Gold Emerging From a Mountain Peak

[The topic reads:] "Should one say that form is seen with one eye, or with two eyes?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest its own correct meaning. That is, some maintain that eye-consciousness itself sees form — as the Venerable Dharmatrāta holds; others maintain that the wisdom associated with eye-consciousness sees form — as the Venerable Ghoṣa holds; others maintain that it is the coming-together of conditions that sees form — as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold; others maintain that form is seen with a single eye — as the Vātsīputrīyas hold. In order to refute these various rival schools' distinct positions and manifest its own school's own position — that form is seen with two eyes — the treatise is composed. Why is this? Because if eye-consciousness itself saw form, consciousness would then have to possess the very characteristic of seeing, yet consciousness has no such characteristic, and so this is unreasonable. If the wisdom associated with eye-consciousness saw form, then the wisdom associated with ear-consciousness ought equally to hear sound, yet wisdom has no characteristic of hearing, and so this too is unreasonable. If the mere coming-together of conditions saw form, one ought then to see form at all times, since there is never a moment without such a coming-together, and so this too is unreasonable. And if form were seen with a single eye rather than with two, then the various parts of the body ought likewise to be unable to register touch-sensation simultaneously — yet, just as the body faculty's two arms, though far apart from one another, are still able to register touch-sensation simultaneously, giving rise to a single body-consciousness, so too the two eyes, though far apart from one another, are equally able, without contradiction, to see form simultaneously, giving rise to a single eye-consciousness. One asks: if the eye sees form, why is it that the other consciousnesses, arising simultaneously, do not see it as well? And why, at a time when consciousness is altogether absent, should form not still be seen? The answer: the eye is of two kinds — first, joined with consciousness; second, empty of consciousness. What is joined with consciousness is able to see; what is empty of consciousness is not — and so no fault follows. Further, the reason the treatise takes up this topic is in order to bring certainty to those in doubt. That is, sentient beings' two eyes may be separated by as little as half a sesame seed's width, or a whole sesame seed's width and a half, or a barley grain's width and a half, a finger's width and a half, a span's width and a half, a bow's-length and a half, a krośa's-length and a half, or a full yojana, or even, in certain cases, up to a hundred yojanas — just as, within the great ocean, there exist enormous beings whose bodies may measure a hundred yojanas in length, or even, in the case of the asura-king Rāhu, as much as two thousand one hundred yojanas; and just as, in the divine destiny, a body in the Akaniṣṭha heaven may measure sixteen thousand yojanas. For beings such as these, whose two eyes are separated by so vast a distance, a doubt may arise: how, exactly, does eye-consciousness operate in dependence on them? Do two instances of eye-consciousness arise simultaneously, each depending on one eye separately? Or does a single instance of eye-consciousness, having arisen in dependence on one eye, then go on to operate in dependence on the second eye as well? Or does a single instance of eye-consciousness split into two halves, each arising separately at the location of each eye? Or does a single instance of eye-consciousness, like some single object laid crosswise, extend across both eyes at once? If two instances of eye-consciousness arose simultaneously, each depending on one eye separately, then a single sentient being would have two minds operating together at once, which is unreasonable. If a single instance of eye-consciousness, having arisen in dependence on one eye, then went on to operate in dependence on the second eye as well, then a single dharma would have to abide across two moments — yet this never happens. If a single instance of eye-consciousness split into two halves, each arising separately at the location of each eye, then a single dharma's own substance would have to possess two parts — yet the substance of every dharma is without any finer division at all. And if a single instance of eye-consciousness, like some single object laid crosswise, extended across both eyes at once, then a single consciousness would have to be both eye-consciousness and body-consciousness at once, since the space between the two eyes still depends on the body faculty — yet each of the five sense-consciousness bodies has its own distinct support and its own distinct object, and no single consciousness ought to have two supports and two objects at once. In order to bring certainty to this very doubt, the treatise shows that, although there is indeed no case of two instances of eye-consciousness arising together, and so on, up through there being no case of a single consciousness extending crosswise across both eyes, it is nonetheless not the case that a single instance of eye-consciousness fails to arise in dependence on both eyes together — and even should the two eyes be separated by a hundred yojanas, no fault follows. Such a principle is subtle, profound, and exceedingly difficult to fathom, and it is in order to display this very profound principle that the treatise is composed.

Should one say that form is seen with one eye, or with two? The answer: it should be said that form is seen with two eyes. One asks: how, then, can the two eyes, separated by so great a distance, still give rise to a single consciousness that sees form together with both? The answer: because both are alike a support for eye-consciousness. Even if there were a hundred eyes, each separated from the next by a hundred yojanas, they too could still, in dependence on all of them, give rise to a single consciousness, allowing simultaneous seeing — just as a mirror-device might have a hundred small facets, and, when a single face is presented before it, a hundred reflected images appear at once. In just the same way, a single consciousness, arising in dependence on many eyes, allows simultaneous seeing — the meaning is exactly the same. It should be understood that here, "the eye sees form" refutes the three distinct positions of Dharmatrāta and the others, while "two eyes see" refutes the Vātsīputrīyas' position that form is seen with a single eye. Why is this? Because closing one eye gives rise to an impure cognition, while opening both eyes gives rise to a pure cognition — and were closing one eye to give rise to this very same cognition, and opening both eyes to give rise to this very same cognition as well, then one ought not to say that form is seen with two eyes at all. But since closing one eye gives rise to an impure cognition, while opening both eyes gives rise to a pure cognition, it should therefore be said that form is seen with two eyes — this is not a claim established merely by asserting the thesis, and so the question-and-answer format is used to establish it further. As for what displays this reason for a pure cognition arising: it is that, with respect to many objects, seeing is clear and fully manifest; the reverse of this is called an "impure" cognition — and the same holds for what is closed off, covered, impaired, damaged, or destroyed. "Covered" means covered by a hand, by clothing, by a leaf, or by some other object; "impaired" means impaired by dirt, smoke, dust, and the like; "damaged" means damaged by membranes or cataracts; "destroyed" means destroyed by withering and decay, by being gouged out, by falling out on its own, by being eaten by insects, and the like.

