Nothing Knows Itself

[The topic reads:] "The view that regards the non-self as self — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is included within identity-view, and is abandoned by seeing suffering. One asks: what here is meant by "the non-self"? The answer: all dharmas. One asks: for what reason do outsiders conceive of self with respect to these? The answer: they are deluded by the functioning of going, coming, and the like — that is, they think: if there is no self, then who goes, who comes; who stays, who sits; who bends, who stretches; who rises, who lies down; who sees, hears, smells, tastes, touches, remembers, and cognizes? It is because a self exists that these various activities occur — and so these various outsiders conceive of self with respect to them. Here, "included within identity-view" displays its own-nature, since it grasps at the existence of a self with respect to the five aggregates of clinging; "abandoned by seeing suffering" displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing the truth of suffering; the rest is as explained above. One asks: identity-view has two aspects — namely, the aspect of self and the aspect of self-possession, being included within self-view and self-possession-view respectively — why, then, does the treatise here speak only of self-view, and not self-possession-view? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some hold: self-possession-view ought equally to be stated, and that it is not stated should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. There are yet others who say: since self-view has already been stated here, it should be understood that self-possession-view is thereby stated as well — why is this? Because it is on account of there being a self that there can be what belongs to self; on account of there being self-view that there can be self-possession-view; on account of there being a view of one's own that there can be a view of what is one's own; on account of there being five self-views that there can be fifteen self-possession-views; on account of there being craving for self that there can be craving for what belongs to self; and on account of there being delusion about self that there can be delusion about what belongs to self. Other masters say: self-view is the root, being of the nature of inversion itself, and so is singled out for treatment here; self-possession-view is not the root, and is not itself of the nature of inversion, and so is not treated here. One asks: those who teach the doctrine well likewise speak of dharmas as constantly having a real substance, nature, characteristic, and entity — yet this is not called an evil view; why, then, is it called an evil view when outsiders speak of a real self existing? The answer: self is of two kinds — first, the self of dharmas; second, the self of the person (pudgala). Those who teach the doctrine well

speak only of the real existence of the self of dharmas — since the nature of dharmas is really existent, and is seen just as it really is, this is not called an evil view. Outsiders likewise say there is a real self, the self of the person; but the person does not really exist by its own nature, and so this view, being a false seeing, is called an evil view. One asks: why does the treatise not speak of a "self as non-self" view? The answer: since self does not really exist at all, regarding it as non-self would itself be right view; here the treatise speaks only of the various evil views taken by views, and so it does not speak of a "self as non-self" view. [The topic reads:] "The view that regards a non-cause as a cause — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: taking a non-cause for a cause is included within precept-and-vow-grasping, and is abandoned by seeing suffering. One asks: what here is meant by "a non-cause"? The answer: an unbalanced cause such as Īśvara and the like. One asks: for what reason do outsiders take a non-cause for a cause? The answer: through associating with evil companions, they hear it said that Īśvara, self-nature, puruṣa, time, space, and the like give rise to all dharmas. Thus, when a farmer reaps an abundant harvest in autumn, he says: "This is what the god Śiva-Mahādeva and the like have granted"; when a son or daughter is born, he says again: "This is what the god Nanda and the like have granted"; and one who has faith in Īśvara, when a son or daughter is born, says: "This is what the gods Viṣṇu, Kubera, and the like have granted." Errors of this kind take a non-cause for a cause. Yet sentient beings are born from their own individual karma, while insentient things are produced by shared karma, not by any perverse cause such as Īśvara. Here, "taking a non-cause for a cause, included within precept-and-vow-grasping" displays its own-nature, since it grasps what is not a genuine, proper cause as a genuine, proper cause. Precept-and-vow-grasping, in brief, is of two kinds: first, taking a non-cause for a cause; second, taking a non-path for a path — here the treatise speaks only of taking a non-cause for a cause. "Abandoned by seeing suffering" displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing the truth of suffering; the rest is as explained above. One asks: why is this view not abandoned by seeing origination instead? The answer: because it operates at the level of the effect. One asks: taking a non-cause for a cause likewise slanders the true cause of dharmas — why, then, is this view not included within wrong view? The answer: the name "wrong view" is established for what functions by way of no aspect at all; this view functions by way of an aspect, and so is not called wrong view. There are yet others who say: the name "wrong view" is established for what destroys a real entity; this view instead superimposes something further, and so is not called wrong view. The Venerable Vasumitra said as follows: if one denies the existence of a cause altogether, this is called wrong view; this view, rather than denying a cause altogether, takes a non-cause for a cause, and so is not called wrong view — since it grasps at what is not a genuine cause as though it were one.

