Five Rivers Into the Sea

Should supreme mundane dharma be said to be a single moment of mind, or many, and so on, as explained at length? One asks: why was this further passage composed? The answer: although the distinctions in what it is associated with have already been explained, how many moments it occurs in has not yet been shown, and this passage now shows that it occurs for exactly a single moment. Further: it is in order to refute another school's position — for the Vibhajyavādins hold that supreme mundane dharma occurs present in continuous succession. They hold that "continuous succession" is, in total, of three kinds: succession of a single occasion, succession of rebirth, and succession of mere similarity. Supreme mundane dharma, though it lacks the first two, does possess the third — and this passage now means to refute their position and show that supreme mundane dharma occurs present for exactly a single thought-moment. Further: it is in order to bring certainty to those in doubt — for it was already said that if mind and mental factors serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for entering the certainty of rightness, this is called supreme mundane dharma; lest one doubt that, just as the mental factors are of many kinds, the mind, too, ought to be many, this passage now shows, in order to settle that doubt, that although the mental factors are of many kinds, the mind itself is only ever one. It is for this reason that this passage was composed. Should supreme mundane dharma be said to be a single moment of mind, or many? The answer: it should be said to be a single moment. One asks: as already explained, the future instances it cultivates are also named supreme mundane dharma — should this dharma not then consist of many moments of mind? What, then, is the point of saying "a single moment"?

The answer: here, only what is presently occurring is spoken of, and this is why it is said to be "a single moment." One asks: why, then, does this passage not mention the future instances it cultivates? The answer: wherever a passage ought to state something yet does not, one should understand that its meaning is left for elsewhere — and there are, further, many additional reasons for this, already given earlier, which need not be repeated here. Although it has been said to be a single moment, the reasoning has not yet been explained — why is this dharma not many moments of mind? A bare assertion is not enough to make the meaning clear. The answer: immediately following this mind and its mental factors, no other mundane mind arises — only a supramundane mind arises. A "mundane mind" means a contaminated mind still fallen within existence — namely, exactly the second moment and beyond of supreme mundane dharma, which this passage rules out. A "supramundane mind" means an uncontaminated mind that cuts off existence — namely, the mind associated with the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, which this dharma draws forth. If some other mundane mind were to arise instead, would it be weaker, equal, or stronger than the one before it? None of these is possible. This threefold question — weaker, equal, or stronger — is posed here simply in order to work through the analysis, since only these three relations to the preceding moment exist. If it were weaker, it could not enter the certainty of rightness — why is this? Because it is never a path of retrogression that enters the certainty of rightness, but only a path of advancement, ever more vigorous and firm, that can do so — a path of decline, withering, falling, and ruin can never enter the certainty of rightness. If it were equal, it likewise could not enter the certainty of rightness — why is this? Because a path of exactly this same kind has already failed to enter the certainty of rightness once before — that is, since this later moment is of the very same kind as the very first moment, which was itself obstructed, beset with difficulty, and lacking in power, and so could not enter the certainty of rightness, the moments that follow, being of the very same kind, should be exactly the same: just as the first moment was unable to give rise, without interval, to the noble path, so too should every later moment of the same kind —

then one could, in the end, never at all realize entry into the certainty of rightness, and there would be no such thing as liberation or release. If it were stronger, then the earlier moment could not have been supreme mundane dharma at all, and only the later moment would be — since the very term "supreme mundane dharma" itself indicates the sense of "utmost" and the rest, and there can only be one such utmost moment. One asks: if the earlier moment is not supreme mundane dharma, then what is it? The answer: it is the superior forbearance. One asks: why is it that the path of seeing is drawn forth only by a stronger preparatory effort immediately preceding it, while the path of cultivation can be drawn forth by a weaker, equal, or stronger effort alike? The answer: because the path of seeing is a path never before attained, and requires a great deal of exertion and preparatory application of mind before it can become present at all — this is why it is drawn forth only by a stronger preparatory effort, unlike the path of cultivation,

which, being a path already attained before, does not require great exertion or preparatory application of mind in order to become present, and so can be drawn forth by a weaker, equal, or stronger effort alike. Supreme mundane dharma, moreover, serves as both a causal condition and a dominant condition for itself, moment to moment. As a causal condition, it involves three kinds of cause: the associated cause, the co-existent cause, and the cause of the same kind — this is the general statement. Stated in detail: a past moment serves as two causes for a past moment —

the associated cause and the co-existent cause; and serves as one cause for a future moment — the cause of the same kind. A future moment serves as two causes for a future moment — the associated cause and the co-existent cause. A present moment serves as two causes for a present moment — the associated cause and the co-existent cause — and as one cause for a future moment — the cause of the same kind. As a dominant condition: it means simply not obstructing arising, and nothing more than not obstructing.

