The Four Immeasurables

Having explained the concentrations that serve as support, we should now discuss the virtues cultivated upon that foundation; among these virtues, let us first discuss the immeasurables. Verse: the immeasurables number four, since they serve as antidotes to hatred and the rest; loving-kindness and compassion have non-hatred as their nature; joy and equanimity have non-greed as their nature. Their aspects, in sequence, are: bestowing happiness, removing suffering, rejoicing for beings, and regarding them equally; they take desire-realm sentient beings as their object. Joy depends on the first two dhyānas; the remaining three depend on six grounds, or five, or ten; none of them is able to sever any affliction; when a human being gives rise to any one, three are necessarily accomplished together. Explanation: the immeasurables number four — loving-kindness, compassion, joy, and equanimity. They are called "immeasurable" because they take immeasurable sentient beings as their object, draw forth immeasurable merit, and yield immeasurable results. Why are there exactly four? Because they serve as antidotes to four kinds of especially prevalent obstruction. What are these four obstructions? Malice and the wish to harm; lack of rejoicing in others' good fortune; sensual craving; and hatred. Loving-kindness and the rest are established, in sequence, as antidotes to these. Impurity-contemplation and equanimity both serve as antidotes to sensual craving — what, then, distinguishes them? The Vibhāṣā states: sensual craving is of two kinds, craving for physical form and craving for intercourse; impurity-contemplation and equanimity serve as antidotes to these, respectively, in that order. In actual principle, impurity-contemplation counters craving for intercourse specifically, while equanimity counters craving directed at friends and family. Among the four, the first two have non-hatred as their substance. In actual principle, it should rather be said that compassion has non-harming as its substance, joy is precisely the feeling of joy, and equanimity is precisely non-greed — or, if their accompanying retinue is included, the five aggregates constitute their substance. If equanimity has non-greed as its nature, how can it serve as an antidote to hatred? Because the hatred it counters here is one drawn forth by craving specifically — hence, in actual principle, both non-greed and non-hatred together should be used as its substance. As for how these four immeasurables' aspects differ from one another: "how might I bring it about that all these sentient beings attain such happiness?" — reflecting in this way is to enter loving-kindness's attainment. "How might I bring it about that all these sentient beings are freed from such suffering?" — reflecting in this way is to enter compassion's attainment. "How wonderful that these sentient beings attain happiness and are freed from suffering!" — reflecting in this way is to enter joy's attainment. "These sentient beings are all equal, with neither intimate nor estranged among them" — reflecting in this way is to enter equanimity's attainment. Since these four immeasurables are not actually capable of causing others to genuinely attain happiness and the rest, are they not then a kind of delusion? No — because one genuinely wishes and aspires for them to attain happiness and the rest, and because one's underlying intention is itself free of any distorting delusion, arising in association with a resolved, wholehearted conceptualization. Even granting this were a kind of delusion, what fault would that actually involve? If it should therefore be non-wholesome, this does not hold in principle, since it arises in association with wholesome roots. If it should therefore lead to something unwholesome, this too does not hold in principle, since this very power is capable of countering hatred and the rest. These take as their object all sentient beings of the desire realm, since they serve as antidotes to hatred and the other obstructions that take those very beings as object. Yet a sūtra states: in cultivating loving-kindness and the rest, one contemplates one direction, then the entirety of every world. This sūtra cites a single vessel-world in order to indicate all the sentient beings contained within it.

The third, joy, depends only on the first two dhyānas, since it is included within the feeling of joy, which is absent from the remaining concentration-grounds. The remaining three depend generally on six grounds — the four dhyānas, the not-yet-arrived approach-stage, and the intermediate dhyāna. Some hold they should depend on only five grounds, excluding the not-yet-arrived approach-stage, since this is a virtue that requires unhurried leisure, achievable only by one already free of desire-realm craving. Others hold that these four immeasurables should, as appropriate, depend generally on ten grounds — the desire realm, the four root dhyānas, their approach-stages, and the intermediate dhyāna — intending by this that both the fixed and not-yet-fixed grounds, in both their root and preparatory forms, should all be included among the immeasurables. Although it was stated above that these are capable of countering the four obstructions, they are nevertheless unable to bring about the actual severing of any affliction, since they are included within contaminated root dhyāna, since they arise in association with resolved conceptualization and deliberate mental application, and since they universally take all sentient beings as their object without distinction. At the preparatory stage, they merely suppress hatred and the rest; or, alternatively, they can cause afflictions already severed by other means to remain more distant. As stated above, these can counter the four obstructions — meaning that even the desire realm and the not-yet-arrived approach-stage also have a version of loving-kindness and the rest, resembling in form the cultivated root immeasurables. Once hatred and the other obstructions have been suppressed in this way, one draws forth the severing path, which is capable of actually severing the afflictions; once these afflictions are severed, in the resulting state of freedom from affliction, one then attains the genuine root four immeasurables. From this stage onward, even when one encounters powerful adverse conditions, one is no longer covered over and overwhelmed by hatred and the rest.

