise clarifies that it is specifically the preparatory action of each unwholesome karma-path — not necessarily the root act itself — that can arise from any of the three unwholesome roots, this being said with reference to whichever root initiates the process. The preparatory action of killing arises from greed when, for instance, someone kills in order to obtain part of the victim's body, to obtain wealth, for mere sport, or to rescue a friend or oneself. It arises from hatred when someone, wishing to eliminate an enemy, kills out of a mind inflamed with rage. It arises from delusion in cases such as ritual sacrifice performed in the mistaken belief that it constitutes righteous conduct, or when rulers, acting under worldly law, execute enemies and eliminate violent criminals in the belief that this generates great merit. The treatise records, as further examples of delusion-based killing, several non-Buddhist positions it explicitly rejects: the Persian teaching that ending the life of an aged or ill parent, thereby releasing them from suffering, generates superior merit; and various other non-Buddhist teachings holding that killing venomous creatures such as snakes, scorpions, and wasps generates superior merit since they cause people harm, or that killing sheep, deer, water buffalo, and other animals originally intended for food incurs no fault at all. Killing undertaken because of a wrong view of this kind is likewise classified as arising from delusion. Theft's preparatory action similarly arises from greed when someone steals simply out of need, or for personal profit, honor, and reputation, or to rescue oneself or a friend; from hatred, when theft is committed specifically to harm an enemy out of rage; and from delusion in cases such as rulers who, under worldly law, seize wicked persons' property in the belief that this is lawful and incurs no fault of theft, or the Brahmanical teaching — which the treatise likewise records without endorsing — that, since Mahābrahmā originally bestowed all worldly wealth upon brahmins at the very beginning of the current era, and brahmins in later ages of diminished power have simply had their own rightful property usurped by lower castes, a brahmin who now seizes or takes another's wealth for clothing, food, or any other use, or to give away to someone else, is merely using what was always their own, incurring no fault of theft — even though, the treatise notes, such persons plainly do recognize, at the moment of taking, that the property in question belongs to someone else. Theft motivated by any such wrong view is likewise classified as arising from delusion.
又經中說:苾芻當知,殺有三種:一從貪生、二從瞋生、三從癡生。乃至邪見有三亦爾。此中應說:何相殺生?名從貪生。問餘亦爾。非諸業道一切皆由三根究竟,然其加行不與彼同。云何不同?頌曰: 加行三根起, 彼無間生故, 貪等三根生。 論曰:不善業道加行生時,一一由三不善根起,依先等起故作是說。殺生加行由貪起者,如有為欲得彼身分、或為得財、或為戲樂、或為拔濟親友自身,從貪引起殺生加行。從瞋起者,如為除怨,發憤恚心起殺加行。從癡起者,如有祠中謂是法心起殺加行,又諸王等依世法律誅戮怨敵除剪凶徒,謂成大福起殺加行。又波剌私作如是說:父母老病,若令命終得免困苦便生勝福。又諸外道有作是言:蛇蠍蜂等為人毒害,若能殺者便生勝福。羊鹿水牛及餘禽獸,本擬供食故殺無罪。又因邪見殺害眾生,此等加行皆從癡起。偷盜加行從貪起者,謂隨所須起盜加行、或為別利恭敬名譽、或為救拔自身親友,從貪引起偷盜加行。從瞋起者,謂為除怨,發憤恚心起盜加行。從癡起者,謂諸王等依世法律奪惡人財,謂法應爾無偷盜罪。又婆羅門作如是說:世間財物於劫初時,大梵天王施諸梵志,於後梵志勢力微劣,為諸卑族侵奪受用。今諸梵志於世他財若奪若偷,充衣充食或充餘用或轉施他,皆用己財無偷盜罪。然彼取時有他物想,又因邪見盜他財物,皆名從癡起盜加行。
Moreover, a sūtra states: "Monastics, you should know that killing is of three kinds: first, arising from greed; second, arising from hatred; third, arising from delusion" — and the same holds true all the way through to wrong view as well. In this connection, one should ask: by what mark is killing said to arise from greed? The same question applies to the rest. Not every karma-path is necessarily completed through all three roots equally; however, their preparatory action is not thereby identical in scope. How does this differ? Verse: preparatory action arises from the three roots, since it is greed and the others, arising in immediate succession, that give rise to it. Prose: when the preparatory action of an unwholesome karma-path arises, it arises, in each case, from one of the three unwholesome roots, spoken of with reference to whichever root initiates it. Killing's preparatory action arises from greed in cases such as killing in order to obtain a part of the victim's body, or to obtain wealth, or for mere amusement, or to rescue a friend or oneself — greed gives rise to the preparatory action of killing. It arises from hatred in cases such as killing out of a mind inflamed with rage, in order to eliminate an enemy. It arises from delusion in cases such as ritual sacrifice performed with the mistaken thought that this constitutes righteous conduct, or rulers who, following worldly law, execute enemies and eliminate violent criminals, believing this generates great merit. Moreover, the Persians teach: if one causes an aged or ill parent to die, thereby releasing them from suffering, this generates superior merit. Moreover, certain non-Buddhists teach: since snakes, scorpions, wasps, and the like poison and harm people, killing them generates superior merit; and that sheep, deer, water buffalo, and other birds and beasts, being originally intended for food, may be killed without fault. Killing undertaken because of such wrong views — all these instances of preparatory action arise from delusion. Theft's preparatory action arises from greed in cases such as stealing according to one's need, or for personal profit, honor, and reputation, or to rescue oneself or a friend — greed gives rise to the preparatory action of theft. It arises from hatred in cases such as stealing specifically in order to eliminate an enemy, out of a mind inflamed with rage. It arises from delusion in cases such as rulers who, following worldly law, seize wicked persons' property, believing this to be lawful and incurring no fault of theft. Moreover, brahmins teach: at the very beginning of the kalpa, worldly wealth was bestowed by Mahābrahmā upon brahmins; later, as brahmins' own power weakened, lower castes usurped and made use of it; now, when brahmins seize or steal another's worldly wealth — whether for clothing, for food, or for other uses, or to give away to others — they are, in every case, merely using their own rightful property, and incur no fault of theft — even though, at the moment of taking, they do recognize the property as belonging to another. Theft undertaken because of wrong view is, in every such case, likewise called preparatory action arising from delusion.
We want to be explicit about what this section is and is not: it is the Abhidharmakośa's own polemical characterization of certain non-Buddhist positions (attributed here to "the Persians" — almost certainly referring to Zoroastrian mercy-killing customs as understood, or perhaps caricatured, by Indian Buddhist writers of this period — and to Brahmanical property theory), presented specifically as examples of delusion-rooted wrongdoing from this treatise's own sectarian standpoint. We are translating the treatise's characterization of these views faithfully, as historical source material documenting how this particular Buddhist scholastic tradition argued against rival traditions, not as an accurate or neutral account of what Zoroastrians or Brahmins themselves actually believed and practiced — readers interested in these traditions' own self-understanding should consult sources from within those traditions rather than this treatise's polemical summary of them.
The technical point actually being illustrated by all of this — separate from the specific historical content of the examples — is worth drawing out clearly: the treatise distinguishes between a karma-path's root act (which does not always divide cleanly by one of the three roots) and its preparatory action (which always traces back to one of greed, hatred, or delusion as its initiating cause), and the examples are chosen specifically to show delusion operating in a distinctive way from the other two roots — where greed and hatred motivate killing or theft through ordinary desire or malice, delusion motivates it through a mistaken belief that the act is actually virtuous or blameless, which the treatise treats as a categorically different, and in some sense more insidious, kind of motivation.
10. The Three Roots Behind Sexual Misconduct and False Speech, and the Turn to Wholesome Conduct
The treatise completes its threefold analysis with sexual misconduct and false speech. Sexual misconduct's preparatory action arises from greed in cases of desire for another's spouse, or for the sake of gaining another's wealth, status, or esteem, or to rescue oneself or another; from hatred, when committed specifically out of a mind inflamed with rage in order to harm an enemy; and from delusion, in cases such as the Persian teaching praising sexual relations with one's own mother and other close relatives, or brahmins who praise, within cattle-veneration rites, participants who take on cow-like vows — drinking water and grazing on grass, standing or moving about — and who then pair off with one another indiscriminately, without regard for kinship; and in the teachings of certain other non-Buddhists holding that all women are, in effect, common property—comparable to a mortar, a flower, a fruit, food, a stairway, a road, a bridge, or a boat—meant to be shared freely by everyone in the world. Sexual misconduct arising from views of this kind is classified as arising from delusion. False speech and the remaining three verbal karma-paths arise from greed and hatred in ways that should be understood by analogy with the foregoing; false speech's preparatory action specifically arising from delusion is illustrated by a non-Buddhist treatise's own teaching that false speech incurs no fault when spoken in jest, in arranging a marriage, before a queen, or to save a life or one's wealth. False speech and divisive speech undertaken because of wrong view should likewise, in every case, be understood as arising from delusion; and the Vedas and other non-Buddhist treatises, being classified entirely as frivolous speech, have their own preparatory action arising from delusion as well. This raises one final technical point: since greed, hatred, and wrong view themselves have no separate preparatory action of their own, how can it still be said that they, too, "arise from the three roots"? The answer is that this is said with reference to the fact that they arise in immediate succession from an equivalent prior root — greed, for instance, may sometimes arise immediately following an episode of greed itself, or following two of the other roots in succession, and the same holds for hatred and wrong view arising immediately from any of the three. Having now explained how unwholesome karma-paths arise from the three unwholesome roots, the treatise turns to the wholesome side: every stage of a wholesome karma-path — preparatory action, root act, and follow-up action alike — arises entirely from the three wholesome roots (non-greed, non-hatred, non-delusion), since a wholesome mind is, by definition, always accompanied by all three wholesome roots at once. These three wholesome stages are simply the mirror image of their unwholesome counterparts: freedom from bad preparatory action is itself good preparatory action, freedom from a bad root act is itself a good root act, and freedom from bad follow-up action is itself good follow-up action — illustrated by the ceremony through which a novice receives full monastic ordination: entering the ordination platform, paying respect to the assembled monks, sincerely requesting a preceptor, and undergoing the formal motion and its two subsequent readings are all called the preparatory action of this wholesome karma-path; the single instant in which the third and final reading is completed, together with its accompanying manifested and unmanifested karma, constitutes the root karma-path itself; and everything from that point onward, up through the traditional teaching of the four supports of monastic life...
