The Hand of the Asura Rāhu

This treatise is composed. Just as, for sentient beings possessing material form, the continuum of mind operates in dependence on the body, upon what does the continuum of mind, for formless sentient beings, operate in dependence? The answer: it operates in dependence on the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, and every other dissociated formation of this same kind. What is meant by "every other dissociated formation"? This refers to acquisition, birth, aging, abiding, impermanence, and the rest. One asks: the continuum of mind, for beings of the desire and form realms, likewise operates in dependence on the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, and the rest — why, then, does this passage speak only of its dependence on the body? The answer: it ought also to be said that it operates in dependence on these as well, and that this is not so stated should be understood as a matter left incomplete. Some say: it is because the sense of "dependence" is more abundant in the case of the body — that is, the continuum of mind, for beings of the desire and form realms, possesses a more abundant sense of dependence on the body, not on the life faculty and the rest, since the eye and the other countless material dharmas serve as the support for eye-consciousness and the rest. There are yet other masters who say: it is because the body is coarse and readily apparent that only dependence on the body is mentioned, since the life faculty and the rest are subtle and difficult to point to directly. If one is born in the desire realm and eye-consciousness manifests before one, this consciousness takes the eye, together with the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty, as its support and its object of dependence;

it takes the great elements upon which the eye faculty depends, the body faculty, the great elements upon which the body faculty depends, the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, acquisition, birth, aging, abiding, impermanence, and the rest, as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. The ear-, nose-, and tongue-consciousnesses should be understood in exactly the same way. If body-consciousness manifests before one, this consciousness takes the body, together with the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty, as its support and its object of dependence; it takes the great elements upon which the body faculty depends, the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, acquisition, birth, aging, abiding, impermanence, and the rest, as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. If mental consciousness manifests before one, this consciousness takes the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty as its support and its object of dependence; it takes the body faculty, the great elements upon which the body faculty depends, the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, acquisition, birth, aging, abiding, impermanence, and the rest, as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. Just as for one born in the desire realm, so too for one born in the form realm, with this one difference: that realm lacks nose- and tongue-consciousness. If one is born in the formless realm and mental consciousness manifests before one, this consciousness takes the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty as its support and its object of dependence; it takes the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, acquisition, birth, aging, abiding, impermanence, and the rest, as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. There are yet others who say: if one is born in the desire realm and eye-consciousness manifests before one, this consciousness takes the eye, together with the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty, as its support and its object of dependence; it takes the body faculty, together with form, scent, taste, touch, the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, acquisition, birth, aging, abiding, impermanence, and the rest, as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. The ear-, nose-, and tongue-consciousnesses should be understood in exactly the same way. If body-consciousness manifests before one, this consciousness takes the body, together with the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty, as its support and its object of dependence; it takes form, scent, taste, touch, the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, acquisition, birth, aging, abiding, impermanence, and the rest, as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. If mental consciousness manifests before one, this consciousness takes the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty as its support and its object of dependence; it takes the body faculty, together with form, scent, taste, touch, the life faculty, the class of homogeneous being, acquisition, birth, aging, abiding, impermanence, and the rest, as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. Just as for one born in the desire realm, so too for one born in the form realm, with this one difference: that realm lacks nose- and tongue-consciousness, and scent and taste; and one born in the formless realm should be understood exactly as already stated above. There are yet other masters who say: if one is born in the desire realm and eye-consciousness manifests before one, this consciousness takes the eye, together with the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty, as its support and its object of dependence; it takes the four co-arisen aggregates as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. The ear-, nose-, tongue-, and body-consciousnesses should be understood in exactly the same way. If mental consciousness manifests before one,

this consciousness takes the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty as its support and its object of dependence; it takes the four co-arisen aggregates as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. Just as for one born in the desire realm,

so too for one born in the form realm, with this one difference: that realm lacks nose- and tongue-consciousness. If one is born in the formless realm and mental consciousness manifests before one, this consciousness takes the immediately preceding, just-ceased mental faculty as its support and its object of dependence; it takes the three co-arisen aggregates as a further kind of dependence, but not as its own proper support. One asks: is the life faculty's own substance a single thing, or many things? Suppose either — what fault follows? If it is a single thing, why does severing a hand or the like not cause death, while severing the head or the waist does cause death? If it is many things, why does a severed hand or the like, once separated from the body, no longer possess any life at all? The answer: it should be said that the life faculty's own substance is a single thing. One asks: if that is so, why does severing the hand or the foot not cause death? The answer: the life faculty is of two kinds — first, that dependent on a complete body;

second, that dependent on an incomplete body. When the hand, the foot, or the like is severed and separated from the body, the life faculty dependent on the complete body ceases, and the life faculty dependent on the incomplete body arises. The body upon which life depends is likewise of two kinds — before the hand or the like is severed, it is called a complete body; once the hand or the like is severed, it is called an incomplete body. Once the hand or the like has been severed, the complete body ceases, and the incomplete body arises — and it is for this reason that life and body mutually depend on one another in their own operation. One asks: why does severing the head or the waist cause death, while severing the hand, the foot, or the like does not cause death? The answer: the head and the waist are the two great mortal joints, and it is for this reason that severing them causes death;

the hand and the like are not so. Further, sentient beings of the desire realm subsist by relying on solid food, which passes through the throat and is stored in the belly — and it is for this reason that severing either of these two locations causes the life faculty to be severed as well. Further, the head is the very support of the eye and the other many faculties, and severing it destroys the eye and every other faculty; the belly is the very support upon which breath-wind depends, and severing the waist destroys the belly, leaving breath with nothing to depend upon — and it is for this reason that severing either of these two locations causes the life faculty to be severed, while severing the hand or the like does not, and this ought not to be pressed as an objection. There are yet others who say: the life faculty's own substance is many things, the life faculty depending on the hand, the foot, and the rest each being separately distinct, corresponding in number to what depends upon it.

