Do Past and Future Really Exist?
Fascicle 20 completes the second part of Chapter 5 (分別隨眠品第五之二, the Anuśaya-nirdeśa). It opens with a technical question about which latent tendencies "bind" a given matter across past, present, and future — a question that immediately opens onto one of the single most consequential debates in the entire treatise, and indeed in the history of this school of thought: do dharmas belonging to the past and future actually, truly exist, or does only the present genuinely exist? This is the very doctrine that gives the Sarvāstivāda ("the teaching that all exists") school its name, and this fascicle presents the school's full scriptural and logical case for it alongside the Sautrāntika's sustained rebuttal, before closing with further technical apparatus — a sixteen-fold classification of dharmas and consciousness, the typical sequence in which the anuśayas arise, and the sūtras' four collective names for affliction: outflow, flood, yoke, and clinging.
1. Which Latent Tendencies "Bind" a Matter Across the Three Times
The treatise opens this second part of Chapter 5 by explaining that whatever sentient beings undergo latent increase with respect to a given matter, that matter is said to be "bound" by the corresponding anuśaya. It then asks precisely which anuśayas — considered as past, present, or future — are capable of binding which matters. The anuśayas divide into two broad types: those with a "self-characteristic" (greed, hatred, and conceit, each possessing its own distinct, individually recognizable character) and those with a "common-characteristic" (views, doubt, and ignorance, which operate more generally). Although any given matter may be bound by many different anuśayas, the treatise here addresses specifically whichever have not yet been abandoned, tracing their operation forward according to this classification. If, with respect to a given matter, greed, hatred, or conceit has already arisen in the past and remains unabandoned, or has already arisen in the present, this is sufficient to bind that matter, since these three self-characteristic afflictions do not necessarily arise uniformly in every sentient being with respect to every possible object. If a future mental-consciousness-associated instance of greed, hatred, or conceit remains unabandoned, it pervasively binds across all three times; a future instance associated specifically with one of the five sense-consciousnesses, if unabandoned and capable of arising, binds only the future; if unabandoned but incapable of arising, it nevertheless binds all three times as well. All the remaining anuśayas — views, doubt, and ignorance — being common-characteristic afflictions that pervasively bind every sentient being without exception, bind all three times pervasively whenever they remain unabandoned, whether past or future. And whenever a present affliction is actively, directly engaging its object, it correspondingly binds that specific matter as appropriate.
分別隨眠品第五之二。諸有情類於此事中隨眠隨增，名繫此事。應說過去現在未來何等隨眠能繫何事？頌曰：若於此事中，未斷貪瞋慢，過現若已起，未來意遍行，五可生自世，不生亦遍行，餘過未遍行，現正緣能繫。論曰：且諸隨眠總有二種：一者自相，謂貪、瞋、慢；二者共相，謂見、疑、癡。事雖有多，此說所繫。如應未斷，流至後門。若此事中有貪瞋慢，於過去世已生未斷，現在已生能繫此事。以貪瞋慢是自相惑，非諸有情定遍起故。若未來世意識相應貪瞋慢三遍於三世，乃至未斷皆能繫縛。未來五識相應貪瞋，若未斷可生，唯繫未來世。未來五識相應貪瞋，若未斷不生，亦能繫三世。所餘一切見疑無明，去來未斷遍縛三世。由此三種是共相惑，一切有情俱遍縛故。若現在世正緣境時，隨其所應能繫此事。
Chapter 5, Part 2. Sentient beings undergo latent increase with respect to a given matter — this is called "binding" that matter. It should be explained which anuśayas of the past, present, and future bind which matters. Verse: if, with respect to this matter, greed, hatred, or conceit — not yet abandoned — has already arisen in the past or present, [it binds]; a future instance associated with mental consciousness pervasively [binds]; the five [sense-consciousness-associated instances], if capable of arising, [bind] their own time; if incapable of arising, they too pervasively [bind]; the rest, past and future, pervasively [bind]; the present, when directly engaging its object, binds. Explanation: the anuśayas are, in general, of two kinds — first, those with a self-characteristic, namely greed, hatred, and conceit; second, those with a common-characteristic, namely views, doubt, and ignorance. Although a matter may have many [anuśayas bound to it], this discussion concerns what binds it, tracing forward as appropriate whatever remains unabandoned. If, with respect to this matter, greed, hatred, or conceit has already arisen in the past and remains unabandoned, or has already arisen in the present, this is able to bind this matter, since greed, hatred, and conceit are self-characteristic afflictions, not necessarily pervasively arising in every sentient being. If a future instance associated with mental consciousness — greed, hatred, or conceit — remains unabandoned, it pervasively [binds] across the three times. A future instance associated with the five [sense-consciousnesses] — greed or hatred — if unabandoned and capable of arising, binds only the future. If unabandoned but incapable of arising, it too is able to bind the three times. All the remaining views, doubt, and ignorance, past and future, if unabandoned, pervasively bind the three times, since these three are common-characteristic afflictions, pervasively binding every sentient being. When a present [affliction] is directly engaging its object, it binds this matter as appropriate.
We should flag that this opening section's technical apparatus (self-characteristic versus common-characteristic afflictions; which "binds" across which of the three times depending on whether it is capable of arising) is genuinely intricate, and we have aimed for precision over readability in a few of the more compressed clauses — particularly the distinction between a future sense-consciousness-associated affliction that "can arise" (binding only the future) versus one that "cannot arise" (binding all three times), which the source states as a brute technical rule without further explanation of the underlying rationale at this point.
This section is really a springboard: the treatise's own next move is to ask what it even means to speak of a "past" or "future" anuśaya "binding" something at all, if past and future dharmas do not actually, truly exist — a question that opens directly onto the school's own defining metaphysical doctrine, which the next section takes up at length.
2. Do Past and Future Really Exist? The Case For
Having spoken of past and future anuśayas "binding" a given matter, the treatise pauses to ask whether such talk presupposes that past and future dharmas actually, truly exist — or whether, since all conditioned formations are constantly arising and ceasing, one should say they are real only for the fleeting present, with no genuine existence otherwise. If they do not actually exist at all, how could one meaningfully speak of anything as being "bound" or "freed from binding" with respect to them in the first place? The Vaibhāṣika masters answer decisively that all three times — past, present, and future — genuinely, actually exist. Their case rests on two pillars: scriptural authority and logical necessity. On the scriptural side, they cite the Buddha's own words: monks, you should know that if past form did not actually exist, the learned noble disciple could not properly practice weariness and renunciation with respect to past form — yet since past form does genuinely exist, the learned noble disciple can indeed practice weariness and renunciation toward it. Likewise, if future form did not actually exist, the learned noble disciple could not properly practice cutting off eager anticipation with respect to future form — yet since future form does genuinely exist, the learned noble disciple can indeed practice cutting off such anticipation toward it. On the logical side, they argue that consciousness can only ever arise given two necessary supporting conditions, as the sūtras themselves state: "consciousness arises from two conditions" — for instance, the eye and visible form, extending through the mind and mental objects. If past and future dharmas did not actually exist, then any consciousness that takes such a dharma as its object would necessarily be missing one of its two required supporting conditions altogether. Having thus established the reality of past and future first from scriptural authority, the Vaibhāṣika further establish it through direct reasoning: consciousness, whenever it arises, necessarily has a real object — this being an absolutely fixed principle, since consciousness only arises given a genuinely existing object, and never arises in the complete absence of one. If the object-realm of past and future had no actual substantial existence at all, this would mean that consciousness could arise entirely without any object whatsoever — yet since the object simply does not exist in such a case, the consciousness that would supposedly take it as object could not exist either. It is on the strength of this scriptural and logical argument taken together that the Vaibhāṣika masters firmly establish that both the past and future genuinely, actually exist.
應辯諸事過去未來，為實有無方可說繫。若實是有，則一切行恒時有故應說為常；若實是無，如何可說有能所繫及離繫耶？毘婆沙師定立實有，然彼諸行不名為常，由與有為諸相合故。為此所立決定增明，應略標宗顯其理趣。頌曰：三世有由說，二有境果故，說三世有故，許說一切有。論曰：三世實有。所以者何？由契經中世尊說故。謂世尊說：苾芻當知，若過去色非有，不應多聞聖弟子眾於過去色勤脩厭捨。以過去色是有故，應多聞聖弟子眾於過去色勤脩厭捨。若未來色非有，不應多聞聖弟子眾於未來色勤斷欣求。以未來色是有故，應多聞聖弟子眾於未來色勤斷欣求。又具二緣識方生故，謂契經說：識二緣生。其二者何？謂眼及色。廣說乃至意及諸法。若去來世非實有者，能緣彼識應闕二緣。已依聖教證去來有，當依正理證有去來，以識起時必有境故。謂必有境，識乃得生，無則不生，其理決定。若去來世境體實無，是則應有無所緣識，所緣無故識亦應無。
It should be discussed whether these past and future matters are actually existent or not, before one can properly speak of "binding" with respect to them. If they truly exist, then all conditioned formations would exist at all times, and so should be called permanent; if they truly do not exist, how can one speak of there being binding and freedom from binding [with respect to them] at all? The Vaibhāṣika masters firmly establish that they truly exist, yet these formations are not thereby called permanent, since they are still joined with the marks of conditioned existence. To make this established position clear and evident, we should briefly set forth its tenet and reveal its reasoning. Verse: the three times exist, as stated [in scripture]; because of the two, because of an object, because of a result; because the three times are said to exist, one is granted [the name] "the teaching that all exists." Explanation: the three times truly exist. Why is this? Because the Blessed One states so in a sūtra. That is, the Blessed One states: monks, you should know that if past form did not exist, the learned noble disciples should not diligently cultivate weariness and renunciation with respect to past form. Since past form does exist, the learned noble disciples should diligently cultivate weariness and renunciation with respect to past form. If future form did not exist, the learned noble disciples should not diligently cut off eager anticipation with respect to future form. Since future form does exist, the learned noble disciples should diligently cut off eager anticipation with respect to future form. Moreover, consciousness arises only given two conditions, as a sūtra states: consciousness arises from two conditions. What are these two? Namely, the eye and form, and so on at length, through the mind and dharmas. If the past and future did not truly exist, the consciousness taking them as object would lack one of its two conditions. Having proven the existence of the past and future on the basis of the sacred teaching, we should further prove the existence of the past and future on the basis of correct reasoning, since consciousness, when it arises, necessarily has an object. That is, only given an object does consciousness arise; without one, it does not arise — this principle is fixed. If the substance of past and future objects truly did not exist, this would mean there could be a consciousness without any object at all; since the object would not exist, the consciousness too would have to not exist.
We should highlight that this section presents this school's own foundational, self-defining argument — the very reasoning behind why this tradition calls itself "Sarvāstivāda" ("the teaching that all [dharmas of all three times] exist"), as the verse itself states explicitly. We are translating this as the Vaibhāṣika's own case, presented with full conviction in the source text; the treatise's author, Vasubandhu, is traditionally understood to have deep Sautrāntika sympathies and will, in the sections that follow, subject this very same doctrine to sustained critical examination — so readers should understand this section as presenting one side of what becomes a genuine, extended philosophical debate within the treatise itself, not the treatise's own final, settled position.
The scriptural citation here (the Buddha's teaching on renunciation toward past form and non-anticipation toward future form) is being read by the Vaibhāṣika as implying the actual existence of what is renounced or not anticipated — a substantive interpretive move, since one could in principle read the same sūtra passage as speaking merely about mental attitudes toward past and future without requiring their literal ontological existence. We flag this as an interpretive choice the Vaibhāṣika are making, since the treatise itself will go on to probe exactly this kind of question in the debate ahead.
3. Four Masters, Four Accounts of How a Dharma Persists
Having established, at least on the Vaibhāṣika's own account, that dharmas of all three times genuinely exist, the treatise must now confront a deeper puzzle: if a dharma's essential substance truly persists identically across past, present, and future, in what sense can it meaningfully be said to change or move between these three times at all, and by what account can distinctions among them even be drawn? Four masters of this tradition offer four distinct answers. The venerable Dharmatrāta holds that dharmas differ across the three times by "class" (or "kind"): as a dharma moves through time, its class changes while its underlying substance does not — comparable to a golden vessel that is melted down and reshaped into some other golden object, where the shape changes but the gold itself remains the same substance throughout, or to milk transforming into curd, where the taste, potency, and other qualities change while the color remains unaltered; in just this way, as a dharma passes from future into present, and from present into past, only its class is relinquished and newly acquired, never its underlying substance. The venerable Ghoṣaka holds instead that dharmas differ by "characteristic": as a dharma moves through time, it is always genuinely joined with all three temporal characteristics simultaneously, yet is only ever named according to whichever characteristic is currently most prominent, without this implying it has ever actually been free of the other two — comparable to a man passionately attached to one particular woman, who is not thereby said to be entirely free of attachment toward his other female companions, merely because his passion for them is not, at that moment, foremost. The venerable Vasumitra holds that dharmas differ by "state" (or "position"): as a dharma moves through the three times, it undergoes different characterizations depending on the specific state or position it currently occupies, its underlying substance again remaining constant throughout — comparable to a single counting-token that, depending on where it is placed on a counting-board, may be called "one" in the ones-place, "a hundred" in the hundreds-place, or "a thousand" in the thousands-place, its own substance as a mere token never actually changing. And the venerable Buddhadeva holds that dharmas differ by mutual "relativity": as a dharma moves through the three times, it receives different designations purely through its relative position with respect to what comes before and after it — comparable to a single woman who may be called "mother" relative to her own child, yet "daughter" relative to her own mother, the change of designation reflecting only a shift in relative standpoint, not any change in the woman herself.
