Two Seal-Carvers Who Never Spoke

[The topic continues:] "Given that the person cannot be found, and there is no principle whereby an earlier mind passes on to a later mind, how, then, can one remember what was previously done?" The answer: sentient beings, through the force of habituation with respect to dharmas, attain a homogeneous cognition of this kind, and are thereby able to know, in this way, whatever they have previously experienced. One asks: the foregoing passage stated that there is no person at all — why, then, does this answer now speak of "sentient beings" with respect to dharmas? The answer: the foregoing statement is expressed in terms of the noble ones' own conception, while this present statement is expressed in terms of worldly conception; the foregoing statement is expressed in terms of the noble ones' own manner of speech, while this present statement is expressed in terms of worldly speech; the foregoing statement is made with reference to ultimate truth, while this present statement is made with reference to worldly convention. Some say: it is for the sake of grammatical fluency — if one spoke only of "dharmas with respect to dharmas," this would accord with the meaning but not with the grammar, whereas speaking of "sentient beings with respect to dharmas" accords with both grammar and meaning together, since, by worldly principle, sentient beings do exist. Some say: it is for the sake of producing understanding — if one spoke only of "dharmas with respect to dharmas," disciples would fail to understand who remembers what, whereas speaking of "sentient beings with respect to dharmas" lets disciples understand that it is the sentient being who remembers the dharma. As for "sentient beings, through the force of habituation with respect to dharmas, attain a homogeneous cognition of this kind": this means that a sentient being's own cognition, with respect to the dharmas it comes to know, becomes fixed through habituation, operating freely and resembling itself from earlier to later — and it is for this reason that it is called "homogeneous." As for "are thereby able to know, in this way, whatever they have previously experienced": this means that, in accordance with what was originally seen and originally experienced, one is thereby able to remember in just this way. Some say: this passage should instead be read as "are thereby able to know, in this way, whatever things there are" — meaning that, in accordance with the substance, characteristic, self-nature, entity, own-nature, and portion originally possessed by a thing, one is thereby able to remember in just this way. Some say: this passage should instead be read as "are thereby able to know, in this way, whatever abides" — meaning that, in accordance with the visible color and the shape originally abided in, one is thereby able to remember in just this way. In order to make this meaning fully clear, a worldly, visible analogy is introduced: it is just as when there are two seal-makers, each able to recognize the characters carved by the other, even though these two people have never gone to ask one another, "how did you carve this character?" nor has either ever answered, "this is how I carved this character" — yet these two people, through the force of habituation, attain a homogeneous cognition of this kind, by which each is able to recognize the characters carved by the other. Sentient beings are exactly the same, through the force of habituation — and so on, as stated at length. Here, whoever is capable of writing is called a "seal-maker." Just as these two people, although they never question or answer one another, are nonetheless able, through the force of habituation, to attain a homogeneous cognition of this kind, by which each recognizes the characters carved by the other — indeed, even a letter arriving from across the sea can still be read and understood — sentient beings are exactly the same: even though there is no real person at all, and no principle whereby an earlier mind passes on to a later mind, they are nonetheless able, through the force of habituation, to attain a homogeneous cognition of this kind, and are thereby able to know, in this way, whatever they have previously experienced. In order to make this same point doubly clear, a second analogy is introduced: it is just as when there are two people, each possessing the ability to know another's mind, who mutually know each other's minds, even though these two people have never gone to ask one another, "how do you know my mind?" nor has either ever answered, "this is how I know your mind" — yet these two people, through the force of habituation, attain a homogeneous cognition of this kind, by which they mutually know each other's minds. Sentient beings are exactly the same, through the force of habituation — and so on, as stated at length. Here, "one who knows another's mind" refers to one who has attained the supernormal power of knowing others' minds. Just as these two people, although they never question or answer one another, are nonetheless able, through the force of habituation, to attain a homogeneous cognition of this kind, by which they mutually know each other's minds — indeed, even at a distance of a hundred yojanas, they can still know each other's minds — sentient beings are exactly the same: even though there is no real person at all — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: if it is the case that a differing mind can still remember what a differing mind previously experienced, then why can it not be that what Devadatta experienced is remembered by Yajñadatta, or that what Yajñadatta experienced is remembered by Devadatta? The answer: because their respective continua differ — an earlier mind and a later mind within one and the same continuum involve no such difference, and so this objection ought not to be raised. Some say: because there is, between their two minds, no sense of a causal relation at all, whereas an earlier mind is indeed able to serve as a cause for a later mind within the same continuum — this objection ought not to be raised. Some say: because their two bodies and minds are not mutually connected, whereas an earlier and a later body and mind, being mutually connected in succession, allow what was earlier experienced to be later remembered. One asks: if it is mere connectedness of mind that allows for remembering, then why does seeing a different ox not call to mind that it is the very same ox as before? The answer: if, with respect to something previously experienced, what is now seen resembles it, then one is indeed able to remember; but if, although something was previously experienced, what is now seen does not resemble it, then one is unable to remember. What was experienced during the first portion of the day can be remembered during the latter portion of the day, and what was experienced during the latter portion of the day can be remembered during the first portion of the day, since the bodily appearance seen earlier and later resembles itself.

Further, all mind and mental factors are fixed with respect to their object, abiding firmly in that object — and this is the ultimate root of what has just been asked. The answer: why is this so? As the Views Chapter states: "if a dharma serves as the object for another dharma, is there ever a time when it does not so serve?" The answer: no, there is no time at which it fails to serve as object — since mind and mental factors are fixed with respect to their object, abiding firmly in that object, incapable of shifting elsewhere, they are thereby able to remember what was previously done. That is, with respect to a single object, there exist countless collections of mind and mental factors, each turning toward this one object according to the very same principle, the very same nature and kind, and the very same mode — one collection of mind and mental factors takes it as its object in a certain way, and every other countless collection of mind and mental factors takes it as object in exactly the same way. Just as a single collection of mind and mental factors, according to this same principle, nature, and mode, apprehends this object, every other countless collection of mind and mental factors apprehends this same object in exactly the same way — just as a single man may have a hundred sons: this one man performs the role of father toward one son in exactly the way he performs it toward every other son, and just as one son performs the role of son toward his father, every other son performs it toward that same father in exactly the same way. Here, eye-consciousness and its associated dharmas are fixed with respect to form as their object, and so on, up through mental consciousness and its associated dharmas being fixed with respect to all dharmas as their object. This form, in serving as object for eye-consciousness and its associated dharmas, is never, at any time, not its object — and so on, up through this dharma, in serving as object for mental consciousness and its associated dharmas, being never, at any time, not its object — since every kind of mind and mental factor is each able to apprehend its own object. It is on this account that there is no case of one collection of mind having experienced something and a different collection of mind remembering it. One asks: how, specifically, are mind and mental factors fixed with respect to their object — fixed as to the sense-field, fixed as to the particular color, or fixed as to the particular moment? Here, some say:

fixed only as to the sense-field — why is this? Lest countless collections of mind and mental factors abide within a dharma that never arises at all. One asks: how, specifically, are they fixed as to the sense-field? The answer: eye-consciousness and its associated dharmas are fixed with respect to the form field, and so on, up through body-consciousness and its associated dharmas being fixed with respect to the tangible field.

