Twenty Reasons the Treatise Begins Here

What is supreme mundane dharma? Once such chapter-headings and the meaning of each chapter-heading have been grasped, they should next be explained at length. One asks: for what reason was this treatise composed? The answer: in order to analyze the meaning of a sutra passage. For in a sutra the Buddha, the World-Honored One, states: if a certain kind of person is unable to reflect properly on conditioned formations, then it is impossible for supreme mundane dharma to arise in them; and if supreme mundane dharma does not arise, then it is impossible for them to enter the certainty of rightness; and if they do not enter the certainty of rightness, then it is impossible for them to attain the fruit of stream-entry, once-returning, non-returning, or arhatship; but if a certain kind of person is able to reflect properly on conditioned formations, then it is possible for supreme mundane dharma to arise in them — and so on, as explained at length. Although the sutra mentions the name "supreme mundane dharma," it does not explain the meaning of supreme mundane dharma at length. Since the sutra is exactly the basis this treatise depends on, whatever it leaves unrevealed should now be analyzed at length here — it is for this reason that this treatise was composed. One then asks: why should a treatise's composition depend on a sutra at all? The answer: because that is simply what the author of the treatise intended; the treatise was composed in accordance with his own intention, and since this does not contradict the nature of dharma, why press the question further? Further: every Abhidharma work exists in order to explain the meaning within the sutras — it is precisely by analyzing the sutras' meaning at length that a work earns the name Abhidharma. This is why that venerable one gathered together, from among the sutras, many dissimilar topics, and analyzed and explained them, establishing the Miscellaneous Chapter; and gathered together the many varieties of wrong view, and analyzed and explained them, establishing the Views Chapter — and so on. Yet within each of these eight chapters he established, the specific and general characteristics of all dharmas are, in every case, fully analyzed. One then asks: why did the venerable one, at the very start of the treatise, speak first of supreme mundane dharma? Was it in order to state the various virtues in their forward sequence, or in their reverse sequence,

— or in the sequence of the nirvedhabhāgīya factors themselves? Suppose it were one of these — what fault would follow? If the virtues were stated in their forward sequence, the treatise should first speak of the contemplation of impurity or the mindfulness of breathing, next the foundations of mindfulness, next the threefold-meaning contemplation, next skill in the seven bases, next heat, next summit, next forbearance, and only after that should it speak of supreme mundane dharma. If the virtues were stated in their reverse sequence, it should first speak of the fruit of arhatship, next non-returning, next once-returning, next stream-entry, next the path of seeing, and only after that should it speak of supreme mundane dharma. If they were stated in the sequence of the nirvedhabhāgīya factors themselves, it should first speak of heat, next summit, next forbearance, and only after that should it speak of supreme mundane dharma — just as the Venerable Ghoṣaka states, in discussing the arising of knowledge: what is heat? what is summit? what is forbearance? what is supreme mundane dharma? Yet if the treatise does not follow any of these three sequences, does it not then suffer the fault of disorder? While the Buddha was still living, the Venerable Kātyāyanīputra had already accomplished boundless, rare virtues; his unobstructed wisdom, regarding the specific and general characteristics of measureless dharmas, manifested however he wished; his vigorous diligence never once flagged; he had already skillfully entered the boundless ocean of awakened understanding that is the letter and meaning of Abhidharma, and could no more be shaken than Mount Sumeru itself; he was a great king among treatise-masters, able to subdue every rival treatise, while no rival treatise could ever match his own.

— the Venerable Kātyāyanīputra was exactly the same. Why, then, did he compose the treatise speaking of supreme mundane dharma first? The masters give various differing answers on this point. Some say: here, the virtues are stated neither in their forward sequence, nor in their reverse sequence, nor in the sequence of the nirvedhabhāgīya factors — it is simply that the author intended it this way, and the treatise was composed in accordance with his own intention; since this does not contradict the nature of dharma, why press the question? Others say: what Abhidharma reveals is the nature and characteristics of dharmas — unlike a sutra, it need not seek a fixed sequence at all. Abhidharma discerns the true nature and characteristics of dharmas through an extensive course of argument; given how intricate this already is, one should not, on top of that, seek a sequence within it — seeking a sequence would only add clutter to the text, with no benefit to the meaning. Others say still: one should not press the question of the author's intent at all — since the sutra itself speaks of supreme mundane dharma first, as explained above, and since this treatise-master composed his treatise in dependence on the sutra, he likewise spoke of supreme mundane dharma first. One then sets the treatise-master's own reasons aside and asks: why, in the sutra itself, did the World-Honored One speak of supreme mundane dharma first? The answer: because he spoke according to the specific condition of those he was teaching. The Buddha observed that those he was guiding had already attained the lower and middle grades of forbearance, but had not yet attained its highest grade, nor supreme mundane dharma itself; wishing them to attain these, he spoke as follows: if a certain kind of person is unable to reflect properly on conditioned formations, then it is impossible for supreme mundane dharma to arise in them — and so on, as explained at length. Here, "reflecting properly" points to the highest grade of forbearance, while "supreme mundane dharma" is named directly by its own name; hence the Buddha, the World-Honored One, observing the specific condition of his students' practice, spoke in just this way. Others say: it was in order to stop the many slanders directed at this point — for other schools direct many slanders at this very topic of supreme mundane dharma.