邪婬加行從貪起者,謂於他妻等起染著心、或為求他財名位恭敬、或為救拔自身他身,從貪著心起婬加行。從瞋生者,謂為除怨,發憤恚心起婬加行。從癡生者,如波剌私讚於母等行非梵行。又諸梵志讚牛祠中有諸女男受持牛禁,吸水齧草或住或行,不簡親踈隨遇隨合。又諸外道作如是言:一切女人如臼花果熟食階隥道路橋船,世間眾人應共受用。此等加行從癡所生。虛誑語等語四業道從貪瞋生,類前應說。然虛誑語所有加行從癡生者,如外論言: 若人因戲笑, 嫁娶對女王, 及救命救財, 虛誑語無罪。 又因邪見起虛誑語、離間語等所有加行,當知一切從癡所生。又諸吠陀及餘邪論,皆雜穢語攝,加行從癡生。貪瞋等三既無加行,如何可說從貪等生?以從三根無間生故,可說貪等從三根生。謂或有時從貪無間生貪業道,從二亦然。瞋及邪見從三亦爾。已說不善從三根生。善復云何?頌曰: 善於三位中, 皆三善根起。 論曰:諸善業道所有加行根本後起,皆從無貪無瞋無癡善根所起,以善三位皆是善心所等起故、善心必與三種善根共相應故。此善三位其相云何?謂遠離前不善三位離惡加行即善加行,離惡根本即善根本,離惡後起即善後起。且如勤策受具戒時,來入戒壇禮苾芻眾,至誠發語請親教師,乃至一白二羯磨等,皆名為善業道加行。第三羯磨竟一剎那中,表無表業名根本業道。從此以後至說四依,
Sexual misconduct's preparatory action arises from greed in cases such as giving rise to a defiled attachment toward another's spouse, or seeking another's wealth, status, or esteem, or seeking to rescue oneself or another — a mind of greedy attachment gives rise to the preparatory action of sexual misconduct. It arises from hatred in cases such as giving rise to a mind inflamed with rage in order to eliminate an enemy. It arises from delusion in cases such as the Persian teaching praising sexual relations with one's mother and others; and brahmins who, within cattle-veneration rites, praise women and men who undertake cow-like vows — drinking water, grazing on grass, standing or walking — and who pair off with whomever they happen to encounter, without regard to kinship or distance; and certain other non-Buddhist teachings holding that all women are like a mortar, a flower, a ripened fruit, food, a stairway, a road, a bridge, or a boat, meant to be shared in common by all people in the world. Preparatory action of this kind arises from delusion. False speech and the remaining three verbal karma-paths arise from greed and hatred in ways that should be explained by analogy with the foregoing. As for false speech's preparatory action arising from delusion, a non-Buddhist treatise states: "If a person speaks falsely out of jest, in arranging a marriage, before a queen, or to save a life or to save one's wealth, this incurs no fault." False speech and divisive speech undertaken because of wrong view should, in every such case, be understood as arising from delusion. Moreover, the Vedas and other heterodox treatises, being subsumed entirely under frivolous speech, likewise have their preparatory action arising from delusion. [Objection:] Since greed, hatred, and wrong view themselves have no preparatory action, how can it be said that they, too, arise from the three roots? [Reply:] Because they arise in immediate succession from an equivalent root, it can be said that greed and the others arise from the three roots — that is, there are occasions when a karma-path of greed arises immediately following greed itself, and the same holds following either of the other two roots; hatred and wrong view likewise may each arise immediately following any of the three roots. We have now explained how unwholesome karma-paths arise from the three roots. What of the wholesome side? Verse: the wholesome, in all three stages, arises entirely from the three wholesome roots. Prose: every wholesome karma-path's preparatory action, root act, and follow-up action arises entirely from the wholesome roots of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion, since all three wholesome stages are initiated by a wholesome mental factor, and a wholesome mind is necessarily associated with all three wholesome roots together. What is the character of these three wholesome stages? They are simply freedom from the three preceding unwholesome stages: freedom from bad preparatory action is itself good preparatory action; freedom from a bad root act is itself a good root act; freedom from bad follow-up action is itself good follow-up action. Consider, for instance, the moment a novice receives the full precept: entering the ordination platform, paying homage to the assembled bhikṣus, sincerely voicing a request to their preceptor, and the single motion together with its two subsequent formal readings — all of this is called the preparatory action of this wholesome karma-path. The single instant in which the third formal reading concludes, together with its manifested and unmanifested karma, is called the root karma-path. From this point onward, up through the teaching of the four supports...
As with the previous section, we want to flag plainly that the non-Buddhist positions catalogued here (attributed to "the Persians," to brahmanical cattle-veneration rites, and to unnamed other non-Buddhist teachers) are presented entirely from this treatise's own polemical, sectarian standpoint, marshaled as examples of delusion-rooted wrongdoing rather than as balanced or accurate descriptions of the traditions being characterized. We have translated the treatise's own characterizations faithfully as historical source material — evidence of how this particular Buddhist scholastic tradition argued against its religious rivals — without treating these characterizations as reliable accounts of what those other traditions actually taught or practiced.
The śrāmaṇera-to-bhikṣu ordination example picking up the wholesome side directly mirrors the killing example used for the unwholesome side several sections earlier, right down to the same three-stage structure (preparatory action / root act / follow-up action) — and this deliberate parallelism is itself making a point: the treatise wants to show that wholesome and unwholesome karma-paths share an identical underlying temporal architecture, differing only in moral content, which is precisely the same lesson fascicle 13 drew when it first established parallel five-name schemes for the vow of individual liberation and for non-restraint.
11. Which Root Completes Each Karma-Path, and Where Each One Arises
The treatise completes the ordination example: from the moment the third formal reading concludes onward, through the traditional teaching of the four supports of monastic life and everything continuing afterward in keeping with this root act, all such manifested and unmanifested karma is called follow-up action. Returning to a point flagged earlier — that not every karma-path is completed through all three roots equally — the treatise now specifies exactly which root is responsible for each root act's completion. Killing, harsh speech, and hatred are all completed specifically through hatred, since these three are only actually completed when an extremely coarse, unrestrained state of mind, indifferent to consequence, is present. Theft, sexual misconduct, and greed are completed specifically through greed, since these three are only completed when an extremely defiled state of mind still concerned with obtaining some benefit is present. Wrong view is completed specifically through delusion, arising only once an especially intense degree of delusion is actually present. The remaining three verbal karma-paths — false speech, divisive speech, and frivolous speech — may each be completed through any of the three roots, since greed, hatred, or delusion, whichever happens to be present, is each independently capable of bringing any of these three to completion. The treatise then specifies exactly where each of these ten unwholesome karma-paths arises, in terms of four kinds of location: killing, harsh speech, and hatred arise specifically in the location of a sentient being; theft, sexual misconduct, and greed arise in the location of possessions or property; wrong view alone arises in the location of name-and-form generally; and false speech, divisive speech, and frivolous speech arise in the location of another's name-body — that is, in relation to another person as the addressee of speech.
第三羯磨竟一剎那中,表無表業名根本業道。從此以後至說四依,及餘依前相續隨轉表無表業,皆名後起。如先所說,非諸業道一切皆由三根究竟,何根究竟何業道耶?頌曰: 殺麁語瞋恚, 究竟皆由瞋, 盜邪行及貪, 皆由貪究竟, 邪見癡究竟, 許所餘由三。 論曰:惡業道中殺生、麁語、瞋恚業道,由瞋究竟,要無所顧極麁惡心現在前時此三成故。諸不與取、欲邪行、貪,此三業道由貪究竟,要有所顧極染污心現在前時此三成故。邪見究竟要由愚癡,由上品癡現前成故。虛誑、離間、雜穢語三,許一一由三根究竟,以貪瞋等現在前時一一能令此三成故。諸惡業道何處起耶?頌曰: 有情具名色, 名身等處起。 論曰:如前所說四節業道,三三一三隨其次第於有情等四處而生。謂殺等三有情處起,偷盜等三眾具處起,唯邪見一名色處起,虛誑語等三名身等處起。
The single instant in which the third formal reading concludes, together with its manifested and unmanifested karma, is called the root karma-path. From this point onward, through the teaching of the four supports and other manifested and unmanifested karma continuing on in accordance with this root act, all of this is called follow-up action. As already stated, not every karma-path is completed through all three roots equally — which root completes which karma-path? Verse: killing, harsh speech, and hatred are all completed by hatred; theft, sexual misconduct, and greed are all completed by greed; wrong view is completed by delusion; the remaining three are held to be completed by any of the three. Prose: among the unwholesome karma-paths, killing, harsh speech, and the karma-path of hatred are completed by hatred, since these three are only completed when an extremely coarse and unwholesome mind, indifferent to consequence, is present. Taking what is not given, sexual misconduct, and the karma-path of greed — these three karma-paths are completed by greed, since these three are only completed when an extremely defiled mind still concerned with some benefit is present. Wrong view's completion necessarily depends on delusion, being completed only when a superior grade of delusion is present. False speech, divisive speech, and frivolous speech are each held to be completed by any of the three roots, since greed, hatred, or delusion, whichever is present, is each independently capable of completing these three. Where do these unwholesome karma-paths arise? Verse: at the location of a sentient being, of possessions, of name-and-form, and of the name-body, in turn. Prose: as stated above, the karma-paths, in their four groupings of three, three, one, and three, arise, in this order, at four locations. Killing and the other two [in its group] arise at the location of a sentient being; theft and the other two [in its group] arise at the location of possessions; wrong view alone arises at the location of name-and-form; false speech and the other two [in its group] arise at the location of the name-body.
