The Seed in Good Soil

The desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, is able to take the suffering and origin of all three realms as its object, but never all at once, within a single moment — that is, it takes the desire realm as its object in one moment,

and takes the form and formless realms as its object in a different moment. One asks: why can it not take the suffering and origin of all three realms at once, within a single moment? The answer: because, when it takes the desire realm as its object, it thereby also increases and grows latent within it, while, when it takes the form and formless realms as its object, it does not thereby increase or grow latent within them. One asks: why is it that, when this view takes the desire realm as its object, it thereby increases and grows latent within it,

while, when it takes the form and formless realms as its object, it does not thereby increase or grow latent within them? The answer: the desire realm is this view's own place of latent increase, while the form and formless realms are not its place of latent increase. Further, the desire realm is this view's own dwelling and home, while the form and formless realms are not its dwelling and home. Further, the desire realm possesses this view's own equal-outflow and ripening fruits, while the form and formless realms do not possess this view's own equal-outflow and ripening fruits. Further, the desire realm possesses this view's own five-section universally-pervasive fruit,

while the form and formless realms do not possess this view's own five-section universally-pervasive fruit. Further, the desire realm does not possess this view's own ultimate antidote, while the form and formless realms do possess this view's own ultimate antidote.

Further, suppose this view could take the suffering and origin of all three realms at once, within a single moment — how, then, would it take them as its object? Would it be like its taking the desire realm as its object, thereby increasing and growing latent within it, and likewise for its taking the form and formless realms as its object? Or would it be like its taking the form and formless realms as its object, not thereby increasing or growing latent within them, and likewise for its taking the desire realm as its object? Suppose either — what fault follows? If it were like its taking the desire realm as its object, thereby increasing and growing latent within the form and formless realms as well, then the very boundaries between the realms would become confused. If it were like its taking the form and formless realms as its object, not thereby increasing or growing latent within the desire realm either, then this would be improper as well, since there exists no affliction that takes a dharma of its own realm as its object while lacking either of the two modes of latent increase, that by object and that by association — an affliction taking a dharma of its own stage as its object must necessarily possess both modes of binding, by object and by association. And were this view able to take the suffering and origin of all three realms at once, within a single moment, with respect to its object showing increase in some cases and no increase in others, then its associated dharmas, too, ought correspondingly to show increase in some cases and no increase in others — which would then violate this very principle of causation, and would also destroy the coherence of associated dharmas altogether. Lest such a fault follow, it is therefore established, soundly, that this view takes its own realm and another realm as its object only at separate times, never simultaneously. In just the same way, the first dhyāna's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, is able to take the suffering and origin of all eight stages as its object, but never all at once, within a single moment — taking the first dhyāna as its object in one moment, and taking the seven higher stages as its object in a different moment. And so it continues, up through the sphere of nothingness's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, being able to take the suffering and origin of two stages as its object, but never at once, within a single moment — taking its own stage as its object in one moment, and taking the higher stage as its object in a different moment. The sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, takes only its own stage's suffering and origin as its object. The desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing cessation, takes only the cessation of the desire realm's own conditioned formations as its object. One asks: why is it that the desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, is able to take the suffering and origin of all three realms as its object, while the desire realm's own wrong view,

abandoned by seeing cessation, is able to take only the cessation of the desire realm's own conditioned formations as its object? The Venerable Pārśva explained: whatever dharma the desire realm's own craving clings to, and whatever the identity-view grasps as a self or as belonging to a self, the cessation of that very dharma is what the desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing cessation, properly takes as its object — that affliction never being able to take another realm as its object, and the same holds true here as well. Some say: suffering and origin are conditioned dharmas, and one's own stage and another stage mutually draw one another along,

and it is for this reason that this wrong view is able to take another stage as its object; the truth of cessation, being unconditioned, admits of no such mutual drawing-along between one's own stage and another stage, and it is for this reason that this wrong view does not take another stage as its object. In just the same way, the first dhyāna's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing cessation, takes only the cessation of the first dhyāna's own conditioned formations as its object, and so on, up through the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing cessation, taking only the cessation of the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's own conditioned formations as its object. The desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing the path, takes only the antidote to the desire realm's own conditioned formations as its object. One asks: why is it that the desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, is able to take the suffering and origin of all three realms as its object, while the desire realm's own wrong view,

abandoned by seeing the path, is able to take only the antidote to the desire realm's own conditioned formations as its object? The Venerable Pārśva explained: whatever dharma the desire realm's own craving clings to, and whatever the identity-view grasps as a self or as belonging to a self, the antidote to that very dharma is what the desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing the path, properly takes as its object —

that affliction never being able to take another realm as its object, and the same holds true here as well. Some say: the desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin, takes as its object what is not itself an antidote, and it is for this reason that it is able to take another stage as its object; the desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing the path, takes precisely the antidote itself as its object, and it is for this reason that it is unable to take another stage's own antidote as its object. Here, some further say: the desire realm's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing the path, takes only the not-yet-arrived stage's own dharma-knowledge class of the path as its object, since that alone serves as this affliction's own antidote of cutting-off. The verdict: it should instead be said that it is able to take the dharma-knowledge class of the path belonging to six stages as its object, since these all share the same category and kind, and are alike a form of destroying the antidote proper to the desire realm. In just the same way, the first dhyāna's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing the path, is able to take the subsequent-knowledge class of the path belonging to nine stages as its object, and so on, up through the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception's own wrong view, abandoned by seeing the path, being able to take the subsequent-knowledge class of the path belonging to nine stages as its object. One asks: why is it that the wrong view abandoned by seeing cessation is able to take only its own stage's own cessation of conditioned formations as its object, while the wrong view abandoned by seeing the path is able to take the dharma-knowledge class of the path belonging to six stages, or the subsequent-knowledge class of the path belonging to nine stages, as its object? The answer: cessation, belonging to one's own stage or another stage, is not a case of mutual causation, whereas the noble path of many stages does indeed mutually serve as cause. One asks: if that is so, then the dharma-knowledge and subsequent-knowledge classes of the path likewise mutually serve as cause for one another — why, then, does the wrong view abandoned by seeing the path not take both together as its object without distinction? Some say: the wrong view abandoned by seeing the path is indeed also able to take both the dharma-knowledge and subsequent-knowledge classes of the path together as its object without distinction, since they mutually serve as cause for one another, and the dharma-knowledge class of the path is likewise able to serve as antidote to the two higher realms.

