The Jar That Isn't Really the Cause of Its Own Perception

The efficient-cause's own very substance is precisely the dominant-condition, both alike taking every dharma as their own nature — yet their meaning differs, since "for the most part superior" is the very meaning of the dominant-condition, while "offering no obstruction" is the very meaning of the efficient-cause. One asks: if "for the most part superior" is the very meaning of the dominant-condition, then the object-condition, too, ought to be named "dominant," since its own substance likewise encompasses every dharma, exactly as the Prakaraṇapāda itself explains — these two conditions alike taking every dharma as their own nature. The answer: considered with reference to a continuum, these two conditions are similar in breadth; considered with reference to a single moment, the dominant-condition's own substance is, for the most part, superior in scope — that is, when taking every dharma as one's object under the aspect of "not-self," whatever, among all dharmas, is not taken as an object refers only to that very dharma's own associated and co-existent dharmas, whereas whatever is not dominant refers only to that very dharma's own self-nature — and it is by virtue of these associated and co-existent dharmas that the dominant-condition's own scope exceeds the object-condition's. One asks: if "offering no obstruction" is the very meaning of the efficient-cause, then the efficient-cause's own substance ought not to encompass every dharma at all — that is, when a single sentient being gives rise to a single destiny's own aggregates, elements, and sense fields, that very sentient being can never give rise to a second, distinct set of aggregates, elements, and sense fields at the same time; when a single eye gives rise to a single instance of eye-consciousness, no second instance of consciousness can arise there as well; just as within a single location, if one tree stands there, no second tree can stand there too, and if one house stands there, no second house can stand there too — all such dharmas mutually obstruct one another in this way, so how could this cause encompass every dharma at all?

The answer: although this circumstance does indeed occur, no contradiction to the principle follows — that is, when a single sentient being gives rise to a single destiny's own aggregates, elements, and sense fields, this is, in effect, as though that sentient being were saying to every other aggregate, element, and sense field: I do not obstruct you — arise as you will; were I to obstruct you, you would then be altogether unable to arise. When a single eye gives rise to eye-consciousness before it, that consciousness is, in effect, as though it were saying to every other instance of eye-consciousness: I do not obstruct you — arise as you will; were I to obstruct you, you would then be altogether unable to manifest before it. The similes of the tree and the house should be explained according to this very same principle. And, further, with respect to whatever it is that actually does obstruct that other dharma, that other dharma, at the very moment it might arise, likewise offers no obstruction in return — and so, whenever a single dharma is on the verge of arising, every other dharma offers it no obstruction whatsoever; were some other dharma to actually obstruct it, that very dharma would then, at that very moment, itself be unable to arise. It is for this reason that "offering no obstruction" is the very meaning of the efficient-cause, and yet the efficient-cause still encompasses every dharma without exception. One asks: since it is through the coming-together of cause and condition that dharmas arise, and through the coming-together of cause and condition that dharmas cease, and since cause and condition are never without this state of having-come-together, why, then, do dharmas not perpetually arise and cease, constantly, without ceasing?

The Venerable Vasumitra explained it in this way: it is through a single coming-together that dharmas arise, and through a single coming-together that dharmas cease — the coming-together proper to arising and the coming-together proper to ceasing being neither two, nor many — so how, then, could dharmas perpetually arise and cease, constantly, without ceasing? He further said: once dharmas have arisen through the coming-together of cause and condition, the immediately following, countless subsequent moments continue on in succession, pressing down and covering over what came before, so that it is no longer able to arise again — just as a person who has fallen from a cliff is then buried, moment after moment, by earth continuously falling and piling upon him from above, so that this person, at that very time, cannot even move, let alone rise up again. The Great Virtuous One stated: since the coming-together of cause and condition exists only momentarily, how, then, could dharmas perpetually arise and cease, constantly, without ceasing? The Venerable Buddhadeva explained it in this way: the arising and the ceasing of dharmas, each and every one, occur only a single time —

were there some further function whereby what has already arisen could arise yet again, or whereby what has already ceased could cease yet again, that function would be entirely without purpose — and it is for this reason that the arising and ceasing of dharmas is never perpetual or constant. One asks: at the very moment cause and condition come together to give rise to dharmas, is the functional capacity of that cause and condition singular, or is it manifold? If it is said to be singular, how could it depend upon many distinct substances? If it is said to be manifold, how could these many substances properly be said to "come together" at all? The answer: it may properly be called singular, and it may properly be called manifold — singular, because it accomplishes a single task; manifold, because it depends upon many distinct substances. Further, because the functional capacities of cause and condition mutually accord with one another, this may be called singular; because they give rise to many distinct dharmas, this may be called manifold. Further, because the functional capacities of cause and condition equally cause dharmas to arise and to function, this may be called singular; because the functions thereby given rise to — material form, feeling, and the rest — are each distinct from one another, this may be called manifold; for, were that functional capacity to possess no manifold aspect whatsoever, then the functions thereby arising, whether possessing form or not possessing form, and so on, ought to display no distinction among themselves at all. It is for this reason that the functional capacity of cause and condition among dharmas cannot be definitively said to be either simply manifold or simply singular. One asks: just as there is a cause and condition by which dharmas arise, is there likewise a cause and condition by which dharmas cease? The Dārṣṭāntika masters explained it in this way: arising depends upon cause and condition, but ceasing is not so — just as, when a person shoots an arrow, the arrow's launching requires the application of force, yet its eventual falling does not; or just as, when a potter's wheel is set spinning, its continued turning requires the application of force, yet its eventual coming to rest does not. The various Abhidharma masters state: the arising and the ceasing of dharmas alike depend upon cause and condition, since ceasing, no less than arising, is itself a kind of function. One asks: how, then, is the simile stated earlier to be reconciled with this?

