The Narrow Path Every Mind Must Take

One asks: as for the aspect that takes all dharmas as non-self — what is its own substance? The answer: wisdom is its own substance. As with own-substance, so too with "thing" and "aspect," "own-nature" as well — these terms are synonymous. Its own substance has now been stated; what should be stated next follows. One asks: why is it named "the aspect that takes all dharmas as non-self"? The answer: because this wisdom, operating with respect to all dharmas, gives rise to the aspect of non-self — hence it is named "the aspect that takes all dharmas as non-self." As for its realm: this aspect occurs only in the desire realm and the form realm; the formless realm, too, possesses this aspect, but there it is unable to take all dharmas as its object, as will be explained at length below.

As for its stage: this aspect occurs across seven stages — namely, the desire realm, the stage of proximate concentration, the intermediate dhyāna, and the four fundamental dhyānas; this is the general statement. Stated specifically: wisdom born of learning occurs only across five stages, namely the desire realm and the four dhyānas; wisdom born of reflection occurs only in the desire realm; wisdom born of cultivation occurs across six stages, namely the seven stages just named minus the desire realm. The four formless stages, too, possess this aspect, but there it is unable to take all dharmas as its object — that is, the sphere of boundless space's own non-self aspect takes the four formless attainments,

their causes, their cessations, and every subsequent-knowledge class of the path as its object, together with the four formless attainments' own non-analytical cessation, every subsequent-knowledge class of the path, and non-analytical cessation, along with all of space, the unconditioned — whether one wishes to treat these as a single thing, or as many separate things, this aspect is entirely able to take all of them as its object. The sphere of boundless consciousness's own non-self aspect takes the three higher formless attainments, their causes, their cessations, and every subsequent-knowledge class of the path,

as its object, together with the three higher formless attainments' own non-analytical cessation, every subsequent-knowledge class of the path, and non-analytical cessation, along with all of space, the unconditioned — whether treated as one thing or as many, this aspect is entirely able to take all of them as its object. The sphere of nothingness's own non-self aspect takes the two higher formless attainments, their causes, their cessations, and every subsequent-knowledge class of the path as its object, together with the two higher formless attainments' own non-analytical cessation, every subsequent-knowledge class of the path, and non-analytical cessation, and all of space, the unconditioned — whether treated as one thing or as many, this aspect is entirely able to take all of them as its object. The sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's own non-self aspect takes the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception itself, its cause, its cessation, and every subsequent-knowledge class of the path as its object, together with the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's own non-analytical cessation, every subsequent-knowledge class of the path, and non-analytical cessation, along with all of space, the unconditioned — whether treated as one thing or as many, this aspect is entirely able to take all of them as its object.

There are yet other masters who say: the sphere of boundless space's own non-self aspect takes as its object the non-analytical cessation of five stages — namely, the four formless attainments and the fourth dhyāna; the rest is as explained above — and so on, up through the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's own non-self aspect taking as its object the non-analytical cessation of two stages — namely, its own stage and the sphere of nothingness; the rest is as explained above. The verdict: it should be understood that the position stated first here is the sound one. One asks: why is it that the formless stages lack an aspect able to take all dharmas as its object? The answer: only a stage possessing the nirvedhabhāgīya factors and their similar preparatory wholesome roots can possess an aspect taking all dharmas as its object; the formless stages lack these, and so lack this aspect. Some say: only a stage possessing the wholesome root of contemplating the truths can possess such an aspect; the formless stages lack this. Some say: only a stage possessing the worldly knowledge bordering on direct realization can possess such an aspect; the formless stages lack this. Some say: only a stage possessing the path of seeing and its preparatory effort can possess such an aspect; the formless stages lack this. Some say: only a stage where contemplation is superior possesses this aspect; the formless stages, being superior in tranquil stillness rather than contemplation, lack it. As for its support: this non-self aspect depends on a body of the desire realm or form realm; its very first arising depends specifically on a body of the desire realm. As for its aspect: it produces the aspect of non-self. As for its object: it takes all dharmas as its object. As for its foundation of mindfulness: it is the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas, mixed in its object. As for what kind of knowledge it is: it is worldly knowledge. As for whether it accompanies absorption: it does not accompany absorption. As for its association with the faculties: it is associated with three faculties — namely, pleasure, joy, and equanimity. One asks: there is likewise a wholesome faculty of displeasure able to take all dharmas as its object — why, then, is this aspect not associated with it? The answer: because they mutually contradict one another — that is, this aspect operates by way of a joyful aspect, while that one operates by way of a grieving aspect, and so they are not associated. As for its time-period: this aspect falls within the three time-periods, taking objects within the three time-periods as well as objects outside time as its object. As for wholesome, unwholesome, or indeterminate: it is wholesome, taking all three kinds as its object across the three realms. As for bound or unbound: it is bound to the desire and form realms, taking objects bound to the three realms as well as unbound objects as its object. As for the trainee, the one beyond training, or neither: it is neither the trainee nor the one beyond training, taking all three kinds as its object. As for abandoned by seeing or by cultivation: it is abandoned by cultivation, taking all three kinds as its object; what is not to be abandoned is likewise taken as its object by these three kinds. As for taking a name or a meaning as object: it takes both name and meaning as its object. As for taking its own continuum or another's continuum as object: it is not itself a continuum, and takes all three kinds as its object equally. As for being born of learning, reflection, or cultivation: it pervades all three. As for being attained through preparatory effort, through freedom from defilement, or by birth: it may be said to pervade all three as well; this is the general statement. Stated specifically: the desire realm's non-self aspect born of learning and reflection is attained only through preparatory effort;