One asks: if that is so, why is it that, when the hand, the foot, or the like is severed and separated from the body, no life remains within it at all? The answer: because the hand, the foot, and the like are bound up with the body — once separated from the body, life no longer arises within them, just as, while the hand, the foot, and the like have not yet been separated from the body, they serve as the support of the body faculty and are called "belonging to a sentient being," but, once separated from the body, this is no longer so — the life faculty is exactly the same, and it is for this reason that, once separated from the body, life no longer arises within it. The verdict: it should be said that the life faculty's own substance is a single thing — it is by virtue of possessing this single life that one is called "possessing life," just as it is by virtue of possessing a single mind that one is called "possessing mind," and by virtue of the ceasing of that single mind that one is called "without mind," and the same holds for a single feeling, a single perception, and a single volition — in just this way, a sentient being, by virtue of possessing a single life, is called "possessing life." Yet this life faculty is solely a ripening, dissociated formation.

Just as mind, feeling, and the rest, a single sentient being's body possesses, within a single moment, one such dharma, never two.

What is the class of homogeneous being? The answer: it is the shared class-nature of sentient beings, exactly like the life faculty, its own substance being a single thing, serving universally as the support for every portion of the body, subsumed within the aggregate of formations dissociated from mind, of solely uncovered-undefined moral quality, solely contaminated, and bound to all three realms. One asks: is this class of homogeneous being something nourished, an equal-outflow, or a ripening? The answer: it is both a ripening and an equal-outflow, never something nourished, since it is not a material dharma. As a ripening, it refers to a destiny's own class of homogeneous being, and the like, just as beings of the hell-destiny mutually resemble one another in succession, and so on, up through beings of the heavenly destiny likewise resembling one another.

As an equal-outflow, it refers to a realm's own class of homogeneous being, and the like, just as beings of the desire realm mutually resemble one another in succession, and so on, up through beings of the formless realm likewise resembling one another. Some say: as a ripening, it refers to what is obtained at the very moment of birth, just as beings resemble their own parents and the like in succession; as an equal-outflow, it refers to what is obtained only afterward, just as beings come to resemble śramaṇas, brāhmaṇas, and the like in succession — and the class of homogeneous being belonging to a continent, a region, a clan, and the like should be understood according to this same principle. There are yet other masters who say: the class of homogeneous being of sentient beings spans the wholesome, the unwholesome, and the undefined — that is, the class of homogeneous being belonging to those on the four approaches and the four fruits is subsumed under the wholesome; the class of homogeneous being belonging to one who commits any of the five uninterrupted-retribution deeds is subsumed under the unwholesome; every other class of homogeneous being is subsumed under the undefined. The verdict: this position ought not to be maintained — although dharmas themselves are indeed of three kinds, the class of homogeneous being of sentient beings is solely subsumed under the undefined,

and it is on this account that one should understand the earlier position stated to be sound. One asks: if one obtains the class of homogeneous being, does one thereby relinquish the class of homogeneous being? The answer: an affirmative implication should be formulated — that is, whoever obtains the class of homogeneous being definitely relinquishes the class of homogeneous being; there is a case of relinquishing the class of homogeneous being without obtaining the class of homogeneous being — namely, when an arhat enters final nirvāṇa. One asks: at the moment of dying here and being reborn there, does one definitely relinquish the class of homogeneous being and obtain the class of homogeneous being? The answer: four alternatives should be formulated. There is a case of dying here and being reborn there without relinquishing the class of homogeneous being or obtaining the class of homogeneous being — as when one dies in hell and is again reborn in hell, and so on, up through dying among the gods and being again reborn among the gods. There is a case of relinquishing the class of homogeneous being and obtaining the class of homogeneous being without dying here and being reborn there — namely, at the stage of entering the certainty of rightness and the like. There is a case of dying here and being reborn there, and also relinquishing the class of homogeneous being and obtaining the class of homogeneous being — namely, dying in hell and being reborn in a different destiny, and the like. There is a case of neither dying here and being reborn there, nor relinquishing the class of homogeneous being, nor obtaining the class of homogeneous being — namely, every case excluded from those just described. Is craving-devoid-of-love to be said to be abandoned by seeing, or abandoned by cultivation? And so on, as elaborated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: it is in order to analyze the meaning of scripture — that is, scripture states that craving is of three kinds: first, sensual craving; second, craving for existence; third, craving-devoid-of-existence — yet, though scripture states this much, it does not elaborate at length, nor does it state whether craving-devoid-of-existence is abandoned by seeing or by cultivation. Scripture is the very root this treatise depends upon; what that scripture leaves unexplained, this treatise should now explain. Further, it is in order to refute a rival position and manifest the meaning of scripture — that is, some maintain that scripture's own statement of "craving-devoid-of-existence" spans both what is abandoned by seeing and what is abandoned by cultivation, just as the Vibhajyavādins hold — in order to refute this position, and to show that scripture's own "craving-devoid-of-existence" is solely abandoned by cultivation, this treatise is composed. Is craving-devoid-of-existence to be said to be abandoned by seeing, or abandoned by cultivation? The answer: it should be said that it is abandoned by cultivation. "Devoid-of-existence" refers to the impermanence of the class of homogeneous being — the craving that takes this as its object is named "craving-devoid-of-existence," and it is for this reason that this craving is solely abandoned by cultivation, since the class of homogeneous being is itself abandoned by cultivation. There are yet others who say: craving-devoid-of-existence is either abandoned by seeing, or abandoned by cultivation. What is abandoned by seeing? This refers to craving toward the non-existence of a dharma abandoned by seeing. What is abandoned by cultivation? This refers to craving toward the non-existence of a dharma abandoned by cultivation. One asks: who maintains this position? The answer: the Vibhajyavādins. Their own intended meaning is this: the impermanence of the three realms is called "devoid-of-existence"; the craving that takes this as its object is named "craving-devoid-of-existence" — since impermanence itself spans both what is abandoned by seeing and what is abandoned by cultivation, the craving that takes it as its object likewise spans both.