The answer: it need not necessarily be reconciled at all, since it does not derive from the Tripiṭaka. Moreover, the dharmas of ordinary beings and of noble ones differ, and cannot simply be equated by way of such an analogy. Further, the arrow and the wheel, too, each fall and come to rest owing to their own respective causes: the arrow's own cause of falling refers to a shield, a target, a wall, and the like — and, should no other such cause be present, then the very bow and its drawn string, too, count as its cause, since, had it not first been shot, how could it now be falling at all? The wheel's own cause of coming to rest refers to a hand, a rod, and the like — and, should no other such cause be present, then the very force that first set it spinning, too, counts as its cause, since, had it not first been spun, how could it now be coming to rest at all? One asks: if the shield, the hand, and the like obstruct the arrow's flight and the wheel's spinning, causing them to fall and to come to rest, how can they properly serve as an efficient-cause for this? The answer: the shield, the hand, and the like obstruct the arrow's continued flight and the wheel's continued spinning — they do not obstruct the arrow's falling or the wheel's coming to rest, and so no fault follows. One asks: if the arising and the ceasing of dharmas both alike depend upon cause and condition, and cause and condition are present at every single time without exception, why, then, does a dharma not also cease at the very moment it arises, or arise at the very moment it ceases? The Venerable Vasumitra explained it in this way: the coming-together proper to arising and the coming-together proper to ceasing are themselves each distinct — it is for this reason that, at the time of arising, no ceasing occurs, and, at the time of ceasing, no arising occurs, since a single cause cannot properly bear two distinct effects. He further explained: at the time of arising, the cause and condition accord with and favor that dharma; at the time of ceasing, the cause and condition contradict and oppose that dharma — although this cause and condition, considered across its earlier and later phases, remains one and the same in substance,

the timing of its benefiting and its harming function nonetheless differs. It is just as a monk who, having concluded the rains retreat, takes up his robe and bowl and travels from monastery to monastery: a bandit, catching sight of him, first bows in reverence and follows along in courteous compliance, but later, upon reaching a stretch of wilderness, seizes his robe and bowl, subjects him to insult, and departs — the cause and condition proper to arising and ceasing are exactly the same. The Great Virtuous One objected: arising and ceasing are themselves two mutually contradictory events — how could they possibly be present together at once? The Venerable Ghoṣa explained it in this way: at the very time dharmas arise, no function yet exists at all — what, then, could there be left to cease? At the very time dharmas cease, function has already fully come to be — what further arising, then, could there be?

One asks: since a single dharma can serve as an efficient-cause for many dharmas, and many dharmas can likewise serve as an efficient-cause for a single dharma — when a single dharma serves as an efficient-cause for many, does this operate as a single dharma serving as cause for many, or as many dharmas serving as cause for many? And when many dharmas serve as an efficient-cause for a single dharma, does this operate as many dharmas serving as cause for one, or as a single dharma serving as cause for one?

Suppose either — what fault follows? When a single dharma serves as an efficient-cause for many dharmas: if this operates as a single dharma serving as cause for many, why does the effect not likewise remain single, since the cause is single? If this operates as many dharmas serving as cause for many, why does the cause not likewise become many, since the effect is many? When many dharmas serve as an efficient-cause for a single dharma: if this operates as many dharmas serving as cause for one, why does the effect not likewise become many, since the cause is many? If this operates as a single dharma serving as cause for one, why does the cause not likewise remain single, since the effect is single?

The answer: it should be said that, when a single dharma serves as an efficient-cause for many dharmas, this operates just as though many dharmas were serving as cause for many; and, when many dharmas serve as an efficient-cause for a single dharma, this operates just as though a single dharma were serving as cause for one. One asks: if that is so, then the one ought to become many, and the many ought to become one. The answer: I do indeed say that the one becomes many, and that the many become one — but this is spoken of only with reference to function, not with reference to actual substance. I say that every cause takes its function, not its actual substance, as its fruit; and I likewise say that every fruit takes its function, not its actual substance, as its cause — every dharma's own actual substance remaining forever unchanging, never itself either cause or fruit in this substantial sense. Yet unconditioned dharmas, too, are named an efficient-cause, though they merely offer no obstruction, without actually accomplishing any fruit.

