The Six Roots of Existence

It was stated earlier that the differences among worlds all arise from karma, and that karma, in turn, only grows and produces its effect in dependence on the anuśayas — apart from the anuśayas, karma has no power to bring about existence. Why is this? How many anuśayas are there? Verse: the anuśayas are the root of all existence; their distinctions are six — namely, greed, hatred, and also conceit, ignorance, views, and doubt. Explanation: because these anuśayas are the root of all existence, karma, apart from them, has no power to bring about existence. Why are the anuśayas able to serve as the root of existence? Because afflictions, in their manifest activity, are able to perform ten kinds of function: first, firmly establishing the root; second, establishing continuity; third, cultivating their own field; fourth, drawing forth outflow; fifth, generating karmic existence; sixth, gathering their own equipment; seventh, obscuring the object; eighth, guiding the stream of consciousness; ninth, transgressing wholesome categories; tenth, broadly binding — causing one to be unable to pass beyond one's own realm and stage. Because the anuśayas are able to perform these functions, they serve as the root of existence, and karma, on their account, has the power to bring about existence. This should, in brief, be understood to have six distinctions — namely, greed, hatred, conceit, ignorance, views, and doubt. The verse's word "also" is meant to show that conceit and the rest likewise increase with respect to their objects through the power of greed, the meaning of which increase will be explained later. The word "and" shows that these six each have a distinct essential nature. If the anuśayas' essential nature is only six, why do the sūtras speak of seven anuśayas? Verse: the six become seven through the division of greed, [namely] greed for existence, in the upper two realms, since it operates through the inward gate, and in order to counter the notion of liberation. Explanation: among the six anuśayas stated previously, greed is divided into two, and so the sūtras speak of seven. What are the seven? First, desire-greed anuśaya; second, hatred anuśaya; third, existence-greed anuśaya; fourth, conceit anuśaya; fifth, ignorance anuśaya; sixth, views anuśaya; seventh, doubt anuśaya.

By what meaning is "desire-greed anuśaya" to be explained? Is the essential nature of desire-greed itself the anuśaya? Or is it that desire-greed possesses an anuśaya? The same question should be raised for the remaining six terms. If so, what is the fault [in each position]? Both have faults. If the essential nature of desire-greed is itself the anuśaya, this contradicts a sūtra. As a sūtra states: there is a certain kind of person who, not for a long stretch of time, dwells with their mind bound by the fetter of desire-greed; even should their mind briefly give rise to the fetter of desire-greed, upon rightly understanding the means of release, they are thereby able to correctly dispel the fetter of desire-greed, together with its anuśaya, being eliminated. If it is that desire-greed possesses an anuśaya [as something distinct], then the anuśaya would have to be dissociated from mind, which contradicts the Abhidharma. As the root treatise states: the desire-greed anuśaya is associated with three faculties [of feeling]. The Vaibhāṣika masters explain it this way: the essential nature of desire-greed and the rest is itself the anuśaya. [Objection:] Does this not then contradict the sūtra? [Reply:] It does not contradict the sūtra, since "eliminated together with its anuśaya" means eliminated together with its binding entanglement. Or, the sūtra may speak loosely of "anuśaya" with reference to a mere potential, just as one speaks loosely of "suffering" with reference to the notion of suffering associated with fire and the like. The Abhidharma speaks according to true characteristics, and it is precisely the afflictions that are called anuśayas — hence the anuśaya is an associated dharma. By what reasoning is it known to be definitely associated [with mind]? Because the anuśayas defile and afflict the mind, obscure and obstruct it, and are able to oppose wholesome states — that is, through the power of the anuśayas, wholesome states not yet arisen do not arise, and wholesome states already arisen degenerate and are lost; hence the essential nature of the anuśaya is not dissociated [from mind]. If something dissociated [from mind] could accomplish this, then wholesome dharmas would have no occasion to arise at all, since what is dissociated is constantly present without interruption. Since wholesome dharmas do have occasion to arise, it is known that the anuśaya is an associated dharma. None of this is actually conclusive proof. Why is this? Even granting that the anuśaya is not associated [with mind], one need not accept that these three effects are what the anuśaya itself accomplishes. The Sautrāntika masters' explanation of this matter is the most excellent.

The Sautrāntika masters' explanation of this matter is the most excellent. What do the Sautrāntika masters say on this point? They say that "desire-greed anuśaya" refers to the meaning of "anuśaya" belonging to desire-greed, yet the essential nature of the anuśaya is neither associated with mind nor dissociated from it, there being no separate entity — the affliction, in its dormant state, is called "anuśaya"; in its waking, [manifest] state, it is called "paryavasthāna" [entanglement]. What is meant by "dormant"? It means [the affliction] does not manifest in activity, but persists as a seed. What is meant by "waking"? It means the afflictions arise manifestly, entangling the mind. What is the "seed" of affliction? It is a distinctive functional capacity, on one's own continuum, arising from affliction, able to generate [further] affliction — like the seed of memory, arising from direct realization, being the distinctive functional capacity able to generate a future act of recollection; or like a sprout, having arisen from a prior fruit, being the distinctive functional capacity able to generate a later fruit. If one insists that affliction has, apart from this, a separate anuśaya dissociated from mind, called the "seed of affliction," one should then also accept that the "seed" of memory is not merely a distinctive functional capacity but a separate, dissociated entity able to draw forth a later act of recollection. Since this is not so [for memory], why should it be so [for affliction]? No distinguishing cause can be found. [Objection:] If so, this contradicts the sūtra of the "six sixes," which states that, with respect to a pleasant feeling, there is a greed-anuśaya. [Reply:] The sūtra only states that it "exists"; it does not say that, at that very time, the anuśaya is [manifestly] present. What contradiction is there? [Objection:] At what time, then, does it exist? [Reply:] At the time of its dormancy. Or, the sūtra may speak loosely of the cause, using the name "anuśaya." Setting this side discussion aside, we should return to the proper topic.

