The Firefly at Sunrise

Is nirvāṇa to be called "belonging to a learner," "belonging to one beyond training," or "belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training"? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: although it has already been stated above that there are two kinds of nirvāṇa-realm, it has not yet been stated whether nirvāṇa is to be called a learner's, one beyond training's, or belonging to neither — and it is in order to state this that this treatise is now composed. Further, it is composed in order to refute other schools and to reveal the correct meaning — that is, there are those who hold that nirvāṇa may be a learner's, may be one beyond training's, or may belong to neither, as the Vātsīputrīyas maintain; this treatise, in order to refute that position, reveals that nirvāṇa belongs solely to neither a learner nor one beyond training, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. Is nirvāṇa to be called a learner's, one beyond training's, or belonging to neither? The answer: nirvāṇa ought to be called belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, since the sense of "learner" and "one beyond training" does not properly apply to it — that is, one is called "a learner" because, for the sake of a further fruit, one clearly and diligently advances in cultivation; once this cultivation is fully complete, and there exists no further, distinct fruit for which to advance in cultivation, one belongs to the same class as a learner yet is not identical to it, and is therefore called "one beyond training." Nirvāṇa possesses neither of these two senses, and it is for this reason that it is called belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training. There are those who say: nirvāṇa may be a learner's, may be one beyond training's, or may belong to neither, as the Vātsīputrīyas maintain. They hold as follows: nirvāṇa's own inherent nature possesses three characteristics — first, belonging to a learner; second, belonging to one beyond training; third, belonging to neither. What is meant by "belonging to a learner"? It refers to the acquisition, obtained by a learner, of the cutting-off of the fetters, its full attainment realized and directly touched. What is meant by "belonging to one beyond training"? It refers to the acquisition, obtained by one beyond training, of the cutting-off of the fetters, its full attainment realized and directly touched. What is meant by "belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training"? It refers to the acquisition, obtained through a contaminated path, of the cutting-off of the fetters, its full attainment realized and directly touched. Those who state this position commit a fault: how could nirvāṇa possess three characteristics simply because it possesses three kinds of acquisition? A single dharma ought not to possess three distinct substantial characteristics, since the acquisition is not identical to the substance itself. It is in order to refute that position that this passage is spoken: with respect to this meaning, nirvāṇa ought properly to be said to belong to neither a learner nor one beyond training — that is, within this treatise's own undistorted meaning, it ought merely to be said that nirvāṇa possesses solely the nature of belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, its characteristic permanently abiding, without any change or alteration. In this passage, the author of the treatise ought properly to stop precisely at this point; to say anything further would be labor spent in vain. There are those who say: at this point, something further ought indeed to be said, since the settling of the matter through question and answer makes the principle yet clearer. That is, the proponent of correct reasoning discriminates the fault in the Vibhajyavādin's own position, thereby revealing that his own position is free of error. The Vibhajyavādin's own position comprises two variants: the first holds that nirvāṇa is at first neither a learner's nor one beyond training's, and later turns into a learner's; at first a learner's, and later turns into one beyond training's; at first one beyond training's, and turns once again into a learner's. The second holds that nirvāṇa is of three kinds: what belongs to a learner is forever a learner's; what belongs to one beyond training is forever one beyond training's; what belongs to neither a learner nor one beyond training is forever neither. If one interprets this passage with reference to the first variant, then: "but do you hold that nirvāṇa may be a learner's, may be one beyond training's, or may belong to neither?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own question, reaffirming the other's position once more — for, without first settling what the other's own position actually is, to declare its faults would not accord with reason. "It is so" is the Vibhajyavādin's own answer: I hold that nirvāṇa's own transformation is not fixed, and may thus be of three kinds, and it is for this reason that I say, "it is so." "What is your own view — do those who, by means of a mundane path, have already permanently cut off desire, greed, and hatred within the desire realm, and have thereby attained the acquisition of freedom from bondage belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, who have not yet attained direct realization with respect to the four truths, and who, upon cultivating direct realization and attaining it, realize the fruit of a non-returner, thereby turn into a learner's acquisition?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own question: does this practitioner, who was previously an ordinary being, now turn into a learner, and does his acquisition of freedom from bondage turn into and give rise to a learner's acquisition? "It is so" is the Vibhajyavādin's own answer, restating the prior question in a way that does not conflict with reason, and it is for this reason that he says, "it is so." Further, "what is your own view — do those who, by means of a mundane path, have already permanently cut off desire, greed, and hatred, and have attained the acquisition of freedom from bondage belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, when they later realize the fruit of a non-returner, have that very freedom from bondage thereby turn into a learner's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own challenge to that position, fearing it may not accord with reason, and thereupon further presses the challenge through reasoning, saying: if he now turns into a learner, then he ought already to have been a learner beforehand, since a learner's substance abides permanently — yet, before realizing the fruit of a non-returner, he had not yet attained any learner's acquisition, so to call him already "a learner" does not accord with correct principle. "What is your own view — do those who, on the path leading toward arhatship as a learner, cut off the fetters and realize the fruit of arhatship, thereby turn into one beyond training's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own question: does this practitioner, who was previously a learner, now turn into one beyond training, and does his acquisition of freedom from bondage turn into and give rise to one beyond training's acquisition? "It is so" is the Vibhajyavādin's own answer, restating the prior question in a way that does not conflict with reason, and it is for this reason that he says, "it is so." Further, "what is your own view — do those who, on the path leading toward arhatship as a learner, cut off the fetters and, at the very moment of realizing the fruit of arhatship, have that very cutting-off of the fetters thereby turn into one beyond training's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own challenge to that position, fearing it may not accord with reason, and thereupon further presses the challenge through reasoning, saying: if he now becomes one beyond training, then he ought already to have been one beyond training beforehand, since one beyond training's substance abides permanently — yet, before realizing the fruit of arhatship, he had not yet attained any acquisition of one beyond training, so to call him already "one beyond training" does not accord with correct principle. "What is your own view — do arhats, when the fetters cut off by one beyond training reassert themselves and they retrogress from the fruit of arhatship, thereby turn into a learner's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own question: does this practitioner, who was previously one beyond training, now turn into a learner, and does his acquisition of freedom from bondage turn into and give rise to a learner's acquisition? "It is so" is the Vibhajyavādin's own answer, restating the prior question in a way that does not conflict with reason, and it is for this reason that he says, "it is so." Further, "what is your own view — do arhats, when the fetters cut off by one beyond training reassert themselves and they retrogress from the fruit of arhatship, have that very cutting-off of the fetters thereby turn into a learner's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own challenge to that position, fearing it may not accord with reason, and thereupon further presses the challenge through reasoning, saying: if he now turns into a learner, then he ought already to have been a learner beforehand, since a learner's substance abides permanently — yet, before retrogressing from the fruit of arhatship, he had not yet attained any learner's acquisition, so to call him already "a learner" does not accord with correct principle. If one interprets this passage with reference to the second variant, then: "but do you hold that nirvāṇa may be a learner's, may be one beyond training's, or may belong to neither?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own question, reaffirming the other's position once more — for, without first settling what the other's own position actually is, to declare its faults would not accord with reason. "It is so" is the Vibhajyavādin's own answer: I hold that nirvāṇa's own substantial kinds are distinct and are fixedly of three sorts, and it is for this reason that I say, "it is so." "What is your own view — do those who, by means of a mundane path, have already permanently cut off desire, greed, and hatred within the desire realm,

