The Twenty Statements of Identity-View

[The topic reads:] "Of these twenty statements of identity-view, how many are self-views and how many are self-possession-views?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to elucidate the meaning of the discourses. That is, in various discourses the Buddha spoke of the twenty statements of identity-view; the Venerable Śāriputra, in the Discourse on the Pond Simile, likewise distinguished these twenty statements of identity-view in brief, yet never stated how many are self-views and how many are self-possession-views. That discourse is the root text this treatise takes as its basis, and what it left unstated, the treatise now wishes to state — hence this topic is taken up. Further, it is taken up in order to refute a rival school and manifest the correct meaning. That is, the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain that identity-view has no real object at all. They say: identity-view conceives of a self and what belongs to self, yet in ultimate truth there is no self and nothing belonging to self — just as a person, seeing a rope, takes it to be a snake, or seeing a stump, takes it to be a person; identity-view, they say, is exactly the same, and so has no object at all. In order to refute this attachment and to demonstrate that this view does indeed have a real object, the treatise is composed. One asks: since in ultimate truth there is no self and nothing belonging to self, how can this view really have an object? The answer: identity-view takes the five aggregates of clinging as its object and conceives of them as self and as belonging to self — just as, taking a rope or a stump as its object, one conceives it to be a snake or a person: the aspect is inverted, but it is not without an object, since the five aggregates of clinging are themselves really existent. Of these twenty statements of identity-view, how many are self-views and how many are self-possession-views? The answer: five are self-views — namely, uniformly regarding form as self, and feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness as self. Fifteen are self-possession-views — namely, uniformly regarding the self as possessing form, form as belonging to the self, the self as dwelling within form, the self as possessing feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness, feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness as belonging to the self, and the self as dwelling within feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. One asks: just as the aspect of self-view, taking the five aggregates of clinging as its object, yields five varieties, the aspect of self-possession-view, likewise taking the five aggregates of clinging as its object, ought equally to yield five — why, then, does the treatise speak of fifteen? The answer: the aspect of self-view, taking the five aggregates of clinging as its object, admits of no further distinction, and so yields only five varieties; the aspect of self-possession-view, taking the five aggregates of clinging as its object, does admit of further distinction, and so yields fifteen varieties — that is, with respect to what belongs to the self, each single aggregate admits of three distinct aspects. Yet this identity-view could equally be said to be one — namely, the identity-view among the five views; or it could be said to be two — namely, distinguished by the aspect of self and of what belongs to self, spoken of as self-view and self-possession-view; or it could be said to be three — on account of the distinction of the three realms of desire, form, and formlessness; or it could be said to be five — on account of the distinction of taking each of the five aggregates as its object; or it could be said to be six — since, within each of the three realms, there is respectively a self-view and a self-possession-view.

Or it could be said to be nine — on account of the distinction of the nine stages of existence, from the desire realm up through the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Or it could be said to be ten — since, with respect to each of the five aggregates taken as object, there is respectively a self-view and a self-possession-view. Or it could be said to be twelve — on account of the distinction of taking the twelve sense fields as object. Or it could be said to be eighteen — since, within each of the nine stages, there is respectively a self-view and a self-possession-view; or again, on account of the distinction of taking the eighteen elements as object. Or it could be said to be twenty — that is, distinguishing, with respect to taking the aggregates as object, the distinct aspects belonging to the self, without distinguishing the place where each arises: as in uniformly regarding form as self, the self as possessing form, form as belonging to the self, and the self as dwelling within form — and the same for feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness. Since each of the five aggregates yields four, this gives twenty. Or it could be said to be twenty-four — since, with respect to each of the twelve sense fields taken as object, there is respectively a self-view and a self-possession-view. Or it could be said to be thirty-six — since, with respect to each of the eighteen elements taken as object, there is respectively a self-view and a self-possession-view. Or it could be said to be forty-eight — that is, distinguishing, with respect to taking the sense fields as object, the distinct aspects belonging to the self, without distinguishing the place where each arises: as in uniformly regarding the eye field as self, the self as possessing the eye field, the eye field as belonging to the self, and the self as dwelling within the eye field — and the same for the remaining eleven fields. Since each of the twelve fields yields four, this gives forty-eight. Or it could be said to be sixty-five — that is, distinguishing, with respect to taking the aggregates as object, the distinct aspects belonging to the self, while also distinguishing the place where each arises: as in uniformly regarding form as self, feeling as the self's own ornament, as the self's own servant, and as the self's own vessel — feeling thus yielding three; and the same for perception, formations, and consciousness — four times three gives twelve, and adding the regarding of form itself as self gives thirteen in total. Just as regarding form as self yields thirteen, so too for feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness — five sets of thirteen give sixty-five. Or it could be said to be seventy-two — that is, distinguishing, with respect to taking the elements as object, the distinct aspects belonging to the self, without distinguishing the place where each arises: as in uniformly regarding the eye element as self, the self as possessing the eye element, the eye element as belonging to the self, and the self as dwelling within the eye element — and the same for the remaining seventeen elements. Since each of the eighteen elements yields four, this gives seventy-two. Or it could be said to be four hundred and eight — that is, distinguishing, with respect to taking the sense fields as object, the distinct aspects belonging to the self, while also distinguishing the place where each arises: as in uniformly regarding the eye field as self, the form field as the self's own ornament, as the self's own servant, and as the self's own vessel —