Being covered and the like, just like closing one eye, give rise to an impure cognition, while the reverse gives rise to a pure cognition — this is spoken of "purity" and "impurity" with reference to the support, by worldly principle. If spoken with reference to ultimate truth, a wholesome cognition is called "pure," and a defiled one "impure." On this basis, four alternatives should be formulated with respect to the eye: there is a case of a pure eye but an impure cognition — namely, a defiled eye-consciousness arising in dependence on a complete, healthy eye. There is a case of a pure cognition but an impure eye — namely, a wholesome eye-consciousness arising in dependence on an incomplete, damaged eye.

There is a case of both the eye and the cognition being pure — namely, a wholesome eye-consciousness arising in dependence on a complete, healthy eye. There is a case of both the eye and the cognition being impure — namely, a defiled eye-consciousness arising in dependence on an incomplete, damaged eye. And just as the eye sees form, the ear hears sound and the nose smells fragrance in exactly the same way, both alike having two locations just as the eye does. One asks: why is it that the eye, ear, and nose each have two locations, while the tongue and body faculty have only one? The answer: the various material faculties are located where they are in order to adorn the body — if a person had two tongues, this would be a repulsive thing, and the world would surely mock him, saying "how is it that this person has two tongues, like a venomous serpent?" And if a person had two bodies, this too would be repulsive, and the world would mock him, saying "how is it that a single person has two bodies, like two fingers placed side by side?" One asks: why do the locations of the eye, ear, and nose number exactly two — neither more nor fewer? The Venerable Pārśva said: this would give rise to doubt in every case, and so ought not to be pressed — that is, were the number increased or decreased, doubt would equally arise as to why these three should each be limited to that particular number instead; yet each having exactly two locations does not contradict the nature of dharmas. Some say: the faculties are located where they are in order to adorn the body, and either fewer or more would make the body appear ugly. Some say: the material faculties exist in order to give rise to a clear cognition — were three consciousnesses to arise in dependence on two locations each, clarity would remain unconfused; more locations would confuse the cognition, and fewer would leave it unclear. Some say: the material faculties exist in order to apprehend their own respective object, and each requires exactly two locations to do so adequately — fewer would leave apprehension unclear, and more would serve no further purpose. One asks: why are the two eyes, two ears, and two nostrils each established as a single element, a single sense-field, and a single faculty? The answer: because their function is one and the same — that is, although there are two locations, they together give rise to a single consciousness and together apprehend a single object, just as, although the body has many parts and locations, since its function is the same throughout, it too is established as a single element, a single sense-field, and a single faculty — the case here is exactly the same.

The eye is of two kinds: nourished and ripening-produced; there is no separate homogeneous-outflow variety to be found. One asks: is there ever a case of a purely nourished eye lacking any ripening-produced component, or a purely ripening-produced eye lacking any nourished component? The answer: there is no case of a ripening-produced eye apart from a nourished eye — just as a person relies upon another person, or a wall relies upon another wall, for support, nourishment likewise safeguards ripening in this way. There is, however, a case of a nourished eye apart from any ripening-produced eye — as with one who attains the divine eye starting from having no eye at all. One asks: does the nourished eye see more form, or does the ripening-produced eye? The answer: the nourished eye sees more form than the ripening-produced eye, since the divine eye faculty itself is nourished. Yet, with respect to different periods of time, the relative superiority of the two eyes should be formulated in four alternatives: there is a case of the nourished eye being superior, not the ripening-produced — as in one's youth, when the ripening-produced continuum is still slight; there is a case of the ripening-produced eye being superior, not the nourished —

as in old age or sickness, when the nourished continuum is slight; there is a case of both eyes being superior — as in the prime of life; and there is a case of neither being superior — namely, apart from the stages just described. With respect to a given sentient being's own continuum, the relative superiority of the two eyes should likewise be formulated in four alternatives: there is a case of the nourished eye being superior, not the ripening-produced — as with one who is wealthy and noble, whose ripening-produced eye is inferior yet whose nourished eye is superior, on account of abundant supporting conditions. There is a case of the ripening-produced eye being superior, not the nourished — as with one who is poor and lowly, whose ripening-produced eye is superior yet whose nourished eye is inferior, on account of a lack of supporting conditions. There is a case of both eyes being superior — as with one who is wealthy and noble and whose ripening-produced eye is also superior, so that, with abundant supporting conditions, the nourished eye is superior as well. There is a case of neither eye being superior —

as with one who is poor and lowly, whose ripening-produced eye is inferior, so that, lacking supporting conditions, the nourished eye is inferior as well. The nourished eye, moreover, is of two kinds:

nourished by wholesome dharmas, and nourished by unwholesome dharmas. One asks: does the eye nourished by wholesome dharmas see form better, or the one nourished by unwholesome dharmas? The answer: the eye nourished by wholesome dharmas sees form better, since the divine eye attained through cultivation is nourished by wholesome dharmas. The ripening-produced eye is likewise of two kinds: ripening of wholesome karma, and ripening of unwholesome karma. One asks: does the eye ripening from wholesome karma see form better, or the one ripening from unwholesome karma? The answer: the eye ripening from wholesome karma sees form better, as with the eyes of bodhisattvas, wheel-turning kings, and the like, which ripen from wholesome karma. Yet, with respect to a given continuum, there can be cases where an eye ripening from unwholesome karma sees form better than one ripening from wholesome karma — as with the eyes of nāga-kings and the like, which see form better than human eyes. And just as with the eye, so too for the ear, nose, tongue, and body faculty. The mental faculty is of three kinds: ripening-produced, homogeneous-outflow, and momentary — the momentary kind being what is associated with the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering. Form is of three kinds: ripening-produced, nourished, and homogeneous-outflow — and the same holds for scent, taste, and touch. Sound is of two kinds: nourished and homogeneous-outflow, having no ripening-produced variety, since it occurs with interruption. Dharmas are of four kinds: ripening-produced, homogeneous-outflow, momentary, and real entities — "real entities" referring to the unconditioned dharmas.

One asks: how, specifically, do the atomic particles of the eye faculty abide — spread out side by side, or stacked one behind another? Suppose either — what fault follows? If spread out side by side, how is it that the wind does not scatter them? If stacked one behind another, how is it that the front does not obstruct the rear? Some say: they abide spread out side by side upon the black pupil, facing outward toward the sphere of external form, like the flower of coriander, or like flour scattered upon the surface of water filling a vessel. One asks: if that is so, why does the wind not scatter them? The answer: because they are covered and held in place by pure form, and so the wind does not scatter them. There are yet other masters who say: they abide stacked one behind another within the black pupil. One asks: if that is so, why does the front not obstruct the rear? The answer: because their substance is clear and pure, they do not obstruct one another — that is, pure form of this kind, though densely accumulated, still does not obstruct itself, just as an autumn pool's water, being clear and pure, still allows a fine needle dropped into it to be seen. The ear faculty's atomic particles abide within the ear canal; the nose faculty's atomic particles abide within the nostrils — these three faculties thus encircle the head like a garland of flowers worn as a crown. The tongue faculty's atomic particles abide upon the tongue, shaped like a crescent moon, though within it, over an area no larger than the tip of a hair, there is in fact no tongue faculty present at all. The body faculty's atomic particles abide throughout the body, inside and out, in due order. There are yet other masters who illustrate, through similes, the manner in which the various faculties' atomic particles abide in their respective order: the eye faculty's atomic particles, upon the black pupil, resemble the head of a pestle; the ear faculty's atomic particles, within the ear canal, resemble a lamp-vessel; the nose faculty's atomic particles, within the nostrils, resemble a person's fingernail; the tongue faculty's atomic particles, upon the tongue, resemble a razor; the body faculty's atomic particles, throughout the body, resemble a halberd or spear; the female faculty's atomic particles, within the female organ, resemble a small drum;

the male faculty's atomic particles, upon the male organ, resemble a finger ring. The Buddha, too, within the discourses, uses these very similes to describe the various faculties' own characteristics. The eye faculty's atomic particles are, at some times, entirely of the "homogeneous" class; at other times, entirely of the "counterpart" class; and at still other times, one portion of the "homogeneous" class and one portion of the "counterpart" class — and the same holds for the ear, nose, and tongue faculties' atomic particles. The body faculty's atomic particles are, at some times, entirely of the "counterpart" class, and at other times, one portion of the "homogeneous" class and one portion of the "counterpart" class — but there is never a time when they are entirely of the "homogeneous" class. One asks: if one's entire body is plunged into a pool of cold water, or into a cauldron of boiling liquid, or, as in hell, one's body is ground between mountains until it resembles a rotted leaf, or wrapped in thirteen kinds of fierce flame — is this not, at that very time, entirely of the "homogeneous" class? The answer: even at such a time, there remains a portion of the "counterpart" class as well — for were every single atomic particle of the body faculty to give rise to body-consciousness all at once, the body would thereby disintegrate altogether, since the five sense-consciousness bodies all depend on an aggregation of particles, and take an aggregation of particles as their object.

One asks: of the eye and the other six faculties, how many are able to apprehend a reaching object, and how many are able to apprehend a non-reaching object? The answer: "reaching" is of two kinds: first, reaching as object; second, reaching without interval. If spoken with reference to reaching as object, then all six faculties apprehend a reaching object. If spoken with reference to reaching without interval,

then three faculties apprehend a reaching object — namely, the nose, tongue, and body — while three apprehend a non-reaching object — namely, the eye, ear, and mental faculty. One asks: if that is so, why is it that the ear can hear a sound as close as one right at the very rim of the ear opening, while the eye cannot see a form as close as an object pressed directly against the tip of a pestle? The Venerable Vasumitra explained:

although both alike apprehend a non-reaching object, it is simply the inherent nature of these faculties that some are able to apprehend a nearby object while others are not — and so this objection ought not to be raised.