For one just beginning this practice, how does one cultivate loving-kindness? First, one reflects on the happiness one has personally experienced, or on hearing described the happiness experienced by buddhas, bodhisattvas, śrāvakas, and pratyekabuddhas, and then forms this thought: "may all sentient beings equally experience such happiness." If one's afflictions are originally so strong that one cannot yet extend this thought equally to everyone, one should divide sentient beings into three categories: friends and loved ones, neutral persons, and enemies. Loved ones are further divided into three grades — superior, middling, and lesser; the neutral category has only one grade; enemies are likewise divided into three — lesser, middling, and superior — making seven grades in total. Having divided beings into these grades, one first generates a genuine, wholehearted resolve to bestow happiness upon one's most beloved. Once this aspiration is accomplished, one gradually cultivates the same resolve toward one's middling and lesser loved ones. Having achieved equal regard across all three grades of loved ones, one next gradually cultivates this same resolve toward the neutral person, and then toward one's lesser, middling, and superior enemies in turn — through the power of repeated practice, one becomes able to generate the very same wish to bestow happiness even upon one's worst enemy as one holds toward one's most beloved. Once this resolve is achieved without any regression, one next gradually expands the scope of its object — extending the mental projection, in stages, to one township, one country, one direction, and finally every world-system — until the aspiration to bestow happiness pervades everywhere without exception. This is how the cultivation of the immeasurable of loving-kindness is accomplished. If one directs this practice toward sentient beings admired for their genuine virtues, one can cultivate loving-kindness's concentration and bring it to swift completion; this is not so for beings admired merely for their faults, since one who has cut off their wholesome roots still has some virtue worth recognizing, and even a rhinoceros-like solitary pratyekabuddha has some fault that can be identified, given that the fruits of their prior merit or transgressions are presently visible. Compassion and joy should be cultivated according to this same pattern, understood as follows: contemplating sentient beings as sunk within an ocean of manifold suffering, one wishes for them all to attain liberation from it; and envisioning sentient beings attaining happiness and being freed from suffering, one feels a deep, genuine rejoicing — how truly wonderful this is! Equanimity is cultivated by starting first from the neutral person, then gradually extending, in the same stepwise manner, all the way to generating the very same equanimous mind toward one's most beloved as one holds toward the neutral person. These four immeasurables are given rise to specifically as one begins as a human being, not otherwise; whenever any one is first attained, three are necessarily accomplished together at that same time. For one born into the third dhyāna and above, only joy specifically fails to be accomplished, since joy requires the first two dhyānas alone. The immeasurables have now been explained; liberation is discussed next.

The immeasurables have now been explained; liberation is discussed next. Verse: the liberations number eight; the first three have non-greed as their nature; two, two, one, one depend on their respective concentrations; the next four have the four formless attainments' wholesome states as their nature; the liberation of the cessation of feeling and perception arises immediately after a subtle-subtle mind, by means of one's own ground's pure mind, or by emerging from a lower ground's uncontaminated mind; the first three take as object the desire realm's visible form; the next four take as object the class-inference type of path with respect to one's own and higher grounds' truths of suffering, origination, and cessation, together with their non-analytical cessation and space. Explanation: the liberations number eight: first, the liberation of possessing an internal perception of form while contemplating external forms; second, the liberation of lacking an internal perception of form while contemplating external forms; third, the liberation of pure form, fully abiding having personally realized it in the body; the next four liberations are the four formless attainments themselves; and the liberation of the attainment of cessation of feeling and perception is the eighth. Among these eight, the first three have non-greed as their nature, since they serve as a proximate antidote to craving. Yet a sūtra speaks of them in terms of "perception" and "contemplation," because perception and contemplation are what predominate within them. Among these three, the first two operate through the aspect of impurity, producing mental images such as a corpse's blue-black bruising and the rest; the third liberation operates through the aspect of purity, producing mental images of a clean, bright radiance. All three, together with their accompanying retinue, have the five aggregates as their substance. The first two liberations each depend generally on the first two dhyānas, since they serve as an antidote to craving for visible color specifically within the desire realm, as experienced from the first dhyāna. The third liberation depends on the later dhyānas, since it is only there that the mind, free of the eight calamities, becomes genuinely clear and pure. The remaining grounds also have a similar liberation-like state, but it is not established as one of the eight, since it is not present there at its most heightened, superior degree.

The next four liberations, in sequence, have the four formless attainments' wholesome states as their nature — not the neutral or tainted varieties, since these could never count as liberation; nor the scattered, undeliberate wholesome variety either, since its nature is too weak and inferior. Such scattered wholesome states occur, for instance, in the mind at the moment of death. Some say scattered wholesome states also occur at other times. The path belonging to the approach-concentration also receives the name "liberation." The uninterrupted path does not, however, since it still takes a lower ground as its object — a state must specifically have turned away from the lower ground before it can be called a liberation. Yet, in most other contexts, only the root ground itself is called "liberation," since the approach-concentration does not represent the complete, fully-realized portion of that state. The eighth liberation is precisely the attainment of cessation, whose own nature and so forth has already been explained earlier. Because it arises through turning away from and being weary of feeling and perception specifically, or, more generally, through being weary of anything with an object at all, this attainment of cessation receives the name "liberation." Some say: it is by means of this liberation that one's obstruction to concentration is overcome — this attainment becomes actually present immediately following a "subtle-subtle" mind. Compared to a mind still oriented toward perception, the mind immediately preceding cessation is already called subtle; this state is even more subtle still, hence it is called "subtle-subtle." Following such a mind, one enters the attainment of cessation; upon emerging from that cessation-attainment, one either gives rise to the peak of existence's pure concentration-mind, or is directly able to give rise to the sphere of nothing-at-all's uncontaminated mind. The mind by which one enters this attainment is solely contaminated, but one may emerge from it through either a contaminated or an uncontaminated mind.