the form realm's own non-self aspect born of learning may be said to be attained either through preparatory effort or by birth. How can it be said to be attained through preparatory effort? That is, if one has, in this present life, well cultivated wholesome states with respect to self- and common-characteristics, one attains it upon being reborn there; if not, one does not attain it upon being reborn there. How can it be said to be attained by birth? That is, although one may have well cultivated it in this present life, if one has not yet been reborn there, one is simply unable to attain it — it is attained only once one is reborn there; this aspect, born of learning, necessarily depends on the preparatory effort cultivated in this present life, and is attained upon rebirth there. The form realm's own non-self aspect born of cultivation is attained through preparatory effort and through freedom from defilement, and may also be said to be attained by birth. One asks: if one dies in the desire realm and is reborn in the second dhyāna, and then dies in the second dhyāna and is reborn in the first dhyāna, does one thereby attain the first dhyāna's own non-self aspect? The answer: if one has previously well cultivated it, one attains it; if not, one does not attain it — and the same holds up through rebirth in the fourth dhyāna. One asks: if one dies in the desire realm and is reborn in the formless realm, and then dies in the formless realm and is reborn in the first dhyāna, does one thereby attain the first dhyāna's own non-self aspect? Some say: one does not attain it,

since it is too remote. As for those who hold this second position: if one has previously well cultivated it, one attains it; if not, one does not attain it — and the same holds up through rebirth in the fourth dhyāna. One asks: if one dies in the first dhyāna and is reborn in the second dhyāna, and then dies in the second dhyāna and is reborn in the first dhyāna,

does one thereby attain the first dhyāna's own non-self aspect? The answer: if one has previously well cultivated it, one attains it; if not, one does not attain it — and the same holds for rebirth in every other stage. One asks: what kind of person attains this aspect — only the noble ones, or ordinary beings as well? Some hold: only the noble ones attain it, not ordinary beings. On this second position, ordinary beings attain it as well. One asks: ordinary beings are of two kinds —

namely, those within the teaching and those outside it — which ordinary beings attain this aspect? Some hold: only those within the teaching attain it, not those outside it, since the latter, attached to a self, are unable to cultivate the view of emptiness and non-self. On this second position, ordinary beings outside the teaching also attain this aspect, though differing from those within it — that is, those within the teaching attain it both through preparatory effort and by birth, and it is both attained and present in the body, and possessed, and presently occurring; ordinary beings outside the teaching attain it only by birth, and it is neither present in the body nor possessed, nor presently occurring, since they remain attached to a self. One asks: how, specifically, does this non-self aspect arise? The answer: if one is born in the desire realm, the non-self aspect of both the desire and form realms arises, and both are able to take all dharmas as their object. If one is born in the first dhyāna, the first dhyāna's own non-self aspect arises; if not fixed to that stage alone, it is likewise able to take all dharmas as its object, while if fixed to that stage, it takes as its object only what ranges from the first dhyāna up through the peak of existence; the non-self aspect of the three higher dhyānas that arises likewise takes as its object only what ranges from the first dhyāna up through the peak of existence. If one is born in the second dhyāna, the second dhyāna's own non-self aspect arises; if not fixed to that stage, it is able to take all dharmas as its object, while if fixed, it takes as its object only what ranges from the second dhyāna up through the peak of existence; the non-self aspect of the third and fourth dhyānas that arises likewise takes as its object only what ranges from the second dhyāna up through the peak of existence. If one is born in the third or fourth dhyāna, this should be explained according to the same principle. If one is born in the desire realm, the form realm, or the formless realm, and the formless realm's own non-self aspect arises, the precise boundary of what it takes as object has already been explained above.

One asks: between the desire and form realms' own non-self aspects, which takes the greater range of dharmas as its object? The answer: the form realm's own non-self aspect, if not fixed, takes the same range of dharmas as the desire realm's; if fixed, it takes a smaller range than the desire realm's, since it is unable to take as its object the form that follows along with itself. The desire realm's own non-self aspect has no such following form of its own, and so is able to take all form as its object. Some say: this refers to the foundation of mindfulness on the body taking all form as its object, apart from feeling and mind, while the foundation of mindfulness on dharmas takes all feeling, mind, and dharmas as its object. One asks: is this aspect that takes all dharmas as non-self contaminated or uncontaminated? The answer: it is contaminated, not uncontaminated — why is this? Because even the worldly non-self aspect, such as belongs to the nirvedhabhāgīya factors, is still unable to take all dharmas as its object — how much less, then, could the uncontaminated non-self aspect take all dharmas as its object, since this latter aspect takes each truth as its object separately. Just as no wrong view can ever take two truths as its object at the same time, how much less could it take many — and the same holds for whatever it is meant to counteract, and for what serves as its own antidote. One asks: is the contaminated non-self aspect able to cut off the afflictions? The answer: it is not able to cut them off. One asks: if that is so, why do the noble ones give rise to it at all? The answer: in order to make their faculties sharper and keener, so as to enter the noble path. Further, the noble ones give rise to it on account of four conditions: first, in order to dwell happily in the present life; second, in order to reflect on what has been accomplished before; third, in order to sport in their own excellent qualities; fourth, in order to enjoy their own noble wealth. One asks: does this non-self aspect accompany a delighted attention, or a disgusted attention? Suppose either — what fault follows? If it accompanies a delighted attention, how can it take disagreeable dharmas as its object? If it accompanies a disgusted attention, how can it take agreeable dharmas as its object? The answer: it should be said that it accompanies a delighted attention. One asks: if that is so, how can it take disagreeable dharmas as its object? The answer: this practitioner of yoga

