Why the Buddha Called His Disciples Fools

[The topic reads:] "As the Buddha, the World-Honored One, once rebuked his disciples, calling them 'fools'" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to bring certainty to those in doubt. That is, the Buddha, the World-Honored One, has permanently cut off both attachment and aversion, remaining equally balanced toward the agreeable and the disagreeable alike, having uprooted the very root of contention and extinguished the very foundation of conceit, regarding every precious treasure as no different from a broken tile, his awakened illumination leaving no dharma whatsoever unperceived, and possessing no residual trace of anything resembling attachment, aversion, conceit, or the like, since every habitual residue of the afflictions has been permanently cut off in him — unlike pratyekabuddhas and śrāvakas, who, although they too have cut off the afflictions, still retain certain residual habits: the habit of craving-attachment, as with the Venerable Ānanda's own fondness for the Śākya clan; the habit of aversion, as with the Venerable Piṇḍola-Bhāradvāja, who once said to the deity of the Ganges, "little slave-girl, halt your flow — I now wish to cross"; the habit of conceit, as with the Venerable Śāriputra, who once flung away a gift of medicine; and the habit of delusion, as with the Venerable Gavāmpati, who, coughing before a meal and knowing that his previous food had not yet been digested — yet, not foreseeing the suffering that would follow — ate once again regardless. Instances of this kind are exceedingly numerous. Although the World-Honored One himself possesses no residual habit of affliction at all, he does at times utter words that merely resemble attachment, aversion, conceit, or delusion. Words resembling attachment are exemplified by the World-Honored One's own statement, "welcome, monks — you have gone forth excellently, and are already complete in the precepts." Words resembling aversion are exemplified by the World-Honored One's own statement, "you are a slave-girl's son of the Śākya clan; the Śākya clan is your very own master." Words resembling conceit are exemplified by the World-Honored One's own statement, "I am the Tathāgata, worthy and fully awakened, accomplished in the ten powers, having attained the four fearlessnesses." Words resembling delusion are exemplified by the World-Honored One's own statement, "great king, where have you now come from?" or his telling Ānanda, "look and see whether it is raining," or "why is there such a loud clamor within the garden?" One might come to doubt: "the World-Honored One has already permanently cut off every habitual residue of the afflictions — how, then, can there still be such utterances merely resembling the afflictions?" — and it is in order to bring this very doubt to a settled resolution that the treatise takes up this topic, explaining the causes and conditions behind them, exactly as it explains this present statement calling them "fools." One asks: why does the Buddha utter words resembling attachment and the like? The answer: in order to protect the field of those he is converting, and to benefit them. That is, the World-Honored One's own words resembling attachment were spoken in order to set at ease, in body and mind, the monks whom Devadatta had led astray, and to remove their doubt — that is, Devadatta, out of greed for fame and gain, had already caused a schism in the Sangha, and, once the Venerable Śāriputra and Mahāmaudgalyāyana had gone and brought the deceived monks back, those monks felt the deepest shame, trembling in body and mind, and doubting: "having followed Devadatta, have we not thereby lost our own precepts?" Upon hearing the World-Honored One say, "welcome, monks — you have gone forth excellently, and are already complete in the precepts," both their trembling and their doubt were entirely removed; had the Buddha not spoken these words at that time, they would have been overcome with shame and distress, and died vomiting blood. Further, the World-Honored One's own words resembling aversion were spoken in order to break down that brahmin's own banner of arrogance — that is, the brahmin Ambāṣṭha, failing to reckon with his own mother's lowly station, harbored arrogant pride, and obstructed another's own going-forth, which would have led him to fall into an evil destiny; and it was through the Buddha's rebuke that his arrogant, obstinate mind was broken, so that, in his very next life, he was reborn in the heavens and there beheld the four noble truths. And it was likewise through rebuking the brahmin Pauṣkarasādi

that he was brought to enter the Buddhist teaching and attain a supremely excellent fruit. Further, the World-Honored One's own words resembling conceit were spoken in order to let those unaware of the Buddha's own virtues come to know them, take refuge in him, and cultivate excellent conduct. Further, the World-Honored One's own words resembling delusion were spoken in order to open a path of conversation for that king, and to dispel Ānanda's own drowsy, dull-witted state of mind, and further, in order to give rise, in that king, to a mind delighting in tranquility. All these words resembling the afflictions that the Buddha speaks are spoken solely for the sake of sentient beings' own benefit and happiness — and his present rebuke of his disciples, calling them "fools," is likewise for the benefit of living beings, exactly as will be explained below. One asks: for what reason do pratyekabuddhas and śrāvakas, though they too have cut off the afflictions, still retain residual habits, while the Buddha does not? The answer: the wisdom of śrāvakas and pratyekabuddhas is not fierce and keen, and so, although they cut off the afflictions, a residue remains — just as an ordinary fire, though it burns what it consumes, still leaves behind ash and embers. The Buddha's own wisdom is fierce and keen, cutting off the afflictions so completely that no residual habit remains at all — just as the fire at the very destruction of an aeon leaves behind no ash or embers whatsoever from whatever it consumes. It is on account of the various causes and conditions explained above that the treatise is composed.

