The Grass That Grows Without a Seed

One asks: which bodily and verbal karma follows along with mind, and which does not? The answer: the form realm's own precepts, together with the uncontaminated precepts, follow along with mind; the desire realm's own precepts, and every other bodily and verbal karma, do not follow along with mind. One asks: why do the desire realm's own precepts not follow along with mind? The answer: the desire realm is, with respect to a mind-following precept of this kind, neither a fit field nor a fit vessel — and so on, as stated at length. Further, the desire realm is not a realm of concentration, not a stage of cultivation, and not a stage of freedom from defilement, and so it possesses no path-precept of this kind capable of following mind; the form realm, being a realm of concentration, a stage of cultivation, and a stage of freedom from defilement, does possess a path-precept of this kind capable of following mind. Further, as to the meaning of the desire realm's own precept: one asks, suppose a desire-realm mind were to say to it, "are you able, for my sake, to cut off precept-violation and the afflictions that give rise to precept-violation? If you are able, I shall follow your own course" — this is the meaning of a desire-realm mind. The answer: the desire realm's own precept would have to reply, "I am not able" — this is the very meaning of this precept; and, being unable, it could then be asked, "if you are not able, why should I follow your course at all?" — it is just as when a person, frightened of an enemy, asks another, "are you able to protect and rescue me? If you are able, I shall rely on you and follow your own course" — and that other replies, "I am not able" — whereupon the first person says, "if you are not able, why should I rely on you at all? You should instead follow my own course" — the case here is exactly the same. One asks: do all wholesome minds of the form realm possess a mind-following precept? The answer: not all do — that is, the first dhyāna has six kinds of wholesome mind lacking a mind-following precept: first, wholesome eye-consciousness; second, wholesome ear-consciousness; third, wholesome body-consciousness; fourth, the wholesome mind at the moment of death; fifth, the wholesome mind giving rise to manifest action; sixth, the wholesome mind associated with wisdom born of learning. The second, third, and fourth dhyānas have two kinds of wholesome mind lacking a mind-following precept — namely, the wholesome mind at the moment of death, and the mind associated with wisdom born of learning. One asks: why does the formless realm have no mind-following precept at all? The answer: that realm is, with respect to a precept of this kind, neither a fit field nor a fit vessel — and so on, as stated at length. Further, precept is included as a portion of material form, and since that realm has no material form at all, it likewise has no precept. Further, precept is composed of the great elements, and since that realm has no great elements at all, it likewise has no precept.

One asks: just as, although there are no uncontaminated great elements, there is still an uncontaminated precept, why, then, should the absence of great elements in that realm prevent it from having a precept? The answer: the uncontaminated precept does not become uncontaminated through the power of the great elements at all, but solely through the power of mind, arising together with the uncontaminated mind it accompanies; the contaminated precept, by contrast, is bound to a particular realm and stage through the power of the great elements — and so the two cases are not analogous. Further, precept serves as the antidote to precept-violation and to the afflictions that give rise to precept-violation; the formless realm's own path is unable to serve as an antidote to precept-violation and its afflictions, and so that realm has no precept. One asks — a further question arising from this very discussion — why is the formless realm's own path unable to serve as an antidote to precept-violation and its afflictions? The answer: precept-violation belongs only to the desire realm, and the formless realm is separated from the desire realm by four kinds of distance, and so possesses no antidote to it. These four kinds of distance are: first, distance of realm and stage; second, distance of support; third, distance of object; fourth, distance of antidote. One asks: if that is so, then the second, third, and fourth dhyānas, too, are free of precept-violation and its afflictions — ought they not, then, likewise to lack any precept as an antidote to them? The answer: antidote is of two kinds: first, the antidote of cutting off; second, the antidote of wearying and destroying. The three higher dhyānas, with respect to precept-violation and its afflictions, lack the antidote of cutting off, yet do possess the antidote of wearying and destroying — as the World-Honored One states: a noble disciple who has entered the unshakable liberation of mind is able to cut off the unwholesome and cultivate the wholesome — not because there is still something unwholesome remaining within his own body to be cut off, but because this is spoken with reference to the antidote directed against the very faults themselves. The formless realm, with respect to precept-violation and its afflictions, possesses neither the antidote of cutting off nor the antidote of wearying and destroying, and so it has no precept at all.

Mind-following precept, in total, is of two kinds: first, the precept co-existent with the path; second, the precept co-existent with concentration. The precept co-existent with the path is the uncontaminated precept; the precept co-existent with concentration is the form realm's own precept. Whatever is a path-co-existent precept is not a concentration-co-existent precept, and whatever is a concentration-co-existent precept is not a path-co-existent precept. Some say instead: the path-co-existent precept is the uncontaminated precept, while the concentration-co-existent precept is every mind-following precept, whether contaminated or uncontaminated. On this position, every path-co-existent precept is also a concentration-co-existent precept, though there is a case of a concentration-co-existent precept that is not path-co-existent — namely, a contaminated mind-following precept. There are yet other masters who say: the path-co-existent precept is the uncontaminated precept, while the concentration-co-existent precept is the contaminated or uncontaminated precept belonging to a fundamental dhyāna. On this position, four alternatives should be formulated: there is a case of a path-co-existent precept that is not concentration-co-existent — namely, any uncontaminated precept of a proximate stage; there is a case of a concentration-co-existent precept that is not path-co-existent — namely, any contaminated precept of a fundamental stage; there is a case of a precept that is both path-co-existent and concentration-co-existent — namely, any uncontaminated precept of a fundamental stage; there is a case of a precept that is neither path-co-existent nor concentration-co-existent — namely, any contaminated precept of a proximate stage. These masters, with reference to attainment, further formulate four alternatives: there is a case of attaining the path-co-existent precept but not the concentration-co-existent precept — namely, during the sixteen moments of entering the certainty of rightness while not yet free of the desire realm's defilement; or, for one already free of the desire realm's defilement who enters the certainty of rightness in dependence on the stage of proximate concentration, during the fifteen moments of the path of seeing; or, for noble ones giving rise to the preparatory path in order to become free of the desire realm's defilement, across the nine uninterrupted paths and eight paths of liberation; or, for one not yet free of the desire realm's defilement who, through resolute faith, sharpens his own faculties, undertaking the preparatory, uninterrupted, and liberation paths belonging to one who has attained vision; or, for noble ones not yet free of the desire realm's defilement, in dependence on the stage of proximate concentration,

giving rise to the immeasurables, the contemplation of impurity, mindfulness of breathing, the foundations of mindfulness, and the like — at all such times, one attains the path-co-existent precept but not the concentration-co-existent precept.