Some say: if a sound presses directly against the ear faculty, in the way an object pressed against the tip of a pestle presses against the eye faculty, it likewise cannot be heard — a sound right at the rim of the ear opening is still, in fact, some distance from the ear, and it is for this reason that it can be heard, since the ear faculty's atomic particles are located within the ear canal itself. The Great Virtuous One explained: the eye, by virtue of light, is able to see form; if form presses too directly against it, this obstructs the light, and so it cannot be seen. The ear, by virtue of open space, is able to hear sound; even if sound presses directly against it, this does not obstruct the open space, and so it can still be heard. On this basis, it is said: the eye sees form by virtue of an abundance of light; the ear hears sound by virtue of an abundance of open space; the nose smells fragrance by virtue of an abundance of wind; the tongue tastes flavor by virtue of an abundance of moisture; the body registers touch by virtue of an abundance of earth; and the mental faculty is able to discern dharmas by virtue of an abundance of attention. One asks: why is it that three faculties are able to apprehend a reaching object, while the other three are not? The answer: because eye-consciousness depends on its own realm, yet takes both its own realm and another realm as its object, and ear-consciousness is likewise so; mental consciousness depends on both its own realm and another realm, and takes both its own realm and another realm as its object; the remaining three consciousnesses depend on their own realm alone, and take their own realm alone as their object. Further, eye-consciousness depends on the "homogeneous" class, and takes both the "homogeneous" and "counterpart" classes as its object, and ear-consciousness is likewise so; the remaining four consciousnesses depend on the "homogeneous" class, and take the "homogeneous" class alone as their object — this is spoken with reference to present consciousness. Further, eye-consciousness depends on its own stage or another stage, and takes both its own stage and another stage as its object, and ear-, body-, and mental consciousness are likewise so; the remaining two consciousnesses depend on their own stage alone, and take their own stage alone as their object. Further, eye-consciousness depends on what is morally indeterminate, and takes all three moral qualities as its object, and ear-consciousness is likewise so; mental consciousness depends on all three moral qualities, and takes all three as its object; the remaining three consciousnesses depend on what is morally indeterminate, and take only what is morally indeterminate as their object. Further, eye-consciousness depends on what is near, yet takes both near and far as its object, and ear-consciousness is likewise so; mental consciousness depends on both near and far, and takes both near and far as its object; the remaining three consciousnesses depend on what is near, and take only what is near as their object.

Why is this? Because, so long as the three faculties (nose, tongue, body) do not abide without interval, directly against their object, the three corresponding consciousnesses cannot arise at all. Further, eye-consciousness may depend on something small yet take something large as its object, as when seeing a great mountain, or depend on something large yet take something small as its object, as when seeing the tip of a hair, or depend on and take an object of equal size, as when seeing a grape — and ear-consciousness is likewise so. Although mental consciousness's own support cannot properly be said to have any size at all, its object may be small or large. The remaining three consciousnesses have a support and object of equal extent, since, in dependence on however many atomic particles of nose, tongue, or body faculty, they take exactly that same number of atomic particles of scent, taste, or touch as their object. Further, eye-, ear-, and mental consciousness depend on what is not karma, yet take both karma and non-karma as their object; the remaining three consciousnesses depend on what is not karma, and take only non-karma as their object. Further, eye-, ear-, and mental consciousness depend on what is neither excellent nor evil conduct, yet take excellent conduct, evil conduct, and what is neither, all as their object; the remaining three consciousnesses depend on what is neither excellent nor evil conduct, and take only what is neither as their object — and the same holds, in this way, for wholesome and unwholesome precepts, restrained and unrestrained conduct, and manifest and unmanifest action. One asks: is there ever a case of a single atomic particle serving as the support, and a single atomic particle serving as the object, giving rise to the eye and the other four sense-consciousnesses? The answer: no. Why is this? Because the eye and the other four sense-consciousnesses depend on an aggregation of particles and take an aggregation of particles as their object; they depend on what has resistance and take what has resistance as their object; they depend on a coming-together of conditions and take a coming-together of conditions as their object. One asks: if that is so, then, since whatever dharma arises together with a given consciousness likewise ceases together with it, and a moment can never remain beyond its own instant, how, then, can it be said that the nose smells fragrance, the tongue tastes flavor, or the body registers touch at all? The answer: if nose-, tongue-, or body-consciousness arises taking a given dharma as its object, that very dharma is thereby said to be discerned by nose-, tongue-, or body-consciousness,

and it is on this very basis that it is said to be smelled, tasted, or touched by the nose, tongue, or body faculty — and so no fault follows. One asks: is there sinew, bone, blood, or flesh present at the location of the eye and the other four faculties? The answer: no, since all the material faculties are composed of pure great elements. As for the discourses' own statement that sinew, bone, blood, and flesh are present at the location of the material faculties: this is because the form, scent, taste, and touch located in between, close to the faculty's own location, are so described — but, in reality, no sinew, bone, or the like is present at the faculty's own location itself.

The field of form is of twenty kinds: blue, yellow, red, white, long, short, square, round, high, low, straight, crooked, cloud, smoke, dust, mist, shadow, light, sunshine, and darkness. Some say the field of form is of twenty-one kinds — the twenty just named, together with the single visible-color of space. Among these forms, some are knowable through visible color alone, not through shape — namely, blue, yellow, red, white, shadow, light, sunshine, darkness, and the single visible-color of space; some are knowable through shape alone, not through visible color — namely, bodily manifest action; and some are knowable through both visible color and shape — namely, the remaining twelve kinds of form. There is no case of something knowable through neither visible color nor shape at all. One asks: does eye-consciousness arise taking a single form as its object, or many forms? If it arises taking a single form as its object, how is this to be reconciled with the statement that "eye-consciousness takes five-colored thread as its object"? If it arises taking many forms as its object, then a single instance of eye-consciousness would possess multiple capacities of discernment, and since its capacity of discernment is multiple, it ought to have multiple substances — yet a single dharma having multiple substances contradicts reason. Some say: eye-consciousness arises taking only a single form as its object. One asks: how, then, is this to be reconciled with the statement that "eye-consciousness takes five-colored thread as its object"? The answer: many colors come together and jointly give rise to a single, composite color, and, upon seeing this single composite color, one speaks of "seeing many colors." The Venerable Vasumitra explained: it is not the case that a single instance of eye-consciousness suddenly grasps many colors at once; rather, on account of its own extreme swiftness, what is not truly simultaneous is mistaken for simultaneous — this is a kind of excessive overconfidence, just as, with a spinning firebrand, what is not truly a wheel is mistaken for a wheel, which is likewise a kind of excessive overconfidence.

