How Can Anyone Remember, Without a Self?

One asks: does the immediately-antecedent condition exist within the future time-period? Suppose it does — what fault follows? If it does, then future dharmas ought to abide in a fixed sequence, and correct preparatory effort would then become useless. Why is this? Because, if a given dharma already abides, without interval, in a fixed position relative to another, then that other dharma must necessarily arise from it without interval — what further use, then, would correct preparatory effort serve? Further, there would then be no sense in which the afflictions could be suppressed and their antidote could arise, and this would mean there could be no ultimate liberation at all. Suppose, on the other hand, that it does not exist — how, then, is the statement of the Views Chapter to be reconciled with this? As it states: "if a dharma serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for another dharma, is there ever a time when it does not so serve?" The answer given there: yes — namely, whenever this latter dharma has not yet arrived at having already arisen. And if the immediately-antecedent condition does not exist in the future, then why is it that, immediately after supreme mundane dharma,

only the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering arises, and nothing else, up through the knowledge of non-arising, ever arises? And how, moreover, is the statement of the Eightfold Discourse to be reconciled with this? As it states:

"such a person, having performed this karma, does not fall into an evil destiny for thirteen aeons, or fourteen aeons, or even up to twenty aeons" — and how, moreover, could the three kinds of karma — ripening in this very life, ripening in the immediately following life, and ripening in some later life beyond that — even be established at all, if there is no immediately-antecedent condition governing the future? The answer: the future does not possess an immediately-antecedent condition. One asks: if that is so, why is it that, immediately after supreme mundane dharma, only the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering arises, and nothing else, up through the knowledge of non-arising, ever arises? The answer: this is fixed as to name and number, not fixed as to the actual event and its particular character. Why is this? Because the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, occurring within six possible stages, when it is not yet known which stage it will occur in, is bound to arise associated with one of three faculties; when it is not yet known which faculty it will be associated with, it is bound to arise with one of four aspects; when it is not yet known which aspect it will have, it is bound to arise at one of countless possible moments; and when it is not yet known at which moment it will arise — well, up through the stage of heightened forbearance, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering is fixed only with respect to three matters, namely its stage, its faculty, and its aspect, while it remains unfixed with respect to two further matters, namely its particular moment and its immediately-antecedent condition. Only once one abides at supreme mundane dharma itself are all five matters fixed. Further, it is not strictly necessary that an immediately-antecedent condition exist in order for dharmas to arise in continuous succession one after another — why is this? Because, if a given dharma depends and relies upon another dharma, it is bound to arise, without interval, immediately following that other dharma, whereas this is not so for any unrelated dharma — just as, with external things, even without any immediately-antecedent condition, they still arise dependent and reliant upon one another in a fixed sequence, one after another: as with a seed, sprout, stem, branch, twig, flower, and fruit, whatever depends and relies upon a given prior thing arises, without interval, immediately after it, while what does not so depend does not. In just the same way, internal dharmas within the future time-period, even lacking any immediately-antecedent condition, still arise, without interval, immediately after whatever they depend and rely upon, while what does not so depend does not. The forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering depends and relies upon supreme mundane dharma, whereas the dharma-knowledge of suffering and the rest do not depend upon it in the same way — and it is for this reason that, immediately after supreme mundane dharma, only the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering arises, and nothing else, up through the knowledge of non-arising, ever arises. Further, the arising of a future dharma depends upon a present dharma: if the present dharma's own conditions come together, that future dharma is then able to arise; if they do not come together, it does not arise. Although there is, strictly speaking, no fixed "place" involved here, still, for the sake of analysis: suppose the conditions for the arising of the path of cultivation came together first — it, too, ought then to arise first; yet this simply never happens. It is only the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering that arises through the coming-together of conditions dependent upon supreme mundane dharma; the dharma-knowledge of suffering and the rest depend upon a different coming-together of conditions altogether — and it is for this reason that, immediately after supreme mundane dharma, only the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering arises, and nothing else, up through the knowledge of non-arising, ever arises. One asks: as for the Eightfold Discourse and the like —

how, then, are they to be reconciled with this? Some say: the World-Honored One, on the basis of the past and the present, infers the future by comparison, and so speaks in this way — that is, the World-Honored One observes that, in the past and the present, a person of such-and-such a kind, having performed such-and-such karma, does not fall into an evil destiny for such-and-such a number of aeons, and that a person of such-and-such a kind, having performed such-and-such karma, receives its ripened effect in this very life, or, having performed such-and-such karma, receives its effect in the immediately following life, or, having performed such-and-such karma, receives its effect in some later life beyond that. On the basis of this direct observation, he then infers by comparison, with respect to the future, that a person of such-and-such a kind, having performed such-and-such karma, will not fall into an evil destiny for such-and-such a number of aeons, and that a person of such-and-such a kind, having performed such-and-such karma, will receive its effect in this very life,