Mental consciousness and its associated dharmas are fixed with respect to the dharma field and the rest. Just as a single instance of eye-consciousness, upon encountering a coming-together with the color blue presently before it, arises taking blue as its object, and upon encountering a coming-together with the color yellow and the like, arises taking yellow and the like as its object — so too, the other consciousnesses, with respect to their own objects, are fixed only as to the sense-field.

This position ought not to be maintained — why is this? For if it were so, a single act of cognition would possess multiple capacities of discernment, and it is unreasonable that a single dharma should have multiple substances. Moreover, how is the statement of the Vijñānakāya to be reconciled with this? As it states: "past eye-consciousness takes only past form as its object, never future or present form." There are others who, wishing to avoid this very fault, say instead that mind and mental factors are fixed with respect to their object as to the sense-field, and also fixed as to the particular color, but not fixed as to the particular moment — why is this? Lest countless collections of mind and mental factors abide within a dharma that never arises at all. One asks: how, specifically, are they also fixed as to the particular color? The answer: mind and mental factors that take blue and the like as their object each differ in their own substance — upon encountering a coming-together with the color blue presently before them, the mind and mental factors that take blue as object arise; upon encountering a coming-together with yellow and the like, the mind and mental factors that take yellow and the like as object arise. This position, too, ought not to be maintained — why is this? Because blue itself is of many kinds — namely, blue roots, blue stems, blue branches, blue leaves, blue flowers, and blue fruit — and yellow and the rest are likewise so. It would then follow that the cognition taking the root and the like as object is identical to the cognition taking the stem and the like as object — and if that were so, a single act of cognition would again possess multiple capacities of discernment, and a single dharma would again have multiple substances, which is unreasonable, and this again contradicts the statement of the Vijñānakāya, exactly as explained above. On the position stated first, mind and mental factors are fixed with respect to three matters. One asks: if that is so, then countless collections of mind and mental factors ought to abide within a dharma that never arises at all. The answer: what fault does this actually involve? Is the future time-period, then, too narrow to have room for them? Yet these dharmas already possess, from the very outset, their own fixed place of abiding — and so this objection ought not to be raised. One asks: with respect to mind and mental factors,

just as they are fixed with respect to their object, are they likewise fixed with respect to their support? Suppose either — what fault follows? If they are indeed fixed with respect to their support as well, why does this passage speak only of their being fixed with respect to their object, and not mention their being fixed with respect to their support? And how, then, is the statement of the Prakaraṇapāda to be reconciled with this? As it states: what are the co-existent dharmas? The answer: all contaminated dharmas, together with the uncontaminated dharmas that arise together with contaminated dharmas. If, on the other hand, they are not fixed with respect to their support, why should they be fixed with respect to their object but not with respect to their support? The answer: they are indeed fixed with respect to their support as well. Yet mind and mental factors,

within the future time-period, remain remote from their support; in the present, they are co-existent with it; and in the past, they are again remote from it. Some say: within the future time-period, they remain remote from their support, while in the present and the past, they are co-existent with it. Some say: across all three time-periods, they are co-existent with their support. One asks: if that is so, why does this present passage not mention it? The answer: this passage is concerned only with explaining how one remembers what was previously done, and what is remembered is the object, not the support — hence the support is not mentioned. One asks: how, then, is the statement of the Prakaraṇapāda to be reconciled with this? The answer: that passage ought properly to have read: "what are the co-existent dharmas? The answer: all conditioned dharmas" — and that it does not read this way is because that passage means to display the noble path's own useful function, and does not speak of what has no such function, and so there is no real contradiction. Some say: that passage means to display that the noble path is both attained in dependence on another's power and arises in dependence on another's power, and so it speaks only of what arises together with contaminated dharmas. One asks: if mind and mental factors are fixed both with respect to their object and with respect to their support, at which stage do they actually take hold of their object — at the stage of arising, or at the stage of ceasing? Suppose either — what fault follows? If at the stage of arising, then, since the stage of arising belongs to the future, how could a future dharma possibly perform any actual function at all?

And if at the stage of ceasing, then, since at the stage of ceasing dharmas are already in decline, dispersing and disintegrating, how could this stage possibly take hold of an object? The answer: it should be said that it is indeed at the stage of ceasing.

One asks: how, then, can a dharma already in decline, dispersing and disintegrating, still take hold of an object? The answer: because conditioned dharmas are, by nature, feeble, and do not rely upon themselves alone,

but operate in dependence on something else; because they have no independent function of their own; and because they are not self-governing. Wherever the coming-together of support and object actually occurs, it is precisely at that stage that a dharma is able to take hold of its object — and this coming-together occurs only at the stage of ceasing. Some say: the stage of arising belongs to the future, and since future dharmas have no actual function at all, they cannot take hold of an object; the stage of ceasing belongs to the present, and since present dharmas do possess an actual function, they are able to take hold of an object. If a dharma did not take hold of its object at the stage of ceasing, then mind and mental factors could never, under any circumstance, take hold of any object at all — lest such a fault follow, it is therefore at the stage of ceasing that a dharma is able to take hold of its object.