Should supreme mundane dharma be said to retrogress, or not, and so on, as explained at length? One asks: why was this further passage composed? The answer: although it has already been shown that this dharma is a single moment of mind, not many, whether it can retrogress has not yet been analyzed, and this is now taken up. Further: it is in order to stop another school's position and make this treatise's own correct meaning clear — for some hold that supreme mundane dharma, too, can retrogress; in order to stop this position, the passage shows that this dharma certainly cannot retrogress, and this is why it was composed. Should supreme mundane dharma be said to retrogress, or not? The answer: it should be said not to retrogress. Though this much is stated, the reason it cannot retrogress should be further shown — a bare assertion does not make the meaning clear. Why is this dharma certainly unable to retrogress? The answer: supreme mundane dharma accords with the truth, advances toward the truth, and is about to enter the truth — and in the interval between this dharma and that truth, there is no room whatsoever for a dissimilar mind to arise that could prevent the direct realization of the noble truths from occurring. One asks: what is meant by "according with the truth," "advancing toward the truth," and "about to enter the truth"? Some say: "the truth," here, names direct realization itself — that is, supreme mundane dharma accords with, advances toward, and is about to enter direct realization.

Some say: "the truth," here, names the truth of the path — that is, supreme mundane dharma accords with, advances toward, and is about to enter the truth of the path. Some say: "the truth," here, names the path of seeing itself — that is, supreme mundane dharma accords with, advances toward, and is about to enter the path of seeing. Some say: "the truth," here, names the truth of suffering — that is, supreme mundane dharma accords with, advances toward, and is about to enter the truth of suffering. Some say: "the truth," here, names the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering itself — that is, supreme mundane dharma accords with, advances toward, and is about to enter the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering. Now, "according with" is here of two kinds: according-with-as-advancing-toward, and according-with-as-about-to-enter. Supreme mundane dharma possesses both kinds of according-with, with respect to the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, since it serves as the immediately-antecedent condition that draws it forth. As for "in the interval between this dharma and that truth, there is no room for a dissimilar mind to arise": this means that, in the interval between supreme mundane dharma and the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, there is no room whatsoever for a contaminated mind still fallen within existence — a "dissimilar" mind — to arise and prevent the direct realization of the noble truths, that is, to prevent the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering from becoming present. One asks: supreme mundane dharma is itself contaminated, and so ought to be "dissimilar" to an uncontaminated mind — why, then, does the passage call a contaminated mind still fallen within existence "dissimilar," yet call an uncontaminated mind that cuts off existence "similar"? The answer: supreme mundane dharma is itself disgusted with the contaminated and inclines toward the uncontaminated — this is why a contaminated mind is called "dissimilar" and an uncontaminated mind "similar": because it turns away from the one and toward the other, just as someone troubled by their own relatives might rely on a stranger for protection, coming to regard their own relatives as strangers and the stranger as a relative. The case here is exactly the same. Others say: supreme mundane dharma accomplishes the very same single task as the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering — namely, relinquishing the nature of an ordinary being and the rest — and this is why a contaminated mind is called "dissimilar" and an uncontaminated mind "similar": because they accomplish the very same single task together. To make the previous point clear even to the simplest of minds,

the treatise now states a visible simile. It is like a vigorous warrior crossing a river, a valley, a mountain, or a cliff — midway, he cannot turn back, returning his body to where he started, or diverting it elsewhere; the heightened bodily momentum he has already set in motion will not come to rest until it reaches its destination. Supreme mundane dharma is exactly the same: it accords with, advances toward, and is about to enter the truth, and in the interval between it and that truth, there is no room for a dissimilar mind to arise that could prevent the direct realization of the noble truths. Here, "crossing a river" means going from this bank toward the far bank; "crossing a valley" means going from this side toward the far side; "crossing a mountain" means going from this peak toward that peak; "crossing a cliff" means going from the height toward the depth below. Or it is like someone falling from the ridge of a roof: before reaching the ground,

he forms the thought, "I shall leap back up to where I started" — yet things do not follow his wish; there is no such possibility. Only if that person possessed supernatural power, or a magical spell, or some potent substance, could he actually return to where he started — such a thing could then occur. But that, in the interval between supreme mundane dharma and the yet-unattained forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, a dissimilar mind could arise and prevent the direct realization of the noble truths — this is simply not possible. In order to make this point yet more vivid, a second visible simile is now offered. In Jambudvīpa, there are five great rivers: the first named Gaṅgā, the second Yamunā, the third Sarayū, the fourth Aciravatī, and the fifth Mahī. These five rivers accord with, advance toward, and are about to enter the great ocean, and midway, nothing can turn them back —

their flow neither returns to its source nor diverts elsewhere; it will certainly flow into the great ocean. Supreme mundane dharma is exactly the same: it accords with, advances toward, and is about to enter the truth, and in the interval, there is no room for a dissimilar mind to arise and prevent the direct realization of the noble truths. One asks: what is the difference between the earlier simile and this one — and what did the earlier simile fail to fully convey, that a second simile was needed? Some say: the two similes carry no real difference in meaning; the second is offered simply to make the point of the first shine still more clearly. Others say: the two similes do differ — the earlier rules out an unreasonable outcome, while the later illustrates the reasonable one directly. Further: the earlier simile illustrates a completeness of internal factors, while the later illustrates a completeness of external factors. Further: the earlier simile stops an internal source of difficulty, while the later stops an external one — just as the five great rivers flowing into the ocean can never be turned back to their own source, meaning the lake of Anavatapta, nor diverted to flow elsewhere, meaning made to branch left or right; the "turning back" of the earlier simile should be understood on the same pattern. One asks: before these five great rivers reach the ocean, is there anything at all able to prevent them from doing so?