The "four locations" classification here (sentient being / possessions / name-and-form / name-body) gives a systematic answer to the question "what, exactly, is this karma-path directed at?" — killing and harsh speech obviously target a sentient being directly, while theft and sexual misconduct target something more like a claim or relationship (property, a spouse) rather than the person as such; wrong view is distinctive in targeting the broadest possible object, "name-and-form" being this treatise's standard term for the totality of mind-and-body constituting existence itself, since a wrong view is, in effect, a mistaken stance toward reality as a whole rather than toward any single being or object; and the remaining verbal karma-paths target specifically another person's "name-body" (名身, a technical term for the linguistic/conceptual dimension of a person as an addressee of communication) since these are, by definition, communicative acts requiring a recipient.
The completion-by-hatred/greed/delusion breakdown is worth holding alongside the earlier section's account of what motivates each karma-path's preparatory action, since the two schemes are asking related but distinct questions: preparatory action can, in principle, be initiated by any of the three roots (recall killing motivated by greed, hatred, or delusion in turn, from two sections back), but the root act's actual completion is far more constrained — killing can only ever be completed through hatred, no matter what root originally motivated the preparatory buildup toward it, since the treatise holds that only an unrestrained, indifferent-to-consequence state of mind is capable of actually crossing the threshold into a completed act of killing.
12. Dying Before Your Victim, and Collective Guilt in Group Killing
The treatise now takes up a genuinely difficult case: if someone undertakes the preparatory action of killing, fully intending to kill another, but dies at the very same moment as their intended victim, or even before them, do they still incur the completed root karma-path of killing? The answer is no — such a person definitely does not incur the root karma-path. This confirms a striking possibility: there can indeed be a would-be killer who undertakes the preparatory action of killing and even brings about the intended result, and yet is never actually touched by the fault of killing at all — precisely this case, of dying simultaneously with or before the victim. The reasoning is twofold. From one angle, since the victim's life still continues at the moment the would-be killer dies, there is no way for that would-be killer to be said to have completed the act of killing them. From the other angle, a completed karma-path requires a specific physical basis to depend on, and once the killer's own body — the very basis their preparatory action depended on — has itself perished, even though a new body of a similar general kind may arise for them afterward, that new body is not the basis the original fault could attach to, since no killing-related preparatory action was ever actually undertaken in connection with it. A further, related question then arises: when a group of people — an army setting out to kill an enemy, or a party of hunters — acts together, and only one member of the group actually performs the act of killing, who among them incurs the completed karma-path of killing? The answer is that everyone in the group who shares in the collective undertaking incurs it equally, exactly as if each had personally performed the act themselves, since they have all consented together to the very same shared undertaking — much as, when people mutually instruct and encourage one another toward a single shared purpose, one person's act of killing is sufficient to implicate everyone else in the fault as well. This holds even for someone who was coerced by others into joining the group, provided that, once inside it, their mind comes to align with the group's shared purpose — the sole exception being someone who has made a prior, fixed vow never to kill under any circumstance, even to save their own life: such a person, even if physically coerced into the group's presence, incurs no fault of killing at all, since they never actually share in the group's killing-intention to begin with.
有起加行定欲殺他,而與所殺生俱死或前死,亦得根本業道罪耶?頌曰: 俱死及前死, 無根依別故。 論曰:若能殺者與所殺生俱時命終、或在前死,彼定不得根本業道。故有問言:頗有殺者起殺加行及令果滿,而彼不為殺罪觸耶?曰:有。云何?謂能殺者與所殺生俱死、前死。何緣如是?以所殺生其命猶存,不可令彼能殺生者成殺罪故。非能殺者其命已終可得殺罪,別依生故。謂殺加行所依止身今已斷滅,雖有別類身同分生,非罪依止。此曾未起殺生加行,成殺業道理不應然。若有多人集為軍眾欲殺怨敵、或獵獸等,於中隨有一殺生時,何人得成殺生業道?頌曰: 軍等若同事, 皆成如作者。 論曰:於軍等中若隨有一作殺生事,如自作者,一切皆成殺生業道,由彼同許為一事故。如為一事展轉相教,故一殺生餘皆得罪。若有他力逼入此中,因即同心亦成殺罪。唯除若有立誓自要救自命緣亦不行殺,雖由他力逼在此中,而無殺心故無殺罪。
If one undertakes the preparatory action of killing, definitely intending to kill another, but dies at the very same time as the intended victim, or dies before them, does one still obtain the fault of the root karma-path? Verse: dying simultaneously or dying beforehand — neither obtains it, since the basis is different. Prose: if the would-be killer dies at the very same time as the victim, or dies beforehand, that person definitely does not obtain the root karma-path. Hence it may be asked: can there be a killer who undertakes the preparatory action of killing and brings the result to completion, and yet is not touched by the fault of killing? The answer: there can. How so? When the would-be killer dies simultaneously with, or before, the victim. Why is this so? Because, since the victim's life still remains, the would-be killer cannot thereby be said to have completed the fault of killing. Nor can the would-be killer, once their own life has ended, obtain the fault of killing, since the physical basis involved is now a different one — that is, the body that the preparatory action of killing depended upon has now perished; although a body of a similar general class may arise for them afterward, this is not the basis to which the fault could attach, since no preparatory action of killing was ever actually undertaken in connection with it — hence it is not reasonable that the karma-path of killing should be completed in this case. If many people gather together as an army intending to kill an enemy, or as a hunting party, and, among them, any one person performs an act of killing, who then comes to possess the karma-path of killing? Verse: if the army and the like share in the same undertaking, all become as if they were themselves the actor. Prose: within an army or similar group, if any one member performs an act of killing, this is as if each had personally performed it — all of them equally come to possess the karma-path of killing, since they have all consented together to this same shared undertaking; just as, when people mutually instruct one another toward a single shared purpose, one person's act of killing causes all the rest to incur the fault as well. Even if someone was forced by others' power into joining this group, if their mind then comes to align with it, they likewise come to possess the fault of killing. The sole exception is someone who has established a vow to never perform killing even for the sake of saving their own life — even if forced by others' power to be present within the group, since they have no killing-intention, they incur no fault of killing.
The "different physical basis" resolution to the simultaneous-death puzzle is a genuinely careful piece of reasoning that connects directly back to this treatise's broader momentariness framework (established at length in fascicle 13): a karma-path, on this account, is not simply a matter of intention plus outcome in the abstract, but requires a continuous physical basis — the killer's own body — persisting from the preparatory action all the way through to the completed act; once that specific body has perished, any successor body, however similar in general type, is causally disconnected from the original preparatory action in the relevant sense, and so cannot serve as the basis for a karma-path that was never actually built up in connection with it.
The group-liability doctrine here anticipates, in a striking way, concepts of joint criminal enterprise or accomplice liability familiar from modern legal systems — the underlying principle, that shared intentional participation in a collective undertaking makes each participant fully responsible for the completed act regardless of who literally performs it, is grounded entirely in mental commitment to the shared purpose, which is precisely why the exception for the person who never actually shares that intention (having made a prior, unconditional vow against killing) is treated as decisive: physical presence within the group is irrelevant if the person's mind was never actually a party to its killing-intention in the first place.
13. What Precisely Constitutes Killing, and What Death Itself Actually Is
Having established the general framework, the treatise now defines with precision exactly what constitutes each completed karma-path, beginning with killing. Killing requires three elements together: a premeditated intention to kill, formed in advance; correctly recognizing the target as the sentient being one intends to kill; and actually killing without accident — meaning one kills precisely the intended target and no other, not somehow killing a different being by mistake. Even a case of "doubtful killing" still counts as killing: if someone, uncertain whether their intended target is even alive, or uncertain whether it is really the being they mean to kill, nevertheless resolves, "whether it is or isn't, I will certainly kill it," and does kill the being with this recklessly indifferent attitude, this too completes the karma-path. This raises a genuinely difficult philosophical question: given that all conditioned things perish moment by moment regardless of anyone's intervention, how can "killing" — cutting off something that would otherwise have continued — make coherent sense at all? The treatise answers that life itself consists in the sustained functioning of the in-and-out breath supporting the ongoing operation of body and mind together; killing means causing this continuity to fail to arise again when it otherwise would have — just as extinguishing a lamp's flame or silencing a bell's ringing sound is called "killing" that flame or that sound, without requiring that some single, persisting thing be destroyed. Alternatively, "life" may be understood as the life-faculty itself, and killing as causing this faculty to fail to continue — meaning that, through a malicious intention, one cuts off another's life such that even a single moment of life that would otherwise have arisen fails to arise; it is this, and this alone, that is touched by the fault of killing. This life-faculty that is thereby cut off — to whom does it actually belong? Since whoever lacks it thereby dies, and it has already been identified elsewhere as the "sixth" item in a certain traditional list, what could it belong to, if not to a self? — a question the treatise sets aside for full examination in its later chapter refuting the self. As the Blessed One states in verse: "When lifespan, warmth, and consciousness — these three factors — depart the body, the abandoned body lies fallen, like a piece of wood, without thought or sensation." Hence a body still possessing these faculties is properly called a living being, and a body lacking them is properly, and simply, called dead.