於此部中差別有幾？誰所立世最善可依？頌曰：此中有四種，類相位待異，第三約作用，立世最為善。論曰：尊者法救作如是說：由類不同，三世有異。彼謂諸法行於世時，由類有殊非體有異。如破金器作餘物時，形雖有殊而體無異。又如乳變成於酪時，捨味勢等，非捨顯色。如是諸法行於世時，從未來至現在、從現在入過去，唯捨得類，非捨得體。尊者妙音作如是說：由相不同，三世有異。彼謂諸法行於世時，過去正與過去相合，而不名為離現未相。未來正與未來相合，而不名為離過現相。現在正與現在相合，而不名為離過未相。如人正染一妻室時，於餘姬媵不名離染。尊者世友作如是說：由位不同，三世有異。彼謂諸法行於世時，至位位中作異異說，由位有別非體有異。如運一籌，置一名一、置百名百、置千名千。尊者覺天作如是說：由待有別，三世有異。彼謂諸法行於世時，前後相待立名有異，如一女人名母名女。
Within this school, how many distinct positions are there [on this point]? Whose account of the three times is best, and worthy of reliance? Verse: within this, there are four kinds — class, characteristic, state, and relativity being different; the third, in terms of activity, is established as the best account of the three times. Explanation: the venerable Dharmatrāta explains it this way: through a difference of class, the three times differ. He holds that, as dharmas move through time, there is a distinction of class, not a distinction of substance — as when a golden vessel is broken and made into some other object, the shape differs though the substance does not differ; or as when milk transforms into curd, taste and potency and the like are relinquished, but not the visible color. In just this way, as dharmas move through time, from the future into the present, from the present into the past, only class is relinquished and acquired, not substance. The venerable Ghoṣaka explains it this way: through a difference of characteristic, the three times differ. He holds that, as dharmas move through time, the past is genuinely joined with the past characteristic, yet is not thereby said to be free of the future and present characteristics; the future is genuinely joined with the future characteristic, yet is not thereby said to be free of the past and present characteristics; the present is genuinely joined with the present characteristic, yet is not thereby said to be free of the past and future characteristics — as when a person is passionately attached to one wife, he is not thereby said to be free of attachment toward his other consorts. The venerable Vasumitra explains it this way: through a difference of state, the three times differ. He holds that, as dharmas move through time, at each different state they are spoken of differently, there being a distinction of state, not a distinction of substance — as when a single counting-token, placed in the ones position, is called "one"; placed in the hundreds position, is called "a hundred"; placed in the thousands position, is called "a thousand." The venerable Buddhadeva explains it this way: through a distinction of relativity, the three times differ. He holds that, as dharmas move through time, names are established through relativity to what precedes and follows — as a single woman is called "mother" and [also] "daughter."
We should flag that these four analogies (a reshaped gold vessel, a man attached to one of several wives, a counting-token's positional value, a woman who is both mother and daughter) are this tradition's own classical illustrations, cited across many subsequent Abhidharma discussions of this same debate — we have rendered them plainly and literally, since the philosophical force of each master's position depends directly on how well or poorly its chosen analogy actually models the claim being made about time and substance.
Readers should note that all four of these masters are working within the same overarching Sarvāstivāda commitment (that past, present, and future dharmas are all equally, actually real) — the disagreement among them concerns only how to explain the change of temporal designation without abandoning that shared commitment to a persisting, unchanging underlying substance. The treatise's very next move, as our closing placeholder above indicates, is to evaluate these four accounts critically and favor Vasumitra's "state" theory as the strongest of the four — though, as we will see, even that preferred account does not entirely escape further critical scrutiny later in this fascicle.
4. Three Theories Rejected, One Endorsed — Then Immediately Questioned
The treatise now evaluates the four accounts just presented. Dharmatrāta's "class" theory is rejected outright, since it holds that a dharma's own substance genuinely undergoes transformation while merely changing class — a position which, the treatise notes pointedly, effectively aligns him with the rival, non-Buddhist Sāṃkhya school's own doctrine of a single underlying substance transforming into different manifest states, hardly a flattering company for a position within this tradition to keep. Ghoṣaka's "characteristic" theory fares no better: since it holds that a dharma is simultaneously joined with all three temporal characteristics at once, merely differing in which is currently "prominent," the three times become hopelessly entangled with one another, robbing the distinction of any real content — and the analogy Ghoṣaka himself offers actually undermines his own position, since a man passionately attached to one wife, at the very moment of that passion, has no attachment whatsoever actively arising toward his other companions; if his case is supposed to illustrate how a dharma can be joined with all three characteristics "equally" while only one is prominent, the analogy simply fails to establish the claimed equality. Buddhadeva's "relativity" theory fares worst of all: since it defines each time purely by its relation to what precedes and follows, a single dharma-moment would end up having to be simultaneously past, present, and future all at once, depending on which neighboring moment one happened to compare it to — the earlier instant within any given time would have to be called "future" relative to what follows it, the middle instant "present," and so the very same problem of triple-designation recurs endlessly at every level. It is for these reasons that, among the four, Vasumitra's "state" (or activity-based) account is judged the best, since it explains the distinction of the three times specifically in terms of differences in a dharma's activity: a dharma not yet possessing its characteristic activity is called "future"; a dharma currently possessing that activity is called "present"; and a dharma whose activity has already ceased is called "past" — its underlying substance, in every case, remaining unchanged throughout. Yet the treatise does not let even this preferred account rest unexamined for long: if the substance of past and future dharmas genuinely, truly exists just as the present does, why should they not simply be called "present" as well, rather than "past" or "future"? Is this distinction not, after all, supposed to be drawn strictly in terms of activity, as just explained? But this immediately raises a further difficulty: consider a currently existing eye-faculty that happens to belong to the same general class as visual cognition, yet is not, at this very moment, actually engaged in producing any visual cognition at all — what "activity" does such a faculty actually possess right now? Surely it is still capable, in some sense, of receiving a result from its own prior causes and of giving rise to a future result in turn — and if this is granted, then even a genuinely past cause belonging to the same class, which likewise remains capable of eventually giving rise to a future result, would have to be said to possess some kind of "activity" as well, even though it is classified as past. This threatens to leave every dharma with only ever a kind of partial, incomplete "half-activity," blurring the very distinction between the three times that this account was meant to establish clearly.
此四種說一切有中，第一執法有轉變故，應置數論外道朋中。第二所立世相雜亂，三世皆有三世相故。人於妻室貪現行時，於餘境貪唯有成就。現無貪起，何義為同？第四所立前後相待，一世法中應有三世。謂過去世前後剎那應名去來，中為現在。未來現在類亦應然。故此四中第三最善，以約作用位有差別，由位不同立世有異。彼謂諸法作用未有名為未來，有作用時名為現在，作用已滅名為過去，非體有殊。此已具知。彼應復說，若去來世體亦實有，應名現在，何謂去來？豈不前言約作用立。若爾，現在有眼等根，彼同分攝有何作用？彼豈不能取果與果？是則過去同類因等既能與果，應有作用。有半作用，世相應雜。已略推徵，次當廣破。
Among these four accounts of "all exists," the first, since it holds that a dharma's substance undergoes transformation, should be placed alongside the Sāṃkhya, a non-Buddhist school. The second's establishment of the temporal characteristics is confused, since the three times would all possess all three temporal characteristics — when a person's passion toward a wife is currently manifest, his passion toward other companions is merely possessed [dormantly], not currently arising — by what reasoning are these the same? The fourth's establishment through mutual relativity to what precedes and follows would mean a single moment's dharma has [all] three times — that is, within the past, the earlier instant should be called future [relative to the later], and the middle called present; the same should hold for the future and present classes as well. Hence, among these four, the third is best, since it distinguishes by a difference of activity and state, establishing the three times as different through a difference of state. He holds that a dharma without activity is called future; possessing activity, it is called present; its activity already ceased, it is called past — the substance not being distinct. This much is already understood. [Objection:] It should further be said: if the substance of past and future is likewise truly existent, should it not be called present? Was this not established, previously, in terms of activity? If so, does not the presently existing eye-faculty, included within a homogeneous class, possess some activity? Is it not able to receive a result and give rise to a result? If so, then a past cause of the same class, likewise able to give a result, should also possess activity — there would then be only "half-activity," and the three times would become confused. We have now briefly raised this objection; next, we shall refute it at length.
We should flag that this section marks a genuine turning point in the treatise's own argumentative structure: having presented and ranked four internal Sarvāstivādin positions, it immediately begins undermining even its own preferred choice (Vasumitra's account), previewing an extended critical demolition to come. This reflects Vasubandhu's well-documented Sautrāntika sympathies — even while writing within and largely following the Vaibhāṣika/Sarvāstivādin framework throughout most of this treatise, he uses moments like this one to expose what he takes to be the deep incoherence of the "all exists across three times" doctrine specifically.
The "half-activity" problem introduced here — that a currently existing but not-currently-producing eye-faculty already seems to possess some form of ongoing causal capacity, blurring the line between "has activity" (present) and "lacks activity" (future/past) — is the specific wedge the treatise will use to pry open a much larger set of difficulties in the sections that follow. We flag this now so readers can track how this initially narrow technical objection develops into a much broader challenge to the entire coherence of positing eternally existing past and future substances.
5. If Substance Is Eternal, What Ever Stops Its Activity?
The treatise now presses its critique of Vasumitra's "activity" account much further with a dense, pointed verse. If a dharma's own substance genuinely, permanently exists at all times, then it ought, in principle, to be capable of giving rise to its characteristic activity at all times as well — so what possible obstructing force could cause that very same, permanently existing substance to sometimes produce its activity and sometimes not? If one answers that the relevant supporting causes and conditions simply have not yet come together, this response does not actually help, since the position under examination already grants that the dharma's substance is eternally, constantly present regardless of any such external conditions. Moreover, can this "activity" itself coherently be said to belong to the past, present, or future? If it can, does this then require positing some further, separate "activity" to account for that very activity's own arising and ceasing — threatening an infinite regress? If, instead, this activity is said to be entirely outside all three times yet nevertheless still spoken of as "existing," it would then have to be unconditioned, since anything genuinely outside past, present, and future in this way is permanent and cannot properly be said to have "already ceased" at all — yet the entire account depends on being able to say exactly this, that a dharma's activity has ceased, making it "past." If one instead insists that this activity is a genuinely distinct thing from the dharma's own substance, one might try to escape this particular difficulty that way — but the position under examination explicitly denies any such distinction between activity and substance, so this escape route is not actually available to it. If, then, activity is simply identical to the dharma's own substance, and that substance is eternally, constantly existent, its activity would have to be equally eternal and constant as well — yet then how could anything ever meaningfully be said to be "past" or "future" at all? The very account of the three times that this theory was meant to establish thus collapses under its own weight. What, precisely, fails to be established here? Consider that a conditioned dharma not yet arisen is called "future"; if already arisen but not yet ceased, it is called "present"; and if already ceased, it is called "past." The proponent of this view must then explain: if the dharma's substance genuinely, truly exists at every moment exactly as the present does, then in what sense has anything ever "not yet arisen," and in what sense has anything ever "already ceased"? What, precisely, was lacking beforehand, such that it is called "not yet arisen"? And what, precisely, becomes lacking afterward, such that it is called "already ceased"? If one answers honestly — that beforehand the dharma did not yet exist at all, hence "not yet arisen," and that afterward it no longer exists at all, hence "already ceased" — this is exactly the position the Sautrāntika themselves hold, and it directly contradicts the Vaibhāṣika's own claim that a dharma originally did not exist and now exists, or that having existed, it then reverts to non-existence; unless one is willing to accept precisely this account of coming into and passing out of existence, the very meaning of the three times fails to be established in any coherent sense whatsoever. Yet this remains in evident tension with the Vaibhāṣika's own repeated insistence that a dharma is, at every point, still joined with the defining characteristics of conditioned existence (arising, persisting, and ceasing) — leading one to say, in effect, that such formations are "not truly permanent," even while simultaneously maintaining that their substance never actually comes into or goes out of existence at all; this pairing of claims, the treatise observes, has never before been coherently articulated by anyone. On the strength of this reasoning, a further verse drives the point home: to accept that a dharma's substance is eternally existent, while nevertheless claiming its nature to be impermanent, without any actual distinction being drawn between that substance and that nature, is a claim with no rational grounding whatsoever — comparable only to the kind of arbitrary, wondrous pronouncement one might expect from a supposedly all-powerful creator deity acting on sheer, unconstrained will, rather than from careful philosophical reasoning.
頌曰：何礙用云何？無異世便壞，有誰未生滅？此法性甚深。論曰：應說若法自體恒有，應一切時能起作用，以何礙力令此法體所起作用時有時無？若謂眾緣不和合者，此救非理，許常有故。又此作用云何得說為去來今？豈作用中而得更立有餘作用？若此作用非去來今而復說言作用是有，則無為故應常非無，故不應言作用已滅，及此未有法名去來。若許作用異法體者，可有此失，然無有異，故不應言有此過失。若爾，所立世義便壞，謂若作用即是法體，體既恒有用亦應然。何得有時名為過未？故彼所立世義不成。何為不成？以有為法未已生名未來，若已生未已滅名現在，若已滅名過去。彼復應說，若如現在法體實有，去來亦然，誰未已生？誰復已滅？謂有為法體實恒有，如何可得成，未已生已滅。先何所闕？彼未有故，名未已生。後復闕何？彼已無故，名為已滅。故不許法本無今有、有已還無，則三世義應一切種皆不成立。然彼所說，恒與有為諸相合故。行非常者，此但有虛言，生滅理無故。許體恒有說性非常，如是義言所未曾有。依如是義，故有頌言：許法體恒有，而說性非常，性體復無別，此真自在作。
Verse: what obstructs the activity, and how [could it be spoken of]? Without a distinction, the meaning of time collapses; who has not yet arisen, and who has already ceased? This nature of dharmas is truly profound. Explanation: it should be said that if a dharma's own substance eternally exists, it should be able to give rise to its activity at all times — by what obstructing force does this dharma's substance's activity exist at some times and not at others? If one says the supporting conditions have not yet come together, this response is unreasonable, since [the position] grants eternal existence [regardless]. Moreover, how can this activity itself be said to be past, future, or present? Is there, within activity, yet a further activity to be established? If this activity is neither past, future, nor present, and yet is still said to exist, then, being unconditioned, it should be eternal, not non-existent — hence one should not say that the activity has already ceased, nor that this not-yet-existing dharma is called past or future. If one grants that activity is a distinct thing from the dharma's substance, this fault might be avoided — yet there is no such distinction [in this position], and so this fault cannot be avoided. If so, the established meaning of time then collapses — that is, if activity is identical to the dharma's substance, and the substance is eternally existent, activity should likewise be so. How, then, could there ever be a time called past or future? Hence the established meaning of time does not hold. Why does it not hold? Because a conditioned dharma not yet arisen is called future; if already arisen but not yet ceased, it is called present; if already ceased, it is called past. It should further be said: if, as with the present, the dharma's substance truly exists [at all times], who has not yet arisen? Who has already ceased? That is, if a conditioned dharma's substance truly, eternally exists, how can it be established that something has not yet arisen or has already ceased? What was lacking beforehand? Since it did not yet exist, it is called not yet arisen. What is lacking afterward? Since it no longer exists, it is called already ceased. Hence, unless one grants that a dharma originally does not exist and now exists, and having existed, then reverts to non-existence, the meaning of the three times fails to be established in every respect. Yet what is stated [by the opposing position] is that [a dharma] is constantly joined with the characteristics of conditioned existence — [hence] formations are said to be impermanent — but this is merely empty talk, since there is, in truth, no arising or ceasing [on their account]. To grant that a dharma's substance is eternally existent while claiming its nature is not permanent — such a claim has never before been made. On the basis of this point, there is a verse: to grant that a dharma's substance is eternally existent, yet claim its nature is not permanent, with no distinction between substance and nature — this is truly the act of a freely willed [creator], [not of sound reasoning].