Further, a conditioned dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a conditioned dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit; a conditioned dharma does not serve as an efficient-cause for an unconditioned dharma, nor does it take that dharma as its own dominant fruit; an unconditioned dharma does not serve as an efficient-cause for an unconditioned dharma, nor does it take that dharma as its own dominant fruit; an unconditioned dharma does serve as an efficient-cause for a conditioned dharma, yet does not take that dharma as its own dominant fruit, since it lacks the function of taking up and giving a fruit. One asks: why is it that conditioned dharmas possess both a cause and a fruit, while unconditioned dharmas possess neither cause nor fruit? The answer: conditioned dharmas flow on through the three time-periods, and so possess both cause and fruit; the unconditioned is not so, and so possesses neither. It is just as one who undertakes a long journey must be furnished with provisions in order to actually arrive somewhere, unlike one who undertakes no journey at all. Further, conditioned dharmas possess function, and so possess both cause and fruit; the unconditioned is not so, and so possesses neither. It is just as one engaged in some undertaking must be furnished with the proper implements in order to actually accomplish something, unlike one engaged in no undertaking at all. Further, conditioned dharmas possess arising and ceasing, and so possess both cause and fruit; the unconditioned is not so, and so possesses neither. Further, conditioned dharmas possess a coming-together, and so possess both cause and fruit; the unconditioned is not so, and so possesses neither. Further, conditioned dharmas possess the three characteristic marks, and so possess both cause and fruit; the unconditioned is not so, and so possesses neither. Further, conditioned dharmas are, by their own nature, feeble and weak, and so possess a cause, and possess function, and so possess a fruit — just as one who is feeble and weak must rely upon another in order to stand, unlike one who is vigorous and strong. The unconditioned is not so, and so possesses neither cause nor fruit. Further, conditioned dharmas are like a king and a king's own retinue, like a wealthy and eminent person and that person's own retinue, like Indra and Indra's own retinue — and so possess both cause and fruit; the unconditioned is not so, and so possesses neither. One asks: when a conditioned dharma fails to arise, is this because some other conditioned dharma serves as a hindrance preventing its arising, or because an unconditioned dharma serves as such a hindrance? The answer: it is because a conditioned dharma serves as the hindrance preventing its arising, never an unconditioned dharma — the unconditioned, serving as an efficient-cause for that dharma, offers it no obstruction whatsoever at any time. It is just as with an irrigation channel: if water does not flow through it, this is owing to some other cause, never because the channel itself obstructs the water. One asks: between an unconditioned dharma's own function as an efficient-cause and its function as a dominant-condition for a given conditioned dharma, which is more excellent — is it that very conditioned dharma itself which benefits, or is it some other dharma? The answer: they are equal, without any difference between them, just as two piles of beans of equal measure. As for whether an unconditioned dharma serves as an object-condition for a conditioned dharma, there are indeed cases where it does, and cases where it does not —

Further, a past dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a past dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit; a past dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a future or present dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit — meaning, in effect: were I not to serve as your own proximate efficient-cause, you would then be altogether without a cause; yet no conditioned dharma is ever without a cause. A future dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a future dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit; a future dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a past or present dharma, yet does not take that dharma as its own dominant fruit — and why is this? Because a fruit and its cause must either coexist together, or the fruit must follow after — meaning, in effect: were I not to serve as your own proximate efficient-cause, you would then be altogether without a fruit; yet no conditioned dharma is ever without a fruit. A present dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a present dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit; a present dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a future dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit — meaning, in effect: were I not to serve as your own proximate efficient-cause, you would then be altogether without a cause; yet no conditioned dharma is ever without a cause. A present dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a past dharma, yet does not take that dharma as its own dominant fruit, since a fruit and its cause must either coexist together, or the fruit must follow after — meaning, in effect: were I not to serve as your own proximate efficient-cause, you would then be altogether without a fruit; yet no conditioned dharma is ever without a fruit. One asks: why is it that a later dharma serves as an efficient-cause for an earlier dharma, and yet that earlier dharma is not counted as the later dharma's own dominant fruit? The answer: offering no obstruction is the very meaning of the efficient-cause — a later dharma offers no obstruction to an earlier dharma, and it is for this reason that it can properly serve as its efficient-cause; yet a fruit must necessarily be something taken up and given through the power of its own cause, and a later dharma exercises no such power of taking up and giving over an earlier dharma, and it is for this reason that the earlier dharma is not the later dharma's own fruit — exactly as a conditioned dharma takes an unconditioned dharma as its own efficient-cause without that unconditioned dharma being its fruit, since the unconditioned altogether lacks the function of taking up and giving a fruit.

Further, a wholesome dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a wholesome dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit; a wholesome dharma serves as an efficient-cause for an unwholesome or an undefined dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit. An unwholesome dharma serves as an efficient-cause for an unwholesome dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit; an unwholesome dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a wholesome or an undefined dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit. An undefined dharma serves as an efficient-cause for an undefined dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit; an undefined dharma serves as an efficient-cause for a wholesome or an unwholesome dharma, and also takes that dharma as its own dominant fruit. Just as the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the undefined mutually serve as an efficient-cause and a dominant fruit for one another in this way, so too should this be understood for dharmas bound to the three realms and dharmas unbound to them, for the dharmas of a learner, of one beyond training, and of neither, for dharmas abandoned by seeing, abandoned by cultivation, and not to be abandoned, for dharmas possessing form and dharmas without form, for visible and invisible dharmas, for resistant and non-resistant dharmas, for contaminated and uncontaminated dharmas, and for associated and dissociated dharmas.

Further, there is a wholesome dharma that serves as a proximate efficient-cause for a wholesome dharma, as when, through wholesome karma, one is born into a joyful, wholesome family, and, once born, further cultivates many fine practices. There is a wholesome dharma that serves as a proximate efficient-cause for an unwholesome dharma, as when, through wholesome karma, one is born into a wealthy and eminent family, and, once born, becomes indulgent and commits much evil. There is an unwholesome dharma that serves as a proximate efficient-cause for an unwholesome dharma, as when, through unwholesome karma, one is born into a family lacking moral restraint, and, once born, commits still further evil. There is an unwholesome dharma that serves as a proximate efficient-cause for a wholesome dharma, as when, through unwholesome karma, one's body suffers illness and affliction, or one loses one's wealth and station, and, one's mind thereby arising in weariness and remorse, one comes to cultivate many fine practices. There is an internal dharma that serves as a proximate efficient-cause for an internal dharma, as when a single sentient being supports and sustains many other people. There is an internal dharma that serves as a proximate efficient-cause for an external dharma, as when farmers plant and cultivate their crops. There is an external dharma that serves as a proximate efficient-cause for an external dharma, as when water and manure cause crops and seedlings to grow and flourish. There is an external dharma that serves as a proximate efficient-cause for an internal dharma, as when food and drink nourish sentient beings. There is a dharma of one destiny that serves as a proximate efficient-cause for the dharmas of all five destinies, as when many people eat the meat of a single sheep, and, their bodies thereby strengthened, some among them then perform wholesome karma while others perform unwholesome karma — those who perform wholesome karma are reborn among humans or gods, while those who perform unwholesome karma fall into the three evil destinies.

