Distinguishing the Noble Ones
Fascicle 22 opens Chapter 6 (分別賢聖品第六, the Ārya-pudgala-nirdeśa, "Distinguishing the Noble Ones"), the treatise's account of the path itself and the beings who walk it. It asks what kind of path accomplishes the severances of affliction described across fascicles 19 through 21, works through a close analysis of the four truths — including the classical Two Truths distinction and a substantial debate over whether pleasure genuinely exists — and closes with concrete instructions for the two gates of entering meditative cultivation: impurity-contemplation and mindfulness of breathing.
1. What Kind of Path Accomplishes Severance: Seeing Versus Cultivation
Having finished explaining how afflictions attain the nine kinds of "full understanding" through severance, the treatise now opens a new chapter — Distinguishing the Noble Ones — by asking what kind of path actually brings about that severance in the first place. Is this path always undefiled, or can a defiled, worldly path accomplish it as well? The answer distinguishes the two paths already named throughout the preceding fascicles: the path of seeing is exclusively undefiled, while the path of cultivation is of both kinds, undefiled and worldly alike. The reason is that the path of seeing is able to swiftly counter the afflictions of all three realms at once, severing all nine grades of what is abandoned by seeing in a single, rapid stroke — a capacity no merely worldly path possesses, since a worldly path works gradually and only within a single realm at a time. The path of cultivation, being different in character and unfolding gradually rather than all at once, is capable of being either undefiled or worldly.
如是已說煩惱等斷於九勝位得遍知名。然斷必由道力故得,此所由道其相云何?頌曰:已說煩惱斷,由見諦修故,見道唯無漏,修道通二種。論曰:前已廣說諸煩惱斷,由見諦道及修道故。道唯無漏亦有漏耶?見道應知唯是無漏,修道通二。所以者何?見道速能治三界故。頓斷九品見所斷故,非世間道有此堪能,故見位中道唯無漏。修道有異故通二種,如向所言由見諦故。
We have now explained that afflictions attain the name "full understanding" through severance at nine superior stages. But severance must always come about through the power of a path — what is the character of this path? Verse: it has been explained that afflictions are severed through seeing the truths and through cultivation; the path of seeing is exclusively undefiled, while the path of cultivation is of both kinds. Explanation: it has already been explained at length that the severance of afflictions comes about through the path of seeing the truths and the path of cultivation. Is this path exclusively undefiled, or can it also be defiled? It should be understood that the path of seeing is exclusively undefiled, while the path of cultivation is of both kinds. Why is this so? Because the path of seeing is able to swiftly counter the afflictions of all three realms at once, severing all nine grades of what is abandoned by seeing in a single stroke — a capacity no worldly path possesses. For this reason, the path at the stage of seeing is exclusively undefiled. The path of cultivation, being of a different character, is of both kinds, exactly as stated just now with the phrase "through seeing the truths and [through cultivation]."
We should flag that this opens an entirely new chapter of the treatise — Chapter 6, Distinguishing the Noble Ones — which shifts the focus from the anuśayas themselves (Chapter 5, just concluded across fascicles 19 through 21) to the path and the persons who walk it. The asymmetry stated here — that seeing the truths is always undefiled, while cultivation can be either undefiled or worldly — sets up the framework for much of what follows in this chapter, since it implies that only the path of cultivation admits of the kind of gradual, this-worldly progress (through ordinary meditative concentration alone, without yet directly realizing the four truths) that a non-Buddhist practitioner could, in principle, also undertake.
2. The Four Truths: Their Order, and Why It Follows Realization, Not Causation
The treatise confirms that the four truths — suffering, origin, cessation, and the path — were already named in the treatise's first chapter, in the section distinguishing contaminated from uncontaminated dharmas, though listed there in a different order (path, cessation, then suffering and origin together) and with the same underlying substance as here. Why, then, are they presented here in this specific order — suffering first, then origin, then cessation, then path — rather than in the order a strict cause-and-effect account would suggest, which would name the cause (origin) before its effect (suffering)? Because this order instead follows the sequence in which a practitioner actually and directly realizes them in meditation. Some topics in this treatise are ordered by their sequence of actual arising (as with the four foundations of mindfulness); others by mere convenience of expression (as with the four right efforts, which have no fixed principled reason to be listed in their given order); the four truths are ordered specifically by the sequence of a yoga practitioner's direct realization, which is itself fixed by how the truths are observed at the preparatory stage that precedes it.
諦四先已說,謂苦集滅道,彼自體亦然,次第隨現觀。論曰:諦有四種,名先已說。於何處說?謂初品中分別有漏無漏法處。彼如何說?謂彼頌言:無漏謂聖道,此說道諦。擇滅謂離繫,此說滅諦。及苦集世間,此說苦集諦。四諦次第如彼說耶?不爾。云何?如今所列:一苦、二集、三滅、四道。四諦自體亦有異耶?不爾。云何?如先所辯,為顯體同彼,故說亦然聲。四諦何緣如是次第?隨現觀位先後而說,謂現觀中先所觀者便在先說,若異此者應先說因後方說果。然或有法說次隨生,如念住等。或復有法說次隨便,如正勝等。謂此中無決定理趣起如是欲,先斷已生、後遮未生,但隨言便。今說四諦,隨瑜伽師現觀位中先後次第。何緣現觀次第必然?加行位中如是觀故。
Verse: the four truths were already named — suffering, origin, cessation, and the path; their own essential nature is likewise as stated then; their order here follows the sequence of direct realization. Explanation: there are four truths, whose names were already given earlier. Where was this stated? In the first chapter, in the section distinguishing contaminated and uncontaminated dharmas. How was it stated there? By that verse's words: "the uncontaminated is the noble path" — referring to the truth of the path; "analytical cessation is separation-from-bondage" — referring to the truth of cessation; "and suffering and its origin are the worldly dharmas" — referring to the truths of suffering and its origin. Does the order of the four truths here match how they were listed there? No. What, then, is the order? As now listed: first suffering, second origin, third cessation, fourth path. Does the essential nature of the four truths differ from what was explained earlier? No. The verse's word "likewise" is used specifically to show that their essential nature is the same, even though the order of presentation differs. Why are the four truths presented in this order? Because they are stated following the sequence in which they are actually directly realized in meditative practice — whichever is observed first in that direct realization is stated first; were it otherwise, one would need to state the cause before the effect. Yet in some cases a topic's stated order follows the sequence of its actual arising, as with the four foundations of mindfulness; in other cases it follows mere convenience of expression, as with the four right efforts, where there is no fixed principled reason for the given order. The four truths spoken of here follow the sequence of a yoga practitioner's direct realization. Why must this sequence be fixed? Because this is how one observes them at the preparatory stage.
Why must the preparatory stage observe the truths in exactly this sequence? Because whatever dharma is both an object of attachment and a source of oppressive distress, and for which one seeks a cause of escape, ought by reason to be observed first of all — hence the practitioner first observes suffering itself, which is precisely the truth of suffering. Next, one asks by what suffering is caused, and observes its cause, which is precisely the truth of the origin. Next, one asks by what suffering is brought to cessation, and observes that cessation, which is precisely the truth of cessation. Finally, one asks by what path that cessation is reached, and observes the path, which is precisely the truth of the path — exactly as one first sees that one is ill, then seeks the cause of the illness, then considers how it might be cured, and only afterward seeks the right medicine. The Sūtra of the Excellent Physician gives the same analogy in scripture: a king among physicians possesses four qualities enabling him to draw out a poisoned arrow — skillfully knowing the illness's symptoms, its cause, its cure, and the right medicine — and the Tathāgata is likewise a great king among physicians, truly understanding suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path. The stage of direct realization follows this same sequence because it is brought about by the force of the preceding preparatory stage, like a horse already familiar with the terrain, now let loose to gallop freely across it. This "direct realization" (abhisamaya) means a direct, complete awakening, and is said to be exclusively undefiled because it is directed toward nirvāṇa, the very object of true and complete awakening.
何緣加行必如是觀?謂若有法是愛著處能作逼惱,為求脫因,此法理應最初觀察,故修行者加行位中最初觀苦,苦即苦諦。次復觀苦以誰為因?便觀苦因,因即集諦。次復觀苦以誰為滅?便觀苦滅,滅即滅諦。後觀苦滅以誰為道?便觀滅道,道即道諦。如見病已,次尋病因,續思病愈,後求良藥。契經亦說諦次第喻。何契經說?謂《良醫經》。如彼經言:夫醫王者,謂具四德能拔毒箭:一善知病狀、二善知病因、三善知病愈、四善知良藥。如來亦爾,為大醫王,如實了知苦集滅道。故加行位如是次觀,現觀位中次第亦爾,由加行力所引發故,如已觀地縱馬奔馳。此現觀名為目何義?應知此目現等覺義。何緣說此唯是無漏?對向涅槃正覺境故,此覺真淨故得正名。
Why must the preparatory stage observe them in this way? Because whatever dharma is both an object of attachment and a source of oppressive distress, and whose escape one seeks a cause for, ought by reason to be observed first of all. Hence the practitioner, at the preparatory stage, first observes suffering — suffering being precisely the truth of suffering. Next, one further observes: by what is suffering caused? One then observes the cause of suffering — that cause being precisely the truth of the origin. Next, one further observes: by what is suffering brought to cessation? One then observes the cessation of suffering — that cessation being precisely the truth of cessation. Finally, one observes: by what path is the cessation of suffering reached? One then observes the path to cessation — that path being precisely the truth of the path. This is like first seeing that one is ill, then seeking the cause of the illness, then considering how the illness might be cured, and only afterward seeking the right medicine. The sūtras, too, give an analogy for this order. Which sūtra states this? The Sūtra of the Excellent Physician. As that sūtra says: a king among physicians is one who possesses four qualities enabling him to draw out a poisoned arrow — skillfully knowing the symptoms of the illness, its cause, its cure, and the right medicine. The Tathāgata is likewise a great king among physicians, truly and fully understanding suffering, its origin, its cessation, and the path. Hence the preparatory stage observes them in this sequence, and the stage of direct realization follows the same sequence, since it is brought about by the force of that preparatory stage, like a horse already familiar with the terrain, now let loose to gallop freely across it. What does "direct realization" itself mean? It should be understood to denote a direct, complete awakening. Why is this said to be exclusively undefiled? Because it is directed toward nirvāṇa, the object of true and complete awakening, and, this awakening being truly pure, it rightly earns this name.
We should flag the memorable physician analogy here — diagnosing symptoms, identifying cause, confirming curability, and prescribing medicine — as the treatise's own scriptural justification (attributed to the Sūtra of the Excellent Physician) for why suffering is diagnosed before its cause is traced, exactly paralleling how a physician examines a patient before investigating etiology. We have preserved the analogy's own four-part structure and its explicit mapping onto the four truths, since the text uses it as a genuine argument for the truths' presentation order, not merely as decorative illustration.
We should also note the treatise's own honest acknowledgment that not every fourfold or sequential list in this literature follows a single unified logic of ordering — some (like the four foundations of mindfulness) reflect actual temporal arising, others (like the four right efforts) reflect mere expository convenience with "no fixed principled reason," and the four truths reflect yet a third principle, the sequence of meditative direct realization. We have kept this taxonomy of different ordering-principles exactly as the text presents it, rather than assuming a single explanatory scheme must govern every numbered list in this tradition.
3. Why "Noble" Truths, and How Every Formation Counts as Suffering
Why does scripture call these four "noble" truths in the first place? Because they are the truths of the noble ones, and so bear their name. Does this mean they are false for those who are not noble? No — they are true for everyone, since their nature involves no inversion whatsoever; it is simply that only the noble ones truly see them as they are, while others do not, and it is for this reason that the sūtras call them specifically "noble," not because they fail to hold for the non-noble. As a verse puts it: what the noble ones call suffering, the non-noble call pleasurable, and what the noble ones call pleasurable, the non-noble call suffering. Other teachers hold that only two of the four — cessation and the path — are exclusively noble truths, while suffering and its origin are common to noble and non-noble alike. This raises an objection: if suffering is meant to hold universally in this way, then, strictly speaking, only painful feeling itself would seem to count as the true essence of "suffering," with everything else falling outside it — so how can it be claimed, as this tradition does, that all contaminated formations whatsoever constitute the truth of suffering, including pleasant and neutral ones?
故得聖名。於非聖者此豈成妄?於一切是諦,性無顛倒故。然唯聖者實見非餘,是故經中但名聖諦。非非聖諦,顛倒見故。如有頌言:聖者說是樂,非聖說為苦;聖者說為苦,非聖說是樂。有餘師說:二唯聖諦,餘二通是聖非聖諦。唯受一分是苦自體,所餘並非。如何可言諸有漏行皆是苦諦?頌曰:苦由三苦合,如所應一切,可意非可意,餘有漏行法。
They bear the name "noble." Are these truths therefore false for one who is not a noble one? No — they are true for everyone, since their nature involves no inversion whatsoever. Yet only the noble ones truly see them as they are, others do not; and it is for this reason that the sūtras call them specifically noble truths, not because they fail to be truths for the non-noble, but rather because the non-noble see them through an inverted view. As a verse states: what the noble ones call suffering, the non-noble call pleasurable; what the noble ones call pleasurable, the non-noble call suffering. Other teachers say: two are exclusively noble truths, the remaining two are common to both the noble and non-noble. Only a portion of feeling is the essential nature of suffering; the rest is not. How, then, can it be said that all contaminated formations are the truth of suffering? Verse: suffering arises through union with the three kinds of suffering — accordingly, all contaminated formations, whether pleasing, displeasing, or neither.