今次應辯成業道相。謂齊何量名曰殺生?乃至齊何名為邪見?且先分別殺生相者,頌曰: 殺生由故思, 他想不誤殺。 論曰:要由先發欲殺故思,於他有情他有情想,作殺加行不誤而殺。謂唯殺彼不漫殺餘,齊此名為殺生業道。有猶豫殺亦成殺生,謂彼先於所欲殺境心懷猶豫為生非生?設復是生為彼非彼?後起決志,若是若非我定當殺。由心無顧,若殺有情亦成業道。於剎那滅蘊,如何成殺生?息風名生,依身心轉,若有令斷不更續生,如滅燈光、鈴聲名殺。或復生者即是命根,若有令斷不續名殺。謂以惡心隔斷他命,乃至一念應生不生,唯此非餘,殺罪所觸。此所斷命為屬於誰?謂命若無彼便死者,既標第六,非我而誰?破我論中當廣思擇。故薄伽梵所說頌言: 壽煖及與識, 三法捨身時, 所捨身僵仆, 如木無思覺。 故有根身名有命者,無根名死其理決然。
We should now discuss the characteristics that constitute each karma-path — that is, to what precise extent is something called killing, and so on up through to what extent something is called wrong view? Let us first distinguish the characteristics of killing. Verse: killing is by premeditated intention, [correct] recognition of the other, and killing without accident. Prose: it is necessary that one first generate a premeditated intention to kill, correctly recognize the other sentient being as such, and, having undertaken the preparatory action of killing, kill without accident — that is, one kills only that intended being, not indiscriminately killing some other; only to this extent is it called the karma-path of killing. Killing performed with doubt also constitutes killing — that is, if one first harbors doubt with respect to the object one wishes to kill, as to whether it is alive or not, or, granting that it is alive, whether it is or is not the intended target, but then resolves, "whether it is or is not, I will certainly kill it," and, through this reckless, indifferent mind, does kill the sentient being, this too constitutes the karma-path. [Objection:] Given that the aggregates perish moment by moment, how can killing be constituted at all? [Reply:] The cessation of the breath is called life, [this life] operating in dependence on body and mind; when something causes this to be cut off, such that it does not continue to arise, this is called killing — just as extinguishing a lamp's flame, or silencing a bell's sound, is called "killing" that flame or that sound. Alternatively, "life" refers to the life-faculty itself; causing this to be cut off, such that it does not continue, is called killing — that is, through a malicious mind, one cuts off another's life, such that even a single moment that ought to have arisen as life fails to arise; it is this alone, and nothing else, that is touched by the fault of killing. [Question:] To whom does this life that is cut off belong? [Reply:] Since whatever lacks it thereupon dies, and it has already been designated as "the sixth" [in a certain list], what could it belong to, if not to a self? This should be examined at length in the treatise refuting the self. Hence the Blessed One states in verse: "Lifespan, warmth, and consciousness — when these three factors leave the body, the abandoned body lies fallen, like a piece of wood, without thought or awareness." Hence a body possessing these faculties is called a living being, and a body lacking them is, by settled principle, called dead.
The "cut off, such that even a single moment that ought to have arisen fails to arise" definition of killing is a genuinely elegant solution to the momentariness puzzle worth spelling out clearly: rather than treating killing as the destruction of some persisting thing (which momentariness rules out, since nothing persists from moment to moment in the first place), the treatise redefines killing as *preventing a causal continuation that would otherwise have occurred* — the life-process, left alone, would have generated its own next moment, and killing is specifically the act of interrupting that generative process rather than destroying any enduring substance. This lets the treatise preserve a coherent, morally serious notion of killing entirely within its strict momentariness framework, without needing to posit any persisting "life" or "self" that is literally destroyed.
We want to flag honestly that this passage explicitly defers a genuinely hard question — to whom, or what, does the life-faculty that is "cut off" actually belong, if there is no persisting self? — to a later chapter of this same treatise (traditionally its ninth and final chapter, refuting the notion of a self). This is a good example of this treatise's willingness to flag a real philosophical tension rather than paper over it with a premature answer; readers should understand this section's treatment of killing as provisionally complete for the purposes of karma theory, while the deeper metaphysical question of what exactly persists (or doesn't) across a lifetime remains explicitly open until that later, dedicated discussion.
14. Refuting the Jain View That Intention Doesn't Matter, and Defining Theft
The treatise now takes aim at a rival position, held by the Nirgrantha (Jain) ascetics, that even entirely unintentional, accidental harm still incurs the full fault of killing — just as touching fire burns a person regardless of whether they intended to touch it. The treatise dismantles this with a series of pointed counterexamples: if this were so, then someone who mistakenly touches another's spouse, or accidentally brushes against someone's body, should equally incur fault; a compassionate person who pulls out a fellow ascetic's hair to relieve them, or a teacher who kindly urges a student toward austerities, or a host whose offered food happens to disagree with a guest's digestion, would all have to incur the fault of causing suffering to another, which is absurd. Likewise, a mother and her unborn child cause each other considerable physical distress throughout pregnancy, yet no one holds that mother and fetus commit any fault against one another on this basis. Moreover, if a victim's own contact with an inanimate cause of death (as when touching fire) were sufficient for fault regardless of intention, then, by the same logic, the fire itself should be burned by the very death it causes, just as it burns whatever touches it — yet fault is never assigned to the killing implement or agent this way. Furthermore, if intention were truly irrelevant, then commissioning another person to kill on one's behalf ought to leave the instigator entirely without fault, exactly as fire itself bears no responsibility for burning someone who merely follows another's instruction to touch it — an outcome no one actually accepts. And pieces of wood and other inanimate objects would likewise have to be touched by the fault of killing, since a collapsing house or falling timber can just as easily take a life. The point being established here is not merely illustrative — it rests on sound reasoning in its own right, not simply on analogy. Having now settled the characteristics of killing, the treatise turns to define theft with the same precision: theft requires a premeditated intention to steal, correctly recognizing the property as belonging to another, taking possession of it — whether by force or by stealth — without accident, and thereby making it one's own; only to this extent is the fault of theft, in the technical sense, actually completed. Several special cases follow: stealing an offering dedicated to a stupa constitutes theft specifically from the Tathāgata himself, since the Buddha, at the moment of entering final nirvāṇa, out of compassion for the world, is understood to have accepted all future offerings made to him in perpetuity — though other teachers hold this should instead be understood with reference to whoever is currently responsible for guarding such property. Digging up and taking an ownerless buried treasure constitutes theft specifically from the reigning sovereign. And taking property designated for the saṅgha's rotating communal use, whether the formal procedure authorizing its use has already been completed for a particular local community or not yet completed at all, constitutes theft against the Buddha's disciples universally; other similar cases should be reasoned through by analogy.
離繫者言,不思而殺亦得殺罪。猶如觸火,設不先思亦被燒害。若爾汝等遇見他妻,或誤觸身亦應有罪。又善心者拔離繫髮,或師慈心勸修苦行,或因施主宿食不消,此等皆應獲苦他罪。又胎與母互為苦因,應母與胎有苦他罪。又所殺者既與殺合,亦應如火能燒自依,不應但令能殺得罪。又遣他殺,殺罪應無,如火不燒教觸火者。又諸木等應為罪觸,如舍等崩亦害生故。又非但喻,立義可成。已分別殺生。當辯不與取。頌曰: 不與取他物, 力竊取屬己。 論曰:前不誤等如其所應,流至後門故不重說。謂要先發欲盜故思,於他物中起他物想,或力或竊起盜加行,不誤而取令屬己身,齊此名為不與取罪。若有盜取窣堵波物,彼於如來得偷盜罪,以佛臨欲入涅槃時,哀愍世間總受所施。有餘師說:望守護者。若有掘取無主伏藏,於國主邊得偷盜罪。若有盜取諸迴轉物,已作羯磨於界內僧、若羯磨未成,普於佛弟子得偷盜罪。餘例應思。
The Nirgrantha ascetics say: killing without deliberate intent still incurs the fault of killing, just as touching fire, even without prior intention, still results in being burned. [Reply:] If this is so, then you yourselves, upon encountering another's spouse, or accidentally touching their body, should equally incur fault. Moreover, a compassionate person who pulls out a fellow ascetic's hair, or a teacher who, out of loving-kindness, urges the cultivation of austerities, or a case where a donor's overnight food happens to disagree with a guest's digestion — all of these should then incur the fault of causing suffering to another [which is absurd]. Moreover, a fetus and its mother are mutual causes of suffering to one another, yet mother and fetus should [on this logic] both incur the fault of causing suffering to another. Moreover, since the one killed comes into contact with the killing agent, then, just as fire burns whatever depends on contact with it, [the killed party's body] should likewise burn [and thus incur fault] — it should not be that only the killer incurs fault. Moreover, if one commissions another to kill, the fault of killing should not arise at all, just as fire does not burn the one who merely instructs another to touch it [rather than touching it directly]. Moreover, wood and other such objects should be touched by the fault [of killing], since a collapsing house and the like can likewise take life. Moreover, this point is established not merely by analogy, but stands on sound reasoning in its own right. Having thus distinguished the characteristics of killing, we should discuss taking what is not given. Verse: taking what is not given is taking another's property, by force or by stealth, making it one's own. Prose: the qualifications already discussed above — such as "without accident" — apply here as well, flowing through to this next topic, and need not be restated. That is, one must first generate a premeditated intention to steal, correctly recognize the property as belonging to another, undertake the preparatory action of theft by force or by stealth, and take it without accident so as to make it one's own — only to this extent is the fault of taking what is not given completed. If one steals an offering dedicated to a stupa, this constitutes the fault of theft against the Tathāgata himself, since the Buddha, at the time of approaching final nirvāṇa, out of compassion for the world, accepted all such offerings entirely for himself. Other teachers say this should instead be understood with reference to whoever is responsible for guarding it. If one digs up and takes an ownerless buried treasure, this constitutes the fault of theft against the reigning sovereign. If one steals property designated for rotating communal use, whether the formal procedure has already been completed for the saṅgha within a given boundary, or has not yet been completed, this constitutes the fault of theft universally against the Buddha's disciples. Other similar cases should be reasoned through by analogy.