One asks: if, when a single sentient being takes another's life, every other sentient being offers this act no obstruction, and none of them serve as an efficient-cause preventing it either — why, then, does not every sentient being equally incur the offense of killing? The answer: only the one who actually commits the killing gives rise to the preparatory effort of killing and brings this very act to its completion, and it is for this reason that he alone incurs the offense of killing, while the others, not doing so, do not incur it. Further, only he gives rise to an evil state of mind and actually severs the other being's own life, and it is for this reason that he alone incurs the offense, while the others do not — and every other path of action should be understood according to this very same principle. One asks: since all external wealth and possessions are brought about by the collective karma of every sentient being together, why is it that only the actual thief incurs the offense of theft with respect to the rightful owner of that wealth, and not with respect to any other being? The answer: the rightful owner alone actively claims and guards that wealth as his own, while other beings do not do so, and it is for this reason that the thief incurs the offense only with respect to the owner, never with respect to others. Further, the owner forms the notion "this is mine" with respect to that wealth, while the thief, in taking it, forms the notion "this belongs to that owner" — and it is for this reason that the offense arises only with respect to the owner, never with respect to others. Further, if a given piece of wealth is, for a given being, both his own personal-effort fruit and his own dominant fruit, then the offense of theft arises specifically with respect to that being; for every other sentient being, that same wealth is only a dominant fruit, never a personal-effort fruit, and it is for this reason that no offense of theft arises with respect to them. One asks: what, then, is the difference between a personal-effort fruit and a dominant fruit? The answer: whatever is obtained through one's own actual effort and labor is a personal-effort fruit; whatever is obtained merely through the absence of obstruction is a dominant fruit. Further, for the one who actually produces a given piece of wealth, it is his own personal-effort fruit; for one who merely makes use of it, it is only a dominant fruit — just as, for a farmer who plants and cultivates a fruit-bearing tree, its fruit is both his own personal-effort fruit and his own dominant fruit, while for one who merely eats that fruit, it is only a dominant fruit. The same holds for wealth in general: for one who actively seeks and produces it,

it is both his own personal-effort fruit and his own dominant fruit; for one who merely enjoys it, it is only a dominant fruit.

One asks: this material world's own vessel — Mount Sumeru, the continents, and the like — is brought about by the collective karma of every sentient being together; if, among these beings, some attain final nirvāṇa, why does the material world not correspondingly diminish? The Venerable Vasumitra explained it in this way: were a given thing, for a particular being, both his own personal-effort fruit and his own proximate dominant fruit, it would indeed diminish upon that being's own passing; but Mount Sumeru and the rest are, for any given being, only a remote dominant fruit, and so no diminishment follows. Further, Mount Sumeru and the rest are brought about by the collective karma of every sentient being together, and, even were only a single sentient being to remain, that being's own karmic power alone would still be sufficient to sustain and uphold them, and so no diminishment would follow — how much more so, then, given that countless, immeasurable, boundless sentient beings have not yet attained final release at all. It is just as a wealthy and eminent person who, though he himself has already died, still has his own palace, gardens, groves, elephants, and horses persist without vanishing, sustained by the karmic power of the other beings who remain — the case here is exactly the same.

There are yet others who say: although countless sentient beings do attain final nirvāṇa or are reborn elsewhere, countless further, immeasurable, boundless sentient beings also come to be born within this very world, and it is owing to their own karmic power that no diminishment follows. The Venerable Buddhadeva explained it in this way: this is sustained by the power of past karma, and it is for this reason that no diminishment follows. One asks: as for a Wheel-Turning Monarch who attains complete mastery over all four continents, what kind of fruit is this? The answer: his own personal, majestic power is a ripening fruit; the various lands and peoples he actually governs are a dominant fruit — it is because, in a past life, he cultivated the wholesome karmas that enhance both his own person and his own surrounding retinue that he now attains these two distinct, superior fruits.