The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained, since the subsequent-knowledge class of the path is not an antidote to the desire realm's own dharmas at all, and, although the dharma-knowledge class of the path does serve as antidote to the two higher realms, it is neither their very first nor their complete antidote, and, further, the dharma-knowledge and subsequent-knowledge classes belong to genuinely distinct categories and kinds. Some say: the subsequent-knowledge class of the path belonging to nine stages is the antidote that cuts off the eight higher stages, and it is only this that serves as the object taken by that stage's own wrong view abandoned by seeing the path, never the path of any other stage. The verdict: this position, too, ought not to be maintained, since the very capacity to serve as antidote is itself of many distinct kinds, and, further, since the subsequent-knowledge class, mutually serving as cause for one another, all share the very same category and kind.

One asks: since a single moment of a latent tendency cannot pervasively take everything as its object, nor pervasively increase and grow latent everywhere, why is it still called "universally pervasive" at all? The answer: this name is given with reference to that latent tendency's own kind and continuum taken as a whole, and so no fault follows. Yet, with respect to a universally-pervasive latent tendency considered against the universally-pervasive-cause, four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of a universally-pervasive latent tendency that is not a universally-pervasive-cause — namely, a future universally-pervasive latent tendency. There is a case of a universally-pervasive-cause that is not, itself, a universally-pervasive latent tendency — namely, the dharmas associated with, and co-existent with, a past or present universally-pervasive latent tendency. There is a case of what is both a universally-pervasive latent tendency and a universally-pervasive-cause — namely, a past or present universally-pervasive latent tendency itself. There is a case of what is neither — namely, every case excluded from those just described; but, if this is instead stated with reference to that latent tendency's own kind and continuum taken as a whole, it should be said that a future universally-pervasive latent tendency, together with its associated and co-existent dharmas, is what is meant. One asks: do all defiled dharmas, without exception, take what is abandoned by seeing as their cause? Suppose either — what fault follows? If all defiled dharmas do take what is abandoned by seeing as their cause, then both the not-yet-cut-off and the already-cut-off alike would serve equally as cause — what, then, would be the real difference between the not-yet-cut-off and the already-cut-off? And, if that is so,

why is it that, among the defiled dharmas abandoned by cultivation, a noble one gives rise to some and not to others? Those that do not arise are craving-devoid-of-love, the various conceits, and extreme wrathful fury; those that do arise are the remaining craving, hatred, conceit, and ignorance. And, if that is so, how is the Vijñānakāya to be reconciled with this — namely, as it states: is there a case of an unwholesome dharma that takes only the unwholesome as its cause? The answer given there is: yes — namely, when a noble one, at the moment of retrogressing from freedom of desire's own defilement, has his very first defiled volition manifest before him. But if not all defiled dharmas take what is abandoned by seeing as their cause, then how is the Prakaraṇapāda to be reconciled with this — namely, as it states: what are the dharmas caused by what is abandoned by seeing? The answer given there is: every defiled dharma, together with the ripening of what is abandoned by seeing. And, if that is so, this would also contradict that same treatise's further statement: what are the dharmas caused by the undefined? The answer given there is: every undefined conditioned dharma, together with every unwholesome dharma. And, if that is so, this would also contradict that same treatise's further statement: there is a case of the truth of suffering being caused by identity-view, and a case of it not being caused by identity-view — excluding the past and present truth of suffering abandoned by seeing suffering, and so on, at length, excluding the future identity-view and its associated dharmas, arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence, and every other defiled truth of suffering. And, if that is so, how is the Vijñānakāya to be further reconciled with this — namely, as it states: unwholesome eye-consciousness, and so on, up through unwholesome mental-consciousness, all take the unwholesome and the undefined as their cause? The answer: it should be said that every defiled dharma does indeed take what is abandoned by seeing as its cause. One asks: if that is so, then both the not-yet-cut-off and the already-cut-off alike serve as cause — what, then, is the real difference between them? The answer: the very name itself differs — that is, the earlier, not-yet-cut-off stage is called the not-yet-cut-off cause, while the later, already-cut-off stage is called the already-cut-off cause. Further, in the earlier stage, the antidote has not yet destroyed it; in the later stage, although it still serves as cause, it has already been destroyed by the antidote.

Further, in the earlier stage, it is able, within one's own person, to obstruct the noble path; in the later stage, although it still serves as cause, it no longer obstructs the noble path within one's own person. Further, in the earlier stage, it is able, within one's own person, to give rise to a smoke-and-flame-like acquisition; in the later stage, although it still serves as cause, it can no longer give rise to any such smoke-and-flame-like acquisition within one's own person. Further, in the earlier stage, it is able, within one's own person, to perform reproachable and defiling deeds;

in the later stage, although it still serves as cause, it can no longer perform any such reproachable or defiling deed within one's own person. Further, in the earlier stage, it is able, within one's own person, to accomplish the task proper to it; in the later stage, although it still serves as cause, it can no longer accomplish that task within one's own person. Further, in the earlier stage, it is able, within one's own person, to accomplish the function of the homogeneous-cause and the universally-pervasive-cause; in the later stage, although it still serves as cause, it can no longer accomplish that function within one's own person. Further, in the earlier stage, it is able, within one's own person, to accomplish an equal-outflow fruit and a ripening fruit; in the later stage, although it still serves as cause, it can no longer accomplish either fruit within one's own person. Further, in the earlier stage, it is able, within one's own person, to take up its fruit and give its fruit; in the later stage, although it still serves as cause, it can no longer take up or give its fruit within one's own person — this, then, is the real difference between the not-yet-cut-off and the already-cut-off. One asks: if that is so, why is it that, among the defiled dharmas abandoned by cultivation, a noble one gives rise to some and not to others? The answer: what is abandoned by seeing serves, with respect to those defiled dharmas, either as a near cause sustaining their continuity, or as a far cause not sustaining their continuity — if it serves as a near cause sustaining their continuity, a noble one does not give rise to that defiled dharma; if it serves as a far cause not sustaining their continuity, a noble one may still give rise to it. Further, if one has already attained the non-selective cessation of that defiled dharma, a noble one does not give rise to it; if one has not yet attained it,