gives rise to delight with respect to what is agreeable — so that even within a vast heap of disagreeable things, if there is but a single agreeable thing among them, delight arises with respect to it, let alone if there are many. It is just like placing a single gold coin atop a heap of copper coins: delight arises with respect to the heap as a whole. The case here is exactly the same, and so no fault follows.

[The topic reads:] "Is there a case of two minds mutually serving as cause for one another?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest its own correct meaning. That is, some maintain that the causal condition has no real substance at all; in order to refute this position, the treatise wishes to show that the causal condition does indeed really possess its own substantial nature. Others maintain that a single person can have two minds arising simultaneously — as the Mahāsāṃghikas hold; in order to refute this position, the treatise shows that a single person never has two minds arising simultaneously. There are also outsiders who, drawing on a worldly, visible analogy, maintain that a later moment serves as cause for an earlier one. They say as follows: it is plainly observed that when a spring gushes forth, the later water presses upon the earlier water, causing it to gush and flow — here, the later water serves as cause for the earlier water. In just the same way, they say, as dharmas pass through the three time-periods, the future presses what is in it into the present, and the present presses what is in it into the past — hence the future serves as cause for the present, and the present in turn serves as cause for the past. In order to refute this position, the treatise wishes to show that a later dharma is never the cause of an earlier one. Were it truly so, this would contradict both the internal and external processes of dependent origination. Contradicting the internal process of dependent origination would mean: formations would then be conditioned by ignorance, and so on, up through birth conditioning old age and death — parents would be caused by their children, the eye and form would be caused by eye-consciousness, and so on, up through the mental faculty and dharmas being caused by mental consciousness; further, the kalala embryonic stage would be caused by the arbuda stage, and so on, up through maturity being caused by old age. Contradicting the external process of dependent origination in the same way would mean: the seed would then be caused by the sprout, and so on, up through the flower being caused by the fruit. Such a position, moreover, incurs a further, grave fault: one would have to receive the effect of karma before having ever created it, and only create the karma after already having received its effect. What would this actually mean? One would receive the ripened effect of pleasure and pain before creating the wholesome or unwholesome karma that produces it; one would obtain the effect of ethical or unethical conduct before undertaking the very precepts, ethical or unethical, that produce it; one would fall into hell before ever committing an act of immediate retribution; one would become a wheel-turning king before ever performing the karma that produces it; one would attain unsurpassed perfect enlightenment before ever cultivating the six perfections that lead to it. And if one could receive an effect before creating its karma, then having created the karma afterward would amount to nothing, its effect already spent — and this would mean there could be no liberation or emancipation at all. For this reason, a later dharma can never serve as cause for an earlier one. It is on account of these causes and conditions that the treatise is composed.

"Is there a case of two minds mutually serving as cause for one another?" The answer: no. Why is this? Because there is no case of a single person having, without regard to before or after, two minds arising simultaneously; and a later mind is never the cause of an earlier one. Here, "no" refutes the denial of the causal condition's real substance — that is, although there is no case of two minds mutually serving as cause for one another, there does remain a sense in which other dharmas serve as cause for one another. "There is no case of a single person..." refutes the Mahāsāṃghika position that a single person can have two minds arising simultaneously. "A single person" excludes multiple persons;

"not before" excludes the past, and "not after" excludes the future — this shows that a single person, within a single moment of the present, never has two minds. There is a variant recitation which says: "neither in the past, nor in the future, nor in the present does a single person have two minds arising simultaneously" — this shows that a single person, within a single moment across all three time-periods, never has two minds. Further, "a later mind is never the cause of an earlier one" refutes the outsiders' position that a later dharma causes an earlier one, showing that a later dharma is never the cause of an earlier one. Here, the treatise composes its topic with reference only to five causes, and so answers "no"; if it were composed with reference to all six causes, it ought to answer "yes," since the efficient cause pervades everything without exception. "There is no case of a single person..." excludes the sense of the associated cause and the co-existent cause; and "a later mind is never the cause of an earlier one" excludes the sense of the homogeneous cause, the universally-pervasive cause, and the ripening cause. What is not excluded at all is the efficient cause. Just as it is said that two minds have no sense of mutually serving as cause for one another, so too for two instances of feeling, two of perception,

two of volition, two of contact, two of attention, two of resolute conviction, two of desire, two of mindfulness, two of concentration, two of wisdom, and the rest of the mental factors; two eyes, and so on, up through two bodies, and the rest of the material dharmas; two vital faculties, two classes of shared existence, and the rest of the formations dissociated from mind, of the same kind —

all likewise have no sense of mutually serving as cause for one another.