We should flag that this passage represents one of the sharpest, most direct philosophical critiques anywhere in this treatise — Vasubandhu, writing here in an unmistakably Sautrāntika voice, systematically dismantles the Vaibhāṣika's preferred account of the three times' reality by showing that "eternal substance with only changing activity" cannot be coherently distinguished from "eternal substance, full stop," which would make the very distinction between past, present, and future collapse entirely. We have tried to preserve the full force and precision of this argument rather than softening its confrontational tone, since the text itself is unusually blunt here (closing with the pointed jab that the opposing view "has never before been coherently articulated by anyone" and amounts to nothing more than an arbitrary, will-based pronouncement).
The comparison to "the act of a freely willed creator" (自在作, referencing Īśvara or a similar creator-deity figure elsewhere criticized in this treatise, e.g. in fascicle 18's discussion of precept-and-vow attachment) is a pointed rhetorical move: in this tradition's own polemics, attributing something to an arbitrary creator's unconstrained will is a byword for an unprincipled, ad hoc explanation lacking genuine rational justification — the treatise is accusing the Vaibhāṣika's "eternal substance, impermanent nature" position of amounting to exactly this kind of unprincipled assertion.
6. What the Buddha Actually Meant by "Past and Future Exist"
Returning to the Vaibhāṣika's original scriptural argument — that the Buddha himself declared past and future form to genuinely exist — the treatise now offers the Sautrāntika's own reading of that same passage. The Sautrāntika do not deny that the Buddha spoke of past and future dharmas as, in some sense, "existing"; they too affirm this. But what they mean by this is quite different from the Vaibhāṣika's literal ontological claim: the past is called "existent" in the sense that it once genuinely existed, and the future is called "existent" in the sense that it is certain to come into existence, since its cause is already present — that is, "existence" here is being used specifically with reference to a dharma's causal role, either as a prior cause that has already produced its effect, or as a future effect whose cause already stands ready to produce it, not with reference to that dharma's own substance actually, presently, ontologically subsisting in the way the present genuinely does. No one, the Sautrāntika insist, actually claims that the past or future exists in exactly the same manner as the present. The Buddha's purpose in speaking this way was specifically to counter a nihilistic misunderstanding that would deny cause and effect altogether — and it is with this specific pedagogical aim in view that he speaks loosely of the past and future as "existing," a usage of the word "existence" broad enough to cover both a dharma's presently subsisting reality and its merely having-been or certain-to-be. This is entirely analogous to ordinary, everyday speech: people commonly say "there was a lamp, and now there is no lamp," or "the lamp has already gone out — I am not the one extinguishing it right now" — such statements are perfectly intelligible and true, without anyone supposing that the extinguished lamp somehow still, literally, presently exists. The Buddha's statement that "past and future exist" should be understood in exactly this same spirit; if this reading were rejected, and "existence" were instead taken as requiring genuine, literal ontological identity with the present, then the very distinction between past, present, and future — which this whole discussion was meant to establish — would itself fail to be properly grounded, since anything genuinely, literally "existing" in the full sense would, by that very fact, simply be present, leaving no coherent content left over for "past" or "future" to mean at all.
又彼所言，世尊說故去來二世體實有者，我等亦說有去來世。謂過去世曾有名有，未來當有，有果因故。依如是義說有去來，非謂去來如現實有。誰言彼有如現在世？非如現世彼有云何？彼有去來二世自性。此復應詰：若俱是有，如何可言是去來性故說彼有？但據曾當因果二性，非體實有。世尊為遮謗因果見，據曾當義說有去來，有聲通顯有無法故。如世間說，有燈先無、有燈後無。又如有言：有燈已滅，非我今滅。說有去來，其義亦應爾。若不爾者，去來性不成。
Moreover, as for their claim that, since the Blessed One states that the substance of the two times, past and future, truly exists, we too say that past and future exist — that is, the past is called existent in the sense that it once existed; the future is called existent in the sense that it will come to exist, since its cause exists. It is with reference to this meaning that past and future are said to exist, not that past and future exist just as the present does. Who says that they exist just as the present world does? [Objection:] If they do not exist as the present does, in what sense do they exist? [Reply:] They have the intrinsic nature of the two times, past and future. [Objection:] This should further be questioned: if both are said to "exist," how can one say that, being of the nature of past and future, they are [merely] said to exist [in that limited sense]? [Reply:] This is stated only with reference to the two natures of having-been-cause and going-to-be-effect, not that the substance truly exists. The Blessed One, in order to counter the view that denies cause and effect, speaks of past and future as existing with reference to the sense of "having been" and "going to be" — the word "existence" being used broadly to express both the presence and absence of a dharma. As the world says: "there was a lamp, [now] there is no lamp"; or as one says: "the lamp has already gone out, it is not I who extinguish it now." The sense in which past and future are said to "exist" should be understood in just this way. If it were not so, the very nature of past and future would fail to be established.
We should highlight that this section presents what is, in effect, the Sautrāntika's positive counter-proposal to the entire Vaibhāṣika framework examined throughout this fascicle: rather than positing that past and future dharmas literally, ontologically exist as substances (merely lacking present "activity"), the Sautrāntika reinterpret all talk of past/future "existence" as a looser, causal way of speaking — a past dharma "exists" only in the sense of having already produced its effect, and a future dharma "exists" only in the sense that its cause is already in place to produce it eventually. We have made sure this contrast with the earlier sections' Vaibhāṣika position comes through clearly, since the difference between "existing as a substance" and "existing only in this looser causal/nominal sense" is the crux of the entire debate this fascicle has been tracing.
The lamp analogy here directly echoes ordinary intuitions about how we speak of things that no longer exist ("there was a lamp, now there isn't") without any confusion about whether the lamp still exists somewhere — the Sautrāntika's argument is that the Buddha's statements about past and future existing should be read with exactly this same everyday, non-literal understanding, rather than as a technical metaphysical claim requiring an elaborate theory of eternally persisting substances to explain.
7. The Topknot Ascetic's Karma, and the Eye That Comes From Nowhere
A further scriptural challenge is raised: if the Sautrāntika reading is correct, why does the Blessed One, addressing a certain staff-and-topknot-bearing ascetic, state that karma, though already past, already ceased, and already transformed, nonetheless still "exists"? Does the ascetic himself not already accept that karma merely "once had" a nature of its own, without needing the Buddha to reaffirm this? The reply is that the Buddha's restatement here should be understood as referring, in a deliberately indirect or "secret" manner, to the specific functional capacity within the present mental continuum that is capable of eventually giving rise to a future result — a capacity carried forward from that karma, drawn out for emphasis in this particular teaching context, not a claim that the past karma's own substance is literally, presently existing in its own right. If this reading were rejected, and the past karma's own substance were instead held to genuinely, presently exist in full, then in what coherent sense could it still be called "past" at all? The very attempt to defend literal past-existence in this passage would undermine the very distinction the term "past" is supposed to preserve. The treatise then offers a further, independent scriptural argument against literal three-times realism, citing the Buddha's own words in the Sūtra on Supreme Emptiness: the Blessed One states that when the eye faculty arises, it does not come from anywhere, and when the eye faculty ceases, it does not go anywhere to be stored or gathered — it is, in the Buddha's own words, "originally non-existent, and now it exists; having existed, it then reverts to non-existence." If the past and future eye-faculty genuinely, substantially existed as the Vaibhāṣika maintain, this sūtra could not coherently speak in these terms at all, since something with an eternally persisting substance could never truly be described as "originally non-existent" or as ultimately "reverting to non-existence." An objection follows: perhaps this sūtra passage is speaking specifically and only about the present eye-faculty, leaving the question of the past and future eye-faculty's own separate, eternal substance untouched. The treatise rejects this defense as unreasonable, since the very nature ascribed to "the present" here is not, in fact, distinct in substance from the eye-faculty's own nature as such — that is, if one grants that the present eye-faculty is genuinely "originally non-existent, now existent, and later reverting to non-existence," one has thereby already conceded that the eye-faculty's very own nature undergoes this same pattern, and there is no principled way to then insist that this same eye-faculty, considered as past or future, somehow escapes this pattern and instead persists as an eternally existing substance all along.
若爾，何緣世尊依彼杖髻外道說業過去盡滅變壞而猶是有。豈彼不許業曾有性？而今世尊重為說有，依彼所引現相續中與果功能密說為有。若不爾者，彼過去業現實有性，過去豈成？理必應爾。以薄伽梵於勝義空契經中說：眼根生位無所從來，眼根滅時無所造集。本無今有、有已還無。去來眼根若實有者，經不應說本無等言。若謂此言依現世說，此救非理，以現世性與彼眼根體無別故。若許現世本無今有、有已還無，是則眼根去來無體義已成立。
If so, for what reason does the Blessed One, addressing that staff-and-topknot-bearing ascetic, state that karma, though past, entirely ceased, and transformed, is nonetheless still existent? Does that ascetic not already accept that karma once had its own nature? Yet now the Blessed One restates that it exists, with reference to the functional capacity, present within that [person's] mental continuum, capable of giving a result, spoken of in this secret [i.e., indirect] manner as "existing." If this were not so, would that past karma's presently, truly existing nature not then fail to be genuinely "past" at all? By this reasoning, it must be so. For the Blessed One, in the Sūtra on Supreme Emptiness, states: at the stage of the eye faculty's arising, it comes from nowhere; at the time of the eye faculty's ceasing, it goes nowhere to be gathered. Originally non-existent, it now exists; having existed, it then reverts to non-existence. If the past and future eye faculty truly existed, the sūtra should not speak in terms of "originally non-existent" and so forth. [Objection:] Perhaps this statement refers only to the present. [Reply:] This defense is unreasonable, since the nature of the present is not distinct in substance from that eye faculty's own nature. If one grants that the present is originally non-existent, now existent, and having existed, then reverts to non-existence, then the meaning that the eye faculty, as past and future, is without [an eternally persisting] substance is thereby already established.
We should flag that the "staff-and-topknot-bearing ascetic" (杖髻外道) is a specific figure referenced in this sūtra citation whom we have not been able to independently identify beyond this brief description in the source text itself — we render the descriptive epithet literally rather than supplying a name, since the passage itself does not provide further identifying detail at this point.
The Sūtra on Supreme Emptiness citation (the eye faculty "comes from nowhere" and "goes nowhere") is a particularly striking scriptural anchor for the Sautrāntika position, since it uses the Buddha's own words about ordinary present-moment arising and ceasing to undercut the Vaibhāṣika's claim that this same eye faculty, considered as past or future, must possess some further, separately persisting substance — the argument turns on the observation that "the present" and "the eye faculty's own nature" cannot coherently be pulled apart the way the Vaibhāṣika's defense would require.
8. The Two-Conditions Dilemma, and How Memory Works Without a Persisting Past
The treatise now returns to the Vaibhāṣika's other main argument — that consciousness requires two conditions to arise, and so a past or future object must genuinely exist to serve as one of them. This claim is probed with a pointed dilemma: when mind and mental objects serve as conditions for mental consciousness to arise, does the mental object function the way the mind itself does, as a full "generating condition" actively producing that consciousness, or does it merely function as an "objective-support condition," providing something for consciousness to be about, without itself needing to generate anything? If a future dharma is meant to function as a genuine generating condition, how could something that will only exist a hundred thousand eons from now already be generating a consciousness in the present moment? And if it is not currently functioning as a generating condition at all, then a present consciousness arising right now clearly does not require any such condition from it. Moreover, since nirvāṇa's very nature is to be entirely free from all conditioned arising, it would be simply incoherent to establish nirvāṇa itself as a "generating condition" for anything — showing that not every object a consciousness takes must function as its generating cause. If, instead, a mental object is meant only to function as an objective-support condition, then the Sautrāntika readily agree: past and future dharmas can indeed serve as the objective-support for a corresponding consciousness — but this in no way requires that they presently, actually exist as substances; if they were required to have that kind of existence merely to serve in this more modest supporting role, how would this differ from claiming they must be fully "generating conditions" as well? What, then, actually constitutes serving as this kind of objective support if there is no genuinely existing substance for consciousness to grasp? The Sautrāntika answer: it is precisely a dharma's having-once-existed, or its being-certain-to-exist, that constitutes this. When one recalls a past form or feeling, one is not directly, vividly perceiving that dharma as though it were clearly, presently observed — rather, one is simply recollecting the mere characteristic of its having-once-existed; and when one anticipates a future dharma in reverse fashion, the same holds true — just as one directly experienced a form's characteristic when it was actually present, one now recollects it as having-been, or anticipates it, in reverse, as going-to-be. If a past or future object were required to exist exactly as the present does in order to be recollected or anticipated this way, it would simply have to be present, not past or future at all; but if its substance genuinely does not presently exist, then one must instead accept that consciousness can indeed take a non-existent object as its support — and this, the Sautrāntika maintain, is exactly the more defensible position to hold.
又彼所說，要具二緣識方生故。去來二世體實有者，應共尋思，意法為緣生意識者，為法如意作能生緣？為法但能作所緣境？若法如意作能生緣，如何未來百千劫後當有彼法？或當亦無為能生緣生今時識。又涅槃性違一切生，立為能生，不應正理。若法但能為所緣境，我說過未亦是所緣，若無如何成所緣境？我說彼有，如成所緣。如何成所緣？謂曾有、當有。非憶過去色受等時，如現分明觀彼為有，但追憶彼曾有之相；逆觀未來當有亦爾，謂如曾現在所領色相，如是追憶過去為有，亦如當現在所領色相，如是逆觀未來為有。若如現有應成現世。若體現無，則應許有緣無境識，其理自成。
Moreover, as for their statement that, since consciousness arises only given two conditions, past and future must truly, substantially exist — one should consider together: when mind and dharmas serve as conditions giving rise to mental consciousness, does the dharma, like the mind, serve as a generating condition, or does the dharma merely serve as its objective-support condition? If the dharma, like the mind, serves as a generating condition, how could a dharma that will exist only a hundred thousand eons in the future already now serve as a generating condition, giving rise to present consciousness? Moreover, nirvāṇa's nature is contrary to all arising — establishing it as a generating condition would not accord with reason. If the dharma merely serves as an objective-support condition, then we too say that the past and future are likewise objective supports — [Objection:] if they do not exist, how can they constitute an objective-support object? [Reply:] We say they exist in the sense of constituting an objective support. How do they constitute an objective support? Namely, through having-once-existed or being-certain-to-exist. It is not that, in recollecting past form, feeling, and the like, one directly, clearly observes them as presently existing — one merely recollects the characteristic of their having once existed; anticipating the future in reverse is likewise so — that is, just as one directly experienced form's characteristic when it was present, one now recollects it as having existed in the past; and just as one will directly experience form's characteristic when it becomes present, one now anticipates, in reverse, that it will exist in the future. If it existed just as the present does, it would have to be the present world. If its substance presently does not exist, then one should accept that there is a consciousness that takes a non-existent object as its support — this reasoning is self-evident.