and have thereby attained the acquisition of freedom from bondage belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, who have not yet attained direct realization with respect to the four truths, and who, upon cultivating direct realization and attaining it, thereby turn into a learner's" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own question: does this practitioner, who was previously an ordinary being, now turn into a learner, and does his acquisition of freedom from bondage turn into and give rise to a learner's acquisition? "It is so" is the Vibhajyavādin's own answer, restating the prior question in a way that does not conflict with reason, and it is for this reason that he says, "it is so."

Further, "what is your own view — do those who, by means of a mundane path, have already permanently cut off desire, greed, and hatred within the desire realm, and have attained the acquisition of freedom from bondage belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, when they later realize the fruit of a non-returner, have that very freedom from bondage thereby turn into a learner's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own challenge: you hold that nirvāṇa, in dependence on a learner's acquisition, becomes a learner's — now that a learner's acquisition does indeed exist, it ought thereby to turn into a learner's. "If he now turns into a learner, then he ought already to have been a learner beforehand, since a learner's substance abides permanently" is the Vibhajyavādin's own counter-challenge, resolving the difficulty by saying: I hold that what belongs to a learner is forever a learner's. "Yet, before realizing the fruit of a non-returner, he had not yet attained any learner's acquisition, so to call him already 'a learner' does not accord with correct principle" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own resolution of that counter-challenge, further reinforcing the original difficulty.

That is, before realizing the fruit of a non-returner, he had not yet attained any learner's acquisition, yet he had already attained the cutting-off pertaining to the five lower fetters — ought that cutting-off, then, not to be called a learner's?

Now that he has indeed attained a learner's acquisition, thereby attaining that same cutting-off, why should it not be called a learner's? If an acquisition possessed by a learner is not to be called a learner's, then it ought not to be said that nirvāṇa is called a learner's in dependence on a learner's acquisition. "What is your own view — do those who, on the path leading toward arhatship as a learner, cut off the fetters and realize the fruit of arhatship, thereby turn into one beyond training's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own question: does this practitioner, who was previously a learner, now turn into one beyond training, and does his acquisition of freedom from bondage turn into and give rise to one beyond training's acquisition? "It is so" is the Vibhajyavādin's own answer, restating the prior question in a way that does not conflict with reason, and it is for this reason that he says, "it is so." Further, "what is your own view — do those who, on the path leading toward arhatship as a learner, cut off the fetters and, at the very moment of realizing the fruit of arhatship, have that very cutting-off of the fetters thereby turn into one beyond training's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own challenge: you hold that nirvāṇa, in dependence on one beyond training's acquisition, becomes one beyond training's — now that one beyond training's acquisition does indeed exist, it ought thereby to turn into one beyond training's. "If he now becomes one beyond training, then he ought already to have been one beyond training beforehand, since one beyond training's substance abides permanently" is the Vibhajyavādin's own counter-challenge, resolving the difficulty. "I hold that what belongs to one beyond training is forever one beyond training's — yet, before realizing the fruit of arhatship, he had not yet attained any acquisition of one beyond training, so to call him already 'one beyond training' does not accord with correct principle" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own resolution of that counter-challenge, further reinforcing the original difficulty. That is, before attaining the fruit of one beyond training, he had not yet attained any acquisition of one beyond training, yet he had already attained the cutting-off of every fetter — ought that cutting-off, then, not to be called one beyond training's? Now that he has indeed attained one beyond training's acquisition, thereby attaining that same cutting-off, why should it not be called one beyond training's? If an acquisition possessed by one beyond training is not to be called one beyond training's, then it ought not to be said that nirvāṇa is called one beyond training's in dependence on one beyond training's acquisition. "What is your own view — do arhats, when the fetters cut off by one beyond training reassert themselves and they retrogress from the fruit of arhatship, thereby turn into a learner's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own question: does this practitioner, who was previously one beyond training, now turn into a learner, and does his acquisition of freedom from bondage turn into and give rise to a learner's acquisition? "It is so" is the Vibhajyavādin's own answer, restating the prior question in a way that does not conflict with reason, and it is for this reason that he says, "it is so." Further, "what is your own view — do arhats, when the fetters cut off by one beyond training reassert themselves and they retrogress from the fruit of arhatship, have that very cutting-off of the fetters thereby turn into a learner's?" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own challenge: you hold that nirvāṇa, in dependence on a learner's acquisition, becomes a learner's — now that a learner's acquisition does indeed exist, it ought thereby to turn into a learner's. "If he now turns into a learner, then he ought already to have been a learner beforehand, since a learner's substance abides permanently" is the Vibhajyavādin's own counter-challenge, resolving the difficulty. "I hold that what belongs to a learner is forever a learner's — yet, before retrogressing from the fruit of arhatship, he had not yet attained any learner's acquisition, so to call him already 'a learner' does not accord with correct principle" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own resolution of that counter-challenge, further reinforcing the original difficulty. That is, before retrogressing from the fruit of one beyond training, he had not yet attained any learner's acquisition, yet he had already attained the cutting-off of a portion of the fetters abandoned by seeing and by cultivation — ought that cutting-off, then, not to be called a learner's? Now that he has indeed attained a learner's acquisition, thereby attaining that same cutting-off, why should it not be called a learner's? If an acquisition possessed by a learner is not to be called a learner's, then it ought not to be said that nirvāṇa is called a learner's in dependence on a learner's acquisition. Further, there exists a separate recitation of this passage, which reads: "do you hold that nirvāṇa belongs solely to neither a learner nor one beyond training?" — the rest as recited above. According to this recitation, one ought properly to say that this passage contains, in full, question, answer, challenge, and resolution — that is, the Vibhajyavādin poses the question, and the proponent of correct reasoning answers; the Vibhajyavādin raises the challenge, and the proponent of correct reasoning resolves it. "Do you hold that nirvāṇa belongs solely to neither a learner nor one beyond training?" is the Vibhajyavādin's own question, reaffirming the other's position once more — for, without first settling what the other's own position actually is, to declare its faults would not accord with reason. "It is so" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own answer: I hold that nirvāṇa belongs solely to neither a learner nor one beyond training, in accordance with reason and in agreement with the sūtras, and it is for this reason that I say, "it is so." "What is your own view — do those who, by means of a mundane path, have already permanently cut off desire, greed, and hatred within the desire realm, and have thereby attained the acquisition of freedom from bondage belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, who have not yet attained direct realization with respect to the four truths, and who, upon cultivating direct realization and attaining it, realize the fruit of a non-returner, thereby turn into a learner's?" is the Vibhajyavādin's own question, its meaning explained as before. "It is so" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own answer, its meaning explained as before. Further, "what is your own view — do those who, by means of a mundane path, have already permanently cut off desire, greed, and hatred within the desire realm, and have attained the acquisition of freedom from bondage belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, when they later realize the fruit of a non-returner,