With respect to this very meaning, craving-devoid-of-existence should be said to be solely abandoned by cultivation — that is, within this treatise, in accordance with scripture's own undistorted meaning, craving-devoid-of-existence should be said to be solely abandoned by cultivation. Here, some say: if one speaks in accordance with scripture's own meaning, craving-devoid-of-existence is solely abandoned by cultivation; if one speaks in accordance with the ultimate meaning, craving-devoid-of-existence spans both what is abandoned by seeing and cultivation. Why is this? As scripture states: there is a certain kind of person who, terrified and oppressed by painful feeling, reflects as follows: were I, after death, to be utterly cut off and rendered non-existent, would this not be blissful indeed? This scripture speaks of that being's own class of homogeneous being's later impermanence as "devoid-of-existence" — and this kind of "devoid-of-existence" is solely abandoned by cultivation, and so craving-devoid-of-existence is not abandoned by seeing at all.

It is with reference to this very passage that the master of this treatise speaks in accordance with scripture's own meaning, contending with the Vibhajyavādins over the correct interpretation of scripture, and states that craving-devoid-of-existence is solely abandoned by cultivation.

If one speaks in accordance with the ultimate meaning, as will be explained further below, the impermanence of the three realms is called "devoid-of-existence," and, since the impermanence of the three realms spans both what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, craving-devoid-of-existence likewise spans both kinds. There are yet others who say: this craving-devoid-of-existence, whether speaking in accordance with the ultimate meaning or in accordance with scripture's own meaning, should in every case be said to be solely abandoned by cultivation — for, although the impermanence of the three realms does span both kinds, the craving that arises from it is solely abandoned by cultivation, since craving-devoid-of-existence arises specifically from weariness with suffering, craving only that the future vessel of suffering be rendered non-existent — and it is solely what is abandoned by cultivation that constitutes this vessel of manifold suffering, and it is for this reason that craving-devoid-of-existence is solely abandoned by cultivation. Although the view of extinction does take the non-existence of all five sections as its object, craving-devoid-of-existence is unable to take all of these as its object in this same universal way, taking only the future cutting-off of the class of homogeneous being as its object.

It is for this reason that the Venerable Ghoṣa stated as follows: a person who gives rise to craving-devoid-of-existence arises only with respect to the appropriated aggregates, elements, and sense fields, oppressed by these, craving their future cutting-off and destruction — there is no oppression by anything abandoned by seeing that causes a sentient being to crave its own cutting-off — and it is for this reason that craving-devoid-of-existence is solely abandoned by cultivation. What has been briefly stated above establishes that craving-devoid-of-existence is solely abandoned by cultivation.

What follows now is the manner in which the proponent of correct principle debates with the Vibhajyavādin, through question and answer and refutation and reconciliation, to establish at length that craving-devoid-of-existence is solely abandoned by cultivation. "You say that craving-devoid-of-existence is solely abandoned by cultivation — have stream-enterers, then, not yet cut off this craving?" — this is the question posed by the Vibhajyavādin, fixing the opposing tenet with precision, since, without first fixing precisely what a rival school actually holds, to then state that school's own faults would be improper. "The answer: yes" is the reply of the proponent of correct principle.