There is a case of attaining the concentration-co-existent precept but not the path-co-existent precept — namely, for ordinary beings, at the very last liberation-path moment of becoming free of the desire realm's defilement; or that same being, in order to become free of the first dhyāna's defilement, giving rise to the preparatory path in dependence on the first dhyāna, together with the very last liberation-path moment; or that same being, in order to become free of the second dhyāna's defilement, giving rise to the preparatory path in dependence on the second dhyāna, together with the very last liberation-path moment; or that same being, in order to become free of the third dhyāna's defilement, giving rise to the preparatory path in dependence on the third dhyāna, together with the very last liberation-path moment; or that same being, in order to become free of the fourth dhyāna's defilement, giving rise to the preparatory path in dependence on the fourth dhyāna; or, for ordinary beings, in dependence on a fundamental dhyāna, giving rise to the preparatory path for drawing forth the supernormal powers, across the five uninterrupted paths and three paths of liberation; or when giving rise to the immeasurables, the contemplation of impurity, mindfulness of breathing, the foundations of mindfulness, heat, summit, forbearance, and supreme mundane dharma, the first three liberations, the eight bases of mastery, the first eight totality-spheres; or at the moment of dying in the formless realm and being reborn in the form realm, or dying in a higher stage of the form realm and being reborn in a lower one — at all such times, one attains the concentration-co-existent precept but not the path-co-existent precept. There is a case of attaining both the path-co-existent and the concentration-co-existent precept together — namely, for one already free of the desire realm's defilement, in dependence on the stage of proximate concentration, at the moment of the subsequent-knowledge of the path upon entering the certainty of rightness; or, for one entering the certainty of rightness in dependence on a higher stage, during the sixteen moments; or, for noble ones, at the very last liberation-path moment of becoming free of the desire realm's defilement, and that same being's preparatory paths, nine uninterrupted paths, and nine liberation paths, in order to become free of the first dhyāna's defilement, and so on, up through the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's defilement; or, for one already free of the desire realm's defilement, sharpening his own faculties through resolute faith to become one of vision, at the moment of the preparatory, uninterrupted, and liberation paths involved; or for one liberated as an arhat sharpening his faculties to become unshakable, across the preparatory paths, nine uninterrupted paths, and nine liberation paths; or when mixing the cultivation of the first dhyāna through the fourth dhyāna together; or, for noble ones, giving rise to the preparatory path for drawing forth the supernormal powers, across the five uninterrupted paths and three liberation paths; or, for noble ones already free of the desire realm's defilement, in dependence on the stage of proximate concentration, giving rise together to the immeasurables, the liberations, the bases of mastery, the totality-spheres, the contemplation of impurity, mindfulness of breathing, and the foundations of mindfulness; or when giving rise to unobstructed understanding, the concentration at the very limit of existence, the freedom-from-contention wisdom, the wish-fulfilling knowledge, the concentrations of emptiness-within-emptiness, wishlessness-within-wishlessness, and signlessness-within-signlessness, and the subtle mind of that final concentration — at all such times, one attains both the path-co-existent and the concentration-co-existent precept together. There is a case of attaining neither the path-co-existent nor the concentration-co-existent precept — namely, for ordinary beings giving rise to the preparatory path, nine uninterrupted paths, and eight liberation paths, in order to become free of the desire realm's defilement, giving rise to heat, summit, forbearance, and supreme mundane dharma in dependence on the stage of proximate concentration or the intermediate dhyāna; or, for ordinary beings, in dependence on the proximate stage of the second, third, or fourth dhyāna, giving rise to the preparatory path, nine uninterrupted paths, and eight liberation paths, in order to become free of the first, second, or third dhyāna's defilement; or, for ordinary beings, in dependence on the proximate stage of the sphere of boundless space through the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, giving rise to the preparatory path, nine uninterrupted paths, and nine liberation paths, in order to become free of the fourth dhyāna's through the sphere of nothingness's defilement; or, for ordinary beings, whether not yet free or already free of the desire realm's defilement, in dependence on the stage of proximate concentration and the like, or a formless concentration, giving rise to the immeasurables, the liberations, the bases of mastery, the totality-spheres, and the contemplation of impurity, mindfulness of breathing, and the foundations of mindfulness, and other such virtues; or, for noble ones, in dependence on the stage of proximate concentration and the like, giving rise to and accomplishing contaminated or uncontaminated virtues; or, in dependence on a formless concentration, giving rise to and accomplishing contaminated or uncontaminated virtues; or during every state of non-concentration and every mindless stage — at all such times, one attains neither the path-co-existent nor the concentration-co-existent precept. These masters, with reference to relinquishment, further formulate four alternatives: there is a case of relinquishing the path-co-existent precept but not the concentration-co-existent precept — namely, upon attaining the fruit of stream-entry or once-returning, or, for one proceeding gradually, upon attaining the fruit of non-returning; or, for one not yet free of the desire realm's defilement, sharpening his own faculties through resolute faith and attaining the status of one of vision, at the moment of retrogression from the once-returner's own superior fruit-path from the once-returner's fruit, and from the stream-enterer's own superior fruit-path from the stream-enterer's fruit — "retrogression from the stream-enterer's fruit" here meaning retrogression from the fruit attained through sharpening one's own faculties — at all such times, one relinquishes the path-co-existent precept but not the concentration-co-existent precept. There is a case of relinquishing the concentration-co-existent precept but not the path-co-existent precept — namely, for ordinary beings, upon retrogressing from freedom from the desire realm's defilement, and so on, up through retrogressing from freedom from the third dhyāna's defilement; or, for ordinary beings and noble ones alike, upon dying in the desire or form realm and being reborn in the formless realm, or dying in the form realm and being reborn in the desire realm; or, for ordinary beings, upon retrogressing from a superior virtue of a fundamental stage — at all such times, one relinquishes the concentration-co-existent precept but not the path-co-existent precept. There is a case of relinquishing both the path-co-existent and the concentration-co-existent precept together — namely, for noble ones, upon retrogressing from freedom from the desire realm's defilement, and so on, up through retrogressing from freedom from the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's defilement; or, in dependence on the four dhyānas and the intermediate dhyāna, attaining the fruit of non-returning; or, upon attaining the fruit of arhatship, already free of the desire realm's defilement, sharpening one's own faculties through resolute faith and attaining the status of one of vision; or, for one liberated as an arhat sharpening his faculties and attaining the unshakable status; or, at the moment of retrogression from the non-returner's own superior fruit-path from the non-returner's fruit, and from the arhat's own superior fruit-path from the arhat's fruit — at all such times, one relinquishes both the path-co-existent and the concentration-co-existent precept. There is a case of relinquishing neither — namely, every other stage apart from the ones just described. These masters, with reference to possession, further formulate four alternatives: there is a case of possessing the path-co-existent precept but not the concentration-co-existent precept —