— this is why it is spoken of first. These "many slanders" arise regarding its essential nature, its name, its realm, its presence, and its retrogression, in every case. As for the slander regarding its essential nature: some say that the five faculties of faith and the rest are its essential nature. As for the slander regarding its name: some say that this should be named a "dharma of the lineage-stage" rather than "supreme mundane dharma." As for the slander regarding its realm: some say it belongs to the desire and form realms; others say it belongs to the form and formless realms; others say it belongs to all three realms; others say it belongs to all three realms and also to none; others say it belongs to none of the three realms, yet also is not unbound to them. As for the slander regarding its presence: some say this dharma remains present across many successive thought-moments. As for the slander regarding its retrogression: some say this dharma can be lost again. It is in order to stop these various slanders that supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Other masters say: every contaminated dharma is fragile and unstable, like mud swept from a rubbish heap — so which among them is the most stable and supreme? It is like ghee among dairy products: this is supreme mundane dharma. This is why it is spoken of first. Some say: this dharma accords with no-self, and this is why it is spoken of first — for this treatise praises renunciation, liberation, and nirvāṇa, which all accord with no-self, unlike the outside scriptures, which praise the enjoyment of every sensual pleasure, according with the grasping at a self. Because supreme mundane dharma carries the very word "dharma," and thereby accords with no-self just as this treatise does — unlike heat and the rest, which carry no such word and so do not share this treatise's accord with no-self — it is for this reason that supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: this dharma is supreme among mundane dharmas, and this is why it is spoken of first — for among all treatises, this one is supreme;

— supreme mundane dharma is supreme among mundane dharmas, just as this treatise is, and this is why it is spoken of first. Some say: when one abides in this dharma, this is called the true benefit of a buddha's appearance in the world, since it is exactly then that one attains unobstructed enjoyment of the ultimate, noble dharma-wealth. For when a buddha appears in the world, sentient beings enter the dharma in two ways: conventionally, and in the ultimate sense. Conventional entry means shaving the hair and beard, donning the dharma-robe, and going forth with true faith. Ultimate entry means that supreme mundane dharma gives rise, without interval, to the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering. Conventional entry into the dharma carries two possible faults — breaking the precepts, or returning to lay life — but ultimate entry carries no such fault; each according to their own lineage, they freely realize the virtues of their own vehicle, without ever losing them again. Some say: when one abides in this dharma, the gate of the noble path, closed since beginningless time, is for the first time thrown open — one relinquishes what one has never before relinquished, the nature of an ordinary being, and attains what one has never before attained, the noble path itself; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: when one abides in this dharma, one relinquishes the name "ordinary being" and gains the name "noble one"; one relinquishes the ranks of an ordinary being and gains the ranks of a noble one; one relinquishes the standing of an ordinary being and gains the standing of a noble one; one relinquishes the lineage of an ordinary being and gains the lineage of a noble one — this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: when one abides in this dharma, one gains the mind, though not yet its cause; one gains clarity, though not yet its cause; one gains feeling, though not yet its cause — and the same holds for the remaining mental factors; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: when one abides in this dharma, one relinquishes objects one has practiced with before and gains objects never practiced with before; one relinquishes what is shared with ordinary beings and gains what is not shared; one relinquishes the mundane and gains the supramundane; one relinquishes what carries the taste of craving and gains what carries no such taste; one relinquishes a basis of indulgent attachment and gains a basis of renunciation — this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: it is in order to cut off doubt about the nature of an ordinary being that supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first — for some doubt whether, since this nature of an ordinary being has no beginning, it must therefore also have no end; this passage now reveals that it does have an end, namely supreme mundane dharma itself. Some say: when one abides in this dharma, the faults of an ordinary being, the instability of an ordinary being, the falseness of an ordinary being, and the obstinacy of an ordinary being no longer arise at all — whereas at the stages of heat, summit, and forbearance, they may still sometimes arise; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: once an ordinary being has given rise to this dharma, they are bound to reach the state of no longer being an ordinary being before they can die at all. Just as with "ordinary being" and "no longer an ordinary being," so too with "not yet having seen the truths" and "having already seen the truths"; "not yet having attained the fruit" and "having already attained the fruit"; "not yet having entered the certainty of rightness" and "having already entered it"; "not yet having given rise to direct realization" and "having already given rise to it"; "abiding among the undetermined group" and "abiding among the group of fixed rightness"; "without the noble path" and "with the noble path"; "without confirmed purity" and "with confirmed purity" — one should understand all these the same way. Heat, summit, and forbearance are not yet fixed in this way; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: once this wholesome root arises, it lasts for exactly a single moment and can never linger — heat and the rest are not like this; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: when one abides in this dharma, the practices such as the foundations of mindfulness, within an ordinary being, are cultivated all the way to their culmination — heat and the rest are not like this; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say —