[The topic reads:] "As the Buddha, the World-Honored One, once rebuked his disciples, calling them 'fools'" — what, specifically, is the meaning of this? The answer: this is a rebuking statement — that is, the Buddha, the World-Honored One, rebuked his disciples, calling them "fools," just as, nowadays, a preceptor or a teacher of proper conduct, when a resident disciple under his own guidance commits some fault, rebukes him, saying: "you are foolish, unclear, and unskilled" — the World-Honored One is exactly the same, rebuking his disciples and calling them "fools." Here, the treatise's own text has two parts in total: first, explaining the meaning of the Buddha's rebuke of his disciples; second, explaining the causes and conditions behind that rebuke. The passage cited above constitutes the first part. Just as a preceptor or a teacher of proper conduct, in order to prevent the faults his disciples might commit — or as parents guard against their children's own faults — administers whatever rebuke is needed solely for the disciple's benefit, harboring no ill will whatsoever, the Buddha is exactly the same. That is, those the Buddha converts fall, in brief, into four kinds: first, those fit to be praised; second, those fit to be rebuked; third, those fit to be set aside; fourth, those fit to be reached through another. Those fit to be praised are exemplified by the Buddha's own praise of Koṭīviṃśa and the like; those fit to be rebuked are exemplified by the Buddha's own rebuke of Udāyin and the like; those fit to be set aside are exemplified by his setting aside the naked ascetic Kāśyapa and the like, as when the Buddha told that brahmin, "now is not the proper time — I cannot yet answer you"; those fit to be reached through another are exemplified by

as when the Buddha turned the wheel of the true Dharma for the five monks, and at that very time eighty thousand gods all attained the noble path; when the Buddha taught the Dharma for King Bimbisāra, at that very time, likewise, eighty thousand gods, together with ninety-two thousand people of Magadha, all attained the noble path; when the Buddha taught the Dharma for Śakra, at that very time, likewise, eighty thousand gods entered the noble path; when the Buddha taught the Dharma for Rāhula, at that very time, likewise, sixty thousand gods attained the path all at once. Instances of this kind are exceedingly numerous. It is for this reason that the World-Honored One ought to have administered a rebuke, and those who thereby entered the path were necessarily rebuked. Some say: the World-Honored One, impelled by his great compassion, constantly seeks out means to benefit others — had he not rebuked Devadatta, saying "you are a foolish one, an eater of spit and mucus," this would have led countless deluded beings to commit various evil deeds, and Devadatta himself would have continued repeatedly to trouble and disturb the World-Honored One; and had he not denounced a certain incomparable woman, saying "your body is filled with impurity and filth," her own lustful mind would have had no way of being stilled — and it is for this reason that he rebuked his disciples, calling them "fools." Some say: the reason the World-Honored One rebuked his disciples was in order to let those who had not yet planted wholesome roots come to plant them, those who had already planted wholesome roots but not yet brought them to maturity swiftly bring them to maturity, and those already matured but not yet liberated swiftly attain liberation — for had he not rebuked them, they would have lost this very benefit — and it is for this reason that the Buddha called them "fools" in this instance. One asks: what, specifically, is meant by "a fool"? Is one called a "fool" because one arises from delusion, or because one presently manifests delusion? Suppose either — what fault follows? If called a "fool" because one arises from delusion, then, since one likewise arises from craving, aversion, conceit, views, and the rest, why does the World-Honored One speak only of "fools"? If called a "fool" because one presently manifests delusion, then the discourses ought not to speak of arhats, too, as "fools" — yet, as the discourses state, "depart, you fool — do not stand before me," and the World-Honored One likewise rebuked Udāyin, saying "you fool, without eyes — how dare you contend with a senior monk over so profound a matter?" And since the other afflictions, too, can presently manifest, why does the treatise speak only of "fools," and not of the others? Some say:

one is called a "fool" because one arises from delusion. One asks: if that is so, since one likewise arises from craving, aversion, conceit, views, and the rest, why does the World-Honored One speak only of "fools"? The answer: because delusion pervades every affliction — if the Buddha knew that rebuking even an arhat as a "fool" would benefit that being, he would indeed rebuke that arhat as well, since even an arhat's own present body still arises from delusion, as the discourses state: "covered by ignorance, bound by the fetter of craving, the foolish worldling thereby acquires a body possessed of consciousness — and the wise are exactly the same" — arhats and the like being here called "the wise." There are yet other masters who say: one is called a "fool" because one presently manifests delusion. One asks: if that is so, then the discourses ought not to speak of arhats, too, as "fools." The answer: as for the discourses' own statement, "depart, you fool — do not stand before me" — this is a mistaken recitation on the reciter's own part; it ought properly to read, "depart, monk — do not stand before me." At the time the World-Honored One was about to enter final nirvāṇa, the Venerable Upavāna stood before the Buddha, fanning him, and at that time countless long-lived gods came to where the Buddha was,

resenting the fact that this venerable one, standing directly before the Buddha, blocked their own view, so that they could not see the World-Honored One, and would thereby lose this final benefit. The Buddha, knowing their intent, thereupon said: "depart, monk — do not stand before me." And as for the World-Honored One's own rebuke of Udāyin, saying, "you fool, without eyes — how dare you contend with a senior monk over so profound a matter?" — this, too, does not present a real contradiction, since Udāyin had not yet attained the fruit of arhatship at that time, being either an ordinary being or a trainee. There are yet other masters who say: arhats and the like, too, presently manifest delusion, since undefiled ignorance has still not been cut off in them. One asks: since the other afflictions, too, can presently manifest, why does the treatise speak only of "fools," and not of the others? The answer: as already explained above, because delusion pervades every affliction — whatever stage's own ignorance presently manifests, the name "fool" is thereby established with reference to it. It is on account of this very meaning that the Buddha rebuked his disciples, calling them "fools."