Those sentient beings mostly give rise to deep attachment to the meditative attainment itself and to its underlying basis, and so it is said that they are attached only to that very state itself — not attached to an [external] object, since they have already become free from desire-greed; hence it is only with reference to them that the name "existence-greed" is established. Since "existence-greed" is spoken of with reference to the upper two realms, it follows by the same logic that desire-realm greed is called "desire-greed," and so the verse does not separately indicate this. The six kinds of anuśaya described above are, in the root treatise, further divided into ten. How does this become ten? Verse: the six become ten through the division of views — the division being into the view of a self, extreme views, wrong view, view-attachment, and precept-and-vow attachment. Explanation: among the six anuśayas, the "views" activity is divided into five; the remaining are non-view, [numbering] five; adding these together makes a total of ten. Among the ten, five have the nature of views: first, the view of a self; second, extreme views; third, wrong view; fourth, view-attachment; fifth, precept-and-vow attachment. Five are not of the nature of views: first, greed; second, hatred; third, conceit; fourth, ignorance; fifth, doubt.

The six kinds of anuśaya described above are, in the root treatise, said to number ninety-eight. By what reasoning is this ninety-eight spoken of? Verse: through differences of activity, category, and realm, they become ninety-eight; in the desire realm, [what is abandoned by] seeing suffering and the rest are seventeen, seven, seven, eight, four — in this order, each excludes three, two, none, none, and [excludes] view and doubt [for cultivation]; the form and formless realms exclude hatred, the rest being as stated for the desire realm. Explanation: the six anuśayas, through differences of activity, category, and realm, become ninety-eight — that is, among the six, through the difference of the view-activity, they are distinguished into ten, as already explained. These ten anuśayas, through differences of category and realm, become ninety-eight. "Category" refers to the five categories of what is abandoned by seeing the four truths and what is abandoned by cultivation. "Realm" refers to the three realms of desire, form, and formless. Within the desire realm, the five categories, multiplied through the ten anuśayas, become thirty-six — that is, from what is abandoned by seeing suffering through what is abandoned by cultivation, there are, in order, seventeen, seven, seven, eight, and four. Among these five categories, with respect to the ten anuśayas, in order, [each category] fully possesses, or excludes three, two, [none, none, or excludes view and doubt] — that is, what is abandoned by seeing suffering possesses all ten in full; what is abandoned by seeing the truths of origin and cessation each has seven, excluding the view of a self, extreme views, and precept-and-vow attachment; what is abandoned by seeing the truth of the path has eight, excluding the view of a self and extreme views. What is abandoned by cultivation has four, excluding views and doubt — thus totaling thirty-six kinds. The first thirty-two are called "abandoned by seeing," since they are abandoned the very moment the truths are seen; the last four are called "abandoned by cultivation," since it is only afterward, through repeated practice of the path over time, that they are abandoned. This shows that, among the ten anuśayas, the view of a self belongs to only one category — abandoned by seeing suffering; extreme views likewise. Precept-and-vow attachment belongs to two categories — abandoned by seeing suffering and by seeing the path. Wrong view belongs to all four categories — abandoned by seeing suffering, origin, cessation, and the path; view-attachment and doubt likewise. The remaining four — greed and the rest — each belong to all five categories, [including] seeing the four truths and cultivation. What characteristic marks something as abandoned by seeing suffering, and so on through what is abandoned by cultivation? Whatever takes as its object what is abandoned by seeing [a given truth] is called abandoned by seeing that truth; the rest are called abandoned by cultivation. Thus, among the six, views divide into twelve, doubt divides into four, and the remaining four each divide into five — hence the desire realm has thirty-six. In the form and formless realms, each of the five categories excludes hatred; the rest are the same as the desire realm, hence each has thirty-one. It is by this reasoning that the root treatise, through the distinctions of activity, category, and realm among the six anuśayas, speaks of ninety-eight. Among these ninety-eight, eighty-eight are abandoned by seeing, being harmed by forbearance; ten anuśayas are abandoned by cultivation, being harmed by wisdom.