or will receive its effect in the immediately following life, or will receive its effect in some later life beyond that. There are yet other masters who say: within a sentient being's own body there exists a certain mark, included among the formations dissociated from mind; the World-Honored One, observing this mark, thereby knows that a person of such-and-such a kind will not fall into an evil destiny for such-and-such a number of aeons in the future, and also knows that the karma such a person has performed will either be received in this very life,

in the immediately following life, or in some later life beyond that. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained. Were it maintained, it would imply that the World-Honored One's own knowledge of future events is merely inferential, never a matter of direct perception — and this is unreasonable. It should instead be said: the Buddha's own knowledge of the future is direct perception, not inference — that is, the Buddha's wisdom and vision are so luminous, pure, and keen that, although future dharmas abide in a chaotic, unordered co-presence, without any fixed sequence at all, he is nonetheless able to perceive directly that a person of such-and-such a kind, having performed such-and-such karma, will not fall into an evil destiny for such-and-such a number of aeons in the future, and that a person of such-and-such a kind, having performed such-and-such karma, will receive its effect either in this very life, in the immediately following life, or in some later life beyond that — clearly and without any error at all. There are yet other masters who say: the future, too, does possess an immediately-antecedent condition. One asks: if that is so, then future dharmas ought to abide in a fixed sequence, correct preparatory effort would become useless, and there would be no sense in which the afflictions could be suppressed and their antidote could arise — and this would mean there could be no ultimate liberation at all. The answer: although future dharmas do possess the fixed nature and characteristic of the immediately-antecedent condition, they do not possess any fixed sequence, before or after,

at all — that is, at the stage where mind and mental factors have not yet arisen, there is indeed a dharma bound to arise from it without interval, but without any fixed sequence, before or after; whereas once it has already arisen, there is indeed a dharma bound to arise from it without interval, and this time with a fixed sequence, before and after. It is just like a group of many monks: while they stand about in a disordered crowd, their relative seniority is already fixed, but their actual order in line is not yet fixed; once they line up in sequence, their seniority is fixed, and their order in line is fixed as well. The case here is exactly the same, and so no fault follows. Correct preparatory effort does not become useless, since a single present mind can have, immediately following it, either of two possible future minds — that is, immediately following a single present mind, there abide, in the future, two possible minds: one wholesome, one defiled. If one cultivates correct preparatory effort in the present, then the wholesome mind arises, and the defiled mind does not; if one gives rise to a mistaken preparatory effort in the present, then the defiled mind arises, and the wholesome mind does not — just as a single seed may give rise to either of two subsequent things, a sprout or ash: if the conditions for a sprout come together, the sprout arises and the ash does not; if the conditions for ash come together through burning, the ash arises and the sprout does not. The case here is exactly the same. It is on this account that there remains a sense in which the afflictions can be suppressed and their antidote can arise, so that one gradually goes on to realize ultimate liberation. One asks: how, then, is the statement of the Views Chapter to be reconciled with this — namely, that "if a dharma serves as the immediately-antecedent condition for another dharma, is there ever a time when it does not so serve?"

— to which the answer given is: "yes, whenever this latter dharma has not yet arrived at having already arisen." The answer: that earlier statement is spoken with reference to the fixed sequence, before and after, whereas this present discussion is spoken with reference to the fixed nature and characteristic of serving as a condition —

and so there is no real contradiction. The verdict: it should be said that the future does not possess an immediately-antecedent condition. Why is this? Because the immediately-antecedent condition does not abide in a chaotic, unordered co-presence, whereas future dharmas do so abide; the immediately-antecedent condition abides in a fixed sequence, whereas future dharmas have no such sequence; the immediately-antecedent condition is established with reference to the sense of opening up space and making way, and future dharmas lack this sense of opening up space and making way. Further, if the future did possess an immediately-antecedent condition, then whoever wished to cultivate what is wholesome would always go on to perform what is wholesome, and whoever wished to perform what is unwholesome would always go on to perform what is unwholesome; yet it is plainly observed that those who wish to cultivate what is wholesome sometimes go on to perform what is unwholesome instead — as with Devadatta — and that those who wish to perform what is unwholesome sometimes go on to perform what is wholesome instead — as with Aṅgulimāla. Hence the future time-period certainly does not possess an immediately-antecedent condition.

One asks: why is material form not an immediately-antecedent condition? The answer: only a dharma that is associated with mind, possesses a support, an aspect, an alerting function, and an object can be established as an immediately-antecedent condition; material form is none of these, and so is not an immediately-antecedent condition. Some say: the immediately-antecedent condition presents itself without confusion, whereas material form does involve confusion, and so is not an immediately-antecedent condition — that is, within a single moment, form of the desire realm and form of the form realm may arise together; or within a single moment, form of the desire realm and unbound form may arise together; or within a single moment, form of the form realm and unbound form may arise together. The Venerable Vasumitra explained: while a single ripening-form's own continuum has not yet ceased, there may be, alongside it, nourished form and homogeneous-outflow form, arising in succession together as many distinct classes co-arising at once — and it is for this reason that form is not an immediately-antecedent condition. The Great Virtuous One explained: because material dharmas can, from a lesser quantity, give rise without interval to a greater quantity,