namely, noble ones not yet free of the desire realm's defilement. There is a case of possessing the concentration-co-existent precept but not the path-co-existent precept — namely, for ordinary beings born in the desire realm who have already become free of its defilement, or for ordinary beings born in the form realm. There is a case of possessing both together — namely, for noble ones born in the desire realm who have already become free of its defilement, or for noble ones born in the form or formless realm. There is a case of possessing neither — namely, for ordinary beings not yet free of the desire realm's defilement, or for ordinary beings born in the formless realm. With reference to non-possession, four alternatives are likewise formulated — namely, the second alternative just given becomes the present first; the first alternative just given becomes the present second; the fourth alternative just given becomes the present third; and the third alternative just given becomes the present fourth.

Every kind of restraint, in total, is of four kinds: first, the restraint of individual liberation; second, the restraint of dhyāna; third, uncontaminated restraint; fourth, the restraint of cutting-off. The restraint of individual liberation refers to the desire realm's own precept; the restraint of dhyāna refers to the form realm's own precept; uncontaminated restraint refers to the uncontaminated precept; the restraint of cutting-off refers to whatever dhyāna-precept or uncontaminated precept is present within the nine uninterrupted paths of becoming free of the desire realm's defilement — to be explained at length elsewhere. These four kinds of restraint are treated in full within the Karma Chapter's own nyāsa on the taking of life.

The mind-following precept belonging to heat serves, with respect to precept-violation, as the antidote of relinquishment, the antidote of sustaining, and the antidote of distancing. Within the path of seeing and the path of cultivation, at the level of summit, forbearance, and supreme mundane dharma, the mind-following precept belonging to the subsequent-knowledge of the path serves, with respect to precept-violation, only as the antidote of sustaining and the antidote of distancing. The mind-following precept belonging to the preparatory path for becoming free of the desire realm's defilement serves, with respect to precept-violation, as the antidote of relinquishment, the antidote of sustaining, and the antidote of distancing. The mind-following precept belonging to the very first uninterrupted path serves, with respect to precept-violation, only as the antidote of sustaining and the antidote of distancing, while, with respect to the afflictions giving rise to precept-violation, it serves only as the antidote of cutting-off and the antidote of relinquishment. The mind-following precept belonging to the seventh uninterrupted path serves, with respect to precept-violation, only as the antidote of sustaining and the antidote of distancing, while, with respect to the afflictions giving rise to precept-violation, it serves as the antidote of cutting-off, the antidote of relinquishment, the antidote of sustaining, and the antidote of distancing. The mind-following precept belonging to the ninth uninterrupted path serves, with respect to precept-violation, as the antidote of cutting-off, the antidote of sustaining, and the antidote of distancing, while, with respect to the afflictions giving rise to precept-violation, it serves as the antidote of cutting-off, the antidote of relinquishment, the antidote of sustaining, and the antidote of distancing. The mind-following precept belonging to the nine liberation paths, and all others thereafter, up through the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising, and the mind-following precept belonging to the right view of one beyond training, serve, with respect to precept-violation and its afflictions, only as the antidote of sustaining and the antidote of distancing. One asks: the dharma-knowledge class of the path is able to cut off precept-violation and its afflictions, and so may properly possess a mind-following precept — but the subsequent-knowledge class of the path lacks this capacity, so how can it, too, possess a mind-following precept? The Venerable Vasumitra explained: although the subsequent-knowledge class of the path lacks the antidote of cutting-off and the antidote of relinquishment with respect to these, it still possesses the antidote of sustaining and the antidote of distancing. Further, the dharma-knowledge class and the subsequent-knowledge class of the path mutually serve as cause for one another, continuing on in mutual succession, mutually connected, mutually giving rise to one another. There are yet other masters who say: the subsequent-knowledge class of the path, too, is indeed able to cut off precept-violation and its afflictions, but, since the dharma-knowledge class has already cut them off beforehand, there is now nothing left for it to cut off — yet it still possesses a mind-following precept nonetheless, just as, when many people together face a single enemy, and one of them has already slain him, the others, though they have slain nothing themselves, are not thereby lacking the capacity to slay — the case here is exactly the same. The Great Virtuous One explained: were it the case that the dharma-knowledge class of the path possessed a mind-following precept while the subsequent-knowledge class did not, then restraint ought to operate only where it is actually capable of functioning, never where it is not — yet restraint, in fact, operates equally whether or not it is actually capable of functioning in a given instance, and so both the dharma-knowledge class and the subsequent-knowledge class of the path alike possess a mind-following precept. One asks: does the desire realm or the form realm have more precepts? Some say: the desire realm has more — why is this? Because the desire realm's own precepts are attained with respect to the root path of action, and also with respect to the preparatory and subsequent stages of that action, whereas the form realm's own precepts are attained only with respect to the root path of action; and the desire realm's own precepts are attained through abstaining from both natural offenses and merely prohibited offenses, whereas the form realm's own precepts are attained only through abstaining from natural offenses. Others say instead: the form realm has more — why is this? Because even the precepts included within the stage of proximate concentration alone already exceed the desire realm's own, possessing countless virtues as antidotes to it — how much more so, then, when the remaining precepts of the still higher stages are added as well. One asks: do contaminated or uncontaminated precepts number more? Some say: contaminated precepts are more numerous — why is this? Because contaminated precepts are included within two kinds of restraint, and a small portion of a third, whereas uncontaminated precepts are included within only one kind of restraint, and a small portion of a second. Further, contaminated precepts are included within two realms, and a small portion of a third, and two sense fields, and a small portion of a third, whereas uncontaminated precepts are included within only one element, and a small portion of one sense field.