the form field thus yielding three; and the same for the remaining ten fields. Eleven sets of three give thirty-three, and adding the regarding of the eye field itself as self gives thirty-four in total. Just as regarding the eye field as self yields thirty-four, so too for the remaining eleven fields — twelve sets of thirty-four give four hundred and eight. Or it could be said to be nine hundred and thirty-six — that is, distinguishing, with respect to taking the elements as object, the distinct aspects belonging to the self,

while also distinguishing the place where each arises: as in uniformly regarding the eye element as self, the form element as the self's own ornament, as the self's own servant, and as the self's own vessel — the form element thus yielding three; and the same for the remaining sixteen elements. Seventeen sets of three give fifty-one, and adding the regarding of the eye element itself as self gives fifty-two in total. Eighteen sets of fifty-two give nine hundred and thirty-six. In this way, the aspect that takes the aggregates as object admits of distinction by realm and stage; the aspect that takes the sense fields as object admits of distinction by realm and stage; the aspect that takes the elements as object admits of distinction by realm and stage; and if one further distinguishes by continuous succession, by time-period, or by momentary instant, then identity-view admits of countless further varieties. Here, however, the treatise speaks only of distinguishing the distinct aspects belonging to the self with respect to taking the aggregates as object, without distinguishing the place where each arises, and so states only the twenty statements of identity-view. One asks: why does the treatise here speak of the twenty statements of identity-view only with reference to the aggregates as object, and not with reference to the sense fields or elements? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Further, the treatise ought equally to have spoken with reference to the sense fields and elements; that it does not do so should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Further, since the aggregates come first in the standard order, the treatise speaks with reference to the aggregates alone; the sense fields and elements are not treated the same way. Further, one ought not to question the treatise's author on this point, since the author composed the treatise on the basis of the discourses, and the Buddha, within the discourses, spoke of identity-view's twenty statements only with reference to the aggregates — hence the author, following this, composed the treatise accordingly. One asks: if that is so, setting the treatise's author aside, one ought instead to ask: why did the World-Honored One himself speak of identity-view's twenty statements only with reference to the aggregates, and not the sense fields or elements? The answer: because he had regard to those he was converting. That is, the Buddha, observing the sentient beings he was to convert, saw that if identity-view's twenty statements were spoken of with reference to the aggregates, they would thereby gain understanding and be able to accomplish what needed to be done — but not so with reference to the sense fields or elements. Had it been the case that speaking with reference to the sense fields or elements would enable them to gain understanding and accomplish what needed to be done, the Buddha would equally have spoken of it that way; but since this was not so, he did not teach it in that manner. Further, identity-view more often takes the aggregates as its object, rather than the sense fields or elements, and so the treatise speaks of it exclusively in those terms. One asks: why does the treatise here speak only of identity-view's having twenty statements, and not state the corresponding statements for the other views? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Further, it should be understood that this discussion, too, is incomplete — that is, the treatise ought equally to state that extreme view has twenty, wrong view has eighty, and view-grasping likewise,

and precept-and-vow-grasping has forty; that the treatise does not state these should likewise be understood as incomplete. Further, identity-view stands foremost among the five views, and so it alone is singled out for treatment. Further, identity-view is what the ten kinds of emptiness most immediately counteract, and this is a further reason it alone is singled out.

As for the ten kinds of emptiness: internal emptiness, external emptiness, internal-and-external emptiness, the emptiness of conditioned things, the emptiness of unconditioned things, the emptiness of dispersal, the emptiness of intrinsic nature, boundless emptiness, the emptiness of ultimate meaning, and the emptiness of emptiness itself. One asks: as for these being called "twenty statements," what does "statement" mean here? The answer: it has the meaning of "own-nature" — that is, this view has twenty distinct own-natures. One asks: as for uniformly regarding form as self, and feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness as self — how, specifically, does one uniformly regard form as self, and feeling and the rest as self? The answer: with respect to whatsoever form there is, whether the four great elements themselves or what is derived from the four great elements, all of it alike is uniformly regarded as self; and the same should be said, as appropriate, up through consciousness. One asks: since identity-view takes only what is contaminated as its object, never what is uncontaminated, and takes only its own realm and stage as its object, never another realm or stage, and even within its own realm and stage does not take everything at once as its object,

