The King Who Remembered His Own Palace

up through this body's own aging stage serving as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own aging stage, and serving as a mere condition, not a cause, for every other stage. If this position is maintained, then, within each single stage, the very first instance of matter would have no cause, and the very last instance of matter would bear no fruit. There are yet others who say: material form does indeed possess a homogeneous-cause, but it operates only within this very same body, never another body, and only among similar stages, never dissimilar ones — that is, this body's own kalala stage serves as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own kalala stage, up through its aging stage, and this body's own arbuda stage serves as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own arbuda stage, up through its aging stage,

serving as a mere condition, not a cause, for the kalala stage, and so on, up through this body's own aging stage serving as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own aging stage, and serving as a mere condition, not a cause, for every prior stage. If this position is maintained, then the kalala stage's very first instance of matter would have no cause, and the aging stage's very last instance of matter would bear no fruit. There are yet others who say: material form does indeed possess a homogeneous-cause, operating both within this very same body and within another body as well, but only among similar stages, never dissimilar ones — that is, this body's own kalala stage serves as a homogeneous-cause for both this body's and another body's own kalala stage, serving as a mere condition, not a cause, for every other stage,

up through this body's own aging stage serving as a homogeneous-cause for both this body's and another body's own aging stage, serving as a mere condition, not a cause, for every other stage. There are yet others who say: material form does indeed possess a homogeneous-cause, operating both within this very same body and within another body, and both among similar and dissimilar stages, but never with any prior stage — that is, this body's own kalala stage serves as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own kalala stage, up through its aging stage, and also for another body's own kalala stage, up through its aging stage; this body's own arbuda stage serves as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own arbuda stage, up through its aging stage, and also for another body's own arbuda stage, up through its aging stage, serving as a mere condition, not a cause, for the kalala stage, and so on, up through this body's own aging stage serving as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own aging stage, and also for another body's own aging stage, serving as a mere condition, not a cause, for every prior stage. There are yet others who say: material form does indeed possess a homogeneous-cause, operating both within this very same body and within another body, and both among similar and dissimilar stages, but never with this body's own prior stage — that is, this body's own kalala stage serves as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own kalala stage, up through its aging stage, and also for another body's own kalala stage, up through its aging stage; this body's own arbuda stage serves as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own arbuda stage, up through its aging stage, and also for another body's own kalala stage, up through its aging stage, serving as a mere condition, not a cause, for this body's own kalala stage, and so on, up through this body's own aging stage serving as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own aging stage, and also for another body's own kalala stage, up through its aging stage, serving as a mere condition, not a cause, for this body's own prior stages. The verdict: it should be said instead that each and every one of another body's own ten stages serves as a homogeneous-cause for another body's own ten stages and for this body's own ten stages alike, and each and every one of this body's own ten stages serves as a homogeneous-cause for this body's own ten stages and for another body's own ten stages alike, since a later-arising dharma that has already arisen can indeed serve as a homogeneous-cause for an earlier-arising dharma that has not yet arisen. External-portion material forms considered relative to one another should be explained according to this same principle.