— when one abides in this dharma, it is called the very last contaminated moment: the mind that ceases is contaminated, and the mind that continues is uncontaminated — no other stage is like this; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: this dharma alone can still be shaken while the ordinary being remains, yet the ordinary being's very body cannot be moved from its stability — this is why it is spoken of first, just as Mount Sumeru, resting upon the golden wheel, cannot be shaken by fierce winds from any of the four directions: just so, once an ordinary being abides in this dharma, the four inverted wrong views can no longer shake them, though this is not so at any other stage of an ordinary being. Some say: this dharma is like the first light of dawn, able to mark both an ending and a beginning, and this is why it is spoken of first — just as the first light of dawn marks the start of day and the end of night, so too does supreme mundane dharma mark the start of the noble path and the end of being an ordinary being. Just as it marks a start and an end, so too it marks the crossing already completed and the entering already achieved, the culmination of preparatory effort — one should understand all of this the same way; no other stage does this. Some say: it reveals that within states otherwise the same in kind, a distinct mark can still appear, and this is why it is spoken of first — for although supreme mundane dharma is itself subsumed under the truth of suffering, it gives rise, without interval, to the very first path that extinguishes suffering; and although it is subsumed under the mundane cycle of aging, death, and the view of a substantial self, it is able to give rise to the very first path that extinguishes them — heat and the rest cannot do this. Some say: it reveals that although this is itself a mundane condition, it is able to give rise, without interval, to the very first supramundane condition — no other stage can do this; this is why it is spoken of first. Just as with the mundane and supramundane conditions, so too should one understand it for the tainted and untainted, the faulty and faultless, the poisoned and unpoisoned, the turbid and unturbid, the object of identity-view and the object free of it, the object of inversion and the object free of it, the object of craving and the object free of it, and the object of the latent tendencies and the object free of it — this is why it is spoken of first. Some say: when one abides in this dharma, one has the strength and the power to accomplish something, like a vigorous man — for it is exactly then that one gives rise, without interval, to the noble path's very first calm and insight, and raises up the noble view and wisdom as the very first, crowning garland among the remaining limbs of awakening; no other stage can do this; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: this dharma's function is supreme of all — it alone can relinquish the nature of an ordinary being and gain the nature of a noble one, relinquish the wrong nature and gain the right nature, and enter the certainty of rightness without interval; no other dharma can do this; this is why it is spoken of first. Some say: when a practitioner abides in this dharma, they can relinquish every unstable, wavering trait of an ordinary being — as flimsy as tuft-cotton, silk-floss, or willow-catkin — and abide unmoved within the noble teaching, like the banner of Śakra, lord of the gods; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Some say: when a practitioner abides in this dharma, they relinquish the crooked afflictions and wrong views that have shaped the mind and its mental factors since beginningless time, and gain, for the first time, the uncontaminated noble path that shapes the mind and its mental factors into uprightness. Some say: when a practitioner abides in this dharma, they relinquish membership in the class of the five kinds of persons — namely, the five who commit the acts of immediate retribution — and gain membership in the class of the eight kinds of persons — namely, the four who are progressing toward a fruit and the four who have attained one; this is why supreme mundane dharma is spoken of first. Others say: there are three reasons the treatise speaks of supreme mundane dharma first — first, to accord with the sutra; second, to stop the many slanders; and third, because it is exactly at this single moment that the first noble fruit is attained. According with the sutra and stopping the slanders have already been explained at length above; as for attaining the first noble fruit at exactly this moment — this means that supreme mundane dharma serves as the immediate efficient-cause result for the noble fruit. It is for all these various reasons that this treatise speaks of supreme mundane dharma first.

Other masters say: the venerable one, in this treatise, expounds all dharmas in reverse sequence. One asks: if that is so, then this treatise should first speak of the fruit of arhatship, next non-returning, next once-returning, next stream-entry, next the path of seeing, and only after that should it speak of supreme mundane dharma — so why does it speak of supreme mundane dharma first? The answer: what is spoken of here, in reverse sequence, is the pure and defiled dharmas within the body of an ordinary being — it does not state everything at the very first mention. "What is supreme mundane dharma?", extending in due course to "what is heat?" — this states, in reverse sequence, the pure dharmas within an ordinary being's body. Next it states: "these twenty statements of identity-view," extending in due course to "when there is no view at all" — this then sets forth the defiled dharmas within an ordinary being's body. Who is able to fully understand these two kinds of dharma? It is the wisdom of no-self. This is why, in the second section — the Knowledge section — it goes on to ask: "is there a single knowledge that knows all dharmas?" and so on, as explained at length. From what does this wisdom of no-self arise? From awakening to dependent origination. This is why the third section states: "one person undergoes, in a single life, the twelve links of dependent origination," and so on, as explained at length. From what does this awakening to dependent origination arise? From craving and from reverence. This is why the fourth section states: "what is craving? what is reverence?" and so on, as explained at length. From what cause do craving and reverence themselves arise? From shame and from conscience. This is why the fifth section states: "what is shame? what is conscience?" and so on, as explained at length. From what do shame and conscience themselves come to be? From understanding the characteristics of dharmas. This is why the sixth section states: "a material dharma's arising, aging, and impermanence," and so on, as explained at length. From what is this understanding of dharma-characteristics itself gained? From relinquishing what is meaningless and cultivating what is meaningful. This is why the seventh section states: "one should know that every inferior ascetic practice is joined with what is meaningless," and so on, as explained at length. Who is it that relinquishes what is meaningless and cultivates what is meaningful? One who is able to think and reflect rightly. This is why the eighth section states: "what is thought? what is reflection?" and so on, as explained at length. By what is the understanding belonging to the Miscellaneous Chapter itself made clear and pure? By the cutting off of the fetters. This is why the second chapter, the Fetters Chapter, is spoken of next. How, in turn, is this cutting off of the fetters realized? By the various kinds of knowledge. This is why the third chapter, the Knowledge Chapter, is spoken of next. Who is able to give rise to the kinds of knowledge that cut off the fetters? A person unobstructed by the hindrance of karma. This is why the fourth chapter, the Karma Chapter, is spoken of next. On what, for the most part, does karma depend for its arising? On the four great elements. This is why the fifth chapter, the Great Elements Chapter, is spoken of next. What is the most excellent thing produced by the great elements? The eye and the other faculties. This is why the sixth chapter, the Faculties Chapter, is spoken of next. By what power are the faculties themselves purified? By the attainment of the meditative absorptions. This is why the seventh chapter, the Absorption Chapter, is spoken of next. Once one has attained absorption, one may still give rise to wrong speculation, which in turn draws forth every kind of evil view — so that the marks of these views may be swiftly recognized and cut off, the eighth and final chapter, the Views Chapter, is spoken of last. Although every one of these eight chapters, taken individually, fully encompasses all dharmas within it, each chapter's name is nonetheless fixed according to whichever topic predominates within it. Hence it is said: because the pure and defiled dharmas within an ordinary being's body are stated here in reverse sequence, rather than everything being stated at once, supreme mundane dharma is for this reason spoken of first.