why does the treatise say that all of it alike is uniformly regarded as self? The answer: this word "all" here means "all of a limited portion," not "all without exception" — hence no fault follows. Further, this word "all" is spoken with reference to the sphere in which the view itself operates, and so, likewise, no fault follows. One asks: is there any case of grasping self and what belongs to self with respect to a single aggregate alone? The answer: yes — that is, within the aggregate of form and the aggregate of formations, there are, in each case, many constituent factors, so that one may be grasped as self and the rest as belonging to self. Although the aggregates of feeling, perception, and consciousness have no such variety of constituents, they nonetheless possess various distinct own-natures, and so it is likewise possible to conceive of one as self and the rest as belonging to self. As for "uniformly regarding the self as possessing form," and so on, as stated at length — how, specifically, does one uniformly regard the self as possessing form? The answer: having, with respect to the remaining four aggregates, successively grasped one of them in turn as self, one then, with respect to form, grasps it as something the self possesses — just as a person possesses wealth, or possesses ornaments. How does one uniformly regard form as belonging to the self? The answer: having, with respect to the remaining four aggregates, successively grasped one of them in turn as self, one then, with respect to form, grasps it as belonging to the self — just as a person has attendants, or has servants. How does one uniformly regard the self as dwelling within form? The answer: having, with respect to the remaining four aggregates, successively grasped one of them in turn as self, one then, with respect to form, grasps it as the self's own vessel or the self's own dwelling-place — as oil dwells within sesame seed, as fat dwells within a lump of dough, as a snake dwells within a basket, as a knife dwells within its sheath, as ghee dwells within curds, as blood dwells within the body, and so on. Just as regarding form yields these three further varieties, so too should it be understood, up through regarding consciousness. One asks: grasping feeling and the rest as self dwelling within form — this much may be granted, since form is coarse and feeling and the rest are subtle; but how can one grasp form as self dwelling within feeling and the rest, since a coarse dharma ought not to dwell within what is subtle? The Venerable Pārśva said: reason ought not to press its demands upon the ignorant, the blind, and those who have fallen into a pit. Some other masters say: when one grasps form as self dwelling within feeling and the rest, one is, in that very grasping, treating form as subtle and feeling and the rest as coarse. Hence the Venerable Vasumitra explained: throughout the body made of form arising from the four great elements, wherever contact occurs, feeling can arise everywhere. What does this mean? It means that, throughout the body, contact can arise everywhere, and feeling likewise arises everywhere; and one thereby thinks: since, from the feet up to the crown, feeling is present everywhere, form-as-self must therefore dwell within feeling. The Great Virtuous One [Bhadanta] explained: every part of the body can give rise to feeling; and one thereby thinks: feeling, present throughout the body, belongs to the body as a whole, and is the self, not any other part; hence feeling can accommodate form-as-self within it. And the same holds for perception, formations, and consciousness. One asks: can identity-view arise taking a single atomic particle as its object? Suppose it can — what fault follows? If it can, this ought to be right view, not identity-view, since it is only by the wisdom of genuinely direct realization that an atomic particle is ever actually seen. If it cannot, then how is the statement in the Treatise on Six Dharmas to be reconciled with this? As that treatise states: atomic particles are permanent, since each dwells separately from every other; and this separate dwelling

is not a cause of impermanence — hence atomic particles are certainly permanent and abiding. What does this passage prove, and how does it establish that this view takes an atomic particle as its object? It states that extreme view takes an atomic particle as its object — and, since identity-view and extreme view share the very same object, this thereby establishes that identity-view, too, takes an atomic particle as its object. The answer: there is no case of identity-view arising by taking a single atomic particle as its object. One asks: if that is so, how is the statement of the Treatise on Six Dharmas to be reconciled with this? The answer: what that treatise states does not accord with correct principle, and cannot be cited as proof that identity-view takes an atomic particle as its object — for that treatise, moreover, states many further reasons that likewise do not accord with correct principle, and so it cannot serve as valid proof.

Some other masters say: identity-view can indeed arise taking a single atomic particle as its object. One asks: if that is so, this ought to be right view, not identity-view. The answer: this is stated with reference to its being a possible object, not with reference to its actually arising in that form. The verdict: this position is unreasonable — why is this? For how could this view rest upon such an object without ever actually arising in that form? Hence the earlier position stated is the sound one. One asks: is there a case of grasping the five aggregates all together as self, taking all of them simultaneously as object? Suppose there is — what fault follows? If there is, how is the statement in the Treatise on Six Dharmas to be reconciled with this? As that treatise states: the substance of self is one alone, and admits of no fivefold division. If there were a case of grasping the five aggregates all together as self, taking all of them simultaneously as object,