Among these eight, the first three take only the desire realm's visible-form sense-sphere as their object; there is, however, a distinction: two of these objects are repugnant, while one is appealing. The next four liberations each take as their object one's own and higher grounds' truths of suffering, origination, and cessation, together with the class-inference type of path belonging to every ground, as well as that path's own non-analytical cessation and space. Why, then, is there no liberation specifically for the third dhyāna? Because the third dhyāna lacks any craving for form, and because its own ground's exquisite bliss would only agitate and disturb such a practice. Why does a practitioner cultivate the pure liberation at all? In order to bring the mind, for a time, into a state of genuine delight — since the preceding impurity-contemplation causes the mind to sink into gloom and sorrow, cultivating the contemplation of purity afterward spurs and rouses it into delight instead. Or, alternatively, it is done in order to verify one's own capability: has the previously cultivated impurity-liberation actually been accomplished or not? Only if, upon contemplating a pure image, no affliction arises, has that prior liberation truly been accomplished. For two reasons, yogic practitioners cultivate liberation and the rest: first, so that afflictions already severed remain even further away; second, in order to attain superior mastery over concentration itself, thereby becoming able to draw forth qualities such as non-contention and the noble supernormal powers, through which one becomes capable of transforming various matters, giving rise to a variety of functions such as retaining or relinquishing an object at will. Why does the sūtra speak of "personally realizing in the body" specifically for the third and eighth liberations, and not the remaining six? Because, among the eight, these two are the most superior, standing respectively at the outer boundary of the two realms.

Liberation has now been explained; the mastery-bases are discussed next. Verse: the mastery-bases number eight; two are like the first liberation; the next two are like the second; the last four are like the third. Explanation: the mastery-bases number eight: first, possessing an internal perception of form while contemplating a small quantity of external forms; second, possessing an internal perception of form while contemplating a large quantity of external forms; third, lacking an internal perception of form while contemplating a small quantity of external forms; fourth, lacking an internal perception of form while contemplating a large quantity of external forms; and lacking an internal perception of form while contemplating external forms as blue, yellow, red, and white respectively, making four more — added to the previous four, these make eight in total. Among these eight, the first two are like the first liberation, the next two are like the second liberation, and the last four are like the third liberation. If this is so, how do the eight mastery-bases differ from the three form-based liberations? Cultivating the liberations discussed previously only enables one to turn away from and abandon an object; cultivating the mastery-bases that follow enables one to actually master one's object — one is able to contemplate it however one wishes, and affliction will never arise in response.

The mastery-bases have now been explained; the totality-bases are discussed next. Verse: the totality-bases number ten; eight are like the pure liberation; the last two are the pure formless attainments, taking one's own ground's four aggregates as object. Explanation: the totality-bases number ten: contemplating, in total saturation, earth, water, fire, wind, blue, yellow, red, white, and the two spheres of infinite space and infinite consciousness. Because one contemplates every point within the object in total saturation, with no gap left uncovered, this is called a "totality-base." Among the ten, the first eight are like the pure liberation, in that their own nature, in all eight cases, is non-greed; including their accompanying retinue, their nature is the five aggregates; they depend on the fourth dhyāna, and take the desire realm's visible form as their object. Some teachers say that the wind totality-base specifically takes as its object the wind-element within the tangible sense-sphere. The last two totality-bases, in sequence, have the pure varieties of the spheres of infinite space and infinite consciousness as their nature, each taking its own ground's four aggregates as its object. It should be understood that, in this scheme, a practitioner cultivating this contemplative practice proceeds from the liberations into the mastery-bases, and from the mastery-bases into the totality-bases, since each later stage arises as a further advance surpassing the one before it.

Through what means are the virtues of these three gateways — liberation, mastery, and totality — actually attained? And on what body do they depend when they arise? Verse: cessation-attainment is as already explained; all the rest are attained through both means; the formless ones among these depend on all three realms; the rest arise only among humans. Explanation: the eighth liberation is as already explained, since it is precisely the previously discussed attainment of cessation. All the remaining liberations, mastery-bases, and totality-bases are attained through both means: through freedom from affliction, and through preparatory practice — since some have previously been cultivated before, and others have not. The four formless liberations and the two formless totality-bases each depend generally on a body from any of the three realms in order to arise; all the rest arise only among human beings. Through the power of the Buddha's teaching, both ordinary beings and noble ones alike are able to give rise to them.

For those born within the form or formless realms, by what specific conditions do they give rise to the dhyānas or formless attainments? Verse: in the two upper realms, it is through the power of cause and of karma that one is able to give rise to the formless attainments; in the form realm, giving rise to the dhyānas additionally occurs through the power of natural law. Explanation: for one born into either of the two upper realms, there are three conditions in total capable of advancing and drawing forth the dhyānas or formless attainments: first, the power of cause — referring to having, in the past, recently and repeatedly practiced, which itself serves as the cause for the attainment's arising. Second, the power of karma — referring to karma previously created that brings about rebirth in a higher ground, to be experienced in a subsequent life; when the ripening of that karma is about to become actually present, its force is able to advance and draw forth that attainment, since, if one has not yet become free of a lower ground's affliction, one could never possibly be reborn in a higher ground in the first place. Third, the power of natural law — referring to the fact that, when a world-system is about to be destroyed, sentient beings of the lower ground are, by the very nature of things, spontaneously able to give rise to the dhyāna of the ground above, since, at that juncture, whatever wholesome dharmas are present all become intensified through this natural power. For those born within the two upper realms who give rise to the formless attainments, this occurs through the power of cause and the power of karma, not through the power of natural law, since the Cloudless Heaven and the other form-realm heavens at that level are not destroyed by the three calamities. For one born within the form realm who gives rise to the dhyānas, this occurs through the two conditions above together with the power of natural law. If one is born within the desire realm and gives rise to a higher attainment, it should be understood that, in every single case, this occurs through the power of the teaching alone.