Further, there are three kinds of dominant: first, self-dominant; second, world-dominant; third, dharma-dominant. Self-dominant refers to a case where a certain kind of person, his afflictions not yet cut off, when some evil object presents itself before him, nonetheless, in order to protect and guard himself, refrains from giving rise to evil karma, thinking: may I not, through this deed, fall into the evil destinies. World-dominant refers to a case where such a person, in order to protect and guard the world, refrains from giving rise to evil karma, thinking: may I not, through this deed, become an object of the world's own mockery and censure — some say instead: may sentient beings of the world not, on my account, be led to create similar evil karma themselves. Dharma-dominant refers to a case where such a person, in order to protect and guard the true Dharma itself, refrains from giving rise to evil karma, thinking: may I not, through this deed, cause the world to hold the true Dharma in contempt. These three are themselves precisely instances of the proximate efficient-cause. One asks: why are these three named "dominant"? The answer: because, with respect to wholesome dharmas, they offer no obstruction — they are a wholesome dharma's own intimate, favorable, dominant condition. One asks: does the efficient-cause's own power admit of increase or decrease? The answer: it does — just as, when a great crowd of people together hauls a massive log, some among them exert their full strength while others do not; those who exert full strength thereby increase the efficient-cause's own power, while those who do not exert full strength thereby diminish it — the very same should be understood for erecting a pillar, pulling a boat, or rolling a stone. Just as this holds for the internal relative to the external, so too does it hold for the external relative to the internal, and for the internal or the external each considered relative to itself. One asks: which is more numerous — instances of the efficient-cause, or instances of the dominant fruit? The answer: instances of the efficient-cause are more numerous, and instances of the dominant fruit fewer, since the efficient-cause encompasses every conditioned and unconditioned dharma alike, while the dominant fruit encompasses only conditioned dharmas. It is on this very account that it may be said: is there a case of a dharma that is not an efficient-cause for another dharma? There is — namely, a dharma's own self-nature with respect to itself. Is there a case of a dharma that is not an efficient-cause with respect to a different nature? There is — namely, a conditioned dharma with respect to an unconditioned dharma, and an unconditioned dharma with respect to another unconditioned dharma.

One asks: what is the efficient-cause's own very substance? The answer: every dharma without exception — its own substance has already been stated, and so it will not be stated again here. One asks: why is it named the "efficient-cause"? What does "efficient" actually mean? The answer: the sense of offering no obstruction is the very meaning of "efficient"; the sense of actually accomplishing something is likewise the very meaning of "efficient."

This efficient-cause definitely spans all three time-periods, and also transcends time altogether, and possesses a dominant fruit. Having thus displayed the six causes' own individual substances, we should now display the six causes' own overlapping and non-overlapping relationships with one another. One asks: is whatever is a correspondence-cause also a co-existent-cause? The answer: whatever is a correspondence-cause is also a co-existent-cause; there is a case of a co-existent-cause that is not a correspondence-cause — namely, conditioned dissociated dharmas. One asks: is whatever is a correspondence-cause also a homogeneous-cause? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of a correspondence-cause that is not a homogeneous-cause — namely, a future associated dharma. There is a case of a homogeneous-cause that is not a correspondence-cause — namely, a past or present dissociated dharma. There is a case of what is both — namely, a past or present associated dharma. There is a case of what is neither — namely, a future dissociated dharma, and unconditioned dharmas. One asks: is whatever is a correspondence-cause also a universally-pervasive-cause? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of a correspondence-cause that is not a universally-pervasive-cause — namely, every associated dharma excluding the past or present universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated dharmas. There is a case of a universally-pervasive-cause that is not a correspondence-cause — namely, the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of the past or present universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated dharmas. There is a case of what is both — namely, the past or present universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated dharmas themselves. There is a case of what is neither — namely, every other dissociated dharma. One asks: is whatever is a correspondence-cause also a ripening-cause? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of a correspondence-cause that is not a ripening-cause — namely, an undefined or uncontaminated associated dharma. There is a case of a ripening-cause that is not a correspondence-cause — namely, an unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome dissociated dharma. There is a case of what is both — namely, an unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome associated dharma. There is a case of what is neither — namely, an undefined or uncontaminated dissociated dharma. One asks: is whatever is a correspondence-cause also an efficient-cause? The answer: whatever is a correspondence-cause is also an efficient-cause; there is a case of an efficient-cause that is not a correspondence-cause — namely, a dissociated dharma. One asks: is whatever is a co-existent-cause also a homogeneous-cause? The answer: whatever is a homogeneous-cause is also a co-existent-cause; there is a case of a co-existent-cause that is not a homogeneous-cause — namely, a future dharma. One asks: is whatever is a co-existent-cause also a universally-pervasive-cause? The answer: whatever is a universally-pervasive-cause is also a co-existent-cause; there is a case of a co-existent-cause that is not a universally-pervasive-cause — namely, every other conditioned dharma excluding the past or present universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated and co-existent dharmas. One asks: is whatever is a co-existent-cause also a ripening-cause? The answer: whatever is a ripening-cause is also a co-existent-cause; there is a case of a co-existent-cause that is not a ripening-cause — namely, an undefined or uncontaminated conditioned dharma. One asks: is whatever is a co-existent-cause also an efficient-cause? The answer: whatever is a co-existent-cause is also an efficient-cause; there is a case of an efficient-cause that is not a co-existent-cause —

namely, unconditioned dharmas. One asks: is whatever is a homogeneous-cause also a universally-pervasive-cause? The answer: whatever is a universally-pervasive-cause is also a homogeneous-cause; there is a case of a homogeneous-cause that is not a universally-pervasive-cause — namely, every other past or present dharma excluding the past or present universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated and co-existent dharmas. One asks: is whatever is a homogeneous-cause also a ripening-cause? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of a homogeneous-cause that is not a ripening-cause — namely, a past or present undefined or uncontaminated dharma. There is a case of a ripening-cause that is not a homogeneous-cause — namely, a future unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome dharma. There is a case of what is both — namely, a past or present unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome dharma. There is a case of what is neither — namely, a future undefined or uncontaminated dharma, and unconditioned dharmas. One asks: is whatever is a homogeneous-cause also an efficient-cause? The answer: whatever is a homogeneous-cause is also an efficient-cause; there is a case of an efficient-cause that is not a homogeneous-cause — namely, a future dharma, and unconditioned dharmas. One asks: is whatever is a universally-pervasive-cause also a ripening-cause? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of a universally-pervasive-cause that is not a ripening-cause — namely, a past or present undefined universally-pervasive latent tendency and its associated and co-existent dharmas. There is a case of a ripening-cause that is not a universally-pervasive-cause — namely, every other unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome dharma excluding the past or present unwholesome universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated and co-existent dharmas. There is a case of what is both — namely, the past or present unwholesome universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated and co-existent dharmas. There is a case of what is neither — namely, every other undefined or uncontaminated dharma. One asks: is whatever is a universally-pervasive-cause also an efficient-cause? The answer: whatever is a universally-pervasive-cause is also an efficient-cause; there is a case of an efficient-cause that is not a universally-pervasive-cause — namely, every other dharma excluding the past or present universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated and co-existent dharmas. One asks: is whatever is a ripening-cause also an efficient-cause? The answer: whatever is a ripening-cause is also an efficient-cause; there is a case of an efficient-cause that is not a ripening-cause — namely, undefined and uncontaminated dharmas.