self would then have to be five in number. Yet the aggregates' own specific characteristics are five, each distinct from the other, while the self-characteristic thus grasped admits of no such distinction — since the self grasped in this way has no finer division, no differentiating mark, and remains permanent and unchanging, incapable of being destroyed by birth, old age, sickness, or death. If there is no such case, then how is the statement of the Discourse of Satyaka's Truthful Words to be reconciled with this? As that discourse states: the ascetic Satyaka, of truthful speech, said to the Buddha: "Gautama, I say that form is self, and that feeling, perception, formations, and consciousness are self." Some hold: there is no case of grasping the five aggregates all together as self, taking all of them simultaneously as object. One asks: if that is so, the statement of the Treatise on Six Dharmas is thereby well reconciled — but how, then, is the statement of the Discourse of Satyaka's Truthful Words to be reconciled? The answer: he spoke thus, contrary to reason, out of arrogance — in reality, he held no such view at all. Further, he wished to put the Buddha to the test, and so spoke these words contrary to reason — that is, having heard that the Buddha possessed supreme wisdom and vision, his mind was not settled in confidence, and he thought: "I shall now test whether this is really so" — and hence spoke in this way. Further, his mind was struck with terror, and so he spoke these words contrary to reason — that is, having first devised many stratagems and come before the Buddha intending to engage him in debate, he then beheld the World-Honored One's body, marked with the signs of a supremely accomplished master of debate — his jaw round like a lion's, his eyelashes like a bull-king's, his teeth fine and sharp, forty in number, his voice deep and subtle, delightful to hear — and, having seen this, feared falling into defeat and was struck with great terror, and hence spoke in this way. Further, the Buddha's own majestic power overwhelmed his mind, and so he spoke these words contrary to reason — that is, this outsider, having come before the Buddha for the sake of debate, beheld the World-Honored One's blazing majesty and virtue, such as even Brahmā, Indra, and the world-guardians could not bear to look upon, and, having seen it, was struck with alarm, and hence spoke in this way. Further, it was owing to the majestic power of gods, nāgas, and yakṣas that he was made to speak these words contrary to reason — that is, gods, nāgas, and yakṣas devoted to the Buddha thought: "This wicked outsider has contrived his words intending to trouble the Buddha; we shall use our own power to disturb his mind, making him speak contrary to reason and swiftly fall into defeat" — just as, when Upāli intended to come and revile the Buddha, the gods' majestic power disturbed his mind and turned his words instead into praise; the case here is exactly the same. There are yet others who say: there is indeed a case of grasping the five aggregates all together as self, taking all of them simultaneously as object. One asks: if that is so, the statement of the Discourse of Satyaka's Truthful Words is thereby well reconciled — but how, then, is the statement of the Treatise on Six Dharmas to be reconciled? The answer: he gives rise, with respect to the five aggregates, to a single composite notion, and grasps it as a single self — hence no fault follows. One asks: if that is so, what does he then grasp as belonging to the self? The answer: if he grasps the internal aggregates as self, he grasps the external aggregates as belonging to the self; if he grasps the external aggregates as self, he grasps the internal aggregates as belonging to the self — hence, likewise, no fault follows. One asks: is there a case of grasping a self existing outside the five aggregates? Suppose there is — what fault follows? If there is, how is the statement of the discourses to be reconciled with this? As the discourses state: whatever ascetics or brahmins there are who posit the existence of a self, all of them alike do so taking the collection of the five aggregates as their object. If there is not, then how can it be said that there is a sixth self-view? The answer: there is no case of grasping a self existing outside the five aggregates. One asks: if that is so, how can it be said that there is a sixth self-view? The answer: the self-view arising with respect to the aggregate of formations as constituted by volition, and the self-view arising with respect to the aggregate of formations in its other constituents, are separately established — and so there are six kinds in total. One asks: the Brahmajāla Sūtra states that all sixty-two forms taken by wrong views are rooted in identity-view, while the Lion's Roar Sūtra states that whatever ascetics or brahmins hold many different views, all of them alike depend on two views — namely, the view of existence and the view of non-existence. What difference is there between the statements of these two discourses? The answer: it is with reference to origination that the various forms taken by views are said to be rooted in identity-view, while it is with reference to reasoned inquiry that the various different views are said to depend on the view of existence and the view of non-existence. Further, identity-view is what draws forth and gives rise to the various forms taken by views,

while the view of existence and the view of non-existence are what preserve and sustain the various different views — this is the difference between what the two discourses state. [The topic reads:] "The view that regards the impermanent as permanent — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: these various forms taken by views, within birth-and-death, work great bondage upon sentient beings, work great affliction, and work great oppression upon them. Because of this, sentient beings again and again undergo manifold suffering and affliction within the desire realm and the realms of form and formlessness, revolving through birth-and-death, cut off from the light of wisdom, entering the mother's womb, dwelling amid the raw and the ripened wombs, undergoing there constriction and duress — like a person guilty of a grave crime, confined within a prison. Wishing to make sentient beings aware of the faults of these forms taken by views, so that they may diligently seek liberation, the treatise takes up this topic. Just as, in the ordinary world, a place of bondage, affliction, and oppression — if a person does not know of it, he cannot keep far from it, but if he knows of it, he can indeed keep far from it — so too is it here. This treatise's Miscellaneous Chapter, Knowledge Chapter, and Views Chapter all investigate the various forms taken by views by means of two matters: first, by own-nature; second, by antidote. By "own-nature" is meant: to which of the five views does such-and-such a view belong? By "antidote" is meant: by which path of seeing is such-and-such a view abandoned? The Utpādajñāna-śāstra [Treatise on the Arising of Knowledge] likewise investigates the various forms taken by views by means of these same two matters. As that treatise states: an outsider slandered the Buddha, saying, "The ascetic Gautama is a great illusionist, deceiving and confusing the world" — yet the World-Honored One's own path has utterly transcended illusion, and so this statement is itself a wrong view slandering the path, abandoned by seeing the path. "Slandering the path as a wrong view" displays its own-nature, since it slanders the World-Honored One as one who has transcended illusion by way of the path; "abandoned by seeing the path" displays its antidote, since it is the arising of forbearance and knowledge in the path of seeing that permanently cuts it off. Further, that same treatise states: someone said, "Why is the World-Honored One so stingy toward the arhats?" — yet the World-Honored One's own path has utterly transcended stinginess, and so this statement of "stinginess" is itself a wrong view slandering the path, abandoned by seeing the path; the two matters here should be understood as before. Further, in the Praśna-śāstra [Treatise of Questions] and in the Brahmajāla Sūtra, the various forms taken by views are investigated by means of a further, single matter — namely, from what does such-and-such a view arise? Taking all of this together, then, the various forms taken by views are to be investigated by means of three matters: first, by own-nature; second, by antidote; third, by origination. The Venerable Pārśva said: one ought not to investigate the various forms taken by views in this way — just as one ought not to press demands upon the ignorant, the blind, and those who have fallen into a pit. The verdict: the various forms taken by views ought indeed to be investigated by means of these three matters — why is this? Because, if the various forms taken by views are investigated by means of these three matters, then even an ordinary being still fully bound by defilement will, in the end, never give rise to them again — just as the noble path permanently cuts them off through full comprehension. Here the story concerning the sincere Dharma Master ought to be told at length: once, in this very country of Kashmir, there was a forest hermitage where various practitioners of yoga had gathered together in one place, discoursing on the various views, and saying: "How exceedingly rare it is that the noble ones, with respect to these countless faults, these evil forms taken by views, never again allow them to manifest!" At that time, within the assembly, there was a Dharma Master named Dārlapa, who said to the assembled company:

"What is so rare in the noble ones' having, with respect to these evil forms taken by views, already cut them off through full comprehension, so that they never again manifest? As for myself, right now — though still an ordinary being fully bound by defilement — if I investigate the various forms taken by views by means of these three matters, then even should I continue to transmigrate through birth-and-death in future times, just as I have done from time without beginning, throughout however many aeons may pass, these forms taken by views shall never again manifest in me — this indeed would be rare." At that time, within the assembly, there was an arhat, who thought: "That an ordinary being fully bound by defilement should dare to roar such a lion's roar in the very midst of this assembly of noble and worthy ones is exceedingly rare indeed — I shall, at some later time, put his words to the test, to see whether they are true or false." Yet, as is said: whatever wealth is accumulated must in the end come to its exhaustion; whatever eminence is attained must in the end come to its fall; whatever union is formed must in the end come to its separation; and whatever life-span there is must in the end come to its death. This same sincere Dharma Master, his life having later ended, was reborn once more, in his native country, into a brahmin family. The arhat, seeing this with his divine eye, went repeatedly to that family's home, inquiring after the child's well-being.

In this way time passed, until the child grew to maturity. The arhat, wishing to put him to the test, took up one of the child's ornaments and asked him: "To whom does this belong?" The child remained silent and did not answer. His mother said to him: "Child, why do you not answer the master's question?" The child said to his mother: "What the master asks about is something that does not exist in the world at all — how, then, could I answer it?" His mother said: "What is it that does not exist in the world?" The child replied: "The self does not exist — why is this? Because all formations are without self: there is no sentient being, no life-principle, no person, no one who is born, no one who nurtures, no one who acts, and no one who experiences; there is only an empty aggregation of formations — and so this question ought not to be answered at all." The arhat, hearing this, exclaimed in praise: "How exceedingly rare! Though you have passed through birth-and-death, these forms taken by views have still not come to manifest in you. In your former life, within the assembly of the noble and worthy ones, you roared this lion's roar: that an ordinary being fully bound by defilement, if he investigates the various forms taken by views by means of these three matters, will not allow them to manifest even after the passing of many aeons — and this statement has now proved true." Hence it should be understood that investigating the various forms taken by views by means of these three matters just described brings very great benefit.

[The topic reads:] "The view that regards the impermanent as permanent — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is included within extreme view, specifically the eternalist grasping, and is abandoned by seeing suffering. One asks: what here is meant by "the impermanent"? The answer: all conditioned dharmas. One asks: for what reason do outsiders conceive of these as permanent? The answer: on account of two conditions. First, they observe that material dharmas resemble one another in continuous succession; second, they observe that mind and mental factors recall past events. As to observing that material dharmas resemble one another in continuous succession: these outsiders observe that the form of old age resembles the form of youth, and that today's form resembles yesterday's form, and thereupon think: it is this very form of youth that turns into the form of old age, and this very form of yesterday that turns into today's form. As to observing that mind and mental factors recall past events: these outsiders observe that what was done, practiced, and experienced in youth can be recalled in old age, and that what was done, practiced, and experienced yesterday can be recalled today, and thereupon think: the mind and mental factors of old age are this very mind and mental factors of youth, and today's mind and mental factors are this very mind and mental factors of yesterday. It is owing to these two conditions that these outsiders falsely conceive the five aggregates of clinging to be permanent. The Venerable Vasumitra explained it thus: these various outsiders, because the five aggregates of clinging's own resemblance in continuous succession conceals it from them, do not know it to be impermanent; because its bearing and comportment conceal it from them, they do not know it to be suffering; because its thin skin and outward adornment conceal it from them, they do not know its impure functioning; and because their own grasping at self conceals it from them, they do not know it to be without self — and it is owing to this that these outsiders give rise to the view of permanence and the rest. Here, "included within extreme view, specifically the eternalist grasping" displays its own-nature, since, among the two extremes of eternalism and annihilationism which extreme view grasps at, this belongs to the eternalist extreme; "abandoned by seeing suffering" displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing the truth of suffering — that is, when, with respect to the truth of suffering, forbearance and knowledge arise, any such incorrect reflection and incorrect discrimination as this,