One asks: why does the World-Honored One rebuke his disciples, calling them "fools"? The answer: because they, with respect to the World-Honored One's own admonitions and instructions, do not practice in accordance with their meaning, do not follow them, and do not sustain them continuously. This next section of the treatise's text constitutes its second part, explaining the causes and conditions behind the Buddha's rebuke of these "fools." "Admonition" and "instruction" together denote the Buddha's own words in general. One who is able to practice correctly is said to "practice in accordance with meaning"; these disciples, being unable to practice correctly, are said to "not practice in accordance with meaning." Some say: one who practices as one properly ought is said to "practice in accordance with meaning"; these disciples, not practicing as they properly ought, are said to "not practice in accordance with meaning." "Not following" means being unable to follow the Buddha's own noble teaching and cultivate its virtues accordingly; "not sustaining continuously" means being unable to cultivate these virtues in a long, continuous, unbroken stream. One asks: what difference is there between "admonition" and "instruction"? The answer: what forestalls what brings no benefit is called "admonition"; what grants what brings genuine benefit is called "instruction." Further, teaching one to abide in correct mindfulness is called "admonition"; teaching one to abide in correct awareness is called "instruction." Further, causing one to cultivate manifest action is called "admonition"; causing one to cultivate unmanifest action is called "instruction." Further, causing one to cultivate calm-abiding is called "admonition"; causing one to cultivate insight is called "instruction." Further, causing one to cultivate the noble path is called "admonition"; causing one to attain the noble fruit is called "instruction." Further, causing one to cultivate worldly wholesome dharmas is called "admonition"; causing one to cultivate supramundane wholesome dharmas is called "instruction." This, then, is the difference between "admonition" and "instruction." Further, these disciples commit an act of sheer foolishness with respect to the noble teaching — it is empty for them, bearing no fruit, no exit, no flavor, and no benefit; they transgress the Buddha's own teaching, and are unable to properly undertake the various points of training — and it is for this reason that the Buddha rebukes them, calling them "fools," "noble teaching" here referring specifically to the noble path. One asks: how, specifically, do they commit an act of foolishness with respect to the noble path? The answer: it is not that they cause the noble path itself to become an act of foolishness, but rather that their own continuum increases and augments its own foolishness, thereby obstructing the noble path. Some say: they do indeed cause the noble path itself to become, in effect, an act of foolishness for them — that is, they cause it to become remote from them, beyond their own mastery, never manifesting in them at all. Some say: the Buddha teaches the noble teaching precisely in order to cut off foolishness; yet these disciples, hearing the noble teaching, fail to cut off their foolishness, and instead only increase it further — and it is for this reason that they are said to commit an act of foolishness with respect to the Buddha's own noble teaching. "Empty" displays that they lack the very womb capable of bearing the noble path within them, just as a woman's body might be incapable of ever conceiving a child,

and, being empty and childless, is called "barren." These disciples are exactly the same: although they hear the Buddha's own teaching, they are unable to receive and hold the very embryo of the noble path within them, and so, with respect to their own persons, the Buddha's efforts yield no human-effort result at all — his labor being spent in vain, this is what is meant by "empty." "No fruit" means they possess neither a homogeneous-outflow fruit nor a liberation fruit;

"no exit" means they possess no human-effort result at all. Further, "exit" here means "attainment" — since they attain nothing whatsoever with respect to the Buddhist teaching, they are said to have "no exit." "No flavor" means they possess, with respect to the Buddhist teaching, no flavor of going forth, no flavor of quiescence, no flavor of the noble path, and no flavor of tranquil cessation, and so are said to have "no flavor." "No benefit" means that "fruit" itself is called "benefit," and since they attain no fruit, they have "no benefit." Further, there are two faults involved, and so they are said to have "no benefit" — it is just as when a skilled physician, out of compassion for the sick, searches in every direction for medicine, and, having obtained it, gives it to a patient, who, holding it in contempt, casts it away into filth — this involves two faults:

first, his own illness is not thereby cured; second, the skilled physician's own efforts are spent in vain. The World-Honored One is exactly the same: having passed through three incalculable aeons cultivating hundreds of thousands of difficult ascetic practices, seeking out the noble Dharma-medicine for the sake of sentient beings, and having obtained it, he teaches it — yet these disciples, hearing it, hold it in contempt, and, instead of putting it into practice themselves, use it merely to seek fame and gain. This too involves two faults: first, their own affliction-illness is not thereby removed; second, the Buddha's own efforts are rendered futile. "Transgressing the Buddha's own teaching" means transgressing the World-Honored One's own noble teaching and its principles. "Unable to properly undertake the various points of training" means being unable to practice the Dharma in accordance with the Dharma. Further, as for their "committing an act of foolishness with respect to the noble teaching": this means they cut off the noble teaching, preventing it from continuing on — that is, the Buddha teaches them the unsurpassed Dharma, and if, upon hearing it, they practice it correctly and go on to teach it to others, who in turn practice it correctly and teach it to yet others still, this continuous chain of mutual benefit, unbroken and without end, is precisely what allows the Tathāgata's own noble teaching to remain unbroken. But these disciples, hearing the noble teaching, are unable to practice it correctly, and are likewise unable to go on and teach it to others — bringing no benefit to themselves, and no benefit to others either — and this is what is meant by "cutting off the noble teaching, preventing it from continuing on." It is on this account that they are said to "commit an act of foolishness." "Empty" means their own persons are not a fit vessel for the Dharma at all. "No fruit" means they render the Buddha's own hopeful intention fruitless — that is, the Buddha wishes sentient beings, upon hearing the Dharma, to be freed from the suffering of birth-and-death, yet these disciples, having heard the Dharma, are unable to practice the very means of escaping suffering, and so they render the Buddha's own hopeful intention fruitless. "No exit" means they are unable to attain the very excellent aim they originally sought when first going forth — namely, the pure upholding of the precepts. "No flavor" means they lack the flavor of meditative absorption. "No benefit" means they lack undistorted wisdom. "Transgressing the Buddha's own teaching" means failing to attain nirvāṇa — the Buddha teaches the correct Dharma precisely so that sentient beings may attain the happiness of nirvāṇa, and since these disciples are unable to realize it, they are said to "transgress" his teaching. "Unable to properly undertake the various points of training" means they are unable to properly undertake the various points of training the Buddha has established — some, though they do undertake the training, are unable to sustain it constantly, as with Bhaddāli, who could only undertake the practice after four months had passed during the rains retreat, with respect to the rule of eating in a single sitting; some, though they do sustain it constantly, do not fulfill it completely — both cases alike are called "being unable to properly undertake the points of training." It is on account of these causes and conditions that the Buddha rebuked his disciples, calling them "fools."