[The topic reads:] "The view that regards a true cause as a non-cause — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is included within wrong view, and is abandoned by seeing origination. One asks: what here is meant by "cause"? The answer: karma, the afflictions, and the like. One asks: for what reason do outsiders maintain that internal and external phenomena arise without any cause? The answer: because they fail to understand the internal and external process of dependent origination. They think: who dug out the rivers and seas; who piled up the mountains and plains; who wove the thorns and brambles; who painted the birds and beasts? By this reasoning, they conclude that everything arises without a cause at all — hence their own verse states: "Who dug out the rivers and seas, who piled up the mountains and plains? / Who wove the thorns and brambles, who painted the birds and beasts? / The world has no sovereign lord, no maker at all — / hence it is known that everything arises without a cause." Here, "included within wrong view" displays its own-nature, since it slanders the very cause from which dharmas arise; "abandoned by seeing origination" displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing the truth of origination; the rest is as explained above. One asks: why is this wrong view of slandering the cause here said to be abandoned by seeing origination, while the Views Chapter states that the wrong view of slandering the cause is abandoned by both seeing origination and seeing the path? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length.

Further, this treatise's statement is of provisional meaning, while that one's statement is of definitive meaning; this treatise's statement carries a further, distinct intention, while that one's carries none; this treatise's statement concerns a further object of reference, while that one's concerns none; this treatise's statement is spoken with reference to worldly convention, while that one's is spoken with reference to ultimate truth. Further, this treatise speaks of a partial cause, while that one speaks of the cause in its entirety; this treatise speaks only of the cause of suffering, while that one speaks of the cause of both suffering and what is not suffering; this treatise speaks only of the cause of inversion, while that one speaks of the cause of both inversion and non-inversion; this treatise speaks only of the cause that gives rise to a result, while that one speaks of causes that both give rise to a result and do not give rise to one. Further, the wrong view slandering origination denies both the substance of the cause and the meaning of causation, while the wrong view slandering the path denies only the substance of the cause, not the meaning of causation — since saying that nirvāṇa has no cause is itself correct, not wrong. Hence the treatise here speaks only of the wrong view slandering the cause as abandoned by seeing origination, not by seeing the path. [The topic reads:] "The view that regards existence as non-existence — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is included within wrong view, and is of four kinds: if one takes suffering to be non-existent, it is abandoned by seeing suffering; if one takes origination to be non-existent, it is abandoned by seeing origination; if one takes cessation to be non-existent, it is abandoned by seeing cessation; if one takes the path to be non-existent, it is abandoned by seeing the path. One asks: what here is meant by "existence"? The answer: the four noble truths. One asks: for what reason do outsiders deny the existence of the four truths? The answer: because they grasp at the existence of a self, they thereby deny the four truths — they say that form and the other four aggregates are the self, not suffering, and thereby deny the truth of suffering; that the self has no cause, and thereby deny the truth of origination; that the self is permanent and never ceases, and thereby deny the truth of cessation; that the self has no antidote, and thereby deny the truth of the path. Just as those who teach the doctrine well, knowing that form and the other four aggregates are suffering, not self, thereby have faith in the truth of suffering; knowing that this suffering has a cause, thereby have faith in the truth of origination; knowing that this suffering can be brought to cessation, thereby have faith in the truth of cessation;

and knowing that this suffering has an antidote, thereby have faith in the truth of the path. Here, "included within wrong view" displays its own-nature, since it denies the real existence of the four noble truths; being of four kinds, and so on, as stated at length, up through "if one takes the path to be non-existent, it is abandoned by seeing the path" — this displays its antidote, since it is permanently cut off at the time of seeing the four truths; the rest is as explained above. It should be understood that slandering the truth of suffering here involves two kinds of slander: first, slandering its substance as an entity; second, slandering its meaning as an effect. Slandering the truth of origination likewise involves two kinds of slander: first, slandering its substance as an entity; second, slandering its meaning as a cause. Slandering the truth of cessation involves only slandering its substance as an entity, not its meaning as an effect — though some hold that it also slanders its meaning as an effect. Slandering the truth of the path involves only slandering its substance as an entity, not its meaning as a cause — though some hold that it also slanders its meaning as a cause, and some hold that it slanders both its meaning as cause and as effect; some hold that slandering the truth of the path involves only slandering its functioning. One asks: why does wrong view not take space or non-analytical cessation as its object? The answer: wrong view takes as its object only what is an aggregate, the cause of an aggregate, the cessation of an aggregate, or the antidote to an aggregate; space and non-analytical cessation are none of these, and so wrong view does not take them as object. Further, wrong view takes as its object only what is suffering, the cause of suffering, the cessation of suffering, or the antidote to suffering; space and non-analytical cessation are none of these, and so wrong view does not take them as object — and just as with suffering and its cause, so too should it be understood for the disease, the boil, the arrow, the affliction, the heavy burden, and their causes, and the like. Further, wrong view takes as its object only what is a matter of defilement or purification; space and non-analytical cessation are neither, and so wrong view does not take them as object. Further, wrong view takes as its object only what is the object of uncontaminated right view; space and non-analytical cessation are not objects of uncontaminated right view, and so wrong view does not take them as object — and just as uncontaminated right view is the antidote to wrong view, so too should it be understood for uncontaminated wisdom, clarity, resolute confidence, and the like, as antidotes to their own opposites. Further, wrong view takes as its object only what is like this shore, that shore, the mid-stream, the boat, or the raft; space and non-analytical cessation are none of these, and so wrong view does not take them as object. Further, wrong view takes as its object only what has the meaning of cause and effect; space and non-analytical cessation have no meaning of cause and effect, and so wrong view does not take them as object. Further, wrong view takes as its object only what is a matter for delight or disgust; space and non-analytical cessation are neither, and so wrong view does not take them as object. Further, wrong view takes as its object only what is capable of harm or benefit; space and non-analytical cessation are capable of neither, and so wrong view does not take them as object. One asks: then what does one take as one's object when denying the existence of space and non-analytical cessation? The answer: one takes precisely the mere name "space" and "non-analytical cessation" as one's object — why is this? Because one who denies their existence in this way has no deep or weighty state of mind about it, unlike slandering an actual matter of defilement or purification. One asks: what kind of cognition is this? The answer: this is, within what is abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm, a neutral, indeterminate cognition of inverted aspect. As for "existence" in general, some say it is of two kinds: first, substantial existence — as with the aggregates, elements, and the like; second, nominal existence — as with "man" and "woman," and the like. Some say it is of three kinds:

first, relative existence — that is, such-and-such a thing exists relative to this, and does not exist relative to that; second, combinatory existence — that is, such-and-such a thing exists in this place, and does not exist in that place; third, existence by time-division — that is, such-and-such a thing exists at this time-division, and does not exist at that time-division. Some say it is of five kinds: first, nominal existence — as with tortoise-hair, rabbit-horns, sky-flowers, and garlands and the like; second, real existence — as with all dharmas, each abiding in its own nature; third, provisional existence — as with a jar, clothing, a cart, a chariot, an army, a forest, or a dwelling, and the like; fourth, combinatory existence — as with a person (pudgala) posited through the combination of the aggregates; fifth, relative existence — as with this shore and that shore, or long and short, and the like.

[The topic reads:] "The view that there is nothing at all — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: this is not a view at all, but a wrong cognition. One asks: if this is not a view, then why does the topic speak of it as "the view that there is nothing at all"? Some say: the topic here ought to read: "as for there being nothing at all — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: it is included within identity-view, and is abandoned by seeing suffering. There are yet others who say: the topic here ought to read: "as for there being no cognition at all — among the five views, which view does it belong to, and by which path of seeing is it abandoned?" The answer: this is not a view at all, but a wrong cognition. There are still others who say: the topic here ought to read simply: "this is not a view" — since it is not stated among the five views. As for the position that the topic should be understood just as it is written — this is so because a question-and-answer structure is thereby produced, in order to complete the question-and-answer form; although there is no view of this kind, it is still phrased this way, just as the Ten Gates Chapter poses the question: "the three uncontaminated faculties and the unconditioned dharmas — by how many latent tendencies are they increased?" and answers: "they are increased by no latent tendency at all" — this is exactly the same. One asks: what, then, is this wrong cognition? The answer: this is, within what is abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm, a neutral, indeterminate cognition of inverted aspect — as when one takes a stump for a person, or a person for a stump, or takes what is not the path for the path, or the path for what is not the path. There are other masters who say: this wrong cognition can also be defiled and give rise to a class of conceit — Mahābrahmā, dwelling in this state, spoke thus: "I am the Great Brahmā, foremost among all the Brahmās; I am able to create and give rise to the world, and am the world's own father." This statement, however, is unreasonable — why is this? Because a mind abandoned by seeing cannot give rise to bodily or verbal action. Hence the earlier position stated is the sound one — namely, that this is, within what is abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm, a neutral, indeterminate cognition of inverted aspect. One asks: if that is so, how is the statement in the Knowledge Chapter to be reconciled with this? As it states: what is wrong cognition? It is defiled wisdom. The answer: wrong cognition is of two kinds: first, defiled; second, undefiled. The defiled kind is associated with ignorance; the undefiled kind is not associated with ignorance — as when one takes a stump for a person, and the like.

The defiled kind, śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas can both cut off completely, and it never again manifests in them; the undefiled kind, although śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas can likewise cut it off completely, still occasionally manifests in them. Only the Tathāgata never gives rise to it at all, since he has permanently cut off both the afflictions and their residual habitual tendencies together — and it is on this account that he alone is called the Fully and Perfectly Awakened One. The defiled kind of wrong cognition is called "wrong cognition" in the ultimate sense; the undefiled kind is called "wrong cognition" only by worldly convention, not in the ultimate sense, since it is not associated with the afflictions, the truly wrong dharmas. As for what the Knowledge Chapter later states concerning wrong cognition being "in the ultimate sense" — the treatise here speaks of it by worldly convention, and so there is no real contradiction.