One asks: of these six causes, how many possess form, and how many are without form? The answer: two are solely without form — namely, the correspondence-cause and the universally-pervasive-cause; the rest span both form and formlessness.

Just as with form and formlessness, so too should visible and invisible, resistant and non-resistant, appropriated and unappropriated, nutritive and non-nutritive, the great elements and what is not the great elements, and derived form and what is not derived form, each be understood in the very same way. One asks: of these six causes, how many are contaminated, and how many uncontaminated? The answer: two are solely contaminated — namely, the universally-pervasive-cause and the ripening-cause; the rest span both the contaminated and the uncontaminated. One asks: of these six causes, how many are conditioned, and how many unconditioned? The answer: five are solely conditioned; one spans both the conditioned and the unconditioned — namely, the efficient-cause. One asks: of these six causes, how many belong to the past, the future, and the present? The answer: three span all three time-periods — namely, the correspondence-cause, the co-existent-cause, and the ripening-cause; two belong solely to the past and the present — namely, the homogeneous-cause and the universally-pervasive-cause; one spans all three time-periods and also transcends time altogether — namely, the efficient-cause. One asks: of these six causes, how many are wholesome, unwholesome, and undefined? The answer: one is solely unwholesome or undefined — namely, the universally-pervasive-cause.

One is solely wholesome or unwholesome — namely, the ripening-cause; the rest span all three moral qualities. One asks: of these six causes, how many are bound to the desire realm, the form realm, and the formless realm? The answer: two are solely bound to the three realms — namely, the universally-pervasive-cause and the ripening-cause; the rest span both being bound to the three realms and being unbound. One asks: of these six causes, how many belong to a learner, to one beyond training, and to neither? The answer: two are solely neither a learner's nor one beyond training's — namely, the universally-pervasive-cause and the ripening-cause;

the rest span all three categories. One asks: of these six causes, how many are abandoned by seeing, how many by cultivation, and how many are not to be abandoned at all? The answer: one is solely abandoned by seeing — namely, the universally-pervasive-cause; one is solely abandoned by seeing or by cultivation — namely, the ripening-cause; the rest span all three categories. One asks: of these six causes, how many are defiled, and how many undefiled? The answer: one is solely defiled — namely, the universally-pervasive-cause; the rest span both categories. Just as with defiled and undefiled, so too should blameworthy and blameless, dark and bright, covered and uncovered, and subject to retrogression and not subject to retrogression, each be understood in the very same way. One asks: of these six causes, how many possess a ripening, and how many do not? The answer: one possesses a ripening — namely, the ripening-cause; the rest span both categories. One asks: of these six causes, how many are themselves a ripening, and how many are not? The answer: two are not themselves a ripening — namely, the universally-pervasive-cause and the ripening-cause; the rest span both categories. One asks: of these six causes, how many are associated, and how many dissociated? The answer: one is solely associated — namely, the correspondence-cause; the rest span both categories. Just as with associated and dissociated, so too should possessing a support and lacking one, possessing an object and lacking one, possessing an aspect and lacking one, possessing alertness and lacking it, and possessing an immediately-antecedent condition and lacking one, each be understood in the very same way. One asks: of these six causes, how many are subsumed under the four noble truths, and how many are not? The answer: two are solely subsumed under the truths of suffering and the origin — namely, the universally-pervasive-cause and the ripening-cause; three are solely subsumed under the truths of suffering, the origin, and the path — namely, the correspondence-cause, the co-existent-cause, and the homogeneous-cause; one spans all four truths, and also what is not subsumed under any truth at all — namely, the efficient-cause. One asks: of these six causes, how many are subsumed under the five aggregates, and how many are not? The answer: two are solely subsumed under four aggregates, excluding the form aggregate — namely, the correspondence-cause and the universally-pervasive-cause; three span all five aggregates — namely, the co-existent-cause, the homogeneous-cause, and the ripening-cause; one spans all five aggregates, and also what is not subsumed under any aggregate at all — namely, the efficient-cause.

One asks: of these six causes, how many are subsumed under which sense fields? The answer: two are solely subsumed under the mental and dharma sense fields — namely, the correspondence-cause and the universally-pervasive-cause; one is solely subsumed under the form, sound, mental, and dharma sense fields — namely, the ripening-cause; three span all twelve sense fields — namely, the co-existent-cause, the homogeneous-cause, and the efficient-cause. One asks: of these six causes, how many are subsumed under which elements? The answer: one is solely subsumed under the mental element and the dharma element — namely, the universally-pervasive-cause; one is solely subsumed under the seven consciousness elements — namely, the correspondence-cause; one is solely subsumed under the form element, the sound element, and the seven consciousness elements — namely, the ripening-cause; three span all eighteen elements — namely, the co-existent-cause, the homogeneous-cause, and the efficient-cause.