Is what has been said about abandonment by seeing and by cultivation definitely so? It is not. How is this? Verse: among anuśayas harmed by forbearance, those of the peak of existence are abandoned only by seeing; the rest are abandoned by both seeing and cultivation; those harmed by wisdom are abandoned only by cultivation. Explanation: the word "forbearance" here refers generally to both the dharma-type and subsequent-type forbearance of cognition. Among the anuśayas harmed by forbearance, those belonging to the stage of the peak of existence are abandoned only by seeing, since only subsequent-type forbearance of cognition is able to abandon them. The remaining eight stages are abandoned by both seeing and cultivation — that is, for noble ones, abandonment is only by seeing, not cultivation, since dharma-type and subsequent-type forbearance of cognition abandon them as appropriate; for ordinary beings, abandonment is only by cultivation, not seeing, since they are abandoned through the repeated cultivation of mundane wisdom. Anuśayas harmed by wisdom, belonging to every stage, are abandoned only by cultivation, since both noble ones and ordinary beings, as appropriate, abandon them all through the repeated cultivation of uncontaminated or mundane wisdom. Other teachers say: non-Buddhist ascetics and sages are unable to suppress and sever the afflictions abandoned by seeing. As the Great Discernment of Karma Sūtra states: those non-Buddhist ascetics who are free from desire-realm greed still actively hold wrong views pertaining to the desire realm. The Brahmajāla Sūtra likewise states that such persons still actively hold various desire-realm views — that is, among those who theorize about the prior limit [of the world], some hold it to be entirely eternal, some hold it to be eternal in part, some hold that all dharmas arise without cause, and so on. Since form-realm afflictions do not take the desire realm as their object, and since [these ascetics] have already become free from greed with respect to desire-realm objects, it must be that their desire-realm views are definitely not yet abandoned. The Vaibhāṣika masters explain the meaning of this sūtra thus: when such views arise, [the ascetics'] [attainment] has temporarily regressed — as in the case of Devadatta.

Through differences of activity, views are divided into five; their names have already been listed — what is their essential nature? Verse: clinging to "I" and "mine"; [clinging to] extinction or permanence; categorically denying; taking the inferior as supreme; and wrongly holding what is not a cause or path [to be such] — these are the essential nature of the five views. Explanation: clinging to a self and to what belongs to a self is the view of a self [satkāyadṛṣṭi]. "Destructible" [sat] is so named because it is destroyed; "aggregation" [kāya] means a gathering — that is, the meaning of an impermanent, composite aggregate; "aggregation" itself is "destructible," hence "satkāya." This "satkāya" is precisely the five aggregates subject to appropriation; this name is established in order to counter the notion of permanence and unity, since this notion must precede the clinging to a self. The Vaibhāṣika masters explain it this way: "sat" means "existing"; "kāya" has the meaning given above. Lest one suppose "I" and "mine" are conceived without any object at all, it is said that this view takes an "existing aggregation" [satkāya] as its object. Because this view arises taking satkāya as its object, it is designated with the name "satkāya[dṛṣṭi]." [Objection:] Any view that merely takes some existing, contaminated dharma as its object should equally receive this name. [Reply:] Yet the Buddha designates this name only for the clinging to "I" and "mine," so that it will be understood that this view takes satkāya as its object, without [being] "I" or "mine," since "I" and "mine" ultimately do not exist. As a sūtra states: monks, you should know that in the world, the various ascetics and brahmins who cling to a self, in whatever way they conceive of it, are in every case conceiving only with respect to these five aggregates subject to appropriation. With respect to the very matter of the presumed "I" and "mine," clinging to [its] extinction or clinging to [its] permanence is called "extreme views," since it wrongly clings to the extremes of extinction or permanence. With respect to the truths of suffering and the rest, which genuinely have a real basis, giving rise to a view that categorically denies them is called "wrong view." All false views are, in a sense, equally inverted and distorted, and so should equally be called "wrong" — yet only categorical denial is called "wrong view" specifically, because its fault is especially severe, as with the saying about spoiled ghee being especially reviled and the like — this alone constitutes pure diminishment, whereas the others constitute [merely] exaggeration. Taking the inferior as supreme is called "view-attachment." What is contaminated is called "inferior," since it is what the noble ones abandon. Clinging to the inferior as supreme is, altogether, called "view-attachment" — properly, this should be named "view-and-so-forth-attachment," but, omitting the word "and-so-forth," it is simply called "view-attachment." With respect to what is not a cause or path, holding the view that it is a cause or path, is, altogether, called "precept-and-vow attachment" — as with [the notion that] Maheśvara, the lord of creation, or some other thing, is the cause of the world, a wrongly held notion of cause; or throwing oneself into water or fire and other such practices being wrongly held as the cause of heavenly rebirth, a wrongly held notion of cause; or merely holding precepts and vows, together with associated concentrated states, being wrongly held as the path to liberation, when it is not actually the path to liberation, a wrongly held notion of path. Properly, this should be named "precept-vow-and-so-forth-attachment," but, omitting "and-so-forth," it is simply called "precept-and-vow attachment." This should be understood as the essential nature of the five views.