Further, the wholesome five aggregates mutually serve as a homogeneous-cause for one another; the defiled five aggregates mutually serve as a homogeneous-cause for one another; the covered-undefined and uncovered-undefined five aggregates likewise mutually serve as a homogeneous-cause for one another, since their own nature and category are equal. Some say: the uncovered-undefined four mental aggregates serve as a homogeneous-cause for the uncovered-undefined form aggregate, but the uncovered-undefined form aggregate cannot serve as a homogeneous-cause for the uncovered-undefined four mental aggregates, since its own power is too weak. Some say instead: the uncovered-undefined form aggregate serves as a homogeneous-cause for the uncovered-undefined four mental aggregates, but the uncovered-undefined four mental aggregates do not serve as a homogeneous-cause for the uncovered-undefined form aggregate, since a superior dharma cannot be caused by an inferior one. Some say: the uncovered-undefined four mental aggregates do not serve as a homogeneous-cause for the uncovered-undefined form aggregate, nor does the uncovered-undefined form aggregate serve as a homogeneous-cause for the uncovered-undefined four mental aggregates, since their respective powers and functions are both too feebly weak, and their categories are entirely distinct from one another — rather, the uncovered-undefined four mental aggregates mutually serve as a homogeneous-cause among themselves. The uncovered-undefined is further of four kinds: ripening-produced, deportment-related, craft-based, and transformation-fruit — each in this same descending order capable of serving as a homogeneous-cause for four, three, two, and one of these kinds respectively. There are yet other masters who say: these four mutually serve as a homogeneous-cause for one another, since they share the same binding and the same nature. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained, lest preparatory-effort wholesome dharmas be made to mutually cause one another as well — the earlier position stated is sound. Defiled dharmas fall into nine grades — namely, the lower-lower, lower-middle, lower-upper, middle-lower, middle-middle, middle-upper, upper-lower, upper-middle, and upper-upper — and these nine grades mutually serve as a homogeneous-cause for one another. One asks: if that is so, on what basis are there nine grades at all? The answer: because there are nine grades of antidote, defiled dharmas likewise possess nine grades — that is, cultivating the lower-lower path serves as antidote to the upper-upper affliction, and so on, up through cultivating the upper-upper path serving as antidote to the lower-lower affliction. Further, by virtue of actual manifestation there are also nine grades — that is, whenever any affliction actually manifests before the mind, it may be of the lower-lower grade, and so on, up through the upper-upper grade. Every unwholesome dharma likewise has nine grades established through ripening. Wholesome dharmas are of two kinds: innate wholesome and effort-based wholesome. Innate wholesome serves as a homogeneous-cause for innate wholesome, and also for effort-based wholesome; effort-based wholesome serves as a homogeneous-cause for effort-based wholesome, but not for innate wholesome, since the latter is inferior to it. Some say: these two kinds of wholesome dharma mutually serve as a homogeneous-cause for one another, since they share the same binding and the same nature. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained, lest one cultivating effort-based wholesomeness be made to retrogress toward the inferior dharma upon its very cultivation — the earlier position stated is sound. Some say: wholesome dharmas are of three kinds — effort-based, freed-from-defilement, and innate. Here, the innate serves as a homogeneous-cause for all three kinds; the freed-from-defilement serves as a homogeneous-cause for two kinds, but not for the innate, since the latter is inferior to it; the effort-based serves as a homogeneous-cause only for the effort-based, since the other two kinds are both inferior to it. Innate wholesome dharmas further possess nine grades, from lower-lower up through upper-upper, mutually serving as a homogeneous-cause for one another. One asks: if that is so, on what basis are there nine grades? The answer: because of nine grades of actual manifestation. Further, because of nine grades established through ripening. Freed-from-defilement wholesomeness and effort-based wholesomeness likewise both possess nine grades, from lower-lower up through upper-upper. Here, the lower-lower grade serves as a homogeneous-cause for all nine grades; the lower-middle grade serves as a homogeneous-cause for the remaining eight grades, and so on, up through the upper-upper grade serving as a homogeneous-cause only for the upper-upper grade — since these two kinds of wholesomeness serve as cause only for what is equal to or superior to themselves, never for an inferior dharma. Effort-based wholesome dharmas are further of three kinds: accomplished through hearing, accomplished through reflection, and accomplished through cultivation. Wholesomeness accomplished through hearing serves as a homogeneous-cause for all three kinds; wholesomeness accomplished through reflection serves as a homogeneous-cause only for wholesomeness accomplished through reflection, not for that accomplished through hearing, since the latter is inferior to it, and not for that accomplished through cultivation, since it belongs to a different realm; wholesomeness accomplished through cultivation serves as a homogeneous-cause only for wholesomeness accomplished through cultivation, not for that accomplished through hearing, since it is inferior, and not for that accomplished through reflection, since that too is inferior and belongs to a different realm besides. Wholesomeness accomplished through cultivation is further of four kinds — heat, summit, forbearance, and supreme mundane dharma — each in this same descending order capable of serving as a homogeneous-cause for four, three, two, and one of these kinds respectively, the meaning being as already explained. The desire realm's own transformation-fruit mind is of four kinds — the fruit of the first dhyāna, up through the fruit of the fourth dhyāna — these four kinds, in this same descending order, capable of serving as a homogeneous-cause for four, three, two, and one of these kinds respectively. Some say: these four do not mutually serve as cause for one another, just as with the dhyānas themselves. Some say: these four mutually serve as cause for one another, since they share the same binding and the same nature. The verdict: the first position stated is sound, since they belong to the same stage and arise through preparatory cultivation.

The transformation-fruit minds of the first dhyāna and the other stages should be understood in this very same way. One asks: does the first dhyāna's own body of consciousnesses have a transformation mind that mutually serves as cause for it, or not? The answer: the body of consciousnesses does serve as a homogeneous-cause for the transformation mind, but the transformation mind does not serve as a homogeneous-cause for the body of consciousnesses, since the latter is inferior to it. In accordance with the principles already stated, the following questions and answers should also be posed: is there a case of an earlier-arising dharma that is not a homogeneous-cause for a later-arising dharma? There is — namely, when they do not share the same realm. Is there a case of an earlier-arising dharma of the same realm that is not a homogeneous-cause for a later-arising dharma? There is — namely, when they do not share the same stage. Is there a case of an earlier-arising dharma of the same stage that is not a homogeneous-cause for a later-arising dharma? There is — namely, a contaminated dharma with respect to an uncontaminated one, or an uncontaminated dharma with respect to a contaminated one. Is there a case of an earlier-arising contaminated dharma that is not a homogeneous-cause for a later-arising contaminated dharma? There is — namely, when they do not belong to the same category, or do not share the same nature, or when the earlier is superior to an inferior later dharma. As for an earlier-arising uncontaminated dharma not serving as a homogeneous-cause for a later-arising uncontaminated dharma, this refers to the case where the earlier is superior to an inferior later dharma.

One asks: whenever any homogeneous-cause gives its fruit, does it also thereby take up its fruit? The answer: whenever it gives its fruit, it certainly also takes up its fruit; but if it does not take up its fruit, how could it give its fruit? Or again, there is a case of taking up the fruit without giving the fruit — namely, an arhat's very last aggregates. This has been stated only in a general way; stated more specifically, distinguishing the wholesome, the unwholesome, the covered-undefined, and the uncovered-undefined, a great many tetralemmas result. One asks: does a wholesome homogeneous-cause, whenever it takes up its fruit, also thereby give its fruit? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of taking up the fruit without giving it — namely, at the moment of cutting off the wholesome roots, the very last acquisition thereby relinquished. There is a case of giving the fruit without taking it up — namely, at the moment of the wholesome roots being restored, the past, previously relinquished wholesome acquisition that one now abides in. There is a case of both taking up and giving the fruit — namely, every other position in which the wholesome roots have not been cut off. There is a case of neither taking up nor giving the fruit — namely, every case excluded from those just described. One asks: does an unwholesome homogeneous-cause, whenever it takes up its fruit, also thereby give its fruit? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of taking up the fruit without giving it — namely, at the moment of becoming free of desire's own defilement, the very last acquisition thereby relinquished. There is a case of giving the fruit without taking it up — namely, at the moment of retrogressing from freedom of desire's own defilement, the past, previously relinquished unwholesome acquisition that one now abides in. There is a case of both taking up and giving the fruit — namely, every other position in which one has not yet become free of desire's own defilement. There is a case of neither taking up nor giving the fruit — namely, every case excluded from those just described. One asks: does a covered-undefined homogeneous-cause, whenever it takes up its fruit, also thereby give its fruit? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of taking up the fruit without giving it — namely, at the moment of becoming free of the defilement of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the very last acquisition thereby relinquished. There is a case of giving the fruit without taking it up — namely, at the moment of retrogressing from freedom of the defilement of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, the past, previously relinquished covered-undefined acquisition that one now abides in. There is a case of both taking up and giving the fruit — namely, every other position in which one has not yet become free of the defilement of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception.