One asks: as for these six causes, which possesses which fruit? The answer: the correspondence-cause and the co-existent-cause possess a personal-effort fruit; the homogeneous-cause and the universally-pervasive-cause possess an equal-outflow fruit; the ripening-cause possesses a ripening fruit; the efficient-cause possesses a dominant fruit — as for the liberation fruit, this is realized through the path, not obtained through any of these causes. One asks: as for these six causes, when do they take up their fruit, and when do they give their fruit? The answer: the correspondence-cause and the co-existent-cause take up their fruit in the present and give their fruit in the present, taking it up within a single moment and giving it within a single moment, taking up a single moment's fruit and giving a single moment's fruit. The homogeneous-cause and the universally-pervasive-cause take up their fruit in the present and give their fruit in the past or present, taking it up within a single moment and giving it across many moments, taking up a single moment's fruit and giving many moments' fruit. The ripening-cause takes up its fruit in the present and gives its fruit in the past, taking it up within a single moment and giving it across many moments, taking up a single moment's fruit and giving many moments' fruit. As for the efficient-cause, some say it takes up its fruit in the present and gives its fruit in the past or present, taking it up within a single moment and giving it across many moments, taking up a single moment's fruit and giving many moments' fruit. There are yet other masters who say: this efficient-cause takes up its fruit in the past or present and gives its fruit in the past or present, taking it up across many moments and giving it across many moments — whenever it takes up its fruit, it thereupon also gives its fruit, the rest as already stated. If one is able to clearly understand these six causes in this way, one will then, with respect to the four fruits, perceive them with full clarity and discernment, just as one observes an āmalaka fruit resting in the very palm of one's own hand.

Further, every dharma's own function necessarily depends upon cause and condition; the causes have already been explained at length, and the conditions should next be explained. Conditions are of four kinds, as elaborated in the Prajñaptiśāstra and the Views Chapter. Yet the Prajñaptiśāstra states as follows: there is a dharma that is the causal condition, that is also the immediately-antecedent condition, that is also the object condition, that is also the dominant condition; and so on, up through: there is a dharma that is the dominant condition, that is also the causal condition, that is also the immediately-antecedent condition, that is also the object condition. One asks: among all dharmas, there are some capable of serving as all four conditions, such as mind and its mental factors; there are some capable of serving as three conditions, such as material form and the dissociated formations; there are some capable of serving as only two conditions, such as unconditioned dharmas — why, then, does that treatise state that there is a dharma that is the causal condition, that is also the immediately-antecedent condition, and so on, at length? The answer: that treatise speaks with reference to what is possible in some cases, not asserting that every dharma, without exception, serves as all four conditions — that is, among dharmas, mind and its mental factors do possess the nature capable of all four conditions; it is not being said that every dharma, without exception, serves as all four. If one were to state the matter with full precision, one ought to say as follows instead. One asks: is whatever is a causal condition also the immediately-antecedent condition? The answer: whatever is the immediately-antecedent condition is also the causal condition; there is a case of the causal condition that is not the immediately-antecedent condition — namely, every conditioned dharma excluding a past or present, non-final instance of mind and its mental factors. One asks: is whatever is a causal condition also the object condition? The answer: whatever is a causal condition is also the object condition; there is a case of the object condition that is not a causal condition — namely, unconditioned dharmas. One asks: is whatever is a causal condition also the dominant condition? The answer: whatever is a causal condition is also the dominant condition; there is a case of the dominant condition that is not a causal condition — namely, unconditioned dharmas. One asks: is whatever is the immediately-antecedent condition also the object condition? The answer: whatever is the immediately-antecedent condition is also the object condition; there is a case of the object condition that is not the immediately-antecedent condition — namely, every dharma excluding a past or present, non-final instance of mind and its mental factors. One asks: is whatever is the immediately-antecedent condition also the dominant condition? The answer: whatever is the immediately-antecedent condition is also the dominant condition; there is a case of the dominant condition that is not the immediately-antecedent condition — namely, every dharma excluding a past or present, non-final instance of mind and its mental factors. One asks: is whatever is the object condition also the dominant condition? The answer: it is so. One asks: if a single dharma possesses all four conditions, ought it not then be counted as merely a single condition — why, then, is it established as four? The answer: this is established with reference to function, not with reference to substance — a single substance possessing four distinct functions.

That is, a single moment's own mind and mental factors give rise to the immediately following moment's own similar kind of mind and mental factors, and it is on this account that they are established as a causal condition; this very moment, in clearing the way, causes the immediately following moment's own mind and mental factors to be able to arise, and it is on this account that they are established as the immediately-antecedent condition; this very moment is able to serve as the object taken up by the immediately following moment's own mind and mental factors, and it is on this account that they are established as the object condition; this very moment, offering no obstruction to the immediately following moment's own mind and mental factors, allows them to arise, and it is on this account that they are established as the dominant condition. Here, the causal condition is like a seed's own nature; the immediately-antecedent condition is like a path that clears and guides the way;