Further, when the receiving-mind that serves as the cause is forceful, memory does not fade. It should be understood that here, the collection of mind arising earlier is expressed by the word "mind" (意), and the collection of mind arising later is expressed by the word "mindfulness" (念). This receiving-mind, moreover, is of two kinds: first, the mind that receives an aspect; second, the mind that receives an object. For instance, with respect to heightened forbearance, there are two minds that receive its aspect but do not receive its object — namely, the forbearance of the subsequent-knowledge of suffering, and its associated subsequent-knowledge of suffering; there are two minds that receive its object but do not receive its aspect — namely, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of origination, and its associated dharma-knowledge of origination; there are three minds that receive both its aspect and its object — namely, supreme mundane dharma, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, and its associated dharma-knowledge of suffering; the remaining minds receive neither its aspect nor its object — namely, the remaining forbearances and knowledges and their associated states. Just as with heightened forbearance, so too should the same be explained at length, as appropriate, for every other mind. What received an aspect can be remembered by what receives an object afterward; what received an object can be remembered by what receives an aspect afterward. There are, further, two kinds of receiving-mind: defiled and undefiled — each can be remembered by either of the two kinds afterward. There are, further, three kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, and indeterminate — each can be remembered by any of the three kinds afterward. There are, further, four kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, defiled-but-indeterminate, and undefiled-and-indeterminate — each can be remembered by any of the four kinds afterward. There are, further, four kinds, distinguished by relation to cause, to the immediately-antecedent condition, to the object, and to the dominant condition — each can be remembered by any of the four kinds afterward. There are, further, five kinds — namely, abandoned by seeing suffering, and so on, up through abandoned by cultivation.

Here, what is abandoned by seeing suffering, when experienced, can be remembered by any of the five kinds afterward; what is abandoned by seeing origination or by cultivation is likewise so. What is abandoned by seeing cessation, when experienced, can be remembered by four kinds afterward, excluding what is abandoned by seeing the path. What is abandoned by seeing the path, when experienced, can be remembered by four kinds afterward, excluding what is abandoned by seeing cessation. There are, further, five kinds: wholesome, unwholesome, defiled-but-indeterminate, undefiled-and-indeterminate arising from correct reasoning, and undefiled-and-indeterminate arising from incorrect reasoning. Here, some say: the wholesome kind, when experienced, can be remembered by two kinds afterward — namely, the wholesome kind itself and the undefiled-and-indeterminate kind arising from correct reasoning; the undefiled-and-indeterminate kind arising from correct reasoning, when experienced, is likewise so. The unwholesome kind, when experienced, can be remembered by three kinds afterward — namely, the unwholesome kind, the defiled-but-indeterminate kind,

and the undefiled-and-indeterminate kind arising from incorrect reasoning; the defiled-but-indeterminate kind, when experienced, is likewise so, as is the undefiled-and-indeterminate kind arising from incorrect reasoning. On the position stated here, each one, when experienced, can be remembered by all five kinds afterward. There are, further, six kinds: eye-consciousness, and so on, up through mental consciousness — what the five sense-consciousnesses experience can be remembered by mental consciousness, and what mental consciousness experiences can be remembered by any of the six. There are, further, twelve kinds: the desire realm has four — wholesome, unwholesome, defiled-but-indeterminate, and undefiled-and-indeterminate; the form realm has three — the same four just named, minus the unwholesome; the formless realm likewise has three; the uncontaminated has two — the trainee's and the one beyond training's. What the desire realm's wholesome kind experiences can be remembered by all twelve kinds afterward, and the unwholesome kind and the form realm's wholesome kind are likewise so. What the desire realm's defiled-but-indeterminate kind experiences can be remembered by eight kinds afterward, excluding the form realm's defiled-but-indeterminate kind and the formless realm's three kinds; the desire realm's undefiled-and-indeterminate kind is likewise so. What the form realm's defiled-but-indeterminate kind experiences can be remembered by ten kinds afterward, excluding the desire realm's two indeterminate kinds; the formless realm's wholesome kind is likewise so. What the form realm's undefiled-and-indeterminate kind experiences can be remembered by ten kinds afterward, excluding the formless realm's two indeterminate kinds. What the formless realm's defiled-but-indeterminate kind experiences can be remembered by nine kinds afterward, excluding the desire realm's two indeterminate kinds and the form realm's undefiled-and-indeterminate kind; the formless realm's undefiled-and-indeterminate kind is likewise so. What the trainee's kind experiences can be remembered by eleven kinds afterward, excluding the desire realm's defiled-but-indeterminate kind. What the one-beyond-training's kind experiences, if he is prone to retrogression, follows the same rule as the trainee's; if he is not prone to retrogression, it can be remembered by seven kinds afterward, excluding the trainee's kind and the four defiled kinds. It is by the force of the earlier receiving-mind serving as a strong cause that a subsequent moment of mindfulness is drawn forth with respect to that same object, and memory does not fade — "not fading" meaning that the mind is not deranged and not overwhelmed by pain. The Venerable Vasumitra explained: memory of what was previously done occurs through three causes and conditions — first, properly grasping the prior mark; second, the continuous, actual functioning of homogeneous succession; third, not losing mindfulness. It is on this account that, although there is no person at all, and no principle whereby an earlier mind passes on to a later mind, one is nonetheless able to remember what was previously done.

One asks: why do sentient beings forget, and then remember again? The answer: when a sentient being's own homogeneous succession continues to operate, it is able to give rise, with respect to the dharma in question, to a cognition and vision of its connectedness. Here, "forgetting" means the loss of mindfulness, not the absence of mindfulness altogether — why is this? Because there is no dharma whatsoever that could be called "without mindfulness." "Homogeneity" is of three kinds: homogeneity of preparatory effort, homogeneity of object, and homogeneity of accompanying circumstance. Homogeneity of preparatory effort is exemplified by one who had previously recited the Sūtra Basket, then forgot it in the interim, and afterward, by performing the very same preparatory practice as before, regained the memory of it — and the same holds for one who had previously recited the Vinaya or Abhidharma Basket. In just the same way, one who had previously taken up the contemplation of impurity, then forgot it in the interim, could afterward, by performing the very same preparatory practice as before, regain the memory of it — and the same holds for one who had previously taken up mindfulness of breathing or the preparatory practice on the elements. It is related that there was once a brahmin's son who had recited and mastered the four Vedic texts, but then forgot them in the interim; he tried again and again to recite them from memory, exhausting every method, yet could not recover his fluency — and so he went to his teacher and related the whole matter to him.