Others say instead: uncontaminated precepts are more numerous — why is this? Because even the mind-following precept belonging to the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering alone already exceeds the contaminated precepts, possessing countless virtues as antidotes to them — how much more so, then, when the remaining precepts of the still higher stages are added as well. One asks: among the mind-following precepts belonging to the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, the dharma-knowledge of suffering, and so on, up through the knowledge of exhaustion, the knowledge of non-arising, and the right view of one beyond training, which is the most numerous? Some say: the mind-following precept belonging to the dharma-knowledge of suffering is double that belonging to the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering — and so on, in this same progression, up through the mind-following precept belonging to the right view of one beyond training,

double that belonging to the knowledge of non-arising. There are yet others who say: just as with the mind-following precept belonging to the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, so too with the mind-following precept belonging to the dharma-knowledge of suffering, and so on, up through the mind-following precept belonging to the subsequent-knowledge of the path — and, across the preparatory paths, nine uninterrupted paths, and nine liberation paths of becoming free of the desire realm's defilement, the mind-following precepts grow ever more numerous, stage after stage — why is this? Because, just as precept-violation and its afflictions are gradually cut off, precept itself gradually increases in step with it, each successive stage's precept resembling the one that preceded it. On this position, the mind-following precept belonging to the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering is, in fact, equal to, and no different from, the mind-following precepts belonging to the dharma-knowledge of suffering, and so on, up through the right view of one beyond training — why is this? Because they equally operate through the very same seven branches of bodily and verbal conduct. One asks: if that is so, how is the statement of the Prajñaptiśāstra to be reconciled with this — namely, that the dharma-knowledge of suffering is superior to the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering, and so on, up through the knowledge of exhaustion being superior to the vajropama-samādhi? The answer: this is spoken with reference to being nourished by cause — that is, the forbearance of the dharma-knowledge of suffering is nourished by a cause of only a single moment, the dharma-knowledge of suffering is nourished by a cause of two moments, and so on, up through the knowledge of exhaustion being nourished by a cause of countless moments — that statement speaks of superiority in class, not of a greater quantity of precept. One asks: does a śrāvaka or a Buddha possess more precepts? Some say: a śrāvaka possesses more — why is this? Because a śrāvaka's own precepts depend on a body belonging to either of two realms, while a Buddha's own precepts depend only on a body of the desire realm; further, a śrāvaka's own precepts depend on a body belonging to either of two destinies, while a Buddha's own precepts depend only on a body of the human destiny. Others say instead: a Buddha possesses more — why is this? Because even the mind-following precept belonging to the powers and fearlessnesses alone already exceeds that of every śrāvaka and pratyekabuddha combined — how much more so, then, when the countless further, supremely excellent mind-following precepts are added as well. One asks: among the various Buddhas, the World-Honored Ones, some attain unsurpassed perfect awakening during an era when the human lifespan is a hundred years, and others during an era when it is as long as eighty thousand years — does a Buddha who attains awakening during the hundred-year era also thereby attain the precept belonging to an eighty-thousand-year body? Suppose either — what fault follows? If he does attain it, how can this present body attain a precept belonging to a different body? If he does not attain it, how is the statement of the Prajñaptiśāstra to be reconciled with this — namely, that all Tathāgatas, worthy and fully awakened ones, are entirely equal to one another? The answer: it should be said that he does indeed attain it. One asks: if that is so, how can this present body attain a precept belonging to a different body? The answer: even granting that this present body attains a precept belonging to a different body, no fault follows, since the continuum is, after all, one and the same. Yet a Buddha who attains awakening during the hundred-year era attains the mind-following precept of the hundred-year era, and it is present in his body, possessed, and presently occurring, while the mind-following precept of the eighty-thousand-year era, though attained, is not present in his body, not possessed, and not presently occurring; and a Buddha who attains awakening during the eighty-thousand-year era attains the mind-following precept of the eighty-thousand-year era, and it is present in his body, possessed, and presently occurring, while the mind-following precept of the hundred-year era, though attained, is not present in his body, not possessed, and not presently occurring. Some say: he does not attain it at all. One asks: if that is so, how is the statement of the Prajñaptiśāstra to be reconciled with this? The answer: it is by virtue of the equality of three matters that they are said to be "equal" — first, equality of practice, that is, just as a single Buddha, across three incalculable aeons, cultivates the four perfections to their full completion and thereby attains unsurpassed perfect awakening, every other Buddha does exactly the same, and so they are said to be "equal"; second, equality of benefit, that is, just as a single Buddha, appearing in the world, brings countless hundreds of thousands of niyutas of sentient beings to final nirvāṇa, every other Buddha does exactly the same, and so they are said to be "equal"; third, equality of dharma-body, that is, just as a single Buddha accomplishes the ten powers, the four fearlessnesses, the great compassion, the three foundations of mindfulness, the eighteen unshared qualities, and other boundless virtues, every other Buddha does exactly the same, and so they are said to be "equal." Further, they are said to be "equal" by virtue of equality of faculty, since every Buddha alike abides in the supreme grade of faculty.