The answer lies in distinguishing three distinct natures of suffering: the suffering of suffering itself, the suffering of change, and the suffering of formations. Every contaminated formation, as appropriate to its kind, is united with one of these three, and so all of them are, without exception, the truth of suffering. Pleasing formations are called suffering because they are united with the suffering of change — since even a pleasurable feeling, as a sūtra notes, is pleasurable while it arises and persists, but becomes suffering the moment it changes. Displeasing formations are called suffering because they are united with the suffering of suffering itself — a painful feeling, the same sūtra notes, is suffering both when it arises and while it persists, needing no further change to be so. And every remaining formation — neither pleasant nor unpleasant — is called suffering because it is united with the suffering of formations, being, as a further scriptural line has it, simply impermanent, and therefore suffering, since it is fabricated by a multitude of conditions.
論曰:有三苦性,一苦苦性、二行苦性、三壞苦性。諸有漏行如其所應,與此三種苦性合故,皆是苦諦亦無有失。此中可意有漏行法,與壞苦合故名為苦。諸非可意有漏行法,與苦苦合故名為苦。除此所餘有漏行法,與行苦合故名為苦。何謂為可意非可意餘?謂樂等三受如其次第,由三受力令順樂受等諸有漏行得可意等名。所以者何?若諸樂受由壞成苦性。如契經言。諸樂受生時樂住時樂壞時苦,若諸苦受由體成苦性。如契經言:諸苦受生時苦、住時苦。不苦不樂受由行成苦性,眾緣造故。如契經言:若非常即是苦。如受順受,諸行亦然。
Explanation: there are three natures of suffering — the suffering of suffering, the suffering of formations, and the suffering of change. Contaminated formations, each as appropriate, are united with one of these three natures of suffering, and so all of them are indeed, without fault, the truth of suffering. Among these, pleasing contaminated formations are called suffering because they are united with the suffering of change. Displeasing contaminated formations are called suffering because they are united with the suffering of suffering. All remaining contaminated formations are called suffering because they are united with the suffering of formations. What is meant by pleasing, displeasing, and the rest? It refers to the three feelings — pleasure and the others — since it is by the power of these three feelings that the contaminated formations associated with pleasurable feeling and so on come to be called pleasing and so on. Why is this so? Because pleasurable feelings become suffering through their own change — as a sūtra states: pleasurable feelings are pleasurable when they arise, pleasurable while they persist, but suffering when they change. Painful feelings, by contrast, are suffering by their very nature — as a sūtra states: painful feelings are suffering when they arise, and suffering while they persist. Feeling that is neither painful nor pleasurable becomes suffering through its nature as a formation, since it is fabricated by a multitude of conditions — as a sūtra states: whatever is impermanent is suffering. Just as feeling relates to what accompanies it, so too do all other formations.
The treatise adds that speaking of the pleasing and displeasing specifically in terms of the suffering of change and the suffering of suffering reflects only what is distinctive to each; in truth, every formation whatsoever is suffering simply by virtue of being a formation — and this deepest layer of suffering, the suffering of formations pervading even ordinary pleasure and neutral experience alike, is something only the noble ones are actually able to perceive. A verse captures the point vividly: just as a single eyelash placed on the palm of the hand goes entirely unnoticed, yet the same eyelash placed upon the eye causes real harm and discomfort — so the ordinary, unawakened person is like the palm, failing to notice the eyelash-like suffering of formations pervading their whole experience, while the wise noble one is like the eye, met with that very same object and responding with an intense, appropriate sense of revulsion and dread.
有餘師釋:苦即苦性名苦苦性,如是乃至行即苦性名行苦性。應知此中說可意非可意為壞苦苦苦者,由不共故。理實一切行苦故苦,此唯聖者所能觀見。故有頌言:如以一睫毛,置掌人不覺,若置眼睛上,為損及不安。愚夫如手掌,不覺行苦睫,智者如眼睛,緣極生厭怖。
Other teachers explain it this way: suffering that is itself suffering in nature is called the suffering of suffering; and, in just the same way, up through formations that are themselves suffering in nature, called the suffering of formations. It should be understood that, in speaking here of the pleasing and displeasing specifically in terms of the suffering of change and the suffering of suffering, this is done because of what is distinctive to each; in truth, all formations are suffering precisely because they are formations, and it is only the noble ones who are able to directly perceive this. As a verse states: just as a single eyelash, placed on the palm of the hand, goes unnoticed, but if placed upon the eye, causes harm and discomfort — so the ordinary, foolish person is like the palm, failing to notice the eyelash of the suffering of formations, while the wise one is like the eye, generating, upon this same object, an intense sense of revulsion and dread.
We should flag the "other teachers" view reported here — that only cessation and the path are exclusively noble truths, while suffering and its origin are common to the noble and non-noble alike — as a genuinely different classification than the treatise's own default position (that all four are "noble" in the sense of being truly seen only by the noble, while remaining objectively true for everyone). We have presented this alternate view exactly as the text reports it, without the treatise explicitly adjudicating between the two; the surrounding discussion of the three kinds of suffering that follows applies regardless of which classification one adopts.
The eyelash simile is one of this tradition's most vivid images for a genuinely difficult claim: that ordinary pleasure itself is, at a deep level, a form of suffering (the suffering of formations) — not because pleasure feels bad, but because it is impermanent, conditioned, and inseparable from the underlying instability of all compounded existence, a subtlety only a trained, noble perception can actually detect, the way only an eye (not a callused palm) registers the presence of a single eyelash. We have kept the simile's own structure of contrast (palm versus eye, ordinary person versus noble one) intact, since the analogy's persuasive force depends on that exact pairing.
4. Why the Path Is Not "Suffering," and Why "Suffering" Alone Is Named, Not Pleasure
The treatise draws a striking contrast: ordinary, unawakened beings generate a genuine sense of dread only when undergoing the most extreme suffering imaginable, such as the torment of the Avīci hell — whereas the noble ones experience that same sense of dread even with respect to the exceedingly subtle, seemingly untroubled aggregates found at the very peak of existence, the most refined state within the entire formless realm. This raises an objection: since the truth of the path is itself conditioned, should it not likewise be classified under the suffering of formations? The treatise answers no — what defines the suffering of formations is precisely that it runs contrary to the noble mind, and the noble path is the very opposite of this, since it is precisely what brings about the complete exhaustion of suffering rather than opposing the mind that perceives it. As for the familiar formula that regards all conditioned things as suffering and nirvāṇa alone as peaceful stillness, this too proceeds in two steps — first seeing the relevant dharmas as suffering, then afterward observing their cessation as peaceful — and so the word "conditioned" in that formula should be understood to mean specifically what is contaminated, not the uncontaminated path, which, though technically conditioned, is excluded from this reckoning.
以諸愚夫於無間獄受劇苦蘊生苦怖心,不如眾聖於有頂蘊。道諦亦應是行苦攝,有為性故。道諦非苦,違逆聖心是行苦相。非聖道起違逆聖心,由此能引眾苦盡故。若觀諸有為涅槃寂靜者,亦由先見彼法是苦、後觀彼滅以為寂靜,故有為言唯顯有漏。
Ordinary, unawakened beings generate a fearful sense of suffering only when undergoing the extreme suffering of the aggregates in the Avīci hell of unremitting torment — a fear the noble ones experience even with respect to the exceedingly subtle aggregates found at the very peak of existence. Should not the truth of the path likewise be included within the suffering of formations, since it too has the nature of being conditioned? The truth of the path is not suffering, since running contrary to the noble mind is the defining mark of the suffering of formations, and the arising of the noble path does not run contrary to the noble mind — indeed, it is precisely this path that is capable of bringing about the complete exhaustion of every kind of suffering. As for the formula that regards all conditioned things as suffering and nirvāṇa alone as peaceful stillness, this too proceeds by first seeing those dharmas as suffering, and only afterward observing their cessation as peaceful stillness; hence the word "conditioned," as used in that formula, refers specifically to what is contaminated.
A further question follows: if it is granted that certain dharmas do genuinely involve pleasure, why does the sūtra speak only of suffering, never of pleasure, as a noble truth? One explanation holds that pleasure is simply too rare to warrant its own name here — just as a heap containing mostly black beans with a small admixture of green beans is still called, without qualification, "a heap of black beans," the rare exception being absorbed into the dominant majority's name. Indeed, what wise person, feeling a slight sense of relief from pouring water over a festering boil, would seriously conclude that the boil itself is thereby a source of genuine pleasure? Other teachers offer a further, verse-based account: pleasure is called suffering because it can itself serve as a cause of suffering, because it gathers together many sufferings in its wake, and because there is real suffering simply in longing for it. The treatise's own preferred resolution goes further still: properly speaking, the noble ones observe that the very substance of ordinary existence and of pleasure are, at bottom, one and the same suffering — sharing, from the standpoint of the suffering of formations, a single underlying flavor — and it is precisely for this reason that suffering alone, and not pleasure, is established as the noble truth.
若諸法中亦許有樂,何緣但說苦為聖諦?有一類釋:由樂少故。如置綠豆烏豆聚中,以少從多名烏豆聚。誰有智者瀝水澆癰有少樂生,計癰為樂?有餘於此以頌釋言:能為苦因故,能集眾苦故,有苦希彼故,說樂亦名苦。理實應言,聖者觀察諸有及樂體皆是苦,以就行苦同一味故,由此立苦為諦非樂。
If it is granted that certain dharmas do indeed involve genuine pleasure, why does the sūtra speak only of suffering, and not of pleasure, as the noble truth? One explanation holds that this is because pleasure is comparatively rare — just as a heap containing both green beans and black beans, with far more black beans than green, is simply called a heap of black beans, the minority element being absorbed into the majority's name. Indeed, what wise person, feeling a slight sense of relief from pouring water over a festering boil, would on that basis conclude the boil itself is a source of pleasure? Other teachers offer a further verse in explanation: because it is capable of serving as a cause of suffering; because it gathers together many sufferings; and because there is suffering in the very longing for it — pleasure, too, is for these reasons called suffering. In truth, it should rather be said that the noble ones observe that the substance of both existence and of pleasure alike is suffering, since, considered from the standpoint of the suffering of formations, they share one and the same single flavor — and it is on this basis that suffering alone, not pleasure, is established as the noble truth.
We should flag the two vivid images offered here as competing (or complementary) explanations for why pleasure gets no name of its own among the noble truths: the "mostly black beans" heap, suggesting pleasure is simply too statistically minor to deserve separate billing, and the "water on a festering boil," suggesting that what feels like pleasure is really only the temporary and partial relief of an underlying, ongoing suffering rather than a positive good in its own right. The treatise does not clearly rank these explanations against each other or against its own final formulation (that pleasure and suffering share one flavor from the standpoint of the suffering of formations) — we have presented all three as the text offers them, in sequence, without imposing an order of preference the passage itself does not state.
We should also note this section is building toward a substantial and historically significant debate — whether pleasure has any real, independent existence at all, or whether "pleasure" is always, at bottom, nothing more than a lesser degree of suffering — which the treatise takes up explicitly in the section immediately following this one, citing rival scriptural and logical arguments on both sides. We have not anticipated that debate's content here, since the text itself has not yet opened it at this point in the passage.
5. Does Pleasure Really Exist? A Direct Debate
The treatise now confronts the question directly: does pleasure have any real existence of its own, or is every feeling, without exception, actually a form of suffering? Some teachers of other schools argue for the latter, appealing to both scripture and reasoning. Scripturally, they cite the Buddha's own words that "all feelings whatsoever are nothing but suffering," that one "should observe pleasurable feeling as suffering," and that "to regard suffering as pleasure is called an inversion." Logically, they argue that every supposed cause of pleasure is unreliable: things like clothing, food, warmth, or coolness, generally accepted as causes of pleasure, produce suffering instead if enjoyed at the wrong time or in excess — and even a merely inappropriately timed, otherwise moderate indulgence becomes a cause of suffering, revealing that such things are, at bottom, always causes of suffering whose true nature simply becomes visible once the suffering involved grows intense enough. On this view, a sensation of pleasure arises only precisely when some prior suffering is being counteracted or exchanged for relief — one never feels pleasure from a supposed "cause of pleasure" except when already afflicted by hunger, thirst, cold, fatigue, or desire — so what the ordinary person mistakes for pleasure is really nothing more than the exchange of a heavier suffering for a lighter one, exactly like shifting a heavy load momentarily from one aching shoulder to the other.