Everything analyzed and distinguished above, across all these various approaches to the teaching, has been undertaken entirely in order to propagate and uphold the Blessed One's true Dharma. What, then, is meant by the "true Dharma"? And for how long will it endure? Verse: the Buddha's true Dharma has two aspects — doctrine and realization constitute its substance; wherever there are those who uphold it, expound it, and practice it, it thereby continues to abide in the world. Explanation: the substance of the Blessed One's true Dharma has two aspects: doctrine and realization. Doctrine refers to the sūtras, the vinaya, and the abhidharma; realization refers to the limbs of awakening belonging to all three vehicles. Wherever there are those capable of upholding and correctly expounding it, the Buddha's true doctrinal Dharma thereby continues to abide in the world. Wherever there are those capable of correctly practicing in accordance with that doctrine, the Buddha's true realized Dharma thereby continues to abide in the world. Hence, corresponding to the duration these three kinds of people remain in the world, it should be understood that the true Dharma abides for precisely that same span of time. The noble teaching generally states that it abides for only a thousand years; some explain that realization specifically abides for only a thousand years, while doctrine's own duration extends still further beyond this. This treatise, in compiling the abhidharma, has relied on what specific reasoning to explain the abhidharma tradition? Verse: the reasoning debated and established by the masters of Kashmir — I have, for the most part, relied on their tradition in explaining the abhidharma; wherever I have somewhat diminished or reduced their positions, this is my own fault; the correct principle for judging the Dharma rests with the Sage alone. Explanation: the Vaibhāṣika masters of the kingdom of Kashmir have debated and soundly established the reasoning of the abhidharma; I have, for the most part, relied on their tradition in explaining the abhidharma school's teachings, and wherever I have somewhat diminished or reduced their positions, this is my own personal fault. The correct principle for judging the Dharma rests solely with the Blessed One, and with the great noble disciples of the Tathāgatas.

The Great Teacher, the world's eye, has long since closed; those capable of serving as witnesses to realization have mostly scattered and passed away; with no one left who has seen the true principle to restrain them, the noble teaching is thrown into confusion by base, undisciplined speculation. He who awakened by himself has already returned to the supreme, tranquil stillness; those who upheld his teaching have, for the most part, likewise passed away following him; the world, left without any refuge, has lost its manifold virtues, and, with no hook left to restrain them, the afflictions now turn freely wherever they please. Now knowing that the lifespan of the Tathāgata's true Dharma is gradually sinking into decline, as though the water had already risen to the throat — at this very time, when the power of these afflictions is only increasing, one should seek liberation, and never be heedless.

Chapter 9, Refuting the Self, Part 1. Setting this teaching aside and relying on some other one instead — is there, then, no liberation to be had? In principle, there can certainly be none. Why is this? Because any other path is thrown into confusion by a false grasping at a self. That is: whatever "self" is grasped at outside this teaching is not merely a conventional label conventionally applied to the aggregates' own continuum, but is instead grasped at as a genuinely real self existing apart from the aggregates. Through the power of this grasping at a self, the afflictions arise, and one cycles through the three realms of existence with no room for liberation. What is the proof of this? It is known that every use of the term "self" refers only to the aggregates' own continuum, and does not designate any separate, independent substance called a self. This is because there is, with respect to this posited self existing apart from the aggregates, no genuine direct perception or inference available for it. That is: if the self's substance were a genuinely separate real entity, comparable to any other existent dharma, then, absent any obstructing condition, it should be directly perceivable — as the mind directly perceives its six kinds of objects — or at least knowable by inference, as the five material sense-faculties are known by inference. As for saying the five material sense-faculties are known by inference: as is commonly observed in the world, even when many conditions are present, if one specific condition is missing, the effect simply fails to occur, whereas, when nothing is missing, the effect does occur — just as a seed produces a sprout only when nothing is lacking. In just the same way, it is observed that, even though a present object, mental attention, and the other conditions are all present, consciousness fails to arise in the blind or deaf, while it does arise in those who are not blind or deaf — from this, one definitely knows that some specific condition is present or lacking. This specific condition is precisely the eye-faculty and the other material sense-faculties. This is what is meant by inferring the existence of the material sense-faculties. With respect to a self existing apart from the aggregates, neither of these two means of valid cognition is available at all — and it is on this basis that one knows for certain there is no genuinely real self-substance.