[The topic reads:] "Is there a case of two minds mutually serving as object for one another?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: ought the treatise not first to take up the topic — "why is there no case of a single person, without regard to before or after, having two minds arising simultaneously?" — and so on, as stated at length, before this one? Why is this? Because, having stated that there is no case of a single person having two minds arising simultaneously without regard to before or after, the treatise, although making this statement, has not yet stated the reason for it — and so it ought next to state: "why is there no case of a single person..." and so on, as stated at length. What, then, is the intention behind not taking up that topic first? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: the Abhidharma is composed in order to display the characteristics and nature of the various dharmas, and one ought not to seek out some fixed sequence in it — so long as it does not contradict the characteristics of the dharmas, whether a given topic comes first or later is not something that should be pressed. Some say: treatises are of two kinds — first, root treatises; second, ancillary treatises. Here, the topics of "is there a case of two minds mutually serving as cause..." and the like are root treatises, while "why is there no case of a single person..." and the like is an ancillary treatise. Since a root treatise ought properly to be stated first, and an ancillary treatise ought properly to be stated afterward, this treatise states first: "is there a case of two minds mutually serving as object for one another?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to bring certainty to those in doubt. That is, having stated above that there is no case of two minds mutually serving as cause for one another, one might suppose that there is likewise no case of two minds mutually serving as object for one another — and it is in order to remove this doubt, and to show that there is indeed such a case, that the treatise takes up this topic. There are yet others who say: it is in order to refute the denial of the objective-support condition's real substance, showing that the objective-support condition does indeed really possess its own substantial nature, that the treatise is composed.

"Is there a case of two minds mutually serving as object for one another?" The answer: yes — as when a mind arises without a future counterpart, and this very mind reflects, giving rise to a second mind — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: ought the treatise not simply answer "yes" in general terms here, without further elaborating with "as when..." and the rest? Why is this? Because, just as it is said, if one dharma serves as the object for another, is there ever a case where this dharma does not serve as the object for that other? The answer: no, since there is no time at which it fails to serve as object. The answer: although stating "yes" in general terms would already suffice for the meaning, the treatise elaborates further still, with "as when..." and the rest, for the benefit of its disciples, so that they may gain full clarity. As for "as when a mind arises without a future counterpart, and this very mind reflects, giving rise to a second mind": this means that one first gives rise, for a single moment, to a wrong view — either slandering only the class of future wrong views, or slandering the future contaminated aggregates in general — and afterward gives rise, for a second moment, to a wrong view — either slandering only the class of past wrong views, or slandering the past aggregates in general; these two wrong views, as associated minds, mutually serve as object for one another. Just as a wrong view can give rise to a subsequent wrong view, taking that prior view's own denial as its object, so too can a wrong view give rise, afterward, to identity-view, grasping at self and what belongs to self with respect to that prior view; to extreme view, positing annihilationism or eternalism; to view-grasping; to precept-and-vow-grasping of the foremost kind; and to doubt, hesitation, craving, aversion, hatred, conceit, self-exaltation, and uncomprehending ignorance capable of being purified by it. Further, a wrong view can afterward give rise to right view, taking up, with respect to that prior view, the aspects of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self, cause, origination, arising, and condition — being existent, real, of a determinate nature, and belonging to a determinate class, possessing a cause and an origination, a locus and a basis for its aspect. Or it can give rise to a neutral, indeterminate mind, taking up, with respect to that prior view, the aspect of neither according with reason nor failing to accord with reason — this is what is meant by saying that a wrong view's associated mind mutually serves as object together with the various contaminated minds; and just as with a wrong view's mind, so too should it be understood for the other defiled minds. Here the treatise speaks of wrong view merely as its own entry-point, since it too is equally defiled. As for "as when a mind arises with a future counterpart, and this very mind reflects, giving rise to a second mind" — one asks: why does the treatise take up this topic yet again? The answer: the foregoing passage spoke of a wrong-view mind mutually serving as object together with contaminated minds;

the treatise now wishes to speak of a right-view mind mutually serving as object together with contaminated minds, and so takes up this further topic — that is, one first gives rise, for a single moment, to a right view — either with respect only to the class of future right views, or with respect to the future contaminated aggregates in general — giving rise to the aspect of "existing"; and afterward gives rise, for a second moment, to a right view — either with respect only to the class of past right views, or with respect to the past contaminated aggregates in general — giving rise to the aspects of impermanence and the rest. Just as a right view can give rise to a subsequent right view, taking up, with respect to that prior view, the aspects of impermanence and the rest, so too can right view afterward give rise to wrong view,

taking that prior view's own object and denying it, or giving rise to identity-view, grasping at self and what belongs to self with respect to it — and so on, as stated at length, up through uncomprehending ignorance. Further, right view can afterward give rise to a neutral, indeterminate mind, taking up, with respect to that prior view, the aspect of neither according with reason nor failing to accord with reason — this is what is meant by saying that right view's associated mind mutually serves as object together with the various contaminated minds; and just as with a right-view mind, so too should it be understood for a neutral, indeterminate mind, both being equally undefiled. As for "as when a mind arises without a future path-counterpart, and this very mind reflects, giving rise to a second mind" — one asks: why does the treatise take up this topic yet again? The answer: the foregoing passage spoke of a wrong-view mind mutually serving as object together with contaminated minds; the treatise now wishes to speak of a wrong-view mind mutually serving as object together with uncontaminated minds, and so takes up this further topic — that is, one first gives rise, for a single moment, to a wrong view slandering the future path, and afterward enters the certainty of rightness, giving rise to the forbearance and knowledge of suffering, or the forbearance and knowledge of origination, taking up, with respect to that prior, now past wrong-view class, the aspects of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self, cause, origination, arising, and condition. In this way, these two minds mutually serve as object for one another. It should be understood that this excludes only the case of the very same moment, and the very same continuous flow, but does not exclude the case of a mere division of time —