have that very freedom from bondage thereby turn into a learner's?" is the Vibhajyavādin's own challenge: just as a conditioned dharma resembles its own acquisition, so too, since a learner's acquisition now exists, and that very freedom from bondage is thereby acquired, this very freedom from bondage ought thereby to turn into a learner's — "if he now turns into a learner, then he ought already to have been a learner beforehand, since a learner's substance abides permanently" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own resolution: every conditioned dharma undergoes transformation and is not fixed, and admits of being spoken of in accordance with whatever acquisition it possesses; nirvāṇa, by contrast, abides permanently, possessing no function of its own, and does not undergo transformation in accordance with any acquisition — were it the case that, being now a learner's, it must already have been a learner's beforehand, this would be an unwarranted, forced assertion; upon further reasoned challenge, it becomes clear that, before realizing the fruit of a non-returner, he had not yet attained any learner's acquisition, so to call him already "a learner" does not accord with correct principle.

Within this passage there are two distinct texts: the former is spoken in order to refute the position that nirvāṇa undergoes transformation, and the latter is spoken in order to refute the position that nirvāṇa is fixedly determined into three kinds — both alike revealing that nirvāṇa's own substance abides permanently, and that, being solely of the nature of belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, it ought not to be called a learner's. "What is your own view — do those who, on the path leading toward arhatship as a learner, cut off the fetters and realize the fruit of arhatship, thereby turn into one beyond training's?" is the Vibhajyavādin's own question, its meaning explained as before. "It is so" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own answer, its meaning explained as before. Further, "what is your own view — do those who, on the path leading toward arhatship as a learner, cut off the fetters and, at the very moment of realizing the fruit of arhatship, have that very cutting-off of the fetters thereby turn into one beyond training's?" is the Vibhajyavādin's own challenge: just as a conditioned dharma resembles its own acquisition, so too, since one beyond training's acquisition now exists, and that very cutting-off is thereby acquired, this very cutting-off ought thereby to turn into one beyond training's — "if he now becomes one beyond training, then he ought already to have been one beyond training beforehand, since one beyond training's substance abides permanently" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own resolution: every conditioned dharma undergoes transformation and is not fixed,

and admits of being spoken of in accordance with whatever acquisition it possesses; nirvāṇa, by contrast, abides permanently, possessing no function of its own, and does not undergo transformation in accordance with any acquisition — were it the case that, being now one beyond training's,

it must already have been one beyond training's beforehand, this would be an unwarranted, forced assertion; upon further reasoned challenge, it becomes clear that, before realizing the fruit of arhatship, he had not yet attained any acquisition of one beyond training, so to call him already "one beyond training" does not accord with correct principle. Within this passage there are two distinct texts: the former is spoken in order to refute the position that nirvāṇa undergoes transformation, and the latter is spoken in order to refute the position that nirvāṇa is fixedly determined into three kinds — both alike revealing that nirvāṇa's own substance abides permanently, and that, being solely of the nature of belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, it ought not to be called one beyond training's. "What is your own view — do arhats, when the fetters cut off by one beyond training reassert themselves and they retrogress from the fruit of arhatship, thereby turn into a learner's?" is the Vibhajyavādin's own question, its meaning explained as before. "It is so" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own answer, its meaning explained as before. Further, "what is your own view — do arhats, when the fetters cut off by one beyond training reassert themselves and they retrogress from the fruit of arhatship, have that very cutting-off of the fetters thereby turn into a learner's?" is the Vibhajyavādin's own challenge: just as a conditioned dharma resembles its own acquisition, so too, since a learner's acquisition now exists, and that very cutting-off is thereby acquired, this very cutting-off ought thereby to turn into a learner's — "if he now turns into a learner, then he ought already to have been a learner beforehand, since a learner's substance abides permanently" is the proponent of correct reasoning's own resolution.

"Every conditioned dharma undergoes transformation and is not fixed, and admits of being spoken of in accordance with whatever acquisition it possesses; nirvāṇa, by contrast, abides permanently, possessing no function of its own, and does not undergo transformation in accordance with any acquisition — were it the case that, being now a learner's, it must already have been a learner's beforehand, this would be an unwarranted, forced assertion; upon further reasoned challenge, it becomes clear that, before retrogressing from the fruit of arhatship, he had not yet attained any learner's acquisition, so to call him already 'a learner' does not accord with correct principle." Within this passage there are, once again, two distinct texts: the former is spoken in order to refute the position that nirvāṇa undergoes transformation, and the latter is spoken in order to refute the position that nirvāṇa is fixedly determined into three kinds — both alike revealing that nirvāṇa's own substance abides permanently, and that, being solely of the nature of belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, it ought not to be called a learner's.