[Thus concludes the Miscellaneous Chapter's first nyāsa. The Jñānaprasthāna-vibhāṣā's Miscellaneous Chapter now opens its second nyāsa, the Knowledge Nyāsa, part one:] "Is there a single knowledge that knows all dharmas?" — and so on; such topics, together with their explanations, having now been grasped, ought next to be expounded at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest its own correct meaning. That is, some maintain that mind and mental factors are able to cognize their own nature — as the Mahāsāṃghikas hold, saying: since knowledge and the like are, by their own nature, capable of cognizing, they are able to cognize both themselves and others, just as a lamp, being by its own nature capable of illuminating, is able to illuminate both itself and other things. Others maintain that mind and mental factors are able to cognize what is associated with them — as the Dharmaguptakas hold, saying that wisdom and the like are able to cognize their associated feeling and the rest. Others maintain that mind and mental factors are able to cognize what co-exists with them — as the Mahīśāsakas hold, saying: wisdom is of two kinds, arising simultaneously — first, associated; second, dissociated; associated wisdom knows what is dissociated, and dissociated wisdom knows what is associated. Others maintain that the person (pudgala) is able to cognize all dharmas — as the Vātsīputrīyas hold, saying that the person is able to know, though this is not itself knowledge. In order to refute these various rival schools' distinct positions and manifest its own statement — that mind and mental factors do not cognize their own nature, what is associated with them, or what co-exists with them, and that the nature of the person cannot be apprehended at all — the treatise is composed. Further, quite apart from refuting others or manifesting its own meaning, the characteristics of the various dharmas ought in any case to be properly distinguished, for the benefit of sentient beings — and it is for this reason, too, that the treatise is composed. Is there a single knowledge that knows all dharmas? The answer: no. If this knowledge arises taking all dharmas as non-self, what does this knowledge not know? The answer: it does not know its own nature, nor the dharmas associated with it and co-existent with it. Here, "does not know its own nature" refutes the Mahāsāṃghika position; "does not know the dharmas associated with it" refutes the Dharmaguptaka position; "does not know the dharmas co-existent with it"

refutes the Mahīśāsaka position; saying that it is knowledge itself that is able to know refutes the Vātsīputrīya position. Further, within this passage there is a question and an answer, and there is a challenge and a resolution: "is there a single knowledge that knows all dharmas?" is the question; "no" is the answer; "if this knowledge arises taking all dharmas as non-self, what does this knowledge not know?" is the challenge; "it does not know its own nature, nor the dharmas associated with it and co-existent with it" is the resolution. One asks: who here poses the question and who answers it? Who raises the challenge and who resolves it? The answer: the Vibhajyavādin poses the question, and the proponent of correct principle answers it; the Vibhajyavādin raises the challenge, and the proponent of correct principle resolves it. Some say: a disciple poses the question and the teacher answers it; the disciple raises the challenge and the teacher resolves it. Some say: there is here no actually distinct questioner or challenger at all — it is simply that the root treatise's own author, in order to elucidate the characteristics of the dharmas, provisionally sets up the roles of guest and host. Here, "a single knowledge" means a single moment of knowledge — hence it does not know its own nature, nor the dharmas associated with it and co-existent with it. If one were instead to ask: among the ten kinds of knowledge, is there a single knowledge that knows all dharmas? — one ought to answer: yes, namely worldly knowledge. Asking the same question with respect to nine, eight, seven, six, five, four, three, or two kinds of knowledge: is there a single knowledge that knows all dharmas? — the answer is likewise: yes, namely worldly knowledge. And if one asks, with respect to this very worldly knowledge: is there a knowledge that, across two moments, knows all dharmas? — the answer is: yes — that is, this knowledge, in its first moment, is able to know everything except its own nature, its associated dharmas, and its co-existent dharmas; in its second moment, it is also able to know the very nature, associated dharmas, and co-existent dharmas of the first moment — hence the answer is: yes. But here the question concerns only a single moment of knowledge, and so the answer is: no. One asks: for what reason does own-nature not know its own nature? The answer: lest there be the fault of no distinction at all between cause and effect, agent and object of action, accomplisher and thing accomplished, drawer-forth and thing drawn forth, producer and thing produced, possessor and thing possessed, transformer and thing transformed, characterizer and thing characterized, and knower and thing known — for this reason, own-nature does not know its own nature. Some say: own-nature, with respect to itself, provides no benefit and no harm, no nourishment and no injury, no accomplishing and no destroying, no increase and no decrease, no gathering and no dispersing; it is not itself a cause, an equivalent, or an immediately antecedent condition for itself; it is not its own object, and provides no dominant condition for itself — the own-nature of dharmas does not observe its own nature, but is only able to serve as a condition with respect to another's nature; for this reason, own-nature does not know its own nature. Some say: it is plainly observed in the world that a fingertip cannot touch itself, a knife's blade cannot cut itself, the pupil of the eye cannot see itself, and a strong man cannot carry himself on his own back — for this reason, own-nature does not know its own nature. The Venerable Vasumitra explained: why does own-nature not know its own nature? The answer: because it is not itself an available object. Further, if own-nature could know its own nature, the World-Honored One would not have established that the six consciousnesses are produced from two conditions each — namely, the eye and form as conditions producing eye-consciousness, and so on, up through the mental faculty and dharmas as conditions producing mental consciousness. Further, if own-nature could know its own nature,