What is supreme mundane dharma? The answer: if mind and its mental factors serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the certainty of rightness, this is called supreme mundane dharma. Others hold instead: if the five faculties serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the certainty of rightness, this is called supreme mundane dharma. One asks: who holds this latter view? The answer: it is stated by the old Abhidharma masters. One asks: why do they state it this way? The answer: in order to refute another school — they do not mean to say only the five faculties can serve as its essential nature, but rather: the Vibhajyavādins (分別論者, "the Analysts") hold that the five faculties of faith and the rest are exclusively uncontaminated, and that no ordinary being ever possesses them at all. One asks: why does that school hold this position? The answer: they hold it because of a sutra passage.

For a sutra states: when the five faculties are heightened, sharp, evenly perfected, and much cultivated, one becomes an arhat whose contaminants are forever exhausted; a degree below this, one becomes a non-returner; a further degree below, a once-returner; a further degree below, a stream-enterer; but if one entirely lacks these five faculties of faith and the rest, then I say that person abides among the outsider class of ordinary beings. It is on the basis of this sutra that the Vibhajyavādins hold the five faculties to be exclusively uncontaminated. In order to refute their intention, the old Abhidharma masters say: supreme mundane dharma has the five faculties as its essential nature. But since supreme mundane dharma occurs within an ordinary being's own body, it follows that the five faculties, too, extend to an ordinary being's contaminated state — for supreme mundane dharma is definitely a conditioned dharma, and could never be uncontaminated. One asks: what fault follows from holding that the five faculties are exclusively uncontaminated in substance? The answer: this directly contradicts a sutra passage, which states: if I had not truly known, regarding these five faculties of faith and the rest, their arising, their passing, their allure, their peril, and the escape from them, I could never have transcended this world of gods and men, together with Māra and Brahmā — and so on, extending to: I could never have attained unsurpassed, perfect awakening, as explained at length. An uncontaminated dharma cannot be examined in this fashion, category by category. The Vibhajyavādins reply as follows: the World-Honored One is speaking here of contemplating the specific characteristic — that is, "if I had not truly known, regarding these five faculties of faith and the rest, their arising and the rest as specific characteristics, I could never have transcended this world of gods and men, together with Māra and Brahmā" —

and so on, as explained at length. What does it mean to contemplate the uncontaminated's own specific characteristic as "arising"? It means that this necessarily arises through drawing near to a good friend, hearing the true dharma, thorough and proper reflection, and practicing in accordance with the dharma. What does it mean to contemplate this as its specific characteristic of "passing"? It means that when the faculty of "I shall come to know what is not yet known" passes, the faculty of "having come to know" arises; and when the faculty of "having come to know" passes, the faculty of "complete knowing" arises. What does it mean to contemplate this as its specific characteristic of "allure"? It means that this, too, can serve as an object of craving. If that is so, is the uncontaminated thereby bound by craving? Not at all — just as you yourself admit that an uncontaminated dharma can be an object of the afflictions without thereby being bound by them, our own position holds the same: craving may take the uncontaminated as its object without ever binding it. What fault could follow from this? What does it mean to contemplate the uncontaminated's specific characteristic as "peril"? It means contemplating that the uncontaminated is itself impermanent. What does it mean to contemplate this as its specific characteristic of "escape"? It means that at the moment of final nirvāṇa, it too must be relinquished, just as a sutra states: at the moment of final nirvāṇa, every conditioned dharma is entirely relinquished. This reply is unreasonable. Why is this? Because the sutra in question actually states: if I had not truly known, regarding these five faculties of faith and the rest, their arising, passing, allure, peril, and escape, I could never have attained the eternal exhaustion of the contaminants and unsurpassed awakening — and contemplating a mere specific characteristic could never, by itself, exhaust the contaminants. Hence what they say is certainly unreasonable, and it follows that the five faculties are not exclusively uncontaminated. Moreover, holding that the five faculties are exclusively uncontaminated also contradicts other sutra passages — as when a sutra states: may the World-Honored One please expound the essentials of the dharma, for there are sentient beings living in the world, being born or growing up, some of sharp faculties, some of middling faculties, and some of dull faculties — and so on, as explained at length. And another sutra states: monks, you should know that before I first turned the wheel of the true dharma, I had already, with the buddha-eye, observed the sentient beings living in the world, being born or growing up, and the distinctions among their sharp, middling, and dull faculties, their fine or poor appearance, their being well or poorly tamed, and their having little or much accumulated defilement; and that if they did not hear the dharma, they would lose the benefit of these five faculties of faith and the rest. If these faculties were exclusively uncontaminated, then anyone of sharp faculties would already be an arhat, anyone of middling faculties a non-returner, and anyone of dull faculties a once-returner or stream-enterer — and if that were so, then before the World-Honored One had even turned the wheel of the dharma, it should already have counted as turned, since every kind of noble one would already have filled up the entire world, and turning the wheel of the dharma afterward would have served no purpose at all. The Vibhajyavādins reply as follows: here, the word "faculty" refers to the basis a faculty depends on, not to the substance of the faculty itself — so how does this contradict our position? But this reply, too, is unreasonable, because it contradicts yet another sutra passage — for another sutra states:

the brahmin Janāṃtapa approached the World-Honored One and addressed the Buddha, saying: Gautama, how many faculties do you speak of? The Buddha replied: I speak of twenty-two faculties, namely the eye-faculty — and so on, as explained at length. Does this sutra, too, speak of the faculty's basis rather than the faculty itself? These two sutras use the word "faculty" in exactly the same sense — one cannot claim, without warrant, that one means the faculty's own substance while the other means merely its basis; this is simply your own arbitrary assertion. It should therefore certainly be granted that the five faculties of faith and the rest likewise extend to the contaminated state. One asks: if they do extend to the contaminated, how then should the sutra passage they cited be interpreted? The answer: the five faculties of faith and the rest do indeed extend to the contaminated; if that sutra speaks of them exclusively as uncontaminated, it is because the various grades of noble persons are established on the basis of the uncontaminated faculties in particular.

Some say instead: that sutra speaks only of the noble path — because the distinctions among noble persons are established with reference to the noble path, not to the conventional. One then asks: but does not that same sutra also state, "if one entirely lacks these five faculties of faith and the rest, I say that person abides among the outsider class of ordinary beings" — how, then, is this to be reconciled? The answer: one who has cut off their wholesome roots is what is meant by an "outsider" ordinary being. For ordinary beings, taken altogether, are of two kinds: inner and outer. Those who have not cut off their wholesome roots are called "inner"; those who have cut them off are called "outer." What that sutra actually means is: "if one entirely lacks these five faculties of faith and the rest, I call that person one who has cut off their wholesome roots" — so the sutra cited poses no difficulty for our own position. Others say: this is what the Sautrāntika school states — for the Sautrāntika masters, too, in order to refute the Vibhajyavādins' position as described above, say the same thing: supreme mundane dharma has the five faculties as its essential nature, though not exclusively so.

Some say instead: this is the Vātsīputrīya school's own position. The masters of that school hold that supreme mundane dharma has the five faculties of faith and the rest as its essential nature; only these five faculties are wholesome by their own nature, and other factors, being mixed with them, borrow the name "wholesome" as well. It is by means of these five faculties, and not by any other faculty, that every distinction among the noble ones is established — as a sutra states: when the five faculties are heightened, sharp, evenly perfected, and much cultivated, one becomes one liberated both ways; a degree below this, one becomes one liberated by wisdom; a further degree below, a bodily witness; a further degree below, one who has arrived at view; a further degree below, one released through faith; a further degree below, a dharma-follower; a further degree below, a faith-follower. One asks: what does this treatise's own position have to do with the Vātsīputrīya school, that it should recount their view here at all? The answer: it is in order to bring certainty to those in doubt — for their tenet and this treatise's own tenet, though largely the same, differ in a few small points. That school holds that supreme mundane dharma has only the five faculties of faith and the rest as its nature; that the nature of every ordinary being is uniformly defiled, bound to the desire realm, cut off by seeing suffering, and has the ten latent tendencies as its essential nature, with the latent tendencies themselves being formations dissociated from mind; that nirvāṇa is of three kinds — belonging to the trainee, the one beyond training, and neither; and that they posit the Asuras as a sixth, real destiny of rebirth for persons. These six or seven points, among others, differ from our own position; everything else being largely similar, there should be no confusion — it is precisely because their view and ours are otherwise so alike that their tenet is recounted here, in order to make the points of difference clear. One should now put this question to them: if only the five faculties are wholesome by their own nature, then what is the nature of every other wholesome dharma? If it is said that these other dharmas are, in themselves, unwholesome or indeterminate, and are merely called "wholesome" because they are mixed with the five faculties — then, since the five faculties are equally mixed with those other dharmas, why are the five faculties not, on the same reasoning, called unwholesome or indeterminate instead? In truth, faith and the other four faculties share, with the remaining factors they accompany, the very same basis, the very same aspect, the very same object; they arise together, abide together, and cease together, share one and the same result and outflow, and share one and the same ripening — yet to say that the five faculties alone are wholesome by their own nature, while the rest are only provisionally called wholesome because mixed with them, merely indulges a mistaken impression and does not accord with sound reasoning. To avoid this fault, one should instead say: supreme mundane dharma has a faculty's own nature, without being defined by the faculty as such.