The Vātsīputrīya school, however, maintains that there is a "person" (pudgala), whose substance is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates. This should be carefully examined: is this person real, or merely conventional? What distinguishes the character of something real from something merely conventional? Having its own distinct, separate existence as a thing is the character of something real — as with form, sound, and the rest. Being merely an aggregation of other things is the character of something merely conventional — as with milk, cheese, and the like. What fault would follow from granting the person is real, or granting it is merely conventional, respectively? If its substance is real, it should then be different from the aggregates, since it would have its own distinct nature — just as the aggregates are each distinct from one another. Moreover, anything with a real substance must necessarily have a cause, or else it would have to be unconditioned — which would make this position identical to the heterodox view of a permanent, uncaused self. Moreover, it would then serve no actual function, and positing it as real would be entirely pointless. If its substance is merely conventional, then this simply amounts to agreeing with our own position.

The pudgala we posit is not subject to the real-or-conventional dichotomy you have just interrogated it with. It can only be said that the pudgala is established in dependence on the internal, present-life aggregates included within what is grasped and appropriated. This is a mistaken statement, whose meaning has not actually been clarified. I still do not understand — what does "depend on" actually mean here? If "gathering together the aggregates" is what "depend on" means, then, since the pudgala is formed by gathering together the aggregates, the pudgala should thereby become merely conventionally existent — just as milk, cheese, and the rest are formed by gathering together form and the rest. If "being caused by the aggregates" is what "depend on" means, then, since the pudgala is established as caused by the aggregates, the pudgala would likewise incur this same fault — so it is not established in this way. How, then, is it established? It is like how, in ordinary usage, fire is established in dependence on fuel — but how can positing fire be said to depend on fuel? That is: fire cannot be posited apart from fuel, and yet fuel and fire are neither different nor identical. If fire were different from fuel, fuel should not be hot. If fire were identical with fuel, then what is burned would itself be what burns. In just this way, the pudgala is established without being apart from the aggregates. Yet the pudgala is neither different from nor identical with the aggregates: if it were different from the aggregates, its substance would have to be permanent; if it were identical with the aggregates, its substance would have to be subject to annihilation. You should now definitively state, in this matter: what exactly is fire, and what exactly is fuel? So that I may understand what "fire depends on fuel" actually means. What should be said? If one is to state it, one should say: what is burned is the fuel; what burns is the fire. This, in turn, requires stating further: what exactly is burned, and what exactly burns, such that they are called "fuel" and "fire"? As is commonly understood in the world: whatever material is not itself blazing but is what is set alight is called the fuel that is burned; whatever possesses light, extreme heat, and blazing flame, and is what sets things alight, is called the fire that burns. This burning fire ignites that fuel's continuum, causing each later moment to differ from the one before it. Although both fuel and fire share the same eight basic substances as their nature, it is only in dependence on fuel as a condition that fire actually arises — just as, in dependence on milk and wine, cheese and vinegar arise respectively — and it is for this reason that it is commonly said, in the world, that fire depends on fuel. But if we follow this very reasoning, fire is then different from fuel, since the fire that comes later and the fuel that came before it occur at different times. If, then, the pudgala you posit depends on the aggregates in just the way fire depends on fuel, it must definitely follow that the pudgala arises in dependence on the aggregates as its condition, that its substance is different from the aggregates, and that it comes to be impermanent rather than eternally abiding.

If it is said that it is precisely the warm sensation within the blazing wood itself that is called "fire," while everything else is called "fuel," then fire and fuel arise simultaneously, and fire must then be a substance different from fuel, since their characteristics differ. One should then explain the meaning of "depends on": since these two arise simultaneously, how can it be said that fire is established in dependence on fuel? For this fire does not take fuel as its cause; rather, each arises from its own respective cause, at the same time. Nor is the name "fire" established because of fuel, since the name "fire" is established specifically because of the warm sensation. If it is said that the statement "fire depends on fuel" is meant to express the sense of arising simultaneously with, or resting upon, fuel, then, correspondingly, one should grant that the pudgala arises simultaneously with the aggregates, or rests upon the aggregates. Since it has already been clearly granted that its substance is different from the aggregates, this conclusion should indeed be granted. If it is granted that, in the absence of the aggregates, the pudgala's substance likewise does not exist — just as, in the absence of fuel, fire's substance also does not exist — this would be consistent. But since the Vātsīputrīya does not grant this, their explanation does not hold up. Yet, at this point, they themselves raise an objection of their own: "if fire were different from fuel, fuel should not be hot." They should then definitively state: what exactly is the substance of "heat" here? If they explain that heat means the tangible quality of warmth itself, then fuel is not hot, since its substance and characteristic are different from that warmth. If, instead, they explain that heat means being joined with warmth, then even something of a different substance can still receive the name "hot" — since the genuine name "fire" refers specifically to the tangible warmth itself, while anything else joined with that warmth can likewise receive the name "hot." This clearly grants that fuel, too, may be called "hot" in this joined sense — so, even though fuel and fire are different, no fault actually follows. How, then, can this objection be raised here as a genuine difficulty for us? If it is said that, when the wood and the rest are entirely ablaze, it is called both "fuel" and "fire" at once, then one should explain: what, in that case, does "depends on" even mean? Under this reading, the pudgala would definitely have to be identical with the aggregates such as form, and there would be no valid reasoning left to prevent this conclusion. Hence, their claim that the pudgala is established in dependence on the aggregates, just as fire is established in dependence on fuel, cannot be established under any line of examination, whichever way one presses it, forward or back.