the World-Honored One would not have established the threefold combination that constitutes contact — namely, that the eye and form as conditions produce eye-consciousness, and, through this threefold combination, contact — and so on, as stated at length. Further, if own-nature could know its own nature, the World-Honored One would not have established the category of wrong view at all — for that wrong view, were it able to know itself as "I am a wrong view," would thereby become right view, as it is said: "if wrong view could observe itself as being a wrong view, it ought then to be called right view, not wrong view." Further, if own-nature could know its own nature, it would not be established that an evil mind, pervading the whole body, is entirely unwholesome, since it would already understand its own body as not being deviant. Further, if own-nature could know its own nature, one ought not to establish the categories of apprehender and apprehended, knower and known, perceiver and perceived, object and possessor of an object, aspect and objective support, faculty and the meaning of a faculty, and so on. Further, if own-nature could know its own nature, then the four foundations of mindfulness ought to admit of no distinction, since the foundation of mindfulness on the body would then be identical to the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas, and so on, up through the foundation of mindfulness on mind being identical to the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas. Further, if own-nature could know its own nature, the knowledge of the four noble truths ought to admit of no distinction, since the knowledge of suffering would then be identical to the knowledge of the path, and so on, up through the knowledge of cessation being identical to the knowledge of the path. Further, if own-nature could know its own nature, the knowledge that recollects former abodes ought not to be said to exist at all,

since it would already know present events. Further, if own-nature could know its own nature, the knowledge of others' minds ought not to be said to exist either, since it would already know its own mental states as well. The Great Virtuous One [Bhadanta] explained: if own-nature could know its own nature, it ought then to be unable to know another's nature, since it would be operating with respect to its own nature; and if own-nature could know another's nature, it ought then to be unable to know its own nature, since it would be operating with respect to another's nature. If it could know both its own nature and another's nature, how would it know them? Would it know its own nature as its own nature, and know another's nature in just the same way — or would it know another's nature as another's nature, and know its own nature in just the same way? If it knew its own nature as its own nature, and knew another's nature in just the same way, then knowing its own nature as its own nature could be correct, while knowing another's nature as its own nature ought to be mistaken. If it knew another's nature as another's nature, and knew its own nature in just the same way, then knowing another's nature as another's nature could be correct, while knowing its own nature as another's nature ought to be mistaken. If that were so, there ought to be no distinction at all in substance and characteristic between a mistaken and a correct knowledge. And if it simultaneously knew its own nature as its own nature and another's nature as another's nature, then a single knowledge would have two distinct functions of understanding — and since the functions of understanding differ, the substance ought to differ as well; and since the substance would then be distinct, this could not be a single knowledge at all — yet for a single sentient being's own mind-stream to have two knowledges arising side by side does not accord with correct principle. Lest such a fault follow, own-nature therefore does not know its own nature. One asks: if that is so, how is the Mahāsāṃghikas' own simile of the lamp to be reconciled with this? The answer: there is no need to reconcile it at all, since it is not included within the sūtra, vinaya, or Abhidharma. Moreover, one cannot use a worldly, visible simile to challenge the noble ones' own Dharma, since the noble ones' Dharma differs from worldly dharmas. But if one insists on reconciling it, then the fault in the simile itself should be pointed out: once the simile has a fault, what it is meant to illustrate cannot be established. Just as a lamp has no faculties, no capacity for reflective cognition, and does not belong among sentient beings, knowledge ought to be exactly the same if the simile held; just as a lamp is composed of atomic particles of form, knowledge ought to be exactly the same — yet since it plainly is not so, how can this serve as a valid simile at all? Further, do they grant that a lamp has, by its own nature, the property of illuminating, or not? If it has the property of illuminating, then what further need would there be for it to illuminate itself? If it does not have the property of illuminating, its own substance ought to be darkness, and it ought not to be called a "lamp" at all — since it is precisely by dispelling darkness that it is called a lamp, how could this not be its very property of illuminating? Hence one ought not to maintain that a lamp is able to illuminate itself — and on this account, too, what the simile was meant to illustrate cannot be established. One asks: for what reason does knowledge not know the dharmas associated with it? The answer: because they share one and the same object, and occur simultaneously — that is, a single sentient being's mind and mental factors, with respect to a single objective sphere, occur simultaneously, and there is, by principle, no way for them to turn about and take one another as object in succession. It is just as when many people gather together in one place: whether they all look downward together, or all gaze up at the sky together, by principle they simply cannot see one another's faces at the very same moment — mind and mental factors are exactly the same. If knowledge could know its associated feeling, would that feeling then be able to take its own substance as its object, or not? If it could take its own substance as object, then the fault already stated above, of taking one's own nature as object, would follow; if it could not, then mind and mental factors, sharing the very same moment of arising, would fail to share the very same object — lest such a fault follow, knowledge therefore cannot know the dharmas associated with it. One asks: for what reason does knowledge not know the dharmas co-existent with it? The answer: because they are too closely adjacent — just as a stick dipped in kohl-medicine and placed directly against the eye cannot, on account of being too closely adjacent, be seen by that very eye; the case here is exactly the same. One asks: what, specifically, are meant by "the dharmas co-existent with it"? The answer: the form that follows along with it, and the dissociated formations that follow along with it. The Western masters maintain as follows: whatever belongs to the continuum of aggregates arising simultaneously with wisdom, and is included within one's own body, constitutes the co-existent dharmas. This position is unreasonable — why is this? For if that were so, eye-consciousness ought to be unable to apprehend the forms of its own body, and the same would follow for the other sense-consciousnesses. They reply: the five sense-consciousnesses are indeed able to apprehend objects within their own body, but mental consciousness is not. If that were so, mental consciousness ought to be unable to apprehend every kind of objective sphere at all — which is itself unreasonable. There follows a further fault as well: suffering-dharma-forbearance ought then to be unable to directly realize the continuum of aggregates co-arising within its own body — and if that were so, its direct realization with respect to its own truth's own sphere would then be only partial. They say in reply: suffering-dharma-forbearance's direct realization with respect to its own truth's own sphere being only partial incurs no fault at all, since suffering-dharma-knowledge, once it arises, brings about complete direct realization