such inverted views, such unbalanced graspings, are permanently cut off and brought to rest — just as dew upon the tip of a blade of grass evaporates once the sun shines upon it; so too here, since the view arose through delusion regarding suffering, it is cut off precisely upon seeing suffering. One asks: those who teach the doctrine well likewise speak of dharmas as having a real substance, a real nature, a real characteristic, or a real entity — why, then, is what they hold not called an evil view, while what outsiders hold is alone termed an evil view? The answer: although those who teach the doctrine well speak of dharmas as having a real substance and so on, they do not attribute to it any further, agent-like function, whereas what outsiders speak of does attribute such a function. Some say: those who teach the doctrine well speak only of dharmas as giving rise to a momentary functioning, whereas outsiders speak of dharmas as repeatedly giving rise to functioning. Some say: those who teach the doctrine well proclaim that dharmas are born by being born, age by being aged, and cease by being ceased, whereas outsiders say that dharmas are not born by being born, do not age by being aged, and do not cease by being ceased. Some say: those who teach the doctrine well proclaim that dharmas flow on through the three time-periods, whereas outsiders say that dharmas do not pass through time at all. Some say: those who teach the doctrine well proclaim that dharmas arise in dependence on causes and conditions coming together, whereas outsiders say that dharmas do not arise from causes and conditions at all;

some say: those who teach the doctrine well proclaim that arising and ceasing are mutually corresponding, that there is a cause, a condition, and the mark of the conditioned all joined together, whereas outsiders say it is not so. It is owing to such various causes and conditions as these that what those who teach the doctrine well hold is not an evil view, while what arises in outsiders is alone termed an evil view. One asks: if one gives rise to the view of permanence with respect to the impermanent, one thereby necessarily slanders the cause and condition of impermanence — why, then, is this view not called a wrong view? The answer: the name "wrong view" is established for what functions by way of no determinate aspect at all; this view is not of that kind, and so it is not a wrong view. Some say: the name "wrong view" is established for what destroys a real entity, whereas this view instead superimposes something further onto it, and so it is not a wrong view. One asks: why, then, is this view called "extreme view"? The answer: because it grasps at the extreme of eternalism, and since both eternalism and annihilationism deviate from the middle, both are termed "extremes"; grasping at either of these two extremes is what is called extreme view. As the World-Honored One told Kātyāyana: if, by correct wisdom, one observes the world's own arising, and yet says that it does not exist at all, one no longer proceeds correctly — for "it does not exist at all" is precisely the view of annihilation; and if, by correct wisdom, one observes the world's own ceasing, and yet says that it does exist, one likewise no longer proceeds correctly — for "it does exist" is precisely the view of permanence. That is, since one observes that the aggregates of sentient beings arise in the future, this is not annihilationism; and since one observes that the aggregates cease in the present, this is not eternalism either. Further, giving rise to self-view is already itself something base and censured by the world; how much more so, then, giving rise to a grasping at either eternalism or annihilationism with respect to the self — this grasping, being utterly base and thoroughly deserving of censure, is for this reason called extreme view.

[The topic reads:] "The view that regards the permanent as impermanent — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is included within wrong view, and is abandoned by seeing cessation. One asks: what here is meant by "the permanent"? The answer: the quiescent extinction of nirvāṇa. One asks: for what reason do outsiders conceive of this as impermanent? The answer: outsiders maintain that there are four kinds of liberation. The first is called "the bodiless"; the second is called "the boundless mind"; the third is called "the pure aggregation"; the fourth is called "the world's own reliquary mound." "The bodiless" refers to the sphere of boundless space; "the boundless mind" refers to the sphere of boundless consciousness; "the pure aggregation" refers to the sphere of nothingness; "the world's own reliquary mound" refers to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception. Yet these four formless attainments, although long-lasting, eventually retrogress; and these outsiders thereupon think: "since our own liberations do indeed fall away and retrogress, it should be understood that the nirvāṇa spoken of by the Śākya clansman must likewise fall away and retrogress" — and hence they give rise to the view that regards nirvāṇa as impermanent. Here, "included within wrong view" displays its own-nature, since it denies the existence of permanent nirvāṇa; "abandoned by seeing cessation"

displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing the truth of cessation; the rest is as explained above. One asks: is there a wrong view that is able to give rise, with respect to quiescent nirvāṇa, to an aspect of impermanence? Suppose there is — what fault follows? If there is, how is the statement of the Prakaraṇapāda [Treatise of Topics] to be reconciled with this? As that treatise states: what is wrong view? It is slandering the cause, slandering the effect, slandering causal function, and destroying a real entity — together with the forbearance, delight, wisdom, examination, and vision associated with these. If there is no such wrong view, then how is what is stated here to be reconciled with this — namely, that the view regarding the permanent as impermanent is included within wrong view, and is abandoned by seeing cessation?