There is no such possibility. Only if someone possessed supernatural power, or a magical spell, or some potent substance, could the rivers be made to return to their source — such a thing could then occur. But that, in the interval between supreme mundane dharma and the yet-unattained forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, a dissimilar mind could arise and prevent the direct realization of the noble truths — this is simply not possible. When the venerable one composed this Jñānaprasthāna, he was dwelling in the eastern region, and so drew on the five rivers commonly seen there for his simile. In truth, however, within this Jambudvīpa there are four great rivers, each with four tributaries of its own, flowing in their respective directions toward the great ocean. That is: within this Jambudvīpa there is a single great lake named Anavatapta, from which, at first, only four great rivers emerge — the first named Gaṅgā, the second Sindhu, the third Vakṣu, and the fourth Śītā.

The first, the Gaṅgā, emerges from the lake's eastern side, from a golden elephant's mouth, circles the lake once to the right, and flows into the eastern sea. Next, the Sindhu emerges from the lake's southern side, from a silver ox's mouth, circles the lake once to the right, and flows into the southern sea. Next, the Vakṣu emerges from the lake's western side, from a lapis-lazuli horse's mouth, circles the lake once to the right, and flows into the western sea. Last, the Śītā emerges from the lake's northern side, from a crystal lion's mouth, circles the lake once to the right, and flows into the northern sea. The great Gaṅgā river has four tributaries: the first named Yamunā, the second Sarayū, the third Aciravatī, and the fourth Mahī. The great Sindhu river has four tributaries, named Vipāśā, Airāvatī, Śatadru, and Vitastā. The great Vakṣu river has four tributaries, named Vakṣu, Vetraṇī, Bhāṅga, and Kucchuba. The great Śītā river has four tributaries, named Sarayu, Bhīmā, Nadī, and Vidyut. These are only the ones with well-known names; in fact, each of the four great rivers has five hundred tributaries of its own, which, together with the four great rivers themselves, come to a total of two thousand four hundred rivers, all flowing in their respective directions toward the great ocean. One asks: before these two thousand four hundred rivers reach the ocean, is there anything at all able to prevent them from doing so? There is no such possibility. Only if someone possessed supernatural power, or a magical spell — and so on, as explained at length — could this happen; but that a dissimilar mind could arise and prevent the direct realization of the noble truths — this is simply not possible.

Further: supreme mundane dharma serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, and there is no dharma whatsoever that moves and turns more swiftly than mind itself, able, in that very moment, to obstruct it and prevent the direct realization of the noble truths. This is why this dharma certainly cannot retrogress. Here again, the same objection as before applies: the earlier passage was only a concessive line of argument, while what is now stated is the fundamental, refutative line of argument, and should therefore be introduced with "further," exactly as the root text itself states. What this passage really means is: supreme mundane dharma serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering; at the very moment it ceases, it takes its result and gives its result, and the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering must then necessarily become present. Whenever a dharma serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for another dharma, taking and giving its result at the very moment of ceasing, there is no possibility whatsoever — whether by another dharma, by a sentient being, by a spell, by a potent substance, by a buddha, by a pratyekabuddha, by one who has reached the far shore, or by any śrāvaka — of obstructing it so that the second moment fails to become present. As for the statement that "there is no dharma that moves and turns more swiftly than mind" — this should be understood to mean exactly the mind associated with the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering: this mind is certain to become present with the utmost swiftness, since there is no other dharma that moves and turns more swiftly than it. As the World-Honored One states: monks, you should know, I see no single dharma that moves and turns as swiftly as the mind — and so on, as explained at length; that sutra passage will be analyzed fully later, in the Absorption Chapter, since the Buddha there states that mind moves and turns more swiftly than every other dharma.