Further, they are said to be "equal" by virtue of equality of precept, since every Buddha alike attains the supreme grade of precept. Further, they are said to be "equal" by virtue of equality of stage, that is, just as a single Buddha, in dependence on the fourth dhyāna, realizes unsurpassed perfect awakening, every other Buddha does exactly the same, and so they are said to be "equal." One asks: at the time of attaining the fruit of arhatship, how many stages' worth of mind-following body-precept does one attain? The Western masters say as follows: one attains the mind-following body-precept of twenty-six locations — namely, nine in the desire realm, and seventeen in the form realm. The masters of Kashmir say: one attains the mind-following body-precept of twenty-five locations, since Mahābrahmā has no separate location of his own. This is cultivated as future potential, not all of it manifesting at once — that is, whichever stage's own body, whether in the desire or form realm, one attains the fruit of no-further-training in, that very stage's own mind-following precept is both cultivated as future potential and actually manifests; the mind-following precept of every other stage's body, though cultivated as future potential, does not actually manifest, since one lacks the ripening-produced support belonging to that stage. One who is reborn in the formless realm and attains the fruit of no-further-training, although he does attain that precept, does not have it actually manifest, since one reborn in a higher stage does not give rise to a lower stage's own concentration. One asks: in dependence on a body of one's own stage, is one able to give rise to every precept belonging to that same stage? The answer: no, one is unable to give rise to all of them — why is this? Because even evil dharmas cannot all be given rise to at once, let alone the various virtues that arise only through preparatory effort. One asks: why is it that a noble one reborn in the formless realm possesses the path-co-existent precept but not the concentration-co-existent precept? The answer: contaminated dharmas are bound to a particular realm and stage; if one is not already reborn in a higher realm, being reborn there would then mean losing something — yet the uncontaminated is not like this. Further, contaminated dharmas, whether superior or inferior, vary according to stage, and, being reborn in a higher stage, one wearies of the lower and has no use for it — yet the uncontaminated is not like this. It is for this reason that a noble one reborn in the formless realm attains and possesses only the path-co-existent precept. This side discussion having now concluded, let us return to the main topic.

One asks: what is the very own-nature of the co-existent-cause? The answer: all conditioned dharmas. Its own substance has now been stated; what should be stated next follows. One asks: why is it named the "co-existent-cause"? What does "co-existent" actually mean? The answer: the sense of inseparability is the very meaning of "co-existent"; the sense of sharing the same single fruit is the very meaning of "co-existent"; the sense of mutual accordance is the very meaning of "co-existent." This co-existent-cause certainly pervades all three time-periods, and possesses a human-effort fruit.

[The topic reads:] "What is the homogeneous-cause?" — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest the correct principle. That is, some maintain that the past and future possess no real substance at all; others maintain that the present is itself unconditioned; others maintain that only a dharma's own very same kind can serve as a homogeneous-cause for it — that is, mind serves as cause only for mind, feeling only for feeling, and so for every other dharma. In order to refute these various distinct positions, and to show that the past and future are indeed real, that the present time-period is itself conditioned, and that both a dharma's own kind and a different kind can serve as a homogeneous-cause for it, the treatise is composed. What is the homogeneous-cause? The answer: an earlier-arising wholesome root serves as a homogeneous-cause for a later-arising wholesome root of the same realm, together with its associated dharmas; a past wholesome root serves as a homogeneous-cause for a future or present wholesome root of the same realm, together with its associated dharmas; a present wholesome root serves as a homogeneous-cause for a future wholesome root of the same realm, together with its associated dharmas. One asks: why does the treatise here not state that a past dharma serves as a homogeneous-cause for another past dharma?

The answer: because the phrase "earlier-arising" and "later-arising" has already accounted for this case. One asks: why does the treatise not mention the past by its own proper name directly? The answer: it is in order to show that a later dharma is never the cause of an earlier one — for were the treatise to state that a past dharma serves as a homogeneous-cause for another past dharma, one might come to doubt that a later past dharma could also serve as cause for an earlier one;

but by stating instead that an earlier-arising dharma serves as cause for a later-arising one, this very doubt is set to rest. Some say: this passage means to show that the past itself admits of an earlier and a later portion within it.

For were the treatise to state that a past dharma serves as a homogeneous-cause for another past dharma, one might come to doubt that past dharmas mutually serve as a homogeneous-cause for one another all at the very same time;

but by stating instead that an earlier-arising dharma serves as cause for a later-arising one, this very doubt is set to rest. One asks: why does the treatise, in speaking of "the earlier-arising," mention only the wholesome root, while, in speaking of "the later-arising," it mentions the associated dharmas as well? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: the associated dharmas ought equally to be mentioned in speaking of "the earlier-arising," and that they are not mentioned should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Some say: this passage is composed in order to refute the intent of the Śramaṇa of Similar Succession, who maintains that a wholesome root serves as cause only for another wholesome root, and the dharmas associated with a wholesome root serve as cause only for the dharmas associated with a wholesome root — in order to refute this intent, and to show that a wholesome root serves as cause both for another wholesome root and for its associated dharmas, and that the dharmas associated with a wholesome root serve as cause both for the dharmas associated with a wholesome root and for the wholesome root itself, the treatise speaks in this way. One asks: why does the treatise here mention only the wholesome root and its associated dharmas, and no other dharma? The answer: because it speaks with reference to what is superior — that is, among wholesome dharmas, the wholesome root is the most superior, and its associated dharmas, being closely adjacent to it, are singled out for treatment together with it; and the same should be understood for the unwholesome and the indeterminate. "Own realm" refers to the desire realm serving as a homogeneous-cause only for the desire realm — and the same should be understood for the form and formless realms. Just as with "own realm," so too with "own stage," since their respective bindings differ — that is, the first dhyāna serves as a homogeneous-cause only for the first dhyāna, and so on, up through the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, to be understood in the same way.