and, from a greater quantity, give rise without interval to a lesser quantity, it is not an immediately-antecedent condition. As for giving rise, from a lesser quantity, to a greater one: it is just as, during the summer rains, a few clouds arise without interval into countless clouds, covering the whole of empty space; or as a small tree-seed gives rise to an exceedingly tall and vast banyan tree; or as a small kalala embryo gives rise to a vast and expansive bodily form. As for giving rise, from a greater quantity, to a lesser one: it is just as a great heap of grass, when burned, is reduced to a small amount of ash. One asks: if that is so, then the mental factors, too, can give rise, from a greater quantity, to a lesser one, and from a lesser quantity, to a greater one — and so they too, by this same reasoning, ought not to be established as an immediately-antecedent condition. As for giving rise, from a greater quantity, to a lesser one: it is as when one passes from a stage possessing both examination and analysis into a stage lacking both. As for giving rise, from a lesser quantity, to a greater one: it is as when one passes from a stage lacking both examination and analysis into a stage possessing both. The answer: this is spoken with reference to the numerical equality across successive moments within the very same stage, not with reference to different stages, and so no fault follows. Some say: this is spoken with reference to the numerical equality across successive moments within the very same class, not with reference to different classes, and so no fault follows — that is, were it the case that, within a single mind, one instance of feeling and the rest gave rise, without interval, to two instances of feeling and the rest, or two instances gave rise to one, this fault might indeed follow; but since this simply never happens, mind and mental factors differ from material form in this regard.

Because material dharmas, being atomic particles of the very same class, arise together in great multitude within a single aggregation, they cannot be established as an immediately-antecedent condition; mind and mental factors involve no such thing.

One asks: why are the formations dissociated from mind not an immediately-antecedent condition? The answer: only a dharma that is associated with mind, possesses a support, an aspect, an alerting function, and an object can be established as an immediately-antecedent condition; the dissociated formations are none of these, and so are not an immediately-antecedent condition. Some say: the immediately-antecedent condition presents itself without confusion, whereas the dissociated formations do present themselves with confusion, and so are not an immediately-antecedent condition — that is, within a single moment, dissociated formations of the three realms and unbound dissociated formations may all arise together; the rest should be understood in the same way, exactly as explained at length above. The Prakaraṇapāda states as follows: what is the dharma immediately following mind? The answer: if, immediately following mind, other mind and mental factors,

whether already arisen or presently arising, and the attainment of non-perception or the attainment of cessation, whether already arisen or presently arising — these are what is called the dharma immediately following mind. One asks: why does that passage not mention the ripening of non-perception? Some say: it ought to be mentioned but is not, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Some say:

the two mindless attainments are obtained through preparatory effort, exertion, and diligent striving, and so that passage mentions them; the ripening of non-perception is the opposite of this, and so that passage does not mention it. Some say: the two mindless attainments are wholesome, and so are mentioned; the ripening of non-perception is neutral and indeterminate, and so is not mentioned. Some say: only what is drawn forth without interval by the power of mind, without confusion, can be named a dharma immediately following mind.

The ripening of non-perception is drawn forth by the power of a ripening cause, operating on its own spontaneously, not drawn forth by the power of the mind entering into it — and so it is not named a dharma immediately following mind. One asks: if that is so, then ripening mind and mental factors, too, being drawn forth by the power of a ripening cause and operating spontaneously, ought likewise not to be named a dharma immediately following mind. The answer: a thing of the same kind drawing forth another of the same kind possesses a superior kind of force, unlike the case just described — since both are alike associated with mind, possessing a support and the rest, they are said to be "of the same kind." One asks: why is it that the two mindless attainments count as a dharma immediately following mind, yet do not count as an immediately-antecedent condition of mind? The answer: they are drawn forth and obtained through the exertion and diligent striving of preparatory effort connected with mind, and so are named a dharma immediately following mind;

but, being contrary to mind and blocking mind off entirely, they are not an immediately-antecedent condition of mind. Some say: they are drawn forth by the power of mind, and so are named a dharma immediately following mind; but, being dissociated from mind, possessing no support, no aspect, no alerting function, and no object, they are not an immediately-antecedent condition of mind. Some say: they are made to grow and increase by the power of mind, and possess a real function, and so are named a dharma immediately following mind; but, since they diminish mind and prevent it from exercising its own function, they are not an immediately-antecedent condition of mind. One asks: why is it that the two mindless attainments, arising in succession, one after another, resembling one another without confusion, still do not have the earlier one serve as the immediately-antecedent condition for the later? The answer: because the later one is drawn forth by the power of the mind that first entered the attainment, not drawn forth by the power of the immediately preceding moment itself — hence the earlier is not an immediately-antecedent condition for the later. One asks: if that is so, then ripening mind and mental factors, too, being drawn forth by the power of a ripening cause and operating spontaneously, ought likewise not to have the earlier serve as an immediately-antecedent condition for the later. The answer: mind and mental factors are associated with mind, possess a support,