有餘部師作如是執:定無實樂,受唯是苦。云何知然?由教、理故。云何由教?如世尊言:諸所有受無非是苦。又契經言:汝應以苦觀於樂受。又契經言:於苦謂樂名為顛倒。云何由理?以諸樂因皆不定故。謂諸所有衣服飲食冷煖等事,諸有情類許為樂因,此若非時過量受用便能生苦,復成苦因不應樂因。於增盛位或雖平等,但由非時,便成苦因能生於苦。故知衣等本是苦因,苦增盛時其相方顯。威儀易脫理亦應然。又治苦時方起樂覺,及苦易脫樂覺乃生。謂若未遭飢渴寒熱疲欲等苦所逼迫時,不於樂因生於樂覺。故於對治重苦因中,愚夫妄計此能生樂,實無決定能生樂因。苦易脫中愚夫謂樂,如荷重擔暫易肩等。故受唯苦,定無實樂。
Some teachers of other schools hold the following position: there is definitely no real pleasure; feeling is, without exception, nothing but suffering. How is this known? By both scripture and reasoning. How by scripture? As the Blessed One says: all feelings whatsoever are nothing but suffering. A further sūtra states: you should observe pleasurable feeling as suffering. A further sūtra states: to regard suffering as pleasure is called an inversion. How by reasoning? Because every cause of pleasure is unreliable. That is, things such as clothing, food and drink, warmth, and coolness, which sentient beings generally accept as causes of pleasure, will instead produce suffering if enjoyed at the wrong time or to excess, thereby becoming a cause of suffering rather than remaining a cause of pleasure. Even at a moderate degree of use, if the timing alone is wrong, it likewise becomes a cause of suffering capable of producing suffering. From this it can be known that things like clothing are, at bottom, always causes of suffering, whose true character as such simply becomes apparent once the suffering they produce grows sufficiently intense. The same reasoning should apply to changing one's bodily posture. Moreover, a sensation of pleasure arises only precisely when one is counteracting some suffering, and only when that suffering is thereby exchanged for relief does the sensation of pleasure come about — that is, when one has not yet been afflicted by sufferings such as hunger, thirst, cold, heat, fatigue, or desire, one does not generate a sensation of pleasure with respect to a supposed cause of pleasure. Hence, with respect to whatever counteracts a weighty cause of suffering, the ordinary, unawakened person falsely imagines that this generates pleasure — but in truth, there is no fixed, reliable cause capable of generating pleasure as such. In the mere exchange of one suffering for a lesser one, the ordinary person mistakenly calls this pleasure, just as one shifts a heavy load momentarily from one shoulder to the other. Hence feeling is nothing but suffering; there is definitely no real pleasure.
The masters of Abhidharma reject this conclusion, holding instead that pleasure genuinely exists — and this treatise sides with them. Their argument begins by turning the question back on the opposing view: by what standard do its proponents even define "suffering" in the first place? If suffering consists in being oppressed and afflicted, then, since a state of ease and comfort likewise exists, pleasure should equally be established as real by that same logic; if suffering consists in harm and injury, benefit and enrichment should equally establish pleasure; if suffering consists in what is unwanted, what is genuinely wanted and pleasing should equally establish pleasure. An objection follows: perhaps the "pleasing" object's own nature isn't truly fixed, since when the noble ones become free of defilement, what was formerly pleasing to them becomes unpleasing — showing that "pleasing" was never a real, intrinsic feature to begin with. The treatise rejects this: when the noble ones become free of defilement with respect to something pleasant, this happens because they come to observe it through a different mode — as a basis for heedlessness, or as something that, once effort reveals its impermanence and decay, is no longer to be prized — not because the feeling's own intrinsic character has actually changed. If that feeling's intrinsic nature were unpleasing to begin with, no one could ever have generated desire toward it in the first place, and the noble ones would have had no need to work at seeing through it to feel revulsion. Since desire clearly can and does arise toward it, and since real effort is needed to see past it, pleasant feeling must genuinely possess its own real, intrinsic pleasantness.
對法諸師言樂實有,此言應理。云何知然?且應反徵撥無樂者何名為苦?若謂逼迫既有適悅,有樂應成。若謂損害既有饒益,有樂應成。若謂非愛既有可愛,有樂應成。若謂可愛體非成實,以諸聖者於離染時,可愛復成非可愛故。不爾。可愛聖離染時,由異門觀為非愛故。謂若有受自相可愛,此受未常成非可愛。然諸聖者於離染時,以餘行相厭患此受,謂觀此受是放逸處,要由廣大功力所成變壞無常故非可愛,非彼自相是非愛法。若彼自體是非可愛,不應於中有起愛者。若不起愛,於離染時聖者不應以餘行相觀察樂受深生厭患,故由自相有實樂受。
The masters of Abhidharma hold that pleasure genuinely exists, and this accords with reason. How is this known? We should first turn the question back upon those who deny pleasure: by what standard do they define suffering? If suffering consists in being oppressed and afflicted, then, since there also exists a state of ease and comfort, pleasure should likewise be established as real. If suffering consists in harm and injury, then, since there also exists benefit and enrichment, pleasure should likewise be established as real. If suffering consists in what is unwanted, then, since there also exists what is genuinely wanted and pleasing, pleasure should likewise be established as real. If it is said that the pleasing object's own nature is not truly real, since, when the noble ones become free of defilement, what is pleasing turns into what is not pleasing — this is not so. When the noble ones become free of defilement, it is because they come to observe it, through a different approach, as unwanted. That is, if a feeling is, by its own intrinsic characteristic, genuinely pleasing, that feeling never actually becomes not-pleasing. Rather, when the noble ones become free of defilement, they come to be revolted by this same feeling through a different mode of observation — observing that it is a basis for heedlessness, and that it must, through great effort, be seen as impermanent and subject to decay, and is therefore not to be prized — but this does not mean its own intrinsic characteristic is itself unpleasing. If that feeling's own nature were itself unpleasing, no one should ever be capable of generating desire toward it. And if no one ever generated desire toward it, the noble ones, at the point of becoming free of defilement, would have no need to observe pleasant feeling through some further mode in order to generate deep revulsion toward it. Hence, by its own intrinsic characteristic, real pleasant feeling does indeed exist.
We should flag that this is a genuine, sustained inter-school debate that the treatise resolves with a clear verdict, unlike some of the open scholastic disagreements preserved elsewhere in this project — the treatise explicitly sides with the Abhidharma masters' position that pleasure genuinely exists, against the unnamed "other schools'" position that all feeling is, at bottom, only suffering (a view that — while the text does not say so explicitly here — anticipates positions associated with the Sautrāntika tradition elsewhere in Abhidharma literature). We have translated both sides' full arguments faithfully before presenting the treatise's chosen resolution, rather than only summarizing the losing position.
The "heavy load shifted from shoulder to shoulder" simile is a genuinely effective image for the skeptical position: momentary relief from a burden is not the same as positive comfort, since the shoulder will ache again soon regardless. The rebuttal's counter-argument is correspondingly subtle: it does not directly refute this specific image, but instead argues indirectly, from the very fact that desire arises toward pleasant things and that real spiritual effort is needed to see past that desire — reasoning that an intrinsically unpleasant thing could never have inspired desire in the first place, so pleasure's reality is inferred from the existence and difficulty of overcoming attachment to it, rather than from any positive phenomenological description of pleasure itself.
6. Reconciling "All Feeling Is Suffering" with Pleasure's Real Existence
Having established that pleasure genuinely exists, the treatise must now account for the Buddha's own scriptural statement that "all feelings whatsoever are nothing but suffering." The Buddha himself, in a sūtra addressed to Ānanda, supplies the resolution: he explains that he spoke those words with a hidden intention, based specifically on the fact that all formations are impermanent and all conditioned things undergo change and decay — not as a literal claim that every feeling is, by its own intrinsic nature, the suffering-of-suffering (that is, painful feeling as such). The treatise offers a striking piece of textual evidence for this reading: if "all feeling is suffering" had been meant literally, Ānanda would have had no reason to ask, as he does, what hidden intention lay behind that statement given that the Buddha elsewhere plainly taught three distinct kinds of feeling (pleasure, suffering, and neither) — instead, he would have had to ask what hidden intention lay behind the three-feelings teaching. Since the sūtra's actual question-and-answer runs the opposite direction, the three-feelings teaching must be the literal, direct account, and "all feeling is suffering" the specially-intended one.
然世尊言諸所有受無非苦者,佛自釋通。如契經言:佛告慶喜:我依諸行皆是無常,及諸有為皆是變壞,密作是說。諸所有受無非是苦,故知此經不依苦苦作如是說。若由自相說受皆苦,何緣慶喜作是問言:佛於餘經說有三受,謂樂及苦、不苦不樂。依何密意此經復言諸所有受無非是苦?慶喜但應作如是問:依何密意說有三受?世尊亦應但作是答:我依此密意,故說有三受。經中既無如是問答,故由自相實有三受。世尊既言我密意說諸所有受無非是苦,即已顯示此所說經依別意說非真了義。
As for the Blessed One's statement that all feelings whatsoever are nothing but suffering — the Buddha himself provides the resolution, as a sūtra records. The Buddha told Ānanda: I said this with a hidden intention, based on the fact that all formations are impermanent, and all conditioned things undergo change and decay. From this it can be known that this sūtra's statement is not made with reference to the suffering of suffering as such. If it were meant literally, by intrinsic characteristic, that all feeling is suffering, why would Ānanda have needed to ask: the Buddha, in other sūtras, spoke of three kinds of feeling — pleasure, suffering, and neither-suffering-nor-pleasure. With what hidden intention does this sūtra now state that all feelings whatsoever are nothing but suffering? Ānanda ought instead to have asked with what hidden intention the Buddha spoke of three kinds of feeling, and the Blessed One ought correspondingly to have answered only that it was with such-and-such hidden intention that he spoke of three kinds of feeling. But since the sūtra contains no such question and answer in that direction, it must instead be, by intrinsic characteristic, that three kinds of feeling truly and really exist. Since the Blessed One himself explicitly stated that he spoke with a hidden intention when he said that all feelings whatsoever are nothing but suffering, this itself already shows that this particular sūtra statement was made with a special intention, and is not a statement of the final, definitive truth.
The treatise then addresses the sūtra instruction to "observe pleasurable feeling as suffering," explaining that this reveals pleasurable feeling has two natures at once: a genuinely pleasurable nature, since, considered according to its own intrinsic characteristic, it is indeed pleasing; and a suffering nature, since, considered from a different angle, it is also impermanent and subject to change and decay. Observing it as pleasure invites bondage, since those prone to craving relish its flavor in just that way, whereas observing it as suffering leads toward liberation, since this frees one from craving — and it is precisely because observing it as suffering brings liberation that the Buddha urges this practice, not because pleasure lacks its own genuine, intrinsic pleasantness. A verse confirms this: the buddhas, in their perfect awakening, know that all formations are impermanent and all conditioned things subject to change, and it is on this basis — not by denying feeling's own character — that they say all feeling is suffering. Similarly, the sūtra statement that "to regard suffering as pleasure is an inversion" targets a different error entirely: it refers to how ordinary beings, faced with pleasurable feelings and sensory desires that in truth involve little pleasure and much suffering, one-sidedly regard them as purely and simply pleasurable, ignoring their suffering-nature altogether — that one-sided view is the inversion, not the mere fact of experiencing genuine pleasure. If, by intrinsic characteristic, all feeling really were suffering without exception, there would be no reason for the Buddha to have spoken of three distinct kinds of feeling in the first place; and the suggestion that he merely spoke that way in accordance with worldly convention fails, since he himself distinguished which of his statements were spoken with hidden intention and which were spoken exactly as things truly are.
又契經言,汝應以苦觀樂受者,應知此經意顯樂受有二種性:一有樂性,謂此樂受依自相門是可愛故;二有苦性,謂依異門亦是無常變壞法故。然觀樂時能為繫縛,諸有貪者噉此味故。若觀苦時能令解脫,如是觀者得離貪故。佛以觀苦能令解脫,故勸有情觀樂為苦。如何知此自相是樂?如有頌言:諸佛正遍覺,知諸行非常,及有為變壞,故說受皆苦。又契經言於苦謂樂名顛倒者,此別意說,以諸世間於諸樂受妙欲諸有一分樂中一向計樂故成顛倒。謂諸樂受若依異門亦有苦性,然諸世間唯觀為樂故成顛倒。諸妙欲境樂少苦多,唯觀為樂故成顛倒。諸有亦然,故不由此能證樂受無實理成。若受自相實皆苦者,佛說三受有何勝利?若謂世尊隨俗說者,不應正理。以世尊言我密說受無非苦故。又於觀五受說如實言故。
As for the further sūtra passage stating that you should observe pleasurable feeling as suffering — it should be understood that this sūtra's intent is to reveal that pleasurable feeling has two natures: a pleasurable nature, since this feeling, according to its own intrinsic characteristic, is genuinely pleasing; and a suffering nature, since, considered from a different angle, it is also an impermanent dharma subject to change and decay. Observing it as pleasure serves as a form of bondage, since those prone to craving relish its flavor in that way, whereas observing it as suffering leads to liberation, since one who observes it this way becomes free of craving. Because observing it as suffering brings about liberation, the Buddha therefore urged sentient beings to observe pleasure as suffering. How is it known that pleasure's own intrinsic characteristic is indeed pleasurable? As a verse states: the buddhas, in their perfect and complete awakening, know that all formations are impermanent, and that all conditioned things undergo change and decay, and it is on this basis that they say all feeling is suffering. As for the further sūtra statement that to regard suffering as pleasure is called an inversion — this too is spoken with a distinct intention: it refers to how ordinary worldly beings, with respect to pleasurable feelings, exquisite sensory desires, and the portion of pleasure found within existence, one-sidedly regard these as purely pleasurable, and this constitutes their inversion. Pleasurable feelings, considered from a different angle, also possess a suffering-nature, yet ordinary worldly beings observe them only as pleasure, and it is this one-sided view that constitutes the inversion. Exquisite objects of sensory desire involve little actual pleasure and much suffering, yet are observed only as pleasurable, and this too constitutes inversion. The same holds for existence in general. Hence this scriptural statement cannot be used to prove that pleasurable feeling has no real existence. If, by intrinsic characteristic, all feeling really were suffering without exception, what benefit would there be in the Buddha speaking of three kinds of feeling at all? And if one supposes the Blessed One merely spoke in accordance with worldly convention, this does not accord with reason, since the Blessed One himself explicitly stated that his remark that all feeling is suffering was spoken with a hidden intention, and, moreover, with respect to observing the five feeling-faculties, he speaks in accordance with how things truly are.