Moreover, if the Vātsīputrīya grants that whether the pudgala is identical to or different from the aggregates can equally not be stated, then, correspondingly, their own accepted category of the three unconditioned dharmas spanning the three times, and their fivefold classification of knowable objects, should likewise become inexpressible — since the pudgala could then not be stated to be either the fifth category or not the fifth. Moreover, when they posit the pudgala, they should further specify precisely what it is based upon. If they say it is based on the aggregates, then the conventional-existence position we have argued for is already established, since positing the pudgala would then not be based on the pudgala itself. If, instead, they say this positing is based on the pudgala itself, then how does their earlier statement — that it is established in dependence on the aggregates — hold up? They should then simply say it is established in dependence on the pudgala. Since they do not grant this, it must be based on the aggregates alone. It is because the aggregates exist that this pudgala can be known, they reply — that is why we earlier said it is established in dependence on the aggregates. But then, by this same logic, since forms can only be known given the eye and other conditions, one should equally say they are established in dependence on the eye and the rest.

Moreover, one should also ask: among the six consciousnesses, which one cognizes the pudgala? All six consciousnesses cognize it. Why is this? Because, whenever eye-consciousness cognizes form, one thereby comes to know that there is a pudgala — this is what is meant by saying it is cognized by eye-consciousness, even though it cannot be said to be identical to or different from form. And so on, up through: whenever mental consciousness cognizes a mental object, one thereby comes to know that there is a pudgala — this is what is meant by saying it is cognized by mental consciousness, even though it cannot be said to be identical to or different from that mental object. If this is so, then the posited pudgala should be exactly the same as milk and the like — merely a conventional designation. That is: just as, when eye-consciousness cognizes various forms, if one is thereby able to know there is milk, one says that milk is cognized by eye-consciousness, even though it cannot be said to be identical to or different from form — and so on, up through: when body-consciousness registers various tangible sensations, if one is thereby able to know there is milk, one says that milk is cognized by body-consciousness, even though it cannot be said to be identical to or different from that tangible sensation. One should avoid concluding that milk thereby becomes constituted by four different substances, one per sense, or by something other than these four. On this basis, it should be concluded that the pudgala is a merely conventional designation, established generally in dependence on the aggregates altogether — just as, in ordinary usage, milk and the like are conventionally designated generally in dependence on form and the other sense data altogether. It is conventional, not real.

Moreover, as for their earlier statement, that whenever eye-consciousness cognizes form, one thereby comes to know there is a pudgala — what does this actually mean? Does it mean that form serves as the cause for cognizing the pudgala? Or does it mean that, at the very moment form is cognized, the pudgala is also thereby cognized? If it means that form serves as the cause for cognizing the pudgala, and yet one cannot say the pudgala is different from form, then, by parallel reasoning, since form itself has the eye, light, mental attention, and other conditions as the causes for its own being cognized, one should equally be unable to say that form is different from the eye and these other conditions. If, instead, it means that, at the moment form is cognized, the pudgala is also thereby cognized — is it the very same cognizing that cognizes form which also cognizes the pudgala? Or is there some separate cognizing involved here? If the cognizing of form is itself what cognizes the pudgala, then one should grant that the pudgala's substance is identical with form, or else that the pudgala is merely conventionally posited with reference to form. Or else there should be no distinction at all of the kind "this category is form, that category is the pudgala." But if there is no such twofold distinction, how can one establish that there is form and that there is a pudgala? For "sentient being" must necessarily be posited by way of some such distinction. If, instead, there is a separate cognizing involved here, then, since the moments of cognizing differ, the pudgala should be different from form — just as yellow differs from blue, or an earlier moment differs from a later one. And the same challenge applies all the way through to mental objects as well. If they attempt to rescue their position by saying: "just as the pudgala and form cannot be definitively said to be identical or different, the two kinds of cognizing, compared to each other, are likewise so" — this reply fails, because the act of cognizing itself should not even be classified as a conditioned dharma if this parallel is pressed. If they grant this, it directly undermines their own school's position. Moreover, if the pudgala genuinely existed, and yet one could not say whether it is form or not-form, why would the Blessed One have stated: "form, up through consciousness, are all without self"?

Moreover, since they have already granted that the pudgala is apprehended by eye-consciousness, does this eye-consciousness then arise taking form and the pudgala jointly as its condition, or what exactly? If it arises taking form alone as its condition, then one should not say that eye-consciousness is able to cognize the pudgala, since the pudgala would then not be a condition for eye-consciousness at all — just as the sound sense-sphere and the rest are not conditions for eye-consciousness. That is: whenever a consciousness arises taking some object as its condition, that very object serves as its objective condition. If the pudgala is not a condition for eye-consciousness, how can it be said to be an object of eye-consciousness at all? Hence it is certain that the pudgala is not cognized by eye-consciousness. If eye-consciousness is said to arise taking the pudgala as its condition, whether alone or jointly with form, this contradicts what a sūtra states, since a sūtra definitively determines that consciousness arises through only two conditions. A sūtra further states: "monks, you should know that the eye, together with form as its condition, is able to give rise to eye-consciousness" — since every instance of eye-consciousness whatsoever arises taking the eye and form as its conditions. Moreover, if this is so, the pudgala would then have to be impermanent, since a sūtra states this: a sūtra states that whatever serves as a cause or condition capable of giving rise to consciousness is, without exception, of an impermanent nature. If they then claim that the pudgala is not an object taken as condition by any consciousness, then it should not be cognized by consciousness at all; if it is not cognized, it should not be knowable at all; and if it is not knowable, how can its existence even be posited? Yet if they do not posit its existence, this directly undermines their own school's position.