[The topic reads:] "There are six causes — namely, the correspondence-cause, and so on, up through the efficient-cause." One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute the theories of no-cause and of unbalanced cause. That is, various outsiders maintain either that dharmas arise without any cause at all, or that there exists an unbalanced cause behind them; in order to refute this position, and to show that dharmas certainly do arise from a cause, not from anything unbalanced, the treatise is composed. Some hold that there are those who maintain that the causal condition is not itself a real, existent thing at all — as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold;

in order to refute this position, and to show that the causal condition, whether in its own-nature or in its characteristic, is indeed a real, existent thing, the treatise is composed. There are yet others who say: it is in order to display the four fruits by means of the six causes, making them as clearly manifest as an āmalaka fruit held in the palm of one's hand — that is, the correspondence-cause and the co-existent-cause together display the human-effort fruit; the homogeneous-cause and the universally-pervasive-cause together display the homogeneous-outflow fruit; the ripening-cause displays the ripening fruit; and the efficient-cause displays the dominant fruit.

It is on account of these causes and conditions that the treatise is composed. Yet these six causes are not, in fact, stated by the discourses — the discourses speak only of four conditions: the nature of the causal condition, the nature of the immediately-antecedent condition, and so on, up through the nature of the dominant condition. The treatise now wishes to further analyze condition by means of cause, and so speaks of these six causes. One asks: does cause subsume condition, or does condition subsume cause? The answer: they mutually subsume one another, each according to its own particular matter — that is, the first five causes are themselves the causal condition, while the efficient cause is the remaining three conditions. Some hold instead: condition subsumes cause, not cause condition — that is, the first five causes are themselves the causal condition, and the efficient cause is the dominant condition, while the immediately-antecedent condition and the objective-support condition are not subsumed under cause at all. There are yet others who say: the six causes, too, are in fact stated by the discourses — namely, in the "increase-by-six" section of the Ekottarikāgama; but, over the great span of time since then, that particular passage has been lost and no longer survives. The Venerable Kātyāyanīputra and the others, by the power of their own wish-fulfilling knowledge, observed the very place within the discourses where the six causes were once stated, and compiled and composed the Abhidharma accordingly — and it is for this reason that the six causes are analyzed here. It is related that the Ekottarikāgama discourse, proceeding from a single-item category up through a hundred-item category, now survives only from the one-item category up through the ten-item category, everything beyond that having been lost;

and even within the one-item through ten-item categories, much has likewise been lost, with very little now remaining. It is related that the great arhat Śāṇakavāsin, a fellow-resident disciple of the Venerable Ānanda, and the personal teacher of the Great Virtuous Jīvaka, on the very day he entered final nirvāṇa, saw seventy-seven thousand birth-story discourses and ten thousand Abhidharma treatises vanish from existence, no longer to be found. If the passing of a single master of treatises already causes so vast a quantity of scripture and treatise to be lost, how much more, then, from that time onward, up to the present day, across the many hundreds, even thousands, of masters of treatises who have since passed away —

how could one possibly reckon how much scripture and treatise has been lost along with them? Hence these six causes are indeed stated by the discourses. There are yet other masters who say: although these six causes are not laid out completely, in sequence, within any single discourse, they are nonetheless spoken of, scattered here and there, throughout the various discourses — that is, the discourses speak of "this is called view, rooted in it, associated with confidence and knowledge," and such passages as these speak of the correspondence-cause; the discourses further speak of "the eye and form as conditions produce eye-consciousness; through this threefold combination, there is contact, and, arising together with it, feeling, perception, and volition," and such passages as these speak of the co-existent-cause; the discourses further speak of "such-and-such a person possesses both wholesome and unwholesome dharmas; the wholesome dharmas have become hidden, and the unwholesome ones have come to manifest, yet there remains a concomitant wholesome root not yet cut off — and since it is not yet cut off, from this wholesome root there remains the possibility of further wholesome roots arising, so that, in the future, this person will still possess pure dharmas," and such passages as these speak of the homogeneous-cause; the discourses further speak of "whatever bodily, verbal, and mental karma, whatever aspirations and desires, all those who hold wrong views bring about, and whatever formations belong to that same class — all such dharmas alike are capable of bringing forth a disagreeable, unpleasant, undesirable result," and such passages as these speak of the universally-pervasive-cause; the discourses further speak of "there is no case whatsoever in which evil conduct of body, speech, or mind receives a desirable ripening; there is indeed a case in which it receives an undesirable ripening," and such passages as these speak of the ripening-cause; the discourses further speak of "two causes and two conditions are able to give rise to right view — namely, another's own voice, and one's own internal correct reasoning-attention," and such passages as these speak of the efficient-cause. Hence these six causes are indeed spoken by the Buddha himself, and it is on this basis that the Venerable Kātyāyanīputra composed the treatise in dependence on the discourses.