This confirms, in accordance with scripture's own undistorted meaning, the established tenet, and it is for this reason that the reply is "yes." "What, then, do you intend — do stream-enterers give rise to a thought such as this: were I, after death, to be utterly cut off and rendered non-existent, would this not be at ease indeed?" — this is the difficulty the Vibhajyavādin now wishes to raise, seeking to fix the opposing tenet against itself so as to reveal a violation of correct principle. "The answer: it is not so" is the reply of the proponent of correct principle, rebuffing this very question and showing that no violation of meaning follows. One asks: why do stream-enterers not give rise to this craving? The answer: because they have seen the true nature of dharmas — that is, stream-enterers, seeing that every dharma continues on through cause and effect in unbroken succession, therefore do not crave their own cutting-off. Further, because they have deep faith in the ripening of karma — that is, stream-enterers, deeply believing that karma and its ripening continue on in succession before and after, therefore do not crave their own cutting-off. Further, because they have penetrated emptiness — that is, stream-enterers, having attained the gateway of liberation through emptiness, know there to be neither a self nor what belongs to a self; since there now exists a later cutting-off, they do not give rise to craving for that future cutting-off. Further, this craving-devoid-of-existence is nurtured by the extinction-view, necessarily manifesting only after the extinction-view has already manifested — stream-enterers, having already cut off the extinction-view, do not give rise to this craving. Further, stream-enterers have attained the non-selective cessation of craving-devoid-of-existence, and so it can never again manifest before them. Now hear what I myself have to say: if craving-devoid-of-existence were solely abandoned by cultivation, and stream-enterers had not yet cut off this craving, then it ought to be said that stream-enterers do give rise to a thought such as this: were I, after death, to be utterly cut off and rendered non-existent, would this not be at ease indeed? But if stream-enterers do not give rise to a thought such as this, then it ought not to be said that craving-devoid-of-existence is solely abandoned by cultivation, and that stream-enterers have not yet cut off this craving — to maintain both of these positions at once is altogether unreasonable — this is the Vibhajyavādin's own opening and closing gambit, turning the argument back upon itself from both directions, the opening gambit showing accordance with his own tenet but violation of true meaning, the closing gambit showing accordance with true meaning but violation of his own tenet — since neither can be accepted, he concludes, summing up: to maintain both of these positions at once is altogether unreasonable. The proponent of correct principle then offers, in reply, the following further meaning: my own school does not maintain that whatever has not yet been cut off must necessarily manifest before one — there is a case of what has not yet been cut off yet does not manifest, and a case of what has already been cut off yet is still able to manifest. Were it the case that whatever has not yet been cut off must necessarily manifest, then there could be no liberation or release at all, since not-yet-cut-off dharmas are without any boundary or limit — even were one to try to give rise to all of them, at what point could this ever be exhausted? It is with this very argument that the proponent of correct principle now turns to refute the Vibhajyavādin in return, resolving the earlier difficulty. Within the treatises on logical reasoning, it is stated that there are three paths by which another's position may be refuted: first, refutation through doubt; second, refutation through pointing out a fault; third, refutation through elimination. Within the Buddha's own scriptures, it is likewise shown that another's statement may be refuted through three paths: first, refutation by surpassing the opponent; second, refutation by matching the opponent; third, refutation by contradicting the opponent's own tenet. As for refutation by surpassing the opponent: as when the ascetic Dīrghanakha declared to the Buddha, "I accept nothing whatsoever" — the Buddha said to him, "do you, then, accept this very view of your own?" — and he was thereby refuted by his own words. As for refutation by matching the opponent: as when the outside teacher Pāṭalika declared to the Buddha, "does Gautama know illusion, or not? If he does not know it, he is not omniscient; if he does know it, he must himself be a deceiver" — the Buddha said to him, "in the village of Godhā, there is an evil man named Lambaka, a smelter, who breaks the precepts and does evil — do you know of him?" — he replied, "I do." The Buddha then said to him, "then you, too, must be an evil man who breaks the precepts" — and he was thereby refuted. As for refutation by contradicting the opponent's own tenet: as when the elder Upāli declared to the Buddha, "the offense of bodily karma is greater; that of mental karma is not" — the Buddha said to him, "the forests of Daṇḍaka and Kaliṅga — by whom were they destroyed? Was this not done by the evil intention of certain sages?" — he replied, "it was." The Buddha then said, "can bodily karma alone accomplish such a thing?" — he replied, "it cannot." The Buddha then said to him, "have you not now contradicted your own earlier statement?" — and he was thereby refuted. Among these three, the proponent of correct principle relies on refutation by matching the opponent to resolve the earlier difficulty — and this is itself of three kinds, to be elaborated further below. "You, too, maintain that the ripening-craving toward hell, the animal realm, and the realm of hungry ghosts is solely abandoned by cultivation — have stream-enterers, then, not yet cut off this craving?" — this is the question of the proponent of correct principle, fixing the opposing tenet with precision, since, without first fixing precisely what a rival school actually holds, to then state that school's own faults would be improper. "The answer: yes" is the reply of the Vibhajyavādin, since the question posed is indeed correctly fixed, and so the reply is "yes." "What, then, do you intend — do stream-enterers give rise to a thought such as this: may I become the dragon-king Airāvaṇa, or the dragon-king Suniṣṭha, or the lord of ghosts Yama, ruling over every being in the ghost-realm?" — this is the difficulty the proponent of correct principle now wishes to raise, seeking to fix the opposing tenet against itself so as to reveal a violation of correct principle. "The answer: it is not so" is the reply of the Vibhajyavādin, rebuffing this very question and showing that no violation of meaning follows. One asks: why do stream-enterers not give rise to this craving? The answer: because those destinies are foolish, while noble ones are wise; because those destinies belong to ordinary beings, while noble ones are not ordinary beings; because those destinies possess evil intentions, while noble ones possess wholesome intentions; because those destinies mostly involve breaking the precepts and committing evil karma, while noble ones have accomplished pure precepts. Further, every noble one has attained the non-selective cessation of those destinies, and so does not crave rebirth there. One asks: do noble ones, then, never give rise to any craving whatsoever toward the evil destinies? The answer: although they do not crave rebirth there, they may still crave certain requisites found there — just as Śakra, lord of the gods, still cherishes the yakṣa Śeṣa-clad-in-blue, and the dragon-kings Airāvaṇa and Suniṣṭha, and stream-enterers and the rest, upon hearing that their own parents have fallen into an evil destiny, still give rise to feelings of affection and longing for them. Since we are here specifically rebuffing the craving for rebirth there, the answer given is: it is not so. Now hear what I myself have to say: if the ripening-craving toward hell, the animal realm, and the realm of hungry ghosts were solely abandoned by cultivation, and stream-enterers had not yet cut off this craving, then it ought to be said that stream-enterers do give rise to a thought such as this: may I become the dragon-king Airāvaṇa, and so on, as elaborated at length. But if stream-enterers do not give rise to such a thought, then it ought not to be said that the ripening-craving toward hell, the animal realm, and the realm of hungry ghosts is solely abandoned by cultivation, and that stream-enterers have not yet cut off this craving — this is the proponent of correct principle's own opening and closing gambit, turning the argument back upon itself from both directions, the opening gambit showing accordance with his own tenet but violation of true meaning, the closing gambit showing accordance with true meaning but violation of his own tenet — since neither can be accepted, he concludes, summing up: to maintain both of these positions at once is altogether unreasonable. The proponent of correct principle's own intended meaning here is this: just as craving toward an evil destiny remains uncut in a noble one yet does not manifest before him, craving-devoid-of-existence should be understood in exactly the same way — and so the Vibhajyavādin's own difficulty does not accord with correct principle. "You, too, maintain that the fetter which, once it fetters one, leads one to kill one's own father or mother, is solely abandoned by cultivation — have stream-enterers, then, not yet cut off this fetter?" — this is the question of the proponent of correct principle, the rest as already stated above. "The answer: yes" is the reply of the Vibhajyavādin, the rest as already stated above. "What, then, do you intend — do stream-enterers, fettered by such a fetter, go on to kill their own father or mother?" — this is the difficulty the proponent of correct principle now wishes to raise, seeking to fix the opposing tenet against itself so as to reveal a violation of correct principle. "The answer: it is not so" is the reply of the Vibhajyavādin, rebuffing this very question and showing that no violation of meaning follows. One asks: why do stream-enterers not give rise to this fetter? The answer: only one possessing an upper-grade evil intention is able to give rise to this fetter, and stream-enterers possess only wholesome intentions.