Further, nirvāṇa ought not first to be neither a learner's nor one beyond training's, and so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: it is in order to make what was stated above fully clear — that is, although the foregoing has already broadly discriminated the matter, its underlying intent has not yet become entirely clear; this treatise now wishes, in brief, to show that the other school's position carries a fault, while its own position carries none, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. Further, that nirvāṇa ought not first to be neither a learner's nor one beyond training's, and later turn into a learner's, first a learner's and later turn into one beyond training's, first one beyond training's and turn once again into a learner's — this refutes the intent of the position holding that nirvāṇa undergoes an indeterminate transformation into three kinds; for, if this were so, then nirvāṇa, changing in accordance with its acquisition, would thereby be impermanent, which does not accord with correct principle. And that nirvāṇa ought not to be a learner's, or one beyond training's, or belonging to neither — this refutes the intent of the position holding that nirvāṇa's own substantial kinds are distinct and fixedly three.

For, if this were so, then nirvāṇa, varying in accordance with the stage one occupies, would thereby be subject to confused intermixture, which does not accord with correct principle — that is, at the stage of an ordinary being, one would possess all three kinds yet obtain only one; upon reaching the stage of a learner, one would possess all three kinds yet obtain two; upon reaching the stage of one beyond training, one would likewise possess all three kinds. If one obtains all three, then one ought to possess a learner's acquisition as well; if one obtains only two, then this ought not to be called the full and complete attainment of nirvāṇa. If it is at the stage of one beyond training that, through one beyond training's own acquisition, all three kinds are obtained together, then the same ought to hold equally at the stage of a learner and the rest — yet it ought then no longer to be said that a learner's acquisition of the cutting-off of the fetters is called "a learner's," that one beyond training's acquisition of the cutting-off of the fetters is called "one beyond training's," and that a contaminated acquisition of the cutting-off of the fetters is called "belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training." If it is said that, although each stage possesses all three in full, each is nonetheless named according to whatever acquisition applies in that particular case, then this amounts to saying that nirvāṇa changes in accordance with its acquisition, and thus carries the same fault of impermanence already stated above — and it is for this reason that this position, too, does not accord with reason. And, if this were so, then the three portions of every dharma, being thus indeterminate, ought to fall into confused intermixture, so that it would then be improper to posit that the characteristic nature of dharmas is fixedly determined — this, taken as a whole, uses correct reasoning to refute both of the two positions stated above, namely the Vibhajyavādin's own claim that nirvāṇa is indeterminate across the stages, and his other claim that nirvāṇa's three natures are fixedly determined — for, if this were so, then nirvāṇa's own substance would be at once permanent and impermanent, thus falling into two conflicting portions. Further, as for what that latter position states,

it, too, admits of a sense of transformation in accordance with whatever acquisition applies — this transformation, not being singular, is accordingly spoken of as twofold; but if it does not undergo transformation in accordance with its acquisition, then how could it be said that nirvāṇa is of three kinds? If a single nirvāṇa transforms in accordance with its acquisition, then every dharma ought likewise to be indeterminate; and, if indeterminate, then confused intermixture ought to follow; and, if there is confused intermixture, then it ought to be improper to posit that the characteristic nature of permanence, impermanence, and the rest is fixedly determined. Nor does the Buddha ever state that nirvāṇa possesses the nature of belonging to a learner or to one beyond training — this, taken as a whole, invokes the noble teaching to refute both of the two positions stated above, since, within the sūtras, it is never once stated that nirvāṇa is a learner's or one beyond training's, and it is therefore certain that what they state does not accord with reason. Although there exists no passage stating outright that nirvāṇa belongs solely to neither a learner nor one beyond training, since the sense of "learner" and "one beyond training" does not properly apply to it, it is thereby determined to possess solely the nature of belonging to neither. Since nirvāṇa is forever solely of the nature of belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, the characteristic nature of dharmas remains fixedly determined without any confused intermixture, forever abiding in its own nature, never relinquishing that nature — nirvāṇa abides permanently, without any change or alteration; it is for this reason that nirvāṇa ought merely to be said to belong to neither a learner nor one beyond training — having thus stated the fault in the other school's own position, this passage now reveals that its own position is free of every such fault: since nirvāṇa is of but a single kind, the characteristic nature of dharmas remains fixedly determined without any confused intermixture, and nirvāṇa abides permanently, without any change or alteration — its principle is thereby well established. The meaning of "acquisition" discussed here shall be broadly discriminated later, within the Nyāsa on the Aggregate of the Concentrations.

As the sūtra states: he accomplishes the aggregate of the precepts of one beyond training, the aggregate of concentration, the aggregate of wisdom, the aggregate of liberation, and the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation, and so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to fully discriminate the meaning of this sūtra passage. As the sūtra states: he accomplishes the aggregate of the precepts of one beyond training, and so on, at length, yet, having said this much, does not discriminate it fully — what is meant by the aggregate of the precepts of one beyond training, and so on, up through the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation? That sūtra is the fundamental basis upon which this treatise depends, and whatever it has left undiscriminated ought now to be discriminated fully. Further, the foregoing has already spoken of the fruit of the path, without yet speaking of the path itself, and it is in order to speak of this that this treatise is now composed. Further, the foregoing has already spoken of the unconditioned fruit of arhatship, without yet speaking of the conditioned fruit of arhatship, and it is in order to speak of this that this treatise is now composed. Further, the foregoing has already spoken of nirvāṇa, without yet speaking of enlightenment, and it is in order to speak of this that this treatise is now composed — and it is for these reasons that this treatise is composed. One asks: there also exist those who accomplish an aggregate belonging to a learner, or to neither a learner nor one beyond training — why does the sūtra not mention these? The answer: this ought indeed to be stated, and that it is not so stated should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, this is the Blessed One's own abbreviated teaching for the sake of his disciples. Further, it is the Blessed One's own way of speaking with reference to what is most superior — that is, among all dharmas, the dharma of one beyond training is superior, and among all sentient beings, the sentient being beyond training is superior, and it is for this reason that this is spoken of in particular. Further, it is the Blessed One's own way of praising the eldest son — that is, the Buddha, at various times, praises the eldest son, at other times the middle son, and at other times the youngest son. As for praising the eldest son, this is as the verse states:

"The arhat's is the greatest bliss, through the permanent cutting-off of thirsting craving; he has also permanently cut off every conceit, rending asunder the net of ignorance." As for praising the middle son, this is as when the Buddha praises the seven kinds of good persons proceeding on their way; as for praising the youngest son, this is as when the Pond Simile Sūtra extols the fruit of stream-entry. Here, it is the eldest son who is being praised, and it is for this reason that only one beyond training is mentioned. Further, this passage speaks specifically of one whose aggregate of precepts is unspoiled by wrongful precepts, whose aggregate of concentration is undisturbed by distraction, whose aggregate of wisdom is unobscured by wrongful wisdom, whose aggregate of liberation is unafflicted by any affliction, and whose aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation is unclouded by ignorance — a learner's aggregate, and the aggregate belonging to neither a learner nor one beyond training, possess no such quality, and it is for this reason that they are not mentioned. What is the aggregate of the precepts of one beyond training? The answer: it is the bodily restraint, the verbal restraint, and the purity of livelihood belonging to one beyond training — that is, as the sūtra states, among the factors proper to one beyond training, right action is precisely this bodily restraint; right speech is precisely this verbal restraint; right livelihood is precisely this purity of livelihood. The sūtra states that these three together are called the aggregate of precepts. One asks: apart from bodily and verbal karma, there exists no distinct right livelihood — why, then, does this passage establish three separate categories? The answer: it is established through the mutual contrast of the black and the white dharmas — that is, among the first seven unwholesome courses of action, bodily action arising from hatred and delusion is called wrong action, verbal action arising from hatred and delusion is called wrong speech, and bodily and verbal action arising from greed is called wrong livelihood, since it constitutes a wrongful way of sustaining life; departing from these three is called right action, right speech, and right livelihood. There are those who say: if, for the sake of sustaining one's life, one engages in some entertaining diversion and thereby gives rise to unwholesome bodily and verbal action, this is called wrong livelihood; if, for any other purpose, one gives rise to unwholesome bodily and verbal action, this is called wrong action or wrong speech; departing from these three is called right livelihood and the rest. There are those who say: if, for the sake of sustaining one's life, one engages in medical or incantatory practices and thereby gives rise to unwholesome bodily and verbal action, this is called wrong livelihood; if, for any other purpose, one gives rise to unwholesome bodily and verbal action, this is called wrong action or wrong speech; departing from these three is called right livelihood and the rest. There are those who say: if, through any of the four kinds of craving, one gives rise to unwholesome bodily and verbal action, this is called wrong livelihood; if, through any other matter, one gives rise to unwholesome bodily and verbal action, this is called wrong action or wrong speech; departing from these three is called right livelihood and the rest. There are those who say: if, through flattery, deception, or any of the five such faults, one gives rise to unwholesome bodily and verbal action, this is called wrong livelihood; if, through any other matter, one gives rise to unwholesome bodily and verbal action, this is called wrong action or wrong speech; departing from these three is called right livelihood and the rest. There are those who say: bodily and verbal action that transgresses a proscriptive precept is called wrong livelihood; bodily and verbal action that transgresses an inherently wrong precept is called wrong action or wrong speech; departing from these three is called right livelihood and the rest. There are those who say: unwholesome bodily and verbal action arising subsequent to one's preparatory action is called wrong livelihood; unwholesome bodily and verbal action belonging to the fundamental course of action itself is called wrong action or wrong speech; departing from these three is called right livelihood and the rest. One asks: why is this aggregate called "śīla"? The answer: "śīla" carries the sense of coolness, since it departs from the heat and vexation attendant upon breaking the precepts. Further, "śīla" carries the sense of habitual training, since it stands first among the three trainings, exactly as it is said: through upholding the precepts, one is free of regret, and so on, at length. Uncontaminated bodily and verbal action within the continuum of one beyond training is called the aggregate of the precepts of one beyond training. What is the aggregate of the concentration of one beyond training? The answer: it is the three concentrations of one beyond training — namely, emptiness, wishlessness, and signlessness. One asks: the substance of concentration is but a single thing, namely the mental factor of concentration itself — how, then, is this threefold distinction established? The answer: it is established through their function as the proximate antidote to three kinds of obstruction — that is, the concentration on emptiness serves as the proximate antidote to the view of a real self; the concentration on wishlessness serves as the proximate antidote to attachment to precepts and vows; the concentration on signlessness serves as the proximate antidote to doubt. Further, it is because their aspects differ — that is, the concentration on emptiness comprises two aspects together, namely emptiness and non-self; the concentration on wishlessness comprises ten aspects together, namely impermanence and suffering, together with the four aspects of origin and the four aspects of the path each; the concentration on signlessness comprises four aspects together, namely the four aspects that take cessation as their object. Further, it is on account of three matters: first, on account of the antidote; second, on account of intention; third, on account of the object. On account of the antidote, the concentration on emptiness is established — that is, the aspect of non-self serves as the antidote to the view of self, and the aspect of emptiness serves as the antidote to the view of what belongs to self; exactly as with the view of self and the view of what belongs to self, so too with the already-viewed and the already-viewed-as-belonging-to-self, and the five views of self and the fifteen views of what belongs to self, likewise. Further, the aspect of non-self serves as the antidote to the craving for self, and the aspect of emptiness serves as the antidote to the craving for what belongs to self — exactly as with the craving for self and the craving for what belongs to self, so too with the conceit of self and the conceit of what belongs to self. On account of intention, the concentration on wishlessness is established — that is, the noble ones, on account of their own intention, do not wish for existence, nor for the noble path itself. Why is this so? Because the noble ones, on account of their own intention, do not wish for the suffering of transmigration and of the aggregates belonging to the world, which depend on transmigration and the suffering of the aggregates belonging to the world; nor do they wish for the aspect that takes the path as its object — though it is not that they do not wish for it at all, it is rather on account of intention that the name "wishlessness" is established. One asks: why, then, do the noble ones cultivate the noble path? The answer: it is for the sake of nirvāṇa — that is, apart from the noble path, there exists no other dharma capable of attaining nirvāṇa, and it is for this reason that they cultivate it, not out of any original wish for the path itself. On account of the object, the concentration on signlessness is established — that is, within the truth of cessation there exist no ten characteristics, and it is for this reason that it is called "signless" — the five sense-objects, male, female, and the three characteristics of conditioned existence are what is meant by "the ten characteristics." Further, it is because the truth of cessation possesses no characteristic of inferior, middling, or superior grade, nor any characteristic of the aggregates belonging to the world, that it is called "signless" — this concentration takes the four aspects of cessation as its object, and it is for this reason that it is called "signless." What is the aggregate of the wisdom of one beyond training? The answer: it is the right view and knowledge of one beyond training — this recitation being the preferable one. There exists a variant recitation which states: the eight kinds of knowledge of one beyond training — namely, the four kinds of dharma-knowledge and the four kinds of subsequent knowledge — but this recitation is far too broad, since the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising are likewise subsumed within these. There exists a further, distinct recitation which states: the discernment, most thorough discernment, and so on, at length, up through the insight, associated with the intentional application of one beyond training. There is yet another recitation which states: the knowledge, vision, illumination, awakening, and direct realization of one beyond training — but this, too, is far too broad, since the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising are likewise subsumed within it. What is the aggregate of the liberation of one beyond training? The answer: it is the mind, associated with the intentional application of one beyond training, that has already resolved conviction, now resolves conviction,