The very moment immediately following supreme mundane dharma, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering must necessarily become present — this is why this dharma certainly cannot retrogress. Within this general topic, a further distinction should be drawn. One asks: for what reason is supreme mundane dharma certain not to retrogress? The answer: because its preparatory effort is vast and broad, and because its footing is firm and secure. "Its preparatory effort is vast and broad" means that all the wholesome dharmas the practitioner has cultivated through giving, moral discipline, learning, reflection, and meditative development have been dedicated, without any attachment of mind, toward liberation and nirvāṇa: "giving" here means giving that adorns the mind; "moral discipline" means the precepts of individual liberation; "the wisdom born of learning" means discernment of the letter and meaning of the holy teaching; "the wisdom born of reflection" means the contemplation of impurity, the mindfulness of breathing, the foundations of mindfulness, the threefold-meaning contemplation, and skill in the seven bases; "the wisdom born of meditative development" means heat, summit, and the lower and middle grades of forbearance. "Its footing is firm and secure" means the superior forbearance itself. Because supreme mundane dharma's own preparatory effort is vast and broad, and its footing firm and secure, it is certain not to retrogress. Further: because this dharma is followed by the complete direct realization of the cutting-off of what is cut off by seeing across all three realms at once, and no one who has directly realized this cutting-off across all three realms ever retrogresses from it, this is why it does not retrogress. Further: because this dharma is followed by the complete direct realization of the cutting-off of what is cut off by seeing at the stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, and no one who has directly realized this cutting-off ever retrogresses from it, this is why it does not retrogress. Further: because this dharma is necessarily followed by the arising of forbearance and knowledge, and no one who has given rise to forbearance and knowledge ever retrogresses from them, this is why it does not retrogress.

Further: because this dharma is necessarily followed by the path of seeing, which serves as a weighty stronghold that certainly never retrogresses — since the path of seeing itself does not retrogress, this dharma does not retrogress either. One asks, as a further question arising from this discussion: for what reason does the path of seeing certainly not retrogress? The answer: because the path of seeing is a swift path, a path free of any obstacle, not a path that pauses partway — this is why it does not retrogress. Further: because the practitioner, once fallen into the path of seeing, is swept along by the great dharma's rushing current, with no room to retrogress — retrogression is only possible where the mind grows slack and slow — just as a person fallen into a mountain torrent, swept along by its rushing, violent current, can find no moment to pause even briefly;

the practitioner is exactly the same, and this is why it does not retrogress. Further: retrogression typically involves the arising of an affliction; while abiding in the path of seeing, not even an ethically-neutral, non-obscuring contaminated wholesome mind can arise, let alone a mind of affliction — this is why it does not retrogress. Further: because one who abides in the path of seeing directly realizes the complete cutting-off of what is cut off by seeing across all three realms at once, and no one who has directly realized this cutting-off ever retrogresses from it, this is why it does not retrogress.

Further: because one who abides in the path of seeing directly realizes the complete cutting-off of what is cut off by seeing at the stage of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, and no one who has directly realized this cutting-off ever retrogresses from it, this is why it does not retrogress. Further: if retrogression from the path of seeing were possible, then one who had already seen the truths would come to no longer see them; one who had already attained the fruit would come to no longer possess it; one who had already directly realized would come to no longer directly realize; one who had already entered the certainty of rightness

would come to no longer be within it; one who had already become a noble one would come to become an ordinary being once again; one who had already abided among the group of fixed rightness would come to abide once again among the undetermined group. Let there be no such multitude of faults as these. This is why the path of seeing certainly does not retrogress.

Some say: this wholesome root lasts for exactly a single moment, and no one can retrogress from half a moment — this is why it does not retrogress. Others say: this wholesome root resembles the uninterrupted path, and no one abiding in the uninterrupted path can retrogress from it — this is why it does not retrogress. Others say still: this wholesome root belongs to the division inclining toward advancement, and no one abiding in that division can retrogress from it — this is why it does not retrogress. Now, the nirvedhabhāgīya factors are, in total, of three divisions: the division inclining toward retrogression, the division inclining toward stability, and the division inclining toward advancement — whatever inclines toward retrogression is named the division inclining toward retrogression; whatever inclines toward stability is named the division inclining toward stability; and whatever inclines toward advancement is named the division inclining toward advancement. Heat possesses all three; summit, too, possesses all three — though some say summit possesses only two, excluding the division inclining toward stability, since the stage of summit is itself the very borderline between advancement and retrogression. Forbearance, too, has two, excluding the division inclining toward retrogression. Supreme mundane dharma belongs to the division inclining toward advancement alone — this is why this stage certainly admits of no possibility of retrogression at all. One asks: these three divisions here are all subsumed under the wholesome roots of the nirvedhabhāgīya factors — what difference is there between this and the four divisions stated later, in the Absorption Chapter? The answer: their respective bases differ. Here, the classification is established with reference to the nirvedhabhāgīya factors alone, considered solely as they accord with the path of seeing, giving rise to a single classification which is then further divided, by distinct sense, into three. In the later Absorption Chapter, the classification is established with reference to every contaminated wholesome dharma born of meditative cultivation in general, giving rise to four divisions instead: whatever inclines toward retrogression is named the division inclining toward retrogression; whatever inclines toward stability, the division inclining toward stability; whatever inclines toward advancement, the division inclining toward advancement; and whatever inclines toward the noble path itself is named the nirvedhabhāgīya division proper. This is why the two classifications rest on different bases.