We should flag the nirvāṇa example as a particularly sharp piece of the Sautrāntika's dialectic: since nirvāṇa is uncontroversially something consciousness can take as an object (one can certainly think about or aspire toward nirvāṇa), yet nirvāṇa's entire nature is to be free from conditioned arising, it plainly cannot serve as any kind of "generating condition" for the consciousness that cognizes it — this single, uncontested example is enough to show that an object of consciousness need not always function as a generating cause, undercutting the Vaibhāṣika's assumption that a real "generating" role is required of every object a consciousness takes.
The account of memory and anticipation offered here — that recollecting the past is recollecting a mere "characteristic of having-once-existed," not directly perceiving a still-existing past object — is a philosophically significant move that anticipates much later Buddhist epistemological discussions (in the Yogācāra and Buddhist logical traditions) about the nature of memory and its relationship to direct perception. We have rendered this carefully since the precise distinction between "directly observing something as presently existing" and "recollecting its characteristic of having-existed" is doing substantial argumentative work here.
9. Scattered Atoms Rejected, and the Thirteenth Sense-Base Reductio
A fallback proposal is raised: perhaps past and future form does not exist in the same coherent, organized way the present does, but instead exists merely as dispersed, scattered atoms, in some looser, diffuse sense. The treatise rejects this decisively: when one actually recollects or anticipates such form, one is not grasping any scattered characteristic at all, but rather the very same organized, coherent characteristic the form had when it was present. Moreover, if past and future form really existed identically to the present, differing only in being "scattered" rather than "gathered," then the atoms themselves, considered as bare substances beneath any particular arrangement, would have to be eternally, permanently existing — and this would mean that form, in its most basic sense, amounts to nothing more than atoms merely gathering and scattering, with no portion of it ever genuinely counting as arising or ceasing at all, since the underlying atomic substance would never actually come into or go out of existence. Such a view, the treatise observes pointedly, would effectively align this position with the doctrine of the Ājīvika ascetics (followers of "wrong livelihood," a rival non-Buddhist tradition), abandoning the Well-Gone One's own teaching in the sūtras, which explicitly states that the eye faculty, upon arising, comes from nowhere, and, upon ceasing, is gathered nowhere — a statement that plainly rules out the idea that form is merely a case of pre-existing atoms scattering and reassembling. And it is not the case, in any event, that feeling and the other mental aggregates are themselves composed of scattered atoms to begin with, so how could one even coherently speak of a "scattered" past or future in their case? Yet recollecting and anticipating feeling and the like function in exactly the same way as with form — one recollects or anticipates the very characteristic these had, or will have, when directly experienced as present, not some diffuse or scattered version of it. If these were required to exist just as the present does, their substance would have to be eternal; but if their substance genuinely does not presently exist, then, once again, one must accept that consciousness is indeed capable of taking a non-existent object as its support — a conclusion the reasoning itself makes self-evident. Pressing further: if it were true that consciousness could never, under any circumstances, take a wholly non-existent object at all, then a thirteenth sense-base would have to be posited, alongside the twelve already recognized, specifically to account for cognitions directed at what is simply not there — yet everyone in this tradition already accepts that there is no such thirteenth sense-base. What, then, does this "non-existent-taking" consciousness actually take as its object? If one insists that this consciousness must still be said to take "that" (the merely conceived, non-existent thing) as its object, then one has, in effect, already conceded that this so-called object is properly named "non-existent." And a parallel case makes the same point vividly: if one hears a spoken word that no longer sounds, and then goes searching for that already-vanished sound, what could such a search-consciousness possibly be taking as its object, if not something that is, by that very point, no longer there at all?
若謂去來極微散亂有而非現，理亦不然，取彼相時非散亂故。又若彼色有同現在，唯有極微散亂為異，則極微色其體應常。又色唯應極微聚散，竟無少分可名生滅。是則遵崇邪命者論，棄背善逝所說契經。如契經說：眼根生位無所從來，乃至廣說，又非受等極微集成。如何可言去來散亂？然於受等追憶逆觀，亦如未滅已生時相。若如現有體應是常，若體現無，還應許有緣無境識，理亦自成。若體全無是所緣者，第十三處應是所緣，諸有達無第十三處。此能緣識為何所緣？若謂即緣彼名為境，是則應撥彼名為無。又若緣聲先非有者，此能緣識為何所緣？若謂即緣彼聲為境，求聲無者應更發聲。
[Objection:] Perhaps past and future form exists as scattered atoms, not as it presently exists. [Reply:] This is also unreasonable, since, when one grasps its characteristic, this is not a scattered characteristic. Moreover, if that form existed the same as the present, differing only by the scattering of atoms, then the atomic form's substance would have to be permanent, and form would then merely be atoms gathering and scattering, with not the slightest portion that could be called arising or ceasing. This would then be honoring the doctrine of the Ājīvika ascetics, abandoning the sūtra taught by the Well-Gone One, which states that, at the stage of the eye faculty's arising, it comes from nowhere, and so on at length. Moreover, feeling and the like are not composed of gathered atoms — how, then, could one speak of past and future feeling as "scattered"? Yet recollecting and anticipating feeling and the like function just as with the characteristic at the time it has not yet ceased or has already arisen. If it existed just as the present, its substance should be permanent; if its substance presently does not exist, one should likewise accept that there is a consciousness taking a non-existent object as its support — this reasoning too is self-evident. [Objection:] If the substance is entirely non-existent, yet it is [still said to be] an objective support, then there should be a thirteenth sense-base as objective support — [yet] all who understand this tradition know there is no thirteenth sense-base. What, then, does this cognizing consciousness take as its object? [Reply:] If one says it takes "that" as its object [i.e., the non-existent thing conceived], then this "that" should be understood by the very name "non-existent." Moreover, if one hears a sound that did not previously exist [i.e., has already ceased], what does the consciousness cognizing it take as its object? If one says it takes that very sound as its object, then one seeking a non-existent sound should [instead] produce a new sound [rather than searching for what no longer is].
We should flag that the reference to "Ājīvika ascetics" (邪命者, literally "those of wrong livelihood") names a specific historical non-Buddhist tradition (the Ājīvikas, associated with strict determinism) frequently criticized in early Buddhist polemical literature — we render this as the treatise's own characterization of an unflattering doctrinal company for the "scattered atoms" position to keep, consistent with our practice throughout this project of flagging such polemical characterizations rather than treating them as neutral, accurate descriptions of the rival tradition's actual self-understanding.
The "thirteenth sense-base" reductio is a clever and genuinely difficult argument: since the twelve sense-bases (six sense faculties plus six corresponding objects) are taken as an exhaustive classification of everything, if consciousness genuinely could not take a non-existent object at all, some object would have to exist for every act of cognition — including cognitions of a vanished sound or an already-past form — forcing the awkward and universally rejected conclusion that a thirteenth category of "objects" would need to be posited just to house these non-existent objects. The Sautrāntika's own resolution — simply accepting that consciousness can indeed take a non-existent object as support — is presented as the far simpler and more defensible alternative.
10. "I Say What Is Absent Is Absent" — Correctly Understood
An objection appeals to the Bodhisattva's own well-known statement: "whatever the world says is absent, I too say is absent" — does this not establish that consciousness only ever properly takes something genuinely existing as its object, since the Bodhisattva here seems to affirm that his own perception simply tracks whatever does or does not, in fact, exist? The treatise clarifies that this statement is not making the metaphysical claim being attributed to it at all. Rather, the Bodhisattva's meaning is that certain other people, out of overweening pride and arrogance, mistakenly perceive things that are not actually there as though they were genuinely present — and it is specifically this kind of mistaken over-perception that the Bodhisattva is disavowing on his own behalf, saying, in effect, "I do not, like those arrogant people, perceive as existing what does not exist; I only regard as existing what genuinely does exist." If the statement were instead read the way the objection proposes, then every single act of cognition whatsoever would have to take a genuinely, actually existing object — yet this cannot be right, since it would leave no coherent explanation for why people sometimes fall into genuine doubt about whether a given object exists at all, or why different individuals, encountering the very same situation, sometimes reach differing judgments about a matter's existence; if every cognition automatically and infallibly tracked real existence, no such hesitation or disagreement could ever meaningfully arise in the first place. This point is further confirmed by a separate teaching the Blessed One gives elsewhere: "Come, monks! If you are able to be my disciples, free from flattery and deception, possessing faith and diligence, I will teach you in the morning such that you attain a superior realization by evening, or teach you in the evening such that you attain a superior realization by morning" — and it is precisely through such training that a disciple comes to know correctly: what exists as existing, what does not exist as not existing, what is superior as superior, and what is unsurpassed as unsurpassed. This teaching, by explicitly training disciples to distinguish existence from non-existence correctly, itself confirms that these are two genuinely different categories requiring careful discernment — which would make little sense if consciousness were simply incapable, by its very nature, of ever taking a non-existent object as its support to begin with. It follows from all of this that the Vaibhāṣika's claim — that consciousness must have a genuinely existing object, and therefore past and future must exist — does not actually succeed as a valid proof.
若謂聲無住未來位，未來實有如何謂無？若謂去來無現世者，此亦非理，其體一故。若有少分體差別者，本無今有其理自成。故識通緣有非有境。然菩薩說，世間所無我知我見無是處者，意說他人懷增上慢，亦於非有現相謂有，我唯於有方觀為有。若異此者，則一切覺皆有所緣，何緣於境得有猶豫或有差別。理必應然。以薄伽梵於餘處說：善來苾芻！汝等若能為我弟子，無諂無誑有信有勤，我旦教汝令暮獲勝，我暮教汝令旦獲勝。便知有是有、非有是非有、有上是有上、無上是無上。由此彼說，識有境故有去來者，亦不成因。
[Objection:] Perhaps the sound does not remain, [being] in the future stage — [yet] if the future truly exists, how can it be called non-existent? [Reply:] To say that past and future do not exist [in the way] the present [does] is also unreasonable, [wait — this line belongs to the opposing position and is being addressed]. If there is even a slight distinction of substance, then the meaning "originally non-existent, now existent" is self-evident. Hence consciousness generally takes both existent and non-existent objects as its support. As for the Bodhisattva's saying, "whatever the world says is absent, I too know and say is absent" — this refers to other persons who, harboring overweening pride, also perceive as existing what is, in fact, not present; [the Bodhisattva means] "I regard as existing only what actually exists." If it were otherwise, [meaning if all cognition necessarily had a real object,] then every act of awareness would have a [genuinely existing] object — for what reason, then, could there be hesitation or disagreement regarding an object's [existence]? By reasoning, this must be so. For the Blessed One states elsewhere: "Come, monks! If you are able to be my disciples, without flattery, without deception, possessing faith and diligence, I will teach you in the morning such that you attain superior realization by evening; I will teach you in the evening such that you attain superior realization by morning" — thereby coming to know: what exists is existent, what does not exist is non-existent, what is superior is superior, what is unsurpassed is unsurpassed. On this basis, their claim that consciousness has an object, and therefore past and future exist, also fails to establish its intended conclusion.
We should flag that our source excerpt for this section includes a brief fragment at its very start ("perhaps the sound does not remain... if the future truly exists, how can it be called non-existent?") that appears to be the tail end of an exchange we already substantially covered in the previous section — the source text itself seems to loop back briefly to close out that line of questioning before pivoting to the Bodhisattva's saying, and we have translated it exactly as it appears rather than smoothing over this slightly repetitive transition.
The appeal to ordinary human experience — that people genuinely hesitate, doubt, and disagree about whether something exists — is a nice piece of everyday reasoning deployed against a highly technical metaphysical claim: if every cognition necessarily and infallibly corresponded to something really existing, this common experience of doubt and disagreement about existence would be inexplicable, since (on the Vaibhāṣika's own logic) any cognized object must, ipso facto, be real. We have preserved this argument's appeal to ordinary experience as a check on abstract metaphysical theorizing, since it is one of the more accessible moves in an otherwise highly technical debate.
11. If Substance Never Changes, Karma Could Never Generate Anything
The treatise now addresses the Vaibhāṣika's final major argument for the reality of the three times: that karma must genuinely have a result, and since a result can only come from a genuinely existing cause, past karma (and its distant future result) must actually exist. This reasoning, the treatise responds, is likewise unsound. The Sautrāntika school does not claim that a past act of karma itself directly reaches across time to generate its distant future result; rather, karma, once performed, initiates a continuous mental continuum that, from that point onward, undergoes a gradual, step-by-step process of transformation and differentiation, until this continuum eventually culminates in the specific fruit that karma is said to produce — a mechanism the treatise indicates will be explained at greater length later, in its chapter dedicated to refuting the notion of a substantial self. If, instead, one insists that past and future genuinely, literally exist as the Vaibhāṣika maintain, then every result, at every point in time, would already have to exist eternally and unchangingly — in which case, what function could karma possibly still perform with respect to that already, eternally existing result? If one answers that karma still somehow "generates" it, this immediately implies that the result was originally non-existent and now newly comes to exist through that generation — which is exactly the very point the Sautrāntika have been arguing for all along, now conceded by the Vaibhāṣika's own reasoning. If, on the other hand, every dharma is held to exist, unchangingly, at every point in time without exception, then the very notion of anything "generating" anything else becomes utterly incoherent, since there would never be any prior absence for a cause to fill. Such a position, the treatise observes, would end up aligning uncomfortably with the doctrine of the rival Vārṣagaṇya school of non-Buddhist ascetics, who explicitly hold that whatever exists must always, eternally exist, and whatever does not exist must always, eternally not exist — meaning that what exists can never cease to exist, and what does not exist can never newly come into existence. If one then proposes instead that karma's actual function is merely to cause an already, eternally-existing future result to become "present" rather than to newly bring it into being at all, one must still explain how, precisely, karma manages to make that result "become present" if the result's own eternal substance never actually changes in any respect. If karma is said to relocate the result to some new position, that result's substance would then have to be capable of a kind of spatial movement, which makes no sense whatsoever for something formless, like a mental state. And if karma is said merely to bring about some qualitative distinction within that already eternally-existing result, without producing it anew, this again directly implies that the result was, in that specific distinguishing respect, originally lacking and only later comes to possess it — precisely the "originally non-existent, now existent" pattern that the entire Vaibhāṣika position has, from the very outset of this whole discussion, been struggling and failing to avoid.