a noble one may still give rise to it. Further, if that defiled dharma's own arising is necessarily dependent on the very nature of an ordinary being, a noble one does not give rise to it; if it is not fixed in this way, a noble one may still give rise to it. Further, if that defiled dharma's own arising is necessarily capable of obstructing noble nature itself, a noble one does not give rise to it; if this is not so, a noble one may still give rise to it. One asks: why is it that a noble one does not give rise to craving-devoid-of-love? The answer: because it is nurtured and sustained by the extinction-view, arising immediately in its wake — every noble one, having already cut off the extinction-view, therefore does not give rise to it. One asks: why is it that a noble one does not give rise to the various kinds of conceit? The answer: because they are nurtured and sustained by identity-view, arising immediately in its wake — every noble one, having already cut off identity-view, therefore does not give rise to them. One asks: why is it that a noble one does not give rise to extreme wrathful fury? The answer: because it is nurtured and sustained by wrong view, arising immediately in its wake — every noble one, having already cut off wrong view, therefore does not give rise to it. One asks: if that is so, how is the Vijñānakāya to be reconciled with this —

namely, as it states: is there a case of an unwholesome dharma that takes only the unwholesome as its cause? The answer given there is: yes, and so on, at length? The answer: that treatise speaks with reference to the not-yet-cut-off cause, and so no real contradiction follows — that is, that first-arising defiled volition possesses two kinds of cause, one already cut off and one not yet cut off, and that treatise speaks only with reference to the not-yet-cut-off cause. Further, that treatise speaks with reference to the unwholesome cause, and so no real contradiction follows — that is, that first-arising defiled volition possesses two kinds of cause, one unwholesome and one undefined, and that treatise speaks only with reference to the unwholesome cause. Further, that treatise speaks with reference to the cause belonging to its own section, and so no real contradiction follows — that is, that first-arising defiled volition possesses two kinds of cause, one belonging to its own section and one to another section, and that treatise speaks only with reference to the cause belonging to its own section. Further, that treatise speaks with reference to the non-pervasive cause, and so no real contradiction follows — that is, that first-arising defiled volition possesses two kinds of cause, one universally pervasive and one not, and that treatise speaks only with reference to the non-pervasive cause. Further, that treatise speaks with reference to the not-held-in-common cause, and so no real contradiction follows — that is, that first-arising defiled volition possesses two kinds of cause, one held in common and one not held in common, and that treatise speaks only with reference to the not-held-in-common cause. One asks: for a noble one, before he had yet become free of desire's own defilement, that same defiled volition had also once taken the unwholesome as its cause — why, then, does that treatise speak only of his later moment of retrogression? The answer: at that earlier time, this volition had not yet been actually possessed, whereas now it comes to be actually possessed; formerly it was unbound, and now it is bound; formerly it was, so to speak, dead, and now it is alive — and it is for this reason that the treatise singles it out for special mention. One asks: a later-arising defiled volition, too, takes the unwholesome as its cause — why, then, does that treatise mention only its very first arising?

The answer: at that time, this volition, having formerly been cut off, now becomes continuous once more; formerly it had no function, and now it has function; formerly it was, so to speak, dead, and now it is alive — and it is for this reason that the treatise singles it out for special mention. There are yet others who say: not all defiled dharmas take what is abandoned by seeing as their cause. One asks: if that is so, how are the Prakaraṇapāda and the Vijñānakāya to be reconciled with this? The answer: those treatises speak only in a general way; were they to speak specifically, they ought to have said: there is a defiled form

that takes what is abandoned by seeing as its cause, but not every defiled form does so, and so on, up through: there is a defiled consciousness that takes what is abandoned by seeing as its cause, but not every defiled consciousness does so. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained, since those treatises plainly state that every defiled dharma, without exception, takes what is abandoned by seeing as its cause, that every unwholesome dharma, without exception, takes the undefined as its cause, that every other defiled truth of suffering, without exception, takes identity-view as its cause, and that the six unwholesome consciousnesses, without exception, take the unwholesome and the undefined as their cause — and so the earlier position stated is the sound one. The Venerable Śrīlāta distinguished defiled dharmas differently, maintaining as follows: there is a dharma abandoned by seeing suffering that takes only what is abandoned by seeing suffering as its cause; there is a dharma abandoned by seeing suffering that takes only what is abandoned by seeing the origin as its cause; there is no case of a dharma taking both together as its cause — and the same holds, in the same way, for what is abandoned by seeing the origin. This position is, in truth, altogether baseless, offered only as a distinction for its own sake — for suppose a noble one has already directly realized suffering but not yet directly realized the origin: rising from the noble path, if what is abandoned by seeing the origin takes only what is abandoned by seeing the origin as its cause, it is able to manifest before him; but if what is abandoned by seeing the origin takes what is abandoned by seeing suffering as its cause, it is unable to manifest before him, since that cause has already been cut off. There is a dharma abandoned by seeing cessation that takes only what is abandoned by seeing cessation as its cause;

there is a dharma abandoned by seeing cessation that takes only what is abandoned by seeing suffering as its cause; there is a dharma abandoned by seeing cessation that takes only what is abandoned by seeing the origin as its cause; there is a dharma abandoned by seeing cessation that takes what is abandoned by seeing both suffering and the origin together as its cause; there is no case of a dharma taking all three together as its cause — and the same holds, in the same way, for what is abandoned by seeing the path and for what is abandoned by cultivation. This, too, is in truth altogether baseless, offered only as a distinction for its own sake — for suppose a noble one has already directly realized cessation but not yet directly realized the path:

rising from the noble path, if what is abandoned by seeing the path takes only what is abandoned by seeing the path as its cause, it is able to manifest before him; but if what is abandoned by seeing the path takes what is abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin as its cause, it is unable to manifest before him, since that cause has already been cut off. In just the same way, when a noble one is cultivating the path of cultivation, if a defiled dharma abandoned by cultivation takes only what is abandoned by cultivation as its cause, it is able to manifest before him; but if it takes

what is abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin as its cause, it is unable to manifest before him, since that cause has already been cut off. Yet, when noble ones become free of the desire realm's own defilement, the desire realm's own defiled dharmas abandoned by cultivation — whether taking only what is abandoned by cultivation as their cause, or taking only what is abandoned by seeing suffering and the origin as their cause — form together a single mass, gradually cut off across the nine grades; and, should such a noble one later retrogress, the desire realm's own defiled dharmas abandoned by cultivation that take only what is abandoned by cultivation as their cause would then be actually possessed once more, while those that take only what is abandoned by seeing as their cause would not be actually possessed, since that cause has already been cut off — and, further, at that time, among the defiled dharmas abandoned by cultivation that take only what is abandoned by cultivation as their cause, the future ones would be actually possessed once more while the past ones would not, since they can never again manifest before him. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained — for how could it be that afflictions cut off by one and the same antidote should, upon a later retrogression, be actually possessed once more in some cases and not in others? Nor can this position be reconciled with the Prakaraṇapāda's or the Vijñānakāya's own statements — and so the position already stated above remains the sound one.

One asks: craving, being equally cut off with respect to every realm, stage, and section alike, why is it that a universally-pervasive latent tendency is able to increase and grow latent within another section, while craving is not? The answer: a universally-pervasive latent tendency possesses an equal-outflow fruit or a ripening fruit within another section, and so it is able to increase and grow latent there; craving possesses no equal-outflow or ripening fruit within another realm or stage, and so it does not increase or grow latent there. Further, one's own stage and another section are similarly coarse or subtle, and so increase and latent growth are possible; a higher stage is comparatively subtle, and so no such increase or latent growth is possible there. One asks: do a pervasively-caused ripening and a non-pervasively-caused ripening mutually serve as cause for one another, or not? Some say: a pervasively-caused ripening serves as cause for a non-pervasively-caused ripening, but a non-pervasively-caused ripening does not always serve as cause for a pervasively-caused ripening — just as a universally-pervasive latent tendency serves as cause for a non-pervasive latent tendency, while a non-pervasive latent tendency belonging to another section cannot serve as cause for a universally-pervasive latent tendency, and the same holds for their respective ripening fruits. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained, since the latent tendency itself is one kind of dharma and its ripening fruit is a different kind of dharma altogether — the latent tendency belongs to five distinct sections, while its ripening fruit belongs only to what is abandoned by cultivation. It should instead be said: a pervasively-caused ripening serves as cause for a pervasively-caused ripening,

and also for a non-pervasively-caused ripening; a non-pervasively-caused ripening serves as cause for a non-pervasively-caused ripening, and also for a pervasively-caused ripening — since they share the same stage, the same section, and the same nature and kind.

One asks: what is the universally-pervasive-cause's own very substance? The answer: it is every past and present universally-pervasive latent tendency, together with its associated and co-existent dharmas — its own substance has already been stated, and so it will not be stated again here. One asks: why is it named the "universally-pervasive-cause"? What does "universally pervasive" actually mean? The answer: the sense of pervasively serving as cause is the very meaning of "universally pervasive"; the sense of pervasively taking an object is the very meaning of "universally pervasive"; the sense of pervasively increasing and growing latent is the very meaning of "universally pervasive." This universally-pervasive-cause pervades only the past and present, these two time-periods, and possesses an equal-outflow fruit.

What is the ripening-cause? — and so on, as stated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: in order to refute a rival school and manifest the correct principle. That is, some maintain that, apart from volition, there is no ripening-cause, and, apart from feeling, no ripening fruit, just as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold — in order to refute this, the treatise shows that ripening-cause and ripening fruit alike pervade all five aggregates. Others maintain that only mind and its mental factors possess a ripening-cause and a ripening fruit, just as the Mahāsāṃghikas hold — in order to refute this, the treatise shows that this cause and this fruit likewise pervade material form and the dissociated formations as well. Others maintain that mind and its mental factors, together with material form, possess a ripening-cause and a ripening fruit, but not the dissociated formations — in order to refute this, the treatise shows that this, too, pervades the dissociated formations. Others maintain that every ripening-cause must relinquish its own substance before its fruit can ripen, holding that a ripening-cause only gives its fruit once it has entered the past, since the past, having already ceased, no longer possesses its own substance — in order to refute this, the treatise shows that the ripening-cause still possesses a genuine substance even at the very stage when its fruit ripens. Others maintain that a ripening-cause's own substance, so long as its fruit has not yet ripened, always exists, but that this substance is destroyed once its fruit has ripened, just as the Kāśyapīyas hold, who say: it is like a seed — so long as the sprout has not yet arisen, the seed's own substance always exists, but once the sprout has arisen, the seed is destroyed; every ripening-cause is exactly the same — in order to refute this, the treatise shows that a ripening-cause's own substance still exists even once its fruit has already ripened. Others maintain that good and evil deeds bear no fruit of pleasure or suffering at all, just as the outside religious teachers hold — in order to refute this, the treatise shows that good and evil karma does indeed bear a fruit of pleasure and suffering. It is for these reasons that this treatise is composed. What is the ripening-cause? The answer: mind and its mental factors, receiving a ripening of material form, mind, mental factors, or dissociated formations — this mind and these mental factors serve, with respect to that ripening, as a ripening-cause. Here, "mind and mental factors" refers to every unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome mind and mental factor, this phrase also encompassing whatever material form follows along with them, since dissociated formations share the very same fruit as mind and mental factors do. "Ripened material form" refers to the form aggregate — namely, the material form of the eye and the other four sense faculties, together with scent, taste, and touch. "Mind" refers to the consciousness aggregate — namely, the six consciousnesses of the eye and the rest. "Mental factors" refers to three aggregates — namely, feeling, perception, and volition, and the rest. "Dissociated formations" refers to the formations aggregate — namely, the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, and the like. This shows that ripening-cause and ripening fruit alike pervade all five aggregates.