One asks: is there any supreme mundane dharma that takes as its object something itself possessing an object? That takes as its object something possessing no object? That takes as its object something both possessing and not possessing an object? That takes as its object neither? The answer: taking as object something possessing an object — namely, whatever supreme mundane dharma takes mind and its mental factors as its object. Taking as object something possessing no object — namely, whatever supreme mundane dharma takes form or formations dissociated from mind as its object. Taking as object both — namely, whatever supreme mundane dharma takes both mind and mental factors and form or dissociated formations as its object. Taking as object neither — namely, the form arising together with the mind, and the formations dissociated from mind arising together with the mind, that are themselves supreme mundane dharma. One asks: is it possible, within a single moment, to attain a supreme mundane dharma that takes as object something possessing an object, one that takes as object something possessing no object, one that takes as object both, and one that takes as object neither, all at once? The answer: yes — while abiding at the stage of superior forbearance, one attains all four cases of supreme mundane dharma as stated above.

One asks: is it possible, within a single moment, to attain a supreme mundane dharma that is not the object of another, one that is the object of another but not itself supreme mundane dharma, one that is both a supreme mundane dharma and the object of another, and one that is neither, all at once? The answer: yes — while abiding at the stage of superior forbearance, this four-alternative analysis applies. Taking one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on the stage of proximate concentration: while abiding at the stage of superior forbearance, "attaining supreme mundane dharma that is not the object of another" refers to whatever supreme mundane dharma, subsumed under the stage of proximate concentration, is not the very dharma about to become present as the immediately-antecedent object — that is, the supreme mundane dharma taking every other object that its own conditions provide. "Attaining what is the object of another, but not itself supreme mundane dharma" refers to whatever supreme mundane dharma, subsumed under the five higher stages, is about to become present as the immediately-antecedent object. "Attaining both a supreme mundane dharma and the object of another" refers to whatever supreme mundane dharma, subsumed under the stage of proximate concentration, is about to become present as the immediately-antecedent object. "Attaining neither" refers to whatever supreme mundane dharma, subsumed under the five higher stages, is not the very dharma about to become present as the immediately-antecedent object — that is, the supreme mundane dharma taking every other object that its own conditions provide. This same fourfold analysis applies for one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on the stage of proximate concentration, while abiding at the stage of superior forbearance; the same should be understood to apply for one who enters relying on any of the five higher stages while abiding at that same stage. One asks: is it possible to possess supreme mundane dharma without possessing the corresponding attainment of freedom from bondage? The answer: this should be answered with a fourfold analysis. Possessing supreme mundane dharma without possessing the corresponding attainment of freedom from bondage: this refers to one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on a given stage, who has not yet become free of that stage's own defilement. Possessing the attainment of freedom from bondage without possessing supreme mundane dharma: this refers to one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on a given stage, who then dies and is reborn in a higher stage. Possessing both supreme mundane dharma and the attainment of freedom from bondage: this refers to one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on a given stage, who has already become free of that stage's own defilement, and who does not die and get reborn in a higher stage.

Possessing neither supreme mundane dharma nor the attainment of freedom from bondage: this refers to one who has not yet entered the certainty of rightness at all — such a person still possesses, in a residual way, only the ordinary, contaminated attainment of freedom from bondage belonging to the mundane path. One asks: is it possible for a noble one specifically to possess supreme mundane dharma without possessing the corresponding attainment of freedom from bondage? The answer: this should likewise be answered with a fourfold analysis. Possessing supreme mundane dharma without possessing the attainment of freedom from bondage: one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on a given stage, who has not yet become free of that stage's own defilement. Possessing the attainment of freedom from bondage without possessing supreme mundane dharma: one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on a given stage, who then dies and is reborn in the very next stage above. Possessing both supreme mundane dharma and the attainment of freedom from bondage: one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on a given stage, who has already become free of that stage's own defilement,

and who does not die and get reborn in a higher stage. Possessing neither: one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on a given stage, who then dies and is reborn skipping over the very next stage, landing in some yet higher stage — such a person still possesses, in a residual way, every supreme mundane dharma and every attainment of freedom from bondage belonging to the stages passed over. One asks: is it possible to possess supreme mundane dharma without possessing the corresponding attainment of freedom from bondage, restricted specifically to the first dhyāna? The answer: this should be answered with a fourfold analysis. The first case: one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on the stage of proximate concentration, the first dhyāna, or the intermediate dhyāna, who has not yet become free of the first dhyāna's own defilement. The second case: one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on a given stage, who then dies and is reborn in a higher stage — if, without yet having attained supreme mundane dharma, one is reborn in the desire or form realm and has already become free of the first dhyāna's own defilement, or is reborn in the sphere of infinite space. The third case: one who enters the certainty of rightness relying on a given stage, having already become free of the first dhyāna's own defilement, without dying and being reborn in a higher stage. The fourth case: whatever remains, excluding the three patterns above.