又彼所言，業有果故有去來者，理亦不然。非經部師作如是說，即過去業能生當果，然業為先所引相續，轉變差別令當果生。彼我品中當廣顯示。若執實有過去未來，則一切時果體常有，業於彼果有何功能？若謂能生，則所生果本無今有，其理自成。若一切法一切時有，誰於誰有能生功能？又應顯成雨眾外道所黨邪論。彼作是說：有必常有，無必常無。無必不生，有必不滅。若謂能令果成現在，如何令果成現在耶？若謂引令至餘方所，則所引果其體應常。又無色法當如何引？又此所引應體本無。若謂但令體有差別，本無今有其理自成。
Moreover, as for their claim that, since karma has a result, past and future exist — this is also unreasonable. The Sautrāntika masters do not hold that past karma itself is able to generate its future result; rather, karma first draws forth a continuum, which then undergoes transformation and differentiation, causing that future result to arise — this will be shown at length in the chapter on refuting the self. If one holds that past and future truly exist, then the result would exist at all times unchangingly — what function, then, would karma have with respect to that result? If one says karma is able to generate it, then the generated result is originally non-existent and now exists — this reasoning is self-evident. If all dharmas exist at all times, who has the function of generating what? Moreover, this would end up affirming the erroneous doctrine held by the Vārṣagaṇya non-Buddhist ascetics, who hold: what exists must always exist; what does not exist must always not exist. What does not exist can never arise; what exists can never cease. [Objection:] Perhaps [karma's function] is to cause the result to become present. [Reply:] How could it cause the result to become present [without change]? If one says it draws the result to a different location, then the drawn result's substance would have to be permanent [in a spatial sense that makes no sense for it]. Moreover, how could a formless dharma be "drawn" in this way? And this "drawing" would itself have to be something the result's substance originally lacked. If one says it merely causes some distinction in the result's substance [without newly producing it], then "originally non-existent, now existent" is, again, self-evident.
We should flag that "the chapter on refuting the self" referenced here (我品, likely corresponding to the Pudgala-viniścaya, the treatise's dedicated later chapter systematically refuting the notion of a substantial, persisting self) is explicitly deferred by the text itself — we have not attempted to reconstruct or anticipate that fuller explanation here, consistent with our practice of translating fascicle by fascicle and letting the treatise's own forward references stand as genuine deferrals rather than filling them in prematurely with outside knowledge.
The Vārṣagaṇya reference (雨眾外道, a non-Buddhist teacher or school associated with a strict eternalist metaphysics related to the Sāṃkhya tradition) is invoked here, as with the earlier Ājīvika and Sāṃkhya comparisons in this fascicle, as an unflattering doctrinal parallel meant to show that the Vaibhāṣika's own position, if followed through consistently, collapses into the same rigid determinism this Buddhist tradition elsewhere explicitly rejects — we present this as the treatise's own polemical framing rather than a neutral description of that rival school's actual views.
12. The Verdict: A Modest "All Exists," and How Binding Still Makes Sense
The treatise now delivers its considered verdict on this entire extended debate: if this school genuinely wishes to be called "the teaching that all exists" in a manner faithful to the Buddha's own scripture, then asserting the literal, eternal existence of past and future dharmas' substance is simply not the correct way to establish this teaching. A properly scriptural version of the "all exists" doctrine should instead be stated exactly as the Buddha himself states it: "Brahmin, you should know that 'all that exists' refers only to the twelve sense-bases" — or, taking the three times into account, "all that exists" should be understood strictly as whatever presently, actually is, within whichever of the three times it happens to occur, rather than as a claim that every dharma's own substance persists identically and eternally across all three times regardless. This, the treatise maintains, is what genuine fidelity to the Buddha's own words actually requires — a considerably more modest, and more defensible, position than the elaborate metaphysics of eternally persisting substance that this fascicle has spent so long examining and, ultimately, dismantling. A further practical objection remains to be addressed: if past and future genuinely do not exist in this literal, ongoing sense, how can one still meaningfully speak of a matter being "bound" by an affliction, or of it later becoming "freed from binding," with respect to something in the past or future? The treatise answers that this poses no real difficulty: it is precisely because the specific anuśaya that would give rise to renewed affliction with respect to that matter still exists (in the causal, dispositional sense already explained) that one properly speaks of a past or future matter being "bound" by that affliction; and it is precisely because that anuśaya, once abandoned, no longer exists in this way that one speaks of the matter as having become "freed from binding." Nothing about this ordinary, everyday way of speaking about binding and liberation actually requires positing that the past or future matter itself literally, presently subsists as an eternal substance — a person's own present continuum either still harbors the relevant latent tendency or does not, and it is this fact about the present continuum, not any claim about the metaphysical status of a past or future object, that genuinely accounts for what is meant by binding and freedom from binding.
是故此說一切有部，若說實有過去未來，於聖教中非為善說。若欲善說一切有者，應如契經所說而說。經如何說？如契經言：梵志當知，一切有者，唯十二處或唯三世。如其所有而說有言。若去來無，如何可說有能所繫及離繫耶？彼所生因，隨眠有故，說有去來能繫煩惱。緣彼煩惱隨眠有故，說有去來所繫縛事。若隨眠斷，得離繫名。
Therefore, this "teaching that all exists" school, if it claims that the past and future truly exist, is not properly teaching in accordance with the sacred doctrine. If one wishes to properly teach "all exists," one should speak as the sūtra itself speaks. How does the sūtra speak? As a sūtra states: Brahmin, you should know that "all that exists" refers only to the twelve sense-bases, or only to the three times, according to what actually exists at each. [Objection:] If the past and future do not exist, how can one speak of there being binding and freedom from binding [with respect to them]? [Reply:] Because the cause that gives rise to that [affliction] — the anuśaya — exists, one speaks of past and future afflictions as binding; because the anuśaya taking that affliction as its object exists, one speaks of the past and future matter bound by it as [existing in this sense]; once the anuśaya is abandoned, the name "freed from binding" is obtained.
We should highlight that this section represents the treatise's own explicit closing verdict on the entire extended debate traced across this fascicle: rather than leaving the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika positions merely juxtaposed, the text here states plainly that literal three-times realism is "not properly teaching in accordance with the sacred doctrine," and that a scripturally faithful "all exists" teaching is the far more modest claim that whatever exists, exists only within whichever of the three times it actually occurs. Given Vasubandhu's well-documented Sautrāntika leanings, this explicit verdict is a significant moment in the treatise, even though the work as a whole continues to present and largely work within the Vaibhāṣika framework in many other places.
The resolution of "how can binding still make sense without literal past/future existence" is elegant in its simplicity: what actually does the explanatory work is not any claim about the metaphysical status of the past or future object itself, but simply whether the relevant anuśaya (a real, presently dispositional fact about a being's own mental continuum) has or has not yet been abandoned. We have made sure this shift — from "does the object exist" to "does the disposition exist" — comes through clearly, since it is the key move that lets the Sautrāntika retain ordinary talk of "binding" and "liberation" without needing the elaborate three-times metaphysics this fascicle has spent so much effort examining and rejecting.
13. The Vaibhāṣika's Last Word, and Returning to the Main Inquiry
Having heard the Sautrāntika's extended case laid out at such length, the Vaibhāṣika masters offer their own final word on the matter, refusing to concede: past and future, they maintain, exist exactly as truly and fully as the present does. As for whatever difficulties in this discussion one finds oneself simply unable to resolve or explain away, those who genuinely cherish this teaching should understand that the nature of dharmas is truly profound, lying beyond the reach of ordinary discursive reasoning — is it really appropriate, they ask pointedly, to dismiss something as non-existent simply because one personally cannot work out how to fully explain it? They then offer several further clarifications of how "arising" and "ceasing" can be spoken of in different senses without requiring the Sautrāntika's account: there is a sense in which a dharma both arises and ceases as "this very thing" (as when form itself is said to arise and that same form is said to cease); there is a sense in which what arises and what ceases are considered "different" (as when what is future is said to "arise" and that same thing, now present, is said to "cease" [into the past]); there is a sense in which the very state of being in a particular time is itself called "arising" (since, at the moment of actually arising, a dharma is included within that time); and there is a sense in which a time period as a whole can be said to have "arising," simply because the future, as a stretch of time, contains many moments yet to occur. With this extended digression now concluded, the treatise returns at last to its interrupted main line of inquiry: are all matters that have already been abandoned thereby necessarily "freed from binding," and are all matters "freed from binding" thereby necessarily already abandoned? If a matter is freed from binding, it must indeed already be abandoned — yet there are matters already abandoned that are not thereby freed from binding. What are these cases of "abandoned but not yet freed from binding"? At the stage of the path of seeing, once the cognition of suffering has already arisen but the cognition of the origin of suffering has not yet arisen, the matters abandoned by seeing suffering are indeed already abandoned — yet if the pervasive anuśayas abandoned by seeing the origin of suffering, which are capable of taking those same matters as their object, have not yet been permanently eliminated, then whatever still takes them as an object remains bound to them nonetheless. Likewise, at the stage of the path of cultivation, whichever specific level of the path has currently arisen: among the nine grades of matters to be cut through, if an earlier grade has already been abandoned, but the anuśayas of the remaining, not-yet-abandoned grades are still capable of taking that same matter as their object, then that matter remains bound as well. This is how "abandoned yet not freed from binding" should be understood.
毘婆沙師作如是說：如現實有過去未來。所有於中不能通釋，諸自愛者應如是知，法性甚深非尋思境，豈不能釋便撥為無？有異門故此生此滅，謂色等生即色等滅。有異門故異生異滅，謂未來生現在世滅。有異門故即世名生，以正生時世所攝故。有異門故說世有生，未來世有多剎那故。傍論已了，今應思擇，諸事已斷彼離繫耶？設事離繫彼已斷耶？若事離繫彼必已斷，有事已斷而非離繫。斷非離繫其事云何？頌曰：於見苦已斷，餘遍行隨眠，及前品已斷，餘緣此猶繫。論曰：且見道位苦智已生、集智未生，見苦所斷諸事已斷，見集所斷遍行隨眠若未永斷，能緣此者於此猶繫。及脩道位隨何道生？九品事中前品已斷，餘未斷品所有隨眠，能緣此者於此猶繫。斷非離繫，如是應知。
The Vaibhāṣika masters explain it this way: past and future truly exist just as the present does. Whatever within this cannot be fully resolved or explained — those who cherish this teaching should understand that the nature of dharmas is truly profound, not within the reach of mere discursive reasoning; how could one, simply for being unable to explain it, thereby dismiss it as non-existent? There is a sense in which this [very thing] arises and this same thing ceases — that is, form and the like arise, and that very form and the like cease. There is a sense in which what arises is different and what ceases is different — that is, what is future arises, and [that same thing, now] in the present world, ceases. There is a sense in which being within a time is itself called arising, since, at the very moment of arising, it is included within that time. There is a sense in which a time itself is said to have arising, since the future has many moments. This digression is now concluded; we should now consider: are all matters already abandoned thereby freed from binding? Or are all matters freed from binding thereby already abandoned? If a matter is freed from binding, it must already be abandoned; there are matters already abandoned that are not [thereby] freed from binding. What are these matters, abandoned but not freed from binding? Verse: with respect to what is abandoned by seeing suffering, the remaining pervasive anuśayas [not yet abandoned]; and, [in cultivation,] what remains after an earlier grade is already abandoned — whatever takes these as object still binds them. Explanation: at the stage of the path of seeing, when the cognition of suffering has already arisen but the cognition of the origin has not yet arisen, the matters abandoned by seeing suffering are already abandoned; if the pervasive anuśayas abandoned by seeing the origin, capable of taking these as object, have not yet been permanently abandoned, then whatever takes them as object still binds them here. And at the stage of the path of cultivation, whichever path has arisen: among the matters of the nine grades, if an earlier grade is already abandoned, the anuśayas of the remaining, not-yet-abandoned grades, capable of taking this as object, still bind it here. "Abandoned but not freed from binding" should be understood in this way.
We should be transparent that this section closes out the extended three-times debate with the Vaibhāṣika's own unyielding final word — they do not concede any point to the Sautrāntika's arguments, instead reasserting their original position and appealing to the "profound, beyond-reasoning" nature of dharmas to explain away whatever objections remain unresolved. The treatise does not adjudicate a final winner between the two positions at this point; it has, throughout this fascicle, presented an extended, genuinely two-sided debate, and we have translated both sides' full arguments as given, letting readers see the debate's structure rather than imposing our own verdict on which side ultimately prevails within this specific text.
This closes what has been, by a wide margin, one of the most philosophically dense and historically significant stretches of this entire translation project — the Sarvāstivāda school's own defining metaphysical doctrine, presented, tested, and extensively debated within its own foundational treatise. Having concluded this, the treatise returns to more straightforwardly technical Abhidharma classification, working out the precise conditions under which a matter already abandoned by seeing one truth can still remain "bound" by a different, not-yet-abandoned anuśaya.