Further, only one possessing an upper-grade shamelessness and lack of conscience is able to give rise to this fetter, and stream-enterers possess shame and conscience. Further, this fetter is nurtured by wrong view, necessarily manifesting only after wrong view has already manifested — stream-enterers, having already cut off wrong view, do not give rise to this fetter. Further, stream-enterers have attained the non-selective cessation of this fetter, and, further, have attained the very precept-basis for never committing this karma at all — and so it can never again, in the end, manifest before them. Now hear what I myself have to say: if the fetter which, once it fetters one, leads one to kill one's own father or mother, were solely abandoned by cultivation, and stream-enterers had not yet cut off this fetter, then it ought to be said that stream-enterers, fettered by such a fetter, would go on to kill their own father or mother. But if stream-enterers do not, fettered by such a fetter, go on to kill their own father or mother, then it ought not to be said that the fetter which leads one to kill one's own father or mother is solely abandoned by cultivation, and that stream-enterers have not yet cut off this fetter — this is the proponent of correct principle's own opening and closing gambit, turning the argument back upon itself from both directions, the rest as already stated above. The proponent of correct principle's own intended meaning here is this: just as this very killing-fetter remains uncut in a noble one yet does not manifest before him, craving-devoid-of-existence should be understood in exactly the same way — and so the Vibhajyavādin's own difficulty does not accord with correct principle. "You, too, maintain that the craving that clings, out of nonexistence, to a dharma abandoned by cultivation, is solely abandoned by cultivation — have stream-enterers, then, not yet cut off this craving?" — this is the question of the proponent of correct principle, the rest as already stated above. "The answer: yes" is the reply of the Vibhajyavādin,

the rest as already stated above. Here, "a dharma abandoned by cultivation" refers to a contaminated wholesome dharma; "nonexistence" refers to that very wholesome root having been cut off — the craving that arises with respect to this is named "craving that clings, out of nonexistence, to a dharma abandoned by cultivation." Since this wholesome root's own cutting-off is itself abandoned by cultivation, the craving arising with respect to it is likewise abandoned by cultivation. "What, then, do you intend — do stream-enterers give rise to craving with respect to this?" — this is the difficulty the proponent of correct principle now wishes to raise, seeking to fix the opposing tenet against itself so as to reveal a violation of correct principle. "The answer: it is not so" is the reply of the Vibhajyavādin, rebuffing this very question and showing that no violation of meaning follows. One asks: why do stream-enterers not give rise to this craving? The answer: noble ones always delight in maintaining possession of their own wholesome dharmas, having no wish ever to be parted from them — the cutting-off of this wholesome root would mean no longer possessing these wholesome dharmas, causing one to be parted from them, and it is for this reason that noble ones do not give rise to craving with respect to this. Further, noble ones always delight in the increase and advancement of their own wholesome dharmas — this wholesome root's own cutting-off would cause wholesome dharmas to diminish and decline, and it is for this reason that noble ones do not give rise to craving with respect to this. Further, this craving toward the nonexistence of a wholesome dharma is nurtured by wrong view, necessarily manifesting only after wrong view has already manifested — stream-enterers, having already cut off wrong view, are without this craving. Further, noble ones have attained the non-selective cessation of this craving, and so it can never manifest. Now hear what I myself have to say: if the craving that clings, out of nonexistence, to a dharma abandoned by cultivation, were solely abandoned by cultivation, and stream-enterers had not yet cut off this craving, then it ought to be said that stream-enterers do give rise to craving with respect to this. But if stream-enterers do not give rise to craving with respect to this, then it ought not to be said that the craving that clings, out of nonexistence, to a dharma abandoned by cultivation, is solely abandoned by cultivation, and that stream-enterers have not yet cut off this craving — this is the proponent of correct principle's own opening and closing gambit, turning the argument back upon itself from both directions, the rest as already stated above. The proponent of correct principle's own final intended meaning here is this: just as this very craving-toward-the-nonexistence-of-a-wholesome-dharma remains uncut in a noble one yet does not manifest before him, craving-devoid-of-existence should be understood in exactly the same way. "Since these three cases already accord with correct principle, this present case should be understood to accord with it as well" — this is the proponent of correct principle's own summary, gathering together these three prior cases to establish his own position — that is, since these three prior cases, first, middle, and last, each already accord with correct principle, my own earlier statement, too, must accordingly be sound, and cannot properly be pressed as an objection against.

What, exactly, is meant by "devoid-of-existence"? The answer: the impermanence of the three realms. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic once more? The answer: it is in order to resolve a genuine doubt — that is, one might doubt that the author of this treatise understood only the meaning in accordance with scripture, and did not understand the meaning in accordance with the ultimate truth — and it is in order to resolve this very doubt that the author, having already established, in accordance with scripture's own meaning, that craving-devoid-of-existence is solely abandoned by cultivation, now shows, in accordance with the ultimate meaning, that craving-devoid-of-existence spans both what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, since the impermanence of the three realms spans both. Further, the Vibhajyavādin questions the proponent of correct principle, saying:

"though you have, up to now, prevailed over me through skillful argument, you have still not settled the ultimate matter with precision — you should now state precisely what 'devoid-of-existence' actually is, rather than merely saying that this craving is solely abandoned by cultivation." The proponent of correct principle replies to the Vibhajyavādin: "though I have, up to now, prevailed over you through skillful argument in accordance with scripture's own meaning, I shall now, in accordance with the ultimate meaning, show that this craving-devoid-of-existence spans both what is abandoned by seeing and by cultivation, since the impermanence of the three realms spans both kinds." Some say: what was said earlier concerned craving; what is said now concerns "devoid-of-existence" — this is in order to show that both are alike abandoned by cultivation. As for what is here said to be "the impermanence of the three realms," this speaks only of the cessation of the three realms' own class of homogeneous being, not of everything without exception. The verdict: it is as stated earlier that is sound — for the phrase "the impermanence of the three realms" admits of no such restriction. Even the craving that clings to the cutting-off of a wholesome dharma still gives rise to craving; how, then, could the impermanence of a dharma abandoned by seeing possibly fail to give rise to craving as well? For one who holds the extinction-view universally reckons all five sections as a self or as belonging to a self, and, upon their future cutting-off, gives rise to craving accordingly — though not taking them all together as a single object, he does still, one by one, separately give rise to craving toward each — what fault could possibly follow from this? One asks: uncontaminated dharmas, too, possess impermanence — why, then, does this passage speak only of the three realms? The answer: if the characteristic of impermanence is craving's own object, this passage speaks of it; the impermanence of the uncontaminated is not craving's own object, and so this passage does not speak of it. Further, if the characteristic of impermanence is something craving increases with respect to, this passage speaks of it; the impermanence of the uncontaminated is not something craving increases with respect to, and so this passage does not speak of it. As the World-Honored One states: mind is liberated from craving, hatred, and delusion, and so on, as elaborated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: it is in order to analyze the meaning of scripture — that is, scripture states that mind is liberated from craving, hatred, and delusion, yet, though scripture states this much, it does not elaborate at length: which mind is liberated — a mind still possessing craving, hatred, and delusion, or a mind already free of craving, hatred, and delusion? Scripture is the very root this treatise depends upon,