The answer: it should be said that this wrong view does indeed exist. One asks: how, then, is the statement of the Prakaraṇapāda to be reconciled with this? The answer: that treatise's statement does not exhaust every aspect of wrong view — that is, there remain further afflictive aspects that it simply does not state there. Some say: it is in fact included within what that treatise states — that is, "slandering the cause" means slandering the truth of origination; "slandering the effect" means slandering the truth of suffering; "slandering function" means slandering the truth of the path; "destroying a real entity" means slandering the truth of cessation. Some say: "slandering the cause," "slandering the effect," and "slandering function" each slander all three of the other truths, while "destroying a real entity" slanders only the truth of cessation. There are yet other masters who say: no such wrong view exists at all. One asks: how, then, is what is stated here to be reconciled with this? The answer: within nirvāṇa there is the characteristic of permanence; if one denies the existence of nirvāṇa, one thereby also denies this characteristic of permanence — just as, within a finger, there are four joints, so that if one denies the existence of the finger, one thereby also denies these four joints. Some say: this statement is made by inference from established principle — that is, these various outsiders maintain only that the aggregates themselves are permanently abiding dharmas; since nirvāṇa is not itself an aggregate, it follows by inference that they must certainly deny its existence altogether — and it is on this basis that the treatise speaks of the view regarding the permanent as impermanent, even though, in fact, there is no wrong view that genuinely gives rise, with respect to quiescent nirvāṇa, to the aspect of impermanence.

[The topic reads:] "The view that regards suffering as pleasure — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is grasping an inferior dharma as superior, included within view-grasping, and is abandoned by seeing suffering. One asks: what here is meant by "suffering"? The answer: all contaminated dharmas. One asks: for what reason do outsiders conceive of these as pleasurable? The answer: they are deluded by momentarily agreeable circumstances — as when fatigue is briefly relieved by rest, cold briefly relieved by warmth, heat briefly relieved by coolness, hunger briefly relieved by food, or thirst briefly relieved by drink, they thereupon think: "I am now experiencing pleasure." Yet, although there is indeed a small measure of pleasure within the aggregates, taking it according to its true measure would not itself be an inversion; it is outsiders' superimposing something further upon it, and grasping it as equivalent to ultimate pleasure, that constitutes the inversion. Here, "grasping an inferior dharma as superior, included within view-grasping" displays its own-nature, since it grasps suffering upon suffering and the like as excellent pleasure; "abandoned by seeing suffering" displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing the truth of suffering; the rest is as explained above. One asks: why is grasping suffering as pleasure called view-grasping, while grasping the impermanent as permanent is not called view-grasping? The answer: grasping suffering as pleasure is, without exception, grasping an inferior dharma as superior, and so it is called view-grasping; grasping the impermanent as permanent is not, without exception, grasping an inferior dharma as superior, and so it is not called view-grasping — since, among permanent dharmas, both the superior and the inferior belong together to a single class,

as with space and non-analytical cessation, which, being indeterminate, are not termed "superior dharmas" in a way that would distinguish them from the inferior. There are yet others who say: it is because there is, within the aggregates, a small measure of genuine pleasure, that grasping suffering as pleasure through observing this measure is called view-grasping; whereas there is no small measure of genuine permanence within the aggregates that could be observed in the same way, and so grasping the impermanent as permanent is not likewise called view-grasping — why is this? Because form and the other four aggregates are, by their very nature, momentary; empty and illusory in substance; abiding only briefly; and on the verge of ceasing and being destroyed. As it is said: what are the dharmas of the moment of cessation? They are the dharmas of the present. Hence grasping the impermanent as permanently abiding is called extreme view, not view-grasping. [The topic reads:] "The view that regards pleasure as suffering — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is included within wrong view, and is abandoned by seeing cessation. One asks: what here is meant by "pleasure"? The answer: ultimate pleasure is nirvāṇa alone. One asks: for what reason do outsiders say that nirvāṇa is suffering? The answer: they say as follows: when even a single faculty is destroyed, suffering still arises from it — how much more so, then, in nirvāṇa, where every faculty is destroyed altogether; hence nirvāṇa must be the utmost suffering. In reply to this, the Venerable Vasumitra said: the faculties are themselves the cause of suffering; if even a single faculty remains, it can still give rise to suffering — how much more so, then, when there are many faculties present. It is precisely within nirvāṇa, where every faculty has ceased altogether, that there is no cause of suffering at all — and so it is, on the contrary, the utmost pleasure.

Here, "included within wrong view" displays its own-nature, since it slanders nirvāṇa; "abandoned by seeing cessation" displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing the truth of cessation; the rest is as explained above. One asks: the truth of the path is likewise pleasurable, as the discourses state: the path depends upon its own provisions, and nirvāṇa depends upon the path; it is because the path itself is pleasurable that the pleasure of nirvāṇa is attained. Why, then, does the treatise speak only of its being abandoned by seeing cessation? The answer: it should be understood that this discussion, too, is incomplete — that is, it ought to be said that the view regarding pleasure as suffering, included within wrong view, is of two kinds: if one takes cessation to be suffering, it is abandoned by seeing cessation; if one takes the path to be suffering, it is abandoned by seeing the path. That the treatise does not state this reflects a further, distinct intention — namely, that the uncontaminated path, although it too is pleasurable, belongs to two aspects at once: insofar as it belongs to the aspect of pleasure, it is because it attains nirvāṇa; insofar as it belongs to the aspect of suffering, it is because it is itself impermanent, as the discourses state: "because it is impermanent, it is suffering." There are yet others who say: the truth of the path is not itself pleasurable at all; it is only because it attains nirvāṇa that it is provisionally spoken of as pleasurable, as it is said:

"it is by what is pleasurable that one arrives at the pleasure of nirvāṇa" — hence the treatise speaks only of its being abandoned by seeing cessation. One asks: is there a wrong view that is able to give rise, with respect to nirvāṇa, to an aspect of suffering? Suppose there is — what fault follows? This point is difficult to reconcile here, and should be understood at length exactly as explained above regarding the view of impermanence as permanent.