The teacher then asked him: "when you first recited these texts, what preparatory practice did you use?" He replied: "originally, I would count on a knotted cord with my hand while reciting aloud." The teacher said: "you should then perform that very same preparatory practice again." Following his teacher's instruction, he was able to remember everything in full. Homogeneity of object is exemplified by one who had previously seen such-and-such a garden, spring, pool, mountain valley, or walking-path, and then forgot it in the interim, but, upon later seeing a similar garden and the like, remembered everything in full. Homogeneity of accompanying circumstance is exemplified by one who, upon obtaining food, clothing, bedding, lodging, a Dharma-teacher, or the like resembling what he had before, is thereby able to remember what he had previously experienced.

It is related that there was once a monk who had recited and mastered the four Āgamas, but then forgot them in the interim; he tried again and again to recite them from memory, exhausting every method, yet could not recover his fluency — and so he went to the Venerable Ānanda and asked him about the matter. The Venerable One answered him: "you should now go and anoint your body with oil, bathe in a heated room, and seek out clothing, food, bedding, lodging, a Dharma-teacher, and the like resembling what you had before." The monk followed this instruction and recovered his fluency in full. In this way, when homogeneous succession continues to operate, it is able to give rise, with respect to the dharma in question, to a cognition and vision of its connectedness. One asks: what connectedness does it give rise to? The answer: the three kinds of homogeneity differ in this respect. One recitation of this passage states that it gives rise, with respect to the dharma, to a cognition and vision of continuous succession — this means giving rise to a cognition and vision of a long-flowing, continuous stream. A further recitation states that it gives rise to a cognition and vision of sequence — this means giving rise to a cognition and vision of an orderly, item-by-item arrangement.

A further recitation states that it gives rise to a cognition and vision of being unobstructed — this means giving rise to a cognition and vision free of stagnation, free of attachment, and free of interruption. A further recitation states that it gives rise to a cognition and vision of being unhindered — this means giving rise to a cognition and vision that has separated from hindrance, subdued its object of antidote, and overcome its opposing adversary. Further, when the receiving-mind that serves as the cause is forceful, memory does not fade. It should be understood that here, the collection of mind arising earlier is expressed by the word "mind," and the collection of mind arising later is expressed by the word "mindfulness," exactly as explained above. It is by the force of the earlier receiving-mind serving as a strong cause that a subsequent moment of mindfulness is drawn forth with respect to that same object — and although it may be forgotten in the interim, it is afterward remembered once more. "Not fading" is to be understood exactly as explained above.

One asks: why do sentient beings remember, and then forget again? The answer: when a sentient being's own heterogeneous succession continues to operate, it fails to give rise, with respect to the dharma in question, to a cognition and vision of its connectedness. Here, "forgetting" means the loss of mindfulness, to be explained at length exactly as before. "Heterogeneity" is of three kinds: heterogeneity of preparatory effort, heterogeneity of object, and heterogeneity of accompanying circumstance. Heterogeneity of preparatory effort is exemplified by one who had previously recited the Sūtra Basket, then forgot it in the interim, and, setting it aside, took up reciting the Vinaya or Abhidharma Basket instead — afterward, he is unable to remember any of it; and the same holds for one who had previously recited the Vinaya or Abhidharma Basket. In just the same way, one who had previously taken up the contemplation of impurity, then forgot it in the interim, and, setting it aside, took up mindfulness of breathing or the preparatory practice on the elements instead — afterward, he is unable to remember any of it; and the same holds for one who had previously taken up mindfulness of breathing or the preparatory practice on the elements. Heterogeneity of object is exemplified by one who had previously seen such-and-such a garden, spring, pool, mountain valley, or walking-path, and then forgot it in the interim, but never again saw anything resembling it — with respect to what he had previously experienced, he is then unable to remember it at all. Heterogeneity of accompanying circumstance is exemplified by one who fails to obtain food, clothing, and the like resembling what he had before — with respect to what he had previously experienced, he is then unable to remember it at all. In this way, when heterogeneous succession continues to operate, it fails to give rise, with respect to the dharma in question, to a cognition and vision of its connectedness. One asks: what connectedness does it fail to give rise to? The answer: the very three kinds of homogeneity — and here, too, there are four variant recitations, the reverse of those given before, to be explained at length in just the same way. Further, when the receiving-mind that serves as the cause is weak, memory then fades. It should be understood that here, the collection of mind arising earlier is expressed by the word "mind," and the collection of mind arising later is expressed by the word "mindfulness," exactly as explained above. It is because the earlier receiving-mind, serving as a weak cause, fails to draw forth a subsequent moment of mindfulness with respect to that same object that, although it may be remembered in the interim, it is afterward forgotten once more. "Forgetting" here means that the mind is deranged, or overwhelmed by painful feeling. The Venerable Vasumitra explained: mindfulness fades away through three causes and conditions —

first, failing to properly grasp the prior mark; second, the continuous, actual functioning of heterogeneous succession; third, the loss of mindfulness itself. He further said: mindfulness fades away through eight causes and conditions — first, at the time of birth, overwhelmed by the pain of birth, mindfulness fades; second, at the time of death, overwhelmed by the pain of death; third, on account of excessive extraneous speech; fourth, on account of dull faculties relying on some other kind of knowledge; fifth, on account of being reborn in an undesirable destiny and overwhelmed by painful feeling; sixth, on account of the five sense faculties, restlessly scattering after their objects without cease, given over to much heedlessness; seventh, on account of a heavy hindrance of affliction repeatedly manifesting;

eighth, on account of not repeatedly cultivating concentration, so that the mind remains scattered and distracted — for these reasons, mindfulness fades away.

One asks: with respect to what kind of knowledge experienced does mindfulness later fade — that born of learning, of reflection, of cultivation, or born by birth and the like? Some say: mindfulness fades with respect to what was experienced by knowledge born of learning, reflection, or birth and the like, but not with respect to what was experienced by knowledge born of cultivation, since the latter is sustained by the power of concentration and does not fade. Some say: mindfulness can fade even with respect to what was experienced by knowledge born of cultivation as well, on account of bodily weakness — that is, one who has attained concentration but whose body is weak will likewise have a weakened mind, and so what he has experienced can fade from memory as well. One asks: in which realm does forgetting occur? The answer: in the desire realm, not in the form or formless realms; and it occurs across all five destinies. Some say: hell has no forgetting at all, since its beings are in a state of constant forgetting. One asks: what kind of person is subject to forgetting? The answer: both ordinary beings and noble ones are subject to it — among the noble ones, stream-enterers, once-returners, non-returners, arhats, and pratyekabuddhas are all subject to it, with the sole exception of the World-Honored One, since the Buddha alone has accomplished the dharma of never forgetting. How is this known? The answer: because the discourses themselves are the authoritative measure — as it is said: "Śāriputra, even if the assembly of monks were to carry me about upon a bed for a hundred years, it would be impossible for the Tathāgata's supreme wisdom and eloquence to suffer even the slightest decline" — and from this it is known that the Buddha possesses the dharma of never forgetting.