Some say: eye-consciousness can indeed arise taking many colors as its object at once. One asks: would this not mean that a single instance of eye-consciousness possesses multiple capacities of discernment — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: when discriminated separately, eye-consciousness arises taking a single color as its object; when not discriminated separately, it arises taking many colors as its object at once. The Great Virtuous One explained: when the distinctions among colors are not clearly and separately apprehended, eye-consciousness can indeed arise taking many colors as its object at once, just as, when observing a grove of trees, one takes in the leaves and the like all together, as a whole. One asks: is there such a thing as a single atomic particle of blue? The answer: yes, though it is not something eye-consciousness is able to apprehend on its own. For if a single atomic particle were not blue,

then a mass of many such particles gathered together ought equally not to be blue — and the same holds for yellow and the rest. One asks: is there such a thing as a single atomic particle possessing length or some other shape? The answer: yes, though it too is not something eye-consciousness is able to apprehend on its own. For if a single atomic particle did not possess length or some other shape, then a mass of many such particles gathered together ought equally not to possess it. Further, there is form that is unseen because it is extremely subtle, not because it fails to be an object at all — as with a form field of fewer than seven atomic particles: it is a real, existent form, not something outside the scope of vision, yet it is unseen because it is not extremely subtle in the ordinary sense; as with any accumulated form apart from the form field itself: there is form that is unseen because it is extremely subtle and simultaneously not an object at all — as with, apart from the form field, every other kind of atomic form; there is form that is unseen not because it is extremely subtle but because it is not an object at all — as with an object pressed directly against the pupil, like the tip of a pestle. Further, there is form that is unseen because it is extremely distant, not because it fails to be an object — as with the gods of the retinue of the Four Great Kings, who, while dwelling within their own celestial palace, remain, though technically within the range of a human eye, unseen on account of their great distance; there is form that is unseen because it is not an object at all, not because it is extremely distant — as with the gods of Brahmā's retinue, who, though they may come quite near to the human realm, remain unseen; there is form that is unseen because it is extremely distant and simultaneously not an object at all — as with the gods of Brahmā's retinue while dwelling within their own celestial palace, unseen by human eyes; there is form that is unseen not because it is extremely distant but because it is not an object at all — as with an object pressed directly against the pupil, like the tip of a pestle. The Venerable Vasumitra explained: form, though it exists, remains unseen owing to four causes and conditions — first, being extremely near, as with an object like the tip of a pestle pressed against the pupil; second, being extremely distant, as with the city of Pāṭaliputra seen from where one presently stands; third, being extremely subtle, as with a form field of fewer than seven atomic particles; fourth, being obstructed, as with form on the other side of a wall. The proponents of the Sāṃkhya school say that form, though it exists, remains unseen owing to eight causes and conditions — namely, being extremely distant;

being extremely near; the faculty being impaired; the mind being distracted; being extremely subtle; being obstructed; being overwhelmed and eclipsed by something more powerful; and being confused by something similar in appearance.

The field of sound is of eight kinds: sound caused by the great elements as appropriated, and sound caused by the great elements as not appropriated — each of these two is further of two kinds, namely, sound belonging to sentient beings and sound not belonging to sentient beings; and each of these, in turn, is further distinguished as agreeable or disagreeable, giving eight kinds in total. Some say instead: sound caused by the great elements as appropriated, and as not appropriated, are each distinguished as agreeable or disagreeable; and sound belonging to sentient beings, and not belonging to sentient beings, are likewise each distinguished as agreeable or disagreeable, likewise giving eight kinds in total. One asks: does ear-consciousness arise taking a single sound as its object, or many sounds? If it arises taking a single sound as its object, how is one able to hear five musical instruments at once, or hear many people reciting at once? If it arises taking many sounds as its object, then a single instance of ear-consciousness would possess multiple capacities of discernment — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: ear-consciousness arises taking only a single sound as its object. One asks: how, then, is one able to hear five musical instruments and many people reciting at once? The answer: many sounds come together and jointly give rise to a single, composite sound, and, upon hearing this single composite sound, one speaks of "hearing many sounds." The Venerable Vasumitra explained: it is not the case that a single instance of ear-consciousness suddenly grasps many sounds at once; rather, on account of its own extreme swiftness, what is not truly simultaneous is mistaken for simultaneous — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: ear-consciousness can indeed arise taking many sounds as its object at once. One asks: would this not mean that a single instance of ear-consciousness possesses multiple capacities of discernment — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: when discriminated separately, ear-consciousness arises taking a single sound as its object; when not discriminated separately, it arises taking many sounds as its object at once. The Great Virtuous One explained: when the distinctions among sounds are not clearly and separately apprehended, ear-consciousness can indeed arise taking many sounds as its object at once, just as when hearing the clamorous, mingled din of a great army.

The field of scent is of four kinds: pleasant scent, unpleasant scent, balanced scent, and unbalanced scent. One asks: does nose-consciousness arise taking a single scent as its object,

or many scents? If it arises taking a single scent as its object, how is one able to smell a hundred-blended incense all at once? If it arises taking many scents as its object, then a single instance of nose-consciousness would possess multiple capacities of discernment — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: nose-consciousness arises taking only a single scent as its object. One asks: how, then, is one able to smell a hundred-blended incense all at once? The answer: many scents come together and jointly give rise to a single, composite scent, and, upon smelling this single composite scent, one speaks of "smelling many scents." The Venerable Vasumitra's own explanation is as before. Some say: nose-consciousness can indeed arise taking many scents as its object at once. One asks: would this not mean that a single instance of nose-consciousness possesses multiple capacities of discernment — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: when discriminated separately, nose-consciousness arises taking a single scent as its object; when not discriminated separately, it arises taking many scents as its object at once. The Great Virtuous One's own explanation is as before — it should be understood accordingly.