Further, bodily and verbal karma, receiving a ripening of material form, mind, mental factors, or dissociated formations — this bodily and verbal karma serves, with respect to that ripening, as a ripening-cause. One asks: bodily and verbal karma that follows along with mind shares the very same fruit as mind, as already explained above — why, then, does this passage again speak separately of bodily and verbal karma? The answer: this refers to wholesome or unwholesome manifest action, and to the unmanifest action produced in dependence on manifest action, that does not follow along with mind.

this being what definitely brings about a ripening fruit. Some say: this passage refers to manifest bodily and verbal action, together with the unmanifest action produced in that very same moment, since they share the very same fruit. That position is unsound: manifest bodily and verbal action arises together with its unmanifest counterpart, yet manifest and unmanifest action never share the very same fruit, since they do not serve as a co-existent-cause for one another. Some say: although manifest action and the unmanifest action produced in dependence on it do not share the very same fruit, they are nonetheless certain to receive their ripening fruit simultaneously, since they arise from one and the same mind. That position, too, is unsound: dharmas that are merely mutually related to one another are not thereby a co-existent-cause for one another, so how could it be definitely said that they receive their ripening fruit within the very same moment? Rather, manifest and unmanifest action, not mutually serving as a co-existent-cause for one another, therefore yield distinct ripening fruits. Among the seven branches of manifest action, each is distinct, and each separately brings about its own ripening fruit; each branch, and the rest, further comprises countless atoms, each atom bearing its own distinction across the three time-periods,

and within each of these time-periods there occur countless further moments, each moment yielding its own distinct ripening fruit, since these are not a co-existent-cause for one another — and the unmanifest action is exactly the same.

Only the seven branches of unmanifest action that follow along with mind are capable of mutually serving as a co-existent-cause for one another, and it is for this reason alone that they share the very same ripening fruit. What has been said here of manifest and unmanifest action should also be understood to encompass whatever follows along with them and shares the very same fruit, their ripening to be understood accordingly, as already explained above.

Further, the dissociated formations, receiving a ripening of material form, mind, mental factors, or dissociated formations — these dissociated formations serve, with respect to that ripening, as a ripening-cause. This, then, is called the ripening-cause. One asks: mind and mental factors, manifest and unmanifest karma, and whatever follows along with these and shares the very same fruit, have already been explained above as sharing the very same fruit — what further dissociated formations does this passage now speak of? The answer: this passage now speaks of the attainment of the concentration of non-perception, the attainment of the concentration of cessation, every unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome acquisition, and whatever follows along with these and shares the very same fruit, none of which have yet been explained above. One asks: what ripening fruit does the attainment of the concentration of non-perception itself receive? Some say: the attainment of non-perception receives the ripening fruit of non-perception, together with material form — its life faculty and class of homogeneous being being the fruit of the karma of the fourth dhyāna's own mind-possessing state, while its remaining aggregates' ripening is a fruit held in common with other causes as well. Some say: the attainment of non-perception receives the ripening fruit of non-perception, together with material form — its life faculty being the fruit of the karma of the fourth dhyāna's own mind-possessing state, while its remaining aggregates' ripening is a fruit held in common with other causes as well. Some say:

the attainment of non-perception receives the ripening fruit of non-perception, together with material form, its remaining aggregates' ripening being a fruit held in common with other causes as well. Some say: the attainment of non-perception receives only the ripening fruit of non-perception itself, its remaining aggregates' ripening being a fruit held in common with other causes as well. One asks: if the life faculty, too, is not itself a fruit of karma, how is the Prakaraṇapāda to be reconciled with this — namely, as it states: there is a dharma that is a ripening fruit yet not itself karma, namely the life faculty? The answer: every life faculty is, without exception, a ripening fruit, and every ripening fruit, without exception, is made manifest through karma — it is with this implicit sense in mind that the treatise speaks in this way, though, in strict truth, the life faculty is not itself directly produced by karma. Further, that treatise speaks according to worldly convention, not according to ultimate truth — that is, when ordinary people in the world see someone of short life, they say: this person has performed a short-life-producing karma; when they see someone of long life, they say: this person has performed a long-life-producing karma. Some say: within the heaven of non-perceptive beings, at the time when mind is absent, one still receives the fourth dhyāna's own mind-possessing karmic fruit, and, at the time when mind is present, one still receives the fruit of the attainment of non-perception. One asks: if, at the time when mind is absent, one still receives a mind-possessing fruit, and, at the time when mind is present, one still receives a mind-absent fruit, how can cause and fruit fail to be inverted? The answer: just as form-realm karma can also receive a formless fruit, and formless-realm karma can also receive a form fruit, without any fault of cause and fruit being inverted, the case here is exactly the same. The Venerable Śrīlāta stated: the attainment of non-perception receives the ripening fruit of non-perception together with the class of homogeneous being, its life faculty and material form being the fruit of the karma of the fourth dhyāna's own mind-possessing state, while its mind, mental factors, and every other dissociated formation are not themselves any kind of ripening fruit at all. The verdict:

this position ought not to be maintained, since the class of homogeneous being belonging to a ripening fruit is itself a karmic fruit — if that is so, then its mind, mental factors, and every other dissociated formation ought likewise to be counted among the ripening fruits. The Venerable Buddhadeva therefore stated: the attainment of non-perception receives the ripening fruit of non-perception itself, its life faculty and class of homogeneous being being the fruit of the karma of the fourth dhyāna's own mind-possessing state, while its remaining aggregates' ripening is a fruit held in common with other causes as well. The verdict: this position, too, ought not to be maintained, since the five sense faculties, eye and the rest, are themselves a karmic fruit as well. It should instead be said: the ripening of non-perception itself is solely the fruit of the attainment of non-perception.