and what that scripture leaves unexplained, this treatise should now explain. Further, it is in order to refute a rival school and manifest the correct principle — that is, some maintain that mind's own nature is originally pure, just as the Vibhajyavādins hold, who say that mind's own nature is originally pure, and is rendered impure in its own characteristic only through defilement by adventitious afflictions.

In order to refute this position, and to show that mind's own nature is not originally pure, being rendered impure in its own characteristic through defilement by adventitious affliction, this treatise is composed. If mind's own nature were originally pure, and were rendered impure in its own characteristic only through defilement by adventitious affliction, why should it not likewise be the case that this adventitious affliction, itself originally defiled in its own nature, becomes pure in its own characteristic through being associated with mind's own originally pure nature? If this adventitious affliction, originally defiled in its own nature, though associated with mind's own originally pure nature, still does not thereby become pure in its own characteristic, then mind, too, ought equally to remain originally pure, its own characteristic not rendered impure by adventitious affliction — the two cases being genuinely analogous.

Further, does this originally pure mind arise prior to adventitious affliction, or does it arise simultaneously with it? If it arises prior, then mind, having already arisen, would have to abide waiting for the affliction to arise — and this would then entail that mind persists across two full moments, a fault directly contradicting one's own school's own tenet. If it arises simultaneously, how could one then still speak of mind's nature being originally pure? Your own school does not even hold that a future mind can properly be spoken of as "originally pure" at all. It is in order to refute this rival school's own distorted position, and to manifest the undistorted principle of one's own school, that this treatise is composed. As the World-Honored One states: mind is liberated from craving, hatred, and delusion — which mind, exactly, is it that attains liberation? Is it a mind still possessing craving, hatred, and delusion, or a mind already free of craving, hatred, and delusion? The answer: it is the mind already free of craving, hatred, and delusion that attains liberation. One asks: a mind already free of craving, hatred, and delusion is, from the very outset, already liberated — why, then, does scripture further speak of it "attaining" liberation? The answer: although, with reference to affliction, it is indeed originally liberated, yet, with reference to its own actual operation across time and its own place within the continuum, it only now attains liberation — that is, so long as the affliction within one's own body has not yet been cut off, mind has not yet come to operate freely across time, nor to take its proper place within the continuum, and, since mind is unable to operate freely across time or take its proper place within the continuum on its own, it is not called "liberated"; but once every affliction within one's own body has been cut off, mind is then able to operate freely across time and to take its proper place within the continuum, and it is for this reason that it is called "attaining liberation." There are yet others who say: it is the mind associated with craving, hatred, and delusion that attains liberation. One asks: who maintains this position? The answer:

the Vibhajyavādins. They maintain that a defiled mind and an undefiled mind are, in their own substance, not actually distinct — that is, so long as its associated afflictions are not yet cut off, it is called a defiled mind; once its associated afflictions have already been cut off, it is called an undefiled mind, exactly as a bronze vessel and the like, before its own tarnish has been removed, is called a tarnished vessel, and, once its tarnish has been removed, is called an untarnished vessel — mind, they say, is exactly the same. This position ought not to be maintained — were it maintained in this way, it would properly be met with resistance, and for the following reason: it is not that this mind, once genuinely combined, associated, and mingled with craving, hatred, and delusion, fails to attain liberation only so long as craving, hatred, and delusion remain uncut, attaining liberation only once craving, hatred, and delusion are cut off. What is meant here is this: mind, if it is genuinely associated with affliction, admits of no liberation at all, since both alike share the very same antidote — while not yet cut off, it is, precisely because not yet cut off, not called liberated; and, once it has already been cut off, since both mind and affliction alike then cease to be actually possessed, this too is not called liberation, since dharmas that are genuinely associated with one another can never be made to depart from their own companion-nature — this not even deserving the name "cutting-off," how much less the name "liberation." A liberated mind, therefore, must necessarily never have been, in its own original nature, associated with affliction at all. In order to establish this very point, scripture is further cited in support: the World-Honored One also states, monks, you should know that this very disk of the sun and moon is obscured by five obscurations, causing it neither to shine brightly, nor to illuminate, nor to spread its light broadly, nor to remain pure. What are these five? First, cloud; second, smoke;

third, dust; fourth, fog; fifth, the hand of the asura Rāhu. Here, "cloud" refers to how, in the height of summer, a small cloud arising may, within a brief span of time, grow and spread until it fills the entire sky, obscuring the disk of the sun and moon alike, causing them not to appear. "Smoke" refers to how, when grass and trees are burned in the wilderness, smoke suddenly arises and fills the entire sky, obscuring the disk of the sun and moon alike, causing them not to appear. "Dust" refers to how, in times of drought, a great wind suddenly whips up clouds of dust that fill the entire sky, obscuring the disk of the sun and moon alike, causing them not to appear. "Fog" refers to how, in autumn and winter, fog arises from the mountains and rivers — and it is further heard that, in the outer regions, when the rain first clears, the sun shining on the plains causes the earth's own vapors to rise up and spread mistily throughout the sky, obscuring the disk of the sun and moon alike, causing them not to appear. As for "the hand of the asura Rāhu" — this refers to how, when the asuras do battle with the gods, the gods use the sun and moon as their own battle standards, and, by the very majestic power of the sun and moon, the gods are perpetually victorious over them — and so the asura Rāhu, forever harboring resentment toward the sun and moon, wishes to destroy them utterly,