Moreover, if it is granted that the pudgala is cognized by all six consciousnesses, then, since it is cognized by eye-consciousness, it should be different from sound and the rest, just as form is; and since it is cognized by ear-consciousness, it should be different from form and the rest, just as sound is. The same objection applies, by this same pattern, to it being cognized by the remaining consciousnesses as well. Moreover, positing the pudgala as cognized by all six consciousnesses directly contradicts what a sūtra states. As a sūtra states: "Brahmin, you should know that the domains and objects of the five faculties are each distinct; each faculty makes use only of its own domain and its own object, and no faculty is capable of also making use of another faculty's domain and object." The five faculties are the eye, ear, nose, tongue, and body; the mental faculty alone additionally makes use of the five faculties' domains and their objects, since those are all dependent upon it. Perhaps, then, one should not claim the pudgala is an object of the five sense-faculties at all — but this would mean it is not cognized by the five sense-consciousnesses either, which would incur the fault of contradicting their own school's position. If this is so, then the mental faculty's object should equally be distinct from the others. As the Sūtra of the Six Kinds of Birth-Simile states: "the domains and objects of these six faculties each have their own distinctions, and each one, respectively, seeks out only its own domain and its own object." This passage is not, however, referring to the eye and the other five faculties as ordinarily understood — since the eye and the other five faculties, along with the consciousnesses they generate, have no capacity of their own to actively "seek out" anything. Rather, it refers, by the names "eye" and so forth, specifically to the mental consciousness drawn forth by the dominant power of the eye and the other faculties; the mental consciousness drawn forth by the dominant power of the mental faculty operating independently is not capable of seeking out the objects belonging to the domains of the eye and the other five faculties. Hence this sūtra's meaning does not actually contradict the fault noted above.

The Blessed One further states: "Monks, you should know that I shall now fully expound for you the entire scope of everything reachable and knowable." What is its substance? Namely: the eye, forms, eye-consciousness, eye-contact, and the internally arisen feeling conditioned by eye-contact — whether pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. Stated fully, up through: the internally arisen feeling conditioned by mental contact — whether pleasant, painful, or neither-painful-nor-pleasant. This is called "the entirety of what is reachable and knowable." On the basis of this scriptural passage, it is decisively determined that everything reachable and knowable amounts to precisely this list alone — and the pudgala is nowhere included among it. Hence the pudgala should also not be an object of cognition, since wisdom's object and consciousness's object must necessarily be the same. Those who claim the eye sees the pudgala should understand that the eye-faculty, in that moment, sees only what actually belongs to its own domain — mistaking what is seen, which is not a self, for a self being seen, they thereby stumble and fall into the deep pit of wrong view. Hence the Buddha's own sūtras settle this matter themselves, stating that the pudgala is spoken of only with reference to the aggregates.

As the Sūtra on the Person states: the eye and form, as conditions, give rise to eye-consciousness; the coming together of these three is contact, together with which feeling, perception, and volition simultaneously arise. Among these, the latter four are formless aggregates, while the first, the eye and form, are named the form aggregate — it is solely by this measure that the name "person" is applied. It is precisely with reference to this that various conventional names and notions are then applied, differing according to their respective senses: some call it a sentient being, an unpleasant rebirth, a youth, a nurturer, a life, one who is born, a pudgala — and one likewise refers to oneself, saying "I see form with my eye." Furthermore, in accordance with conventional usage, one says: this venerable one has such-and-such a name, such-and-such a lineage, such-and-such a clan, eats such-and-such food, experiences such-and-such pleasure, experiences such-and-such suffering, has such-and-such a long life, abides for such-and-such a duration, and has such-and-such a lifespan's limit. Monks, you should know: all of this is merely name and notion, merely a way of referring to oneself, and exists only as a conventional designation established in accordance with worldly convention. All of this is impermanent and conditioned, arising from a multitude of conditions, and fashioned by volition. The Blessed One has always instructed that one should rely on sūtras of definitive meaning; this sūtra is of definitive meaning, and should not be interpreted otherwise. The Blessed One further told a brahmin: "I say that all that exists is only the twelve sense-spheres." If the repeated-taker-of-existences is not included among these sense-spheres, then, in principle, it is established that it has no real substance at all. If it is included among the sense-spheres, then it should not be said to be "inexpressible."

A sūtra recited even within their own school's canon likewise states: "whatever eye there is, whatever forms there are" — stated fully, up through — "monks, you should know that the Tathāgata, precisely by means of this, establishes and sets forth every dharma that possesses its own real substance." The pudgala is nowhere included in this list — how, then, can it be said to possess a real substance? The Sūtra to King Bimbisāra likewise states: "whatever foolish, unlearned ordinary beings, following after a mere conventional name, conceive of as a self — there is, in this, no nature of self or what belongs to a self; there is only the entire substance of suffering dharmas, about to arise, now arising, and already arisen" — and so on, stated fully. There was an arhat bhikṣuṇī named Śailā, who spoke thus to Māra, the king of demons: you have fallen into the destiny of wrong view; within this mere assembly of empty formations, you falsely grasp at there being a sentient being — the wise understand there is none. Just as, by gathering together its various parts, one conventionally conceives of and posits a "chariot," so too, when one conventionally posits a "sentient being," it should be understood as merely a gathering-together of the aggregates.