There is a case of neither taking up nor giving the fruit — namely, every case excluded from those just described. One asks: does an uncovered-undefined homogeneous-cause, whenever it takes up its fruit, also thereby give its fruit? The answer: whenever it gives its fruit, it certainly also takes it up; there is a case of taking up the fruit without giving it — namely, an arhat's very last aggregates. This has already been distinguished with reference to actual possession, distinguishing taking up the fruit from giving the fruit; it should now be distinguished with reference to actual manifestation. Further, this has already been distinguished with reference to dissociated dharmas; it should now be distinguished with reference to associated dharmas. One asks: does a wholesome homogeneous-cause, whenever it takes up its fruit, also thereby give its fruit? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of taking up the fruit without giving it — namely, when an unwholesome or undefined mind manifests immediately after a wholesome mind. There is a case of giving the fruit without taking it up — namely, when a wholesome mind manifests immediately after an unwholesome or undefined mind, one then abiding in the past wholesome mind that had been interrupted. There is a case of both taking up and giving the fruit — namely, throughout the wholesome mind's own continuous, uninterrupted succession. There is a case of neither taking up nor giving the fruit — namely, every case excluded from those just described. One asks: does an unwholesome homogeneous-cause, whenever it takes up its fruit, also thereby give its fruit? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of taking up the fruit without giving it — namely, when a wholesome or undefined mind manifests immediately after an unwholesome mind.

One then abides in the past unwholesome mind that had been interrupted. There is a case of both taking up and giving the fruit — namely, throughout the unwholesome mind's own continuous, uninterrupted succession.

There is a case of neither taking up nor giving the fruit — namely, every case excluded from those just described. One asks: does a covered-undefined homogeneous-cause, whenever it takes up its fruit, also thereby give its fruit? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of taking up the fruit without giving it — namely, when a wholesome, unwholesome, or uncovered-undefined mind manifests immediately after a covered-undefined mind. There is a case of giving the fruit without taking it up — namely, when a wholesome, unwholesome, or uncovered-undefined mind is immediately followed by a covered-undefined mind manifesting, one then abiding in the past covered-undefined mind that had been interrupted. There is a case of both taking up and giving the fruit — namely, throughout the covered-undefined mind's own continuous, uninterrupted succession. There is a case of neither taking up nor giving the fruit — namely, every case excluded from those just described. One asks: does an uncovered-undefined homogeneous-cause, whenever it takes up its fruit, also thereby give its fruit? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of taking up the fruit without giving it — namely, when a wholesome or defiled mind manifests immediately after an uncovered-undefined mind. There is a case of giving the fruit without taking it up — namely, when a wholesome or defiled mind is immediately followed by an uncovered-undefined mind manifesting, one then abiding in the past uncovered-undefined mind that had been interrupted. There is a case of both taking up and giving the fruit — namely, throughout the uncovered-undefined mind's own continuous, uninterrupted succession. There is a case of neither taking up nor giving the fruit — namely, every case excluded from those just described. This has already been distinguished with reference to continuous succession, distinguishing taking up the fruit from giving the fruit; it should now be distinguished with reference to a single moment. That is, after a single moment of mind, twenty moments of mind may arise, one immediately after another, without interruption, and within this sequence four alternatives can be formulated. Taking the wholesome homogeneous-cause as an example, the first alternative is this: when the leading, foremost moment's own wholesome mind is manifest, excluding that very first moment, it is considered in relation to the nineteen subsequent moments of wholesome mind. The second alternative is this: when any of the nineteen subsequent moments of wholesome mind is manifest, one then abides in the past, leading, foremost wholesome mind. The third alternative is precisely the leading, foremost wholesome mind's own manifestation, considered in relation to the very first moment of wholesome mind. The fourth alternative refers to every case excluded from those just described. Just as these four alternatives apply to the wholesome homogeneous-cause, the very same four alternatives apply, each accordingly, to the unwholesome, covered-undefined, and uncovered-undefined homogeneous-causes as well.

Is there a case, within the span of a single moment, of obtaining the homogeneous-cause without obtaining that particular cause, or of obtaining that particular cause without obtaining the homogeneous-cause, or of obtaining both together, or of obtaining neither? The answer: there is — namely, at the moment of retrogressing from a higher śramaṇa fruit down to abiding in the stream-enterer's own fruit, all four of these alternatives occur. As for obtaining the homogeneous-cause without obtaining that particular cause: this refers to obtaining, at that very moment, the past very first moment of forbearance for the knowledge-of-conformity-to-the-path, yet not obtaining that particular cause, since one has not obtained the path of seeing. As for obtaining that particular cause without obtaining the homogeneous-cause: this refers to obtaining, at that very moment, the past stream-enterer's own fruit, yet not obtaining the stream-enterer's own superior fruit-path, since the stream-enterer's own superior fruit-path takes the stream-enterer's own fruit as its cause, and serves as a homogeneous-cause for the higher śramaṇa fruit. As for obtaining both the homogeneous-cause and that particular cause together: this refers to obtaining, at that very moment, the past continuously-sustained stream-enterer's own fruit, excluding its very first moment. As for obtaining neither the homogeneous-cause nor that particular cause: this refers to every case excluded from those just described. One asks: is there a case, within the span of a single moment, of knowing the homogeneous-cause without knowing that cause's own object, or of knowing that object without knowing the homogeneous-cause, or of knowing both together, or of knowing neither? The answer: there is — namely, while abiding in the path of seeing's own dharma-knowledge-of-the-path moment, all four of these alternatives occur.