or will resolve conviction — that is, the resolved conviction associated with the right view of one beyond training belonging to the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising, which this aggregate subsumes — and not the unconditioned liberation. That is, among all dharmas, two dharmas are called "liberation": first, analytical cessation, which is unconditioned liberation; second, resolved conviction, which is conditioned liberation — the name "liberation" being established through mastery with respect to one's object, and not meaning freedom from bondage. What is the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation of one beyond training? The answer: it is the knowledge of exhaustion

and the knowledge of non-arising. One asks: why are these two kinds of knowledge called the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation? The answer: it is because, among the states belonging to liberation, these alone are found — being most capable of thoroughly and decisively determining the matter of liberation. What distinction is there between the aggregate of the wisdom of one beyond training and the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation? The answer: the knowledge of suffering and of origin belonging to one beyond training is the aggregate of the wisdom of one beyond training, since it takes as its object the dharmas of bondage; the knowledge of cessation and of the path belonging to one beyond training is the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation of one beyond training, since it takes as its object the dharmas of liberation. Further, the knowledge of suffering, origin, and cessation belonging to one beyond training is the aggregate of the wisdom of one beyond training, since this takes as its object the contaminated dharmas and the unconditioned liberation, but does not take as its object the uncontaminated knowledge that takes liberation as its object; the knowledge of the path belonging to one beyond training is the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation of one beyond training, since this takes as its object the uncontaminated, conditioned liberation,

and likewise takes as its object the uncontaminated knowledge that takes liberation as its object. Further, the knowledge of suffering, origin, and the path belonging to one beyond training is the aggregate of the wisdom of one beyond training, since it does not take as its object the dharma of freedom from bondage; the knowledge of cessation belonging to one beyond training is the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation of one beyond training, since it takes as its object the dharma of freedom from bondage. This distinction just stated is a distinction in terms of coarse, conventional characteristics; were one to speak of the distinction in terms of ultimate, true characteristics, it ought to be stated as before — namely, that the right view and knowledge of one beyond training is the aggregate of the wisdom of one beyond training, and that the knowledge of exhaustion and the knowledge of non-arising are the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation of one beyond training. Further, the antidote to wrongful wisdom is the aggregate of the wisdom of one beyond training; the antidote to ignorance is the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation of one beyond training. Further, wisdom that is keen and sharp, seeking out and searching, its exertion never resting, is the aggregate of the wisdom of one beyond training; wisdom that is neither keen nor sharp, neither seeking nor searching, its exertion at rest, is the aggregate of the knowledge-and-vision of liberation of one beyond training. As for the realm of these five aggregates: they are not bound to any of the three realms. As for their stage: the aggregate of precepts exists within six stages — namely, the four dhyānas, together with the not-yet-arrived stage and the dhyāna-interval; the remaining four aggregates exist within nine stages — namely, the aforementioned six stages, together with the three lower formless spheres. One asks: do these five aggregates admit of a distinction of superior, middling, and inferior grade? The answer: within a single continuum, no such distinction exists; across distinct continua, it does exist — that is, the Buddha's own is the superior grade, a pratyekabuddha's is the middling grade, and a śrāvaka's is the inferior grade. Further, one of sharp faculties possesses the superior grade, one of middling faculties the middling grade, and one of dull faculties the inferior grade. Although conditioned virtues are boundless in number, these five are supreme among them, and it is for this reason that they alone are established as "aggregates."