Its life faculty, class of homogeneous being, and the five material sense faculties are solely the fruit of the karma of the fourth dhyāna's own mind-possessing state; its remaining aggregates' ripening is a fruit held in common with other causes as well. One asks: what ripening fruit does the attainment of the concentration of cessation itself receive? The answer: it receives the ripening fruit of the four aggregates belonging to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception,

excluding the life faculty and class of homogeneous being, since these belong solely to karma's own fruit. One asks: what ripening fruit does an acquisition itself receive? The answer: an acquisition receives the ripening fruit of material form, mind, mental factors, and dissociated formations — here, "material form" refers to scent, taste, and touch, not the five material sense faculties, since those belong solely to karma's own fruit; "mind and mental factors" refers to painful feeling, pleasant feeling, and neutral feeling, together with their associated dharmas; "dissociated formations" refers to the various acquisitions themselves, together with arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence. The Venerable Saṃghavasu explained: an acquisition is also able to receive the ripening fruit of the eye and the other four sense faculties, together with the life faculty and the class of homogeneous being. He explained it this way: although a single acquisition, on its own, has no power to draw forth the class of homogeneous being and the rest, once acquisitions gather together in a great mass, they are indeed able to draw it forth — yet such a mass is capable of bringing about only a dull and obtuse body, resembling that of an earthworm and similar creatures. The material form thereby drawn forth by acquisitions covers all nine sense fields excluding sound; mind and its mental factors pervade all three classes of feeling; and the dissociated formations here refer to the class of homogeneous being, the life faculty, the various acquisitions, and arising, abiding, aging, and cessation. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained, since acquisitions, considered relative to one another, are never a co-existent-cause for one another — even were they to gather together in a hundred million strong, what further benefit could this possibly bring, since, sharing no single common fruit, they could never jointly draw forth the class of homogeneous being and the rest in this way. The Venerable Ghoṣa stated instead: an acquisition is unable to draw forth the class of homogeneous being and the rest at all — rather, whenever karma draws forth the class of homogeneous being and the rest, it is able, at the very locus of the eye and the other sense faculties, to bring about only scent, taste, and touch. The verdict: this position, too, ought not to be maintained, lest the formless realm's own acquisitions be left with no ripening fruit at all — and so it is the earlier position stated that is sound.

One asks: the Prakaraṇapāda states: what is the ripening-cause? The answer given there is: every unwholesome and contaminated-wholesome dharma — what difference is there between this and what the present treatise here states? The answer: that statement is provisional in meaning, while this one is fully definitive; that statement carries a further, unstated intention, while this one carries no further unstated intention; that statement is stated with a further cause left implicit, while this one leaves no further cause implicit; that statement speaks according to worldly convention, while this one speaks according to ultimate truth; that statement is stated with a mere shadow of the matter, while this one is stated without any such shadow. Further, that statement speaks of an already-arisen ripening-cause, while this one speaks of both an already-arisen and a not-yet-arisen ripening-cause. That statement speaks of a ripening-cause that gives its fruit, while this one speaks of a ripening-cause that both gives its fruit and does not yet give its fruit. Further, that statement speaks of the fruit of new karma, while this one speaks of the fruit of both new and old karma. Further, that statement speaks of a past ripening-cause, while this one speaks of a ripening-cause spanning all three time-periods. Further, that statement speaks of a ripening-cause that is presently, actually giving its fruit, while this one speaks of a ripening-cause that has already given its fruit, is presently giving it, or will give it in the future — this, then, is the very difference between that statement and this one. One asks: why does this present passage speak only of a ripening-cause presently, actually giving its fruit? The answer: because such a case is the most evident and clearly manifest one. Further, because it is with reference to that actually present fruit that the five destinies of rebirth and their various sentient beings are established. Further, because it is at that very moment that this cause's own function reaches its full completion — and so, by clearly showing the ripening-cause presently, actually giving its fruit, the ripening-causes that have already given, and that will yet give, their fruit are thereby shown as well, this being the more convenient way to convey the meaning — and it is for this reason that this present passage speaks only of the ripening-cause presently, actually giving its fruit.

Further, within the desire realm, there is a four-aggregate ripening-cause that yields a single fruit — namely, wholesome or unwholesome mind and its mental factors, together with whatever follows along with them; there is a two-aggregate ripening-cause that yields a single fruit — namely, wholesome or unwholesome bodily and verbal karma, together with whatever follows along with them; there is a one-aggregate ripening-cause that yields a single fruit — namely, an acquisition, together with whatever follows along with it. Within the form realm, there is a five-aggregate ripening-cause that yields a single fruit — namely, wholesome mind and its mental factors that are accompanied by following material form, together with whatever follows along with them; there is a four-aggregate ripening-cause that yields a single fruit — namely, wholesome mind and its mental factors that are not accompanied by following material form, together with whatever follows along with them; there is a two-aggregate ripening-cause that yields a single fruit — namely, wholesome bodily and verbal manifest action, together with whatever follows along with it; there is a one-aggregate ripening-cause that yields a single fruit — namely, the attainment of non-perception, together with whatever follows along with it. Within the formless realm, there is a four-aggregate ripening-cause that yields a single fruit —