yet, owing to the overwhelming, dominant power of sentient beings' own collective karma, he is, for all his skill and effort, unable to destroy them, and so instead merely uses his own hand to obscure them and cause them to temporarily vanish from sight. As scripture states: monks, you should know that there exists no such being of vast, imposing, and towering form as the asura Rāhu — this refers to a transformation, not to any actual physical body. Just as the disk of the sun and moon is never genuinely combined, associated, or mingled with these five obscurations, and, so long as these obscurations have not departed, this disk of the sun and moon does not shine brightly, does not illuminate, does not spread its light broadly, and does not remain pure, while, once these obscurations have departed, this disk of the sun and moon does shine brightly, illuminate, spread its light broadly, and remain pure — so too, it is not that this mind, genuinely combined, associated, and mingled with craving, hatred, and delusion, fails to attain liberation only so long as craving, hatred, and delusion remain uncut, attaining liberation only once craving, hatred, and delusion are cut off. What is meant here is this: just as the disk of the sun and moon has never, from the very outset, been associated or mingled with these five obscurations, only later becoming, upon their departure, bright, illuminating, broad in its light, and pure, so too is mind exactly the same — it has never, since beginningless time, been associated or mingled with craving, hatred, and delusion, only later being called, upon their departure, liberated — and it is for this reason that mind attains liberation only once it has departed from craving, hatred, and delusion and these have subsequently been cut off — this principle being fixed and decisive. Which mind attains liberation — a past mind, a future mind, or a present mind? And so on, as elaborated at length. One asks: why does the treatise take up this topic? The answer: it is in order to refute a rival school and manifest the correct principle — that is, with respect to those who fail to properly distinguish the three time-periods, denying that past and future dharmas genuinely exist at all — in order to refute this position, and to show that past and future dharmas do indeed genuinely exist, this treatise is composed. Further, some maintain that there exists no genuine moment of actually-arising or actually-ceasing at all, just as the Dārṣṭāntikas hold, who maintain that time itself admits of only two divisions: first, what has already arisen; second, what has not yet arisen; and, likewise, only two further divisions: first, what has already ceased; second, what has not yet ceased —

beyond these, there exists no further, distinct moment of actually-arising or actually-ceasing at all. In order to refute this position, and to show that there does indeed exist a genuine stage of actually-arising and actually-ceasing, this treatise is composed. Further, it has already been stated above that a mind free of craving, hatred, and delusion attains liberation, yet it has not yet been stated which mind, belonging to which time-period, attains this liberation, or with respect to what — and it is in order to state this that this treatise is now composed.

Which mind attains liberation — a past mind, a future mind, or a present mind? The answer: it is the future mind of one beyond training, at the very moment of its own arising, that attains liberation from every obstruction. As for "future," this excludes the mistaken view denying that past and future dharmas genuinely exist. "The mind of one beyond training" reveals that it is a mind belonging to one beyond training that is called "attaining liberation." "At the very moment of its own arising" reveals that there does indeed exist a genuine stage of actually-arising and actually-ceasing, refuting the Dārṣṭāntika's own position. "Liberated from every obstruction" reveals that it attains liberation from every obstruction whatsoever — that is, at the very moment of becoming free of the ninth and lowest grade of affliction abandoned by cultivation belonging to the sphere of neither-perception-nor-non-perception, one attains liberation, at that very moment, from every obstruction belonging to all five sections across the three realms, since one thereby fully comprehends the origin of suffering, and, at that very moment, obtains every one of the non-selective cessations all together. One asks: at that very moment, the future mind is, in every sense, liberated — why, then, does the treatise mention only its arising? The answer: this is offered merely as an illustrative gateway, the same being understood to hold for every case by analogy — at that time, every one of these future minds attains freedom in its own actual operation across time and within the body. Further, it is because the mind at the very moment of arising is itself the very path of liberation, the foremost among all, liberated from every obstruction — and it is by virtue of this that every future mind attains liberation, and it is for this reason that this alone is singled out for mention. Further, liberation is itself of two kinds: first, liberation in actual operation across time; second, liberation within the continuum. The mind at the very moment of arising possesses both kinds of liberation together, and it is for this reason that this alone is singled out for mention; every other future mind, though possessing liberation within the continuum, lacks liberation in actual operation across time, and it is for this reason that this is not mentioned. One asks: at that very moment, all five aggregates alike attain liberation — why, then, does the treatise speak only of mind's own liberation? The answer: mind is singled out here as the gateway, the same being understood to reveal, by analogy, that every future aggregate alike attains liberation. Further, this is spoken with reference to what is most superior — that is, among the five aggregates, mind is the most superior, and so, in speaking of mind's own liberation, every other aggregate's liberation is thereby already spoken of as well, just as, when it is said that a king has arrived, this already implies that his ministers and consorts have arrived along with him. Further, since mind is the great master, mental factors and the rest all depend upon it, and it is on account of mind that manifest action and the dissociated formations arise, depending on mind and the rest for their own arising — and it is for this reason that mind alone is singled out for mention, not the other aggregates. Further, mind is the sovereign master — if mind is pure, every other aggregate is pure as well, and it is for this reason that mind alone is singled out for mention. Further, at the very moment of the uninterrupted path that cultivates the knowledge of another's mind, one takes only mind as one's object, and it is for this reason that mind alone is singled out for mention here — this same matter has already been explained at length in the very first chapter. One asks: the mind of a learner, and the mind of one neither a learner nor beyond training, likewise attain liberation — why, then, does the treatise speak only of the mind of one beyond training? The answer: this is spoken with reference to what is most superior — that is, in speaking of what is most superior among dharmas, the dharma of one beyond training is superior to that of a learner and the rest; in speaking of what is most superior among sentient beings, the sentient being beyond training is superior to the sentient being who is a learner and the rest — and it is for this reason that this passage speaks only of one beyond training. Further, it is because the mind of one beyond training attains liberation abundantly, possessing superior virtues, and free of every fault