As the Blessed One has stated: "Monks, you should know: there is only a single culmination; there exists no distinct, further culmination," and so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to discriminate the meaning of this sūtra passage. As the sūtra states: there is only a single culmination; there exists no distinct, further culmination — yet, having said this much, it does not discriminate whether this refers to the culmination of diligent effort, or the culmination of accomplishment. That sūtra is the fundamental basis upon which this treatise depends, and whatever it has left unstated ought now to be stated, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. One asks: there are two culminations — how, then, can the sūtra speak of only "one"? The Venerable Pārśva says: with respect to each of these two culminations, taken singly, there exists only one — that is, there exists only a single culmination of diligent effort, with no other, distinct culmination of diligent effort besides it, and there exists only a single culmination of accomplishment, with no other, distinct culmination of accomplishment besides it. Exactly as the Blessed One has stated: there is only a single truth, with no distinct second truth — this, too, means that, with respect to each truth taken singly, there exists only one — that is, there exists only a single truth of suffering, with no distinct second truth of suffering, and so on, up through: there exists only a single truth of the path, with no distinct second truth of the path. The same holds here as well, and it is for this reason that the sūtra speaks of "one." There are those who say: it is in order to refute the heretical paths and false liberations of the outsiders that the sūtra speaks of "one" — that is, the various outsiders falsely maintain all manner of practices, such as going naked, starving oneself, lying in ashes, subsisting on air, turning to follow the sun, or drinking only water, eating only fruit, or excrement, wearing garments of rags, lying upon logs and stones, casting themselves from cliffs, throwing themselves into fire, or imitating the conduct of an ox and the like, taking these to be the true path. The Buddha, in order to refute them, speaks as follows: these are false paths, practiced by the foolish; the true path is but a single one, with no distinct second true path — and this is precisely the culmination of diligent effort. Further, the various outsiders falsely maintain all manner of practices — a bodiless state, a boundless mind, a pure assembly, a worldly stūpa, and the like — taking these to be true liberation. The Buddha, in order to refute them, speaks as follows: these are merely places of rebirth, not true liberation; true liberation is but a single one, namely, the culmination of accomplishment. There are other masters who say: there exists only a single culmination of diligent effort capable of cutting off the cause of birth and death, and only a single culmination of accomplishment capable of relinquishing the suffering of birth and death, and it is for this reason that the sūtra speaks of "one" — not that there fail to exist two kinds. There are others who say: culmination is but a single thing, namely, the culmination of accomplishment; it is for the sake of realizing this that one cultivates the culmination of diligent effort, and it is for this reason that the sūtra speaks of culmination as being but a single thing, with no second. There are yet others who say: the various outsiders, each within his own school, gives rise to the notion of a "culmination"; the Buddha, in order to refute them, speaks as follows: within a poorly taught Dharma there exists no true culmination, since what the foolish practice there is unable to bring about the permanent departure from craving, hatred, and delusion; within a well-taught Dharma there does exist a true culmination, since what the wise practice there is able to bring about the permanent emergence from craving, hatred, and delusion. There are yet others who say: it is not that the Buddha wishes to reveal the true culmination that he speaks the word "only one" — it is rather in order to reveal the outsiders' own fault. That is, the various outsiders contend with one another in dispute: those who give rise to the view of annihilation hold annihilation to be the culmination, and dismiss the view of eternalism as wrong; those who give rise to the view of eternalism hold eternality to be the culmination, and dismiss the view of annihilation as wrong. In order to reveal their fault, the Buddha speaks as follows: if annihilation were the culmination, then the view of eternalism ought not to be wrong; if eternality were the culmination, then the view of annihilation ought not to be wrong —

yet the culmination is but a single thing, with no second, and it is for this reason that neither the position of annihilation nor of eternalism, which they each maintain, is the true culmination. One asks: which dharma, in this context, is called "culmination"? The answer: the Blessed One, at times, applies the word "culmination" to the path, and, at other times, applies the word "culmination" to cutting-off, since both the transcendent cause and the transcendent fruit are alike called "culmination." As for its application to the path, this is as the Blessed One has stated:

"A certain kind, clever yet conceited, is unable to know the culmination — since he does not realize the path, he dies untamed." "A certain kind" refers to an outsider, who, being genuinely foolish, calls himself clever, and, giving rise to conceit, is thus called "clever yet conceited." "Culmination" here refers to the culmination of diligent effort; with respect to this culmination, he does not truly know and see it, and it is for this reason that he is called "unable to know" it. "The path" refers to the noble eightfold path; since he is unable to realize this path, he "dies untamed" — that is, having afflictions when born, he has afflictions still when he dies, never having attained the path of true and genuine taming. As for the sūtra's application of the word "culmination" to cutting-off, this is as the Blessed One has stated:

"One who has already reached the culmination is free of dread, free of doubt and regret, since he has permanently uprooted the arrow of existence, and abides in his very last body. This is the very culmination, supreme, quiescent, and unsurpassed — the undying track, purified, since every characteristic is thereby exhausted." "Culmination" here refers to the culmination of accomplishment. "Already able to reach that culmination" is called "already reached." "Free of dread" refers to one who has thoroughly penetrated the dharma of dependent origination, and has thoroughly cultivated the gate of liberation through emptiness, and therefore no longer fears the evil destinies or the suffering of birth and death. "Free of doubt" refers to one who, unlike the outsiders, does not abide in wrongful conduct and wrongful views, giving rise to all manner of hesitant speech, doubting his own realization. "Free of regret" refers to one who, having already cut off and fully understood attachment to precepts and vows, and having already given rise to the knowledge of the culmination, no longer undergoes any change of heart or regret. "The arrow of existence" refers to two kinds of arrow —

first, the arrow of craving; second, the arrow of views. Through the well-cultivated noble path, one attains their cutting-off and full understanding, casting them aside, vomiting them forth, permanently never to turn back again, and it is for this reason that this is called "permanently uprooted." "His very last body" refers to his final embodiment; having permanently cut off the cause and condition of any further existence, he no longer undergoes any future birth and death, and it is for this reason that he is said to "abide in his very last body." "This is the very culmination" refers to the culmination of accomplishment, which, in comparison to the culmination of diligent effort, transcends it, and it is for this reason that it is called "the very culmination." "Supreme, quiescent" is so called because the three fires are stilled. "Track" is so called because it establishes a place of abiding; that this track is superior is why it is called "unsurpassed." "The undying track, purified" — "track" has already been explained as above; being free of every affliction and secondary affliction, it is called "purified"; abiding permanently, without change, it is called "undying." "Since every characteristic is thereby exhausted" refers to the fact that, within nirvāṇa, every characteristic of affliction, karma, and suffering is quiescent and extinguished. There is a further sūtra passage which relates that there was a certain brahmin named Mahāmaudgalyāyana, who came to where the Buddha was, and asked the Buddha, saying: Gautama the Honored One, when you instruct and admonish your monks, are they all able to realize the utterly culminating nirvāṇa-realm, or not?