— just as path-dharma-forbearance's direct realization with respect to its own truth's own sphere is likewise only partial, without incurring any fault, since path-dharma-knowledge, once it arises, brings about complete direct realization. This reply is unreasonable — why is this? Because the meaning of direct realization differs between the truths of suffering and the path. That is, with respect to what is bound to the desire realm and abandoned by the path of seeing, each and every wrong view there slanders the entire dharma-knowledge class of the path all at once; and so path-dharma-forbearance, even if it directly realizes only the dharma-knowledge class of the path with respect to a single instance, is nonetheless thereby able to cut off, all at once, the wrong view that slanders it in its entirety. How much more so, then, that — apart from excluding its own nature, associated dharmas, and co-existent dharmas — it directly realizes everything else. Identity-view,

with respect to the five aggregates of clinging, grasps at self and what belongs to self, whether taken all together or taken individually one by one — and if suffering-dharma-forbearance did not bring about complete direct realization with respect to its own truth's own sphere,

then there ought to remain some separately-objectified instance of identity-view left uncut at that time, since it would not have been included in this direct realization, its own particular grasped object not yet realized. And if identity-view were not thereby cut off completely, then the other afflictions abandoned by seeing suffering, of which identity-view is the very forerunner, ought likewise to remain uncut — and if that were so, one could not properly speak of genuine direct realization having been attained with respect to one's own truth's own sphere at all. If direct realization is not attained with respect to the truth of suffering, then it ought equally not to be attained with respect to origination, cessation, and the path — and, were this so, there would then be no ultimate liberation at all. Lest such a fault follow, one ought not to maintain that suffering-dharma-forbearance fails to observe the dharmas co-arising within its own body. Moreover, if it were so,

this would then contradict what the root treatise itself has already stated elsewhere — namely, that whatever dharma serves as the object giving rise to suffering-dharma-forbearance is the very same dharma that gives rise to supreme mundane dharma. And since supreme mundane dharma is indeed able to take the desire realm's five aggregates all together as its object, why should suffering-dharma-forbearance alone be unable to do so? Hence it should be understood that the position stated earlier is the sound one. One asks: for what reason does the person (pudgala) fail to know dharmas? The answer: because it, like a rabbit's horn, simply cannot be apprehended at all — that is, all dharmas are without self; there is no sentient being, no person, no life-principle, no one born, no one who nurtures, no one who acts, and no one who experiences; there is only an empty aggregation of formations — and so there is no person capable of knowing dharmas at all.

"Is there a single consciousness that cognizes all dharmas?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest its own correct meaning. That is, some maintain that consciousness (vijñāna) is simply identical to knowledge (jñāna), differing merely by the single added syllable "vi-." In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that consciousness and knowledge differ in their very substance, as the discourses say: "consciousness associated with knowledge." Others maintain that the six consciousnesses each take separate objects — just as the five sense-consciousnesses each take separate objects, so too, on this view, mental consciousness takes only the dharma-field as its object. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that mental consciousness takes all twelve sense fields as its object, as the discourses state: "everything without exception is the object of mental consciousness." Others maintain that knowledge takes all dharmas as its object, while consciousness cannot do so. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both consciousness and knowledge alike are able to take all dharmas as their object, whether totally or individually. Others maintain that knowledge takes both self-characteristic and common-characteristic as its object, while consciousness takes only self-characteristic. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both knowledge and consciousness alike take both characteristics as their object. Others maintain that knowledge takes objects both of a similar class and of a dissimilar class, while consciousness takes only objects of a similar class. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both knowledge and consciousness alike take objects of both classes. Others maintain that knowledge takes objects belonging to the three time-periods as well as objects outside time, while consciousness takes only present objects. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both knowledge and consciousness alike take objects belonging to the three time-periods as well as objects outside time. Others maintain that knowledge takes as its object the five aggregates in general, as well as what is not an aggregate, while consciousness takes only form as its object. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both knowledge and consciousness alike take the five aggregates, as well as what is not an aggregate, as their object.

Others maintain that knowledge takes both its own continuum and another's continuum as its object, while consciousness takes only its own continuum. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both knowledge and consciousness alike take both one's own and another's continuum as their object. Others maintain that knowledge takes the internal and external sense fields as its object, while consciousness takes only the external fields. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both knowledge and consciousness alike take both the internal and external fields as their object. Others maintain that knowledge takes both contaminated and uncontaminated dharmas as its object, while consciousness takes only contaminated dharmas. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both knowledge and consciousness alike take both kinds as their object. Others maintain that knowledge takes both conditioned and unconditioned dharmas as its object, while consciousness takes only conditioned dharmas. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both knowledge and consciousness alike take both kinds as their object. Others maintain that knowledge is only a factor of the path, while consciousness is only a factor of continued existence — as the Vātsīputrīyas hold, on the ground that the discourses say right view is a factor of the path, since "conditioned by consciousness" is stated of formations. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that both knowledge and consciousness alike pervade both factors, one or the other simply being spoken of according to which predominates in context. Others maintain that knowledge and consciousness never occur together — as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold. In order to refute this position, the treatise shows that knowledge and consciousness do indeed arise together at the same time. It is on account of these various causes and conditions that the treatise is composed.