We should note that "離繫者" (literally "those free from bondage" or "those bound by non-attachment") is this treatise's standard term for the Nirgrantha ascetics — that is, the Jain tradition, whose doctrine of karma the Abhidharmakośa here characterizes (from its own polemical standpoint) as holding that physical contact or harm generates karmic consequence regardless of intention. As with the earlier sections' treatment of Persian and Brahmanical positions, we are translating this treatise's own characterization of a rival tradition's view faithfully as historical source material, not as a neutral or authoritative account of actual Jain doctrine, which readers should consult from Jain sources directly if interested in that tradition's own self-understanding — the Jain view of karma is, in fact, considerably more nuanced in its own textual tradition than this brief polemical summary suggests.
The reductio-ad-absurdum style of this whole passage (mistaken touch, a compassionate hair-pulling, an unwitting host, wood and collapsing houses) is a vivid example of this treatise's occasional willingness to argue through humor and exaggerated consequence rather than purely abstract logic — each example is chosen to show that the Jain position, taken to its logical conclusion, would criminalize obviously blameless or even virtuous actions, which the treatise treats as sufficient grounds for rejecting the premise that intention is irrelevant to moral responsibility.
15. The Precise Definition of Sexual Misconduct, and Its Edge Cases
Having discussed theft, the treatise defines sexual misconduct precisely, identifying four distinct ways an act can be improper, each independently sufficient to constitute this fault. The first is impropriety of partner: engaging in sexual activity with someone else's wife or concubine, or with one's own mother, father, a relative of either parent, or anyone under a ruler's specific protection. The second is impropriety of orifice: engaging in sexual activity with one's own wife through the mouth or through any orifice other than the proper one. The third is impropriety of place: engaging in sexual activity within monastery grounds or at a stupa's isolated precincts. The fourth is impropriety of time: engaging in sexual activity during a spouse's pregnancy, while she is nursing a child, or while she is observing the upavāsa precept — even with one's own lawfully wedded wife or concubine, sexual activity under any of these circumstances still constitutes this same fault, though some hold that this specifically applies only once the husband has agreed to his wife's observing the precept and then violates that agreement, this too being "wrong time." The qualification "without accident," established for the earlier karma-paths, applies here as well. If someone mistakes another's wife for their own, or mistakes their own wife for another's, and errs only as to which orifice or similar detail is proper, then, although the act itself occurs, no karma-path is actually completed, since the mistake removes the required correct recognition. If someone engages in improper conduct with one particular married woman while genuinely believing her to be an entirely different married woman, does this still complete the karma-path? Some hold that it does, since sexual misconduct's preparatory action and its actual consummation have both, in fact, occurred with respect to some married woman; others hold that it does not, reasoning by analogy to killing, where the karma-path is completed only if the very being targeted by the preparatory action is the same being with whom the act is actually completed. Engaging in sexual misconduct with a Buddhist nun raises its own question: from whom, precisely, is the fault of theft-like violation incurred in this specific case? The answer is that it is incurred with respect to the ruling sovereign, since it is the sovereign's own authority that does not tolerate such an act — after all, even engaging with one's own wife or concubine during her observance of the precept is already improper, so how much more so with someone who has gone forth from household life entirely. And with respect to a young, unmarried girl, from whom is the fault incurred? If she has already been promised in marriage to someone, it is incurred with respect to that intended party; if not yet promised to anyone, it is incurred with respect to whoever is currently responsible for her protection; and this case, along with all similar ones, may in every instance also be understood as incurred with respect to the sovereign.
已辯不與取。當辯欲邪行。頌曰: 欲邪行四種, 行所不應行。 論曰:總有四種行不應行,皆得名為欲邪行罪:一於非境行不應行,謂行於他所攝妻妾或母或父或父母親乃至或王所守護境。二於非道行不應行,謂於自妻口及餘道。三於非處行不應行,謂於寺中制多逈處。四於非時行不應行。非時者何?謂懷胎時、飲兒乳時、受齋戒時。設自妻妾亦犯邪行。有說:若夫許受齋戒而有所犯方謂非時。既不誤言,亦流至此。若於他婦謂是己妻,或於己妻謂為他婦,道非道等但有誤心,雖有所行而非業道。若於此他婦作餘他婦想,行非梵行成業道耶?有說亦成,以於他婦起婬加行及受用故。有說不成,如殺業道於此起加行,於餘究竟故。於苾芻尼行非梵行,為從何處得業道耶?此從國王不忍許故。於自妻妾受齋戒時尚不應行,況出家者。若於童女行非梵行,為從何處得業道耶?若已許他,於所許處;未許他者,於能護人;此及所餘,皆於王得。
Having discussed taking what is not given, we should discuss sexual misconduct. Verse: sexual misconduct is fourfold — engaging in what should not be engaged in. Prose: there are, altogether, four kinds of engaging in what should not be engaged in, all of which are called the fault of sexual misconduct. First, engaging in an improper object: engaging with a wife or concubine belonging to another, or with one's mother, father, a relative of either parent, or even a person under a ruler's protection. Second, engaging via an improper channel: engaging with one's own wife through the mouth or any other improper orifice. Third, engaging in an improper place: engaging within a monastery or at a stupa's secluded precincts. Fourth, engaging at an improper time. What is meant by "improper time"? It refers to the period of pregnancy, the period of nursing a child, and the period of observing the upavāsa precept — even with one's own wife or concubine, this too constitutes the fault of misconduct. Some say: this refers specifically to a case where the husband has agreed to his wife's undertaking the precept, and then commits a violation — only this is called "improper time." Since "without accident" was already stated earlier, this qualification flows through and applies here as well. If one mistakes another's wife for one's own, or one's own wife for another's, or errs merely as to orifice and the like, then, although the act is performed, this does not constitute the karma-path. If one engages in improper conduct with a particular married woman while believing her to be some entirely different married woman, does this constitute the karma-path? Some say it does, since the preparatory action of sexual misconduct and its actual consummation have both occurred with respect to a married woman. Others say it does not, reasoning by analogy with the karma-path of killing, where the preparatory action must be directed at, and completed with respect to, the very same being. With respect to committing this act with a bhikṣuṇī, from whom is the karma-path's fault incurred? This is incurred with respect to the reigning sovereign, since the sovereign's own authority does not tolerate this — for even with one's own wife or concubine, this act should not be performed during her observance of the precept, how much more so with one who has gone forth from household life. With respect to committing this act with a young girl, from whom is the fault incurred? If she has already been promised to someone, it is incurred with respect to that party; if not yet promised to anyone, it is incurred with respect to whoever protects her; this case, and all others like it, may also, in every instance, be incurred with respect to the sovereign.
The mistaken-identity puzzle here (engaging with one married woman while believing her to be a different married woman) is a fascinating parallel to the earlier "doubtful killing" discussion, and the treatise honestly records a genuine, unresolved disagreement about how far the killing-case's logic should extend: one position holds that sexual misconduct's fault attaches simply to the fact of improperly engaging with *a* married woman, regardless of which specific one was intended, while the other insists on the same strict correspondence between intended target and actual object that governs killing. We have preserved this as an open, unresolved dispute rather than supplying a preference the text itself does not clearly indicate.
The recurring device of attributing a fault "with respect to the sovereign" (for violations against a nun, an unprotected young girl, or buried treasure in the previous section) reflects this treatise's broader framework in which theft- and misconduct-related faults are always owed to some specific injured party or authority, even in cases — like harming a religious renunciate who has, in principle, relinquished ordinary social ties — where no obvious private victim with standing to be wronged seems to exist; the sovereign functions here as a kind of default guarantor of social and religious order whenever no more specific injured party is available.