As the Elephant Footprint Simile Discourse states, Śāriputra said: "if the internal mental field is not impaired, the external dharma field is presently before it, and the attention capable of generating it correctly arises, then, at that time, mental consciousness arises." One asks: how, specifically, is the mental faculty impaired? The answer: it is impaired in three ways — first, temporary impairment;

second, impairment for the whole class of a shared existence; third, ultimate impairment. Temporary impairment means: immediately following a wholesome mind, an unwholesome or indeterminate mind becomes present — at that time, the wholesome mind is said to be temporarily impaired; and so on, up through, immediately following an indeterminate mind, a wholesome or unwholesome mind becoming present — at that time, the indeterminate mind is said to be temporarily impaired. In just the same way, immediately following a desire-realm mind, an unbound form-realm mind becomes present — at that time, the desire-realm mind is said to be temporarily impaired; and so on, up through, immediately following an unbound mind, a mind of any of the three realms becoming present — at that time, the unbound mind is said to be temporarily impaired. And if one enters the attainment of non-perception or the attainment of cessation, at that time every kind of mind is said to be temporarily impaired. Impairment for the whole class of a shared existence means: for one who has cut off his own wholesome roots, his wholesome mind undergoes impairment for the whole class of that existence; for an ordinary being who has become free of the desire realm's defilement, his unwholesome mind undergoes impairment for the whole class of that existence — and so on for similar cases. Ultimate impairment means: once the knowledge of suffering has arisen but the knowledge of origination has not yet arisen, the mind abandoned by seeing suffering across the three realms undergoes ultimate impairment; and so on, up through, once the knowledge of cessation has arisen but the knowledge of the path has not yet arisen, the mind abandoned by seeing suffering, origination, and cessation across the three realms undergoing ultimate impairment. For a stream-enterer, the mind abandoned by seeing across the three realms undergoes ultimate impairment. For a once-returner not prone to retrogression, the mind abandoned by seeing across the three realms, together with the mind of the six grades abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm, undergoes ultimate impairment. For a non-returner not prone to retrogression, the mind abandoned by seeing across the three realms, together with the defiled mind abandoned by cultivation in the desire realm, undergoes ultimate impairment. For an arhat not prone to retrogression, the defiled mind abandoned by seeing and by cultivation across the three realms undergoes ultimate impairment. For an ordinary being not prone to retrogression who has become free of the desire realm's defilement,

his desire realm's defiled mind undergoes ultimate impairment; and so on, up through one who has become free of the sphere of nothingness's own defilement, whose defiled mind across all eight stages undergoes ultimate impairment. The Venerable Vasumitra explained: when the mental faculty encounters a coming-together of conditions, it is not called "impaired"; when it fails to encounter such a coming-together, it is then called "impaired." He further said: when the mental faculty is not obstructed by an opposing cause, it is not called "impaired"; when it is obstructed by an opposing cause, it is then called "impaired."

[The topic reads:] "For what reason does an offering made in sacrifice reach hungry ghosts, and not any other destiny?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to explain the discourses. As the discourses state: the brahmin Śrutavat came before the Buddha and said to him: "Gautama, I have a relative who has passed away, and I wish to offer him food — will he receive this food of mine?" The World-Honored One told him: "this matter is not fixed either way — why is this? Sentient beings are distinguished into five destinies. If your relative has been reborn in hell, he subsists by eating the food of hell, and cannot receive your food; the same holds if he has been reborn as an animal, a god, or a human being. But if your relative has been reborn among the hungry ghosts, then he is indeed able to receive the food and drink you offer." The brahmin said: "but if my relative has not been reborn among the hungry ghosts, then who will receive what I offer?" The Buddha said to him: "there is no such thing as your having no relative at all among the hungry ghosts" — and so on, as stated at length. Although that discourse speaks in this way, it does not explain why an offering made in sacrifice reaches hungry ghosts specifically, and not any other destiny. That discourse is the root text this treatise takes as its basis, and what it left unstated, the treatise now wishes to state — hence this topic is taken up. One asks: why did that brahmin not ask the Buddha why an offering reaches hungry ghosts and not any other destiny? The answer: for one of two reasons — he was either of sharp faculties or of dull faculties. If of sharp faculties, he was able to understand this on his own, without needing to ask the Buddha; if of dull faculties, he was unable even to form the doubt, and so did not ask the Buddha. One asks: why did the World-Honored One not explain to him, on his own initiative, the reason why an offering reaches only hungry ghosts? The answer: likewise for one of two reasons — he was either of sharp or of dull faculties.

If of sharp faculties, he was able to understand this on his own, without the Buddha needing to explain it; if of dull faculties, he was not a fit vessel for the teaching, and so the Buddha did not explain it to him.

For what reason does an offering made in sacrifice reach hungry ghosts, and not any other destiny? The answer: this destiny, by its own inherent nature, obtains such a station, this matter being its own particular portion — and it is for this reason that an offering reaches it, and no other. The intent of the question here is this: does it reach them because their destiny is base and lowly, or because it is exalted and noble? Suppose either — what fault follows? If it reaches them because their destiny is base and lowly, then an offering made in sacrifice ought equally to reach hell-beings and animals; if it reaches them because their destiny is exalted and noble, then an offering ought equally to reach humans and gods. The intent of the answer here is this: it reaches them neither because their destiny is base and lowly, nor because it is exalted and noble, but rather owing to two conditions — first, the destiny's own inherent nature; second, karmic ripening. Of these, the destiny's own inherent nature is displayed first — that is, this hungry-ghost destiny, by its own inherent nature, obtains such a station, this matter being its own particular portion, and it is for this reason that an offering reaches it, and no other.

In order to make this point fully clear, a worldly, visible analogy is introduced: it is just as geese, wild geese, peacocks, parrots, mynah birds, and jīvaṃjīvaka birds, although they can fly freely through the sky at will, do not possess any supernormal power or majesty greater than a human being's — yet their own destiny, by its inherent nature, obtains such a station,

this matter being its own particular portion, enabling them to fly through the sky. The hungry-ghost destiny is exactly the same: it is by this same inherent power of its own nature that an offering made in sacrifice reaches it, and no other destiny.