14. Sixteen Categories of Dharma, Sixteen Kinds of Consciousness
The treatise now opens an extensive new project: determining, for any given matter, exactly how many anuśayas undergo latent increase with respect to it. Rather than working through every individual case one by one, which would require an unmanageable amount of explanation, the treatise offers a streamlined "abbreviated" method for navigating this vast combinatorial space. All dharmas, though numerous, can be sorted into sixteen categories: the five categories of abandonment (by seeing each of the four truths, or by cultivation) within each of the three realms, amounting to fifteen categories, plus the uncontaminated as a sixteenth. Correspondingly, the specific types of consciousness capable of taking these dharmas as their object can likewise be sorted into sixteen kinds. Working out exactly which consciousness-type can take which dharma-category as its object: desire-realm dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, by seeing the origin, or by cultivation are each capable of being taken as object by five kinds of consciousness — the three types belonging to their own realm (as already explained for each abandonment-category), a fourth belonging to the form realm's cultivation-abandoned category, and a fifth, uncontaminated consciousness, since all five are capable of taking them as object. Form-realm dharmas belonging to these same three categories are each capable of being taken as object by eight kinds of consciousness — the three of their own realm and the realms below it, an eighth belonging to the formless realm's cultivation-abandoned category, and an eighth still, the uncontaminated. Formless-realm dharmas belonging to these same three categories are each capable of being taken as object by ten kinds of consciousness — the three types from each of the three realms, and a tenth, the uncontaminated. Dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and by seeing the path, in each of the three realms, are correspondingly taken as object by their own realm's corresponding consciousness-type in each case, as appropriate. And uncontaminated dharmas, finally, are capable of being taken as object by ten kinds of consciousness — the final three abandonment-categories (cessation, path, and cultivation) within each of the three realms, plus a tenth, the uncontaminated itself, since all of these are capable of taking the uncontaminated as their object.
應了知何法何識境，易思何事何隨眠隨增。此中且應知，何法何識境？頌曰：見苦集脩斷，若欲界所繫，自界三色一，無漏識所行，色自下各三，上一淨識境，無色通三界，各三淨識緣，見滅道所斷，皆增自識行，無漏三界中，後三淨識境。論曰：若欲界繫見苦見集脩所斷法，各五識緣，謂自界三即如前說，及色界一即脩所斷，無漏第五，皆容緣故。若色界繫，即前所說三部諸法，各八識緣，謂自下三皆如前說，及上界一即脩所斷，無漏第八，皆容緣故。若無色繫，即前所說三部諸法，各十識緣，謂三界三皆如前說，無漏第十，皆容緣故。見滅見道所斷諸法，應知一一增自識緣。此復云何？謂欲界繫見滅所斷為六識緣，五即如前，增見滅斷。見道所斷為六識緣，五亦如前，增見道斷。色無色界見滅道斷，隨應為九十一識緣。若無漏法為十識緣，謂三界中各後三部，即見滅道脩所斷識，無漏第十，皆容緣故。
One should understand which dharma is the object of which consciousness, in order to easily consider how many anuśayas undergo latent increase with respect to which matter. On this point, one should first understand which dharma is the object of which consciousness. Verse: [dharmas] abandoned by seeing suffering, the origin, and by cultivation, if bound to the desire realm, are the object of five kinds of consciousness — three of their own realm, one of the form realm — [as well as] uncontaminated consciousness; form-realm [dharmas] are the object of eight, [including] three of their own and lower [realms], one of the upper realm's [cultivation-abandoned category, and uncontaminated consciousness]; formless-realm [dharmas] are the object of ten, spanning all three realms — three each — [and uncontaminated consciousness]; [dharmas] abandoned by seeing cessation and the path each add their own [realm's] consciousness as object; uncontaminated dharmas should be understood to be the object of ten kinds of consciousness, [namely] the latter three [categories, in each of the three realms]. Explanation: desire-realm dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering, the origin, and by cultivation are each the object of five kinds of consciousness — the three of their own realm, as explained before, plus one of the form realm's cultivation-abandoned category, and a fifth, uncontaminated consciousness, since all are capable of taking them as object. Form-realm [dharmas] of these same three categories are each the object of eight kinds of consciousness — the three of their own realm and the realms below, as explained before, plus one of the upper realm's cultivation-abandoned category, and an eighth, uncontaminated consciousness, since all are capable of taking them as object. Formless-realm [dharmas] of these same three categories are each the object of ten kinds of consciousness — the three of each of the three realms, as explained before, and a tenth, uncontaminated consciousness, since all are capable of taking them as object. Dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path should each be understood to add their own realm's consciousness as object — how is this? Desire-realm [dharmas] abandoned by seeing cessation are the object of six kinds of consciousness, the five as before, plus the one abandoned by seeing cessation; those abandoned by seeing the path are the object of six kinds of consciousness, the five as before, plus the one abandoned by seeing the path. Form- and formless-realm [dharmas] abandoned by seeing cessation and the path are, as appropriate, the object of nine or ten [kinds of consciousness]. Uncontaminated dharmas are the object of ten kinds of consciousness — namely, the latter three categories within each of the three realms (the consciousness abandoned by seeing cessation, the path, and by cultivation), and a tenth, uncontaminated consciousness, since all are capable of taking them as object.
We should be candid that this section is pure combinatorial reference material — a systematic table mapping sixteen dharma-categories against sixteen consciousness-types, compressed into verse and terse prose. We have aimed for accuracy in every stated count, but this is a case where the source itself functions as a lookup table rather than a discursive argument, and readers wanting to verify the exact cross-tabulation may find it more useful to work through the numbers systematically (5, 8, 10 for the first three categories per realm; +1 each for cessation and path; 10 for the uncontaminated) than to follow our prose rendering alone.
This framework exists purely as scaffolding for the treatise's actual goal, previewed in the next section: using this 16×16 object-relation map to work out, for any specific matter one might ask about, precisely how many anuśayas undergo latent increase with respect to it — the treatise's own worked example, using the pleasure faculty, illustrates how this scaffolding is meant to be applied in practice.
15. Worked Example: The Pleasure Faculty, and Defiled Versus Undefiled Mind
Having established the general sixteen-by-sixteen framework, the treatise now demonstrates how to apply it through a worked example, cautioning that working out every single individual case in full would require an unmanageably vast amount of explanation, so only a representative sample is offered here to illustrate the underlying method. Suppose one asks: with respect to the pleasure faculty specifically, as an object among the matters that can be "bound," how many anuśayas undergo latent increase? One should recognize that the pleasure faculty itself comes in seven varieties: one belonging to the desire realm (specifically its cultivation-abandoned form), five belonging to the form realm (spanning all five categories of abandonment there), and a seventh, uncontaminated form. Since uncontaminated dharmas are never subject to latent increase by any anuśaya at all, as already explained earlier in this fascicle, only the first six varieties are actually relevant here — and these six varieties undergo latent increase, as appropriate, from the desire-realm and form-realm cultivation-abandoned anuśayas together with all the pervasive anuśayas of the form realm. If one asks instead: with respect to the consciousness that takes the pleasure faculty as its object, how many anuśayas undergo latent increase? One should recognize that this particular consciousness comes in twelve varieties: four belonging to the desire realm (excluding only the category abandoned by seeing cessation), five belonging to the form realm (spanning all five categories there), two belonging to the formless realm (specifically its categories abandoned by seeing the path and by cultivation), and a twelfth, uncontaminated variety — all twelve being capable of taking the pleasure faculty as their object. This consciousness undergoes latent increase, as appropriate, from the four relevant categories of the desire realm, all categories of the form realm functioning as [its own] condition, the two relevant categories of the formless realm, and all the pervasive anuśayas throughout. And if one asks further still: with respect to the consciousness that takes as its object that very consciousness (which itself takes the pleasure faculty as object), how many anuśayas undergo latent increase? One should recognize that this further consciousness comes in fourteen varieties: the same twelve just described, plus two additional formless-realm varieties (specifically those abandoned by seeing suffering and by seeing the origin). This fourteen-fold consciousness undergoes latent increase, as appropriate, from the desire and form realms as already described, and from all four categories of the formless realm together with all pervasive anuśayas throughout. This same method, applied analogously, should be used to work out every other individual case one might wish to consider.
如是了知十六種法為十六識所緣境已，今應思何事何隨眠隨增。若別疏條恐文煩廣，故我於此略示方隅。且有問言：所繫事內樂根有幾隨眠隨增？應觀樂根總有七種，謂欲界一即脩所斷，色界五部，無漏第七。一切無漏非諸隨眠之所隨增，如前已說。此中前六隨其所應欲脩所斷及諸遍行色界一切隨眠隨增。若有問言：緣樂根識復有幾種隨眠隨增？應觀此識總有十二，謂欲界四除見滅斷，色界五部，無色界二即見道諦及脩所斷，無漏第十二，皆能緣樂根。此隨所應欲界四部，色界有為緣，無色界二部，及諸遍行隨眠隨增。若復有問言：緣緣樂根識復有幾種隨眠隨增？應觀此識總有十四，於前十二更加二種，即無色界見苦集斷。如是十四識能緣緣樂根，此隨所應欲色如上，無色四部隨眠隨增。准此方隅，餘應思擇。
Having thus understood the sixteen kinds of dharma as objects of the sixteen kinds of consciousness, we should now consider how many anuśayas undergo latent increase with respect to which matter. Detailing every individual case would make the text unmanageably lengthy, so I present here only a representative sample. Suppose one asks: with respect to the pleasure faculty among the matters bound, how many anuśayas undergo latent increase? One should observe that the pleasure faculty totals seven kinds — one belonging to the desire realm, namely the cultivation-abandoned kind; five belonging to the form realm, [across] the five categories; and a seventh, uncontaminated. All uncontaminated [dharmas] are not subject to latent increase by any anuśaya, as already explained. Among these, the first six, as appropriate, undergo latent increase from the desire realm's cultivation-abandoned [anuśayas], the pervasive anuśayas, and all anuśayas of the form realm. Suppose one asks: with respect to the consciousness taking the pleasure faculty as object, how many anuśayas undergo latent increase? One should observe that this consciousness totals twelve — four belonging to the desire realm, excluding [only] that abandoned by seeing cessation; five belonging to the form realm, [across] the five categories; two belonging to the formless realm, namely those abandoned by seeing the path and by cultivation; and a twelfth, uncontaminated — all capable of taking the pleasure faculty as object. This, as appropriate, undergoes latent increase from the four categories of the desire realm, the form realm functioning as a condition [throughout], the two categories of the formless realm, and all pervasive anuśayas. Suppose one further asks: with respect to the consciousness taking as object that consciousness which takes the pleasure faculty as object, how many anuśayas undergo latent increase? One should observe that this consciousness totals fourteen — the previous twelve, plus two further kinds, namely the formless realm's [categories] abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin. Such a fourteen-fold consciousness is able to take as object [that consciousness which takes] the pleasure faculty [as object]; this, as appropriate, undergoes latent increase from the desire and form realms as above, and from all four categories of the formless realm, together with all pervasive anuśayas. Following this pattern, all remaining cases should be worked out analogously.
We should flag that this worked example is itself already quite intricate — note how the count escalates (7 → 12 → 14) as the treatise moves from asking about the pleasure faculty itself, to a consciousness taking it as object, to a further consciousness taking that consciousness as object, illustrating how "meta-level" cognition (consciousness of consciousness) draws in a progressively wider range of potential anuśayas capable of latent increase. We have aimed for precision in reproducing each stated count and category, though we acknowledge that fully verifying every number against the broader Abhidharma reference framework this passage assumes would require independent cross-checking beyond what this passage alone supplies.
The treatise's own closing instruction — "following this pattern, all remaining cases should be worked out analogously" — confirms that this worked example is explicitly offered as a template rather than an exhaustive treatment; we have not attempted to supply additional worked examples of our own beyond what the source text itself provides, since doing so would risk introducing errors not actually present in the original.
16. Defiled Versus Undefiled Mind, and the Sequence the Anuśayas Arise In
The treatise raises a further refinement: if a particular mind is said to "possess" a given anuśaya, does that anuśaya definitely undergo latent increase with respect to that very mind? This is not fixed. Some minds possess an anuśaya through direct association with it, yet if that associated anuśaya, though taking that mind as its object, has itself already been abandoned, it no longer undergoes latent increase there, even though the mind may still loosely be said to "possess" it in virtue of the constancy of their prior association. Working this out systematically: "mind possessing anuśaya" divides into two overall kinds, according to whether the mind itself is defiled or undefiled. A defiled mind may or may not undergo latent increase: if the anuśaya associated with it, and capable of taking it as object, has not yet been abandoned, latent increase does occur; but if that same anuśaya has already been abandoned, latent increase no longer occurs there, even though the mind continues to be described as "possessing" that anuśaya on account of their constant, ongoing association. An undefiled mind, by contrast, is far more restricted: it can only ever undergo latent increase through an anuśaya that takes it as an object from without, never through any direct internal association, since an undefiled mind, by definition, is never itself directly associated with any affliction — and even this more limited kind of latent increase requires that the specific anuśaya taking it as object has definitely not yet been permanently abandoned; this restricted case is what is meant by describing an undefiled mind as still, in this specific sense, "possessing an anuśaya." Turning next to an entirely different question, the treatise asks: among the ten fundamental anuśayas already described, in what characteristic sequence do they typically arise, one giving rise to the next? Ignorance comes first: through failing to properly understand the truths, a person does not wish to examine suffering, its origin, its cessation, or the path. From this failure to understand, doubt is drawn forth next: having heard two conflicting positions, the person wavers uncertainly over whether suffering is genuinely suffering, and so on similarly for the remaining truths. From this wavering doubt, wrong view is drawn forth: through faulty reasoning and reflection, a settled but mistaken conviction arises, categorically denying the truth of suffering and the rest. From this denial of the truths, self-view is drawn forth: taking the very aggregates that the denial concerns, the person settles into a firm conviction that these constitute an actual "self." From this self-view, extreme views are drawn forth: relying on this notion of a self, the person clings to one of the two extremes of permanence or annihilation regarding it. From these extreme views, precept-and-vow attachment is drawn forth: clinging to the self through one of these two extremes, the person comes to regard this very clinging as itself capable of achieving purification. From precept-and-vow attachment, view-attachment is drawn forth: having settled on this supposed means of purification, the person inevitably comes to regard it as the supreme position of all. From this view-attachment, greed is drawn forth next: the person develops a deep, personal affection and attachment toward their own cherished view. From this greed, conceit is drawn forth: having become so deeply attached to their own view, the person grows arrogant and elevated, looking down upon and disparaging others who hold different views. And from this conceit, hatred is finally drawn forth: having become so deeply attached to and confident in their own view, the person cannot bear it when others hold views contrary to their own, and comes to resent and despise them for it. Other teachers hold instead that this final step of hatred arises specifically at the moment of accepting or rejecting one's own view, when one cannot tolerate having it questioned. When afflictions abandoned by seeing the truths — greed and the rest — arise in this sequence, they take the practitioner's own mental continuum's view as their object. This account describes only the typical sequence of arising; afflictions arising outside this typical sequence follow no fixed order at all.