an aspect, an alerting function, and an object, and so the earlier moment exerts a superior kind of force upon the later, drawing it forth and opening the way for it — hence every such earlier moment does indeed serve as an immediately-antecedent condition for the later. The dissociated formations are the very opposite of this, and so cannot be taken as a parallel case. One asks: when one enters and then exits the attainment of non-perception or the attainment of cessation,

the mind in between may span half an aeon, or even a full aeon — how, then, can this be called "immediately-antecedent"? The answer: because there is no other mind intervening in between, that is, although the mind entering and the mind exiting are separated by a great span of time, there is no other mind intervening between them at all — and hence the later is called "immediately-antecedent" to the earlier. It is just like two people traveling together on a long journey, one walking ahead, one walking behind, separated by a great distance: someone asks, "do you have a companion?" and the other replies, "yes, he is coming right behind me" — even though, between the two of them, there may be birds and beasts along the way, since no other person intervenes, he is still called "right behind." The case here is exactly the same: since no mind intervenes, it is called "immediately-antecedent." One asks: if a dharma is a mental immediately-antecedent dharma, is it also a mental interval-dharma? The answer: this should be put in the form of four alternatives. There is a case of a dharma that is a mental immediately-antecedent dharma but not a mental interval-dharma — namely, apart from the very first moment of the two mindless attainments and the mind and mental factors of the stage possessing mind, every other continuum of the two mindless attainments and the mind and mental factors upon exiting the attainment. There is a case of a dharma that is a mental interval-dharma but not a mental immediately-antecedent dharma — namely, the very first moment of the two mindless attainments, and the mind and mental factors of the stage possessing mind, together with their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence. There is a case of a dharma that is both a mental immediately-antecedent dharma and a mental interval-dharma — namely, the very first moment of the two mindless attainments, and the mind and mental factors of the stage possessing mind. There is a case of a dharma that is neither a mental immediately-antecedent dharma nor a mental interval-dharma — namely, apart from the very first moment of the two mindless attainments and the mind and mental factors of the stage possessing mind, together with their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, every other continuum of the two mindless attainments, and the mind and mental factors upon exiting the attainment, together with their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence. One asks: if a dharma is a mental immediately-antecedent dharma, is it also a mindless-attainment-interval dharma? The answer: this too should be put in the form of four alternatives. There is a case of a dharma that is a mental immediately-antecedent dharma but not a mindless-attainment-interval dharma — namely, the very first moment of the two mindless attainments, and the mind and mental factors of the stage possessing mind. There is a case of a dharma that is a mindless-attainment-interval dharma but not a mental immediately-antecedent dharma — namely, apart from the very first moment, every other continuum of the two mindless attainments, and the mind and mental factors of the stage possessing mind, together with their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, and the mind and mental factors upon exiting the attainment, together with their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence. There is a case of a dharma that is both a mental immediately-antecedent dharma and a mindless-attainment-interval dharma — namely, apart from the very first moment of the two mindless attainments and the mind and mental factors of the stage possessing mind, every other continuum of the two mindless attainments, and the mind and mental factors upon exiting the attainment. There is a case of a dharma that is neither a mental immediately-antecedent dharma nor a mindless-attainment-interval dharma — namely, the very first moment of the two mindless attainments, and the mind and mental factors of the stage possessing mind, together with their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence.

There are three kinds of attention: attention to a particular characteristic, attention to a common characteristic, and attention of resolute conviction. Attention to a particular characteristic is exemplified by reflecting that form has the characteristic of obstruction and change, feeling the characteristic of registering experience, perception the characteristic of grasping an image, formations the characteristic of constructing, and consciousness the characteristic of discerning; or that earth has the characteristic of solidity, water of moisture, fire of warmth, and wind of motion; and so on. Attention to a common characteristic is exemplified by the sixteen aspects and the like. Attention of resolute conviction is exemplified by the contemplation of impurity, mindfulness of breathing, the immeasurables, the liberations, the bases of mastery, the totality-spheres, and the like. One asks: of these three kinds of attention, how many kinds, occurring immediately beforehand, allow the noble path to become present, and how many kinds become present immediately after the noble path? Some say: all three kinds, occurring immediately beforehand, allow the noble path to become present, and all three kinds become present immediately after the noble path — this position reconciles well with what the discourses state, that the contemplation of impurity accompanies the cultivation of the mindfulness factor of awakening, based on disgust, based on dispassion, based on cessation, and inclining toward relinquishment, where the word "accompanies" here expresses this very sense of immediacy. Some say: only two kinds, occurring immediately beforehand, allow the noble path to become present — excluding attention to a particular characteristic — while all three kinds become present immediately after the noble path. Some say: only attention to a common characteristic, occurring immediately beforehand, allows the noble path to become present, while all three kinds become present immediately after the noble path. One asks: how, then, is the discourses' own statement to be reconciled with this — namely, that the contemplation of impurity accompanies the cultivation of the mindfulness factor of awakening? The answer: this is stated with reference to an indirect, successive cause — just as with the principle of grandparent and grandchild, each generating the next in succession — that is, the attention of resolute conviction draws forth and gives rise to attention to a common characteristic, and attention to a common characteristic draws forth and gives rise to the noble path;

some say: only attention to a common characteristic, occurring immediately beforehand, allows the noble path to become present, and only attention to a common characteristic becomes present immediately after the noble path.