The Venerable Dharmatrāta says as follows: mind and its mental factors are all, in the end, variations of volition — hence supreme mundane dharma has volition as its essential nature.

The Venerable Buddhadeva says as follows: the very substance of mind and its mental factors is simply mind itself — hence supreme mundane dharma has mind as its essential nature.

These two venerable ones together say: the volitional acts of faith and the rest, and the mind itself, arise one after another, never in simultaneous use — so when it is said that the five faculties of faith and the rest serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the path of seeing, this is said only in the sense of what is possible in a given case: that is, the five faculties of faith and the rest are able to enter the path of seeing because, in one instance, one might use faith's volition or faith-accompanied mind as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the path of seeing, and in another, one might use wisdom's volition or wisdom-accompanied mind for the very same purpose. One then objects: if that is so, then a factor dissociated from mind ought equally to be usable as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the path of seeing. They reply: granting this, too, would cause no difficulty — just as your own tenet holds that mind's substance, arising one moment after another, though not mutually associated, can still, by sharing an object, serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the path of seeing, our own tenet holds exactly the same:

the volitional acts of faith and the rest, though not mutually associated in their own substance, can still, by sharing an object, serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the path of seeing. What difficulty could this cause? There is, in fact, a very great fault here. Why is this? If faith's volition alone served as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the path of seeing, then, lacking diligence, mindfulness, concentration, and wisdom, one ought equally to be able to enter the path of seeing with laziness, forgetfulness, distraction, and faulty wisdom instead — and likewise, if wisdom's volition alone served as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the path of seeing, then, lacking faith, diligence, mindfulness, and concentration, one ought equally to be able to enter the path of seeing with faithlessness, laziness, forgetfulness, and distraction instead. Would this not amount to a very great fault indeed?

It is in order to refute these various differing positions that the treatise again states: in this sense, if mind and its mental factors serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the certainty of rightness, this is called supreme mundane dharma. "In this sense" means: within this framework, free of error — within this tenet, this treatise, this chapter, this section, this class of topic, in accordance with the sutra, as accepted by myself and by every other fellow practitioner of the holy life — the meaning stands exactly as stated. The Venerable Kātyāyanīputra thereby wishes to make clear his own tenet: that supreme mundane dharma has, as its essential nature, mind together with its associated mental factors as a whole — whether faculty or not.

One asks: supreme mundane dharma serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, and is called "entering the path of seeing" — but is it named "entering" only once it has already ceased, or is it named "entering" already while it still abides? If it is named "entering" only once it has ceased, why does the text not say "has entered"?

But if it is named "entering" already while it still abides, then ordinary beings and noble ones would become hopelessly confused. Some hold: it is named "entering" once it has ceased. One then asks: if that is so, should this passage not say "has entered," since at that very moment the path of seeing has already arisen? The answer: it is proper to say "has entered," yet the text says merely "enters," because, at the very point of completion, it speaks in the register of the preparatory act still under way — just as the word "coming" is used to describe an event already completed, the way it is said in the world: "Great King, where have you now come from?" — even though the arrival has already happened, it is spoken of as happening now; the case here is exactly the same. It is likewise as when something already cut off is spoken of as being cut off now — as a sutra states, "cutting off pleasure, cutting off pain," and so on, as explained at length: at the moment one departs from the desire realm's defilement, the painful faculty has, in fact, already been cut off; yet it is only when one departs from the third dhyāna and the defiled pleasant faculty is cut off that it is spoken of as "being cut off" — is this not a case of something already cut off being spoken of as cut off now? It is likewise as when something already liberated is spoken of as being liberated now,

as a sutra states: "the mind is liberated from the leak of desire, the leak of existence, and the leak of ignorance" — at the moment one departs from the desire realm's defilement, the mind has, in fact, already been liberated from the leak of desire; yet it is only when one departs from the defilement of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, and the mind is liberated from the leaks of existence and of ignorance, that it is spoken of as "being liberated" — this, too, is a case of something already liberated being spoken of as liberated now. It is likewise as when something already experienced is spoken of as being experienced now, as a sutra states: "while experiencing a pleasant feeling, one truly knows that one experiences a pleasant feeling," and so on, as explained at length — this, too, is a case of something already experienced being spoken of as experienced now, since it cannot possibly be fully known at the very moment it is being experienced. The case here is exactly the same: although the entering has already occurred, it is spoken of as entering now. Other masters say: this passage should instead read "enters the certainty of rightness immediately" — but this is unreasonable, for what difference in meaning could there possibly be between "the immediately-antecedent condition for entering" and "entering immediately"? On this view, then, supreme mundane dharma is named "entering" at the very moment it still abides. One asks: if that is so, would not an ordinary being thereby already be a noble one, since they have already entered the noble path? The answer: no such fault follows. At the very moment supreme mundane dharma reaches its abiding stage, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering is only at the stage of arising, and has not yet been fully accomplished — hence one is not yet called a noble one. Although the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering has not yet fully arisen, since it is precisely in the process of arising, it is named "the immediately-antecedent"; supreme mundane dharma, at that very moment, serves as its immediately-antecedent condition, and this is why it is called "entering." It is on this basis that it is said: if mind and its mental factors serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the certainty of rightness, this is called supreme mundane dharma. One asks: if mind and its mental factors have already entered the certainty of rightness, or are about to enter it, are these too supreme mundane dharma?