With respect to what is not a cause, giving rise to the view that it is a cause — why is this not abandoned by seeing the origin? Verse: with respect to Maheśvara and the like, wrongly clinging to them as a cause arises from the inversions of permanence and self, hence it is abandoned only by seeing suffering. Explanation: one who holds that Maheśvara, the lord of creation, or something else, is the cause of the world's generation, must first conceive of that entity's essential nature as a permanent, unified self acting as an agent, before this causal clinging can arise. The moment suffering is seen, the clinging to permanence and to a self with respect to Maheśvara and the like is permanently and completely severed, and so the causal clinging arising from it is severed as well. [Objection:] If so, the view that throwing oneself into water or fire and other such practices is the cause of heavenly rebirth, or that merely holding precepts and vows brings about purification, ought not to be abandoned by seeing suffering. [Reply:] Yet the root treatise states that certain non-Buddhist ascetics give rise to such a view and hold such a doctrine — that if a person holds the vow of an ox, a deer, or a dog, they will attain purification, liberation, and release, permanently transcending suffering and pleasure and arriving at a state beyond both. All such cases of wrongly holding what is not a cause to be a cause should be understood in the same way — this precept-and-vow attachment is abandoned by seeing suffering, as explained at length there. Why, further, is this abandoned by seeing suffering? Because confusion about the truth of suffering is an extremely pervasive fault — every affliction that takes any contaminated object as its basis is already, in doing so, confused about suffering. [Objection:] What further characteristic distinguishes precept-and-vow attachment such that it can also be said to be abandoned by seeing the path? [Reply:] Whatever arises taking as its object what is abandoned by seeing the path should also, for the same reason, be called confused about the truth of suffering. [Objection:] But wrong view and doubt taking the truth of the path as their object, if they categorically deny or merely doubt the existence of a path to liberation, how could they also hold that this [alternative practice] is able to bring about permanent purification? [Reply:] If [wrong view or doubt] categorically denies the true path to liberation, wrongly clinging to some other cause of purification instead, then this would be clinging to something else as bringing about purification, not wrong view [as such] and the like — [hence] this taking as object what is abandoned by seeing the path does not, by the same reasoning, hold. [Objection:] Moreover, if there is clinging to wrong view and the like, taking what is abandoned by seeing the origin or cessation as its object, as a cause of purification, why, then, is this not abandoned by seeing those [truths] as well? [Reply:] The point being clung to here requires further careful consideration. As stated above, the inversions of permanence and self arise [from this] — are there then only these two kinds of inversion? It should be understood that there are, altogether, four kinds of inversion: first, the inversion of clinging to permanence with respect to what is impermanent; second, the inversion of clinging to pleasure with respect to what is suffering; third, the inversion of clinging to purity with respect to what is impure; fourth, the inversion of clinging to self with respect to what is without self. What is the essential nature of these four inversions? Verse: the essential nature of the four inversions arises from the three views, being inversions only through inference and augmentation; perception and mind follow the power of the view. Explanation: the essential nature of the four inversions is established from the three views — that is, among extreme views, only the view of permanence constitutes the inversion of permanence; among the varieties of view-attachment, clinging to pleasure and purity constitutes the inversions of pleasure and purity; among self-view, only the view of self constitutes the inversion of self.

What is the essential nature of the four inversions? Verse: the essential nature of the four inversions arises from the three views, being inversions only through inference and augmentation; perception and mind follow the power of the view. Explanation: the essential nature of the four inversions is established from the three views — that is, among extreme views, only the view of permanence constitutes the inversion of permanence; among varieties of view-attachment, clinging to pleasure and purity constitutes the inversions of pleasure and purity; among self-view, only the view of self constitutes the inversion of self. [Objection:] If so, why does a sūtra state that, with respect to what is impermanent, clinging to permanence, there is inverted perception, mind, and view — and likewise for suffering, impurity, and non-self? [Reply:] Properly, it should be understood that only the view is inverted; perception and mind, following the view, are also given the name "inverted," since their operative character is the same as the view's. [Objection:] If so, why does [the sūtra] not likewise speak of feeling and the like? [Reply:] Because this is not widely accepted in the world — that is, "inverted mind and perception" is widely accepted in the world, but "inverted feeling" and the like is not; hence the sūtra does not speak of it. Such inversions are already abandoned by the stream-enterer, since they are the view, and what is associated with the view, abandoned by seeing. Other schools say: there are twelve inversions — that is, within the inversion of clinging to permanence with respect to the impermanent, there are three inversions of perception, mind, and view, and likewise for the inversion of clinging to self with respect to what is without self. Among these, eight are abandoned only by seeing; four are abandoned by both seeing and cultivation — namely, the perception and mind [components] of the pleasure and purity [inversions]. If this were not so, how could desire-craving arise in a noble one not yet free from desire, who has already abandoned the perception of pleasure and purity? The Vaibhāṣika masters do not accept this position. If there could be an active perception or mind of pleasure and purity, one would have to accept that noble ones have a pleasure-and-purity inversion; [but] noble ones also give rise to the perception and mind of a sentient being — should one, then, also accept that there is a self-inversion? It is not the case that desire-craving arises with respect to a woman or one's own body merely because one is free from the perception and mind of a sentient being. As a sūtra states: when a well-learned noble disciple has truly and rightly seen and known the noble truth of suffering, at that time, that noble disciple's inverted perception, mind, and view of clinging to permanence with respect to the impermanent are all already permanently eliminated — and so on, at length. Hence it is known that perception and mind take on the character of "inverted" only by borrowing the power of the view's inversion, not through any inversion of their own. Yet a noble one may, at times, be momentarily confused, and desire-craving may abruptly arise with respect to an object — as when one is momentarily confused by a painted spirit-image seen on a spinning wheel of fire.