namely, wholesome mind and its mental factors, together with whatever follows along with them; there is a one-aggregate ripening-cause that yields a single fruit — namely, the attainment of the concentration of cessation, together with whatever follows along with it. Further, there is a karma that receives ripening only within a single sense field — namely, the karma that obtains only the life faculty and the class of homogeneous being, this karma receiving its ripening only within the dharma sense field. There is a karma that receives ripening within two sense fields — namely, the karma that obtains the mental sense field, this karma receiving its ripening only within the mental and dharma sense fields; the karma that obtains the touch sense field likewise receives its ripening within two sense fields — namely, the touch and dharma sense fields. The karma that obtains the body sense field receives its ripening within three sense fields — namely, the body, touch, and dharma sense fields; the karma that obtains the form, scent, or taste sense fields is likewise so, each receiving its ripening within its own field, together with the touch and dharma fields. The karma that obtains the eye sense field receives its ripening within four sense fields — namely, the eye, body, touch, and dharma sense fields; the karma that obtains the ear or nose sense field is likewise so, each receiving its ripening within its own field, together with the body, touch, and dharma fields. There are yet other masters who say: since every one of the four great elements gives rise to both form and sound, and since the desire realm's own material forms are never separate from scent and taste, the karma that obtains the eye sense field, on this account, receives its ripening within seven sense fields — namely, the eye, body, and the form, scent, taste, touch, and dharma sense fields; the karma that obtains the ear or nose sense field is likewise so, each receiving its ripening within its own field, together with the body, and the form, scent, taste, touch, and dharma fields. The karma that obtains the body sense field receives its ripening within six sense fields — namely, the body, and the form, scent, taste, touch, and dharma fields. The karma that obtains the form sense field receives its ripening within five sense fields — namely, the form, scent, taste, touch, and dharma sense fields; the karma that obtains the scent or taste sense field is likewise so, each receiving its ripening within the form, scent, taste, touch, and dharma fields. These accounts just given describe what is definitely obtained; what is not definitely obtained cannot be fixed in number in this same way. There is a karma capable of receiving ripening within eight sense fields, a karma capable of receiving ripening within nine sense fields, a karma capable of receiving ripening within ten sense fields, and a karma capable of receiving ripening within eleven sense fields, always excluding the sound sense field. One asks: why is it that some karma is able to receive ripening within many sense fields, while other karma receives ripening within only a few sense fields? The answer: if a karma possesses manifold capacities, able to bring about manifold fruits, it receives its ripening within many sense fields; if a karma lacks manifold capacities, unable to bring about manifold fruits, it receives its ripening within only a few sense fields — just as, among external seeds, some possess manifold capacities, able to bring about manifold fruits, such as rice, sugarcane, grapes, and lotus roots, while others lack manifold capacities, unable to bring about manifold fruits, such as the seed of the sacoraka-plant or the palmyra tree — that is, there exists a grass in the marshlands called sacoraka, growing as a single stalk from a single seed, rising several feet in height, bearing only a few leaves at its crown shaped like a canopy; and there exists a palmyra tree, rising well over a hundred cubits, likewise bearing only a few leaves at its crown shaped like a canopy — though its trunk and stem grow very tall, its actual fruit is extremely scant.

Karma is exactly the same. Thus, one lifetime's own karma can yield fruit across three lifetimes, though there is no karma of three lifetimes that yields fruit within only a single lifetime; a single moment's own karma can yield fruit across many moments, though there is no karma of many moments that yields fruit within only a single moment — for karma, whether wholesome or unwholesome, always yields a morally undefined fruit, and, just as with any produced fruit, that fruit never diminishes below its own cause.

One asks: among those who perform karma, does one first perform the projecting karma that determines the class of homogeneous being, or first perform the fulfilling karma that fills it in? Some say:

one first performs the projecting karma, and only afterward performs the fulfilling karma — for if one has not first projected, there would afterward be nothing left to fill in, just as a painter first sketches the outline and only afterward fills in the various colors; the case here is exactly the same. There are yet other masters who say: one first performs the fulfilling karma, and only afterward performs the projecting karma — just as the bodhisattva, across three incalculable aeons, first completes the fulfilling karma, and only afterward, across the final hundred great aeons, completes the projecting karma. On this account, the matter is not fixed either way: some first perform the projecting karma and only afterward the fulfilling karma, while others first perform the fulfilling karma and only afterward the projecting karma, each according to the particular inclination and intention with which the agent undertakes the deed.

Further, there are three kinds of karma, distinguished by when their ripening is received: first, karma whose fruit is received in this very life; second, karma whose fruit is received in the very next life; third, karma whose fruit is received in some later life still. Karma whose fruit is received in this very life refers to karma performed and increased in this present life whose ripening fruit is received within this very same life, and no other. Karma whose fruit is received in the very next life refers to karma performed and increased in this present life whose ripening fruit is received in the very next life following, and no other. Karma whose fruit is received in some later life still refers to karma performed and increased in this present life whose ripening fruit is received, accordingly, only from the third or fourth life onward. Now, the word "ripening" is used in scripture to convey a great many distinct senses. In some passages, "equal-outflow" is spoken of as "ripening" — as when it is said that craving is the "ripening" of the link of feeling, within the chain of dependent origination. In some passages, "nourishment and growth" is spoken of as "ripening" — as when it is said that food, drink, and medicine "ripen" into pleasure. In some passages, "the content of a dream" is spoken of as "ripening" — as when it is said that one dreams of such-and-such a "ripening." In some passages, "abundance or scarcity of harvest" is spoken of as "ripening" — as when it is said that, when the constellations travel along a certain path, such-and-such a "ripening" of abundance or scarcity will follow. In some passages, an address to Brahmā himself is spoken of as "ripening" — as when it is said: Great Sage, I have not yet departed — behold this radiant light: what "ripening" does it hold? In some passages, "ripening" proper is spoken of as "ripening" — as in the present treatise's own statement, where the ripening fruit of material form and the rest is called "ripening." "Ripening" — or, more precisely, "maturing" — is itself of two kinds: first, ripening of the same kind; second, ripening of a different kind. As for ripening of the same kind:

this is precisely the equal-outflow fruit — that is, the wholesome giving rise to the wholesome, the unwholesome giving rise to the unwholesome, and the undefined giving rise to the undefined. Ripening of a different kind is precisely the true ripening fruit — that is, the wholesome or unwholesome giving rise to an undefined fruit; this undefined fruit, arising from a wholesome or unwholesome cause differing from it in kind, is for this very reason called “ripening.”