One asks: why does the treatise here speak of knowledge before speaking of consciousness? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: this follows an established precedent in the discourses and treatises — that is, the discourses relate that the Venerable Mahākauṣṭhila once went to visit the Venerable Śāriputra, and first asked why knowledge is called "knowledge," and only afterward asked why consciousness is called "consciousness." Śāriputra replied: it is called "knowledge" because it is able to know; it is called "consciousness" because it is able to discern. The Prakaraṇapāda likewise speaks first of what is known, then of what is discerned, and speaks first of the gate of knowledge, then of the gate of consciousness. Dharmanandin likewise says: wherever knowledge and consciousness operate, one may be certain that some superior undertaking is thereby accomplished — hence this treatise, too, speaks of consciousness only after knowledge. Some say: both are root dharmas — that is, within every class of purification, knowledge is the root; within every class of defilement, consciousness is the root; and since the class of purification is superior, it is spoken of first. Some say: both are foremost dharmas — as the discourses state: "with clarity as the foremost, immeasurable wholesome dharmas are able to grow and increase; with consciousness as the foremost, all defiled dharmas are able to grow and increase" — and since wholesome dharmas are superior, knowledge is spoken of first. Some say: both are that upon which one relies and toward which one goes — as the discourses state: "one ought to rely upon and go toward knowledge, not toward consciousness"; and it is further said that the five sense faculties each operate within their own separate objective sphere, while the mental faculty is able to receive whatever sphere any of them operates within, so that the mental faculty is itself that upon which all of them ultimately rely and go toward — and since what knowledge relies upon and goes toward is superior, knowledge is spoken of first. Some say: both possess an object — that is, of the twelve sense fields, only two possess an object, namely the mental field and the dharma field; speaking of "knowledge" here shows, in general terms, the dharma field as possessing an object, while speaking of "consciousness" shows, more specifically, that both the mental field and the dharma field are involved, this being a greater number of dharmas — and so knowledge is spoken of first. Some say: this passage speaks of mind and mental factors together — that is, speaking of "knowledge" shows, in general terms, all the mental factors, while speaking of "consciousness" shows both mind and mental factors together, a greater number of dharmas — and so knowledge is spoken of first.

"Is there a single consciousness that cognizes all dharmas?" The answer: no. If this consciousness arises taking all dharmas as non-self, what does this consciousness not cognize? The answer: it does not cognize its own nature, nor the dharmas of consciousness associated with it and co-existent with it. Here, the refutation of rival positions, the question-and-answer structure, the challenge and resolution, and the exposition of the root text should all be understood exactly as explained above. One asks: as for what is here called the aspect of taking all dharmas as non-self — by which discourse is it known that such an aspect, taking all dharmas as non-self, actually exists? The answer: as the discourses state: "When, by wisdom, one observes / all dharmas as without self, / then one is able to weary of suffering — / this is the path to purification." From this discourse, it is known that such an aspect, taking all dharmas as non-self, actually exists. One asks: does this discourse speak of the aspect of taking all dharmas as non-self, or the aspect of taking the truth of suffering as non-self? Suppose either is the case — what fault follows? If it speaks of the aspect of taking all dharmas as non-self, how, then, can it go on to speak of "wearying of suffering" specifically? If it speaks of the aspect of taking the truth of suffering as non-self, how, then, can it speak of "observing all dharmas as non-self"? Some hold: this discourse speaks of the aspect of taking all dharmas as non-self. One asks: how, then, can it go on to speak of "wearying of suffering"? The answer: the first half of this verse speaks of the aspect of taking all dharmas as non-self, while the second half speaks of the aspect of taking the truth of suffering as non-self.

Some say: the first half speaks of the time of cultivating contemplation, while the second half speaks of the time of direct realization. Some say: the first half speaks of wisdom born of learning, reflection, and cultivation together, while the second half speaks only of wisdom born of cultivation. Some say: the first half speaks of contaminated wisdom, while the second half speaks of uncontaminated wisdom — and just as with contaminated and uncontaminated, mundane and supramundane, tasted and untasted, dependent on craving and dependent on renunciation, falling within the realms and not falling within the realms,

conducive to grasping and not conducive to grasping — so too should it be understood here. Some say: the first half speaks of attention to a common characteristic, while the second half speaks of attention to a particular characteristic. There are yet other masters who say: this discourse speaks only of the aspect of taking the truth of suffering as non-self. One asks: how, then, can it speak of "observing all dharmas as non-self"? The answer: "all" is of two kinds — namely, "all without exception," and "all of a limited portion." Here the discourse speaks only of "all of a limited portion";

and elsewhere, too, "all" is spoken of in this limited sense — as when the World-Honored One says "all is burning," where uncontaminated dharmas plainly have no meaning of "burning" at all; the case here is exactly the same. Although this particular discourse does not speak of the aspect of taking all dharmas as non-self, other discourses do — as the World-Honored One says: "all conditioned formations are impermanent; all dharmas are without self; nirvāṇa is quiescent." The verdict: whether or not scriptural proof for it can be found,