Is it only the view-anuśaya that has multiple distinctions, or do others as well? Conceit also has them. How is this? Verse: conceit has seven, or nine derived from three; all are abandoned by both seeing and cultivation; for noble ones, as with the entanglement of killing and the like, there are cultivation-abandoned kinds that do not manifest. Explanation: the anuśaya of conceit has seven distinctions: first, conceit; second, excessive conceit; third, the conceit of excessive conceit; fourth, self-conceit; fifth, conceit of overestimation; sixth, deficiency-conceit; seventh, wrong conceit. Causing the mind to become elevated is, altogether, called "conceit"; because its manner of operation differs, it is divided into seven kinds. Toward one who is inferior or equal, respectively thinking oneself superior or equal, causing the mind to become elevated, is, altogether, called "conceit." Toward one who is equal or superior, respectively thinking oneself superior or equal, is altogether called "excessive conceit." Toward one who is superior, thinking oneself superior, is called "the conceit of excessive conceit." Clinging to the five aggregates subject to appropriation as "I" and "mine," causing the mind to become elevated, is called "self-conceit." Not having attained a distinguished quality, yet thinking one has attained it, is called "conceit of overestimation." Toward one who is greatly superior, thinking oneself only slightly inferior, is called "deficiency-conceit." Lacking virtue, yet thinking oneself to have virtue, is called "wrong conceit." Yet the root treatise states there are nine kinds of conceit: first, the conceit-type "I am superior"; second, the conceit-type "I am equal"; third, the conceit-type "I am inferior"; fourth, the conceit-type "there is a superior I"; fifth, the conceit-type "there is an equal I"; sixth, the conceit-type "there is an inferior I"; seventh, the conceit-type "there is no superior I"; eighth, the conceit-type "there is no equal I"; ninth, the conceit-type "there is no inferior I." These nine kinds are derived by separating out, from the previous seven kinds of conceit, three specifically — namely, conceit, excessive conceit, and deficiency-conceit — each, depending on the object viewed, differing in operation to form three groups of three. The first three, in order, are excessive conceit, conceit, and deficiency-conceit. The middle three, in order, are deficiency-conceit, conceit, and excessive conceit. The last three, in order, are conceit, excessive conceit, and deficiency-conceit. Toward one greatly superior, thinking oneself only slightly inferior — deficiency-conceit can indeed be constituted this way, since there remains an elevated ground for it. [Objection:] What elevated ground is there for "deficiency-conceit toward an inferior [object]"? [Reply:] It is with respect to that same beloved, superior class of sentient being — although, with respect to one's own person, one knows oneself to be extremely inferior, one still holds oneself in esteem. This is explained according to the Jñānaprasthāna.

Which of these seven kinds of conceit are abandoned? All are abandoned by both seeing and cultivation. Among those abandoned by cultivation, before a noble one has abandoned them, can they still manifest? This is not fixed — that is, there are some abandoned by cultivation that noble ones definitely do not manifest, such as the entanglement of killing, which is abandoned by cultivation, yet noble ones certainly do not manifest it. "The entanglement of killing" refers to the affliction that gives rise to the deliberate intention to end a sentient being's life. The word "and the like" indicates the entanglements of theft, sexual misconduct, and false speech, [as well as] the entirety of non-existent-craving and a portion of existence-craving. What is meant by "non-existent"? It refers to craving for the impermanence — that is, the cessation — of the three realms; craving of this kind is called "non-existent-craving." "A portion of existence-craving" refers to aspiring to become, for instance, the great nāga king Airāvata and the like. All these entanglements and cravings take as their object only what is abandoned by cultivation, and are therefore abandoned only by cultivation. We have discussed the kinds of conceit and the rest — some are abandoned by cultivation; why is it that noble ones, though not yet having abandoned them, do not give rise to them? Verse: certain kinds of conceit, self-conceit, and unwholesome remorse — noble ones possess but do not give rise to these, since they are augmented by view and doubt. Explanation: the word "and the like" indicates the entanglements of killing and the rest, [and] the entirety of non-existent-craving and a portion of existence-craving. These kinds of conceit, self-conceit, and remorse are directly augmented by view and doubt; although abandoned by cultivation, because view and doubt have already been broken and turned back [by seeing the truths], noble ones are unable to give rise to them. That is, the type of conceit called self-conceit is augmented by the view of a self; the entanglement of killing and the rest are augmented by wrong view; non-existent-craving is augmented by the extinction [i.e. annihilationist] view; the portion of existence-craving is augmented by the permanence [i.e. eternalist] view; unwholesome remorse is augmented by doubt — hence, within a noble one's own being, none of these definitely ever arise.

Among the ninety-eight anuśayas, how many are pervasive, and how many are not? Verse: the views and doubt associated with what is abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, together with independent ignorance, pervasively operate within their own realm and stage; among these, excluding two views, the remaining nine are also able to take higher [realms] as their object; excluding [what is obtained through] attainment, the rest, together with their accompanying factors, are also included as pervasive. Explanation: only the views and doubt abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, together with the independent ignorance associated with them, have the power to pervasively operate across the five categories within their own realm and stage; these eleven all obtain the name "pervasive" — namely, seven views, two [instances of] doubt, and two [instances of] ignorance, [totaling] eleven. These eleven, taking as their object, pervasively, all dharmas across the five categories within their own realm and stage, serve, as anuśayas, as the cause that pervasively gives rise to defiled dharmas across the five categories. On the basis of these three meanings, the name "pervasive" is established. [Objection:] Does this pervasive taking-as-object of the five categories refer to gradual, successive objectification, or to simultaneous objectification? If gradual and successive, others should equally be pervasive [by the same reasoning]. If simultaneous, who could possibly, all at once, universally regard everything within the desire realm as being the supreme [cause] able to bring about purification, or as the cause of the world? [Reply:] It is not said that [these anuśayas] simultaneously take as their object everything within their own realm and stage all at once; rather, it is said that they possess the power to pervasively and rapidly extend across the five categories within their own realm and stage.