As for knowing the homogeneous-cause without knowing that cause's own object: this refers to knowing, at that very moment, the past three dharma-knowledge classes taking suffering, origin, and cessation as their object. As for knowing that object without knowing the homogeneous-cause: this refers to knowing the future four dharma-knowledge classes. As for knowing both the homogeneous-cause and that object together: this refers to knowing the past forbearance-for-the-knowledge-of-the-path class. As for knowing neither the homogeneous-cause nor that object: this refers to every case excluded from those just described.

One asks: does the power of the homogeneous-cause admit of increase or decrease? The answer: it does — that is, if the cause has been long cultivated, its power thereby increases; if it has not been long cultivated, or has suffered some harm, its power thereby decreases. As an example of increased power among unwholesome dharmas: the Venerable Mṛgaśiras once cultivated dhyāna within a certain forest, sitting beneath a single tree, when a thought of desire suddenly arose in his mind; recognizing it with weariness and disgust, he abandoned that spot and sat beneath a different tree, whereupon a thought of hatred arose; recognizing it likewise with weariness and disgust, he again abandoned that spot and sat beneath yet another tree, whereupon a thought of harm arose. The reason for this was that this Venerable One had once, in a past life, been a great king ruling over that very land: at the spot where he had once amused himself with the five pleasures and indulged in every manner of sensual delight, now sitting there again, a thought of desire arose in him; at the spot where he had once ordered the beheading, mutilation, and dismemberment of living beings, now arriving there again, a thought of hatred arose in him; at the spot where he had once conscripted living beings into forced labor, binding and flogging them, now arriving there again, a thought of harm arose in him. Again, when the Venerable Ānanda entered the city to beg for alms, the woman Mātaṅgī saw him and, at once, felt desire arise, following after him with her eyes fixed upon him, unable to tear herself away — for this woman had, across five hundred past lives, been Ānanda's own wife, and it was for this reason that a single glimpse of him now was enough to make a thought of desire arise in her, following him without letting go. All such cases as these arise from the heightened power of a past cause. There are also cases where presently cultivating the afflictions heightens the cause's own power, whether homogeneous or dissimilar dharmas mutually giving rise to one another in succession — just as with unwholesome dharmas, so too should wholesome and undefined dharmas be understood. As with Śibi, who had long cultivated the practice of giving, and so, no sooner was he born, he said to his father and mother: what wealth does this household possess? I wish to give it all away to every poor and destitute person — cases such as this are recounted at length in the scriptures.

One asks: what is the homogeneous-cause's own very substance? The answer: it is every past and present conditioned dharma — its own substance has already been stated, and so it will not be stated again here. One asks: why is it named the "homogeneous-cause"? What does "homogeneous" actually mean? The answer: the sense of belonging to the same kind and category is the very meaning of "homogeneous"; the sense of sharing the same realm and stage is the very meaning of "homogeneous"; the sense of belonging to the same class or section is the very meaning of "homogeneous." This homogeneous-cause pervades only the past and present, these two time-periods, and possesses an equal-outflow fruit. What is the universally-pervasive-cause? — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest the correct principle. That is, some maintain that every single affliction, without exception, is universally pervasive; in order to refute this, the treatise shows that, among the afflictions, some are universally pervasive and some are not. Others maintain that the afflictions belonging to all five sections are, each and every one, either universally pervasive or not; in order to refute this, the treatise shows that only the afflictions abandoned by seeing suffering and seeing the origin can be either universally pervasive or not. Others maintain that every affliction abandoned by seeing suffering and seeing the origin is universally pervasive, while every affliction abandoned by seeing cessation and the path takes an uncontaminated object; in order to refute this, the treatise shows that, among the afflictions abandoned by seeing suffering and seeing the origin, some are universally pervasive and some are not, and that, among the afflictions abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, some take a contaminated object and some take an uncontaminated one. Others maintain that whichever afflictions pervade all three realms are thereby universally pervasive; in order to refute this, the treatise shows that, among the afflictions pervading all three realms, some are universally pervasive and some are not. Others maintain that there are exactly two universally pervasive dharmas, ignorance and craving, just as the Dārṣṭāntikas say: whatever forms the very root of dependent origination is called universally pervasive — ignorance being the root of dependent origination looking toward the prior limit, and craving being the root of dependent origination looking toward the posterior limit, and so both are universally pervasive; in order to refute this, the treatise shows that ignorance is sometimes universally pervasive and sometimes not, while craving is, without exception, never universally pervasive at all. Others maintain that whatever afflictions pervade all five sections are thereby called universally pervasive — namely, ignorance together with craving, hatred, and conceit; in order to refute this, the treatise shows that ignorance is sometimes universally pervasive and sometimes not, while craving, hatred, and conceit are, without exception, never universally pervasive at all. Others maintain that five dharmas are universally pervasive — namely, ignorance, craving, views, conceit, and mind itself, just as the Vibhajyavādins maintain, whose own verse states:

There are five universally pervasive dharmas, broadly giving rise to every suffering — namely ignorance, craving, and views, conceit, and mind, these are the five. In order to refute this, the treatise shows that ignorance and views are sometimes universally pervasive and sometimes not, while the remaining three are, without exception, never universally pervasive at all. It is in order to refute these various distinct erroneous positions, and to manifest the correct principle, that the treatise is composed.