16. Precisely When a Lie Becomes Complete, and the Four Kinds of Testimony
Having discussed sexual misconduct, the treatise turns to false speech: it consists in speaking with a corrupted intention to convey something other than what one actually believes to be true, where the person being deceived actually comes to understand the intended, false meaning of what was said — a defiled mind, speaking without accident, completes the fault. If the person being deceived never actually comes to understand the meaning of what was said, what kind of speech has occurred instead? It counts merely as frivolous speech, not false speech proper. Since a lie is typically composed of many syllables strung together, exactly when does the karma-path become complete? The treatise holds that it is completed together with the very last syllable — that syllable's own manifested vocal sound and its accompanying unmanifested karma together constitute the completed karma-path; alternatively, it may be said to be completed at whatever moment the deceived party actually comes to understand the intended meaning, with that moment's manifested and unmanifested karma constituting the completed karma-path, and every syllable preceding that moment functioning merely as this karma-path's preparatory action. This raises a further technical question: precisely when does "understanding the meaning" itself occur — once the listener, having already heard the utterance, has correctly grasped it, or already at the very moment of properly hearing it, prior to any subsequent processing? If understanding requires already having correctly grasped what was heard, then, since the meaning conveyed by speech is known specifically through mental consciousness, and the auditory consciousness that actually hears the spoken sound has, by that point, already ceased along with the manifested speech-act itself, this would mean the karma-path could only ever be completed through unmanifested karma alone, never through any accompanying manifested karma at that instant. If, instead, understanding is held to occur already at the moment of properly hearing, though this position, too, avoids one difficulty, it raises another: how can mere proper hearing, without yet having actually processed the meaning, already count as "understanding"? For someone skilled with language, however, where no confusion or distraction intervenes, the very arising of auditory consciousness itself may properly be called "understanding" — and this latter position, being free of difficulty, should be adopted as the correct one. A sūtra further teaches that there are, in total, sixteen kinds of statement: stating that one has truly seen, heard, sensed, or known something one has, in fact, not seen, heard, sensed, or known at all, or stating that one has not seen, heard, sensed, or known something one has, in fact, seen, heard, sensed, or known — these eight kinds together constitute "ignoble speech." Conversely, truthfully stating that one has not seen, heard, sensed, or known what one has genuinely not seen, heard, sensed, or known, or truthfully stating that one has seen, heard, sensed, or known what one genuinely has — these eight kinds together constitute "noble speech." What, precisely, distinguishes what is "seen" from what is "heard," "known," and "sensed"? The Vaibhāṣika hold: whatever object is directly apprehended by eye-consciousness is called "seen"; whatever is apprehended by ear-consciousness is called "heard"; whatever is apprehended by mental consciousness is called "known"; and whatever is apprehended by the nose-, tongue-, or body-consciousness is called "sensed" — grouped together under this single term specifically because smell, taste, and touch, being themselves morally neutral in nature like something inert or lifeless, are treated as more passively "sensed" rather than actively cognized the way sight, sound, and mental objects are. This grouping is confirmed both by reasoning and by scripture — as a sūtra states, the Buddha addressing Mahāprajāpatī: "What do you think? With respect to all forms that you have not seen with your own eyes, have never seen, will never see, and do not even wish to see — do you, on account of these, give rise to desire, to craving, to fondness, to attachment, to clinging, to grasping, or to infatuation?" [She replied:] "No..."
已辯欲邪行。當辯虛誑語。頌曰: 染異想發言, 解義虛誑語。 論曰:於所說義異想發言,及所誑者解所說義,染心不誤成虛誑語。若所誑者未解言義,此言是何?是雜穢語。既虛誑語是所發言,有多字成言,何時成業道?與最後字俱生表聲及無表業成此業道。或隨何時所誑解義,表無表業成此業道。前字俱行皆此加行,所言解義定據何時?為據已聞正解名解?為據正聞能解名解?若爾何失?若據已聞正解名解,言所詮義意識所知,語表耳識俱時滅故,應此業道唯無表成。若據正聞能解名解,雖無有失然未了知,如何正聞可名能解?善言義者無迷亂緣,耳識已生名為能解,如無失者應取為宗。經說諸言略有十六,謂於不見不聞不覺不知事中言實見等,或於所見所聞所覺所知事中言不見等,如是八種名非聖言。若於不見乃至不知言不見等,或於所見乃至所知言實見等,如是八種名為聖言。何等名為所見等相?頌曰: 由眼耳意識, 并餘三所證, 如次第名為, 所見聞知覺。 論曰:毘婆沙師作如是說:若境由眼識所證名所見,若境由耳識所證名所聞,若境由意識所證名所知,若境由鼻識舌識及身識所證名所覺。所以然者,香味觸三無記性故如死無覺,故能證者偏立覺名。何證知然?由經理證。言由經者,謂契經說:佛告大母:汝意云何?諸所有色非汝眼見、非汝曾見、非汝當見、非希求見,汝為因此起欲起貪、起親起愛、起阿賴耶、起尼延底、起耽著不?不
Having discussed sexual misconduct, we should discuss false speech. Verse: speaking, with a defiled and differing intention, in a way whose meaning is understood, constitutes false speech. Prose: speaking with an intention differing from the actual meaning conveyed, where the one being deceived comes to understand the meaning of what was said, with a defiled mind and without accident, constitutes false speech. If the one being deceived does not come to understand the meaning of the words, what is this speech? It is frivolous speech. Since false speech is speech actually uttered, and speech is composed of many syllables, at what point is the karma-path completed? Together with the very last syllable, that syllable's manifested vocal sound arising together with its unmanifested karma constitutes this karma-path. Or, alternatively, at whatever moment the deceived party comes to understand the meaning, the manifested and unmanifested karma at that moment constitutes this karma-path, with all the preceding syllables constituting this karma-path's preparatory action. At what point, precisely, is "understanding the meaning" to be reckoned — with reference to having already heard and then correctly understood, or with reference to properly hearing and thereby already being capable of understanding? If either, what difficulty follows? If "understanding" is reckoned with reference to having already heard and correctly understood, then, since the meaning conveyed by speech is known by mental consciousness, and the manifested speech and the auditory consciousness [that heard it] have, by that point, already ceased together, this karma-path would have to be completed by unmanifested karma alone. If "understanding" is instead reckoned with reference to properly hearing and thereby being capable of understanding, although this avoids that difficulty, there is not yet actual comprehension — how, then, could mere proper hearing be called "understanding"? [Reply:] For one skilled in language, where there is no cause for confusion, the mere arising of auditory consciousness may itself be called "capable of understanding" — this position, being free of difficulty, should be adopted as the correct one. A sūtra states that speech, briefly summarized, is of sixteen kinds: stating that one has truly seen and so forth with respect to matters one has not seen, not heard, not sensed, and not known; or stating that one has not seen and so forth with respect to matters one has seen, heard, sensed, and known — these eight kinds are called ignoble speech. If, with respect to matters not seen through not known, one states that one has not seen and so forth; or, with respect to matters seen through known, one states that one has truly seen and so forth — these eight kinds are called noble speech. What are the characteristics of "seen" and the rest? Verse: by eye-, ear-, and mental consciousness, together with the remaining three [senses] which apprehend, these are, in order, called seen, heard, known, and sensed. Prose: the Vaibhāṣika explain it this way: if an object is apprehended by eye-consciousness, it is called "seen"; if apprehended by ear-consciousness, it is called "heard"; if apprehended by mental consciousness, it is called "known"; if apprehended by nose-, tongue-, or body-consciousness, it is called "sensed." Why is this so? Because smell, taste, and touch are, in nature, morally neutral, like something lifeless and without awareness — hence what apprehends them is specifically given the name "sensed" [rather than more actively "known" or "seen"]. How is this confirmed? By both reasoning and scripture. As for scripture: a sūtra states, the Buddha addressing Mahāprajāpatī: "What do you think? With respect to all forms that are not seen by your eyes, that you have never seen, will never see, and do not wish to see — do you, because of these, give rise to desire, to craving, to fondness, to attachment, to clinging, to grasping, or to infatuation?" [She replies:] "No..."
The debate over exactly when "understanding" occurs (after full mental processing, versus at the bare instant of correct auditory perception) is a genuinely fine-grained piece of Abhidharma psychology, and we have preserved its careful back-and-forth structure rather than compressing it, since the stakes are real: the treatise's own broader system requires that manifested vocal karma and the auditory consciousness that hears it occur, and cease, together in the same instant — if "understanding" required a further step of mental processing after that instant, false speech's karma-path could seemingly never involve manifested karma at its moment of completion, only unmanifested karma, which the treatise apparently regards as an unwelcome, overly narrow consequence to accept without argument.
We should flag our own uncertainty about the classical Sanskrit term underlying "阿賴耶" and "尼延底" in the Mahāprajāpatī sūtra citation — these are technical transliterations from a scriptural passage on non-attachment (likely something like āśraya and nidhyāna, or similar early Abhidharma technical vocabulary for "resting-place" or "settling" of desire) whose precise referents in this specific context are not fully certain to us; we have left them in a general sense consistent with the surrounding string of near-synonyms for attachment, without claiming a more precise technical identification than the passage itself makes clear.
17. Completing the Four Kinds of Testimony, and Lying Through Gesture Alone
The treatise completes its citation of the sūtra to Mahāprajāpatī, in which the Buddha, having already asked about unseen forms, goes on to ask the same question about unheard sounds and unknown mental objects, each time receiving the same answer: no such attachment arises. The Buddha then instructs her that, with respect to what is seen, heard, sensed, and known, one should recognize only the bare fact of seeing, hearing, sensing, or knowing, without embellishing it with any further quality of desirability or undesirability. Since this sūtra explicitly names only form, sound, and mental objects when speaking of "seen," "heard," and "known," this is taken as confirmation that smell, taste, and touch are, correspondingly, grouped together under the single term "sensed." An objection follows: if this grouping were not accepted, what else could these three sense-objects be called? Moreover, since smell, taste, and touch clearly lie outside the scope of "seen" and the other three named terms, no statement could even be formed about them at all unless they were covered by "sensed" — and this, it is argued, settles the matter by sound reasoning. The treatise responds that this argument does not actually succeed, since the sūtra cited does not, in fact, serve as genuine proof for this specific point — its actual purpose was never to settle the technical meanings of "seen," "heard," "sensed," and "known" at all, but rather to encourage the practitioner, with respect to the six sense-objects, to recognize only their bare occurrence without embellishing them with attachment or aversion. If this technical distinction is not settled by this sūtra, what, then, does properly determine each term's precise meaning? Other teachers propose an alternative account: whatever is directly witnessed through the five sense-faculties themselves is called "seen"; whatever is known through another's report is called "heard"; whatever is inferred through one's own reasoning based on accepted principles is called "sensed"; and whatever is directly, mentally cognized is called "known" — under this scheme, each of the five sense-objects independently admits being described by any of these four terms as appropriate, and, for mental objects specifically, three of the four terms apply (excluding only "seen"), meaning the term "sensed" is by no means left without any object of its own, and smell, taste, and touch can indeed each be spoken of in their own right — so the original objection's claim of "no reasoning" is itself shown to be unreasonable. Earlier teachers of the tradition offer yet another account: what is directly perceived by the eye is called "seen"; what is learned through another's account is called "heard"; what one arrives at through one's own reflection and reasoning is called "sensed"; and what one directly experiences or personally realizes within is called "known." Setting this digression aside, we return to the main topic: can the fault of false speech be incurred through a bodily gesture conveying a different meaning than the truth, without any actual speech being uttered at all? Indeed it can — hence the root treatise itself asks: can the fault of killing be incurred without the body moving at all? Yes — through speech alone. Can the fault of false speech be incurred without any speech being uttered at all? Yes — through bodily movement alone. Can both faults be incurred without either the body moving or speech being uttered? Yes — as in the case of a sage's inwardly harbored anger, or the specific circumstance of formally suspending a fellow monastic from participation in the communal recitation. If, in such a case, neither the body moves nor speech is uttered, how can unmanifested karma still arise, given that it is not accompanied by any manifested act at all? This is a point that genuinely calls for careful further consideration.