One asks: if a fruit is called a "ripening fruit" precisely because it differs in kind from its cause and yet has properly matured, why, then, is the bad destiny of rebirth called "unripened"? The answer: it, too, is indeed a ripening — but, being so lowly and base, it is spoken of as "unripened," just as a lowly and base village, town, or the like may still be called "not a village" and so forth. Further, it is called "unripened" precisely because it has been over-ripened —

just as an unskilled potter, in firing his clay vessels, wastes a great deal of firewood and grass, and the vessels themselves become scorched and misshapen, unfit for any practical use, and so, too, are called "unripened" — the bad destinies of rebirth are exactly the same, their suffering fruit so excessive that they, too, are called "unripened." Further, it is because no wholesome ripening exists there that it is called "unripened." One asks: animals and hungry ghosts, too, do receive some wholesome fruit — how, then, can the bad destinies, as a whole, be called "unripened"? The answer: their wholesome fruit is so scant that it, too, is spoken of as though it were entirely absent — just as a river with very little water remaining may still be called "waterless." Further, although these destinies do possess some wholesome fruit, they are nonetheless unable to cultivate any further, superior wholesome dharma, and it is for this reason that they, too, are called "unripened" — just as a farmer whose harvest proves extremely meager may still say that he has "no harvest" at all — while, in strict truth, the bad destinies of rebirth do indeed possess a genuine ripening fruit.

One asks: why is it that unwholesome dharmas and contaminated-wholesome dharmas possess a ripening fruit, while undefined and uncontaminated dharmas do not? The answer: the own-nature of a dharma, together with the surrounding conditions that either complete or lack what is needed, are of three distinct kinds — just as with an external seed. That is, a firm and sound seed, placed within good soil, irrigated with water and covered over with manure, will, once cause and condition are both complete, sprout forth — in just this way, an unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome dharma, whose own nature is firm and sound, placed within the field of existence, irrigated with the water of craving and covered over with the manure of the remaining fetters, will, once cause and condition are both complete, sprout forth into existence. A firm and sound seed, placed instead within a storehouse, lacking the conditions of water and manure, will be unable to sprout — in just this way, an uncontaminated wholesome dharma, though its own substance is firm and sound, lacking the moistening water of craving and the covering manure of the remaining fetters, produces no sprout of existence at all. A rotten and decayed seed, though placed within good soil and irrigated with water and covered over with manure, will, its own causal power lacking, still be unable to sprout — in just this way, every undefined conditioned dharma, though moistened by the water of craving and covered by the manure of the remaining fetters, its own substance being feeble and weak, produces no sprout of existence at all.

One asks, this further question arising from the very discussion at hand: why is it that uncontaminated dharmas have no ripening fruit at all? The answer: because they are neither a fit field nor a fit vessel — and so on, as stated at length. Further, whatever dharma perpetuates the continuous succession of birth, aging, sickness, and death across every realm of existence and every destiny possesses a ripening fruit; the uncontaminated brings the very succession of birth, aging, sickness, and death across every realm of existence and every destiny to its final and complete cessation, and so it has no ripening fruit. Further, whatever dharma causes every realm of existence and every destiny to increase gradually possesses a ripening fruit; the uncontaminated causes every realm of existence and every destiny to diminish gradually, and so it has no ripening fruit. Further, whatever dharma is itself an activity productive of the suffering of birth, aging, sickness, and death within the mundane world of existence possesses a ripening fruit; the uncontaminated is itself an activity that brings the suffering of birth, aging, sickness, and death within the mundane world of existence to cessation, and so it has no ripening fruit. Further, whatever dharma is the basis of identity-view, the basis of inverted views, the basis of craving and attachment, the basis of latent tendency, tainted, poisoned, defiled, and turbid, falling under the truths of suffering and the origin, falling into the three states of existence, possesses a ripening fruit; uncontaminated dharmas are unlike all of this, and so they have no ripening fruit. Further, were an uncontaminated dharma to possess a ripening fruit, this would then amount to a superior cause producing an inferior fruit, since the cause would be an uncontaminated wholesome conditioned dharma while the fruit would be a contaminated, undefined dharma. Further, were an uncontaminated dharma to possess a ripening fruit, this would mean that the noble path itself perpetuates the continuity of existence — and for the noble path to perpetuate existence would directly contradict all reason. Further, were an uncontaminated dharma to possess a ripening fruit, in which realm, exactly, would this fruit be received?

Were it received within the desire realm, this would be improper, since the uncontaminated is not bound to the desire realm, just as form-realm or formless-realm karma is not received within the desire realm. Were it received within the form realm, this too would be improper, since the uncontaminated is not bound to the form realm, just as desire-realm or formless-realm karma is not received within the form realm. Were it received within the formless realm, this too would be improper, since the uncontaminated is not bound to the formless realm, just as desire-realm or form-realm karma is not received within the formless realm. Were it received somewhere outside the three realms altogether, this too would be improper, since no place exists at all outside the three realms. Further, the uncontaminated noble path serves as antidote to ripening and to the ripening-cause itself; were this path also able to bring about a ripening fruit of its own, a further antidote would then be required to counter that very fruit — and this further antidote, being itself uncontaminated, would again bring about yet another ripening fruit needing yet a further antidote to counter it, and so on and on without end, meaning that there could never be any true liberation or release. Lest such a fault follow, therefore, the uncontaminated has no ripening fruit at all. Further, were an uncontaminated dharma to bring about a ripening fruit, this would mean that one could never, in the end, attain nirvāṇa at all, and no noble one ought ever to strive with diligence to cultivate it, since it would only be a dharma that turns the wheel of birth and death onward — and it is on this account that the uncontaminated has no ripening fruit. One asks, this further question arising from the very discussion at hand: why is it that undefined dharmas have no ripening fruit at all? The answer: because they are neither a fit field nor a fit vessel — and so on, as stated at length. Further, were an undefined dharma to possess a ripening fruit, that fruit would itself have to be either undefined, or wholesome, or unwholesome. Were it undefined, why, then, should it be called a "ripening" fruit at all, since "ripening" specifically means maturing into something of a different moral kind, not maturing into something of the very same kind? Were it wholesome or unwholesome, this too would be improper, since a ripening fruit must always itself be of an undefined moral nature. Further, were an undefined dharma to possess a ripening fruit, then, since that fruit would itself have to be undefined, it would in turn be able to bring about yet a further ripening fruit of its own, and this would go on indefinitely without end, meaning that there could never be any true liberation or release. Lest such a fault follow, therefore, undefined dharmas have no ripening fruit at all. It is through all of these various causes and conditions, taken together, that only unwholesome dharmas and contaminated-wholesome dharmas serve as the ripening-cause.