What is the universally-pervasive-cause? The answer: an earlier-arising universally-pervasive latent tendency abandoned by seeing suffering serves as a universally-pervasive-cause for a later-arising latent tendency of the same realm abandoned by seeing the origin, cessation, and the path through cultivation, together with its associated dharmas; a past universally-pervasive latent tendency abandoned by seeing suffering serves as a universally-pervasive-cause for a future or present latent tendency of the same realm abandoned by seeing the origin, cessation, and the path through cultivation, together with its associated dharmas; a present universally-pervasive latent tendency abandoned by seeing suffering serves as a universally-pervasive-cause for a future latent tendency of the same realm abandoned by seeing the origin, cessation, and the path through cultivation, together with its associated dharmas. Just as with what is abandoned by seeing suffering, so too should what is abandoned by seeing the origin be understood. This, then, is called the universally-pervasive-cause. One asks: why does the treatise here not state that a past dharma serves as universally-pervasive-cause for another past dharma? The answer: because the phrase "earlier-arising" and "later-arising" has already accounted for this case. One asks: why does the treatise not mention the past by its own name directly? The answer: it is in order to show that a later dharma is never the cause of an earlier one — for were the treatise to state that a past dharma serves as universally-pervasive-cause for another past dharma, one might come to doubt that a later past dharma could also serve as cause for an earlier one; but by stating instead that an earlier-arising dharma serves as cause for a later-arising one, this very doubt is set to rest. Some say: this passage means to show that the past itself admits of an earlier and a later portion within it, for were the treatise to state that a past dharma serves as universally-pervasive-cause for another past dharma, one might come to doubt that past dharmas mutually serve as a universally-pervasive-cause for one another all at the very same time; but by stating instead that an earlier-arising dharma serves as cause for a later-arising one, this very doubt too is set to rest.

One asks: why does this passage further speak of "own realm"? The answer: because the treatise wishes to show that a universally-pervasive-cause never crosses over from one realm into another — that is, the desire realm's own universally-pervasive latent tendencies serve as universally-pervasive-cause only within the desire realm, and the same should be understood for the form and formless realms. Just as this passage speaks of "own realm," one might expect it likewise to speak of "own stage," yet it does not do so, and this should be understood as a matter this discussion leaves incomplete, since the universally-pervasive-cause does indeed operate within its own stage as well, differing from the homogeneous-cause only in that it never crosses from what is abandoned by seeing suffering directly to what is abandoned by seeing suffering in return, but only forward, toward what is abandoned by the origin, cessation, and cultivation. One asks: why, in speaking of "the earlier-arising," does the treatise mention only the latent tendency, while, in speaking of "the later-arising," it mentions the associated dharmas as well? The answer: this is simply what the treatise's author intended, in the very same way as was already explained for the homogeneous-cause's own defining passage. One asks: are a universally-pervasive latent tendency's own co-existent dharmas — that is, the dharmas that arise, abide, and cease together with it, as dissociated formations — also to be counted as a universally-pervasive-cause?

One asks: what is the universally-pervasive latent tendency's own very substance? The answer: in the desire realm there are eleven — namely, the five views and doubt and ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering,

and wrong view, view-of-view-and-precept-grasping, doubt, and ignorance abandoned by seeing the origin. The form and formless realms should each be understood to likewise possess eleven of their own. Here, "ignorance" refers both to the ignorance associated with the five views and doubt, and to the ignorance that is not held in common with any other affliction. The Prakaraṇapāda states: among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, thirty-three are universally pervasive, and sixty-five are not. One asks: since the ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin is, in some instances, universally pervasive and, in other instances, not, why does that treatise state simply that thirty-three are universally pervasive and sixty-five are not?

The answer: the Western masters' own recited text states instead that, among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, twenty-seven are universally pervasive, sixty-five are not, and six require further distinction — that is, the ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin is, in some instances, universally pervasive and, in other instances, not. Which instance is universally pervasive? The ignorance not associated with any non-pervasive latent tendency. Which instance is not universally pervasive? The ignorance associated with a non-pervasive latent tendency. This account is sound in meaning. But if one instead asks which instance is universally pervasive by saying it is the ignorance associated with the universally-pervasive latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, this fails to include the not-held-in-common ignorance, and so that other account is the sounder one. One asks: if that is so, why do the masters of Kashmir not adopt this same recitation? The answer: it, too, could properly be recited this way, and that it is not is owing to a further, distinct intention — since, on their reckoning, the greater portion is indeed universally pervasive. That is, among the ten instances of ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering, seven are universally pervasive — namely, the ignorance associated with the five views and doubt, together with the not-held-in-common ignorance — and three are not universally pervasive — namely, the ignorance associated with craving, hatred, and conceit. Among the seven instances of ignorance abandoned by seeing the origin, four are universally pervasive — namely, the ignorance associated with the two views and doubt, together with the not-held-in-common ignorance — and three are not universally pervasive — namely, the ignorance associated with craving, hatred, and conceit. And, as for this country's own recitation, stating that thirty-three are universally pervasive and sixty-five are not, the ignorance in question there refers, in every instance, to the not-held-in-common ignorance alone, since only this ignorance arises through its own power, whether pervasive or not; the associated ignorance, numbering eighty-three in total — namely, twenty-seven universally pervasive and fifty-six not — being a latent tendency that manifests only through relying on another's power, is spoken of only in terms of what it is associated with, and, since its own nature is not fixed, is not separately enumerated. Its own substance has now been stated; what should be stated next follows. One asks: why is it named the "universally-pervasive latent tendency"? What does "universally pervasive" actually mean? The answer: the sense of taking everything as its object is the very meaning of "universally pervasive"; the sense of sustaining through the power of its object is the very meaning of "universally pervasive," since sustaining through this power allows it to take its object broadly. Further, it is called "original all, all-all, all-arising" — the "original all" meaning that, since beginningless time, it manifests fully across all nine grades; the "middle all" meaning that, since beginningless time, there has never been a single sentient being who fails to give rise to it; and the "final all" meaning that, since beginningless time, it universally takes every contaminated phenomenon as its object and thereby arises. The Prajñaptiśāstra states as much:

there has never been any ordinary being who, throughout the long night of time, has failed either to cling to some contaminated dharma as a self, or to cling to it as belonging to a self, or to grasp it as eternal or as annihilated, or to deny it outright as non-existent, or to grasp it as pure, liberating, and transcendent, or to grasp it as the noblest and most supreme, or to give rise to doubt and hesitation over it, or to give rise to blind, unknowing darkness over it — and it is for this reason that it is called, from the very beginning, all-all, all-arising, universally pervasive. Further, whenever a dharma, in the very moment it is present, is able to take all five sections as its object and serve as their cause, causing the dharmas of all five sections to remain benighted with respect to their own object, it is called universally pervasive. One asks: how does a universally-pervasive latent tendency cause even the uncontaminated-object-taking dharmas to remain benighted with respect to their own object? The answer: if one clings to a self and the like, one thereby necessarily slanders the very antidote that extinguishes the self — one first remains benighted with respect to that antidote, and only afterward denies it outright as non-existent. Further, whenever a dharma, in the very moment it is present, is able to take all five sections as its object and serve as their cause, becoming latent within all five sections without exception, it is called universally pervasive.

One asks: are the dharmas associated with, and co-existent with, a universally-pervasive latent tendency, also to be counted as a universally-pervasive-cause? Suppose either — what fault follows? If they are, why does the treatise state only that thirty-three are universally pervasive? If they are not, why is it that, among the associated and co-existent dharmas, some are counted as a universally-pervasive-cause and some are not? Some say: these are not universally-pervasive-causes at all. One asks: if that is so, why is it that, among the associated and co-existent dharmas, some are counted as a universally-pervasive-cause and some are not? The answer: just as, among associated and co-existent dharmas, some are latent tendencies and some are not, so too, among associated and co-existent dharmas, some are universally-pervasive-causes and some are not — what fault could follow from this? The verdict: it should instead be said that they, too, are indeed universally-pervasive-causes, since the very meaning of "cause" extends to them as well, the associated and co-existent dharmas sharing this very same fruit in common. One asks: if that is so, why does the treatise state only that thirty-three are universally pervasive? The answer: that statement is made only in order to distinguish, among the ninety-eight latent tendencies, how many are universally pervasive and how many are not; it is not meant as a total accounting of the meaning of universally-pervasive-cause, and so no real contradiction follows. Further, a universally-pervasive latent tendency possesses three distinguishing features, and it is on this account that it alone is called universally pervasive: first, it pervasively becomes latent within all five sections; second, it pervasively takes all five sections as its object; third, it pervasively serves as their cause. Its associated dharmas possess only two of these three features, lacking the pervasive latency; its co-existent dharmas possess only one of these three features, namely serving pervasively as their cause — and it is for this reason that the treatise does not separately mention them. One asks: is the acquisition belonging to a universally-pervasive latent tendency also to be counted as a universally-pervasive-cause? The Venerable Saṃghavasu explained: if the acquisition of what is universally pervasive were not itself universally pervasive, then the acquisition of what is not universally pervasive ought, by the same token, to be universally pervasive — and so the acquisition of what is universally pervasive must indeed be a universally-pervasive-cause as well. This argument, however, is unsound — just as the acquisition of matter is itself neither matter nor a form of matter, how could it possibly be counted as matter? — and so the acquisition of what is universally pervasive is rightly held not to be a universally-pervasive-cause.

One asks: why is it that the characteristic marks of arising and the rest, belonging to a universally-pervasive dharma, are themselves counted as a universally-pervasive-cause, while its acquisition is not? The answer: the characteristic marks of arising and the rest share exactly the same fruit as the universally-pervasive dharma itself, are constantly accompanying it without ever being separated from it, bear no priority or posteriority relative to it, and are extremely intimate with it — and it is for this reason that they, too, are counted as a universally-pervasive-cause. Its acquisition, by contrast, does not share the same fruit as the universally-pervasive dharma, is not constantly accompanying it, though also not entirely separate from it, sometimes preceding and sometimes following it, and is not extremely intimate with it — resembling, rather, the bark upon a tree — and it is for this reason that it is not counted as a universally-pervasive-cause.

One asks: why is it that a universally-pervasive latent tendency is established only among the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, and never among the dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path? The ancient Abhidharma masters explained: this is simply a matter of lineage and kinship — that is, the dharmas abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin are the very clan, lineage, birthplace, and home of the universally-pervasive latent tendencies, whereas the dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path are not. Some say: it is because the latent tendencies here are extremely firm and solid — that is, the latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin all share a single common intent and a single common function, and are, for this reason, extremely firm and solid, and it is on account of this very firmness and solidity that a universally-pervasive latent tendency can be established among them; the dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path do not share a single common intent, their respective functions being each distinct, and are, for this reason, extremely feeble and weak, and it is on account of this very feebleness and weakness that no universally-pervasive latent tendency is established among them — just as, among the people of a city, if they all share a single common intent and a single common undertaking, then neither the city's own ruler nor any outside enemy can subdue them, whereas, if these people do not share a single common intent, their undertakings each distinct, they will readily be subdued — the case here is exactly the same.