The field of taste is of six kinds: sweet, sour, salty, pungent, bitter, and bland. One asks: does tongue-consciousness arise taking a single taste as its object, or many tastes? If it arises taking a single taste as its object, how is one able to taste a hundred-flavored pill all at once? If it arises taking many tastes as its object, then a single instance of tongue-consciousness would possess multiple capacities of discernment — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: tongue-consciousness arises taking only a single taste as its object. One asks: how, then, is one able to taste a hundred-flavored pill all at once? The answer: many tastes come together and jointly give rise to a single, composite taste, and, upon tasting this single composite taste, one speaks of "tasting many tastes." The Venerable Vasumitra's own explanation is as before. Some say: tongue-consciousness can indeed arise taking many tastes as its object at once. One asks: would this not mean that a single instance of tongue-consciousness possesses multiple capacities of discernment — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: when discriminated separately, tongue-consciousness arises taking a single taste as its object; when not discriminated separately, it arises taking many tastes as its object at once. The Great Virtuous One's own explanation is as before — it should be understood accordingly. One asks: when tasting a flavor, does tongue-consciousness arise first, or body-consciousness? The answer: whichever object is more predominant, that consciousness arises first; if the two objects are equal, tongue-consciousness arises first, since sentient beings' own craving for flavor tends to predominate.

The field of touch is of eleven kinds: the four great elements, smoothness, roughness, lightness, heaviness, coldness, hunger, and thirst. One asks: does body-consciousness arise taking a single tangible quality as its object, or many? Some say: body-consciousness arises taking only a single tangible quality as its object — that is, either solidity alone, and so on, up through thirst alone. Some say: it can, up to a point, arise taking five tangible qualities as its object at once — namely, smoothness together with the four great elements, and so on, up through thirst together with the four great elements. Some say: it can, up to a point, arise taking all eleven kinds of tangible quality as its object at once — just as, up to a point, eye-consciousness can arise taking as many as twenty kinds of form as its object at once. One asks: how can body-consciousness take a common characteristic as its object, given that the five sense-consciousness bodies are supposed to take only a particular characteristic as their object? The answer: "particular characteristic" is of two kinds: first, the particular characteristic of an individual entity; second, the particular characteristic of a category. If spoken with reference to the particular characteristic of an individual entity, the five sense-consciousness bodies do indeed also take a common characteristic as their object; if spoken with reference to the particular characteristic of a category, then the five sense-consciousness bodies take only a particular characteristic as their object — and so there is no real contradiction.

One asks: when smelling, tasting, or touching scent, taste, or touch, does one smell, taste, or touch an appropriated scent and the like, or a non-appropriated scent and the like? If one smells, tastes, or touches an appropriated scent and the like, how can this be called "receiving and making use of what the donor has given," and would one not then be smelling, tasting, or touching at all times? If one smells, tastes, or touches a non-appropriated scent and the like, then the external scent, taste, or touch would have absolutely no causal relation at all to the internal scent, taste, or touch —

and how, then, could it be said to be "received and made use of" at all? Some say: one does indeed smell, taste, or touch an appropriated scent, taste, or touch. One asks: how, then, can this be called "receiving and making use of what the donor has given," and would one not then be smelling, tasting, or touching at all times? The answer: the external scent, taste, and touch serve as the arousing cause for the internal act of smelling, tasting, or touching, and so no fault follows.

Some say: one does not smell, taste, or touch an appropriated scent, taste, or touch. One asks: then the external scent, taste, or touch would have absolutely no causal relation at all to the internal scent, taste, or touch —

and how, then, could it be said to be "received and made use of" at all? The answer: just as with sound, which likewise involves no direct transfer, and so no fault follows. Some say: one does smell, taste, or touch both appropriated and non-appropriated scent, taste, and touch, though not at the very same time. One asks: since the internal scent, taste, and touch admit of no increase or decrease of their own, how, then, can smelling, tasting, or touching occur at all? The answer: because of the external condition, an increase or decrease does indeed occur.

The field of dharmas is of seven kinds — namely, the preceding four aggregates together with the three unconditioned dharmas, taking, from within the aggregate of form, only unmanifest form. As for the three unconditioned dharmas,

they are space, analytical cessation, and non-analytical cessation. One asks: does mental consciousness arise taking a single dharma as its object, or many dharmas? The answer: it arises taking either a single dharma or many dharmas as its object. Moreover, the dharmas it can take as its object are not limited to these seven kinds alone — it is able to take these seven kinds, together with every other dharma, all at once as its object, with the sole exception of its own nature and what is associated and co-existent with it. One asks: it is related that the bodhisattva's six faculties are exceptionally acute — how, specifically, is this acuteness known with respect to their objects? The answer: beside the bodhisattva's own palace stood the Hall of the Unfading, within which five hundred lamps were kept burning. The bodhisattva, dwelling within his own palace, could not see the lamp-flames themselves, but could see only their light, and thereby knew there were exactly five hundred lamps; and if, among them, even a single lamp went out, he would immediately remark, "one lamp has now gone out" — this is what is called the bodhisattva's own acute eye faculty. Within the Hall of the Unfading, five hundred musicians once played music all at once; the bodhisattva, dwelling within his own palace, could not see the musicians themselves, but could hear only the sound of their music, and thereby knew that five hundred instruments were being played; and if a single string broke, or a single musician dozed off, he would immediately remark, "the music has now diminished by this much" — this is what is called the bodhisattva's own acute ear faculty. Within the bodhisattva's own palace, a hundred-blended incense was once burned; the bodhisattva, smelling it, knew there were exactly a hundred ingredients present. The one who blended the incense, wishing to test the bodhisattva, would sometimes increase or decrease the proportion of some ingredient among the hundred;