That is, just as geese, wild geese, peacocks, and the like, within the animal destiny, are able, by the inherent power of their own destiny, to fly through the sky and remain aloft for a long while, whereas a person apart from supernormal powers, spells, or medicinal herbs, wishing to remain suspended in empty space even four fingers' breadth above the ground, would be unable to do so even for a brief moment — yet their own supernormal power and majesty is not superior to a human being's. Hungry ghosts are exactly the same: it is by this same inherent power of their own destiny that an offering made in sacrifice reaches them, and no other. In order to make this same point doubly clear, a second analogy is introduced: it is just as a certain class of hell-beings is able to recall past lives and also to know others' minds; a certain class of animals, and a certain class of hungry ghosts, are able to recall past lives, to know others' minds, and to produce smoke and flame, raise clouds, bring rain, and cause heat and cold — although they are capable of doing these things, their supernormal power and majesty is not greater than a human being's, yet their own destiny, by its inherent nature, obtains such a station, this matter being its own particular portion, enabling them to do these things. The hungry-ghost destiny is exactly the same: it is by this inherent power of its own nature that an offering made in sacrifice reaches it, and no other destiny. As for a certain class of hell-beings being able to recall past lives, as the discourses state: hell-beings think thus: "the great virtuous ascetics and brahmins, observing that desire, in time to come, is able to bring about calamity, and is a source of great terror, have always taught us the method of cutting off desire."

"Although we heard this teaching, we were unable to cut off desire, and it is on account of desire that we now undergo such great suffering and affliction." They further think: "we, in our former lives, committed wicked and evil acts against pure-conduct ascetics and brahmins, and it is on account of this cause that we now undergo this suffering." One asks: at what time are they able to have such thoughts? The answer: at the very time of their birth there, not in the middle or later period — why is this? Because, at the very time of their birth there, they have not yet begun to undergo pain and suffering, and so are able to have such thoughts; but once they undergo pain and suffering, they cannot even remember what they are presently experiencing in this life, let alone what they experienced before. One asks: abiding in what kind of mind are they able to have such thoughts — wholesome, defiled, or neutral and indeterminate? The answer: all three kinds are possible. One asks: what kind of neutral, indeterminate mind? The answer: comportment-mind, not craft-mind, since they have no occasion for craft there, and not ripening-produced mind either, since their own ripening-mind belongs to the five sense-consciousnesses.

One asks: do these thoughts of theirs occur at the level of mental consciousness, or within the five sense-consciousness bodies? The answer: at the level of mental consciousness, not within the five sense-consciousness bodies, since the five sense-consciousnesses admit of no such discrimination. One asks: how many lifetimes can these thoughts of theirs recall? The answer: they can recall only a single lifetime — namely, the one immediately preceding their death and rebirth here. Some say: they can recall many lifetimes, up to five hundred. As for their also knowing others' minds: within hell, there exists a kind of knowledge attained simply by virtue of being born there, by which they are able to know others' minds, although there is no particular event through which this can be demonstrated. One asks: at what time are they able to know others' minds? The answer: only at the very time of their birth there,

why is this? Because, once they undergo pain and suffering, their mind becomes deranged and confused. One asks: abiding in what kind of mind are they able to know others' minds? The answer: abiding in any of the three moral qualities of mind, they are able to know them. One asks: what kind of neutral, indeterminate mind? The answer: comportment-mind, not craft-mind; as for ripening-produced mind, it is as explained above. One asks: does this occur at the level of mental consciousness, or within the five sense-consciousness bodies? The answer: at the level of mental consciousness, not within the five sense-consciousness bodies, since the five sense-consciousness bodies take only material form as their object. As for a certain class of animals being able to recall past lives, as the discourses relate:

a brahmin said to a dog named Śaṅkha: "if you are truly my father Dhṛtaka, then ascend this seat" — and the dog ascended it. He said further: "if you are truly my father Dhṛtaka, then eat this rice" — and the dog ate it. He said further still: "if you are truly my father Dhṛtaka, then show me where you buried your treasure when you died" — and the dog showed him. One asks: at what time can such an animal recall a past life? The answer: at the beginning, middle, and end of its life alike, it is able to recall it. One asks: abiding in what kind of mind does it remember? The answer: abiding in any of the three moral qualities of mind. One asks: what kind of neutral, indeterminate mind? The answer: comportment-mind, craft-mind, and ripening-produced mind — all three are capable of remembering. One asks: in which consciousness does this occur? The answer: at the level of mental consciousness, not within the five sense-consciousness bodies. One asks: how many lifetimes can it recall? Some say: it can recall only a single lifetime — namely, the one immediately preceding its death and rebirth here. Some say: it can recall many lifetimes, up to five hundred. How is this known? It is related that there was once a woman who left her child in one place and went off on some errand; presently, a wolf came and carried her child away. A crowd of people pursued the wolf and said to it:

"for what reason are you carrying off another's child?" The wolf replied: "this woman, across five hundred lifetimes, has always killed my own children, and I, in turn, across those same five hundred lifetimes, have always killed hers. If she is truly able to relinquish this old grudge and enmity, I too will relinquish it." The woman said: "I have already relinquished it." But the wolf, observing that although her mouth said she had relinquished it, her heart had not, thereupon killed her child and departed. As for animals also knowing others' minds: the animal destiny is indeed capable of knowing others' minds, exactly as in this very episode of the wolf knowing the woman's mind. One asks: at what time is it able to know this? The answer: at all three time-periods alike, it is able to know it. One asks: abiding in what kind of mind does it know? The answer: abiding in any of the three moral qualities of mind. One asks: what kind of neutral, indeterminate mind? The answer: comportment-mind, craft-mind, and ripening-produced mind — all three are capable of knowing it. One asks: in which consciousness does this occur? The answer: at the level of mental consciousness, not within the five sense-consciousnesses. As for a certain class of hungry ghosts being able to recall past lives, as a verse states:

"In my past life, I amassed wealth and possessions, by righteous means or by unrighteous means alike; now another enjoys that wealth and happiness, while I alone endure poverty and suffering." One asks: at what time is it able to recall this? The answer: at all three time-periods alike. One asks: abiding in what kind of mind does it remember? The answer: abiding in any of the three moral qualities of mind. One asks: what kind of neutral, indeterminate mind? The answer: the same three kinds as explained above. One asks: in which consciousness does this occur? The answer: at the level of mental consciousness, not within the five sense-consciousness bodies. One asks: how many lifetimes can it recall? The answer: up to five hundred. How is this known? It is related that there was once a woman seized by a hungry ghost, who grew weak and was on the verge of death. A spell-master said to the ghost: "why are you now tormenting this woman?" The ghost replied: "this woman, across five hundred lifetimes, has always taken my life, and I, in turn, across those same five hundred lifetimes, have always taken hers. If she is truly able to relinquish this old grudge and enmity, I too will relinquish it."