nor does it exclude the case of a shared class of existence, nor the case of a beginningless continuum. Excluding the case of the very same moment means: there is certainly no case where, in one moment, a wrong view slandering the noble path arises, and then, in the very next moment, one is thereby able to enter the certainty of rightness. Excluding the case of the very same continuous flow means: there is certainly no case where, within one single continuous flow, a wrong view slandering the noble path first arises, and one is then thereby able, immediately afterward, to enter the certainty of rightness. Not excluding the case of a mere division of time means: one may, during the first portion of a day, give rise to a wrong view slandering the noble path, and then, during the middle portion of that same day, be able to enter the certainty of rightness; or one may, during the middle portion of a day, give rise to such a wrong view, and then, during the last portion of that same day, be able to enter the certainty of rightness — and the same holds for the three divisions of the night. In just this way, none of the divisions of day and night, half-month, month, season, or year are excluded at all — how much less, then, a shared class of existence, or a beginningless continuum. And just as with wrong view, so too should it be understood for doubt and ignorance, since they equally take the path as their object. As for "as when a mind arises with a future path-counterpart, and this very mind reflects, giving rise to a second mind" — one asks: why does the treatise compose this topic yet again? The answer: the foregoing passage spoke of a right-view mind mutually serving as object together with contaminated minds; the treatise now wishes to speak of a right-view mind

mutually serving as object together with uncontaminated minds, and so composes this further topic — that is, one first gives rise, for a single moment, to a right view — either with respect only to a future uncontaminated mind, or with respect to the future uncontaminated aggregates in general — giving rise to the aspect of "existing"; and afterward gives rise to the noble path, taking up, with respect only to that prior, now past right-view class, or with respect to the past contaminated aggregates in general, the aspects of impermanence, suffering, emptiness, non-self, cause, origination, arising, and condition. In this way, these two minds mutually serve as object for one another. It should be understood that, for those who hold that the noble path arises without interval solely from attention to a common characteristic, this excludes only the case of the very same moment, but does not exclude the case of the very same continuous flow and the rest; excluding the case of the very same moment means that this attention having a future path-mind as its aspect is itself an attention to a particular characteristic. For those who hold that the noble path arises without interval from either of the two kinds of attention, they too do not exclude the case of the very same moment. As for "just as there can be two persons each knowing another's mind, and these two minds mutually serve as object for one another" — one asks: why does the treatise take up this topic yet again? The answer: the foregoing passage spoke of a mind within one's own continuum mutually serving as object together with a mind within that same continuum; the treatise now wishes to speak of a mind within one's own continuum mutually serving as object together with a mind within another's continuum, and so takes up this topic. One asks: what kind of two persons, each knowing another's mind, does the treatise here have in mind, such that their two minds mutually serve as object for one another? The answer: the treatise here speaks of two persons, each knowing another's mind, who are equal in faculty, equal in stage, and equal in path — their two minds mutually serve as object for one another. "Equal in faculty" means equally possessing sharp, middling, or dull faculties; "equal in stage" means equally depending on the first dhyāna, and so on, up through equally depending on the fourth dhyāna; "equal in path" means equally contaminated, equally uncontaminated, equally within the dharma-knowledge class, equally within the subsequent-knowledge class, equally trainees, or equally beyond training. One asks: how, specifically, do these two minds serve as object for one another? The answer: each takes only the other's mind itself as its object, not that mind's own object or its own capacity-for-taking-an-object aspect — for if it took that mind's own object and its capacity-for-taking-an-object aspect as its object, the fault of taking oneself as one's own object would follow. One asks: there are likewise other kinds of knowledge whose accompanying minds mutually serve as object for one another — why, then, does the treatise speak only of the knowledge of others' minds in this way? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: it ought to be stated but is not,