We should flag the treatise's hermeneutic method here as worth making explicit: rather than treating every scriptural statement as equally literal, it distinguishes statements made with a "hidden intention" (密意, an indirect, situationally-motivated teaching) from statements that are "definitive" or "as things truly are" (了義/如實), and argues from the internal structure of a specific sūtra dialogue (the precise direction of Ānanda's question) to determine which category a given passage belongs to. This is a genuine interpretive technique this tradition uses elsewhere in Buddhist scriptural exegesis, not an ad hoc move invented just for this passage — though we note the treatise's argument depends on taking the Ānanda dialogue's exact wording as decisive evidence, a inference some readers might find more suggestive than strictly conclusive.
We should also note the recurring, careful distinction this passage draws between a feeling's own intrinsic character (自相) and how it appears when considered "from a different angle" (異門) — pleasurable feeling is said to be genuinely pleasant in itself, while also being suffering when viewed through the lens of its impermanence; the practical instruction to "observe pleasure as suffering" is framed as a skillful shift of vantage point for the sake of liberation, not a denial that the first, intrinsic description was ever true. We have tried to preserve this two-level structure clearly, since collapsing it into a single flat claim ("pleasure is really suffering") would misrepresent the treatise's own more nuanced position.
7. Finishing the Rebuttal: The Five Feeling-Faculties, and Why Causes of Pleasure Are Not "Unreliable"
The treatise adds a further scriptural point: with respect to observing the five feeling-faculties, the Buddha speaks exactly as things truly are. A sūtra states that whatever is the pleasure-faculty and whatever is the joy-faculty should both be understood as pleasurable feeling, and that observing these five faculties with right wisdom permanently severs the three fetters — language that presupposes their genuine reality, not mere convention. The treatise then presses the opposing view with a series of direct counterarguments. If, as that view holds, the Buddha merely followed worldly convention in distinguishing pleasure, joy, and equanimity to match three respective degrees of underlying suffering (lower, middling, upper), this fails on its own terms, since pleasure itself comes in degrees too — the scheme would then require, absurdly, that only the very highest pleasure ever arise from the very lowest suffering. And when one savors an especially wonderful fragrance, taste, or touch, what "lower suffering" is even present to be relieved? If one insists some lower suffering is present, then once it has already ceased, one should feel the most extreme pleasure imaginable, since no suffering at all remains — yet this plainly does not happen. Nor does the scheme hold together internally: a supposedly "lower" painful feeling is granted to be sharp and unmistakable, while a "middling" feeling is granted to be vague, which is backwards; and since the lower three meditative absorptions are said to involve pleasure and the higher stages equanimity, the scheme would absurdly require that suffering increase precisely as meditative attainment grows more refined.
又於觀五受說如實言故。謂契經說:所有樂根、所有喜根,應知此二皆是樂受,乃至廣說。復作是說:若以正慧如實觀見如是五根三結永斷,乃至廣說。又佛如何於一苦受,隨順世俗分別說三?若謂世間於下上中苦,如其次第起樂等三覺,佛隨順彼說樂等三。理亦不然,樂亦三故,應於下等三苦唯起上等樂覺。又受殊勝香味觸等所生樂時,有何下苦而世於中起樂受覺?若許爾時有下苦者,如是下苦已滅未生,世應爾時有極樂覺,此位眾苦都無有故。受欲樂時徵問亦爾。又下品受現在前時,許受分明猛利可取,許中品受現在前時,與此相違,如何應理?又下三定說有樂故,應有下苦;以上諸地說有捨故,應有中苦。定勝苦增,豈應正理?故不應依下等三苦如次建立樂等三受。
Moreover, with respect to observing the five feeling-faculties, the Buddha speaks in accordance with how things truly are. A sūtra states: whatever is the pleasure-faculty, and whatever is the joy-faculty — both of these should be understood to be pleasurable feeling, and so on, at length. It further states: if, by right wisdom, one truly observes and sees these same five faculties, the three fetters are permanently severed, and so on, at length. Moreover, how could the Buddha, with respect to a single painful feeling, distinguish it into three merely in accordance with worldly convention? If it is claimed that, since worldly beings experience three degrees of suffering — lower, upper, and middling — and correspondingly generate three sensations of pleasure, and that the Buddha, following this convention, spoke of pleasure and the others as three, this too does not hold, since pleasure itself is likewise threefold, so it should follow that only the highest degree of pleasurable sensation would arise in connection with the lowest degree of suffering. Moreover, when one experiences pleasure arising from an especially wonderful fragrance, taste, or tactile sensation, what lower degree of suffering is present, that worldly beings should generate a sensation of pleasure with respect to it? If one grants that a lower degree of suffering is present, then, once this lower suffering has already ceased, worldly beings ought, at that point, to experience the very highest degree of pleasurable sensation, since no suffering whatsoever remains present. The same line of questioning applies to the experience of pleasure through sensory desire. Moreover, when a lower-grade feeling is manifestly present, it is granted to be clear, intense, and readily identifiable, yet when a middling-grade feeling is present, the opposite is granted to hold — how could this accord with reason? Moreover, since it is said that the lower three meditative absorptions involve pleasure, there ought correspondingly to be a lower degree of suffering there; and since it is said that the higher stages involve equanimity, there ought correspondingly to be a middling degree of suffering there. But how could it accord with reason that suffering should increase precisely as meditative attainment grows more excellent? Hence it is not correct to establish pleasure, joy, and equanimity respectively on the basis of lower, upper, and middling degrees of suffering.
A further scriptural point clinches the case: the Buddha told the Śākya chieftain Mahānāma that if form were purely and simply suffering, never pleasurable, and never accompanied by pleasure, and so on — a passage whose very structure presupposes that form is not, in fact, purely suffering, confirming that at least some small portion of genuinely real pleasure must exist. Having shown that neither the opponents' scriptural citations nor their logical arguments succeed, the treatise turns to directly refuting their central claim that "every cause of pleasure is unreliable." This claim misunderstands causation itself: it is only in dependence on the specific condition of the underlying basis receiving it that any external object becomes a cause of pleasure or of suffering, not the object in isolation. When the same object, reaching the same basis in the same condition, reliably produces pleasure every time that exact condition holds, the cause of pleasure is not unreliable at all — it is simply relational. Ordinary fire illustrates the same point: depending on the condition of what is being cooked, fire becomes either a cause of delicious ripeness or a cause of spoiling, and this depends not on the fire alone; when the same fire, applied to the same food in the same condition, reliably produces delicious ripeness, that cause is not unreliable either. The cause of pleasure works in exactly the same way, and its genuine determinacy is thereby established by reason.
又契經說:佛告大名:若色一向是苦非樂,非樂所隨,乃至廣說。故知定有少分實樂。如是且辯彼所引教,顯無實樂為證不成,所立理言亦不成證。且以諸樂因皆不定故者,此非正理,迷因義故。謂觀所依分位差別,諸外境界方為樂因或為苦因,非唯外境。若此外境至此所依如是分位能為樂因,未嘗至此不為樂因,是故樂因非不決定。如世間火,觀所煮炙分位差別,為美熟因或為違因,非唯彼火。若此火至此所煮炙如是分位為美熟因,未嘗至此非美熟因,故美熟因非不決定。樂因亦爾,決定理成。
Moreover, a sūtra states: the Buddha told Mahānāma: if form were purely and simply suffering, never pleasurable, and never accompanied by pleasure, and so on, at length. From this it can be known that there must indeed be at least some small portion of genuinely real pleasure. Thus far we have shown that the scriptural passages the opponents cite in an attempt to prove that no real pleasure exists do not succeed as proof; their logical arguments likewise fail to establish their case. As for their argument that every cause of pleasure is unreliable — this is not sound reasoning, since it misunderstands the true meaning of causation. It is only in dependence on the specific condition of the underlying basis that any external object becomes a cause of pleasure or a cause of suffering, not the object alone. If this same external object, upon reaching this same underlying basis in this same specific condition, is capable of serving as a cause of pleasure, it has never failed, upon reaching precisely this condition, to serve as a cause of pleasure — and therefore the cause of pleasure is not, in fact, unreliable. It is like ordinary fire: depending on the specific condition of whatever is being cooked or roasted, that fire becomes either a cause of delicious ripeness or a cause of spoiling, and this depends not on the fire alone. If this same fire, applied to this same food in this same specific condition, serves as a cause of delicious ripeness, it has never failed, under precisely this condition, to serve as such a cause, and so the cause of delicious ripeness is not unreliable either. The cause of pleasure works in exactly the same way, and so its being genuinely determinate is established by reason.
We should flag the fire-and-cooking analogy as a genuinely careful piece of philosophical reasoning about causation: the opposing view had argued that because the same object (food, clothing, warmth) can produce either pleasure or suffering depending on circumstances, no object is a reliable "cause" of pleasure at all. The treatise's response distinguishes an object's causal role from the full causal relation, which always includes the condition of the recipient — a cause paired with the right condition is perfectly reliable, and the earlier argument only showed that the object alone, stripped of its receiving context, is not sufficient by itself, which nobody actually disputed. We have tried to preserve this precise philosophical move rather than flattening it into a simpler claim.
We should also note that the Mahānāma sūtra citation is presented in abbreviated form ("乃至廣說," "and so on, at length"), meaning the source text itself does not quote the full passage — we have preserved this citation exactly as abbreviated, rather than supplying the sūtra's complete wording ourselves, since we have not independently verified the full text of this particular citation beyond what the treatise itself quotes.
8. Why Craving Is Named "the Origin": Seed Versus Water, Karma Versus Craving
Having established that all contaminated formations are correctly called suffering, the treatise turns to the truth of the origin. Scripture names craving alone as the origin of suffering, yet, strictly speaking, other causes — karma and ignorance among them — are also, properly, the truth of the origin; craving is simply singled out because it is the most prominent among them. A verse confirms this broader picture: karma, craving, and ignorance together serve as causes bringing about future formations and the continuity of existence, and it is this continuity that constitutes what is called a "person." A further sūtra speaks of "five kinds of seed" — merely another name for the appropriated consciousness already discussed — and of those seeds being "placed within the earth-element," merely another name for the four abodes of consciousness; such sūtra language is spoken with a hidden intention, whereas the Abhidharma speaks directly in terms of the dharmas' own true characteristics. Properly understood, the sūtra's naming of craving alone as "the origin" refers specifically to the cause of continuation, while the verse naming karma, craving, and ignorance together speaks more fully of both the cause of coming-into-being and the cause of its continuation, together with the causes underlying each.
經就勝故說愛為集,理實所餘亦是集諦。如是理趣由何證知?餘契經中亦說餘故。如薄伽梵伽他中言:業愛及無明,為因招後行,令諸有相續,名補特伽羅。又契經說五種種子,此即別名說有取識。又彼經說置地界中,此即別名說四識住。故經所說是密意言,阿毘達磨依法相說。然經中說愛為集者,偏說起因。伽他中說業愛無明皆為因者,具說生起及彼因因。
The sūtra names craving as the origin because it does so with reference to what is most prominent; in truth, the other causes as well are also, properly speaking, the truth of the origin. How is this principle known? Because other sūtras likewise speak of these other causes. As the Blessed One states in a verse: karma, craving, and ignorance serve as causes bringing about future formations, causing the continuity of existence — this is what is called a person. A further sūtra speaks of five kinds of seed — this is simply another name for the appropriated consciousness. That same sūtra speaks of these being placed within the earth-element — this is simply another name for the four abodes of consciousness. Hence what the sūtra states is spoken with a hidden intention, whereas the Abhidharma speaks directly according to the true characteristics of the dharmas. As for the sūtra's statement that craving alone is the origin, this speaks one-sidedly of only the cause of continuation. The verse's statement that karma, craving, and ignorance are all causes speaks fully of both the cause of coming-into-being and the cause of continuation, together with their underlying causes.
What, precisely, is meant by "coming-into-being" and by "continuation"? The actual manifestation of a distinct individual existence — differentiated by realm, destiny, and mode of birth — is called coming-into-being; the subsequent, undifferentiated continuity of that same existence going forward is called continuation. Karma and craving-for-existence serve, respectively, as the cause of each in turn, much as a seed serves as the cause of a sprout distinguished by its particular kind (rice, wheat, and so on), while water serves as the cause sustaining the continued growth of any sprout whatsoever, without regard to kind. Why is craving specifically the cause of continuation? Because, apart from craving, a future existence does not arise — among those who die possessing craving and those who die free of it, a further future existence is observed to arise only for the former, showing that continuation tracks the presence or absence of craving precisely. It is also observed that wherever craving toward some object is present, the mind's continuum repeatedly and habitually inclines toward that same object — from which it can be inferred that craving is what drives the mental continuum onward toward a future existence in general. And in the grasping of a future body, no other factor clings as tenaciously as craving does — like a paste of vetch-bean powder mixed with water and applied to the skin while bathing, which, once dried, sticks fast and resists removal more stubbornly than anything else; self-love clings to a future body in just this same tenacious way, confirming craving's role as the cause of continuation.