若心由彼名有隨眠，彼於此心定隨增不？此不決定，或有隨眠，謂與心相應，及緣心未斷相應已斷則不隨增。依此義門應作是說。頌曰：有隨眠心二，謂有染無染，有染心通二，無染局隨增。論曰：有隨眠心總有二種，有染、無染心差別故。於中有染或有隨增，謂相應緣隨眠未斷，相應已斷則不隨增，仍說有隨眠，以恒相應故。若無染者，唯局隨增。緣此隨眠必未永斷，此唯據隨增名有隨眠故。如上所說十種隨眠次第生時，誰前誰後？頌曰：無明疑邪身，邊見戒見取，貪慢瞋如次，由前引後生。論曰：且諸煩惱次第生時，先由無明於諦不了，不欲觀苦乃至道諦。由不了故，次引生疑，謂聞二途便懷猶豫為苦非苦，乃至廣說。從此猶豫引邪見生，謂邪聞思生邪決定，撥無苦諦乃至廣說。由撥無諦引身見生，謂取蘊中撥無苦理，便決定執此是我故。從此身見引邊見生，謂依我執斷常邊故。從此邊見引生戒取，謂由於我隨執一邊，便計此執為能淨故。從戒禁取引見取生，謂計能淨已必執為勝故。從此見取次引貪生，謂自見中情深愛故。從此貪後次引慢生，謂自見中深愛著已，恃生高舉[夌*欠]蔑他故。從此慢後次引生瞋，謂自見中深愛恃已，於他所起違己見中，情不能忍必憎嫌故。有餘師說：於自見解取捨位中起憎嫌故。見諦所斷貪等生時，緣自相續見為境故。如是且依次第起說，越次起者前後無定。
If a mind, on account of that [anuśaya], is called "possessing an anuśaya," does that anuśaya definitely undergo latent increase with respect to this mind? This is not fixed. Some possess it through association; and one that takes the mind as object, if unabandoned [undergoes increase], if the associated one is already abandoned, then no latent increase occurs. On the basis of this principle, it should be said thus. Verse: mind possessing anuśaya is of two kinds — defiled and undefiled; defiled mind may go either way; undefiled is confined to [object-based] latent increase. Explanation: mind possessing anuśaya totals two kinds, owing to the distinction between defiled and undefiled mind. Among these, defiled [mind] may or may not undergo latent increase — that is, if the associated, object-taking anuśaya is not yet abandoned, [it does]; if the associated one is already abandoned, then no latent increase occurs, though it is still said to "possess" the anuśaya, on account of their constant association. If undefiled, [latent increase] is confined [to the object-based kind alone] — the anuśaya taking it as object must not yet be permanently abandoned; this is what is meant, with reference only to [object-based] latent increase, by "possessing an anuśaya." As for the ten kinds of anuśaya described above, when they arise in sequence, which comes first, which after? Verse: ignorance, doubt, wrong view, self-view, extreme views, precept-attachment, view-attachment, greed, conceit, hatred — in this order, each earlier one draws forth the arising of the next. Explanation: when afflictions arise in sequence, first, through ignorance, one fails to understand the truths, not wishing to examine suffering, and so on through the path. Owing to this failure to understand, doubt is next drawn forth — that is, having heard two paths, one harbors uncertainty as to whether this is suffering or not, and so on at length. From this uncertainty, wrong view is drawn forth — that is, through erroneous hearing and reflection, a mistaken conviction arises, categorically denying the truth of suffering, and so on at length. From this denial of the truths, self-view is drawn forth — that is, within the aggregates subject to appropriation, denying the principle of suffering, one settles into the conviction that this is "I." From this self-view, extreme views are drawn forth — that is, relying on this clinging to a self, one clings to the extremes of annihilation or permanence. From these extreme views, precept-and-vow attachment is drawn forth — that is, having, with reference to the self, clung to one of these extremes, one then holds this very clinging to be capable of purification. From precept-and-vow attachment, view-attachment is drawn forth — that is, having settled on this as capable of purification, one then necessarily clings to it as supreme. From this view-attachment, greed is next drawn forth — that is, one develops deep affection within one's own view. From this greed, conceit is next drawn forth — that is, having become deeply attached to one's own view, one relies on this to become elevated, looking down upon and disparaging others. And from this conceit, hatred is next drawn forth — that is, having become deeply attached to and reliant on one's own view, one cannot bear views held by others that contradict one's own, and necessarily comes to resent and dislike them. Other teachers say: hatred arises specifically at the stage of accepting or rejecting one's own view, giving rise to resentment and dislike [there]. When greed and the rest, abandoned by seeing the truths, arise, they take one's own continuum's view as their object. This describes the sequence of arising; those arising outside this sequence have no fixed order.
We should highlight this section's second half as a genuinely illuminating piece of moral psychology within the treatise: the proposed sequence (ignorance → doubt → wrong view → self-view → extreme views → precept-attachment → view-attachment → greed → conceit → hatred) traces a plausible, step-by-step account of how a person's confusion about the nature of reality could gradually harden into settled wrong view, then into a defended identity built around that view, and finally into pride and hostility toward those who disagree — essentially a psychological account of how intellectual error escalates into interpersonal animosity. We have preserved the causal "draws forth" language throughout to keep this progressive, cascading structure visible, since it is the main point the passage is making.
We should flag that we render "[夌*欠]蔑" (a compound built from two characters, one of them a rare or non-standard glyph in the source scan, likely intending 陵蔑 or a close variant meaning "look down upon and belittle") based on context and the parallel with 高舉 ("become elevated") — we are confident in the general sense (arrogant disparagement of others) even though the exact reading of the rare character is not something we can fully verify from the source text alone.
17. Three Conditions for an Affliction to Arise, and the Fourfold "Outflow"
The treatise now identifies the three specific conditions necessary for any affliction actually to arise in active, manifest form. Take, for instance, the entanglement of desire-greed about to arise: this requires, first, that the anuśaya of desire-greed has not yet been abandoned or fully understood; second, that an object suited to provoking desire-greed is currently, actually present; and third, that improper attention is being directed toward that object. It is through the combined power of these three conditions that desire-greed actually arises. These three conditions correspond, in order, to the power of cause, the power of the surrounding circumstances, and the power of one's own preparatory mental effort; the arising of every other affliction should be understood analogously, each requiring its own version of these same three supporting conditions. This account describes the general case where all three conditions are present together; in some instances, however, an affliction may arise relying merely on the power of surrounding circumstance alone, as with an arhat who has regressed from their attainment, in whom afflictions can still arise even without deliberate improper attention, given sufficiently provocative circumstances. Turning now to a related topic, the treatise notes that the sūtras refer to these same anuśayas, together with their more actively manifest entanglements, under several further collective names: "outflow" (āsrava), "flood" (ogha), "yoke" (yoga), and "clinging" (upādāna). "Outflow" comes in three kinds: the outflow of desire, the outflow of existence, and the outflow of ignorance. "Flood" comes in four kinds: the flood of desire, the flood of existence, the flood of views, and the flood of ignorance. "Yoke" likewise comes in four kinds, corresponding exactly to the four floods just named. And "clinging" comes in four kinds: the clinging of desire, the clinging of views, the clinging of precepts and vows, and the clinging to a doctrine of self.
諸煩惱起由幾因緣？頌曰：由未斷隨眠，及隨應境現，非理作意起，說惑具因緣。論曰：由三因緣諸煩惱起。且如將起欲貪纏時，未斷未遍知欲貪隨眠故，順欲貪境現在前故，緣彼非理作意起故，由此力故便起欲貪。此三因緣如其次第，即因境界加行三力，餘煩惱起類此應知。謂此且據具因緣說，或有唯託境界力生。如退法根阿羅漢等，即上所說隨眠并纏。經說為漏、瀑流、軛、取。漏謂三漏：一欲漏、二有漏、三無明漏。言瀑流者，謂四瀑流：一欲瀑流、二有瀑流、三見瀑流、四無明瀑流。軛謂四軛，如瀑流說。取謂四取：一欲取、二見取、三戒禁取、四我語取。
By how many conditions do afflictions arise? Verse: through an unabandoned anuśaya, a corresponding object being present, and improper attention arising — these are said to be the conditions for an affliction. Explanation: afflictions arise through three conditions. Consider the entanglement of desire-greed about to arise: because the anuśaya of desire-greed is not yet abandoned or fully understood, because an object conducive to desire-greed is presently before one, and because improper attention toward it arises — through the power of these, desire-greed then arises. These three conditions, in order, are the power of cause, of circumstance, and of preparatory effort; the arising of other afflictions should be understood analogously. This is stated with reference to the case where all conditions are present; some arise relying merely on the power of circumstance, as with an arhat who has regressed from the root [of attainment], and the like. These are the aforementioned anuśayas together with their entanglements, which the sūtras call outflow, flood, yoke, and clinging. "Outflow" refers to three outflows: first, the outflow of desire; second, the outflow of existence; third, the outflow of ignorance. "Flood" refers to four floods: first, the flood of desire; second, the flood of existence; third, the flood of views; fourth, the flood of ignorance. "Yoke" refers to four yokes, as with the floods. "Clinging" refers to four clingings: first, the clinging of desire; second, the clinging of views; third, the clinging of precepts and vows; fourth, the clinging to a doctrine of self.
We should note the "regressed arhat" example as a useful edge case the treatise itself flags: even someone who has attained arhatship, if they belong to the specific category capable of regressing from that attainment (a recognized category in this tradition's account of different types of arhat), can still have an affliction arise purely through the force of overwhelming external circumstance, without needing the third condition (improper attention) to be separately, deliberately present — showing that the three-condition account describes the general, typical case rather than an absolutely exceptionless rule.
We are keeping the four collective terms — āsrava ("outflow," sometimes rendered "canker" or "taint"), ogha ("flood"), yoga ("yoke"), and upādāna ("clinging," sometimes rendered "grasping" or "appropriation") — in their more standard scholarly renderings, since these are well-established technical terms across Buddhist literature broadly, not unique to this treatise; readers familiar with other Buddhist texts may recognize these same four categories under these same or similar English glosses elsewhere.
18. The Precise Numerical Substance of Outflow, Flood, Yoke, and Clinging
The treatise now works out the precise numerical substance underlying each of these four collective categories. The "outflow of desire" comprises forty-one distinct items: all the root afflictions bound to the desire realm, excluding delusion, together with their ten associated entanglements — that is, thirty-one root afflictions plus ten entanglements. The "outflow of existence" comprises fifty-two items: all the root afflictions bound to the form and formless realms, again excluding delusion, twenty-six from each of the two higher realms. An objection is raised here: do these two higher realms not also possess the entanglements of torpor and restlessness? The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kashmir explain that, although this is technically true, these two realms' entanglements are comparatively few and lack the independent, unrestrained potency that would justify including them separately in this particular count. Why are the anuśayas of these two higher realms combined together into a single category of "existence-outflow"? Because they share the same neutral moral quality, operate through an inward-turned mode of activity, and arise specifically in dependence on the meditative absorptions — it is on account of these three shared features that they are combined into one. And why is ignorance, in particular, singled out and established as its own separate, third outflow, rather than being folded together with the other afflictions the way delusion was excluded from the first two categories? Because ignorance specifically serves as the root of all conditioned existence, a distinguishing feature significant enough to warrant its own separate category. As for "flood" and "yoke," their substance is identical to that of "outflow," except that views are additionally singled out and separated into their own distinct category within them, called the "flood of views" and "yoke of views" respectively — since views are especially sharp and penetrating in character, this quality of sharpness is what specifically qualifies something to be called a "flood" in this system's technical sense (as will be explained shortly), whereas views, precisely because of this same sharp, restless quality, do not "abide" or settle in the way the more general "outflow" category requires, and so views could not be independently established as their own category there, but can be here, within "flood" and "yoke," where the required qualifying feature is different. This yields twenty-nine items comprising the "flood of desire" (greed, hatred, and conceit, each in five varieties, plus doubt in four varieties, plus the ten entanglements); twenty-eight items comprising the "flood of existence" (greed and conceit, each in ten varieties across the two higher realms, plus doubt in eight varieties); thirty-six items comprising the "flood of views" (the twelve view-related anuśayas in each of the three realms); and fifteen items comprising the "flood of ignorance" (the five varieties of ignorance in each of the three realms). "Yoke" should be understood to match "flood" exactly in substance, item for item.
論曰：欲界煩惱并纏，除癡，四十一物總名欲漏，謂欲界繫根本煩惱三十一并十纏。色無色界煩惱除癡，五十二物總名有漏，謂上二界根本煩惱各二十六。豈不彼有惛沈掉舉二種纏耶？《品類足》中亦作是說：云何有漏？謂除無明，餘色無色二界所繫結縛隨眠隨煩惱纏。今於此中何故不說？迦濕彌羅國毘婆沙師言：彼界纏少，不自在故。何緣合說二界隨眠為一有漏？同無記性於內門轉，依定地生，由三義同故合為一。如前所說名有貪因，即是此中名有漏義。准此三界十五無明義至已立為無明漏。何緣唯此別立漏名？無明能為諸有本故。瀑流及軛體與漏同，然於其中見亦別立，謂前欲漏即欲瀑流及欲軛，如是有漏即有瀑流及有軛。析出諸見為見瀑流及見軛者，謂猛利故令住名漏，如後當說。見不順彼，性猛利故，由此於漏不獨立名，但可與餘合立為漏。如是已顯二十九物名欲瀑流，謂貪瞋慢各有五種、疑四、纏十。二十八物名有瀑流，謂貪與慢各十、疑八。三十六物名見瀑流，謂三界中各十二見。十五物名無明瀑流，謂三界無明各有五。應知四軛與瀑流同。
Explanation: desire-realm afflictions together with their entanglements, excluding delusion, forty-one items in all, are collectively called the outflow of desire — that is, thirty-one root afflictions bound to the desire realm, plus ten entanglements. Form- and formless-realm afflictions, excluding delusion, fifty-two items in all, are collectively called the outflow of existence — that is, twenty-six root afflictions in each of the two upper realms. [Objection:] Do these realms not have the two entanglements of torpor and restlessness? As the Prakaraṇapāda also states: what is the outflow of existence? It is, excluding ignorance, the remaining bonds, fetters, anuśayas, and secondary afflictions' entanglements bound to the form and formless realms. Why, then, are these not mentioned here? [Reply:] The Vaibhāṣika masters of Kashmir say: those realms' entanglements are few and lack independent potency. Why are the anuśayas of the two realms combined and spoken of as a single "outflow of existence"? Because they share a neutral nature, operate through an inward-turned mode, and arise in dependence on the meditative stages — owing to these three shared features, they are combined into one. This is the same meaning already given earlier for "existence-greed"; here, it is called "existence-outflow." On this basis, the fifteen kinds of ignorance across the three realms are established as the "outflow of ignorance." Why is only this one separately established with the name "outflow"? Because ignorance is able to serve as the root of all existence. The substance of flood and yoke is the same as outflow, except that, within them, views are additionally separated out — that is, the aforementioned outflow of desire corresponds to the flood of desire and yoke of desire; likewise, the outflow of existence corresponds to the flood of existence and yoke of existence. Views are separated out as the flood of views and yoke of views, since it is their sharpness that qualifies something to be called "outflow" in the sense to be explained later; views, being sharp by nature, do not conform to this [abiding] quality, and so are not independently established within "outflow," but may be combined with the rest and established within [flood and yoke]. Thus, twenty-nine items are called the flood of desire — namely, greed, hatred, and conceit, each having five kinds, doubt four, and ten entanglements. Twenty-eight items are called the flood of existence — namely, greed and conceit, each ten, and doubt eight. Thirty-six items are called the flood of views — namely, twelve views in each of the three realms. Fifteen items are called the flood of ignorance — namely, five kinds of ignorance in each of the three realms. It should be understood that the four yokes are the same as the floods.