The answer: yes, these too. One asks: if so, then why does this passage not state this explicitly? The answer: to speak of "presently entering" is already understood to include both "having entered" and "about to enter"; and to speak of "the present" is already understood to include both "the past" and "the future," since their character is the same in this respect.

The volition-mind-difference theorists say as follows: if faith's volition-accompanied mind serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the path of seeing, then only faith's volition-accompanied mind can serve as the immediately-antecedent condition of the same kind for it — and so on, up to: if wisdom's volition-accompanied mind serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the path of seeing, then only wisdom's volition-accompanied mind can serve as the immediately-antecedent condition of the same kind for it. The similar-continuity theorists say as follows: mind and its mental factors can only serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for something of their own same kind — that is, mind can only condition mind, not a mental factor; a mental factor can only condition a mental factor, not mind; and among the mental factors, feeling can only condition feeling, not any other factor, and the same holds for perception and the rest.

Yet the mental factors are not constantly co-arising with one another; they arise only upon meeting their own distinct condition — if one delights in a preceding object, a pleasant feeling arises; if one is repelled by it, a painful feeling arises; if one is neutral toward it, a feeling that is neither painful nor pleasant arises; if one wishes to register something, feeling arises; if one wishes to grasp its image, perception arises; if one wishes to act upon it, volition arises; and so on, up to: if one wishes to make a determination, wisdom arises. Hence the mental factors are not constantly co-arising. If that is so, then mind and mental factors that have already arisen should not, in every case, be able to serve as an immediately-antecedent condition at all. They reply as follows: every one of them is, in fact, able to serve as such a condition, though not always without interval — just as your own tenet grants that upon emerging from the attainment of no-perception, even though there has been no mind or mental factor at all for five hundred aeons, the mind and mental factors present at the moment of entering that attainment still serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for the mind that emerges from it now — our own tenet holds exactly the same: even though factors of the same kind may be separated by a long interval, the earlier still serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for the later. What difficulty could this cause? This reply is unreasonable. Why is this? Because having a mind and having no mind are two entirely distinct states. Moreover, an associated dharma either has already given its result or has not yet given it — to treat these as interchangeable would be unreasonable. A mind not yet arisen cannot be "immediately-antecedent" at all — to make it serve in advance as such a condition would be unreasonable. Furthermore, this position directly contradicts what is stated in the Prakaraṇapāda, which states: what is the dharma immediately following mind? It means the remaining mind and mental factors immediately following mind, whether already arisen or presently arising, together with the attainment of no-perception and the attainment of cessation, whether already arisen or presently arising. And if their position were correct, a further, distinct fault would follow: if, immediately following a mind and its mental factors belonging to the stage with both examination and analysis, a mind and its mental factors belonging to the stage with analysis alone, or to the stage with neither, become present — then the mind and mental factors already arisen at the earlier stage could not serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for the later stage at all, since they are dissimilar in kind; and the same would follow, up to the case where, immediately following

a mind and its mental factors belonging to the stage with neither examination nor analysis, a mind and its mental factors belonging to the stage with analysis alone, or to the stage with both, become present — the same reasoning applies here too. The same fault, moreover, follows for wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate mind and mental factors succeeding one another without interval: if the earlier cannot serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for the later, then the later, having no condition at all, could never arise. If it is claimed that the later arises through a same-kind immediately-antecedent condition reaching across an interval left by other, intervening states, this too is unreasonable, since reaching across an interval to serve as a condition, while still within a period that has mind, makes no sense at all. Furthermore, in the case of the very first moment of the uncontaminated, and of a superior contaminated state never before arisen since beginningless time — since these have, by definition, no earlier occurrence of their own to draw on, a same-kind immediately-antecedent condition could never allow them to arise at all. Their position, moreover, carries a very great fault of its own: it would mean that immediately following greed, greed must always arise again, with no occasion ever to suppress greed and give rise instead to the contemplation of impurity; that immediately following hatred, hatred must always arise again, with no occasion ever to suppress hatred and give rise instead to the contemplation of loving-kindness and compassion; and that immediately following delusion, delusion must always arise again, with no occasion ever to suppress delusion and give rise instead to the contemplation of causes and conditions — and the same should be understood, by the same reasoning, for the arising of self-view and the rest — since, on their view, a dissimilar kind of mind has no proximate condition by which it could ever arise at all. Furthermore, since this superior wholesome state has never arisen before, a wholesome mind could then never have any way to arise in the first place — and if that were so, there could be no such thing as attaining liberation at all. Let there be no such various faults as these.