何法名生?何法名起?界趣生等品類差別自體出現,說名為生。若無差別後有相續,說名為起。業與有愛如其次第為彼二因,譬如種子與穀麥等別種類芽為能生因、水與一切無差別芽為能起因,業及有愛為生起因應知亦爾。愛為起因何理為證?離愛後有必不起故。謂有愛離愛二俱命終,唯見有愛者後有更起。由此理證愛為起因,起有起無定隨愛故。又由愛故相續趣後,現見若於是處有愛,則心相續數趣於彼。由此比知,以有愛故能令相續馳趣後有。又取後身,更無有法封執堅著如貪愛者,如蓽豆屑於澡浴時和水塗身,至乾燥位著身難離,餘無以加。如是無有餘為因法,執取後身如我愛者,由此理證愛為起因。
What is meant by coming-into-being, and what is meant by continuation? The actual manifestation of a distinct individual entity, differentiated by realm, destiny, birth, and so forth, is called coming-into-being. The subsequent, undifferentiated continuity of that same existence is called continuation. Karma and craving-for-existence serve, respectively, as the cause of each of these two, just as a seed serves as the cause capable of generating a sprout distinguished by its particular kind, while water serves as the cause capable of sustaining the continued growth of any sprout, without distinction as to kind — so too should karma and craving-for-existence be understood as, respectively, the cause of coming-into-being and the cause of continuation. By what reasoning is craving established as the cause of continuation? Because, apart from craving, a future existence definitely does not arise — among those who die possessing craving and those who die free of craving, only in the case of the one possessing craving is a further future existence observed to arise. By this reasoning it is established that craving is the cause of continuation, since whether continuation occurs or not is determined precisely by the presence or absence of craving. Moreover, it is because of craving that the mental continuum races onward toward a future existence — it is directly observed that wherever craving is present with respect to some object, the mental continuum repeatedly inclines toward that object. By analogy, it can be inferred that it is because of craving that the mental continuum is driven onward toward a future existence. Moreover, in the grasping of a future body, there is no other dharma that clings as tenaciously as craving does — like a paste made of vetch-bean powder mixed with water and applied to the body while bathing, which, once dried, sticks fast to the body and is difficult to remove, surpassing everything else in tenacity. In just the same way, there is no other causal factor that grasps a future body as tenaciously as self-love does — and by this reasoning too, craving is established as the cause of continuation.
We should flag the seed-and-water analogy as a genuinely precise piece of causal reasoning, distinguishing two different explanatory roles that easily get collapsed together in looser accounts of dependent origination: karma determines the specific kind of future rebirth (which realm, which destiny, which mode of birth — the "seed," determining rice versus wheat), while craving determines only that continuation happens at all, indifferently to which kind (the "water," sustaining any sprout whatsoever). We have preserved this two-factor structure clearly, since the passage's subsequent evidence (the dying-with-craving versus dying-without-craving observation, and the bean-paste simile) is specifically evidence for craving's narrower role as continuation's cause, not for karma's role, which the passage treats as comparatively less in need of separate proof here.
We should also note the vetch-bean paste simile (蓽豆屑, a bean-flour paste used as a period cleansing/exfoliating agent in ancient Indian bathing practice) is a concrete, culturally specific image we have kept in its original form — a paste applied wet that becomes stubbornly adhesive once dry — rather than substituting a more familiar modern analogy, since the text's own point depends on this specific physical property (fluid and easily removed while wet, but nearly impossible to remove once dried) rather than on stickiness in general.
9. The Two Truths: The Jar That Breaks, and What Never Stops Being Cognized
Beyond the four noble truths, the sūtras teach a further, cross-cutting distinction: two kinds of truth, conventional truth and ultimate truth. The treatise offers a precise test for telling them apart. If, for some thing, the cognition of that thing ceases the moment the thing is physically broken apart, that thing is a matter of conventional truth — a jar, once smashed into fragments, no longer sustains the cognition "jar"; cloth, likewise, once torn apart. The same holds even without physical breakage: if wisdom can analytically resolve a thing into its more basic components such that the cognition of the original thing disappears, that too is merely conventional — water, once wisdom resolves it into visible form and its other underlying constituents, no longer sustains the cognition "water," and the same holds for fire. Prior to being broken apart or analytically resolved, such things are simply designated by name on the basis of ordinary worldly perception; because they exist only in this designated, provisional sense, they are called "conventional." Within the framework of conventional truth, saying "there is a jar" is genuinely true, not false — and this is precisely what conventional truth means.
如是世尊說諦有四。餘經復說:諦有二種,一世俗諦、二勝義諦。如是二諦,其相云何?頌曰:彼覺破便無,慧析餘亦爾,如瓶水世俗,異此名勝義。論曰:若彼物覺彼破便無,彼物應知名世俗諦。如瓶被破為碎凡時瓶覺則無,衣等亦爾。又若有物以慧析餘彼覺便無亦是世俗,如水被慧析色等時水覺則無,火等亦爾。即於彼物未破析時,以世想名施設為彼,施設有故名為世俗。依世俗理說有瓶等是實非虛,名世俗諦。
The Blessed One thus taught that there are four truths. Other sūtras further state: there are two kinds of truth — conventional truth and ultimate truth. What is the character of these two truths? Verse: that whose cognition ceases once broken, and likewise whatever, once further analyzed by wisdom, its cognition also ceases — such things, like a jar or water, are conventional; whatever differs from this is called ultimate. Explanation: if, for a given thing, the cognition of that thing ceases the moment that thing is physically broken apart, that thing should be understood as a matter of conventional truth. For example, once a jar is smashed into fragments, the cognition "jar" no longer arises; the same holds for something like cloth. Moreover, if there is a thing such that, once wisdom analytically resolves it into its remaining components, the cognition of that thing likewise ceases, this too is conventional — for example, once wisdom analytically resolves water into visible form and so forth, the cognition "water" no longer arises; the same holds for fire and the rest. At the point before such a thing has been broken apart or analytically resolved, worldly convention designates it with a name on the basis of ordinary perception, and because it is established as existing in this way, by designation, it is called conventional. In accordance with the principle of conventional truth, it is said that things like a jar genuinely exist, not falsely, and this is called conventional truth.
Whatever differs from this — where the cognition of a thing survives even physical breakage, and survives even the most thorough analytical resolution wisdom can perform — is a matter of ultimate truth. When something like visible form is broken down all the way to its ultimate, indivisible particles, or when superior wisdom strips away associated properties such as taste, the cognition of that underlying reality persists at every stage without exception, and the same holds for feeling and the other aggregates. Because these are genuinely and truly existent in this deeper sense, they are called "ultimate," and saying "there is form" within the framework of ultimate truth is genuinely true, not false. The earlier master-teachers offer a complementary formulation: whatever dharmas are apprehended by supramundane wisdom, and by the correct mundane wisdom subsequently attained in its wake, are matters of ultimate truth; whatever dharmas are apprehended by any other kind of cognition are matters of conventional truth.
若物異此,名勝義諦。謂彼物覺彼破不無,及慧析餘彼覺仍有,應知彼物名勝義諦。如色等物碎至極微,或以勝慧析除味等,彼覺恒有,受等亦然,此真實有故名勝義。依勝義理說有色等是實非虛,名勝義諦。先軌範師作如是說:如出世智及此後得世間正智所取諸法名勝義諦,如此餘智所聚諸法名世俗諦。
Whatever differs from this is called ultimate truth. That is, if, for a given thing, the cognition of that thing does not cease even when it is broken apart, and, even once wisdom analytically resolves it into its remaining components, the cognition of it still persists, such a thing should be understood as a matter of ultimate truth. For example, when something like visible form is broken down all the way to its ultimate, indivisible particles, or when superior wisdom analytically strips away taste and the like, the cognition of it still persists at every stage; the same holds for feeling and the rest. Because these are genuinely and truly existent in this way, they are called ultimate. In accordance with the principle of ultimate truth, it is said that things like form genuinely exist, not falsely, and this is called ultimate truth. The earlier master-teachers explain it this way: whatever dharmas are apprehended by supramundane wisdom, and by the correct mundane wisdom subsequently attained in its wake, are called matters of ultimate truth; whatever dharmas are apprehended, by contrast, by all other kinds of cognition are called matters of conventional truth.
We should flag that this is one of the most historically influential passages in the entire treatise — the classical Abhidharma formulation of the two truths (saṃvṛti-satya and paramārtha-satya), whose vocabulary later Mahāyāna traditions (Madhyamaka especially) would adopt and substantially reinterpret for very different philosophical purposes. Readers familiar with the two-truths distinction from other Buddhist contexts should note that this Sarvāstivāda Abhidharma version defines the distinction specifically in terms of whether a thing survives physical or analytical decomposition — a test tied directly to this school's commitment to genuinely existing, partless ultimate particles (paramāṇu) and irreducible dharmas — which is a narrower and more specific criterion than some later philosophical uses of the same two terms. We have translated this passage on its own terms, as this specific treatise presents it, without importing later doctrinal developments the text itself does not contain.
We should also note the treatise offers two formulations side by side without explicitly reconciling them: its own primary criterion (survives-decomposition versus doesn't), illustrated with the jar and water examples, and the "earlier master-teachers'" alternative criterion (apprehended by supramundane wisdom versus by ordinary cognition). The two are clearly meant to converge in practice, but the text does not walk through why they must always agree — we have presented both exactly as offered, without supplying a bridging argument the passage itself does not make.
10. The Three Wisdoms: Hearing, Reflection, and Meditation
Having explained the truths themselves, the treatise turns to how a practitioner actually approaches the path that sees them. One who has resolved to approach the seeing of the truths should first settle into pure moral discipline, and only then diligently cultivate wisdom — first taking in teachings conducive to seeing the truths through hearing, then diligently seeking out their meaning, then reflecting on that meaning without distortion, and only then cultivating it further through meditative concentration. In this way, the wisdom born of hearing gives rise to the wisdom born of reflection, which in turn gives rise to the wisdom born of meditation. The Vaibhāṣika masters distinguish these three precisely by what each takes as its object: the wisdom born of hearing takes only names or words as its object, since it cannot yet set the literal text aside to observe meaning directly; the wisdom born of reflection takes both name and meaning together, moving at times from text to meaning and at other times from meaning back to text, not yet having set the text aside entirely; and the wisdom born of meditation takes meaning alone as its object, having finally set the text aside and observing meaning directly. A simile captures the progression: it is like a person floating in deep, swift water — one who has never learned to swim cannot release their support; one who has learned but not mastered it sometimes lets go and sometimes clings on; and one who has thoroughly mastered swimming needs no support at all, crossing by their own strength.
已辯諸諦,應說云何方便勤修趣見諦道。頌曰:將趣見諦道,應住戒勤修,聞思修所成,謂名俱義境。論曰:諸有發心將趣見諦,應先安住清淨尸羅,然後勤修聞所成等。謂先攝受順見諦聞,聞已勤求所聞法義,聞法義已無倒思惟,思已方能依定修習。行者如是住戒勤修,依聞所成慧起思所成慧,依思所成慧起修所成慧。此三慧相差別云何?毘婆沙師謂三慧相緣名俱義如次有別:聞所成慧唯緣名境,未能捨文而觀義故。思所成慧緣名義境,有時由文引義、有時由義引文,未全捨文而觀義故。修所成慧唯緣義境,已能捨文唯觀義故。譬若有人浮深駛水,曾未學者不捨所依,曾學未成或捨或執,曾善學者不待所依自力浮渡。三慧亦爾。
Having now explained the truths, we should explain by what skillful means one diligently cultivates to approach the path of seeing the truths. Verse: about to approach the path of seeing the truths, one should settle into moral discipline and diligently cultivate the wisdoms born of hearing, reflection, and meditation, whose objects are, respectively, name, both name and meaning, and meaning. Explanation: whoever has resolved to approach the seeing of the truths should first settle into pure moral discipline, and only then diligently cultivate the wisdom born of hearing and the rest. That is, one first takes in teachings conducive to seeing the truths through hearing; having heard them, one diligently seeks out the meaning of what was heard; having grasped the meaning, one reflects upon it without distortion; and only after such reflection is one able to cultivate it further through meditative concentration. A practitioner who thus settles into moral discipline and diligently cultivates in this way gives rise, on the basis of the wisdom born of hearing, to the wisdom born of reflection, and, on the basis of the wisdom born of reflection, gives rise to the wisdom born of meditation. What distinguishes these three kinds of wisdom? The Vaibhāṣika masters hold that these three differ, respectively, in whether they take as their object name alone, both name and meaning together, or meaning alone: the wisdom born of hearing takes only names as its object, since it is not yet able to set aside the literal text and directly observe the meaning. The wisdom born of reflection takes both name and meaning as its object, since at times it proceeds from text to meaning and at other times from meaning to text, not yet having entirely set aside the text. The wisdom born of meditation takes only meaning as its object, since it is already able to set aside the text entirely and observe the meaning alone. It is like a person floating in deep, swift-flowing water: one who has never learned to swim cannot let go of some support; one who has learned but not yet mastered the skill sometimes lets go and sometimes clings to a support; and one who has thoroughly mastered swimming needs no support at all, crossing by their own strength alone. The three kinds of wisdom are analogous to these three.
An objection follows: if the wisdom born of reflection takes both name and meaning as its object, does it really deserve to count as a genuinely distinct third category, rather than simply being a mixture of the other two? On close examination, the treatise finds no fault in keeping all three distinct: the superior wisdom a practitioner generates in dependence on hearing an authoritative teaching is called wisdom born of hearing; the superior wisdom generated in dependence on correctly reasoning through that teaching is called wisdom born of reflection; and the superior wisdom generated in dependence on cultivating meditative concentration is called wisdom born of meditation. The phrase "born of" in each name indicates that each kind of wisdom is brought about by its respective cause, just as ordinary speech calls a living ox "grass-fed" — meaning the ox is sustained and nourished by eating grass, not that the ox simply consists of grass itself.