[The topic reads:] "What is the correspondence-cause?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest the correct principle. That is, some maintain that mind and mental factors arise one after another, in sequence, never all at once — as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold, saying: mind and mental factors, in dependence on their various causes and conditions, arise one after another, just as merchants traveling together along a narrow, treacherous path must cross it one at a time, never two abreast — mind and mental factors are exactly the same, arising one at a time through the coming-together of their many respective conditions, since the particular conditions each one depends on differ from one another in each case. The Ābhidharmikas reply: mind and mental factors do indeed each have their own distinct cause, and so it can indeed be said that their coming-together of conditions differs from case to case; yet, since each has its own distinct cause, it can equally be said that their coming-together of conditions does not differ at all — that is, mind and mental factors, though each distinct, do indeed each possess their own arising, abiding, changing, and ceasing, arising through a coming-together of conditions, and so it can be said their coming-together differs; yet, since they equally depend on the very same faculty and take the very same object as their condition for arising, it can equally be said that every such coming-together does not differ at all — and so all mind and mental factors, each as appropriate, arise together, at the very same time. Others, again, maintain that dharmas each correspond only to their own nature, never to another's — they say as follows: mutual delight is the very meaning of "correspondence," and no dharma can mutually delight together with another dharma, in the way one's own nature could delight with itself. The Ābhidharmikas reply: it is the coming-together of two distinct things that can properly be called "correspondence" — there is no sense of correspondence within a single thing alone, nor is there any such thing as a self-nature delighting in itself, since the capacity to take an object and the object taken are themselves genuinely distinct. Others, again, maintain that a self-nature, with respect to itself, is neither correspondent nor non-correspondent — they say as follows: correspondence, properly speaking, requires uniting with something else; a self-nature, with respect to itself, has no "other" to unite with, and so cannot properly be called "correspondent"; yet mutual delight is the very meaning of correspondence, and since a self-nature does indeed delight deeply in itself, it cannot properly be called "non-correspondent" either.

The Ābhidharmikas reply: there is no such thing as a self-nature delighting in itself — the reasoning being exactly as explained above.

Others, again, maintain that the sense of one thing being sustained by another's power is the very meaning of correspondence — they say as follows: if one dharma arises sustained by the power of another dharma, this dharma is thereby correspondent with that other — hence mind is correspondent with mind, since mind's own power sustains mind, enabling it to arise; a mental factor is correspondent with mind, since mind's own power sustains that mental factor, enabling it to arise; yet mind is not correspondent with a mental factor, since mind does not arise sustained by that mental factor's own power,

and a mental factor is not correspondent with another mental factor, since neither arises sustained by the other's own power. The Ābhidharmikas reply:

mind is sustained by mental factors, and mental factors are sustained by mind, and mental factors are all mutually sustained by one another's power, thereby arising — hence they mutually correspond with one another. As for a single body having two minds arising side by side — this simply never happens, and so there is no sense of "correspondence" involved there at all. In order to refute these various distinct positions and manifest the correct principle, the treatise is composed. What is the correspondence-cause? The answer: feeling serves as a correspondence-cause for the dharmas associated with feeling, and the dharmas associated with feeling serve as a correspondence-cause for feeling; and the same holds for perception, volition, contact, attention, desire, resolute conviction, mindfulness, and concentration; wisdom serves as a correspondence-cause for the dharmas associated with wisdom, and the dharmas associated with wisdom serve as a correspondence-cause for wisdom. This is what is meant by the correspondence-cause. One asks: why does the treatise here not mention mind itself? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some hold: mind, too, ought to be mentioned, and that it is not mentioned should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete, since the meaning of each of the six causes, as stated, is not exhaustively spelled out in every case. If one were to state the matter in a fully exhaustive, complete manner, one ought to say as follows: what is the correspondence-cause? All mind and mental factors. What is the co-existent-cause? All conditioned dharmas. What is the homogeneous-cause? All past and present dharmas. What is the universally-pervasive-cause? All past and present universally-pervasive latent tendencies, together with the dharmas associated and co-existent with them. What is the ripening-cause? All unwholesome dharmas, and all wholesome contaminated dharmas. What is the efficient-cause? All dharmas. There are those who say that even were the matter stated in this way, it would still not be fully exhaustive, since one would still not know, in any given case, which specific dharma serves as cause for which other. Hence the position that this discussion is left incomplete is the sounder one, the treatise's own authors having simply given a brief, representative sample as the root case. There are yet other masters who say: mind has, in fact, already been mentioned within what is stated here, since the dharmas associated with feeling, and the dharmas associated with wisdom, already include mind itself. One asks: why does the treatise not mention mind's own particular characteristic directly? The answer: equality and resemblance are themselves the very meaning of correspondence; mind, being supreme like a sovereign king, is for this reason not mentioned directly, as a verse states:

"the sixth is the sovereign king — while defiled, he grasps for himself; even the undefiled comes to be defiled — the defiled one is called a fool." There are yet others who say: it is with reference to concentration that mind is subsumed. Some say: "mind" itself is what "concentration" here refers to, and, mind having already been mentioned, it is not separately mentioned again. One asks: why does the treatise speak only of the ten universal mental factors as correspondence-cause, and not of any other dharmas? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: it ought to be mentioned but is not, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Some say: only whatever dharma is found across every realm, every stage, every destiny, every mode of birth, every category, and every mind is spoken of here; other dharmas, not being so, are not mentioned. One asks: what does "universal mental factor" actually mean? The answer: "great" refers to mind — these ten dharmas belong to the very ground from which mind arises, the "great ground," and it is this great ground itself that is spoken of as the "great-ground dharmas." Some say: mind is called "great" because its own substance and function are supreme, and it is this very greatness that constitutes the "ground," hence "great ground," since it is the very basis all mental factors depend upon; feeling and the other nine, being found universally across every instance of this great ground, are called the "great-ground dharmas." Some say: feeling and the other nine are called "great" because they pervade every class of mind, and mind is their own "ground," hence "great ground"; feeling and the rest, being what this great ground itself possesses, are called the "great-ground dharmas." One asks: why are they called "mental factors"? The answer: because they belong to mind. One asks: why do mind and mental factors mutually serve as a correspondence-cause for one another? The answer: because they mutually serve as cause for one another; because they mutually arise through one another's power; because they mutually draw one another forth; because they mutually nourish one another; because they mutually augment one another; because they mutually depend on one another — just as two bundles of reeds, leaning against each other, are able to stand; just as many strands of rope, twisted together, are able to drag a great log; just as many people, joining hands together, are able to cross a great river — conditioned dharmas, being feeble by nature, are able to accomplish their own function only by depending on one another in this mutual way. One asks: if one said to feeling, "could you, apart from perception, still apprehend an object?" — the answer would be, "no, I could not." And the same holds for whatever other mind or mental factor one might ask this same question of. One asks: what is the very own-nature of the correspondence-cause? The answer: all mind and mental factors — that is, it is included within three aggregates and a small portion of a fourth, one sense field and a small portion of another, and seven elements and a small portion of an eighth. Its own substance has now been stated; what should be stated next follows. One asks: what does "correspondence" actually mean?