Even so, "pervasive" is not confined only to these — wherever self-view is active, self-craving and self-conceit must also necessarily arise there; wherever the view of clinging to purity as supreme is active, craving and elevation must also necessarily arise there — should craving and conceit, then, also be pervasive? [Reply:] If so, since [this affliction takes] a mixed object, one should say it is abandoned by cultivation; or one should say it is abandoned by seeing, since it is drawn forth by the power of view. The Vaibhāṣika masters explain it this way: these two afflictions have their own individual character, not shared, and lack the power of rapid, [simultaneous-type] objectification, and so are not pervasive. Hence "pervasive" applies only to these eleven, and to no others — this being self-evident on this basis, without further need for statement. Among the eleven, excluding the view of a self and extreme views, the remaining nine are also able to take a higher [realm] as their object. "Higher" here specifically means a higher realm or stage, and also indicates that there is no [anuśaya] that takes a lower [realm] as its object. Although these nine are able to generally take what is above their own [stage] as object, in principle there is no taking of what is above one's own stage all at once, simultaneously. With respect to taking a higher [realm] as object, this is spoken of in terms of realm — some take only one [higher realm], others take two together. Hence the root treatise states: there are anuśayas bound to the desire realm that take the form realm as their object; there are anuśayas bound to the desire realm that take the formless realm as their object; there are anuśayas bound to the desire realm that take both the form and formless realms as their object; there are anuśayas bound to the form realm that take the formless realm as their object. Distinguished by stage, this should be considered analogously by realm. [Objection:] Born within the desire realm, if one gives rise to the view that the great Brahmā is a sentient being, or gives rise to the view that he is eternal, why is it said that self-view and extreme views do not take a higher realm or stage as their object? [Reply:] It is because [such a person] does not cling to that [Brahmā] as "I" or "mine," and because extreme views necessarily arise from self-view. [Objection:] If so, this notion that he is an eternal sentient being — what kind of view does this belong to? [Reply:] The Ābhidharmikas say: these two are not [genuine] "view" at all, but are included under wrong cognition. [Objection:] For what reason is it that, when others take this as their object, it is "view," yet here, though likewise taking this as object, it is not "view"? [Reply:] This is stated on the basis of [our] tradition's established position.

Is the substance of "pervasive" only the anuśayas themselves? It is not. How is this? [It also includes] the accompanying concurrent dharmas — that is, the eleven anuśayas described above, together with their accompanying concurrent dharmas, are all included within "pervasive," except for possession, since it does not share the same single result [with them]. On this basis, the question is raised: are all pervasive anuśayas [also] pervasive causes? The reply: a fourfold analysis should be made here. The first case: pervasive anuśayas belonging to the future. The second case: the concurrent dharmas of the past and present that co-exist with them. The third and fourth should be reasoned through accordingly. Among the ninety-eight anuśayas, how many take a contaminated object, and how many take an uncontaminated object? Verse: the wrong view and doubt associated with what is abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, together with independent ignorance — six are able to take the uncontaminated as object. Explanation: only the wrong view and doubt abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, together with their associated independent ignorance, each three in number, [totaling] six, are able to take the uncontaminated as their object. The rest take the contaminated as their object — this is self-evident on this basis.

Among these six, those taking cessation as their object each take the cessation of their own stage as their object, since cessations, considered relative to one another, are not cause and effect — that is, the three anuśayas bound to the desire realm take only the cessation-through-discernment of desire-realm formations as their object; likewise, up through the three anuśayas of the peak of existence, which take only the cessation-through-discernment of the peak of existence's own formations as their object. Those taking the path as their object take six or nine stages — that is, the three anuśayas bound to the desire realm take only the path of the dharma-cognition type spanning six stages as their object, since, whether serving as the antidote for the desire realm or as the antidote for other [stages], all are its object, being of the same type. Each of the eight stages of the form and formless realms has three anuśayas, each able to take, in common, the path of the subsequent-cognition type spanning nine stages as its object, since, whether serving as the antidote for its own stage or as the antidote for others, all are its object, being of the same type. Why is cessation confined to one's own stage while the path is not? Because the paths of different stages serve as mutual causes for one another. Although dharma-cognition and subsequent-cognition are also mutually causal, subsequent-cognition does not serve as an antidote for the desire realm, and so the path of the subsequent-cognition type is not the object of the desire realm's three [anuśayas]. Since dharma-cognition is able to serve as an antidote for the form and formless realms, should it not then be the object of the three [anuśayas] in each of those eight stages? [Reply:] It is not the case that all of it is able to serve as an antidote for the form and formless realms — the dharma-cognition type concerning suffering and origin is not an antidote for them; nor is it wholly able to serve as an antidote, since it cannot serve as the antidote for what is abandoned by seeing there. Since these two initial conditions are both absent, it is not their object. It is for this same reason that the pervasive afflictions taking suffering and origin as their object encounter no such restriction, since these objects mutually serve as cause for one another across [all stages], without needing to function as an antidote. Why is it that greed, hatred, conceit, precept-and-vow attachment, and view-attachment, though [in principle] abandoned by seeing the uncontaminated, do not take the uncontaminated as their object? Because the anuśaya of greed ought to be relinquished — if it could take the uncontaminated as its object, this would then be without fault, like a wholesome aspiration, which ought not to be relinquished. Hatred arises with respect to an object of hostility and harm; cessation and the path are not hostile, and so are not an object for hatred. Conceit arises with respect to an object of coarse agitation; cessation and the path are tranquil, and so are not an object for conceit. Clinging to what is not a genuine cause of purity as being a cause of purity is called precept-and-vow attachment; cessation and the path are genuinely pure, and so should not be an object for precept-and-vow attachment. Clinging to what is not supreme as being supreme is called view-attachment; cessation and the path are genuinely supreme, and so likewise should not be an object for view-attachment. For these reasons, greed and the rest do not take the uncontaminated as their object.