有言:若爾,思慧不成。謂此既通緣名緣義,如次應是聞修所成。今詳三相無過別者,謂修行者依聞至教所生勝慧名聞所成,依思正理所生勝慧名思所成,依修等持所生勝慧名修所成。說所成言顯三勝慧是聞思等三因所成,猶如世間於命牛等如次說是食草所成。
Some object: if this is so, then the wisdom born of reflection cannot properly be established as its own category, since it takes both name and meaning as its object, it would, by this same logic, simply amount to a combination of the wisdom born of hearing and the wisdom born of meditation. Upon careful examination, however, there is no fault in distinguishing these three: the superior wisdom that a practitioner generates in dependence on hearing an authoritative teaching is called wisdom born of hearing; the superior wisdom generated in dependence on correctly reasoning through it is called wisdom born of reflection; and the superior wisdom generated in dependence on cultivating meditative concentration is called wisdom born of meditation. The phrase "born of" indicates that these three kinds of superior wisdom are each brought about by their respective cause, just as, in ordinary worldly speech, one says of a living ox that it is grass-fed.
We should flag the swimming simile and the "grass-fed ox" simile as addressing two different aspects of the same three-wisdoms scheme: the swimming simile illustrates a progression in independence from external support (text, in this case), while the ox simile addresses a more technical linguistic point — that "born of X" names an effect by its generating cause without claiming the effect is made of or identical to that cause. We have kept both similes distinct, since they answer different questions (how do the three wisdoms differ in character, versus what does the naming convention itself mean) rather than treating them as making the same point twice.
We should also note the objection and reply preserved here address a genuine structural worry about this threefold scheme: if wisdom born of reflection takes "both name and meaning," doesn't it just reduce to a blend of the other two, undermining its claim to be a distinct third stage? The treatise's reply shifts the basis of classification from what each wisdom takes as its object to what each wisdom is generated by (hearing, reasoning, or meditative cultivation, respectively) — a subtle but important move, since it means the three-wisdoms scheme is ultimately a causal classification rather than a purely object-based one, even though the object-based description (name / both / meaning) is what the initial verse and explanation lead with.
11. Purifying the Vessel: Contentment, Few Desires, and the Four Noble Lineages
The treatise now asks how a diligent practitioner keeps the "vessel" of body and mind pure enough for cultivation to succeed quickly. Purity comes about through three causes: bodily and mental seclusion, contentment paired with having few desires, and abiding in the four noble lineages. Bodily seclusion means avoiding mixed, crowded dwelling with others; mental seclusion means being free of unwholesome discursive thought — both readily accomplished once contentment and few desires are in place. Contentment means being without discontent; having few desires means being without excessive desire. Since "seeking more" might seem to concern the unobtained just as much as excessive desire does, the treatise refines the distinction: discontent is feeling disappointed that what one has already obtained is not fine or plentiful enough, while excessive desire is seeking fineness or abundance in what one has not yet obtained. Contentment and few desires directly counter these two respectively, are rooted in non-greed, and can pervade all three realms (even undefiled cultivation); discontent and excessive desire, by contrast, are rooted in desire-greed itself and confined to the desire realm alone.
諸有欲於修精勤學者,如何淨身器令修速成?頌曰:具身心遠離,無不足大欲,謂已得未得,多求名所無。治相違界三,無漏無貪性。論曰:身器清淨略由三因。何等謂三因?一身心遠離、二喜足少欲、三住四聖種。身遠離者,離相雜住。心遠離者,離不善尋。此二易可成,由喜足少欲。言喜足者無不喜足,少欲者無大欲。所無二種差別云何?對法諸師咸作是說:於已得妙衣服等更多求名不喜足,於未得妙衣等多希求名大欲。豈不更求亦緣未得,此二差別便應不成?是故此中應作是說:於所已得不妙不多悵望不歡名不喜足,於所未得衣服等事求妙求多名為大欲。喜足少欲能治此故,與此相違應知差別。喜足少欲通三界無漏,所治二種唯欲界所繫。喜足少欲體是無貪,所治二種欲貪為性。
For those who wish to diligently apply themselves in cultivation, how should the vessel of body and mind be purified so that cultivation quickly succeeds? Verse: possessing bodily and mental seclusion, being without discontent and without excessive desire — meaning, with respect to what one has already obtained or not yet obtained, seeking still more is called being "without." These counteract three opposing things across the three realms, and have non-greed as their nature. Explanation: the purity of the vessel comes about, in brief, through three causes. What are these three? First, bodily and mental seclusion; second, contentment and having few desires; third, abiding in the four noble lineages. Bodily seclusion means being apart from mixed, crowded dwelling. Mental seclusion means being free of unwholesome discursive thought. These two are readily accomplished through contentment and having few desires. Contentment means being without discontent; having few desires means being without excessive desire. What is the difference between these two? The masters of Abhidharma uniformly explain it this way: seeking still more with respect to fine clothing one has already obtained is called discontent; excessively desiring fine clothing one has not yet obtained is called excessive desire. But does not seeking more also concern what has not yet been obtained, collapsing this distinction? It should therefore instead be said: feeling disappointed that what one has already obtained is not fine or plentiful enough is discontent; seeking fineness or abundance in clothing and similar things one has not yet obtained is excessive desire. Contentment and having few desires counteract these two respectively, and their character should be understood as the direct opposite. Contentment and few desires pervade all three realms and can be undefiled, whereas the two things they counteract are bound only to the desire realm. The essential nature of contentment and few desires is non-greed, while the essential nature of the two things they counteract is desire-greed itself.
Because they are capable of generating many noble ones, contentment and few desires, cultivated as a stable disposition, are called the "noble lineages" — four in total, all rooted in non-greed. The first three consist simply in contentment with whatever robes, food and drink, and bedding one happens to receive; the fourth consists in delight in abandonment and cultivation, its non-greed lying in its capacity to relinquish craving for continued existence itself. These four exist to serve the Buddha's disciples, who give up worldly possessions and occupations specifically in search of liberation: the Buddha compassionately established two things supportive of the path in their place — basic requisites and spiritual activity. The first three noble lineages are the requisites; the fourth is the activity — and one who relies on the requisites to take up that activity will not be long from liberation. These four exist specifically to counteract four kinds of arising craving that a sūtra describes with respect to robes, food and drink, bedding, and existence-or-nonexistence itself — craving that arises when it should arise, abides when it should abide, and takes hold when it should take hold, on each of these four occasions. Viewed from a complementary angle, the Buddha taught these four lineages to both temporarily quiet and ultimately eliminate craving for "what belongs to me" (such as clothing) and for "my own body" itself: the first three lineages temporarily quiet craving for the first three; the fourth permanently eliminates all four forms of craving, including craving for continued existence.
能生眾聖故名聖種。四聖種體亦是無貪,四中前三體唯喜足,謂於衣服飲食臥具隨所得中皆生喜足,第四聖種謂樂斷修,如何亦用無貪為體?以能棄捨有欲貪故。為顯何義立四聖種?以諸弟子捨俗生具及俗事業,為求解脫歸佛出家。法主世尊愍彼安立助道二事:一者生具、二者事業。前三即是助道生具,最後即是助道事業。汝等若能依前生具作後事業,解脫非久。何故安立如是二事?為欲對治四種愛生,故契經言:苾芻諦聽!愛因衣服應生時生、應住時住、應執時執。如是愛因飲食臥具及有無有,皆如是說。為治此四說四聖種。即依此義更異門說,謂佛為欲暫息永除我所我事欲,故說四聖種。我所事者謂衣服等,我事者謂自身,緣彼貪名為欲。為暫止息前三貪故說前三聖種,為永滅除四種貪故說第四聖種。
Because they are capable of generating many noble ones, they are called noble lineages. The essential nature of the four noble lineages is likewise non-greed. Among the four, the first three consist solely in contentment — generating contentment with whatever one happens to obtain in clothing, food and drink, and bedding. The fourth noble lineage consists in delight in abandonment and cultivation — how can this too have non-greed as its essential nature? Because it is capable of relinquishing the greed for existence. For what purpose are these four noble lineages established? Because the Buddha's disciples, in giving up worldly possessions and occupations, go forth and take refuge in the Buddha in search of liberation. The Blessed One compassionately established, for their benefit, two things supportive of the path: basic requisites, and activity. The first three noble lineages are the requisites supportive of the path; the last is the activity supportive of the path. If you are able to rely on these requisites and thereby take up this activity, liberation will not be long in coming. Why are these two things established in this way? In order to counteract four kinds of arising craving. As a sūtra states: monks, listen carefully! Craving arises, when it should arise, on account of robes; abides, when it should abide, on account of robes; and takes hold, when it should take hold, on account of robes. The same is said of craving arising on account of food and drink, bedding, and existence-or-nonexistence. It is in order to counteract these four that the four noble lineages are taught. On the basis of this same meaning, it can also be explained through a further approach: the Buddha, wishing to both temporarily quiet and ultimately eliminate craving for what belongs to me and for my own body, taught the four noble lineages. What belongs to me refers to things such as clothing; my own body refers to oneself; and craving with respect to these is called desire. The first three noble lineages are taught in order to temporarily quiet the first three forms of craving; the fourth is taught in order to permanently eliminate all four forms of craving.
We should flag the treatise's careful, almost legalistic refinement of "discontent" versus "excessive desire" as a genuinely useful psychological distinction: the first concerns one's attitude toward what one already has (dissatisfaction with its quality or quantity), while the second concerns one's attitude toward what one lacks (wanting more than is needed) — and the treatise explicitly revises its own first-pass definition after noticing the initial formulation didn't cleanly separate the two, a small but honest piece of philosophical self-correction we have preserved rather than smoothing over.
We should also note the fourth noble lineage — "delight in abandonment and cultivation" — occupies a different logical category from the first three: the first three are about contentment with material sustenance (a restraint on craving for what one physically needs), while the fourth is about active enthusiasm for spiritual practice itself, which the text explains still counts as "non-greed" specifically because it displaces and relinquishes the deeper, more fundamental craving for continued existence — a different and more far-reaching target than mere dissatisfaction over robes or food. We have kept this asymmetry between the fourth lineage and the first three visible rather than treating all four as parallel instances of the same basic virtue.
12. The Two Gates of Entry, and the Three Stages of Skeleton Contemplation
The treatise now names the two essential gates for correctly entering meditative cultivation: the contemplation of impurity, and mindfulness of breathing. One in whom desire arises intensely and repeatedly — a "desire-type" practitioner — correctly enters cultivation through contemplating impurity; one whose mind is much disturbed by discursive thought — a "thought-type" practitioner — correctly enters through mindfulness of breathing. Two explanations are offered for why breathing specifically counters discursive thought: some teachers hold that mindfulness of breathing, unlike impurity-contemplation, does not involve many different objects, and so is capable of stilling a mind scattered by thought, whereas impurity-contemplation's many objects — differences of color and shape — tend to provoke further discursive thought rather than calming it; other teachers hold instead that mindfulness of breathing operates through an inward-turned mode (attending to something internal), while impurity-contemplation operates mostly through an outward-turned mode (attending to external objects), and only an inward-turned practice is capable of stilling an outward-scattering mind.
已說修所依器。由何門故能正入修?頌曰:入修要二門,不淨觀息念,貪尋增上者,如次第應修。論曰:正入修門要者有二,一不淨觀、二持息念。誰於何門能正入修?如次應知。貪尋增者,謂貪猛盛數現在前,如是有情名貪行者,彼觀不淨能正入修。尋多亂心名尋行者,彼依息念能正入修。有餘師言:此持息念非多緣故能止亂尋,不淨多緣顯形差別引多尋故治彼無能。有餘復言:此時息念內門轉故能止亂尋,不淨多於外門轉故,猶如眼識治彼無能。
We have now explained the vessel on which cultivation depends. Through what gate does one correctly enter cultivation? Verse: entering cultivation requires two gates — the contemplation of impurity and mindfulness of breathing — to be cultivated respectively by one dominated by desire and one dominated by discursive thought. Explanation: the essential gates for correctly entering cultivation are two: the contemplation of impurity, and mindfulness of breathing. Who correctly enters cultivation through which gate? This should be understood in the following order. Dominated by desire means one in whom desire arises intensely and repeatedly; such a being is called a desire-type practitioner, and it is by contemplating impurity that such a person correctly enters cultivation. One whose mind is much disturbed by discursive thought is called a thought-type practitioner, and it is by relying on mindfulness of breathing that such a person correctly enters cultivation. Some teachers say: mindfulness of breathing, precisely because it does not involve many different objects, is capable of stilling disturbing discursive thought; impurity contemplation, by contrast, involves many objects, differences of color and shape, which tend to provoke further discursive thought, and so is incapable of counteracting it. Other teachers further say: mindfulness of breathing operates through an inward-turned mode, and is thereby capable of stilling disturbing thought; impurity contemplation, by contrast, mostly operates through an outward-turned mode, and so, like visual consciousness, is incapable of counteracting it.