There are yet other masters who say: just as with "own realm" and "own stage," so too with "own location" — that is, a hell-being serves as a homogeneous-cause only for another hell-being, and so on, up through the Akaniṣṭha heaven, to be understood in the same way. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained. Were it maintained, then the very first moment of arising within the five pure-abode heavens would have no homogeneous-cause at all, since no being has ever previously been born there, from beginningless time. It should instead be said: afflictions arising within the same stage but at different locations mutually bind one another, and, according to their own class, mutually serve as a homogeneous-cause for one another — with the sole exception that the latent tendencies of different schools' own five categories differ in the scope of their binding. As for the treatise's further statement concerning the past and the rest: this is in order to show that the past and future genuinely possess real substance, and that the present is itself conditioned — and just as with the wholesome root, the same holds for the unwholesome and indeterminate roots. The one difference is that, in the case of the unwholesome, "own realm" is excluded from the statement of homogeneous-cause. One asks: why is "own realm" excluded in the case of the unwholesome? The answer: because unwholesome roots have no counterpart in a different realm at all — were "own realm" stated, there would be nothing to distinguish it from. Some say: "own realm" ought equally to be stated in the case of the unwholesome, since the very word "own realm" here also refers to "own category" — that is, what is abandoned by seeing suffering serves as a homogeneous-cause only for what is abandoned by seeing suffering, and so on, up through what is abandoned by cultivation, to be understood in the same way. One asks: if that is so, then this passage ought simply to say "just as with the wholesome root, the same holds for the unwholesome and indeterminate roots," without further stating any difference at all. The answer: were the treatise to state the matter in this simple way alone, one might come to doubt that, just as the indeterminate root pervades all three realms, the unwholesome root does as well — and it is for this reason that the further statement of difference is required. One asks: why, in this passage,

does the treatise not state that an earlier-arising unwholesome root serves as a homogeneous-cause for a later-arising indeterminate root, together with its associated dharmas, and that an earlier-arising indeterminate root serves as a homogeneous-cause for a later-arising unwholesome root, together with its associated dharmas? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended — and so on, as stated at length. Some say: it ought to be stated but is not, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete. Some say: were the treatise to state the matter this way, one might come to doubt that the unwholesome root, too, pervades all three realms, or that the indeterminate root exists only in the desire realm; or one might come to doubt whether a small cause could produce a great effect, or a great cause a small effect — and it is for these reasons that the treatise does not state it, though the meaning is genuinely present even without being stated, since each category does indeed serve as a homogeneous-cause for the other. One asks: does the homogeneous-cause exist within the future time-period? Suppose either — what fault follows? If it does, why does the treatise here not mention it — since it speaks only of an earlier-arising dharma serving as homogeneous-cause for a later-arising one, of a past dharma serving as homogeneous-cause for a future or present one, and of a present dharma serving as homogeneous-cause for a future one, yet never states that a future dharma serves as homogeneous-cause for another future dharma? And if it does exist, then there ought to be two minds mutually serving as cause for one another, which would contradict what was stated earlier. If it does not exist, then how is this treatise's own Views Chapter to be reconciled with this — namely, that "if a dharma serves as cause for another dharma, is there ever a time when it does not so serve?" — to which the answer given is: no, there is no time at which it fails to serve as cause; if a dharma has already arisen, it is a homogeneous-cause; if it has not yet arisen, it is not a homogeneous-cause — this being so, if a dharma serves as cause for another dharma, there ought indeed to be a time when it does not so serve, so how can the answer be "no, there is no such time"? And if it does not exist, how is the Prakaraṇapāda to be reconciled with this — namely, as it states: what are the dharmas that are not a mind-caused cause? The answer: the very first uncontaminated mind of a person who has already entered the certainty of rightness, and, for every other ordinary being certain to enter the certainty of rightness, that same very first uncontaminated mind — yet, for that ordinary being, every uncontaminated mind belonging to the future is likewise not a mind-caused cause — why, then, does the treatise mention only that very first uncontaminated mind specifically? And if it does not exist, how is the Prakaraṇapāda to be further reconciled with this — namely, as it states: "there is a case of the truth of suffering serving as a cause for identity-view, and a case of the truth of suffering not serving as a cause for identity-view — excluding the future truth of suffering associated with identity-view, and its associated dharmas — every other defiled truth of suffering" serves as a cause for identity-view, including even identity-view's own associated dharmas, which are themselves the very dharmas excluded — if a future instance of identity-view does not serve as cause for another future instance of identity-view, why does the treatise speak of "excluding the future truth of suffering associated with identity-view and its associated dharmas" at all? And if it does not exist, how is the Vijñānakāya to be further reconciled with this — namely, as it states: with respect to the latent tendencies present in a past defiled eye-consciousness, that same mind

may either serve as cause without being what it lies dormant within, or be what it lies dormant within without serving as cause, or serve as cause and also be what it lies dormant within, or neither serve as cause nor be what it lies dormant within. As for serving as cause without being what it lies dormant within: this refers to whatever latent tendency, arising prior to this mind, of the homogeneous or universally-pervasive class, is that very same latent tendency, provided that either it does not take this mind as its object, or, even if it does, has already been cut off, together with its associated latent tendency having already been cut off. As for being what it lies dormant within without serving as cause: this refers to whatever latent tendency, arising after this mind, of the homogeneous or universally-pervasive class, is that very same latent tendency, taking this mind as its object and not yet cut off, thereby able to serve as its cause. As for serving as cause and also being what it lies dormant within: this refers to whatever latent tendency, arising prior to this mind, of the homogeneous or universally-pervasive class, is that very same latent tendency, taking this mind as its object and not yet cut off, together with its associated latent tendency not yet cut off. As for neither serving as cause nor being what it lies dormant within: this refers to whatever latent tendency, arising after this mind, of the homogeneous or universally-pervasive class, is that very same latent tendency, provided that either it does not take this mind as its object, or, even if it does, has already been cut off; or else refers to every other condition, or to another's own latent tendency, or to a universally-pervasive latent tendency not of the same realm — just as this holds for a past defiled eye-consciousness, so too does it hold for a future defiled eye-consciousness.