The venerable one here analyzes supreme mundane dharma through seven distinct gates — the first being "what is supreme mundane dharma?", down through the seventh, "should supreme mundane dharma be said to retrogress, or not?" Among these, the first three gates belong to the root treatise itself, while the remaining four arose as further questions generated along the way. It is by means of these seven gates that supreme mundane dharma has been analyzed and shown with the utmost clarity.

What is summit? — and so on, as explained at length. One asks: heat should properly be discussed before summit — why, then, does this passage discuss summit first? The answer: as already explained, this treatise expounds the pure and defiled dharmas within an ordinary being's body in reverse sequence; this is why summit is discussed first, and heat only afterward. One asks: if that is so, then forbearance should be discussed here before summit — why does this passage skip ahead to summit instead? The answer: forbearance has, in fact, already been discussed, though not explicitly — for it was already said earlier that if a later moment were stronger, then the earlier moment could not have been supreme mundane dharma at all, and only the later moment would be. What, then, was that earlier moment?

It is the superior forbearance. Since forbearance has already been discussed, summit is now discussed. One asks: why does the venerable one discuss forbearance only covertly, without explicitly explaining its own characteristics at length? The answer: it ought indeed to be explicitly explained at length — what is forbearance, why is it named forbearance, which realm does forbearance belong to, and every further question arising from this discussion ought all to be explained fully — and since they are not, what is the intent behind this? The answer: it is simply what the author of the treatise intended; the author, following his own intention, sometimes states things explicitly and sometimes covertly, sometimes at length and sometimes briefly, in composing this treatise, and this should not be pressed further. Here, the venerable one explains supreme mundane dharma explicitly and at length, while discussing forbearance covertly and briefly, and discussing summit and heat briefly as well. Other masters say: wherever the sutras themselves state something explicitly, the venerable one states it explicitly here too; forbearance is not stated explicitly in the sutras, and this is why it is discussed covertly here. One asks: but does not a sutra state forbearance explicitly? As the World-Honored One states: if a certain kind of person possesses six dharmas, they will certainly be unable, in this very life, to become free of dust and stain, and to give rise to the pure dharma-eye with respect to all dharmas. What are the six dharmas? First, not delighting in hearing the dharma; second, though hearing the dharma taught, not turning the ear to attend to it; third, though attending with the ear, not abiding with a mind resolved to practice it; fourth, not diligently seeking to realize wholesome dharmas not yet realized; fifth, not diligently guarding wholesome dharmas already realized; and sixth, not possessing forbearance in conformity — one should understand that the corresponding wholesome factors are simply the reverse of these six. Since forbearance is indeed stated explicitly in this very sutra, why does the venerable one discuss it covertly? They reply as follows: although the sutra speaks of "forbearance in conformity," it does not speak of "forbearance in conformity with the truths" specifically — and so this does not count as an explicit statement. One asks: what difference is there between "forbearance in conformity" and "forbearance in conformity with the truths"? Since there is no difference in meaning between them, one should understand the earlier position to be the sound one. One asks, as a further question arising from this discussion: why is this forbearance alone named "in conformity with the truths," and not heat or summit as well? The answer: heat and summit, too, ought properly to be called "in conformity with the truths" — and the fact that they are not so named should be understood as an instance where the text leaves something for elsewhere, since the meaning applies to them as well. Further: "in conformity with the truths" means according most closely with the direct realization of the noble truths — forbearance accords most closely with the direct realization of the noble truths, while heat and summit do not; this is why forbearance alone is so named.

Further: forbearance stands immediately adjacent to the path of seeing; heat and summit are not like this. Further: forbearance resembles the path of seeing; heat and summit are not like this — that is, within the path of seeing, only the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas is constantly present, and the stage of forbearance is exactly the same; heat and summit are not, since, although their earlier stage gives rise only to the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas, their later, more advanced stage can give rise to the other three foundations of mindfulness as well. Further: the stage of forbearance necessarily involves an unwavering resolve to advance into the noble path; heat and summit are not like this. Further: a practitioner cultivating direct realization delights, at the stage of forbearance, in contemplating the truths individually; at the stage of summit, in contemplating the Three Jewels individually; and at the stage of heat, in contemplating the aggregates individually. Further: heat brings the lowest grade of ignorance regarding the truths to rest; summit, the middle grade; forbearance, the highest grade. Further: heat brings the coarsest ignorance regarding the truths to rest; summit, the middle; forbearance, the subtlest. Further: heat gives rise to the lowest grade of clarity regarding the truths; summit, the middle grade; forbearance, the highest grade.