Turning first to impurity-contemplation, the treatise identifies desire as coming in four distinct kinds — desire for attractive color, for attractive shape, for exquisite touch, and for being served and attended to — each countered by contemplating a corpse in a specific state: bruised and discolored counters the first, devoured and mangled counters the second, infested with maggots counters the third, and motionless and unresponsive counters the fourth. But contemplating a skeleton counters all four kinds of desire at once, since a bare skeleton contains none of the features that could provoke any of them — making skeleton-contemplation the universal method worth discussing first, though, being a matter of imaginative mental application taking only a limited object, it can only suppress affliction temporarily rather than sever it permanently. A practitioner passes through three stages in cultivating it. In the first, initial practice, one fixes the mind on a part of one's own body and imaginatively contemplates its flesh rotting away to reveal clean bone, then the whole skeleton, then a second skeleton, then progressively more — filling a room, a monastery, a village, a country, finally the entire earth to the very edge of the ocean — before gradually contracting this vast visualization back down to a single skeleton once more.
此中先應辯不淨觀。如是觀相云何?頌曰:為通治四貪,且辯觀骨鎖,廣至海復略,名初習業位,除足至頭半,名為已熟修,繫心在眉間,名超作意位。論曰:修不淨觀正為治貪,然貪差別略有四種:一顯色貪、二形色貪、三妙觸貪、四供奉貪。緣青瘀等修不淨觀治第一貪,緣彼食等修不淨觀治第二貪,緣蟲蛆等修不淨觀治第三貪,緣屍不動修不淨觀治第四貪。若緣骨鎖修不淨觀,通能對治如是四貪,以骨鎖中無四貪境,故應且辯修骨鎖觀。此唯勝解作意攝故、少分緣故,不斷煩惱,唯能制伏令不現行。然瑜伽師修骨鎖觀總有三位:一初習業、二已熟修、三超作意。謂觀行者欲修如是不淨觀時,應先繫心於自身分,或於足指或額或餘,隨所樂處心得住已,依勝解力於自身分假想思惟,皮肉爛墮漸令骨淨,乃至具觀全身骨鎖。見一具已復觀第二,如是漸次廣至一房一寺一園一村一國,乃至遍地以海為邊,於其中間骨鎖充滿,為令勝解得增長故。於所廣事漸略而觀,乃至唯觀一具骨鎖,齊此漸略不淨觀成,名瑜伽師初習業位。
Among these, the contemplation of impurity should be discussed first. What is the character of this contemplation? Verse: in order to universally counteract the four kinds of desire, the contemplation of the skeleton is to be discussed first — expanding out as far as the sea and then contracting again is called the stage of initial practice; removing everything from the feet up through half of the skull is called the stage of matured cultivation; fixing the mind between the eyebrows is called the stage of transcending mental application. Explanation: the cultivation of impurity-contemplation is specifically intended to counteract desire; desire, however, comes in four distinct kinds, in brief: desire for color, for shape, for exquisite touch, and for being served. Cultivating impurity-contemplation with a bruised, discolored corpse as its object counteracts the first kind of desire; with a corpse being devoured as its object counteracts the second; with a corpse infested by maggots as its object counteracts the third; with a motionless corpse as its object counteracts the fourth. If, however, one cultivates impurity-contemplation taking the skeleton as its object, this is capable of universally counteracting all four kinds of desire, since a skeleton contains none of the objects that could provoke any of these four — for this reason, the cultivation of skeleton-contemplation should be discussed first. Because this belongs entirely to the category of resolved mental application, and because it takes only a small, limited object, it does not sever affliction, but is only capable of suppressing it, preventing it from becoming manifest. A yoga practitioner cultivating skeleton-contemplation passes through three stages: initial practice, matured cultivation, and transcending mental application. When a practitioner wishing to cultivate this contemplation begins, they should first fix the mind on a part of their own body, and, by the power of resolved imagination, contemplate that part as if its skin and flesh were rotting away, gradually exposing clean bone, until the entire skeleton of the whole body is contemplated. Once one skeleton has been visualized, one visualizes a second, and so on, gradually expanding to fill a room, a monastery, a garden, a village, a country, until the entire earth, bounded by the ocean, is filled with skeletons, in order to strengthen the power of this resolved imagination. One then gradually contracts this visualization back down, until only a single skeleton is contemplated once more; at this point, this expand-then-contract form of impurity-contemplation is complete, and this is called the stage of initial practice.
In the second stage, matured cultivation, the practitioner strengthens the contracted visualization further by mentally removing bone after bone from that single skeleton — first the feet, then progressively more — until only half of the skull remains, the mind fixed upon that half-skull alone. In the third and final stage, transcending mental application, the practitioner removes even that remaining half-skull, fixing the mind instead between the eyebrows and abiding there in serene, single-pointed stillness — completing the most extremely contracted form of the practice.
為令略觀勝解力增,於一具中先除足骨思惟餘骨繫心而住,漸次乃至除頭半骨思惟半骨繫心而住,齊此轉略不淨觀成,名瑜伽師已熟修位。為令略觀勝解自在,除半頭骨繫心眉間,專注一緣湛然而住,齊此極略不淨觀成,名瑜伽師超作意位。
In order to further strengthen the power of this contracted visualization, one begins, within that single skeleton, by mentally removing the foot bones, contemplating and fixing the mind upon the remaining bones, and gradually continues, removing bone after bone, up until only half of the skull remains, contemplating and fixing the mind upon that half-skull alone. At this point, this further-contracted impurity-contemplation is complete, and this stage is called the stage of matured cultivation. In order to attain complete mastery over this contracted visualization, one then removes even the remaining half-skull, fixing the mind instead between the eyebrows, concentrating single-pointedly on this one object, abiding there in serene stillness. At this point, this most extremely contracted form of impurity-contemplation is complete, and this stage is called the stage of transcending mental application.
We should flag that this section reads less like abstract doctrinal argument and more like an actual guided meditation instruction, with a clear, followable three-stage sequence (expand the visualization outward to the entire visible world, then progressively contract it back down to a single point of focus between the eyebrows) — a structure genuinely usable as a practice outline, not merely a description. We have kept the instructional, second-person-implied character of the original as much as English syntax allows, since the passage's practical, step-by-step nature is part of its content, not incidental to it.
We should also note the treatise is explicit that this practice, however vivid, only suppresses affliction temporarily rather than severing it permanently, since it works through "resolved" or imaginative mental application (a deliberately constructed mental image) rather than through the direct seeing of the four truths that alone brings about genuine, lasting severance — a distinction worth keeping in mind, since later sections of this fascicle return to the sharper, permanent kind of severance achieved through the path of seeing.
13. Classifying Impurity-Contemplation, and Introducing Mindfulness of Breathing
The treatise now systematically classifies impurity-contemplation: its essential nature, the stages it can be cultivated in, what it takes as its object, where it arises, its mode of activity, which time it takes as its object, whether it is contaminated, and how it is attained. Impurity-contemplation has non-greed as its essential nature, and can be cultivated across ten stages — the four dhyānas, their four preparatory stages, the intermediate dhyāna, and the desire realm. It takes as its object only visible form (color and shape) belonging to the desire realm that can actually be seen. It arises only among humans, and only in three of the four continents, excluding the northern continent — not even among beings of other destinies, let alone other realms. Since it is named for "impurity," its mode of activity is exclusively that of perceiving impurity; the object it takes belongs to whatever time the practitioner exists in, except for an object that has not yet arisen, which can belong to any of the three times. Because it operates entirely through resolved, imaginative mental application, it is by nature always contaminated, never uncontaminated; and it can be attained either automatically, through freedom from defilement, or freshly, through preparatory effort, since both cases occur.
此不淨觀何性?幾地?緣何境?何處生?何行相?緣何世?為有漏、為無漏?為離染得、為加行得?頌曰:無貪性十地,緣欲色人生,不淨自世緣,有漏通二得。論曰:如先所問今次第答。謂此觀以無貪為性通依十地,謂四靜慮及四近分中間欲界,唯緣欲界所見色境。所見者何?謂顯形色。緣義為境,由此已成。唯人趣生,三洲除北,尚非餘趣況餘界生。既立不淨名,唯不淨行相。隨在何世緣自世境,若不生法通緣三世。既唯勝解作意相應,此觀理應唯是有漏。通離染得及加行得,由有曾得未曾得故。
What is the nature of this impurity-contemplation? How many stages does it depend on? What does it take as its object? Where does it arise? What is its mode of activity? What time does it take as its object? Is it contaminated or uncontaminated? Is it attained through freedom from defilement, or through preparatory effort? Verse: it has non-greed as its nature, depends on ten stages, takes desire-realm form as its object, arises among humans; it is impurity, takes an object of its own time, is contaminated, and is attained by both means. Explanation: we now answer, in order, the questions raised. This contemplation has non-greed as its essential nature, and can be cultivated relying on ten stages — the four dhyānas and their four preparatory stages, together with the intermediate dhyāna and the desire realm — taking as its object only visible form belonging to the desire realm that can actually be seen. What is meant by what can be seen? It refers to color and shape. That its object is visible form in this meaningful sense is thereby established. It arises only among those born in the human destiny, and, among humans, only in three of the four continents, excluding the northern continent — it does not even occur among beings of other destinies, let alone among beings born in other realms. Since it is established under the name impurity, its mode of activity is exclusively that of perceiving impurity. Whatever time the practitioner exists in, the object taken belongs to that same time; however, with respect to a dharma that has not yet arisen, it can take an object belonging to any of the three times. Since it is associated exclusively with resolved mental application, this contemplation should, by reason, be exclusively contaminated. It can be attained either through freedom from defilement or through preparatory effort, since there are cases of both having previously attained it and never having previously attained it.
Having explained impurity-contemplation, the treatise turns to mindfulness of breathing (ānāpānasmṛti). "Āna" means holding the in-breath, drawing external air into the body; "apāna" means holding the out-breath, expelling internal air from the body. It is wisdom, empowered by mindfulness, that observes the breath as its object — hence the name "ānāpāna-mindfulness," even though its essential nature is wisdom rather than mindfulness itself, named for mindfulness because mindfulness is what sustains it and keeps the object clear, exactly as with the four foundations of mindfulness. It can be cultivated across five stages — the preparatory stages of the first three dhyānas, the intermediate dhyāna, and the desire realm — since this practice is associated exclusively with equanimous feeling: painful and pleasurable feelings draw forth discursive thought, which this practice specifically counters, so the two cannot coexist, while joy and pleasure run contrary to the single-pointed concentration this practice depends on, so these too cannot coexist with it. Some teachers hold that equanimous feeling is also present within the root stage of the lower three dhyānas themselves, extending the count to eight stages, though not beyond the third dhyāna, since breathing itself ceases once the fourth dhyāna and higher concentrations are actually present.
說不淨觀相差別已,次應辯持息念。此差別相云何?頌曰:息念慧五地,緣風依欲身,二得實外無,有六謂數等。論曰:言息念者,即契經中所說阿那阿波那念。言阿那者,謂持息入,是引外風令入身義。阿波那者,謂持息出,是引內風令出身義。慧由念力觀此為境,故名阿那阿波那念。以慧為性而說念者,念力持故,於境分明所作事成,如念住故。通於五地,謂初二三靜慮近分中間欲界,此念唯與捨相應故。謂苦樂受能順引尋,此念治尋故不俱起。喜樂二受能違專注,此念於境專注故成。由此相違,故不俱起。有說:根本下三靜慮中亦有捨受。彼說依八地,上定現前息無有故。
Having explained the distinguishing characteristics of impurity-contemplation, we should next discuss mindfulness of breathing. What are its distinguishing characteristics? Verse: mindfulness of breathing has wisdom as its nature, is cultivated in five stages, takes wind as its object, arises in dependence on a desire-realm body; it is attained by both means, is real, and does not exist in the formless realm; it has six factors: counting and so on. Explanation: mindfulness of breathing refers to what the sūtras call ānāpānasmṛti. Āna means holding the in-breath, drawing external air inward into the body. Apāna means holding the out-breath, expelling internal air outward from the body. It is wisdom, empowered by the force of mindfulness, that observes this breath as its object, hence it is called ānāpāna-mindfulness. Although its essential nature is wisdom, it is named mindfulness because it is sustained by the power of mindfulness, through which the object becomes clear and the intended task is accomplished, just as with the foundations of mindfulness. It can be cultivated across five stages — the preparatory stages of the first, second, and third dhyānas, the intermediate dhyāna, and the desire realm — since this mindfulness is associated exclusively with equanimous feeling. Painful and pleasurable feelings tend to draw forth discursive thought, and since this mindfulness counters discursive thought, it cannot arise together with them. Joy and pleasure run contrary to single-pointed concentration, whereas this mindfulness depends on concentrating single-pointedly on its object, so, being mutually opposed, they cannot arise together either. Some say that equanimous feeling is also present within the root stage of the lower three dhyānas, and on this account it is cultivated relying on eight stages, since, once the higher concentrations are actually present, breathing itself ceases to exist.
Mindfulness of breathing takes wind — the breath itself — as its object, and arises in dependence on a body belonging to the desire realm, occurring only among beings of the human and heavenly destinies, excluding those born in Uttarakuru. It can be attained either through freedom from defilement or through preparatory effort, and, unlike impurity-contemplation, is associated exclusively with genuine, non-imaginative mental application rather than resolved imagination. Only beings within the true Dharma are capable of cultivating it; non-Buddhist practitioners lack it entirely, since there is no one outside the Buddha's teaching to instruct them in it, and they are, on their own, incapable of perceiving so subtle a phenomenon as the breath's precise workings. This practice reaches its full completeness through six factors: counting, following, fixing, observing, turning, and purifying.