One asks: if that is so, then for one who enters the certainty of rightness in dependence on the stage of proximate concentration, upon emerging from the noble path, he may indeed give rise to a desire-realm attention to a common characteristic; but for one who enters the certainty of rightness in dependence on a higher stage, upon emerging from the noble path, since his desire-realm mind cannot arise at all, being too remote, and since he has not yet attained a form-realm attention to a common characteristic either — even though he has already attained the nirvedhabhāgīya factors, the noble path itself no longer becomes present again afterward — with what kind of attention to a common characteristic, then, does he emerge from the noble path? The answer: during the interval of the nirvedhabhāgīya factors, he has already cultivated and attained aspects such as "all conditioned formations are impermanent," "all dharmas are without self," "nirvāṇa is quiescent," and the like — and it is these very aspects of attention that he gives rise to upon now emerging from the noble path. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained; the position stated first above is the sound one — namely, that all three kinds of attention, occurring immediately beforehand, allow the noble path to become present, and all three kinds become present immediately after the noble path.

Further, the desire realm has three kinds of attention: attention born of learning, attention born of reflection, and attention born by birth. The form realm has three kinds of attention: attention born of learning, attention born of cultivation, and attention born by birth. The formless realm has two kinds of attention: attention born of cultivation and attention born by birth. The uncontaminated has a single kind of attention: attention born of cultivation. Here, in the desire realm, only attention born of reflection, occurring immediately beforehand, allows the noble path to become present, while all three kinds become present immediately after the noble path. In the form realm, only attention born of cultivation, occurring immediately beforehand, allows the noble path to become present, while only two kinds become present immediately after the noble path, excluding attention born by birth. In the formless realm, only attention born of cultivation, occurring immediately beforehand, allows the noble path to become present, and only attention born of cultivation, likewise, becomes present immediately afterward. One asks: why is it that, immediately after the noble path, the desire realm's attention born by birth can become present, but the form and formless realms' attention born by birth cannot?

The answer: because the desire realm's attention born by birth is keen and forceful, while the form and formless realms' attention born by birth is not keen. For one who attains arhatship in dependence on the stage of proximate concentration, he may emerge from the noble path either with a desire-realm mind or with a proximate-concentration mind. For one who attains arhatship in dependence on the sphere of nothingness, he may emerge from the noble path either with a sphere-of-nothingness mind or with a sphere-of-neither-perception-nor-non-perception mind. For one who attains arhatship in dependence on any other stage, he emerges from the noble path only with a mind of that very same stage.

Further, the first dhyāna is of three kinds: associated with relish, pure, and uncontaminated — and the same holds, in this way, up through the sphere of nothingness, each possessing all three kinds; the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, by contrast, has only two kinds, excluding the uncontaminated. Here, immediately following the kind associated with relish, two kinds become present, excluding the uncontaminated; immediately following the pure kind, all three kinds become present; immediately following the uncontaminated kind, two kinds become present, excluding the kind associated with relish. The pure first dhyāna, moreover, is further of four kinds: conducive to retrogression, conducive to stability, conducive to advancement, and conducive to penetration — and the same holds, in this way, up through the sphere of nothingness, each possessing all four kinds; the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, by contrast, has only three kinds,

excluding the kind conducive to advancement. Here, immediately following the kind conducive to retrogression, two kinds become present — namely, the kind conducive to retrogression itself and the kind conducive to stability. Immediately following the kind conducive to stability, three kinds become present, excluding the kind conducive to penetration. Immediately following the kind conducive to advancement, three kinds become present, excluding the kind conducive to retrogression. Immediately following the kind conducive to penetration, two kinds become present — namely, the kind conducive to penetration itself and the kind conducive to advancement. One asks: if one is born in the second, third, or fourth dhyāna, and gives rise to the sense-consciousness bodies of the first dhyāna,

how many kinds of mind, occurring immediately beforehand, does one enter with, and how many kinds does one exit with? The answer: this depends on the stage into which one is born. If one has not yet become free of that stage's own defilement, then three kinds of mind, occurring immediately beforehand, allow those sense-consciousness bodies to become present, and immediately following those sense-consciousness bodies, three kinds of mind become present — namely, wholesome, defiled, and neutral, indeterminate. If one has already become free of that stage's own defilement, then two kinds of mind, occurring immediately beforehand, allow those sense-consciousness bodies to become present, and immediately following those sense-consciousness bodies, two kinds of mind become present — namely, excluding the defiled kind.