The four alternatives for the past may well be granted as reasonable, but how could four alternatives possibly be formulated for the future? If there is a "before" and "after" involved, how could there be no cause at all? And if it does not exist, how is the Prajñaptiśāstra to be further reconciled with this — namely, as it states: every dharma is fixed with respect to four matters, namely cause, effect, support, and object —

if the future time-period lacks a homogeneous-cause, becoming one only once it has already arisen, how could this be said to be "fixed" at all? And if it does not exist, then there ought to be a case of having no cause and yet having a cause,

and likewise a case of having no effect and yet having an effect, which would thereby destroy this school's own basic tenet. The answer: it should be said that the homogeneous-cause does not exist within the future time-period, and it is precisely because it does not exist that the treatise does not mention it here, nor does the fault of two minds mutually serving as cause for one another follow. One asks: how, then, is this treatise's own Views Chapter to be reconciled with this — namely, that "if a dharma serves as cause for another dharma..." — and so on, as stated at length? Some say: that passage is composed with reference to the co-existent-cause, since the co-existent-cause pervades every conditioned dharma, and is genuinely able to accomplish its effect across all three time-periods. Some say: that passage is composed with reference to both the correspondence-cause and the co-existent-cause together, since these two causes together pervade all three moral qualities, and are genuinely able to accomplish their effect across all three time-periods. Some say: that passage is composed with reference to the correspondence-cause, the co-existent-cause, and the ripening-cause, these three together,

since these three causes together are genuinely able to accomplish their effect across all three time-periods. Some say: that passage is composed with reference to the correspondence-cause, the co-existent-cause, the ripening-cause, and the efficient-cause, these four together, since these four causes pervade all three time-periods. Some say: that passage is composed with reference to five causes, excluding only the efficient-cause, since the efficient-cause pervades every dharma without exception, and so is excluded from consideration here. Here, some say instead: the universally-pervasive-cause is excluded, since its own substance and function are too narrow in scope, and so it should be said that this passage is composed with reference to all six causes, since the very word "cause" here refers to all six causes together. One asks: if a dharma, once already arisen, is a homogeneous-cause or a universally-pervasive-cause, but, before it has arisen, is neither — then, if a dharma serves as cause for another dharma, there ought indeed to be a time when it does not so serve — how, then, can the answer be "there is no such time"? The answer: this answer is given implicitly, with reference to the very last stage — that is, once a dharma, at this final stage, is certainly able to function as a homogeneous-cause or a universally-pervasive-cause, from that point onward there is never again a time when it fails to serve as cause — and it is with this in mind that the treatise speaks in this way. One asks: if that is so, how, then, is the Views Chapter to be further reconciled with this — namely, that "if a dharma serves as an immediately-antecedent condition for another dharma, is there ever a time when it does not so serve?" — to which the answer given is: "yes, whenever this latter dharma has not yet arrived at having already arisen"? Here, too, ought not the treatise to give its answer implicitly, with reference to the very last stage, saying "there is no time when it does not so serve" — that is, once a dharma, at this final stage, is certainly able to function as an immediately-antecedent condition, from that point onward there is never again a time when it fails to so serve? Why does the treatise not answer in this same way here? The answer: it ought indeed to be capable of being answered in this same way, and that it is not is owing to a further, distinct intention — namely, in order to display the matter through differing aspects and differing wording. If the same meaning is expressed through differing aspects and differing wording, it becomes easier to understand. Further, it is in order to display two gateways, two summaries, two lamps, two lights, two torches, two radiances, two brilliances, and two shadows of textual expression. Just as the homogeneous-cause, with reference to its very last stage, is said implicitly to have no time when it fails to serve as cause, the immediately-antecedent condition, too, ought equally, with reference to this same stage, to be said implicitly to have no time when it fails to so serve; and just as the immediately-antecedent condition is stated with reference to every stage — namely, "whenever this latter dharma has not yet arrived at having already arisen" — the homogeneous-cause, too, ought equally to be stated in this same way with reference to every stage. These two textual formulations mutually illuminate one another, both alike encompassing both meanings.

One asks: how, then, is the Prakaraṇapāda to be reconciled with this — namely, as it states: "what are the dharmas that are not a mind-caused cause?" — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: that passage speaks only of what is, in the final analysis, never a mind-caused cause — that is, although, for one who has not yet entered the certainty of rightness, every uncontaminated mind he might have is not a mind-caused cause, once he does enter the certainty of rightness, only his very first uncontaminated mind remains a case of not being a mind-caused cause, since every other mind thereafter is indeed caused by mind. There are yet other masters who say: that passage does not, in fact, discuss the meaning of the homogeneous-cause at all — what, then, does it discuss? It discusses only two kinds of ordinary beings — namely, those destined for final nirvāṇa, and those not destined for it. Although the passage does not explicitly mention those not destined for nirvāṇa, this can be inferred by logical implication and is thereby known to exist — that is, since the passage has already stated that certain other ordinary beings are certain to enter the certainty of rightness, it follows, by this same logical implication, that there must also be ordinary beings certain never to enter the certainty of rightness at all —