汝為因此起欲起貪、起親起愛、起阿賴耶、起尼延底、起耽著不?不爾。大德!諸所有聲非汝耳聞,廣說乃至諸所有法非汝意知,廣說乃至,不爾。大德!復告大母:汝於此中應知所見,唯有所見應知所聞所覺所知,唯有所聞所覺所知。此經既於色聲法境說為所見所聞所知,准此定於香等三境總合建立一所覺名。若不許然,何名所覺?又香味觸在所見等外,於彼三境應不起言說。是名為理。此證不成,且經非證,經義別故。非此經中世尊為欲決判見等四所言相,然見此經所說義者,謂佛勸彼於六境中及於見等四所言事,應知但有所見等言,不應增益愛非愛相。若爾,何相名所見等?有餘師說:若是五根現所證境名為所見,若他傳說名為所聞,若運自心以種種理比度所許名為所覺,若意現證名為所知。於五境中一一容起見聞覺知四種言說,於第六境除見有三,由此覺名非無所目,香等三境言說非無,故彼理言亦為無理。先軌範師作如是說:眼所現見名為所見,從他傳聞名為所聞,自運己心諸所思搆名為所覺,自內所受及自所證名為所知。且止傍言,應申正論。頗有由身表異想義不由發語成虛誑語耶?曰:有。故論言:頗有不動身殺生罪觸耶?曰:有,謂發語。頗有不發語誑語罪觸耶?曰:有,謂動身。頗有不動身不發語二罪所觸耶?曰:有,謂仙人意憤及布灑他時。若不動身亦不發語,欲無無表離表而生,此二如何得成業道?於如是難應設劬勞。
"Do you, because of these, give rise to desire, craving, fondness, attachment, clinging, grasping, or infatuation?" "No, Venerable One." "With respect to all sounds not heard by your ears," and so on at length, through "all dharmas not known by your mind," and so on at length — "No, Venerable One." The Blessed One further tells Mahāprajāpatī: "In this matter, you should know only the seen with respect to what is seen; you should know only the heard, sensed, and known with respect to what is heard, sensed, and known." Since this sūtra speaks of form, sound, and mental objects as "seen," "heard," and "known," this confirms that smell and the other two objects are, together, established under the single name "sensed." [Objection:] If this is not accepted, what else could be called "sensed"? Moreover, smell, taste, and touch lie outside the scope of "seen" and the rest — with respect to these three objects, no statement could otherwise even be made; this is what is meant by "reasoning." [Reply:] This proof does not succeed, since this sūtra is not, in fact, evidence for this point — its meaning is a different one. It is not the case that, in this sūtra, the Blessed One intended to determine the technical meanings of "seen" and the other three terms; rather, the meaning conveyed by this sūtra is that the Buddha is exhorting her that, with respect to the six sense-objects and the matters spoken of as "seen" and the rest, one should recognize only the bare fact of seeing and so forth, without adding any further quality of desirable or undesirable. [Question:] If this is so, what, then, are the actual characteristics of "seen" and the rest? [Reply:] Other teachers say: whatever object is directly witnessed by the five sense-faculties is called "seen"; whatever is known through another's report is called "heard"; whatever is inferred through one's own reasoning, using various accepted principles, is called "sensed"; whatever the mind directly realizes is called "known." Among the five sense-objects, each may in turn be spoken of using any of the four terms — seen, heard, sensed, known; for the sixth object [mental objects], excluding "seen," the remaining three apply. By this account, the term "sensed" is not without its own referent, and statements about smell, taste, and touch are indeed possible — hence that [objector's] reasoning, too, turns out to be unreasonable. The earlier teachers of the tradition explain it this way instead: what is directly seen by the eye is called "seen"; what is heard through another's account is called "heard"; what one arrives at through one's own reflection and reasoning is called "sensed"; what one personally experiences within, or directly realizes, is called "known." Setting this digression aside, we should return to the proper discussion. Can the fault of false speech be incurred through a bodily gesture conveying a different meaning, without uttering any speech at all? Indeed, it can. Hence the treatise states: can the fault of killing be incurred without the body moving? Yes — through speech. Can the fault of false speech be incurred without uttering speech? Yes — through bodily movement. Can both faults be incurred without the body moving and without speech being uttered? Yes — as in the case of a sage's inward anger, and the occasion of formally suspending [a fellow monastic from the communal recitation]. If the body does not move and speech is not uttered, how can unmanifested karma still arise apart from any manifested act? Considerable effort should be devoted to this difficulty.
We should be honest that this passage ends on another explicitly unresolved note — "considerable effort should be devoted to this difficulty" is the treatise's own acknowledgment that the case of unmanifested karma arising with neither bodily nor verbal manifestation (the sage's silent, inward anger; the formal suspension of a fellow monastic) genuinely strains its established framework, in which unmanifested karma is elsewhere consistently said to depend on an accompanying manifested act. We have preserved this open difficulty exactly as flagged rather than supplying our own resolution.
The "sage's inward anger" example is worth noting as a striking limit case: this treatise has consistently held, since fascicle 13, that mental karma (unlike bodily and verbal karma) never generates any unmanifested residue at all — yet here it is suggested that a sage's silent anger alone can somehow incur both the fault of harsh speech and the fault of false speech (or their unmanifested equivalent) without any actual speech or bodily gesture occurring. This appears to be a recognized exception or special case within the tradition specifically tied to a sage's spiritual potency, rather than a general revision of the treatise's usual rule that mental karma alone cannot generate unmanifested karma — though the text does not fully explain the mechanism here, consistent with its own admission that this point requires further effort to resolve.
18. Divisive Speech, Harsh Speech, and Frivolous Speech
Having finished with false speech, the treatise now addresses the remaining three verbal karma-paths, opening with a summary verse: speech arising from a defiled mind that breaks apart another's relationships is called divisive speech; disagreeable, coarse speech is called harsh speech; and speech arising from any of the various defilements is called frivolous speech — while some other teachers hold that frivolous speech is specifically distinguished from the first three defiled categories, naming flattery, song, and heterodox treatises as its characteristic instances. Divisive speech is defined as speech uttered with a defiled mind aiming to break apart another's relationships — the karma-path is completed once the hearer understands the intended meaning without any error, regardless of whether the target relationship actually ends up broken or not, since what matters is the successful communication of the divisive intent, following the same "correct understanding" standard already established for false speech. Harsh speech is defined similarly, but with the aim of disparaging another through disagreeable words spoken from a defiled mind harboring the original intention to scold or revile that person — again completed once the intended meaning is correctly understood by the hearer. Frivolous speech, in its broadest characterization, is simply any speech uttered from a defiled mind that does not otherwise qualify as one of the first three verbal karma-paths — since, the treatise reasons, all speech arising from defilement is inherently corrupting and unproductive in this sense. However, other teachers propose a narrower, more specific characterization: frivolous speech names particular categories of defiled speech distinct from the first three — namely, flattery (obsequious speech from one who sustains himself through an improper livelihood, such as a monastic who speaks ingratiatingly to secure support), song (worldly people teasing one another with defiled playful verses, or performers composing verses from a defiled mind meant to please an audience), heterodox treatises (elaborate discourses that expound and defend wrong views at length), and, more broadly still, defiled lamentation and various forms of idle worldly banter. A pointed question follows: does not a wheel-turning monarch himself sing at times — would this not then also count as frivolous speech? The response is that a wheel-turning monarch's song arises from a mind of renunciation and itself gives rise to further renunciation, rather than proceeding from a prior defiled state, and so does not qualify. Other teachers, however, hold that even at such times there can be defiled speech connected with matters like arranging a marriage, though because the fault involved is comparatively slight, it does not rise to the level of completing a full karma-path. Having now finished with the three verbal karma-paths, the treatise turns to the three mental karma-paths.