and the bodhisattva, upon smelling it, would immediately remark, "compared with the earlier incense, this ingredient has now been increased or decreased by this much" — this is what is called the bodhisattva's own acute nose faculty. When the bodhisattva took his meals, his attendants would always present him with a hundred-flavored pill; the bodhisattva, tasting it, would know that all one hundred flavors were fully present. The one who prepared the food, wishing to test the bodhisattva, would sometimes increase or decrease some flavor among the hundred, and the bodhisattva, upon tasting it, would immediately know exactly how much had been increased or decreased — this is what is called the bodhisattva's own acute tongue faculty. When the bodhisattva bathed, his attendants would present him with a bathing robe; the bodhisattva, touching it, would immediately know that the weaver, or the one presenting the robe, suffered from such-and-such an ailment — this is what is called the bodhisattva's own acute body faculty. The bodhisattva is skilled in knowing the particular and common characteristics of every dharma,

without any obstruction whatsoever — this is what is called the bodhisattva's own acute mental faculty.

[The topic reads:] "Is everything past also not manifest?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest its own correct meaning. That is, some maintain that the past and the future possess no real substantial nature at all, and that the present, though it does exist, is itself unconditioned; in order to refute this position, and to show that the past and future do exist, and that the present is itself conditioned, the treatise is composed. Is everything past also not manifest? The answer: this should be put in the form of four alternatives. "Past" is of two kinds: first, past by time-period; second, past by yogic attainment. "Not manifest" is likewise of two kinds: first, not manifest by time-period; second, not manifest through concealment. Here, the topic is composed with reference to both kinds of each together, and since "past" and "not manifest" differ in scope, broader and narrower, four alternatives are accordingly formulated. There is a case of what is past but not "not manifest" — as when the Venerable Udāyin said:

"All fetters have passed away; / from the forest, having left the forest, he has come; / delighting in renouncing the desires, / like gold emerging from a mountain peak." The Discourse of Udāyin is the root text underlying this verse. As it states: the World-Honored One, while dwelling at the Hall of Mṛgāramātā in Śrāvastī, in the latter part of the day, arose from his meditative absorption and took Udāyin with him to the eastern pool; putting on his inner garment, he entered the pool to bathe, and the Venerable One massaged and scrubbed the Buddha's body for him.

Now, Udāyin, in the days when the Buddha was still a bodhisattva, had always attended and served him closely; and now, seeing the Buddha's own body ablaze with radiant light, surpassing even how it had appeared in his bodhisattva days, he was filled with joy, reverence, and love, and, joining his palms, said to the Buddha: "I now wish to praise the World-Honored One with a verse comparing him to a dragon — may you graciously permit me to do so." The Buddha said: "if you wish to speak, speak freely as you please." Udāyin then recited this verse. "All fetters have passed away" means that the Buddha has been liberated from every affliction. "From the forest, having left the forest, he has come" — "forest" here refers to householder life; the World-Honored One has come from the household life, having relinquished the ways of the household and gone forth into the homeless life. "Delighting in renouncing the desires" — "desire" is of two kinds: first, the desire of affliction; second, the desire for material provisions; since the Buddha's body and mind remain undefiled by either of these two, he is said to "delight in renunciation," dwelling in loving delight within it. "Like gold emerging from a mountain peak" — "mountain peak" here means the golden mountain peak, that very place from which the sun itself emerges; just as, when the sun first rises over the mountain peak, its light illuminates everything everywhere, the Buddha's own emergence from the afflictions and their secondary afflictions is exactly the same. Some say: "mountain peak" refers to the clouds atop the mountain peak — just as, when the sun emerges from the clouds, its light illuminates everything everywhere, the Buddha is exactly the same. Some say: "mountain peak" refers to the black sand atop the mountain peak, and "gold" refers to gold-dust — just as gold-dust emerges from black sand,

shining with brilliant light, the Buddha is exactly the same: emerging from the afflictions, his powers, his fearlessnesses, and the rest shine forth with brilliant light. This, then, is what is meant by "past."

"Not not-manifest" here means the second kind of "past" (yogic past); "not not-manifest" means neither of the two kinds of "not manifest," since the Buddha's own body was present and openly manifest at that very time. There is a case of what is "not manifest" but not "past" — as when a certain person, whether by supernormal power, by spells, by medicine, or by a kind of knowledge attained simply by virtue of being born in a certain place, conceals something so that it does not manifest. By supernormal power: this refers to using the power of supernormal ability to make something not manifest — as the discourses state: the Brahmā king said to the Buddha, "I wish to hide myself"; the Buddha said, "very well." The Great Brahmā then hid himself within the earth, whereupon the Buddha pointed and said, "is this not you?" The Brahmā king thought to himself, "this is because I hid too close by," and so he crossed the great ocean and hid within the very heart of Mount Sumeru; the World-Honored One again pointed and said, "are you not dwelling here?" The Brahmā king thought again, "this is because my hiding place was too coarse,"

and so he transformed himself into an exceedingly minute body and hid himself within the very curl of the Buddha's own white hair-tuft between his brows. The Buddha, already aware of this, unfurled the hair-tuft and revealed him. The Great Brahmā king was then overcome with the deepest shame, whereupon the Buddha said to him: "now I shall hide myself — use every power you possess to try to find me." The Brahmā king respectfully assented. The Buddha then entered into just such a meditative absorption, emitting a great radiance that filled the entire Brahmā palace, and also causing a great sound to be heard throughout the Brahmā world,

yet none of the Brahmās, nor the Brahmā king himself, could discover where the Buddha actually was. One asks: where, exactly, did the Buddha remain so that they could not find him? Some say: he remained hidden within the very topknot of the Brahmā king's own hair.