this, then, is what is meant by "a dharma without rebirth into nirvāṇa" — and it is precisely this "dharma without nirvāṇa" that is called "not a mind-caused cause." One asks: how, then, is the Prakaraṇapāda to be further reconciled with this — namely, as it states: "there is a case of the truth of suffering serving as a cause for identity-view" — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: that treatise states only "excluding the future truth of suffering associated with identity-view" — without the further phrase "and its associated dharmas"; if it does indeed say this, this is a mistaken recitation on the reciter's own part. One asks: how, then, is the Vijñānakāya to be further reconciled with this — namely, as it states: "with respect to the latent tendencies present in a past defiled eye-consciousness" — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: with respect to the future, only three alternatives ought to be formulated, excluding the case of "being what it lies dormant within, without serving as cause," since a future dharma has no "later" moment relative to itself. Yet the treatise speaks of the future as though it were parallel to the past for a further, distinct reason — that is, at the very moment a dharma actually arises, it necessarily enters into the present, and can then definitely be classed as homogeneous or universally-pervasive; relative to whatever else has not yet arisen, it can be spoken of as "earlier," and, in relation to it, whatever else can then be spoken of as "later." There are yet other masters who say: that passage does indeed intend four alternatives even for the future, simply without stating that the future has an "earlier" and "later" moment of mind in the same explicit way as the past — as for "serving as cause without being what it lies dormant within": this refers to a case where the associated latent tendency has already been cut off; as for "being what it lies dormant within without serving as cause": this refers to a homogeneous or universally-pervasive latent tendency existing within the future time-period, taking a future defiled eye-consciousness as its object and not yet cut off, thereby able to serve as its cause; as for "serving as cause and also being what it lies dormant within": this refers to a case where the associated latent tendency has not yet been cut off, and so cannot yet serve as cause; as for "neither serving as cause nor being what it lies dormant within": this refers to a homogeneous or universally-pervasive latent tendency existing within the future time-period which either does not take this as its object, or, even if it does, has already been cut off — or else refers to every other condition, or to another's own latent tendency, or to a universally-pervasive latent tendency not of the same realm. One asks: how, then, is the Prajñaptiśāstra to be further reconciled with this — namely, as it states: "every dharma is fixed with respect to four matters" — and so on, as stated at length? The answer: "cause" here refers to the four causes — namely, the correspondence-cause, the co-existent-cause, the ripening-cause, and the efficient-cause; "effect" refers to the three fruits — namely, the human-effort fruit, the ripening fruit, and the dominant fruit; "support" refers to the six kinds of support — namely, the eye, ear, nose, tongue, body, and mental faculty; "object" refers to the six kinds of object — namely, form, sound, scent, taste, touch, and dharmas. Since these four matters are fixed in this way across all three time-periods, no real contradiction follows. One asks: if the future time-period lacks a homogeneous-cause and a universally-pervasive-cause, which exist only in the past and present, then there ought to be a case of having no cause and yet having a cause, and likewise a case of having no effect and yet having an effect — and this would thereby destroy this school's own basic tenet that the three time-periods genuinely exist. The answer: even granting this, no real fault follows, since this is spoken with reference to a mere positional status, not to the dharma's own substance — for it is the status of active function, arising through the coming-together of conditions, that constitutes "cause" and "effect," not the dharma's own bare substance; and status and substance are themselves neither identical nor separate — although the substance always exists, its status does not always obtain. Hence the homogeneous-cause and the universally-pervasive-cause, originally absent and now present, involve no real fault at all. There are yet other masters who say: the future time-period does indeed possess a homogeneous-cause. One asks: if that is so, then, although the six objections just raised are indeed well resolved on this position, why does the treatise's own text here not state it this way? The answer: it ought to be stated but is not, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete, since the meaning of each of the six causes, as stated, is not exhaustively spelled out in every case. Further, only a homogeneous-cause that has real power, able to take up an effect and give rise to an effect, is spoken of here; a future homogeneous-cause has no such power, being unable to take up or give rise to an effect, and so is not mentioned. Further, only a homogeneous-cause that has already become present, already come into coming-together, and already possesses actual function, bearing a real load and burden, is spoken of here; a future homogeneous-cause has no such reality, and so is not mentioned. Further, only a homogeneous-cause that has already operated within the world, its own characteristic clearly manifest, is spoken of here; a future homogeneous-cause

has not yet operated within the world, its own characteristic not yet clearly manifest, and so is not mentioned. One asks: if the future time-period did possess a homogeneous-cause, would this not incur the fault of two minds mutually serving as cause for one another? The answer: just as the four aspects of impermanence, and the rest, each have their own distinct affiliation, so too does every other dharma — and so this fault does not follow. That is, within the future time-period, the aspect of impermanence has, among the four aspects, one that ought properly to arise immediately after it, this being the very aspect it is affiliated with as its own object of cultivation — and it is with respect to this affiliated aspect alone that the aspect of impermanence serves as its cause,

not the reverse, since that other aspect is not affiliated with this one as its own object in the same way. The aspect of impermanence arising necessarily precedes the others; and the aspects of suffering, emptiness, and non-self are exactly the same — and every other conditioned dharma should be understood analogously. Hence the fault of two minds mutually serving as cause for one another does not follow. Were it maintained otherwise, then there would be a case of one who, relying on the fourth dhyāna, attains the fruit of arhatship, cultivating uncontaminated dharmas belonging to all nine stages for the future, all of these future dharmas being affiliated with this present cultivation — yet were he later to give rise to the noble path of some other stage, he would then no longer be able to cultivate any further uncontaminated dharma for the future, since no other noble path remains affiliated with this present one — and this ought then to place that cultivation among the past and present rather than counting as a homogeneous-cause at all, which would directly contradict what has just been stated here — namely, that an earlier-arising wholesome root serves as a homogeneous-cause for a later-arising one — and so on, as stated at length. Lest such a fault follow, it is therefore sound, in principle, to maintain that the future time-period possesses no homogeneous-cause at all.

One asks: does material form possess a homogeneous-cause? The masters from beyond the border regions say as follows: no material dharma whatsoever possesses a homogeneous-cause — matter arises solely through the combined power of other conditions coming together. It is plainly observed that, when the earth is dug more than a hundred cubits deep, the mud brought up from below, exposed to sun and wind, and later meeting with rain, gives rise to grass, even though no prior seed was ever present there; and it is likewise plainly observed that grass and trees grow atop rooftops and mountain peaks, where no seed existed beforehand either — and from this it is known that material form has no homogeneous-cause at all. One asks: if that is so, how is this treatise's own Great Elements Chapter to be reconciled with this — namely, as it states that a past instance of the great elements, and the derived form composed from them, serve as a cause and a dominant condition for a future instance of the great elements and their derived form? The answer: what obligation do I have to reconcile another's own treatise? But if one must indeed reconcile it, it should be said as follows:

the power of the dominant condition may be near or far, present within this very body or present within another body — when it is near, present within this very body, it is called "cause";

when it is far, present within another body, it is called "dominant condition." The masters of Kashmir say: material form, too, does possess a homogeneous-cause,

with the sole exception of the very first moment of uncontaminated form. One asks: if that is so, then, although this reconciles the Great Elements Chapter's own statement, how is the empirical case cited above to be reconciled with this? The answer: within the mud brought up from below, a seed was indeed already present beforehand, but, lacking the other necessary conditions, the grass had not yet been able to grow; later, upon meeting with the full complement of conditions, the grass then grew. And as for the grass and trees growing atop that mud heap, the rooftop, or the mountain peak — these arose because the wind carried, or a bird's beak brought, a seed to that very place, and it is on this account that this occurred.