[The topic reads:] "The view that regards the impure as pure — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is grasping an inferior dharma as superior, included within view-grasping, and is abandoned by seeing suffering. One asks: what here is meant by "the impure"? The answer: all contaminated dharmas. One asks: for what reason do outsiders conceive of these as pure? The answer: they are deluded by momentarily fresh and clean circumstances — as when one grooms the hair, nails, mouth, teeth, and skin, thereby making one's outward form and complexion appear, for a time, fresh and clean, one thereupon thinks: "my body is pure." Yet, although there is indeed a small measure of purity within the aggregates, taking it according to its true measure would not itself be an inversion; it is outsiders' superimposing something further upon it, and grasping it as equivalent to ultimate purity, that constitutes the inversion. Here, "grasping an inferior dharma as superior, included within view-grasping" displays its own-nature,

since it grasps what is like filth and excrement as genuine purity; "abandoned by seeing suffering" displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing the truth of suffering; the rest is as explained above. One asks: it is plainly observed that the body's nine apertures constantly discharge impurity — how, then, can outsiders grasp the body as pure? The answer: they think as follows:

"What has already been discharged is indeed impure, but what has not yet been discharged must surely be pure" — just as the kiṃśuka tree's flowers are red, resembling flesh, and a jackal, crouching beneath and gazing up at them, thinks: "Now I shall surely have flesh to eat"; but presently, when one of the flowers falls to the ground, the jackal runs up and sniffs it, and only then knows it is not flesh at all; and it thinks further: "Though what has already fallen is not flesh, what has not yet fallen must surely be flesh." Outsiders are exactly the same — deluded by ignorance, they hold to just such a grasping. All contaminated dharmas are termed impure for two reasons: first, on account of the afflictions; second, on account of their object. Defiled dharmas are impure by both of these two reasons together; undefiled dharmas are impure only on account of their object. One asks: if that is so, then how can contaminated wholesome dharmas likewise be called pure? The answer: because they possess a small measure of purity — that is, although they still possess taint, fault, poison, and turbidity, they nonetheless run counter to the afflictions, are not mixed together with the afflictions, and undermine the afflictions. There are yet others who say: uncontaminated dharmas alone are pure in the ultimate sense; contaminated wholesome dharmas, since they draw one toward and accord with that ultimate purity, are likewise called pure. One asks: those who teach the doctrine well likewise speak of purity with respect to contaminated dharmas, as with the three pure practices, and yet this is not called an evil view — why, then, is it called an evil view when outsiders speak of these same dharmas as pure? The answer: those who teach the doctrine well speak of purity only with reference to excellent conduct, whereas outsiders speak of purity indiscriminately, whether the conduct is excellent or evil. Further, those who teach the doctrine well speak of purity only with reference to wholesome roots, whereas outsiders speak of purity indiscriminately, whether the roots are wholesome or unwholesome. Further, those who teach the doctrine well speak of purity only with reference to the dharmas that serve as antidotes to the fetters, bonds, latent tendencies, and secondary afflictions and their entanglements, whereas outsiders also speak of the fetters and the like themselves as pure. Further, those who teach the doctrine well speak of contaminated dharmas as possessing only a small measure of purity, whereas outsiders speak of them as ultimately and completely pure — and it is for this reason that what outsiders hold is an evil view, while what those who teach the doctrine well hold is not called an evil view.

[The topic reads:] "The view that regards the pure as impure — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is included within wrong view, and is of two kinds: if one takes cessation to be impure, it is abandoned by seeing cessation; if one takes the path to be impure, it is abandoned by seeing the path. One asks: what here is meant by "the pure"? The answer: the two truths of cessation and the path. One asks: for what reason do outsiders conceive of the truths of cessation and the path as impure? The answer: they say as follows: the afflictions are genuinely impure; when the noble path cuts them off, it thereby itself becomes impure, and the cessation attained by the path likewise becomes impure — just as, when a knife or water is used to cut or wash something filthy, the knife or water thereby itself becomes impure, and if that same knife or water is then used to cut or wash something else, that too becomes impure; cessation and the path, they say, are exactly the same, and so ought likewise to be impure. Here, "included within wrong view" displays its own-nature, since it slanders cessation and the path as impure; "abandoned by seeing cessation and the path" displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing cessation and the path; the rest is as explained above. One asks: is there a view that is able to give rise, with respect to the two truths of cessation and the path, to an aspect of impurity? Suppose there is — what fault follows? This point is difficult to reconcile here, and should be understood at length exactly as explained above.