Further: heat gives rise to the coarsest clarity regarding the truths; summit, the middle; forbearance, the subtlest. Further: heat attains the lowest grade of confidence regarding the truths; summit, the middle grade; forbearance, the highest grade. Further: heat attains the coarsest confidence regarding the truths; summit, the middle; forbearance, the subtlest. Further: at the stage of forbearance, the noble truths are sometimes contemplated through sixteen aspects, sometimes through twelve, sometimes through eight, and sometimes through four; at the stages of heat and summit, they are contemplated only ever through all sixteen aspects. Further: the stage of forbearance involves no admixture of attention; the stages of heat and summit do — that is, at the stages of heat and summit, one repeatedly gives rise again to a wholesome mind of the desire realm contemplating the desire realm's own suffering, and, once this admixture has occurred, is again able to draw forth this same wholesome root as present; forbearance is not like this. Further: the stage of forbearance involves only individual attention, individually contemplating each truth; the stages of heat and summit are not like this — that is, although heat and summit, too, apply individual attention to individually contemplate each truth, in between they also cultivate a general aspect, contemplating all the truths together at once: contemplating that everything contaminated is suffering, that every formation is impermanent, that every dharma is empty and without self, and that nirvāṇa alone is true stillness. Further: the stage of forbearance sometimes contemplates the noble truths for a single, continuous moment; the stages of heat and summit only ever contemplate them in continuous succession. Further: the stage of forbearance gradually narrows its contemplation of the truths, according most closely with, and advancing most directly toward, nirvāṇa — like someone traveling to another land who trades bulk goods for something of equal value but far less bulk; the stages of heat and summit are not like this. It is for all these various reasons that forbearance alone is named "in conformity with the truths," while heat and summit are not. One asks: why is supreme mundane dharma not likewise given the name "in conformity with the truths"? The answer: although this stage is supreme in every respect, it does not contemplate the four truths comprehensively, and so the name "in conformity with the truths" is not established for it.

One asks: how many foundations of mindfulness does forbearance count as, in the present? The answer: in the present, only one — the mixed-object foundation of mindfulness on dharmas; in the future, it counts as all four, since it resembles the path of seeing. One asks: how many conditions does forbearance itself serve as? The answer: all four — the causal condition, the immediately-antecedent condition, the objective condition, and the dominant condition. As the causal condition: it is this condition for the dharmas associated with and co-arising with it, of the same kind and so on. As the immediately-antecedent condition: it is this condition for supreme mundane dharma itself. As the objective condition: it is this condition for the mind and mental factors able to take it as their object. As the dominant condition: excepting only itself, it is this condition for every other conditioned dharma. One asks: how many conditions does forbearance itself have? The answer: all four. It has a causal condition: the dharmas associated with and co-arising with it, of the same kind and so on. It has an immediately-antecedent condition: the already-arisen summit. It has an objective condition: the four noble truths. It has a dominant condition: every other dharma, excepting only itself. One asks: should forbearance be said to belong to which realm? The answer: it should be said to belong to the form realm alone. One asks: should forbearance be said to have both examination and analysis, analysis alone, or neither? The answer: it should be said to have all three. One asks: should forbearance be said to be associated with the faculty of pleasure, joy, or equanimity? The answer: it should be said to be associated with all three faculties. One asks: should forbearance be said to be a single moment of mind, or many? The answer: it should be said to be sometimes many, and sometimes a single moment — since the superior forbearance itself is exactly one moment. One asks: should forbearance be said to retrogress, or not? The answer: it should be said not to retrogress. All such matters as these should be understood on the same pattern as what has already been explained above regarding supreme mundane dharma.

One asks: taking which truth as its object does forbearance, immediately afterward, lead to entering the certainty of rightness? Some hold: it is forbearance taking the truth of the path as its object that, immediately afterward, leads to entering the certainty of rightness. One asks: if that is so, would this not create a mismatch between object and aspect — and if there is such a mismatch, would this not create an obstacle to entering the certainty of rightness? The answer: although there is, in this case, a mismatch between object and aspect, it creates no obstacle to entering the certainty of rightness.

Why is this? Because it has already become habituated — that is, the practitioner has already made this pattern into a familiar, well-worn path, freely traversed. It is just as, within the path of seeing, the forbearance and knowledge taking the desire realm as their object are immediately followed by the forbearance and knowledge taking the peak of existence as their object becoming present, and the forbearance and knowledge taking the peak of existence as their object are immediately followed by the forbearance and knowledge taking the desire realm as their object becoming present; the aspect taking the truth of suffering as its object is immediately followed by the aspect taking the truth of origin as its object becoming present, and the aspect taking the truth of origin as its object is immediately followed by the aspect taking the truth of cessation as its object becoming present. In every one of these cases, although there is a mismatch between object and aspect, it creates no obstacle to direct realization, precisely because the pattern has already become habituated — and forbearance here is exactly the same. If one holds that forbearance taking the truth of the path as its object is immediately followed by entering the certainty of rightness,