此定緣風,依欲身起。唯人天趣,除北俱盧。通離染得及加行得,唯與真實作意相應。正法有情方能修習,外道無有,無說者故、自不能覺微細法故。此相圓滿由具六因:一數、二隨、三止、四觀、五轉、六淨。
This concentration takes wind as its object, and arises in dependence on a body belonging to the desire realm. It occurs only among beings of the human and heavenly destinies, excluding Uttarakuru. It can be attained either through freedom from defilement or through preparatory effort, and is associated exclusively with genuine mental application. Only beings within the true Dharma are capable of cultivating this practice; non-Buddhist practitioners lack it, since there is no one to teach it to them, and because they are, on their own, incapable of perceiving such a subtle phenomenon. This practice reaches its full completeness through six factors: counting, following, fixing, observing, turning, and purifying.
We should flag a genuinely interesting technical point the treatise makes about naming conventions: mindfulness of breathing is called "mindfulness" even though its actual essential nature is wisdom, because mindfulness is the sustaining power that keeps the breath clearly in view, allowing wisdom to observe it — exactly parallel to how the four foundations of mindfulness (身受心法) are likewise essentially wisdom, named for the mindfulness that supports them. This same naming pattern (X named for what sustains or enables X, rather than for X's own essential substance) recurs across this tradition's technical vocabulary, and we have kept it visible here rather than glossing over the distinction between a practice's name and its actual essential nature.
We should also note the passage draws a sharp contrast between the "resolved," deliberately imaginative mental application underlying impurity-contemplation (visualizing bodies as skeletons, which are not literally present) and the "genuine," non-imaginative mental application underlying mindfulness of breathing (directly attending to the breath as it actually occurs) — this distinction is presented as the reason non-Buddhist practitioners, lacking proper instruction, cannot independently discover the breathing practice, since it requires perceiving something genuinely subtle rather than constructing a vivid mental image. We have preserved this contrast in kind between the two practices, since it explains why the treatise treats them somewhat differently in its classification (e.g., impurity-contemplation is said to be exclusively contaminated, while mindfulness of breathing's status is treated separately in what follows).
14. The Six Factors of Mindfulness of Breathing, in Detail
The treatise now details each of the six factors that bring mindfulness of breathing to completion. Counting means fixing the mind on the in-breath and out-breath without further deliberate effort, relaxing body and mind, and simply maintaining mindful awareness of the count of each breath, from one to ten, neither undercounting nor overcounting, since an unstable count risks the mind becoming either too scattered or too contracted. Three faults can occur here: undercounting (mistaking two breaths for one), overcounting (mistaking one breath for two), and confusion (mistaking an in-breath for an out-breath or vice versa); freed of these three faults, the counting is correct, and if the mind wanders partway through counting to ten, one simply begins again from one, repeating the cycle until concentration is attained. Following means fixing the mind on the breath without further effort and simply tracking its movement, noting whether the in-breath travels throughout the whole body or only part of it, following it with unbroken mindfulness as it moves through the throat, heart, navel, hips, thighs, shins, down to the toes; the out-breath is likewise followed as it leaves the body, out to a distance of one span or one fathom.
此相圓滿由具六因:一數、二隨、三止、四觀、五轉、六淨。數謂繫心緣入出息不作加行,放捨身心唯念憶持入出息數,從一至十不減不增,恐心於現極聚散故。然於此中容有三失:一數減失,於二謂一。二數增失,於一謂二。三雜亂失,於入謂出、於出謂入。若離如是三種過失,名為正數。若十中間心散亂者,復應從一次第數之,終而復始乃至得定。隨謂繫心緣入出息,不作加行隨息而行,念息入出時各遠至何所。謂念息入,為行遍身、為行一分?隨彼息入,行至喉心臍髖髀脛乃至足指,念恒隨逐。若念息出,離身為至一磔一尋,隨所至方念恒隨逐。有餘師說:息出極遠,乃至風輪或吠嵐婆。此不應理,此念真實作意俱故。
This practice reaches its full completeness through six factors: counting, following, fixing, observing, turning, and purifying. Counting means fixing the mind on the in-breath and out-breath as its object, without any further deliberate effort — relaxing the body and mind, and simply maintaining mindful awareness of the count of each in-breath and out-breath, counting from one to ten without undercounting or overcounting, out of concern that the mind might otherwise become excessively scattered or excessively contracted. In this practice, however, three faults may occur: the fault of undercounting, mistaking two breaths for one; the fault of overcounting, mistaking one breath for two; and the fault of confusion, mistaking an in-breath for an out-breath, or an out-breath for an in-breath. When free of these three faults, the counting is called correct. If, partway through counting to ten, the mind becomes scattered, one should begin counting again from one in sequence, repeating this cycle until concentration is attained. Following means fixing the mind on the in-breath and out-breath as its object, without further deliberate effort, simply following the breath as it moves, being mindful of how far each in-breath and out-breath travels. That is, one is mindful of the in-breath: does it travel throughout the whole body, or only through part of it? One follows that in-breath with unbroken mindfulness as it travels to the throat, the heart, the navel, the hips, the thighs, the shins, down even to the toes. When mindful of the out-breath, one likewise follows it with unbroken mindfulness as it leaves the body and travels outward, to a distance of one span or one fathom, wherever it reaches. Some teachers say that the out-breath travels extremely far, all the way to the wind-wheel or to Vairambha. This does not accord with reason, since this practice of mindfulness is always accompanied by genuine mental application.
Fixing means fixing mindfulness exclusively at the tip of the nose, between the eyebrows, or even at the toes — wherever one prefers — settling the mind there, and observing the breath dwelling within the body like a thread strung through a string of beads, noting whether it is cool or warm, harmful or beneficial. Observing means that, having observed the breath-wind itself, one further observes the derived matter composed of the four great elements that accompanies it, together with the mind and mental factors depending on and abiding in that matter — taking the full five aggregates as one's object. Turning means shifting this awareness onward, progressively redirecting it into ever more excellent wholesome roots, all the way up to the stage of supreme mundane dharmas, the final stage of preparation before the path of seeing. Purifying means advancing further still, entering the path of seeing and beyond. Other teachers give a different account of where turning ends and purifying begins: on their view, "turning" spans from the foundations of mindfulness all the way up through the diamond-like concentration immediately preceding arhatship, and only the knowledge of exhaustion attained at arhatship, and what follows it, is properly called "purifying."
止謂繫念唯在鼻端,或在眉間乃至足指,隨所樂處安止其心。觀息住身如珠中縷,為冷為煖、為損為益。觀謂觀察此息風已,兼觀息俱大種造色及依色住心及心所,具觀五蘊以為境界。轉謂移轉,緣息風覺安置後後勝善根中乃至世間第一法位。淨謂昇進入見道等。有餘師說:念住為初,金剛喻定為後名轉,盡智等方名淨,為攝六相故說頌言:持息念應知,有六種異相,謂數隨止觀、轉淨相差別。
Fixing means fixing mindfulness exclusively at the tip of the nose, or between the eyebrows or at the toes, wherever one prefers, settling the mind at that chosen place, and observing the breath dwelling in the body like a thread through beads, noting whether it is cool or warm, harmful or beneficial. Observing means that, having observed this breath-wind, one further observes the derived matter composed of the four great elements that accompanies the breath, together with the mind and mental factors that depend on and abide in that matter, observing the full five aggregates as one's object. Turning means shifting one's attention onward, taking the awareness generated by observing the breath-wind and progressively redirecting it into ever more excellent wholesome roots, all the way up to the stage of supreme mundane dharmas. Purifying means advancing further, entering the path of seeing and beyond. Other teachers say instead: turning begins with the foundations of mindfulness and continues up through the diamond-like concentration; only the knowledge of exhaustion and what follows it are called purifying. In order to summarize these six aspects, a verse states: it should be understood that mindfulness of breathing has six distinct aspects, distinguished as counting, following, fixing, observing, turning, and purifying.
We should flag that this six-factor breathing practice reads as a genuinely usable, sequential meditation manual, moving from a simple counting exercise, through tracking the breath's physical path, to fixing attention at a single point, then broadening observation to the full five aggregates, and finally using the concentration built this way as a launching point toward the path of seeing itself — we have kept the instructional character and concrete physical details (throat, navel, hips, toes) exactly as given, since they are practically load-bearing, not merely illustrative.
We should also flag the treatise's explicit rejection of the claim that the out-breath travels all the way to the cosmological "wind-wheel" or to Vairambha (a name for an extremely powerful cosmic wind in this tradition's cosmology) — dismissed here as inconsistent with the practice's basis in genuine, non-imaginative mental application rather than exaggerated speculation. We have preserved this as a small but telling example of the treatise applying its own internal standards of plausibility even to a scholastic detail, rather than accepting every reported teacher's view uncritically.
15. The Breath's Own Characteristics — Fascicle 22 Complete
The treatise closes its account of mindfulness of breathing with a final set of technical characteristics belonging to the breath itself. The breath belongs to whatever realm the body is born into, since it is simply a part of that body. Its occurrence depends on two distinguishing factors, body and mind together: for one born in the formless realm, in the earliest embryonic stage, in a mindless concentration, or in the fourth dhyāna and above, breathing does not occur at all, since it requires both a body with open pores and passages and a mind belonging to a breathing-compatible stage actually present at the same time. When emerging from the fourth dhyāna and above, and at the moment of birth into a breathing-capable state, the in-breath occurs first; when entering the fourth dhyāna and above, and at the final moment before death, the out-breath occurs last. The breath is reckoned among "the sentient," being part of a sentient being's body, yet is not something "appropriated" in the technical sense, since it is distinct from the sense faculties themselves.
息相差別云何應知?頌曰:入出息隨身,依二差別轉,情數非執受,等流非下緣。論曰:隨身生地,息彼地攝,以息是身一分攝故。此入出息轉依身心差別,以生無色界及羯剌藍等并入無心定及第四定等,此息於彼皆不轉故。謂要身中有諸孔隙,入出息地心正現前,息於爾時方得轉故。出第四定等及初生時息最先入,入第四定等及後死時息最後出。息有情數攝,有情身分故。非有執受,與根相離故。
What should be understood as the distinguishing characteristics of the breath? Verse: the in-breath and out-breath follow the body; they occur in dependence on two distinguishing factors; they are reckoned among the sentient, but are not something appropriated; they are of the nature of equal outflow, and cannot be taken as an object by a lower stage. Explanation: the breath belongs to whatever realm the body is born into, since the breath is included as a part of the body. The occurrence of the in-breath and out-breath depends on two distinguishing factors, since, for one born in the formless realm, or in the earliest embryonic stage, or one who has entered a mindless concentration, or has entered the fourth dhyāna and above, the breath does not occur in any of these cases. That is, the breath can occur only when the body possesses open pores and passages, and a mind belonging to a stage where breathing occurs is actually manifest at that time. When emerging from the fourth dhyāna and above, and at the very moment of birth, the in-breath is the very first to occur; when entering the fourth dhyāna and above, and at the very last moment before death, the out-breath is the very last to occur. The breath is reckoned among the sentient, since it is a part of a sentient being's body. It is not something appropriated, since it is separate from the faculties.
The breath has the nature of "equal outflow," being generated by a cause of the same type as itself, rather than being "nourishment-grown" — indeed, the breath actually grows more subtle, not more pronounced, as the body itself matures and grows larger. Nor is it produced by karmic ripening, since, once interrupted, it can resume and continue afterward, unlike any other kind of karmically ripened form, which cannot resume once interrupted. Finally, the breath can be taken as an object only by a mind belonging to its own stage or a higher one, never by a mind of a lower stage — except for postural and similarly transformation-produced minds, which, being capable of producing results across different realms, are not bound by this restriction. With this account of the breath's own nature, the treatise's discussion of the two gates into cultivation — impurity-contemplation and mindfulness of breathing — comes to a close, completing Fascicle 22 of the Abhidharmakośa.
是等流性,同類因生故。非所長養,身增長時彼損減故。非異熟生,斷已後時更相續故、餘異熟色無如是故。唯自上地心之所緣,非下地威儀,通果心境故。說一切有部俱舍論卷第二十二。
It has the nature of equal outflow, since it is generated by a cause of the same class. It is not nourishment-grown, since the breath actually diminishes as the body grows. It is not produced by ripened fruition, since, once interrupted, it can start up again afterward and continue, whereas no other kind of ripened-fruition form behaves this way. It can be taken as an object only by a mind belonging to its own stage or a higher one, never by a lower stage's mind, except in the case of postural minds, which, being able to produce results across realms, are not so restricted. Abhidharmakośa-śāstra of the Sarvāstivāda School, Fascicle Twenty-Two, [end].
We should flag the treatise's specific physiological claim that the breath grows more subtle, not more pronounced, as the body matures and grows — offered here as the reason breathing is not classified among "nourishment-grown" phenomena (which typically increase as the body grows through food and development). We present this exactly as the treatise's own stated physiological premise, part of this tradition's broader classification scheme for different origins of physical phenomena, without independently verifying it against outside physiological knowledge, ancient or modern.
This closes a fascicle that opened an entirely new chapter of the treatise — Chapter 6, Distinguishing the Noble Ones — moving from the technical apparatus of the anuśayas (Chapter 5, concluded in fascicle 21) into the treatise's account of the path itself: what kind of path accomplishes severance, a close analysis of the four truths and the historically significant Two Truths distinction, the sustained debate over whether pleasure genuinely exists, and finally the concrete, practical instructions for the two entry-gates of meditation — impurity-contemplation and mindfulness of breathing — that a practitioner actually uses to purify the "vessel" of body and mind before approaching the path of seeing. Fascicle 23 will continue this account of the path.