The answer: equality is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: the mental factors present may be more or fewer in any given case — a wholesome mind has more mental factors than an unwholesome one, an unwholesome mind has more than a defiled-but-indeterminate one, a defiled-but-indeterminate mind has more than an undefiled-and-indeterminate one, a desire-realm mind has more than a form-realm one, a form-realm mind has more than a formless-realm one, and a contaminated mind has more than an uncontaminated one — how, then, can equality be the very meaning of correspondence? The answer: equality is spoken of with reference to the equality of substance involved, not the equality of number — were it the case that a single mind could have two instances of feeling but only one of perception, this could indeed not be called "equal"; but since a single mind has only a single instance of feeling and a single instance of perception, and likewise for every other factor, equality is indeed the very meaning of correspondence. Further, equal inseparability is the very meaning of correspondence.

Further, equal non-differentiation is the very meaning of correspondence. Further, equal operation is the very meaning of correspondence — just as, when a cart turns, every one of its parts turns together, accomplishing a single task, so too, when the cart of mind turns toward its object, its mental factors turn together with it, jointly accomplishing a single task — and it is for this reason that they are called "correspondent." Further, equal activity is the very meaning of correspondence — just as autumn pigeons and the like arrive at their feeding ground together, feed together, and rise together all at once, mind and mental factors are exactly the same, neither before nor after one another, moving toward their object together, experiencing their object together, and relinquishing their object together — and it is for this reason that they are called "correspondent." Further, equal mutual accord is the very meaning of correspondence — just as people in accord with one another are said to be "in correspondence," mind and mental factors in accord with one another are exactly the same. Further, equal coming-together is the very meaning of correspondence — just as water and milk mixed together are said to be "combined," mind and mental factors coming together are exactly the same. The Venerable Meghika said: correspondence is so named because of the equality of four matters — first, equality of time-period, since mind and mental factors alike occur within the very same single moment; second, equality of support, since mind and mental factors alike occur in dependence on the very same single faculty; third, equality of object, since mind and mental factors alike occur taking the very same single object; fourth, equality of aspect, since mind and mental factors alike occur bearing the very same single aspect.

Further, correspondence is so named because of the equality of five matters — the four matters just named, together with equality of substance, that is, mind and each mental factor being, each in its own right, a single, distinct thing,

arising together in combination, and it is for this reason that they are called "correspondent." Further, the sense of bundled reeds is the very meaning of correspondence — just as a single reed, on its own, cannot stand upright,

requiring many bundled together in order to stand, mind and mental factors are exactly the same, requiring many mutually depending on one another in order to operate in the world, taking up an effect, giving rise to an effect, and taking an object. Further, the sense of joined cords is the very meaning of correspondence — just as a single strand alone cannot drag timber, but many strands joined together do have the power to drag it, mind and mental factors are exactly the same, exactly as explained at length above. Further, the sense of joined hands is the very meaning of correspondence — just as, when a river's current runs swift, one person alone cannot cross it, but many people joining hands together are able to cross it, mind and mental factors are exactly the same, exactly as explained at length above. Further, the sense of a merchant caravan is the very meaning of correspondence — just as many merchants, joined together as companions, are able to cross a dangerous road, mind and mental factors are exactly the same, exactly as explained above. The Venerable Vasumitra explained it thus: the sense of mutually drawing forth is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: if that is so, then eye-consciousness and mental consciousness, too, mutually draw one another forth — are they, then, correspondent? The answer: their own supports differ; only when they share the same support and mutually draw one another forth are they truly correspondent. Further, the sense of inseparability is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: if that is so, then the four great elements, too, are inseparable from one another — are they, then, correspondent? The answer: they have no support at all; only when there is a support, and inseparability besides, is there true correspondence. Further, the sense of possessing an object is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: if that is so, then all six consciousnesses possess an object — are they, then, correspondent with one another? The answer: their own supports differ; only when they share the same support and possess an object is there true correspondence. Further, the sense of sharing the same object is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: if that is so, then each of the five sense-consciousnesses, sharing the same object as mental consciousness, ought to be called correspondent with it, and, further, many instances of eye-consciousness ought to be called correspondent with one another, as when many sentient beings all together observe the very same new moon. The answer: their own supports differ; only when they share the same support and the same object is there true correspondence. Further, the sense of constant combination is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: if that is so, then vitality, warmth, and consciousness, these three, too, are constantly combined together — are they, then, correspondent? The answer: no, since vitality and warmth are two dharmas without any support of their own at all; only when there is a support, and constant combination besides, is there true correspondence. Further, the sense of perpetual co-arising is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: if that is so, then the four great elements, too, perpetually co-arise — are they, then, correspondent? The answer: they have no support at all; only when there is a support, and perpetual co-arising besides, is there true correspondence. Further, the sense of co-arising, co-abiding, and co-ceasing is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: if that is so, then form that follows along with mind, and the formations dissociated from mind that follow along with mind, too, co-arise, co-abide, and co-cease — are they, then, correspondent? The answer: they have no support at all; only when there is a support, and co-arising, co-abiding, and co-ceasing besides, is there true correspondence.