已辯虛誑語。當辯餘三語。頌曰:染心壞他語,說名離間語,非愛麁惡語,諸染雜穢語,餘說異三染,佞歌邪論等。論曰:若染污心發壞他語,若他壞不壞俱成離間語。解義不誤,流至此中。若以染心發非愛語毀呰於他,名麁惡語。前染心語流至此故,解義不誤亦與前同。謂本期心所欲罵者,解所說義業道方成。一切染心所發諸語名雜穢語。所以者何?染所發言皆雜穢故。唯前語字流至此中。有餘師說:異虛誑等前三種語,所有一切染心發言名雜穢語,此謂佞歌及邪論等。佞謂諂佞,如有苾芻邪命居懷發諂佞語。歌謂歌詠,如世有人以染污心諷吟相調,及倡伎者為悅他情以染污心作諸詞曲。言邪論者,謂廣辯說諸不正見所執言詞。等謂染心所發悲嘆,及諸世俗戲論言詞。但異前三染心所發,一切皆是雜穢語收。輪王現時亦有歌詠,如何不是雜穢語收?由彼語從出離心發,能引出離,非預染心。有餘師言:爾時亦有成嫁娶等所發染言,由過輕故不成業道。已辯三語。當辯意三。
We have finished discussing false speech. We shall now discuss the remaining three kinds of speech. The verse states: Speech arising from a defiled mind that breaks apart another is called divisive speech; disagreeable, coarse speech [is called harsh speech]; speech arising from any defilement is called frivolous speech — some say it is distinguished from these three kinds of defilement, [naming] flattery, song, heterodox treatises, and the like. Explanation: if, with a defiled mind, one utters speech aimed at breaking apart another, then whether or not the other party's relationship is actually broken, the karma-path of divisive speech is equally completed — [as with false speech,] it is completed once the meaning is understood without error; [this standard] carries over and applies here as well. If, with a defiled mind, one utters disagreeable speech to disparage another, this is called harsh speech; since [the standard of] defiled speech from before carries over here too, [the karma-path is completed once] the meaning is understood without error, just as before — that is, once the person originally intending to scold has had their intended meaning correctly understood, the karma-path is completed. All speech arising from a defiled mind is called frivolous speech. Why is this? Because all speech arising from defilement is inherently corrupting. Only the word "speech" carries over from before [into this definition]. Other teachers say: distinct from the first three kinds of speech — false, divisive, and harsh — whatever speech arises from any defiled mind is called frivolous speech, referring specifically to flattery, song, heterodox treatises, and the like. "Flattery" means obsequious speech, as when a monk, sustaining himself through an improper livelihood, harbors and utters flattering speech. "Song" means singing, as when worldly people, with a defiled mind, tease one another in playful verse, or when performers, to please others' feelings, compose verses and lyrics from a defiled mind. "Heterodox treatises" means broadly expounding and defending the words and positions of various wrong views. "And the like" refers to lamentation arising from a defiled mind, and various words of worldly idle banter. These are simply distinct from the first three kinds of defiled speech, and all fall under frivolous speech. [Objection:] A wheel-turning monarch also sings at times he manifests his reign — why would this not also fall under frivolous speech? [Reply:] Because that speech arises from a mind of renunciation and gives rise to further renunciation, not preceded by a defiled mind. Other teachers say: at such times there can also be defiled speech connected with arranging a marriage and the like, but because the fault is slight, it does not complete a karma-path. We have finished discussing the three kinds of speech. We shall now discuss the three mental [karma-paths].
We should flag honestly that the two definitions of frivolous speech offered here are genuinely quite different in scope — the first (any defiled speech not already covered by the other three verbal paths) is extremely broad, while the second (specifically flattery, song, heterodox treatises, lamentation, and idle banter) is much narrower and more concrete. The treatise does not clearly state which view it ultimately favors, so we have presented both without artificially resolving the tension between them.
The wheel-turning monarch exception is a small but telling detail: it shows this tradition distinguishing an action's karmic quality not merely by its outward form (singing is singing, whether done by a monarch or a flatterer) but by the state of mind from which it proceeds and the state of mind it tends to produce — a renunciate king's song, arising from and reinforcing renunciation, is treated as categorically different from song arising from and reinforcing attachment, even though the two might look identical to an outside observer.
19. The Three Mental Karma-Paths: Greed, Hatred, and Wrong View — Fascicle 16 Complete
The treatise closes its survey of the ten karma-paths with a summary verse on the three mental karma-paths: an evil wish for another's wealth is called greed; malice wishing harm upon sentient beings is called hatred; and the view that denies good and evil their causal efficacy is called wrong view. Greed is defined specifically as an evil wish directed at another's property — an unreasonable desire to make what belongs to someone else one's own rather than theirs, driven by a forceful, covetous mind bent on acquiring what belongs to another; this, and not desire in general, is what constitutes the greed karma-path. Other teachers hold a broader position: that all craving belonging to the desire realm counts as the greed karma-path, appealing to the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances, where the Buddha, discussing the hindrance of covetousness, teaches that one should abandon craving for this world — taken as evidence that "greed" is simply a general term for desire-realm craving as such. Still others offer a middle position: although desire-realm craving, taken in its entirety, may be called greed, this does not mean all such craving completes a full karma-path, since only its coarser instances fall under this evil conduct — otherwise, absurdly, one would have to say that the greed karma-path is generated even during the era of a wheel-turning monarch's reign or among the inhabitants of Uttarakuru, where craving certainly exists but under conditions the tradition does not wish to characterize as morally blameworthy in this way. Hatred is defined as malice directed at sentient beings — a mind bent on wishing harm or injury upon another being; this hostile intention itself constitutes the hatred karma-path. Wrong view, finally, is defined as the view that denies the causal efficacy of good and evil — a mind that repudiates the very existence of moral cause and effect. The treatise cites the classic sūtra formula for this nihilistic position in full: there is no giving, no rejoicing in merit, no sacrificial offering, no good conduct, no bad conduct, no ripened fruit of good or bad karma, no this world, no other world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously born beings, and no ascetics or brahmins in the world who have attained arhatship. This single sūtra passage, the treatise notes, actually comprises three distinct forms of denial rolled together — denial of karma itself, denial of karma's fruit, and denial of the noble ones who have realized the path — even though the summary verse names only the first of these three explicitly, intending it to stand for all three together. With this, the treatise's extended treatment of the ten karma-paths comes to a close, and Fascicle 16 of the Abhidharmakośa concludes.
當辯意三。頌曰:惡欲他財貪,憎有情瞋恚,撥善惡等見,名邪見業道。論曰:於他財物惡欲名貪,謂於他財非理起欲,如何令彼屬我非他,起力竊心耽求他物,如是惡欲名貪業道。有餘師言:諸欲界愛皆貪業道。所以者何?《五蓋經》中依貪欲蓋,佛說應斷此世間貪,故知貪名總說欲愛。有說:欲愛雖盡名貪,而不可說皆成業道,此惡行中攝麁品故。勿輪王世及北俱盧所起欲貪成貪業道。於有情類憎恚名瞋,謂於他有情欲為傷害事,如是憎恚名瞋業道。於善惡等惡見撥無,此見名為邪見業道。如經說:無施與、無愛樂、無祠祀、無妙行、無惡行、無妙惡行業果異熟、無此世間無彼世間、無母無父、無化生有情、世間無沙門、或婆羅門是阿羅漢。彼經具顯謗業謗果謗聖邪見,此頌舉初等言攝後。說一切有部俱舍論卷第十六。
We shall now discuss the three mental [karma-paths]. The verse states: An evil wish for another's wealth is greed; malice toward sentient beings is hatred; the view that denies good and evil and the rest is called the wrong-view karma-path. Explanation: an evil wish directed at another's property is called greed — that is, giving rise to an unreasonable wish regarding another's wealth, [thinking] how might this become mine rather than theirs, giving rise to a forceful, covetous mind that craves and seeks another's possessions; such an evil wish is called the greed karma-path. Other teachers say: all craving of the desire realm is the greed karma-path. Why is this? Because in the Sūtra of the Five Hindrances, with respect to the hindrance of covetous desire, the Buddha teaches that one should cut off craving for this world — hence it is known that "greed" is a general term for desire-realm craving. Others say: although desire-realm craving, in its entirety, may be called greed, one cannot say that all of it completes a karma-path, since only the coarser portion is included within this evil conduct — otherwise, [one would absurdly have to say that] the craving-desire arising during a wheel-turning monarch's era or in Uttarakuru completes the greed karma-path. Malice toward sentient beings is called hatred — that is, wishing to do harm to another sentient being; such malice is called the hatred karma-path. Denying, through evil views, the existence of good and evil and so forth — this view is called the wrong-view karma-path. As the sūtra says: there is no giving, no rejoicing [in merit], no sacrificial offering, no good conduct, no bad conduct, no ripened fruit of the karma of good or bad conduct, no this world, no other world, no mother, no father, no spontaneously born beings, no ascetics or brahmins in the world who are arhats. That sūtra fully sets forth the wrong view that denies karma, denies its fruit, and denies the noble ones; this verse names only the first and uses "and so forth" to encompass the rest. Abhidharmakośa-śāstra of the Sarvāstivāda School, Fascicle Sixteen, [end].
We should note honestly that the treatise leaves the scope of the greed karma-path genuinely unsettled among three competing positions: the narrow view (only covetous desire specifically for another's property), the broad view (all desire-realm craving whatsoever), and a middle view (all desire-realm craving is "greed" in name, but only its coarser instances complete the karma-path). We have preserved all three without picking a winner, since the text itself does not clearly adjudicate between them here.
This closes Fascicle 16, which has carried the treatise's account of karma from the black/white/mixed/neither classification, through the three sages and three purities, into an extraordinarily detailed technical dissection of all ten karma-paths — their preparatory action, root act, and follow-up action; the three roots behind each; the precise conditions for their completion; and now, finally, the definitions of the three mental karma-paths that close out the set. Where this fascicle's source text touched on the beliefs or customs of other traditions — Jain, Zoroastrian, Brahmanical — in polemical or unflattering terms, we have flagged this repeatedly as the treatise's own sectarian characterization, not a neutral or reliable account of those traditions' actual self-understanding, and we reiterate that here as this fascicle closes. Fascicle 17 will begin next.