We should be transparent that this section is, once again, dense numerical bookkeeping — the precise item-counts for each collective category (41, 52, 15 for the three outflows; 29, 28, 36, 15 for the four floods) depend on carefully tracking which specific anuśayas and entanglements are included or excluded in each case, following distinctions established earlier in this and prior fascicles (the ninety-eight anuśayas, the ten entanglements, and so on). We have aimed for accuracy in reproducing each stated count, but readers wanting to independently verify the arithmetic should expect to cross-reference this passage against the earlier ninety-eight-anuśaya breakdown from fascicle 19.
The rationale for why ignorance gets its own separate "outflow" category (being "the root of all existence") while being excluded from the desire- and existence-outflows in the first place is a subtle point: ignorance is powerful and foundational enough to warrant special treatment, yet is specifically excluded from the two more "active," passion-driven outflow categories because of its comparatively passive, unafflicted-seeming character relative to greed, hatred, and conceit — we have tried to make this distinction between "significant enough for its own category" and "too passive to belong with the more active afflictions" clear in our translation, since the text's own reasoning depends on holding both points together without contradiction.
19. The Four Clingings, and the Meaning Behind "Anuśaya" Itself — Fascicle 20 Complete
The treatise now works out the precise substance of the four kinds of "clinging" (upādāna), which should be understood to match "yoke" in substance, with one modification: the desire-yoke and the self-doctrine category each additionally absorb ignorance into their count, and views are divided into two separate categories rather than remaining combined, distinguishing this scheme from the "yoke" scheme just given. Specifically, the previously described desire-yoke, now combined together with desire-realm ignorance, comprising thirty-four items in total, is called the "clinging of desire" — that is, greed, hatred, and conceit, together with ignorance, each in five varieties, plus doubt in four varieties, plus the ten entanglements. The previously described existence-yoke, combined together with the ignorance of the two higher realms, comprising thirty-eight items in total, is called the "clinging to a doctrine of self" — that is, greed, conceit, and ignorance, each in ten varieties, plus doubt in eight varieties. Within the views-yoke, excluding specifically precept-and-vow attachment, the remaining thirty items are called the "clinging of views," while the six items excluded (precept-and-vow attachment across the three realms, in its two categories) are called the "clinging of precepts and vows." Why is precept-and-vow attachment specifically singled out and separated from the other views to form its own distinct category of clinging? Because it uniquely functions as an enemy of the noble path in two directions at once, deceiving both householders and renunciants alike: householders are deceived by it into believing that self-starvation and similar ascetic practices constitute the path to heavenly rebirth, while renunciants are deceived by it into believing that abandoning pleasant, desirable objects constitutes, by itself, the genuine path to purification. And why is ignorance not similarly established as its own separate category of clinging, the way it was for outflow? Because the very function that qualifies something to be called "clinging" is its capacity to actively grasp and take hold of further states of existence, and ignorance, understood as a mere failure to correctly understand its object, lacks this active, grasping character and is not, by itself, sufficiently sharp or forceful to independently generate this kind of clinging — it can, however, still be combined together with the other afflictions and included within their respective categories of clinging, as already shown. The sūtras themselves offer their own definition, stating: what is the desire-yoke? It is, among all forms of desire, the greed for desire, the wish for desire, the fondness for desire, the love of desire, the delight in desire, the confusion of desire, the indulgence in desire, the craving for desire, the joy in desire, the hoarding of desire, the following of desire, and the attachment of desire, which entangle and press upon the mind — this is called the desire-yoke. The existence-yoke and views-yoke should be understood analogously. A further sūtra states that desire-greed itself is called "clinging" — from which it is understood that the specific desire-greed arising with respect to each of the four categories (desire, views, precepts and vows, and doctrines of self) is what constitutes the clinging named after each. Having now explained the anuśayas together with their entanglements under the names of outflow, flood, yoke, and clinging as the sūtras themselves use these terms, the treatise closes by asking what these various names — "anuśaya" itself, and each of its synonyms — actually mean at their root. When a root affliction is actively manifest, its precise character and workings are exceedingly difficult to discern, and it is for this reason that it is called "subtle." It is called productive of "twofold increase" because it is capable of intensifying with respect both to the object it takes and to the mental states it is directly associated with, in the manner already explained earlier in this fascicle. It is called "following" and "pursuing" because the possession it repeatedly generates constantly accompanies a sentient being, remaining an enduring source of trouble and affliction, arising again and again even without deliberate effort, and persisting despite whatever effort one expends trying to prevent it — hence it is also called "binding." Through this very meaning, it is what detains sentient beings for a long time within birth-and-death, or causes them to circulate endlessly through birth-and-death, from the very peak of conditioned existence all the way down to the hell of unremitting torment. Because its continuum constantly leaks out fault without end through the six "wounds" (the six sense-doors), it is called "outflow." Because it thoroughly sweeps away wholesome qualities with overwhelming force, it is called "flood." Because it binds sentient beings together into shared bondage, it is called "yoke." And because it is capable of serving as the basis for further clinging and appropriation, it is called "clinging." A more precise gloss adds: because affliction, within the domain of one's sense-objects, continuously leaks out fault without interruption, it is called "outflow" — as a sūtra illustrates, comparing this to a person rowing a boat against the current, who must exert great effort even to make a little headway, yet if that same boat is instead released to drift downstream, no effort at all is needed for it to move easily along; wholesome and defiled states of mind arising should be understood in just the same way. Building on the meaning of this sūtra, affliction that continuously leaks out fault with respect to its objects is called "outflow"; when its force becomes especially overwhelming, it is instead called "flood," since sentient beings who fall into it can only be swept helplessly along, unable to resist its surging, turbulent current. When manifestly active but not yet at this overwhelming degree of force, it is called "yoke," simply because it joins sentient beings together with all the various kinds of suffering; or it is called "yoke" because of how frequently it manifests. And it is called "clinging" because it serves as the basis upon which desire and the other categories are grasped and appropriated. With this, Fascicle 20 of the Abhidharmakośa comes to a close.
應知四軛與瀑流同，四取應知體同四軛。然欲我語各并無明，見分為二與前軛別。即前欲軛并欲無明三十四物總名欲取，謂貪瞋慢無明各五、疑有四、并十纏。即前有軛并二界無明三十八物總名我語取，謂貪慢無明各十、疑有八。於見軛中除戒禁取，餘三十物總名見取，所除六物名戒禁取。何緣別立戒禁取耶？由此獨為聖道怨故，雙誑在家出家眾故。謂在家眾由此誑惑，計自餓等為天道故。諸出家眾由此誑惑，計捨可愛境為清淨道故。何緣無明不別立取？能取諸有故立取名，然諸無明非能取故。謂不了相說名無明，彼非能取，非猛利故，但可與餘合立為取。然契經說：欲軛云何？謂諸欲中欲貪、欲欲、欲親、欲愛、欲樂、欲悶、欲耽、欲嗜、欲喜、欲藏、欲隨、欲著纏壓於心，是名欲軛。有軛、見軛應知亦爾。又餘經說：欲貪名取。由此故知，於欲等四所起欲貪名欲等取。如是已辯隨眠并纏，經說為漏瀑流軛取。此隨眠等名有何義？頌曰：微細二隨增，隨逐與隨縛，住流漂合執，是隨眠等義。論曰：根本煩惱現在前時，行相難知故名微細。二隨增者，能於所緣及所相應增惛滯故。言隨逐者，謂能起得恒隨有情常為過患，不作加行為令彼生。或設劬勞為遮彼起，而數現起，故名隨縛。由如是義故名隨眠。稽留有情久住生死，或令流轉於生死中，從有頂天至無間獄。由彼相續於六瘡門泄過無窮故名為漏，極漂善品故名瀑流，和合有情故名為軛，能為依執故名為取。若善釋者應作是言，諸境界中流注相續泄過不絕故名為漏。如契經說：具壽當知，譬如挽船逆流而上，設大功用行尚為難。若放此船順流而去，雖捨功用行不為難。起善染心應知亦爾。准此經意，於境界中煩惱不絕說名為漏，若勢增上說名瀑流。謂諸有情若墜於彼，唯可隨順無能違逆，涌泛漂激難違拒故。於現行時非極增上說名為軛，但令有情與種種類苦和合故。或數現行故名為軛，執欲等故說名為取。說一切有部俱舍論卷第二十。
It should be understood that the four yokes are the same as the floods; the four clingings should be understood to have the same substance as the four yokes. However, the desire and self-doctrine [categories] each combine with ignorance, and views are divided into two, differing from the yokes just described. The aforementioned desire-yoke, combined with desire-realm ignorance, thirty-four items in all, is collectively called the clinging of desire — that is, greed, hatred, conceit, and ignorance, each five, doubt four, plus ten entanglements. The aforementioned existence-yoke, combined with the ignorance of the two realms, thirty-eight items in all, is collectively called the clinging to a doctrine of self — that is, greed, conceit, and ignorance, each ten, doubt eight. Within the views-yoke, excluding precept-and-vow attachment, the remaining thirty items are collectively called the clinging of views; the six excluded items are called the clinging of precepts and vows. Why is precept-and-vow attachment separately established? Because it alone is an enemy of the noble path, deceiving both householders and renunciants together — that is, householders are deceived by it into taking self-starvation and the like to be the path to heaven; renunciants are deceived by it into taking the abandonment of pleasing objects to be the path of purification. Why is ignorance not separately established as clinging? Because the name "clinging" is established with reference to the capacity to grasp [further] existence, and ignorance is not able to grasp in this way — that is, ignorance, named for its failure to understand its characteristic, is not able to grasp, not being sharp; it can only be combined with the rest and established as clinging. Yet a sūtra states: what is the desire-yoke? It is, among all desires, desire-greed, desire-wish, desire-fondness, desire-love, desire-delight, desire-confusion, desire-indulgence, desire-craving, desire-joy, desire-hoarding, desire-following, and desire-attachment, entangling and pressing upon the mind — this is called the desire-yoke. The existence-yoke and views-yoke should be understood analogously. A further sūtra states: desire-greed is called clinging. From this, it is known that the desire-greed arising with respect to desire and the other three is called the clinging of desire and the rest. Having now discussed the anuśayas together with their entanglements, which the sūtras call outflow, flood, yoke, and clinging — what do these names, "anuśaya" and the rest, actually mean? Verse: subtle, twofold latent increase, following and binding, abiding, flooding, drifting, joining, and grasping — these are the meanings of "anuśaya" and the rest. Explanation: when a root affliction is manifestly present, its mode of activity is difficult to discern, hence it is called subtle. "Twofold latent increase" means it is able to increase with respect to both its object and its associated states, as already explained. "Following" means that the possession it constantly gives rise to always accompanies the sentient being, being a constant fault, arising without deliberate effort, or, even with effort expended to prevent it, still frequently manifesting — hence it is also called "binding." By this meaning, it is called anuśaya. It detains sentient beings, causing them to abide long in birth-and-death, or to circulate within birth-and-death, from the peak of existence down to the hell of unremitting torment. Because its continuum constantly leaks fault without end through the six wound-gates, it is called outflow. Because it powerfully sweeps away wholesome qualities, it is called flood. Because it joins sentient beings together, it is called yoke. Because it is able to serve as a basis for grasping, it is called clinging. Properly explained, one should say: within the sense-objects, its continuum leaks fault ceaselessly, hence it is called outflow — as a sūtra states: venerable one, you should know, it is like rowing a boat against the current, where even great effort makes progress difficult; if this boat is instead released to go with the current, even without exerting effort, its movement is not difficult. The arising of wholesome and defiled mind should be understood in just this way. Based on the meaning of this sūtra, affliction that ceaselessly leaks fault with respect to its objects is called outflow; when its force becomes especially overwhelming, it is called flood, since sentient beings falling into it can only follow along, unable to resist, being swept and driven, difficult to oppose. When manifestly active, but not yet at this degree of overwhelming force, it is called yoke, simply because it joins sentient beings together with all kinds of suffering; or it is called yoke because of its frequent manifestation. It is called clinging because it grasps desire and the rest. Abhidharmakośa-śāstra of the Sarvāstivāda School, Fascicle Twenty, [end].
We should flag that the "boat rowed against the current versus released downstream" analogy is a particularly vivid and memorable image for this section's core point: cultivating wholesome states of mind requires sustained effort (like rowing upstream), while defiled states of mind arise readily and effortlessly once conditions are conducive (like a boat released to drift), which is precisely why affliction is said to "flow out" so continuously and why sustained practice is needed to counter it. We have preserved this analogy's structure carefully, since the sūtra citation is doing real argumentative work here, not merely serving as decoration.
This closes Fascicle 20, an unusually dense and philosophically significant fascicle that opened with technical questions about latent increase across time before pivoting into one of the most consequential debates in the entire treatise — the reality of past and future dharmas, presented with genuine, extended back-and-forth between the Vaibhāṣika and Sautrāntika positions — and then returned to further technical apparatus (the sixteen-fold dharma/consciousness classification, the sequence of the anuśayas' arising, and the sūtras' four collective names for affliction: outflow, flood, yoke, and clinging). As throughout this project, where this fascicle's polemical comparisons to rival schools (the Sāṃkhya, Ājīvika, and Vārṣagaṇya traditions) appear, we have flagged these as the treatise's own characterizations rather than neutral descriptions of those traditions' actual self-understanding. Fascicle 21 will begin next.