There are twelve kinds of mind: the desire realm has four — wholesome, unwholesome, defiled-but-indeterminate, and undefiled-and-indeterminate; the form and formless realms each have three — the same four just named, minus the unwholesome; the uncontaminated has two — the trainee's and the one beyond training's. One asks: of these twelve kinds of mind, how many kinds does each one give rise to, occurring immediately afterward, and from how many kinds does each one arise, occurring immediately beforehand? The answer: the desire realm's wholesome mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to nine kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own four, the form realm's two (wholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the formless realm's one (defiled-but-indeterminate), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from eight kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own four, the form realm's two (wholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds.

The unwholesome mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to four kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own four. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from ten kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own four, and the form and formless realms' three each. The desire realm's defiled-but-indeterminate mind holds exactly the same relations as the unwholesome mind. The desire realm's undefiled-and-indeterminate mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to seven kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own four, the form realm's two (wholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the formless realm's one (defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from five kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own four, and the form realm's one wholesome mind. The form realm's wholesome mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to eleven kinds of mind — namely, all twelve kinds, excluding only the formless realm's undefiled-and-indeterminate mind. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from nine kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own three, the desire realm's two (wholesome and undefiled-and-indeterminate), the formless realm's two (wholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. The form realm's defiled-but-indeterminate mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to six kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own three, and three of the desire realm's, excluding its undefiled-and-indeterminate mind. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from eight kinds of mind — namely, the form and formless realms' three each, and the desire realm's two (wholesome and undefiled-and-indeterminate). The form realm's undefiled-and-indeterminate mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to six kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own three, the desire realm's two (unwholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the formless realm's one (defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from three kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own three. The formless realm's wholesome mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to nine kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own three, the desire realm's two (unwholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate),

the form realm's two (wholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from six kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own three, the form realm's one wholesome mind, together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. The formless realm's defiled-but-indeterminate mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to seven kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own three, the desire realm's two (unwholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the form realm's two (wholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from seven kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own three, and the desire and form realms' two each (wholesome and undefiled-and-indeterminate). The formless realm's undefiled-and-indeterminate mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to six kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own three, the desire realm's two (unwholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the form realm's one (defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from three kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own three. The trainee's mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to five kinds of mind — namely, the three realms' wholesome minds, together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from four kinds of mind — namely, the three realms' wholesome minds, together with the trainee's mind. The one-beyond-training's mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to four kinds of mind — namely, the three realms' wholesome minds, together with the one-beyond-training's mind. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from five kinds of mind — namely, the three realms' wholesome minds, together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. There are also twenty kinds of mind: the desire realm has eight — wholesome through preparatory effort, wholesome by birth, unwholesome, defiled-but-indeterminate, comportment-mind, craft-mind, ripening-produced mind, and mind of transformative capacity. The form realm has six — the same as the first eight minus the unwholesome and craft-mind. The formless realm has four — wholesome through preparatory effort, wholesome by birth, defiled-but-indeterminate, and ripening-produced mind. The uncontaminated has two — the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's. One asks: of these twenty kinds of mind, how many kinds does each one give rise to, occurring immediately afterward, and from how many kinds does each one arise, occurring immediately beforehand? The answer: the desire realm's mind wholesome through preparatory effort gives rise, immediately afterward, to ten kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own seven, excluding the mind of transformative capacity, and the form realm's one mind wholesome through preparatory effort, together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from eight kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own four, excluding its four undefiled-and-indeterminate varieties, and the form realm's two (wholesome through preparatory effort and defiled-but-indeterminate), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. There are yet other masters who say: this mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from eleven kinds of mind — namely, the eight just named, together with the desire realm's own comportment-mind, craft-mind, and ripening-produced mind — why is this? Because one who has thoroughly cultivated a mind wholesome through preparatory effort can have it become present immediately following his own realm's own comportment-mind, craft-mind, or ripening-produced mind as well. The desire realm's mind wholesome by birth gives rise, immediately afterward, to nine kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own seven, excluding the mind of transformative capacity, and the form and formless realms' one defiled-but-indeterminate mind each. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from eleven kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own seven, excluding the mind of transformative capacity, and the form realm's two (wholesome through preparatory effort and defiled-but-indeterminate), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. The unwholesome mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to seven kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own seven, excluding the mind of transformative capacity. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from fourteen kinds of mind — the desire realm's own seven, excluding the mind of transformative capacity, the form realm's four, excluding its wholesome-through-preparatory-effort and transformative-capacity minds, and the formless realm's three, excluding its wholesome-through-preparatory-effort mind. The desire realm's defiled-but-indeterminate mind holds exactly the same relations as the unwholesome mind. The desire realm's comportment-mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to eight kinds of mind —

namely, the desire realm's own six, excluding wholesome-through-preparatory-effort and transformative-capacity, and the form and formless realms' one defiled-but-indeterminate mind each. There are yet other masters who say: this mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to nine kinds of mind — namely, the eight just named, together with the desire realm's own wholesome-through-preparatory-effort mind, since one who has thoroughly cultivated it can have it become present immediately afterward as well. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from seven kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own seven, excluding the mind of transformative capacity. The desire realm's ripening-produced mind holds exactly the same relations as the desire realm's comportment-mind. The craft-mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to six kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own six, excluding wholesome-through-preparatory-effort and transformative-capacity. There are yet other masters who say: this mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to seven kinds of mind — namely, the six just named, together with the desire realm's own wholesome-through-preparatory-effort mind,

since one who has thoroughly cultivated it can have it become present immediately afterward as well. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from seven kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own seven, excluding the mind of transformative capacity.