Some say: it is because self-view sustains and upholds them here — that is, wherever self-view is present, contaminated dharmas continue on in vigorous, blazing succession, and it is there that a universally-pervasive latent tendency can be established; the affliction abandoned by seeing the origin, though itself lacking self-view, is nonetheless nurtured and sustained by self-view, whereas no dharma abandoned by seeing cessation and the path involves any such matter. Some say: it is because these dharmas take as their object every cause and effect belonging to contaminated existence, pervasively — that is, the latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin are both able to take every cause and every effect of contaminated existence, pervasively, as their object, and it is on this account that a universally-pervasive latent tendency is established among them; every other latent tendency is not like this. Some say: it is because, with respect to their own object, these latent tendencies are fixed in a pattern of ever-increasing growth — that is, the latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin all take a contaminated object, and, in following after this contaminated object, they grow ever more increased, just as a person gazing at the moon thereby benefits his own eyesight; whereas the latent tendencies abandoned by seeing cessation and the path may take either a contaminated or an uncontaminated object — and those that take an uncontaminated object thereby grow ever more diminished, in whatever degree they take that object, just as a person gazing at the sun thereby damages his own eyesight — and it is because this pattern is not fixed that no universally-pervasive latent tendency is established among them. Some say: it is because these latent tendencies here operate through two distinct kinds of latent function — that is, the latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin both perform their latent function through two distinct gateways: first, through taking an object; second, through association. The latent tendencies abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, by contrast, may perform their latent function through either of these two gateways, or through association alone — being, in this respect, not fixed — and it is for this reason that no universally-pervasive latent tendency can be established among them. Some say: this matter is fixed in that it rests upon exactly two feet, the meaning being as already stated above. Some say: it is because all four sections alike possess two kinds of path — that is, within the section of what is abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, there is what is universally pervasive and what is not;

while, within the section of what is abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, there is what takes a contaminated object and what takes an uncontaminated object — and so there is nothing further here requiring explanation. Some say: this is because every latent tendency, without exception, falls under one or the other of these two — that is, every latent tendency, without exception, falls under the truth of suffering or the truth of origin — and it is only among these that a universally-pervasive latent tendency exists. Some say: if the truth of suffering and the truth of origin possessed contaminated fruits and causes as their basis, then the dharmas abandoned by seeing cessation and the path would thereby be shown to be feeble at their very root, and it is for this reason that no universally-pervasive latent tendency is established among them. Some say: there is nothing here requiring explanation at all, since a universally-pervasive latent tendency, by definition, is certainly able to take everything, pervasively, as its object, and no dharma abandoned by seeing cessation and the path is ever able to take everything as its object in this pervasive way.

One asks: why is it that craving, hatred, and conceit, though abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, are not universally pervasive? The answer: because none of these three bear the characteristic mark of universal pervasiveness — that which is universally pervasive must be able to take everything as its object, whereas these three are unable to do so. Some say: these three are subsumed under afflictions of one's own particular characteristic, whereas only those subsumed under afflictions of a shared, common characteristic can be established as universally pervasive. How, then, are these three each subsumed under one's own particular characteristic? Whoever gives rise to craving does so either with respect to his own body and not another's, or with respect to another's body and not his own, or with respect to this or that particular part of the body, distinctly, in each separate case — and hatred and conceit are exactly the same — and so these are each subsumed under one's own particular characteristic. Self-view and the rest, by contrast, within a single moment of thought, universally take an entire realm, an entire destiny, and the very fact of birth itself as their object, whether clinging to it as a self or as belonging to a self, or persisting on through every degree of blind, unknowing darkness — and so these are subsumed under a shared, common characteristic. Some say: it is because craving, hatred, and conceit are difficult to bring to a blazing pitch — that is, craving, hatred, and conceit can only be brought to a blazing pitch in dependence upon a spouse, wealth and possessions, or an enemy and a rival, whereas a universally-pervasive latent tendency can easily be brought to a blazing pitch, continuing on of its own accord, effortlessly, like the ceaseless flowing of a river. Some say: it is because wrong view, doubt, and ignorance are able to take all four noble truths as their object, and it is among these that a universally-pervasive latent tendency can be established, whereas craving, hatred, and conceit possess no such capacity, and so no universally-pervasive latent tendency is established among them. One asks: why is it that craving, hatred, and conceit, together with view-grasping and precept-and-vow-grasping, when abandoned by seeing cessation and the path, do not take an uncontaminated object? The answer: because it would be improper to reproach the uncontaminated with these; the uncontaminated bears no characteristic of malice; its nature is gentle and accommodating; it is the very finest and most supreme; and it is utterly pure — and it is for these reasons that craving and the rest do not take an uncontaminated object.