and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Some say: this passage speaks only of what is clear, unmixed, and easily known; other kinds of knowledge are not like this. One asks: there are many kinds of knowledge of others' minds — which does the treatise here have in mind? The answer: it speaks of the kind attained through preparatory effort and through freedom from defilement. One asks: why does it not speak of the others? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: it ought to be stated but is not, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Some say: this passage speaks only of the kind that is superior in name and meaning — that is, the kind attained through preparatory effort and through freedom from defilement is born of cultivation, is included within the higher knowledges possessing four or five branches, and is the superior fruit of dhyāna. Some say: this knowledge makes no error at all with respect to its object, while the other kinds are not like this — and this is why the treatise does not speak of them. Let this passage now stir the vast ocean of further inquiry for the reader. Just as it is said that two minds mutually serve as object for one another, it should be understood that feeling and the other mental factors likewise mutually serve as object for one another. Further, it ought also to be explained how the various minds — by category, by realm, wholesome and so on — mutually serve as object for one another. By category: a mind abandoned by seeing suffering mutually serves as object together with a mind abandoned by seeing suffering, origination, or by cultivation; a mind abandoned by seeing origination likewise mutually serves as object together with a mind abandoned by seeing suffering, origination, or by cultivation; a mind abandoned by seeing cessation, taking a contaminated object, mutually serves as object with the same; a mind abandoned by seeing the path, taking a contaminated object, mutually serves as object with the same; a mind abandoned by seeing the path, taking an uncontaminated object, mutually serves as object together with an uncontaminated mind — it should be understood that an uncontaminated mind likewise mutually serves as object in return; a mind abandoned by cultivation mutually serves as object with the same, and a mind abandoned by cultivation mutually serves as object together with an uncontaminated mind. It should be understood that a mind abandoned by cultivation mutually serving as object together with a mind abandoned by seeing suffering or origination refers specifically to a wholesome or neutral, indeterminate mind; mutually serving as object together with an uncontaminated mind refers only to a wholesome mind. By realm: a mind of the desire realm mutually serves as object together with a mind of the desire realm, the form realm, or an unbound mind; a mind of the form realm mutually serves as object together with a mind of the form realm, the formless realm, or an unbound mind; a mind of the formless realm mutually serves as object together with a mind of the formless realm or an unbound mind. It should be understood that a mind of the formless realm mutually serving as object together with a mind of the form realm refers specifically to the stage proximate to the sphere of boundless space. As for wholesome and the rest: a wholesome, unwholesome, or neutral, indeterminate mind each mutually serves as object together with all three kinds of mind, with the sole exception of an unwholesome ripening-mind, since this exists only among the five sense-consciousness bodies; the remaining neutral, indeterminate minds do possess the sense of mutually serving as object for one another. Further, as for what is here said concerning wrong view's slandering the cause and slandering the effect, there are four distinct formulations,

that is: slandering the effect by way of the cause; slandering the cause by way of the effect; slandering the effect without reference to the cause; and slandering the cause without reference to the effect. Slandering the effect by way of the cause is exemplified by the statement: "excellent conduct and evil conduct have no ripened effect." Slandering the cause by way of the effect is exemplified by the statement: "whatever pleasure or pain every person and being experiences has no cause and no condition at all." Slandering the effect without reference to the cause is exemplified by the statement: "there are no spontaneously-born sentient beings at all." Slandering the cause without reference to the effect is exemplified by the statement: "there is no such thing as excellent conduct or evil conduct at all."

One asks: conditions are of four kinds — why, then, does the treatise here speak only of the causal condition and the objective-support condition, and not the other two? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: it ought to be stated but is not, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Some say: these other two are in fact already included within what has been stated here — that is, in speaking of the causal condition, it should be understood that the immediately-antecedent condition has thereby already been spoken of as well, since, just as there is no case of two minds mutually serving as cause for one another, there is likewise no case of two minds mutually serving as an immediately-antecedent condition for one another; and in speaking of the objective-support condition, it should be understood that the dominant condition has thereby already been spoken of as well,

since, just as there can be two minds mutually serving as object for one another, there can likewise be two minds mutually serving as a dominant condition for one another. [The topic reads:] "Why is there no case of a single person..." — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic yet again? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest its own correct meaning. That is, some maintain that the immediately-antecedent condition does not really possess its own substance at all; in order to refute this intention, the treatise wishes to show that the immediately-antecedent condition does indeed really exist. Others maintain that a single person can have two minds arising simultaneously; in order to refute this once more emphatically, the treatise wishes to show that there is only ever a single mind. Some say: this passage is an ancillary treatise — the foregoing passage stated that there is no case of a single person, without regard to before or after, having two minds arising simultaneously, but did not yet state the reason for it; the treatise now wishes to state it, and so takes up this topic. Why is there no case of a single person, without regard to before or after, having two minds arising simultaneously? The answer: because there is no second immediately-antecedent condition available — that is, the arising of mind and mental factors necessarily depends upon the immediately-antecedent condition, and since there is no second such condition available,

there can therefore certainly be no case of a single person, without regard to before or after, having two minds arising simultaneously. One ought then further to ask: why is there no second immediately-antecedent condition available? And so the further answer is given: because each and every sentient being's mind continues on in its own single succession — that is, a sentient being's mind, by its own inherent nature, continues on one after another in succession, never as two, never as many; this is a case of one question being answered by mutual, reciprocal reference to the other. Some say: this passage answers the earlier question a second time — that is, the earlier question asked why there is no case of a single person, without regard to before or after, having two minds arising simultaneously, and this passage now answers it a second time by saying that each and every sentient being's mind continues on in its own single succession — that is, each and every sentient being, by the force of its own inherent nature, has only a single mind continuing on in succession. Why is this? Because a future collection of minds must arise from the coming-together of present conditions, and does not arise without such a coming-together; and since the present possesses only a single such coming-together, the future mind arises one instance at a time — just as, when many people pass through a narrow path, they must pass through one at a time, never two abreast, let alone many at once; or just as, when cattle or sheep exit through a narrow pen-gate, they exit one at a time, never two, never many. In just the same way, a sentient being's future collection of minds arises, one instance at a time, in dependence on the present coming-together of conditions. Were there, in the present, many such comings-together available all at once, ready to open the way for the next moment, then many minds ought to arise at the very same time — but since this simply does not happen, minds arise one at a time. Further, since these comings-together themselves occur in a definite sequence, before and after — suppose, for instance, that the coming-together for the path of cultivation existed first, and the path of seeing arose only afterward: it would then follow that the path of cultivation arises before the path of seeing, but since this simply does not happen, the path of seeing arises first. It is on this account that there is no case of a single person, without regard to before or after, having two minds arising simultaneously. Within this same topic, there is a further set of distinctions — namely, as to why there is no case of a single person, without regard to before or after, having two minds arising simultaneously. The Venerable Vasumitra explained: within a single moment, the body has only a single mind, since it operates in dependence on that body, and so there is never a case of two. Further, within a single moment, the vital faculty has only a single mind, since it operates in dependence on that vital faculty, and so there is never a case of two. Further, within a single moment, there is only a single class of shared existence's mind, since it operates in dependence on that class, and so there is never a case of two. The Great Virtuous One explained: when a dharma arises, its coming-together of conditions is always single, never two, since a single coming-together cannot give rise to two effects — and so a single moment's mind is only ever single. There are yet others who say: if two minds could arise simultaneously, then the mind ought to be untamable —