The desire realm's mind of transformative capacity gives rise, immediately afterward, to two kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own transformative-capacity mind, and the form realm's wholesome-through-preparatory-effort mind. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from two kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's own transformative-capacity mind, and the form realm's wholesome-through-preparatory-effort mind. The form realm's wholesome-through-preparatory-effort mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to twelve kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own six, the desire realm's three (wholesome through preparatory effort, wholesome by birth, and transformative capacity), and the formless realm's one (wholesome through preparatory effort), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from ten kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own four, excluding comportment-mind and ripening-produced mind, the desire realm's two (wholesome through preparatory effort and transformative capacity), and the formless realm's two (wholesome through preparatory effort and defiled-but-indeterminate), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. The form realm's wholesome-by-birth mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to eight kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own five, excluding transformative capacity, the desire realm's two (unwholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the formless realm's one (defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from five kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own five, excluding transformative capacity. The form realm's defiled-but-indeterminate mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to nine kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own five, excluding transformative capacity, and the desire realm's four (wholesome through preparatory effort, wholesome by birth, unwholesome, and defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from eleven kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own five, excluding transformative capacity, the desire realm's three (wholesome by birth, comportment-mind, and ripening-produced mind), and the formless realm's three, excluding wholesome-through-preparatory-effort. The form realm's comportment-mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to seven kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own four, excluding wholesome-through-preparatory-effort and transformative capacity, the desire realm's two (unwholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the formless realm's one (defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from five kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own five, excluding transformative capacity. The form realm's ripening-produced mind holds exactly the same relations as the form realm's comportment-mind. The form realm's mind of transformative capacity gives rise, immediately afterward, to two kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own wholesome-through-preparatory-effort mind and transformative-capacity mind.

This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from two kinds of mind — namely, the form realm's own wholesome-through-preparatory-effort mind and transformative-capacity mind. The formless realm's wholesome-through-preparatory-effort mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to seven kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own four, and the form realm's one (wholesome through preparatory effort), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from six kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own three, excluding ripening-produced mind, and the form realm's one (wholesome through preparatory effort), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds.

The formless realm's wholesome-by-birth mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to seven kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own four, the desire realm's two (unwholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the form realm's one (defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from four kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own four.

The formless realm's defiled-but-indeterminate mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to eight kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own four, the desire realm's two (unwholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the form realm's two (wholesome through preparatory effort and defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from ten kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own four, and the desire and form realms' three each (wholesome by birth, comportment-mind, and ripening-produced mind). The formless realm's ripening-produced mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to six kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own three, excluding wholesome-through-preparatory-effort, the desire realm's two (unwholesome and defiled-but-indeterminate), and the form realm's one (defiled-but-indeterminate). This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from four kinds of mind — namely, the formless realm's own four. The trainee's mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to six kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's two (wholesome through preparatory effort and wholesome by birth), and the form and formless realms' one each (wholesome through preparatory effort), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from four kinds of mind — namely, the three realms' one each (wholesome through preparatory effort), together with the trainee's mind. The one-beyond-training's mind gives rise, immediately afterward, to five kinds of mind — namely, the desire realm's two (wholesome through preparatory effort and wholesome by birth), and the form and formless realms' one each (wholesome through preparatory effort), together with the one-beyond-training's mind. This mind, in turn, arises, immediately beforehand, from five kinds of mind — namely, the three realms' one each (wholesome through preparatory effort), together with the trainee's and the one-beyond-training's minds.

[The topic reads:] "Given that the person cannot be found, and there is no principle whereby an earlier mind passes on to a later mind, how, then, can one remember what was previously done?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest its own correct meaning. That is, some maintain that the person really exists in its own substance — as the Vātsīputrīyas hold, saying: we grant that a self exists, and it is precisely this that makes it possible to remember what was previously done —