Further, the sense of operating with the same support, the same object, and the same aspect all together is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: how is this known to be so? The answer: how could it possibly be otherwise? Further, the sense of jointly accomplishing a single task is the very meaning of correspondence. One asks: if that is so, then forbearance and knowledge, too, jointly accomplish a single task — are they, then, correspondent? The answer: these do not arise simultaneously; only when they arise at the very same time, jointly accomplishing a single task, is there true correspondence. The Great Virtuous One explained: the sense of being companions together is the very meaning of correspondence — consciousness and its mental factors mutually accommodate and receive one another, arising at the very same time, jointly taking up the very same object — this alone is true correspondence. The Venerable Ghoṣa explained it thus: the sense of sharing, in every respect, the same support, the same object, the same aspect, and the same activity is the very meaning of correspondence — why is this? Because conditioned dharmas, being feeble by nature, can only arise and function by mutually sustaining one another through their own power — one has never observed a single universal mental factor arising and functioning entirely on its own. This correspondence-cause certainly pervades all three time-periods, and possesses a human-effort fruit.

[The topic reads:] "What is the co-existent-cause?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: what difference is there between the correspondence-cause and the co-existent-cause? Some say: there is no difference at all — since, within a single moment, feeling and perception and the like serve as both causes for one another. Hence it should be said: whatever is a correspondence-cause is thereby also a co-existent-cause; but there is a case of a co-existent-cause that is not a correspondence-cause — namely, whatever co-existent-cause is dissociated from mind. On this position, the two causes do genuinely differ — although grounded in the same underlying dharmas, their meaning is distinct. One asks: if that is so, what difference is there, specifically, between the two causes? The answer: the very names themselves already differ — one is called "correspondence-cause," the other "co-existent-cause." Further, the sense of being companions together is the meaning of the correspondence-cause; the sense of sharing the very same single fruit is the meaning of the co-existent-cause. Further, the sense of sharing the same single support, the same single aspect, and the same single object is the meaning of the correspondence-cause; the sense of sharing the same single arising, the same single aging, the same single abiding, the same single ceasing, the same single fruit, the same single homogeneous-outflow, and the same single ripening is the meaning of the co-existent-cause. Further, the sense of grasping a staff together is the meaning of the correspondence-cause; the sense of, having grasped the staff together, thereby accomplishing some task, is the meaning of the co-existent-cause.

Further, the sense of joining hands together is the meaning of the correspondence-cause; the sense of, having joined hands together, thereby crossing a raging river, is the meaning of the co-existent-cause. Further, the sense of mutual accordance is the meaning of the correspondence-cause; the sense of inseparability is the meaning of the co-existent-cause. What is the co-existent-cause? The answer: mind serves as a co-existent-cause for mental factors, and mental factors serve as a co-existent-cause for mind. One asks: why did the treatise not mention mind directly in the earlier discussion of the correspondence-cause, yet does mention mind directly here in the co-existent-cause? The answer: equality is the very meaning of the correspondence-cause, and since mind, as sovereign, is supreme over the mental factors, the sense of equality between them is not clearly manifest, and so mind is not mentioned there; jointly accomplishing a single task is the very meaning of the co-existent-cause, and since mind and mental factors are alike in accomplishing their task together, mind is mentioned here. Here, "mind" refers to every kind of mind, and "mental factors" likewise refers to every kind of mental factor, each mutually serving as a co-existent-cause for the other, as appropriate. Mind serves as a co-existent-cause together with the bodily and verbal karma that follows along with mind. "Bodily and verbal karma that follows along with mind" refers to the restraint of dhyāna and the uncontaminated restraint. One asks: why does the treatise here not state that the bodily and verbal karma following mind serves, in turn, as a co-existent-cause for mind? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: it ought to be stated but is not, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete,

since, as stated before, the meaning of each of the six causes, as stated here, is not exhaustively spelled out in every case. Some say: this passage states the beginning and end in full, but abbreviates the middle, its meaning being inferable by analogy — and so it is not stated. There are yet other masters who say: mind is able to serve as cause for the bodily and verbal karma that follows along with it, without itself following that karma's own course, since mind is the superior of the two; the bodily and verbal karma that follows along with mind, by contrast, does follow mind's own course, and so cannot serve as cause for it in return, since it is the inferior of the two — just as a king is able to grant rank and salary to his ministers without following their own course, while a minister, following the king's own course, cannot in turn grant rank and salary to the king — the case here is exactly the same.

The verdict: mind and the bodily and verbal karma that follows along with it do indeed mutually serve as a co-existent-cause for one another — why is this? Because they share the very same fruit, and jointly accomplish a single task together. One asks: if that is so, why does the treatise not state this here? The answer: for the three reasons already stated above.

Mind serves as a co-existent-cause together with the formations dissociated from mind that follow along with mind, and these dissociated formations that follow along with mind, in turn, serve as a co-existent-cause together with mind.

One asks: which formations dissociated from mind, following along with mind, serve as cause for mind in this mutual way? The answer: mind and mental factors, and the bodily and verbal karma following along with mind, together with their own arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, mutually serve as cause with mind. Here, some say: mind serves as a co-existent-cause together with its own arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, yet only its own arising and abiding serve, in turn, as a co-existent-cause for mind, not its aging or impermanence, since only what enhances something is properly called its cause, while aging and impermanence, being dharmas of decline and dissolution, cannot properly be called causes. Some say: mind serves as a co-existent-cause together with its own arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, and its own arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, in turn, all serve as a co-existent-cause for mind, since all mutually assist one another in jointly accomplishing a single task. Some say: mind serves as a co-existent-cause together with mind and mental factors, and the bodily and verbal karma following along with mind, together with their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, yet only mind's own arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence serve, in turn, as a co-existent-cause for mind, not the arising and the rest of anything else. The verdict: it should be said that mind, together with mind and mental factors, and the bodily and verbal karma following along with mind, together with their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, all mutually serve as a co-existent-cause for one another. How is this known to be so? The Prakaraṇapāda states: what are the dharmas that are a co-existent-cause of mind? All mental factors, the restraint co-existent with the path, the restraint co-existent with concentration, and mind, together with the arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence of these various dharmas. One asks: if that is so, how is a further statement of the Prakaraṇapāda to be reconciled with this — namely, that "there is a case of the truth of suffering serving as a cause for identity-view, and a case of the truth of suffering not serving as a cause for identity-view" —