Among the ninety-eight anuśayas, how many undergo latent increase through their object, and how many through association? Verse: unabandoned pervasive anuśayas latently increase with respect to everything within their own stage; non-pervasive ones, with respect to their own category, through their object; not with respect to the uncontaminated or higher [objects] taken, since these are not appropriated and are opposed; latent increase through association follows whatever is associated. Explanation: pervasive anuśayas universally undergo latent increase, through their object, with respect to all dharmas across the five categories of their own stage, since they are able to pervasively take the dharmas of their own stage as object. The remaining, non-pervasive anuśayas of the five categories undergo latent increase, through their object, only with respect to their own category, since they take only their own category as object. This is the general statement. Distinguishing further: the six afflictions taking an uncontaminated object, and the nine taking a higher [realm] as object, have no latent increase with respect to the object they take. Why is this? Because the uncontaminated and higher objects are not appropriated [by the lower stage's self-view and craving], and are opposed to them. That is, if a dharma is appropriated as one's own by the self-view and craving of a given stage, then there is a rational basis for the anuśayas of that stage's self-view and craving to undergo latent increase with respect to it as their object — like moisture soaking into cloth, or dust settling and clinging to a surface. Uncontaminated dharmas and the dharmas of a higher stage are not appropriated as their own by the self-view and craving of a lower stage, and so, though a lower affliction may take them as object, there is no latent increase through that object. A mind abiding in a lower stage that seeks a higher stage is a wholesome aspiration, not an anuśaya. The noble path, nirvāṇa, and the dharmas of a higher stage are opposed to the lower afflictions capable of taking them as object, and so these two likewise have no rational basis for latent increase through their object — like a foot that does not linger upon a scorching-hot stone. Some say: "anuśaya" carries the meaning of "conforming"; since the uncontaminated and higher objects do not conform to the lower anuśayas, even though they are taken as object, there is no rational basis for latent increase — like a person with a wind-disorder who takes a dry, astringent medicine: the patient [takes] the medicine, but the illness does not thereby increase. We have now discussed latent increase with respect to object; we shall next discuss latent increase with respect to association — that is, whatever anuśaya is associated with a given dharma undergoes latent increase, on account of that association, with respect to that dharma. Wherever "latent increase" is spoken of, it means up until [the anuśaya] is not yet abandoned — hence the opening verse states the phrase "not yet abandoned." Is there any anuśaya that neither takes the uncontaminated nor takes a higher realm as object, yet whose latent increase occurs only through association, not through object? There is — namely, the pervasive anuśayas that take a higher stage as their object.

Among the ninety-eight anuśayas, how many are unwholesome, and how many are neutral? Verse: the anuśayas of the upper two realms, together with the view of a self and extreme views of the desire realm, and their associated delusion, are neutral; the rest are all unwholesome. Explanation: all anuśayas of the form and formless realms are only of a neutral nature, since a defiled dharma, if unwholesome, has a painful ripened result, and the upper two realms lack any painful ripened result, since the cause of oppression by another is definitely absent there. The view of a self, extreme views, and their associated delusion, when bound to the desire realm, are likewise of a neutral nature. Why is this? Because these do not conflict with giving and the rest, since one may think "may I have happiness in the present" and diligently cultivate giving, precepts, and the rest. Clinging to the extreme view of annihilation accords with liberation, and so the Blessed One states: among the various view-traditions of the non-Buddhist ascetics, this view is supreme — namely, "I do not exist, and what is mine also does not exist; I shall not exist, and what will be mine shall also not exist." Moreover, these two views are confused only about matters concerning oneself, not motivated by a wish to oppress or harm other sentient beings. [Objection:] If so, craving for heavenly pleasure and the conceit arising from it should, by the same reasoning, also be so [i.e., neutral]. [Reply:] The elder teachers of the tradition explain it this way: innate, spontaneously arising self-view is of a neutral nature, as with the manifest self-view activity of birds, beasts, and the like; if it arises through deliberate discrimination, it is of an unwholesome nature. All the remaining anuśayas bound to the desire realm, contrary to what has been described above, are all of an unwholesome nature.

Among the unwholesome afflictions described above, how many are unwholesome roots, and how many are not? Verse: the unwholesome roots of the desire realm are greed, hatred, and unwholesome delusion. Explanation: only greed and hatred bound to the desire realm, and unwholesome delusion, are included among the unwholesome roots — in this order, the Blessed One speaks of greed, hatred, and delusion as the three unwholesome roots. Only afflictions whose nature is exclusively unwholesome are established as the root of unwholesome dharmas; the rest are not so — the remaining afflictions are not unwholesome roots, this meaning already established by inference, and so the verse does not state it. Among the neutral afflictions described above, how many are neutral roots, and how many are not? Verse: the neutral roots are three — neutral craving, delusion, and wisdom; not the other two, since they operate through oscillation and elevation; teachers from outside establish four — including craving, view, conceit, and delusion, since these three are all definitely delusion-based. Explanation: the Vaibhāṣika masters of Kashmir say the neutral roots are likewise three — namely, neutral craving, delusion, and wisdom, the latter included down to the wisdom that arises as karmic ripening. Why do doubt and conceit not count as neutral roots? Because doubt operates by oscillating between two directions, and conceit operates through elevation. Those masters say doubt oscillates between two directions, its nature being unstable, and so should not be established as a root; conceit operates through an elevated orientation toward its object, differing in character from what constitutes a root, and so is likewise not established as one. A root must necessarily be firmly, stably grounded, generating growth downward — this is universally recognized in the world — hence those two are not roots. Teachers from outside establish four instead: namely, neutral craving, view, conceit, and delusion. Since the term "neutral" already excludes both good and evil, why are these four established as neutral roots? Because foolish, ordinary beings who cultivate the higher absorptions rely on nothing more than craving, view, and conceit, these three all operating through the power of ignorance; hence these four are established as the neutral roots.