Some say: he transformed himself into an exceedingly subtle body. Some say: he manifested a transformation-body to conceal himself. Some say: he manifested an obstructing form and used it to block their view. Some say: the objective sphere of one dhyāna in relation to another, and the objective sphere of one Buddha in relation to another, are both entirely inconceivable, and so it simply cannot be known where the Buddha's own body actually was. It is much the same as with the Venerable Mahāmaudgalyāyana, who, entering into just such a meditative absorption, concealed himself right where he sat, so that Devadatta, staring directly at him, could not see him at all — cases of this kind. By spells: this refers to using the power of spells to make something not manifest — as with the spells bound and formed by various sages, whoever holds and maintains them being able, at will, to conceal whatever they choose and make it not manifest. By medicine: this refers to using the power of a medicinal substance to make something not manifest — as with certain medicines possessing great supernormal efficacy, so that whoever holds them is likewise able, at will, to conceal whatever they choose and make it not manifest, as with the substances kept in the palaces of piśāca-demons, vetāla-spirits, and the like. By a kind of knowledge attained simply by virtue of being born in a certain place: this refers to using the power of that very knowledge to keep whatever has been concealed from ever manifesting again. Here, some say: although hell possesses this kind of knowledge attained by virtue of birth-place, it is nonetheless unable to make the body not manifest — for if it could, no hell-being would ever have to remain there even a single instant to undergo suffering. Others say: although hell-beings are indeed unable to make their bodies not manifest before the hell-guardians themselves, they are able to do so before others; animals, hungry ghosts, and gods likewise possess this kind of knowledge attained by virtue of birth-place, allowing them to make their bodies not manifest — only the human destiny lacks it. One asks: among these four kinds of power — supernormal power, spells, medicine, and birth-place knowledge — which is able to conceal which? The answer: supernormal power is able to conceal everything, being the most superior of the four. One asks: whose supernormal power is able to conceal whose? The answer: the Buddha's own supernormal power is able to conceal everyone; a pratyekabuddha's, excepting the Buddha, is able to conceal everyone else; Śāriputra's, excepting the Buddha and pratyekabuddhas, is able to conceal everyone else; Mahāmaudgalyāyana's, excepting the Buddha, pratyekabuddhas, and Śāriputra, is able to conceal everyone else — and so on, down to one of dull faculties, excepting one of sharp faculties, being able to conceal everyone else. Spells, excepting supernormal power, are able to conceal everyone else. One asks: which spell is able to conceal what? The answer: there are complete spells and incomplete spells, and there are superior spells and inferior spells; a spell that is both complete and superior is able to conceal anything at all, while one that is neither complete nor superior, excepting the complete and superior kind, is able to conceal everything else. Medicine, excepting supernormal power and spells, is able to conceal everything else — why is this? Because the power of spells is able to procure medicine, but the power of medicine cannot procure spells. One asks: which medicine is able to conceal what? The answer: a superior medicine is able to conceal an inferior one. Birth-place knowledge, excepting the three kinds just named, is able to conceal everything else, being the most inferior of the four. One asks: within this category, which being's birth-place knowledge is able to conceal which other being? Some say: a hell-being's is able to conceal only another hell-being; and so on, up through a god's being able to conceal only another god. Some say: a hell-being's is able to conceal only another hell-being; an animal's is able to conceal two destinies; a hungry ghost's, three destinies; a god's is able to conceal all five destinies. On this position, a hell-being's own knowledge is able to conceal beings across all five destinies,

and so on, up through a god's own knowledge likewise being able to conceal beings across all five destinies. This, then, is what is meant by "not manifest but not past." "Not manifest" here means the second kind of "not manifest" (concealment), and "not past" means neither of the two kinds of "past," since what has been concealed still abides within the present. There is a case of what is both past and not manifest — namely, whatever formations have already arisen, already come to be, already been born, already come into existence, already turned, presently turning, already accumulated, already appeared, already passed away,

already exhausted, already ceased, already departed from, and already changed — being past, belonging to the portion of the past, and included within the past time-period; all such phrases together display past formations. "Past" here is past by time-period, and "not manifest" is not manifest by time-period. There is a case of what is neither past nor not manifest — namely, whatever remains apart from the characteristics just described. Here, the word "characteristic" applies to whatever it names — that is, whatever dharma is displayed by name in the first three alternatives is excluded entirely, and whatever remains undisplayed forms the fourth alternative. What, specifically, is this fourth alternative? It excludes every dharma of the past time-period, the Buddha's own present body, and whatever has been concealed, taking instead every remaining present dharma, every future dharma, and the unconditioned dharmas. One asks: just as, later, "exhausted" and "ceased" are likewise formulated into four alternatives with reference to the severing of the fetters, why does the treatise here not likewise formulate four alternatives with reference to the severing of the fetters? The answer: there are passages that speak of the severing of the fetters as "exhausted" and as "ceased," but there is no passage anywhere that speaks of the severing of the fetters as "not manifest."