then there would be three moments of mind sharing exactly the same object and exactly the same aspect — namely, supreme mundane dharma, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, and the two moments associated with the dharma-knowledge of suffering itself; sharing the same aspect but not the same object — namely, the forbearance of the subsequent-knowledge of suffering and the two moments associated with the subsequent-knowledge of suffering; sharing the same object but not the same aspect — namely, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of origin and the remaining moments associated with the dharma-knowledge of origin; and sharing neither the same object nor the same aspect. Others hold instead: it is forbearance taking the truth of suffering as its object that, immediately afterward, leads to entering the certainty of rightness. Why is this? Because the path of seeing is an uncontaminated wholesome root, possessing great power — even where there is a mismatch between object and aspect, it creates no obstacle to direct realization. Forbearance, by contrast, is a contaminated wholesome root, lacking great power — were there any mismatch between its object and aspect, this would indeed create an obstacle to entering the certainty of rightness. This is why the practitioner, while abiding at the stage of forbearance, contemplates a broad object and aspect at first, narrowing it only gradually thereafter,

and it is by this means that entry into the certainty of rightness is achieved. That is: the practitioner first contemplates, through four aspects, the suffering of the desire realm; next, through four aspects, the suffering of the form and formless realms; next, through four aspects, the causes of the formations of the desire realm; next, through four aspects, the causes of the formations of the form and formless realms; next, through four aspects, the cessation of the formations of the desire realm; next, through four aspects, the cessation of the formations of the form and formless realms; next, through four aspects, the path of the formations of the desire realm; and finally, through four aspects, the path of the formations of the form and formless realms. Up to this point, the stage is named the lower grade of forbearance. From here onward, the contemplation is gradually narrowed: once again, through four aspects, one contemplates first the suffering of the desire realm, then the suffering of the form and formless realms, and so on, up to, finally, the path of the formations of the desire realm — gradually omitting the path of the formations of the form and formless realms. Once again, through four aspects, one contemplates first the suffering of the desire realm, then the suffering of the form and formless realms, up to, finally, the cessation of the formations of the form and formless realms — gradually omitting every path of the formations altogether. Once again, through four aspects, one contemplates first the suffering of the desire realm, then the suffering of the form and formless realms, up to, finally, the cessation of the formations of the desire realm — gradually omitting the cessation of the formations of the form and formless realms. Once again, through four aspects, one contemplates first the suffering of the desire realm, then the suffering of the form and formless realms, up to, finally, the causes of the formations of the form and formless realms — gradually omitting every cessation of the formations altogether. Once again, through four aspects, one contemplates first the suffering of the desire realm, then the suffering of the form and formless realms, then finally the causes of the formations of the desire realm — gradually omitting the causes of the formations of the form and formless realms. Once again, through four aspects, one contemplates first the suffering of the desire realm, then finally the suffering of the form and formless realms — gradually omitting every cause of the formations altogether. Once again, through four aspects, one contemplates the suffering of the desire realm alone — gradually omitting the suffering of the form and formless realms as well. The practitioner then contemplates the suffering of the desire realm continuously through these same four aspects, and narrows this further still, down to contemplating it through a single aspect, for two moments — resembling the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering and the dharma-knowledge of suffering itself. Up to this point, the stage is named the middle grade of forbearance. The practitioner then contemplates the suffering of the desire realm, through that same single aspect, for a single moment, resembling the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering — this is named the upper grade of forbearance. Immediately following this, one further single moment contemplating the suffering of the desire realm is named supreme mundane dharma. Immediately following this, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering arises, and so on in succession, up through the arising of the subsequent-knowledge of the path. It is like someone wishing to travel from their own country to another land, who has a great deal of property too heavy to carry — he first exchanges it for brass, but even this he finds too much; he then exchanges the brass for gold, but even the gold he finds too heavy; he then exchanges the gold for a single precious jewel of great value, and carries this jewel wherever he wishes to go. The practitioner is exactly the same: contemplating, at first, every truth broadly, both above and below, and then narrowing this gradually, down to a single moment's mind contemplating only the suffering of the desire realm — from which supreme mundane dharma next arises, and from that the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, and so on in succession, up through the arising of the subsequent-knowledge of the path. If one holds this position — that forbearance taking the truth of suffering as its object is immediately followed by entering the certainty of rightness — then there would be four moments of mind sharing exactly the same object and exactly the same aspect: namely, the superior forbearance, supreme mundane dharma, and the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering,

together with the two moments associated with the dharma-knowledge of suffering itself; sharing the same aspect but not the same object — namely, the forbearance of the subsequent-knowledge of suffering and the two moments associated with the subsequent-knowledge of suffering; sharing the same object but not the same aspect — namely, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of origin and the remaining moments associated with the dharma-knowledge of origin; and sharing neither the same object nor the same aspect. One asks: is supreme mundane dharma, like forbearance, also divided into three grades? The answer: within a single continuum, no; but across many different continua, yes — that is, the buddha lineage represents the upper grade, the pratyekabuddha lineage the middle grade, and the śrāvaka lineage the lower grade. The same should be said with reference to the six lineages, and to the three faculties as well.