just as even a single mind, now, is already stubborn and unruly, difficult indeed to tame — how much more so, then, if there were two minds at once! And if the mind could never be tamed,

there could then be no sense of attaining liberation at all — hence a single continuum never has two minds simultaneously. There are yet others who say: if a single continuum could have two minds arising simultaneously, then the fault would follow of defilement and purity arising at the very same time — that is, one mind defiled, one mind pure — and this would mean there could be no principle of attaining liberation at all; further, one would then have to be reborn in a good and a bad destiny at the very same time. Further, if a single continuum could have two minds arising simultaneously, what would prevent there being three? And if there were three, one would have to experience the ripened effects of all three realms at the very same time — this would destroy the very distinction between the realms, and there would again be no liberation. Further, if a single continuum could have three minds arising simultaneously, what would prevent there being four? And if there were four, one would have to experience the ripened effects of all four kinds of birth at the very same time — this would destroy the very distinction between the kinds of birth, and there would again be no liberation. Further, if a single continuum could have four minds arising simultaneously, what would prevent there being five? And if there were five, one would have to experience the ripened effects of all five destinies at the very same time — this would destroy the very distinction between the destinies, and there would again be no liberation. Further, if a single continuum could have five minds arising simultaneously, what would prevent there being six? One would then have to have all six consciousnesses arising together at the very same time, and take in every objective sphere all at the very same time. Further, if a single continuum could have six minds arising simultaneously, what would prevent there being a hundred? And if there could be a hundred, what would prevent a thousand — and so on, what would prevent countless minds arising together at once? And if that were so, all dharmas would have to arise all at once from the future, and cease all at once in the present — and this would mean there could be no future or present at all, since it is only by observing the future and the present that the past is said to exist; and if the future and present did not exist, the past, too, would not exist. And if the three time-periods did not exist, there would be no conditioned dharmas at all; and if there were no conditioned dharmas, there would be no unconditioned dharmas either — and so, in this way, absolutely nothing at all would exist. This is a very grave fault indeed, and it is for this reason that there is no case of two minds arising simultaneously. There are yet other masters who say: if a single continuum could have two minds arising simultaneously, then feeling and the other mental factors ought likewise to arise as two at once, so that a single moment would then have ten aggregates' worth of content — and this would destroy the very notion of a sentient being; and since the sentient being would be destroyed, its supporting body would be destroyed; and since its support would be destroyed, the five categories of what is to be abandoned would be destroyed; and since the five categories would be destroyed, their antidotes would be destroyed; and since the antidotes would be destroyed, full comprehension would be destroyed; and since full comprehension would be destroyed, the fruits of the ascetic path and everything else would likewise all be destroyed. Lest such a fault follow, a single continuum therefore never has two minds simultaneously. One asks: just as a single moment does have many mental factors, without incurring the fault just described, ought not the same hold for two minds as well? The Venerable Vasumitra explained: although the mental factors are many, they are drawn forth together with the mind as a single unity by the very same immediately-antecedent condition — just as the mind is single, so too are feeling and the rest single, and so no fault follows. The Great Virtuous One explained: mind arises together with feeling and the rest through a single coming-together of conditions — just as the mind is single, so too are feeling and the rest single, and so no fault follows. There are yet others who say: mind arises together with feeling and the rest through a single attention — just as the mind is single, so too are feeling and the rest single; although all of these are alike called "mental factors," their substance and class each differ from one another, and so no fault follows.