It should therefore be granted instead that an earlier-arising cluster of mind and mental factors serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for a later-arising cluster: whether equal or unequal in extent, the earlier makes way for the later with the same enabling force, just as one heap of grain makes way for the next. One asks: while supreme mundane dharma is presently occurring, the future mind and mental factors it thereby cultivates — are these, too, supreme mundane dharma? Some say: they are not supreme mundane dharma. Why is this? Because this passage states that if mind and mental factors serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the certainty of rightness, this is called supreme mundane dharma — and since those future factors cannot yet serve as such a condition, they are therefore not supreme mundane dharma. Moreover, if they were supreme mundane dharma, then supreme mundane dharma would consist of many minds at once, contradicting a later passage, which states that supreme mundane dharma is properly a single mind, not many minds. Others say instead:

these future factors, too, are indeed supreme mundane dharma — for if they were not, this would directly contradict what is stated in the Knowledge Chapter, which states: when a path never before attained is presently occurring, it cultivates other, future instances of that same kind of path — and if one insists that these future factors are not themselves supreme mundane dharma, how could they even be called instances "of that same kind" at all? One asks: since these future factors cannot serve as the immediately-antecedent condition, how could they possibly be named supreme mundane dharma? The answer: although they cannot serve as the immediately-antecedent condition, they can still accord with it, since they arise through the very same attainment. It is like a monk who gives his consent to the assembly: when the sangha performs the poṣadha ceremony, a monk who is not himself present in the assembly can still, by having given his consent, be counted as having performed the poṣadha, and every other business of the sangha can likewise be validly accomplished on his behalf. In just the same way, the future instances thereby cultivated, though unable to serve as the immediately-antecedent condition, still arise through, and accord with, that very same attainment. Even supposing they did not arise through and accord with that attainment, though this alone would still not let them serve as the immediately-antecedent condition, they are still able to function as a condition through the sheer force of that accordance,

since their unobstructing power toward the noble path is itself strong. One asks: if these future factors, too, are supreme mundane dharma, why does the root treatise itself not state this explicitly here? The answer: wherever the root text ought to state something yet does not, one should understand that its meaning is left for elsewhere. Further: wherever a dharma is able to serve as the immediately-antecedent condition, the root text states it explicitly here; since these future factors cannot serve as such a condition, they are not stated. Further: wherever a dharma is presently operative in the world, the root text states it here;

since these future factors are not presently operative in the world, they are not stated. Further: wherever a dharma is able to take a result and give a result, the root text states it here; since these future factors can do neither, they are not stated. Further: wherever a dharma is attained through nourishment yet is also present within the body, the root text states it here; though these future factors are indeed attained through nourishment, they are not present within the body, and so are not stated. Further: wherever a dharma has the power to cultivate future instances, the root text states it here; these future factors have no power of cultivation themselves, and so are not stated. Further: wherever this mind is the cause and that mind is the result, the root text states it here; these future factors are not like this, and so are not stated. Further: wherever a dharma repays a cause, and is also able to take a result while remaining present within the body and taking an object, the root text states it here; these future factors are not like this, and so are not stated. Further: wherever both kinds of cultivation are present together, the root text states it here; these future factors have only the cultivation of attainment, without the cultivation of actual practice, and so are not stated. Further: wherever a dharma has actual function, the root text states it here; these future factors have no such function, and so are not stated. One then asks: if that is so, why does a later passage state that supreme mundane dharma is not many minds at once? The answer: that later passage speaks only of the single mind that has actual function in the present — it does not mean to deny the rest altogether. If it is said that, in truth, there are many minds at once, this is because, among the future instances, there are many categories, all of the very same kind; and if even instances not themselves cultivated in the present can still be named supreme mundane dharma, how much more so those that are cultivated? Hence it is asked: is there ever a case of a factor associated with supreme mundane dharma that does not serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering? Yes — namely, exactly these future instances thereby cultivated. One then asks: do the form and the formations dissociated from mind that arise together with supreme mundane dharma count as supreme mundane dharma themselves? Some hold: they are not supreme mundane dharma, since this passage states that only if mind and mental factors serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the certainty of rightness is this called supreme mundane dharma — and since these accompanying factors cannot serve as such a condition, they are not properly named so. Others hold instead: these factors, too, are indeed supreme mundane dharma. One asks: since they do not serve as the immediately-antecedent condition, how could they possibly be named so? The answer: although they do not serve as the immediately-antecedent condition, they still accord with it, since they arise together with, abide together with, and cease together with this same mind and its mental factors, share the very same result, outflow, and ripening, and stand in the closest possible relation to them. One asks: if that is so, why does this passage not state this explicitly? The answer: wherever a passage ought to state something yet does not, one should understand that its meaning is left for elsewhere. Further: wherever a dharma is able to serve as the immediately-antecedent condition, the root text states it here; these accompanying factors are not like this, and so are not stated. Further: wherever a dharma is attained through nourishment and also takes an object, the root text states it here; these accompanying factors are not like this, and so are not stated. Further: wherever a dharma is associated with mind, has a basis, an aspect, an object, and attentiveness, the root text states it here; these accompanying factors are not like this, and so are not stated. Hence it is asked: is there ever a case of a presently-occurring supreme mundane dharma that is not the immediately-antecedent condition for the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering? Yes — namely, exactly this accompanying form, and these formations dissociated from mind.