Various sūtras speak of the fourteen neutral matters — are these also included within the "neutral" [category] discussed here? They are not. How is this? That sūtra establishes the name "neutral" only with reference to questions that ought to be set aside — that is, the modes of answering questions total four in all. What are these four? Verse: categorical, analytical, counter-questioning, and setting-aside answers — as with [questions about] death, rebirth, superiority, and the self and aggregates being one or different. Explanation: as for the four kinds of questions, first is that which ought to receive a categorical answer; second, that which ought to receive an analytical answer; third, that which ought to receive a counter-questioning answer; fourth, that which ought to receive an answer of setting-aside. These four, in this order, [correspond to questions] such as one asking about death, rebirth, superiority, and whether the self is the same as or different from the aggregates. Answers are of four kinds, corresponding to answering these four questions. If one asks: must all sentient beings die? This should receive a categorical answer: all sentient beings will definitely die. If one asks: will all who have died definitely be reborn? This should receive an analytical answer: those with affliction will be reborn, others not. If one asks: are humans superior or inferior? This should receive a counter-questioning answer: compared to what? If compared to the gods, humans should be recorded as inferior; if compared to what is below, humans should be recorded as superior. If one asks: are the aggregates the same as, or different from, the sentient being [that possesses them]? This should receive an answer of setting-aside: since a sentient being has no real, substantial existence, [the question of] sameness or difference does not hold, like [asking about] the fair or dark complexion of the son of a barren woman. How can setting-aside itself be called "answering"? Because stating, in reply to that question, that it should not be [directly] answered, is itself already a [determinate] answer.

The Ābhidharmikas explain it this way: as for the categorical answer, if someone asks: is the Blessed One a Tathāgata, worthy one, and perfectly awakened buddha? Is the essential teaching he expounds well-taught? Do his disciples practice excellent conduct? Are form and the rest, up through consciousness, all impermanent? Are suffering and the rest, up through the path, well established? These should receive a categorical answer, since they accord with true meaning. As for the analytical answer, if someone with a sincere heart requests: may the venerable one teach me the Dharma — one should make a distinction: the Dharma is manifold, comprising past, future, and present; which does one wish to hear? If they say, teach me the Dharma of the past, one should distinguish further: the Dharma of the past is also manifold, from form through consciousness. If they request form, one should distinguish: form has three kinds — wholesome, unwholesome, and neutral. If they request the wholesome, one should distinguish: the wholesome has seven kinds, namely abstention from killing, and so on at length, through abstention from frivolous speech. If they further request abstention from killing, one should distinguish: this has three kinds, arising from the three wholesome roots of non-greed, non-hatred, and non-delusion. If they request the kind arising from non-greed, one should distinguish: this further has two kinds, manifested and unmanifested — which does one wish to hear? As for the counter-questioning answer, if someone with a flattering heart requests: may the venerable one teach me the Dharma — one should counter-question them: the Dharma is manifold; which does one wish to hear? without further analytical distinction, up to the point of causing them to fall silent, or causing them to state their own request, whereupon it may be judged inappropriate. [Objection:] Are these not, in both cases, entirely without any actual question, there being only a request for teaching, and without any actual answer, there being only the counter-question of what one wishes to hear — how, then, can these two constitute question-and-answer at all? [Reply:] As when someone requests, "teach me the path" — is this not asking about the path? And by counter-questioning in reply to what they asked, is this not answering about the path? [Objection:] If so, both [the analytical and counter-questioning examples] should equally be counter-questioning answers. [Reply:] Not so — the sincere and flattering intentions differ, and the answer given is, respectively, with or without analytical distinction. As for the answer of setting-aside, if someone asks: is the world finite, or infinite, and so on? This should be set aside, and not answered. We have now discussed the character of question and answer according to the Abhidharma treatises. As the Mahāsāṃghika school's own sūtra states: monks, you should know that there are four kinds of question and answer. What are the four? There is a question that should receive a categorical answer, and so on, up to a question that should only be set aside. What is a question that should receive a categorical answer? Asking: are all conditioned formations impermanent? This question is called one that should receive a categorical answer. What is a question that should receive an analytical answer? Asking: what result is received by one who has deliberately carried out an act of karma? This question is called one that should receive an analytical answer. What is a question that should receive a counter-questioning answer? Asking: are a person's perception and self the same, or different? One should counter-question: by which notion of self do you ask this? If they mean the coarse self, one should answer that perception is different from it. This question is called one that should receive a counter-questioning answer. What is a question that should only be set aside? Asking: is the world permanent, impermanent, both, or neither? Is the world finite, infinite, both, or neither? Does the Tathāgata exist after death, not exist, both, or neither? Is the life-principle identical to the body, or different from the body? These questions are called ones that should only be set aside. Abhidharmakośa-śāstra of the Sarvāstivāda School, Fascicle Nineteen, [end].