The Blessed One, within the Saṃyukta Āgama, spoke thus to the brahmin Bhadrāli: Bhadrāli, listen carefully to the teaching capable of untying every fetter: it is in dependence on the mind that one becomes defiled, and it is likewise in dependence on the mind that one becomes purified. The self genuinely has no self-nature; it is only through inverted thinking that one grasps at its existence — there is no sentient being, and no self; there are only dharmas that possess causes. The twelve links of existence comprehend within them the aggregates, the sense-spheres, and the elements; carefully reflecting on all of this, one finds no pudgala. Having contemplated that what is internal is empty, one contemplates that what is external is likewise empty; even the one who is capable of cultivating this contemplation of emptiness cannot itself be found. A sūtra states: grasping at a self incurs five faults — giving rise to the view of self and the view of a sentient being, thereby falling into the destiny of wrong view; walking the same errant path as the various heterodox teachers; one's mind failing to awaken to and enter emptiness; being unable to attain pure faith; being unable to abide stably; and being unable to attain liberation, since the noble Dharma cannot become pure within such a person. None of this constitutes valid proof, the Vātsīputrīya objects. Why is this? Because it has never been recited within our own school's canon. Does your school accept, as the standard of validity, the school's own recitation, or the Buddha's own word? If the school's recitation is the standard, then the Buddha is not your teacher, and you are not a disciple of the Śākya. If the Buddha's word is the standard, then all of this is indeed the Buddha's word — how, then, can it fail to constitute valid proof? They reply: all of these statements are not the genuine word of the Buddha. Why? Because our school does not recite them. This is utterly unreasonable. In what way is it unreasonable? These very scriptural passages are recited by every other school, and they contradict neither the nature of the Dharma nor any other sūtra — yet they dare to arbitrarily raise slander and rejection against them, claiming, "since our own school does not recite this, it is not the genuine word of the Buddha." This is nothing but reckless, unrestrained arrogance — and hence it is utterly unreasonable.

Moreover, is there not also, within their own school's canon, this sūtra: "all dharmas are without self-nature"? If their intention is that, since the pudgala is neither identical to nor different from the dharmas it is based upon, it is on this basis that "all dharmas" are said to be without self — then, if this is so, the pudgala should not be an object of mental consciousness either, since a sūtra has already decisively determined that consciousness arises from two conditions. Moreover, how do they explain another sūtra? A sūtra states: "conceiving of what is not-self as a self" — this involves the inversions of perception, mind, and view. Since conceiving of a self constitutes an inversion, this is stated with reference to what is not-self, not with reference to an actual self — why, then, is any further explanation needed? What is meant by "not-self" here? It refers to the aggregates, sense-spheres, and elements. This directly contradicts their earlier claim that the pudgala is neither identical to nor different from the aggregates such as form. A further sūtra states: "Monks, you should know: whatever śramaṇas, brahmins, and others hold views involving the grasping of a self, all of these arise exclusively with respect to the five aggregates of clinging." Hence there is no self-view that arises in dependence on an actual self — one only falsely conceives of what is not-self as being a self. A further sūtra states: "whatever has been remembered, is being remembered, or will be remembered of one's various past abodes, all of this arises exclusively with respect to the five aggregates of clinging" — hence it is certain that there is no pudgala. If this is so, why does this same sūtra also state: "I, in a past life, had such-and-such a form," and so on? This sūtra is meant to show that the one capable of remembering a past life is a single continuum, within which various different events have occurred. If one holds that a genuinely real pudgala existed in a past life and possessed such-and-such a form, how does this not fall into the fault of giving rise to the view of a substantial self? Or else, should one instead deny that this sūtra even exists? Hence, this sūtra speaks in terms of the collectively, conventionally designated self, saying it "has such-and-such a form" only in the sense that a heap or a stream has such-and-such a character.

If this is so, then the Blessed One should not be omniscient — since no single mind or mental factor, each arising and perishing differently moment by moment, could ever know all dharmas. If it is granted that only a self could possibly know everything completely, then the pudgala would have to be permanent, since it would have to be granted that, even when the mind ceases, this pudgala does not cease along with it — but this directly oversteps your own school's accepted position. We do not claim that the Buddha is called "omniscient" because he is able to instantaneously and completely know all things at once in a single moment; rather, it is with reference to his continuum's capability that he is so called. That is: once one attains the name "Buddha," the aggregates' own continuum has perfected such an exceptional capability that, the very moment attention is directed toward it, undistorted knowledge of whatever object one wishes to know arises accordingly — it is for this reason that he is called "omniscient," not because he is able to instantaneously and completely know everything in a single mind-moment. Hence, on this point, there is the following verse: through the continuum's possessing this capability — just as fire can consume anything at all — so too is omniscience; it is not attained through instantaneously knowing everything all at once. How can it be known that "knowing all dharmas" is spoken of with reference to the continuum, and not to a self's complete knowing? Because it is said that Buddhas, the Blessed Ones, exist across the three times. Where is this stated? As a verse says: whether past Buddhas, or future Buddhas, or present Buddhas — all of them extinguish sentient beings' sorrow. Your own school grants only that the aggregates exist across the three times, not the repeated-taker-of-existences — hence this conclusion must necessarily follow. Fascicle 29 of the Abhidharmakośa of the Sarvāstivāda School