there certainly does exist an aspect that takes all dharmas as non-self — that is, practitioners of yoga give rise to precisely this aspect at the stage of cultivating contemplation, and it is on this basis that the treatise speaks of it here. One asks: there is likewise an aspect of emptiness able to take all dharmas as its object — why, then, does the treatise here not speak of it as well? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: it ought to be stated but is not, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Some say: the meaning of the non-self aspect is fixed and determinate, and so it alone is singled out for treatment — whereas the meaning of the emptiness aspect is not fixed and determinate, since all dharmas do possess a meaning of existence: emptiness pertains to another's nature, so that, since there is a meaning of existence, non-emptiness pertains to one's own nature. The non-self aspect, by contrast, is never indeterminate, since it pertains, without exception, to the absence of self in both one's own nature and another's. It is on this account that the Venerable Vasumitra said: "I do not say with certainty that all dharmas are empty,

"but I do say with certainty that all dharmas are without self." One asks: if the non-self aspect and the emptiness aspect are both able to take all dharmas as their object,

what difference is there between these two aspects? The answer: the non-self aspect serves as the antidote to self-view, while the emptiness aspect serves as the antidote to self-possession-view — and just as with the antidote to self-view and to self-possession-view, so too should it be understood for the antidote to the view of one's own and the view of what is one's own, the five self-views and fifteen self-possession-views, the aspect of self and the aspect of self-possession, the grasping of self and the grasping of self-possession, and the craving for self and the craving for self-possession. Some say: observing the aggregates as non-self is the non-self aspect; observing that there is no self within the aggregates is the emptiness aspect — and just as with observing the aggregates as non-self and observing that there is no self within the aggregates, so too should it be understood for observing the elements, and no self within the elements, and observing the sense fields, and no self within the sense fields. Some say: with respect to what does not exist, observing it as non-existent is the non-self aspect; with respect to what does exist, observing it as non-existent is the emptiness aspect. Some say: with respect to what is absent, observing it as absent is the non-self aspect; with respect to what is present, observing it as absent is the emptiness aspect. Some say: observing the emptiness of own-nature is the non-self aspect; observing the emptiness of what is cognized is the emptiness aspect. Some say: observing that the substance of dharmas is not self-governing is the non-self aspect; observing that there is no agent within is the emptiness aspect. These, then, are the distinctions between the two aspects. One asks: why is it that the contaminated non-self aspect takes all dharmas as its object, while the uncontaminated non-self aspect takes only the truth of suffering as its object? The answer: the contaminated non-self aspect is not itself an antidote to the afflictions, and so is able to take all dharmas as its object; the uncontaminated non-self aspect is itself an antidote to the afflictions, and so does not take all dharmas as its object, since not all dharmas accord with the nature of the afflictions. Some say: the contaminated non-self aspect is not itself an antidote to inversion, and so is able to take all dharmas as its object; the uncontaminated non-self aspect is itself an antidote to inversion, and so does not take all dharmas as its object, since not all dharmas accord with the nature of inversion. Some say: the contaminated non-self aspect has no fixed boundary to its object, and so is able to take all dharmas as its object; the uncontaminated non-self aspect has a fixed boundary to its object, and so does not take all dharmas as its object, taking as its object, specifically, the very sphere of identity-view, in order to show it to be non-self. Some say: the contaminated non-self aspect is superior at the time of cultivating contemplation, and so is able to take all dharmas as its object, since, at the time of cultivating contemplation, one observes all dharmas as non-self; the uncontaminated non-self aspect is superior at the time of direct realization, and so does not take all dharmas as its object, since, at the time of direct realization, it takes only the truth of suffering as non-self, each truth being separately observed within the stage of direct realization. It is owing to these causes and conditions that the contaminated non-self aspect is able to take all dharmas as its object, while the uncontaminated non-self aspect takes only the truth of suffering as its object. One asks: the contaminated non-self aspect, too, is actually unable to take all dharmas as its object, since it cannot take as its object its own nature and the dharmas associated and co-existent with it — how, then, can the treatise still say that it takes all dharmas as its object? The answer: this is said with reference to the greater portion, and so no fault follows — that is, what it does take as object is like the great earth, the four great oceans, Mount Sumeru, and the vastness of empty space, while what it does not take as object is merely like a mustard seed, a single drop from the great ocean, a single mote of dust from the towering peak, or the space a mosquito occupies — hence no fault follows. Some say: it is because this contaminated non-self aspect takes all dharmas as its object across two moments that the treatise speaks in this way — unlike the uncontaminated non-self aspect, which, even across many moments, is still unable to take all dharmas as its object in their entirety. Some say: the contaminated non-self aspect, even within a single moment, does take as its object everything it ought to take as object; as for its own nature and the dharmas associated and co-existent with it, these simply are not objects it is meant to take at all, and so it ought not to be faulted on this account. It is owing to these causes and conditions that this contaminated non-self aspect, although it is said to take "all dharmas" as non-self, is nonetheless not thereby an inverted view.