The woman said: "I have already relinquished it." But the ghost, observing that although her mouth said she had relinquished it, her heart had not, thereupon took her life and departed. As for hungry ghosts also knowing others' minds: this is exactly the same as this very episode of the ghost knowing the woman's mind. One asks: at what time is it able to know this? The answer: at all three time-periods alike. One asks: abiding in what kind of mind does it know?

The answer: abiding in any of the three moral qualities of mind. One asks: what kind of neutral, indeterminate mind? The answer: the same three kinds as explained above. One asks: in which consciousness does this occur? The answer: at the level of mental consciousness, not within the five sense-consciousnesses. As for producing smoke and flame, raising clouds, bringing rain, and causing heat and cold: this ability belongs only to the animal destiny, not to any other destiny, and, within the animal destiny, only to nāgas, not to any other class of animal. One asks: if that is so, how is the discourses' own statement to be reconciled with this — namely, that "there are gods who can raise clouds, gods who can bring down rain, gods who can cause heat and cold, and gods who can raise wind and thunder"? The answer: it should be understood that this discourse refers to nāgas by the term "gods," just as other discourses do —

as when the Buddha said to Ānanda: "look and see whether the god is raining or not" — this, too, refers to a nāga by the word "god." One asks: as for producing smoke and flame and the like,

is this done by many nāgas together, or can a single nāga do it alone? The answer: a single nāga alone is indeed capable of it. One asks: if that is so, why do the discourses speak as they do — namely, "there are gods who can raise clouds, gods who can bring down rain" — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: this is spoken according to each one's own particular preference — that is, some nāgas delight only in raising clouds, while others delight only in bringing down rain, and so on for the rest. Here, the phenomena of smoke, flame, cloud, and rain are drawn forth by the nāga's own preparatory effort, and so are the proximate result of that nāga's own human-like effort alone; whereas the water that flows out from the nāga's own palace is not drawn forth by any such preparatory effort, and so is the shared, dominant result belonging to all sentient beings together. Just as hell-beings and the like, by the inherent power of their own destiny, are capable of the things described above, yet possess no supernormal power or majesty greater than a human being's, hungry ghosts are exactly the same: it is by the inherent power of their own destiny that an offering made in sacrifice reaches them, and no other destiny. There are yet others who say: all five destinies alike possess their own inherent, superior capacities — that is, in the hell destiny, ripening-form and the like, once cut off, can resume again; the other destinies lack this. In the animal destiny, there are those capable of flying through the sky and raising clouds and rain; in the hungry-ghost destiny, an offering made in sacrifice reaches them;

in the human destiny, one is capable of undertaking wholesome or unwholesome precepts, cultivating a superior grade of wholesome conduct, and possesses courage, strong memory, and profound wisdom; in the divine destiny, the desire-realm gods

obtain whatever they require the very instant they think of it, while the form and formless realm gods possess a superior kind of rebirth and a superior kind of concentration. There are yet others who say: every region of the world, too, possesses its own inherent, superior particularities — that is, in the country of China, even servants and slaves are all clothed in fine silk, something the nobility of other regions cannot obtain; in India and similar countries, even the poor and lowly are all clothed in fine cotton, something the nobility of other regions cannot obtain either; in the country of Kashmir, during the autumn season, garlands of saffron flowers are hung around the necks of oxen, something the finest people of other regions cannot obtain; in the northern regions, even the poor drink grape wine, something the wealthy of other regions cannot obtain either. Just as every region possesses its own inherent, superior particularities, hungry ghosts are exactly the same: an offering made in sacrifice reaches them. Some say: the various destinies differ in their inherent natures in yet another way — that is, among the four non-human destinies, each and every one possesses a kind of knowledge attained simply by virtue of being born there; only the human destiny lacks this, while the three evil destinies all possess it, exactly as explained at length above.

The divine destiny, too, has those capable of recalling past lives, as a verse states: "I have donated the Jeta Grove, receiving thereby the Great Dharma King's dwelling and the noble sangha's own use of it — hence my heart rejoices." Such gods also know others' minds, though there is no particular event through which this can be demonstrated regarding when they recall or know it — the same should be explained at length, as appropriate, exactly as with animals and hungry ghosts. One asks: this knowledge attained by virtue of birth-place — how many destinies does it allow one to recall and know? Some say: each destiny can recall and know only itself. Some say: hell-beings can recall and know only hell; animals can recall and know two destinies; hungry ghosts can recall and know three destinies; gods can recall and know all five destinies. One asks: if animals cannot know the gods, how is the statement of the Prajñaptiśāstra to be reconciled with this — namely, that "the nāga-king Suniṣpanna and the like know the thoughts in Śakra's mind" — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: this is a matter of inferential knowledge, not direct knowledge, and so no real contradiction follows. On the position stated here, however, this matter is not fixed either way, since the wolf and the ghost in the stories above were indeed shown to recall and know human minds. One asks: why does the human destiny lack this kind of knowledge? The answer: because it is neither a fit field nor a fit vessel for it — and so on, as stated at length. Further, the human destiny possesses the knowledge of physiognomy, the knowledge of interpreting speech and signs, the knowledge of recollection arising from one's own inherent nature, the knowledge of excellent aspiration, and the like, and these conceal it instead. Just as this knowledge attained by virtue of birth-place is possessed by every other destiny but lacking in the human destiny alone, so too, in just this way, an offering made in sacrifice reaches only the hungry-ghost destiny, and no other. This has now displayed how, by the inherent power of destiny, an offering made in sacrifice reaches hungry ghosts, and no other; it should now be displayed how this occurs by karmic ripening as well. Further, there are people who, over a long span of time, give rise to a longing and fond wish of this kind: "I shall take a wife; I shall arrange a wife for my son; I shall arrange a wife for my grandson, so that sons and grandsons may be born in unbroken succession — and once my own life has ended, should I be reborn among the hungry ghosts, they, remembering me, will surely make offerings to me." Because of this long-held longing and fond wish, an offering made in sacrifice does indeed reach him, and no other destiny — that is, because he has given rise to this very longing and fond wish, it draws forth karma that leads to his rebirth precisely among the hungry ghosts, and it is for this reason that an offering made in sacrifice reaches him, and no other. Just as, in villages, towns, and cities, there are people who, whether for the sake of ensuring their descendants never die out, or for the sake of making their wealth and property ever more abundant, or for the sake of spreading their reputation for riches far and long, amass wealth, treasure, cattle, sheep, and the like by righteous or unrighteous means, and are unwilling to give even to their own relatives, let alone to give to strangers — such a person, bound and fettered by the mind of miserliness and greed, relinquishes his human class of existence and is reborn among the hungry ghosts, dwelling in the unclean places of his own former house — its drains, its latrines, and the like. His relatives, longing for him, are stricken with grief,