that is, "excluding the latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering, past and present, and their associated truth of suffering; excluding the universally-pervasive latent tendencies abandoned by seeing origination, past and present, and their associated truth of suffering; excluding the future truth of suffering associated with identity-view; excluding the future arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence of identity-view — every other defiled truth of suffering" does serve as a cause for identity-view? The answer: the Prakaraṇapāda ought properly to have stated: "excluding the latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering, past and present, and their associated and co-existent truth of suffering; excluding the universally-pervasive latent tendencies abandoned by seeing origination, past and present, and their associated and co-existent truth of suffering; excluding the future truth of suffering associated with identity-view; excluding the future identity-view itself and its associated dharmas, together with their arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence — every other defiled truth of suffering" does serve as a cause — and that it does not state the matter this way, though it ought properly to, should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete.

Further, the four great elements, arising together, mutually serve as a co-existent-cause for one another — this, then, is what is meant by the co-existent-cause. Here, there are those who hold that the substance of the four great elements admits of no unequal predominance among them; they say as follows: the earth element serves as a co-existent-cause for the other three elements, and the other three serve, in turn, as a co-existent-cause for the earth element — and the same holds, in this way, for the wind element as well. There are others who hold that the substance of the four great elements does admit of unequal predominance among them; they say as follows:

the earth element serves as a co-existent-cause for all four elements together, and all four elements, in turn, serve as a co-existent-cause for the earth element — why is this?

Because the earth element possesses multiple constituent particles, among which one particle serves as a co-existent-cause for the many, and the many, in turn, serve as a co-existent-cause for the one — and the same holds, in this way, for the wind element as well. The verdict: it should be said that, whether the substance of the four great elements admits of unequal predominance or not, the earth element serves as a co-existent-cause for the other three, and the other three, in turn, serve as a co-existent-cause for the earth element — why is this? Because the earth element does not depend on the earth element itself in order to give rise to derived form, since no dharma ever depends on its own nature, or on another instance of the very same kind, in order to serve as its cause — and the same holds, in this way, for the wind element as well. One asks: does an as-yet-unarisen instance of the four great elements likewise serve as a co-existent-cause? The answer: it, too, is indeed a co-existent-cause, since it falls within the meaning of "cause," and possesses the very characteristic of a cause. Some say: it is not a co-existent-cause —

this passage here speaks only of the four great elements, having arisen together, mutually serving as a co-existent-cause for one another. The verdict: it should be said that both the arisen and the as-yet-unarisen instances of the four great elements alike mutually serve as a co-existent-cause for one another — here, the word "arisen" refers to the very capacity for arising, or to being joined together with arising, exactly as the Prakaraṇapāda states: what are the dharmas produced by a cause? All conditioned dharmas — just as that passage's own word "produced" refers to both what is already produced and what is not yet produced, the case here is exactly the same.

One asks: does derived form possess a co-existent-cause? The answer: yes, since every conditioned dharma possesses the marks of arising and the rest, which serve as a co-existent-cause for it. One asks: does derived form serve as a co-existent-cause for other derived form? The answer: yes, it does serve as a co-existent-cause — as with derived form that follows along with mind. One asks: does resistant derived form serve as a co-existent-cause for other resistant derived form? The answer: no. Some say: it does indeed, as with the eye faculty and the like, where many atomic particles, arising together, mutually serve as a co-existent-cause for one another. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained; the position stated first is the sound one — why is this? Because sharing the very same single fruit is the very meaning of the co-existent-cause, and these particles do not share the very same single fruit. Now, every kind of mind possesses what follows along with it — namely, the mental factors, and their marks of arising and the rest — yet not every kind of mind possesses bodily and verbal karma and form that follows along with it. What follows along with mind is, in total, of ten kinds: a single arising, a single abiding, a single ceasing, a single fruit, a single homogeneous-outflow, and a single ripening; wholesome if the mind is wholesome, unwholesome if unwholesome, indeterminate if indeterminate, each according to a single time-period. "A single fruit" refers to the fruit of freedom from binding; "a single homogeneous-outflow" refers to the homogeneous-outflow fruit;

"a single ripening" refers to the ripening fruit. Stated separately, according to each particular dharma, how many or few of these ten apply will be explained in the Faculties Chapter. One asks: what is the very own-nature of "what follows along with mind"? The answer: four aggregates, or five aggregates — in the desire realm and the formless realm, four aggregates, since there is no form following along with mind there; in the form realm, five aggregates, since form does follow along with mind there. Its own substance has now been stated; what should be stated next follows. One asks: why is it called "following along with mind"? The answer: the sense of mutual accordance is the very meaning of "following along";

the sense of mutual inclusion and benefit is the very meaning of "following along"; the sense of jointly accomplishing a single task is the very meaning of "following along" — as if the dharma that follows along with mind were to say to mind itself: "whatever task you undertake, I undertake it as well." Mind and mental factors, considered in mutual relation to one another, are said to "follow along" with reference to five matters — namely, support, object, aspect, fruit, and ripening. Mind, considered in mutual relation to the form and the formations dissociated from mind that follow along with it, is said to "follow along" with reference to only two matters — namely, fruit and ripening.