the object condition is like a supporting staff; the dominant condition is like a path offering no obstruction. Thus, a past or present, non-final instance of mind and its mental factors possesses the nature of all four conditions; every other conditioned dharma possesses the nature of three conditions; the three unconditioned dharmas possess the nature of two conditions — all of this stated with reference to meaning, not with reference to substance, since a single substance possesses many distinct meanings. Just as, among dharmas, there are some possessing all six causes — namely, past or present unwholesome universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated dharmas possess all six causes as efficient-cause; there are some possessing five causes — namely, past or present undefined universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated dharmas, or the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of past or present unwholesome universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated dharmas,

or past or present non-pervasive unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome mind and mental factors, possess five causes as efficient-cause; there are some possessing four causes — namely, the arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence of past or present undefined universally-pervasive latent tendencies and their associated dharmas, or past or present non-pervasive contaminated-or-uncontaminated form and dissociated formations, or past or present uncontaminated mind and mental factors, or past or present non-pervasive undefined mind and mental factors, or future unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome mind and mental factors, possess four causes as efficient-cause; there are some possessing three causes — namely, past or present non-pervasive undefined form and dissociated formations, or past or present uncontaminated form and dissociated formations,

or future unwholesome or contaminated-wholesome form and dissociated formations, or future undefined or uncontaminated mind and mental factors, possess three causes as efficient-cause; there are some possessing two causes — namely, future undefined or uncontaminated form and dissociated formations possess two causes as efficient-cause; there is one possessing a single cause — namely, unconditioned dharmas. Just as the one and the many, with respect to the meaning of "cause," do not conflict with one another, so too should this hold for "condition." One asks: if that is so, what difference is there between cause and condition? The Venerable Vasumitra stated as follows: there is no difference at all — the cause is precisely the condition, and the condition is precisely the cause. As the sūtra states: two causes and two conditions are able to give rise to right view — namely, another's own spoken instruction, and one's own proper reflection within. And, as the Great Cause Sūtra states:

the Buddha told Ānanda: the link of aging and death has such a reason, such a cause, such an origin, such a source, and such a condition — meaning precisely the link of birth. And so it is known that cause and condition are, in truth, no different. There are yet others who say: if this exists, then that exists — this being precisely that thing's own cause, and also precisely that thing's own condition. One asks: is it merely because a jar exists that the perception of a jar comes to exist — is this perception's cause solely the jar itself? The answer: it is not merely because a jar exists that the perception of a jar comes to exist, since, even when no jar is present, the perception of a jar can still arise, while, conversely, there are times when a jar is present and yet the perception of a jar does not arise — rather, it is through a coming-together that the perception of a jar comes to exist, and it is for this reason that this very coming-together is the cause and condition of the perception of a jar. There are yet others who say: the coming-together is itself the cause, and this coming-together cause is what is meant by "condition." One asks: if each individual constituent, taken alone, is not properly called a cause, then the coming-together of many such constituents ought likewise not to be called a cause. The answer: just as each individual constituent, taken alone, is not properly called a "coming-together" either, and yet the gathering together of many such constituents is indeed called a "coming-together," so too, though each individual constituent, taken alone, is not properly called a cause, the coming-together of many such constituents may indeed properly be called a cause. There are yet others who say: what is of the same kind is the cause; what is of a different kind is the condition — as when fire is said to be of the same kind relative to fire, or wheat relative to wheat, and so on.

One asks: what "same kind" relationship does wheat bear to its own sprout? If merely sharing the name "wheat" were enough to count as the "same kind," then the field, the water, and the like, sharing the very same great elements, ought likewise to be called "the same kind" — and the field, the water, and the rest would then have to be counted as the wheat's own cause as well. There are yet others who say: what is proximate is the cause; what is distant is the condition. One asks: if that is so, then cause and the immediately-antecedent condition ought to have no difference between them at all; and, further, an unwholesome or an undefined mind arising immediately after a wholesome one ought then to have to be counted as that wholesome mind's own cause. There are yet others who say: what is not held in common is the cause; what is held in common is the condition. One asks: if that is so, then the eye, relative to eye-consciousness, ought to be counted as its cause rather than a mere condition, since the eye is not held in common with anything else; and, further, wheat, relative to its own ash, ought then to be counted as merely a condition rather than a cause, since ash is something held in common. There are yet others who say: what is capable of generating something is the cause; what merely accompanies what generates it is the condition. One asks: if that is so, then the link of birth, relative to the link of aging and death, ought then not to be counted as a condition at all; and whatever merely accompanies and conforms to the link of birth's own existence, relative to aging and death, ought then not to be counted as a cause at all. There are yet others who say: whatever nourishes and sustains one's own continuum is the cause; whatever nourishes and sustains another's continuum is the condition. One asks: if that is so, then a wholesome mind that arises in dependence on nourishing one's own continuum alone ought then to be counted only as a cause, never as a condition. The Great Virtuous One stated as follows: what is in active operation is the cause; what merely accompanies that operation is the condition. What is proximate is the cause; what is distant is the condition — and this same distinction of proximate and distant should be understood to apply as well to being present here or there, to being in a state of harmonious coming-together or not, and to belonging to this very body or to another body. One asks: if that is so, then what is of the same kind, and what merely accompanies an operation, ought then to be counted only as a condition, never as a cause — and "ignorance conditions the formations" ought then to have to be restated as "ignorance causes the formations," rather than "conditions" them. It is for this reason that, although cause and condition share the very same underlying substance, their meaning nonetheless differs — the meaning of "cause" being intimate and close, and the meaning of "condition" being loose and distant. It is in order to express this very distinction that six are named as causes while four are named as conditions; were this not the intended distinction, the very number of causes and of conditions ought to be exactly the same.