The desire realm possesses eleven universally-pervasive latent tendencies; nine of these can take either realm — this one or another — as their object, while two take only this very realm as their object — namely, self-view and extreme-view. One asks: why is it that these two views do not take another realm as their object? The answer: because their own capacity to reach an object extends only this far. Further, these two views operate only with respect to coarse dharmas — that is, these two views arise only by directly perceiving the coarse, manifest aggregates and clinging to them as a self or as belonging to a self, or by reckoning them as subject to annihilation or as eternal; but were one born in the desire realm, one would be unable to directly perceive the subtle aggregates of the form or formless realm, and so one would not cling to them as a self or as belonging to a self in this way. One asks: if that is so, then one born in the form realm does directly perceive the coarse, manifest aggregates of the desire realm — why, then, does he not cling to them as a self or as belonging to a self? The answer: because he has already become free of their defilement — that is, one born in the form realm has already become free of the desire realm's own aggregates' defilement, and so, although he does directly perceive them, he does not cling to them as a self or as belonging to a self and so on. Further, the afflictions of a higher stage do not take a lower stage as their object. One asks, this further question arising from the very discussion at hand: why do the afflictions of a higher stage not take a lower stage as their object? The answer: because one has already become free of that lower stage's own defilement — that is, only one who has already become free of a lower stage's own defilement is able to give rise to that higher stage's own afflictions manifestly before him; and, having already become free of that lower dharma's own defilement, how could the higher stage's own afflictions still take it as their object? One asks: how is it known that one must first become free of a lower stage's own defilement before that higher stage's own afflictions can manifest before him? The answer: as the Prajñaptiśāstra states, there are six kinds of non-restraint — that is, each of the three realms possesses two kinds, associated and dissociated. When the desire realm's own associated non-restraint manifests before one, six kinds of non-restraint are thereby possessed, and four kinds of non-restraint also manifest before him — namely, the desire realm's own two, together with the form and formless realms' own dissociated kinds. When the form realm's own associated non-restraint manifests before one, four kinds of non-restraint are thereby possessed, and three kinds also manifest before him — namely, the form realm's own two, together with the formless realm's own dissociated kind.

When the formless realm's own associated non-restraint manifests before one, two kinds of non-restraint are thereby possessed, and these same two also manifest before him — namely, the formless realm's own two. Here, "defiled dharma" is what is meant by "non-restraint" — and it is by this very passage that one knows that a higher stage's own affliction can only manifest before one after that person has already become free of a lower stage's own defilement. One asks: why is it that the desire realm's own afflictions are able to take the form and formless realms as their object, while the afflictions of those two higher realms are unable to take the desire realm as their object? The answer: the desire realm is an indeterminate realm, not a realm of cultivation, not a realm freed of defilement, and so it is unable to subdue and restrain its own latent tendencies, and it is for this reason that it is able to cross over and take the form and formless realms as its object. The form and formless realms, by contrast, are realms of concentration, realms of cultivation, realms freed of defilement, and so they are able to skillfully subdue and restrain their own latent tendencies, and it is for this reason that they are unable to cross over and take a lower stage as their object — just as a man who cannot even restrain his own wife and concubines may thereby come to commit improper acts with another's, whereas one who skillfully restrains even his own wife and concubines would never so much as glance at another's with improper intent, let alone commit any improper act — the case here is exactly the same. Further, one born in the desire realm remains hesitant and undecided with regard to the aggregates of the two higher realms — uncertain whether they are suffering or not suffering, whether they are the origin or not the origin, whether they are the very finest or not the very finest, whether they are pure or not pure — and it is owing to this very lack of clear understanding that the desire realm's own afflictions are able to take the higher realms as their object; whereas one born in a higher stage has already directly perceived the aggregates of the lower stage, entertaining no such hesitation whatsoever, and it is for this reason that a higher stage's own afflictions do not take a lower stage as their object. Further, were the afflictions of the form and formless realms to take the desire realm as their object, they would thereby increase and grow latent within it, and, were they to increase and grow latent within it in this way, the very boundaries between the realms would become hopelessly confused — and it is for this reason that those afflictions do not take the desire realm as their object. One asks: just as the desire realm's own afflictions, though they do take the higher realms as their object, do not thereby increase and grow latent within them, why should the same not hold true for the higher realms' own afflictions with respect to the desire realm as well? The answer: the aggregates of the higher realms are superior, and so, though the desire realm's own afflictions take them as their object and arise in dependence on them, they do not thereby increase and grow latent within them; the aggregates of the desire realm, by contrast, are inferior, and so, were a higher realm's own afflictions to take them as their object and arise in dependence on them, they would at once increase and grow latent within them — just as an inferior person, standing before one who is noble and eminent, though he may look directly upon him, is unable to do him any real harm, whereas, were that noble and eminent person to look upon the inferior person, he would at once be able to do him real harm — the case here is exactly the same.

The form realm likewise possesses eleven universally-pervasive latent tendencies, nine of which can take either realm as their object, while two take only their own realm as their object. The formless realm likewise possesses eleven universally-pervasive latent tendencies, every one of which takes only its own realm as its object, with none taking another realm as its object, since there exists no realm higher than it, and it does not take any lower realm as its object either. Some say: there are also latent tendencies here that do take another realm as their object, though the concentration capable of taking such an object is not one that ever actually manifests. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained — since there exists no higher realm at all to be taken as an object, how could there possibly be a concentration capable of taking such an object? And so the position holding that no such thing exists is the one sound in principle.

The first dhyāna, up through the sphere of nothingness, each likewise possesses eleven universally-pervasive latent tendencies, nine of which can take either one's own or another stage as their object, while two take only their own stage as their object.

The sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception likewise possesses eleven universally-pervasive latent tendencies, every one of which takes only its own stage as its object, since there exists no stage higher than it, and it does not take any lower stage as its object either. Some say: there are also latent tendencies here that do take another stage as their object,

though the concentration capable of taking such an object is not one that ever actually manifests. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained — since there exists no higher stage at all to be taken as an object, how could there possibly be a concentration capable of taking such an object? And so the position holding that no such thing exists is the one sound in principle.