and think: "he amassed such wealth and property, yet never enjoyed it himself, nor gave it to others — where, then, has he now been reborn?" And so they gather their relatives together

and invite various ascetics and brahmins, holding a great offering ceremony, wishing thereby to provide for him, so that he might leave suffering behind and receive happiness. At that time, the hungry ghost, dwelling in his own abode, perceives this very event, gives rise to the thought that these are indeed his own relatives, and to the thought that this wealth belongs to him, and immediately rejoices — giving rise, with respect to this field of merit, to a mind of faith and reverence, and giving rise, with respect to what is being done, to a mind of sympathetic joy — and is thereby freed from his heavy suffering. It is owing to this cause and condition that an offering made in sacrifice reaches him. One asks: if that is so, why is this not simply a case of "another performs the karma, yet a different one receives its effect"? The answer: it is not so — for, at that very time, by giving rise to a mind of reverence, faith, and sympathetic joy, and by perceiving the merit of giving and the fault of miserliness and greed, he thereby increases his own volition associated with relinquishment,

which becomes karma ripening in this very life, so that he obtains its effect within this same life — and so no fault of "another performs the karma, yet a different one receives its effect" follows. The Venerable Vasumitra explained: the effect now received is drawn forth by his own prior karma; that prior karma had been obstructed, and it is by his present karma that this obstruction is removed — hence, again, no fault of "another performs the karma, yet a different one receives its effect" follows. That is, this hungry ghost had already, in a former life, created karma for the acquisition of food and drink; it was only owing to the obstructing, concealing power of miserliness and greed within his mind that he gave rise to inverted perception and views with respect to food and drink, and so was unable to actually make use of it. Now, hungry ghosts are of two kinds: first, those who crave purity; second, those who crave impurity. Those who crave purity, owing to their own miserliness and greed, see a river as not a river at all, see water as blood, and see whatever food and drink there is as impure; those who crave impurity see a river as utterly dried up, see water as nonexistent, and see a vessel full of food and drink as entirely empty. But if his relatives hold an offering ceremony on his behalf, he then gives rise to a mind of faith, reverence, and sympathetic joy, perceiving the merit of giving and the fault of miserliness and greed, and, his own volition associated with relinquishment thereby increasing, his inverted perception and views are removed: the one who craves purity now sees the river as a river, sees the water as clear and pure, and sees all food and drink as pure and excellent; the one who craves impurity now sees the river as brimming over, sees the water as water, and sees the vessel of food and drink as entirely full. It is on this account that an offering made in sacrifice on his relatives' part reaches him. There are those who say instead: that hungry ghost, too, had already created, in a former life, karma for the acquisition of food and drink, but, owing to the concealing power of miserliness and greed, he now acquires, as its ripened result, a feeble and cowardly body and mind; and every place where food and drink is to be found is certain to be guarded by some powerful spirit or demon, so that, being feeble and cowardly, he is unable even to approach it — and even should he manage to approach it, he would not dare to eat it. But if his relatives hold an offering ceremony on his behalf — and so on, as stated at length, up through his own volition associated with relinquishment increasing — this causes his body and mind to grow strong and vigorous once more,

and it is by this that he is now able to reach places where food and drink is to be found, and to eat it. It is owing to this cause and condition that an offering made in sacrifice reaches him — and so, again, no fault of "another performs the karma, yet a different one receives its effect" follows. The Great Virtuous One explained: although that hungry ghost had already created, in a former life, karma for the acquisition of food and drink, it was, being too feeble and weak, not yet able to yield its effect;

but if his relatives hold an offering ceremony on his behalf — and so on, as stated at length, up through his own volition associated with relinquishment increasing — then his own previously created karma is now able to yield its effect, and it is for this reason that an offering made by his relatives in sacrifice reaches him — and so, again, no fault of "another performs the karma, yet a different one receives its effect" follows. One asks: once this volition associated with relinquishment has increased, does it bring about merely the acquisition of material provisions, or does it also bring about a superior body and mind? The answer: both are obtained together. As for the superior body and mind:

he relinquishes his former inferior form, scent, taste, and touch, and acquires a superior form, scent, taste, and touch; he relinquishes his lack of majesty, and acquires majesty. As for the material provisions: this means acquiring food, drink, clothing, gardens, groves, and dwellings, and the like. One asks: if a relative has been reborn in some other destiny, and merit-making karma is performed on his behalf, does he too obtain its benefit? The answer: if he, too, is able to give rise to a mind of faith, reverence, and sympathetic joy, causing his own volition associated with relinquishment to increase, then he too obtains this merit. One asks: if that is so, why does this passage not mention it? The answer: it ought to be mentioned but is not, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Some say: this passage speaks with reference to the greater portion of cases, since this occurs mostly among hungry ghosts, and not so among the other destinies. Some say: this occurs mostly among hungry ghosts because those who create this particular kind of karma are mostly reborn precisely among the hungry ghosts. Some say: it is because the hungry-ghost destiny is always yearning after human beings. Some say: it is because the hungry-ghost destiny, driven by hunger and thirst, always harbors hope everywhere it turns — and it is for this reason that the treatise singles it out for treatment. The meaning of the five destinies ought properly to be discussed here in full, as will be explained at length in the Meditative Absorption Chapter.