since it is this same self that first experiences a thing and now remembers it. Were there no self, how could one remember what was previously done at all? Others maintain that a thing's own nature conceals itself within another — as the outsiders who teach the doctrine of mutual concealment among dharmas hold, saying: every conditioned dharma has a day-portion and a night-portion, each concealing the other — when night comes, the day-portion enters into it, and although the nature of day is still present within the night, it does not manifest; when day comes, the night-portion enters into it, and although the nature of night is still present within the day, it does not manifest. In this way, it becomes possible to remember what was previously done, since, within the day-portion and the night-portion, the night is present within the day and the day within the night — what was done during the night can thus be remembered during the day, and what was done during the day can thus be remembered during the night. Were it not so, how could one remember what was previously done at all? Others maintain that a thing's own nature transforms into another — as the outsiders who teach the doctrine of transformation among dharmas hold, saying: it is precisely the kalala stage itself that transforms into the arbuda stage, and so on, up through the very stage of firmness transforming into the stage of decline and old age — just as a green leaf itself transforms into a yellow leaf. In this way, it becomes possible to remember what was previously done, since the substance of the earlier and later stages is not in fact different — what was done in the earlier stage can thus be remembered in the later stage. Were it not so,

how could one remember what was previously done at all? Others maintain that a thing's own nature travels into another — as the outsiders who teach the doctrine of traveling among dharmas hold, saying: the kalala stage travels and enters into the arbuda stage, and so on, up through the stage of firmness traveling and entering into the stage of decline and old age.

In this way, it becomes possible to remember what was previously done, since the earlier dharma is still present within the later stage — what was done in the earlier stage can thus be remembered in the later stage. Were it not so, how could one remember what was previously done at all? One asks: between the outsiders' two positions of transformation and of traveling, what difference is there? The answer: the transformation-outsiders maintain that the earlier stage itself transforms into becoming the later stage, so that the earlier stage is no longer present within the later stage at all; the traveling-outsiders maintain that the earlier stage travels into the later stage, and, having arrived at the later stage, its own character remains unimpaired, growing and increasing together with the later stage at the very same time. Some say: the transformation-outsiders maintain that the later and the earlier are neither identical nor different; the traveling-outsiders maintain that the later and the earlier are both identical and different. Others maintain

that the underlying awareness itself is one — as the proponents of the doctrine of a single awareness across before and after hold, saying: the awareness that performs the deed and the awareness that later recalls it, although differing in appearance and function, are one and the same in their underlying nature. In this way, it becomes possible to remember what was previously done, since the substance of awareness in the earlier and later stages is one and the same.

What was done in the earlier stage can thus be remembered in the later stage. Were it not so, how could one remember what was previously done at all? Others maintain that the mental element is permanent — as the proponents of the doctrine of a permanent mental element hold, saying: although the six consciousnesses arise and cease, the mental element itself is permanent.

In this way, it becomes possible to remember what was previously done, since it is the mental element that remembers whatever deed the six consciousnesses have performed. Were it not so, how could one remember what was previously done at all? Others maintain that the aggregates are of two kinds: first, the root aggregate; second, the functional aggregate — the former being permanent, the latter impermanent. They say: although the root aggregate and the functional aggregate differ from one another, they combine together to form a single sentient being. In this way, it becomes possible to remember what was previously done, since it is the root aggregate that remembers whatever deed the functional aggregate has performed. Were it not so, how could one remember what was previously done at all? Others maintain that an earlier mind travels to and informs a later mind, saying: "I have done such-and-such a deed — you should remember and retain it." They say: mind is subtle and communicates in hidden ways, so that whatever an earlier mind has done, it necessarily informs a later mind of it. In this way, it becomes possible to remember what was previously done. Were it not so, how could one remember what was previously done at all? Yet the Buddhas and the disciples of the Buddha, more numerous than the sands of the Ganges, although they never speak of the existence of a person, nor of a thing's nature concealing itself, transforming, or traveling into another, nor of a single underlying awareness, a permanent mental element, a root aggregate distinct from a functional aggregate, or an earlier mind traveling to inform a later mind, still declare that there is indeed a genuine capacity to remember what was previously done. This principle is settled and certain,

yet subtle, profound, and exceedingly difficult to fathom. It is in order to demonstrate that these very characteristics and natures of dharmas are settled and certain, yet subtle, profound, and exceedingly difficult to fathom, and in order to refute the unreasonable statements of rival schools, that the treatise is composed. One asks: here the treatise ought properly to state the question in full — namely: "given that the person cannot be found, and there is likewise no such thing as a thing's nature concealing itself, transforming, or traveling into another, no single underlying awareness, no permanent mental element, no root aggregate distinct from a functional aggregate, and no principle of an earlier mind traveling to inform a later mind, how, then, can one remember what was previously done?" Why, then, does the treatise state only "given that the person cannot be found, and there is no principle whereby an earlier mind passes on to a later mind"? The answer: here, stating that "the person cannot be found" specifically refutes the very first of these positions, the doctrine of the person; and stating that "there is no principle whereby an earlier mind passes on to a later mind" refutes, in general terms, all seven of the remaining positions taken together. Some say: here, stating that "the person cannot be found" refutes only the first position, the doctrine of the person, while stating that "there is no principle whereby an earlier mind passes on to a later mind" refutes only the eighth position, the doctrine of an earlier mind traveling to inform a later mind — and since both the first and the last positions are thereby refuted, it should be understood that the six positions in between have already been refuted as well, the root treatise's own author having simply cited the first and last as a representative sample, so that his disciples might more easily grasp and retain the whole.