that this passage speaks of it, unlike other minds — and it is for this reason that the Venerable Ghoṣa stated: it is because it is abundant, because it is superior, and because it is free of every fault, that only the mind of one beyond training is called "liberated." Further, it is because the mind of one beyond training possesses both kinds of liberation together — namely, liberation of its own nature, and liberation within the continuum — that this passage speaks of it specifically, unlike other minds, and it is for this reason that four alternatives should here be formulated: there is a mind liberated in its own nature but not liberated within the continuum — namely, the uncontaminated mind of a learner. There is a mind liberated within the continuum but not liberated in its own nature — namely, the contaminated mind of one beyond training. There is a mind liberated both in its own nature and within the continuum — namely, the uncontaminated mind of one beyond training. There is a mind liberated neither in its own nature nor within the continuum — namely, the contaminated mind of a learner, and the mind of an ordinary being. Further, if a mind is liberated in its entirety, this passage speaks of it; the mind of a learner is liberated only in a single portion; the mind of one neither a learner nor beyond training may be entirely unliberated, or liberated only in a single portion — and it is for this reason that this passage does not speak of these. Further, if a mind is solely liberated, without any bondage whatsoever, possessing only wisdom and no ignorance, this passage speaks of it; other minds are not so, and it is for this reason that this passage does not speak of them. Further, if a mind is liberated from the afflictions of all five sections, and from the dharmas of all five sections, this passage speaks of it; other minds are not so, and it is for this reason that this passage does not speak of them. Further, if a mind is liberated from the obstructions of all five sections and from the objects of all five sections, this passage speaks of it;

other minds are not so, and it is for this reason that this passage does not speak of them. Further, if a mind possesses only correct liberation, with no false liberation, only correct wisdom, with no false wisdom, and no adversary remaining, this passage speaks of it; other minds are not so. Further, if a mind is no longer subdued by the eight forms of wrongness, this passage speaks of it; other minds are not so — a learner's mind, though already far removed from the eight forms of wrongness, is nonetheless still subject to obstruction, and so is likewise said to be "subdued" by them. Further, if a mind is ultimately able to cut off future existence, attaining the non-selective cessation of all existence, this passage speaks of it; other minds are not so. Further, if a mind's own liberation is ultimately, fully complete, this passage speaks of it; other minds are not so. Further, if a mind has already attained the very throne of liberation, its head bound with the very crown of liberation, this passage speaks of it; other minds are not so. Further, if a mind abides solely within the continuum of liberation, exactly like the continuum of craving belonging to a wind-deity, this passage speaks of it; other minds are not so. Further, if a mind has, in the end, uprooted every affliction of the three realms as completely as one shaves off hair and beard, this passage speaks of it. Further, if a mind has already cut off the very peak of affliction dependent on the peak of existence, this passage speaks of it. Further, if a mind is associated with a vast, expansive, and subtle ease and bliss, this passage speaks of it; a learner's mind, though it does possess a certain ease and bliss, still retains an adversary in the form of unexhausted affliction, and so cannot be called vast, expansive, or subtle — just as a king whose enemies are not yet exhausted, or whose enemies, though exhausted, still have neighboring lands not yet paying him tribute, cannot yet be said to enjoy the greatest happiness — a learner's mind, its own afflictions not yet exhausted, and the wholesome roots of the three realms not yet fully cultivated, cannot have its own ease and bliss called vast, expansive, or subtle in this same way. Further, if a mind is associated with an ease and bliss that has already relinquished its own heavy burden, no longer subdued by the intentions of affliction, and is called a sage in this sense, this passage speaks of it. Further, if a mind has relinquished the abode of heat and affliction and attained the abode of coolness, relinquished the support of affliction and attained the support of wholesome roots, relinquished the defiled aggregates and attained the pure aggregates, relinquished the assembly of defiled beings and attained the assembly of pure beings, its intentions forever quiescent, its sagacity fully complete, this passage speaks of it. Further, if a mind has entered into the very ranks of the supreme field of merit, this passage speaks of it; a learner's mind, still possessing affliction, has not yet entered into the ranks of the supreme field of merit, as the verse states:

"Craving and desire destroy sentient beings, just as weeds overrun a field; give to one free of craving and desire, and one will certainly obtain a supreme fruit, without any doubt." Further, if a mind, once it takes another's life, incurs an offense of the uninterrupted-retribution class, this passage speaks of it. Further, if a mind's own merits and faults no longer operate mingled together,

this passage speaks of it. Further, if a mind has cut off every attachment, broken every embankment, and removed every obstruction, this passage speaks of it. Further, if a mind has cut off the four kinds of nourishment, broken the four kinds of demonic adversary, departed from the four abodes of consciousness, ultimately transcended the nine abodes of sentient beings, severed every path of rebirth, and exhausted birth, aging, sickness, and death across every realm and destiny, this passage speaks of it.

Further, this ought not to be pressed as an objection against the treatise's own author, since the author composed this treatise in dependence on scripture, and scripture itself states that it is the mind of one beyond training that attains liberation, not the mind of a learner and the rest, and this treatise, following it, singles this out for mention accordingly. One asks: at the moment the knowledge of exhaustion arises, does the wholesome root cultivated across all three realms likewise attain liberation? The answer: it, too, attains liberation, since it is permanently freed from every obstruction. One asks: when one, having retrogressed from the fruit of arhatship, subsequently regains it, which mind, at that time, is called "attaining liberation" — is it the past mind, or the future mind? The answer: only the future mind is called "attaining liberation," never the past mind, since the past mind no longer exists within the body, nor operates across time — it has already been liberated once before, and so, though now regained a second time, it is not called "attaining liberation" once more.