One asks: as stated above, what is the very substance of the immediately-antecedent condition? The answer: apart from an arhat's very last mind and mental factors, every other past and present mind and mental factors constitute the substance of the immediately-antecedent condition. One asks: why is it that an arhat's very last mind and mental factors do not serve as an immediately-antecedent condition? The answer: were that mind and its mental factors to serve as an immediately-antecedent condition, a further mind and mental factors ought then to arise after them — and if that were so, there would be no ultimate liberation at all. There are yet other masters who say: this last mind, too, does serve as an immediately-antecedent condition; that no further mind and mental factors arise after it is due to some other, obstructing condition, not because that last mind itself fails to serve as such a condition — and were a further mind to arise, this last mind would indeed serve as its condition, just as the mental faculty, the mental element, and the mental field still bear that name even when no further consciousness arises from them. This position ought not to be maintained — why is this? Because the immediately-antecedent condition is established with reference to its actual function: if a given dharma serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for another dharma, then no dharma, no sentient being, no spell, and no medicine whatsoever is capable of obstructing it and preventing that other dharma from arising. The mental faculty, element, and field, by contrast, are established with reference to the character of being a faculty as such — even though no further consciousness arises from them in this last case, they still possess the character of a faculty and the rest, and so still retain that name. One asks: why is it that an arhat's very last mind possesses the character of the mental faculty and the rest, but lacks the character of the immediately-antecedent condition? The answer: the mental faculty, element, and field need not have regard to any later dharma at all in order to be so established — hence the mental factors that accompany and observe them, too, retain their own names regardless; the immediately-antecedent condition, by contrast, is established precisely with regard to a later dharma, and since no later dharma arises in this last case, it is not spoken of as such a condition. Further, even within what fails to give rise to a further dharma, the character of the mental faculty is still present, and so this last mind still counts as the mental faculty and the rest; but within what fails to give rise to a further dharma, the character of the immediately-antecedent condition is simply absent, since that character requires a genuine succession — and it is for this reason that this last mind and the like are not established as an immediately-antecedent condition. One asks: what, specifically, is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition? The answer: its own substance is precisely its own defining mark, and its defining mark is precisely its own substance — one ought not to seek some defining mark apart from and separate from its substance. The Venerable Vasumitra explained: the sense of opening up space and making way is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. Further, the sense of granting sequence is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. Further, the sense of granting function is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. Further, the sense of being able to generate mind is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. Further, the sense of being able to draw forth and give rise to mind is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. Further, the sense of being able to alert mind is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. Further, the sense of being able to sustain the continuity of mind is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. The Great Virtuous One explained: the sense of being able to draw forth and generate the immediately subsequent mind is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. The Venerable Vāmala explained: the sense of being able to make a mind not yet arisen continue on from a mind already arisen is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. The Ābhidharmikas explained: the sense of being able to make each dharma, with its own distinct particular characteristic, arise without any interval is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. "Each dharma with its own distinct particular characteristic" refers to feeling, perception, and the other mental factors, together with mind itself, each having its own distinct particular characteristic, arising simultaneously without ever admitting of two of the very same kind at once. There are yet other masters who say: the sense of making a similar dharma arise without any interval

is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition. Its substance and defining mark have now been stated; what should be stated next follows. One asks: why is it named "the immediately-antecedent condition"? The answer: this condition is able to draw forth an immediately-antecedent dharma of an equal kind — hence it is named the immediately-antecedent condition.

One asks: from one moment to the next, the mental factors present may be more or fewer — how, then, can they be called "equal"? For instance, the desire realm has more mental factors present than the form realm; the form realm has more than the formless realm; a wholesome mind has more mental factors than an unwholesome one; an unwholesome mind has more than a neutral, indeterminate one;

a contaminated mind has more than an uncontaminated one — how, then, can it be said that this condition draws forth an immediately-antecedent dharma of an equal kind? The answer: "equal" is spoken of with reference to the equality of the kind of event involved, not with reference to numerical equality — and so no fault follows. Were it the case that a single mind could have one instance of perception but two instances of feeling, then it could indeed not be called "equal";

but within a single mind, feeling and the other mental factors that ought to arise each arise only singly, one at a time — and it is for this reason that it is called "equal." One asks: does mind serve as an immediately-antecedent condition only for mind, and does feeling and the rest serve as an immediately-antecedent condition only for feeling and the rest of the very same kind — or is it not so? The Śramaṇa of Similar Succession explained:

mind serves as an immediately-antecedent condition only for mind, and likewise feeling and the rest serve as an immediately-antecedent condition each only for their own kind. This position ought not to be maintained — why is this? Because, if it were necessarily so, a wholesome mind would give rise only to a further wholesome mind, an unwholesome mind only to a further unwholesome mind, a neutral, indeterminate mind only to a further neutral, indeterminate mind, a mind of craving only to a further mind of craving, a mind of aversion only to a further mind of aversion, and a mind of delusion only to a further mind of delusion — and this would mean there could be no ultimate liberation at all. Further, since the mental factors present may be fewer or more from one moment to the next, then, when a moment with fewer factors gives rise to one with more, the additional factors would have to arise without any condition at all; and when a moment with more factors gives rise to one with fewer, some of the effects would have to simply diminish away — and this would mean that, within a single collection of mind and mental factors, some elements arise from a condition and some do not, some serve as a condition and some do not. Further, an uncontaminated collection of mind and mental factors would then have to arise without any condition at all when arising after a contaminated one. It should instead be said: mind serves as an immediately-antecedent condition both for mind and for feeling and the rest, and feeling serves as an immediately-antecedent condition both for feeling and for mind and the rest — and the same holds for the other mental factors. One asks: does mind serve as a proximate immediately-antecedent condition only for mind, and not for feeling and the rest, while feeling and the rest serve as a proximate immediately-antecedent condition only for feeling and the rest, and not for mind — or is it not so? The Śramaṇa of Similar Succession explained: mind serves as a proximate immediately-antecedent condition only for mind, not for feeling and the rest, and feeling and the rest serve as a proximate immediately-antecedent condition only for feeling and the rest, not for mind. This position ought not to be maintained — why is this? Because it has already been explained above that the sense of opening up space and making way is the defining mark of the immediately-antecedent condition, and within this sense of opening up space and making way, there is no such thing as "near" or "far" at all. It should instead be said: the collection of mind arising earlier serves as an immediately-antecedent condition for the collection of mind arising afterward, without any distinction of proximity — just as with a heap of beans and the like.