The Blessed One told him: this is not fixed — one kind is able to realize it, and one kind is not. This, too, is a case of applying the word "culmination" to cutting-off, since nirvāṇa is itself the culmination of cutting-off. Further, there is diligent effort, there is the culmination of diligent effort, there is accomplishment, and there is the culmination of accomplishment. What is diligent effort? What is the culmination of diligent effort? What is accomplishment? What is the culmination of accomplishment? The answer: an ordinary being's path is diligent effort, but not the culmination of diligent effort; the cutting-off he attains is accomplishment, but not the culmination of accomplishment. A noble one's path is diligent effort and is the culmination of diligent effort; the cutting-off he attains is accomplishment and is the culmination of accomplishment. Further, a contaminated path is diligent effort, but not the culmination of diligent effort; the cutting-off it attains is accomplishment, but not the culmination of accomplishment. An uncontaminated path is diligent effort and is the culmination of diligent effort; the cutting-off it attains is accomplishment and is the culmination of accomplishment. Further, the path leading toward a fruit is diligent effort, but not the culmination of diligent effort; the cutting-off it attains is accomplishment, but not the culmination of accomplishment. The path of the fruit itself is diligent effort and is the culmination of diligent effort; the cutting-off it attains is accomplishment and is the culmination of accomplishment. Further, a learner's path is diligent effort, but not the culmination of diligent effort; the cutting-off it attains is accomplishment, but not the culmination of accomplishment. The path of one beyond training is diligent effort and is the culmination of diligent effort; the cutting-off it attains is accomplishment and is the culmination of accomplishment. As the sūtra states, the Buddha told the monks: there are outsiders who likewise posit the cutting-off and full understanding of the various graspings,

yet they are unable to posit this completely — that is, they posit only the cutting-off and full understanding of the grasping after desire, the grasping after views, the grasping after precepts and vows, and the grasping that clings to a real self. What meaning does this convey? One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to fully discriminate the meaning of this sūtra passage. As the sūtra states: the Buddha told the monks: there are outsiders,

and so on, at length. Although the sūtra states this much, it does not discriminate its meaning fully. That sūtra is the fundamental basis upon which this treatise depends, and whatever it has left unstated ought now to be stated, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. Here, the intent of this question comprises three distinct parts: first, one asks — the outsiders genuinely do not understand the meaning of cutting off the various forms of grasping, so why does the Blessed One say that they, too, posit the cutting off and full understanding of the various graspings? Second, one asks — the outsiders are genuinely unable to speak of cutting off and fully understanding the various forms of grasping, so why does the Blessed One say that they posit the cutting off and full understanding of three graspings? Third, one asks — the outsiders are likewise able, to some small degree, to cut off the grasping that clings to a real self, so why does the sūtra not posit that they cut off this as well, but speak only of their cutting off the three? Of these three, the middle question is answered first: the outsiders are genuinely unable to speak of cutting off and fully understanding the various forms of grasping — so why does the Blessed One say that they posit the cutting off and full understanding of three graspings? There are those who say: this is merely the Blessed One speaking casually, without deliberation. This position ought not to be maintained. Why is this so? The Blessed One's own teaching of the Dharma is never entirely without cause, or is at least founded upon some slight cause — for, were what they claim true, this would constitute a slander against the Blessed One, and ought therefore to be rejected, censured, and opposed. Why is this so? The Blessed One is forever free of meaningless speech; what he states is invariably measured and beneficial; he rains down the rain of the Dharma according to the field and the vessel that receives it; and he speaks the Dharma only when some great cause and condition calls for it — and it is on this account that every word the Blessed One speaks causes sentient beings to obtain great benefit and ease, so that the claim that his words constitute a slander against the Blessed One is itself untenable. There are others who say: this statement reveals that the outsiders cut off but a small portion. This position, too, ought not to be maintained. Why is this so? Even an ordinary being is able to cut off a small portion of the grasping that clings to a real self, so that this claim, too, does not accord with correct principle, and ought therefore to be rejected, censured, and opposed. Why is this so? Just as an ordinary being, at the stage of departing from the desire realm's own defilement, entirely cuts off the grasping after desire, and, from the stage of departing from the defilement of the desire realm all the way up through the stage of departing from the defilement of the sphere of nothing-whatsoever, is able to cut off a small portion of the grasping after views and the grasping after precepts and vows, so too, from departing from the defilement of the first dhyāna all the way up through the stage of departing from the defilement of the sphere of nothing-whatsoever, is he able to cut off a small portion of the grasping that clings to a real self as well. If cutting off even a small portion were sufficient grounds for positing it, then one ought also to posit the cutting off of the grasping that clings to a real self — and it is for this reason that this claim, too, does not accord with correct principle. And yet the Blessed One, expounding the essentials of the Dharma broadly for the countless great assemblies of gods and humans, reveals it without any distortion, causing each according to his own kind to understand. There were certain outsiders who overheard the Buddha speaking of such terms as the aggregates, the elements, the sense-fields, the hindrances, the establishments of mindfulness, and so on, up through the limbs of enlightenment, some of them hearing the terms in full, others only partially. If any of these outsiders happened to hear the term "grasping after desire,"

they would then declare: I, too, posit the cutting off and full understanding of the grasping after desire. If they happened to hear the term "grasping after views," they would declare: I, too, posit the cutting off and full understanding of the grasping after views. If they happened to hear the term "grasping after precepts and vows," they would declare: I, too, posit the cutting off and full understanding of the grasping after precepts and vows. This is the author of the treatise's own answer, given with reference to the ultimate meaning, and it neither conflicts with reason nor slanders the Buddha. That is, before the Blessed One appeared in the world, the various outsiders enjoyed great renown and gain.

Once the Buddha appeared in the world, he eclipsed all the outsiders, exactly as, once the sun rises, the glow of the firefly disappears — their renown, gain, and following gradually diminished. They therefore gathered together in one place and jointly deliberated, saying: before Gautama appeared in the world, every renown and gain in the world belonged to us; now that he has appeared, all of it has suddenly reverted to that man — yet Gautama possesses no genuine virtue superior to our own, being merely skilled in scripture and treatise, and dignified in bodily form, matters we ourselves cannot match. Though his dignified form is difficult to seize from him, his scripture and treatise may easily be stolen — should we manage to do so, we might yet recover our renown and gain. They further deliberated, saying: Susīma and the rest are clever and possess a retentive memory — were we to send them to Gautama's own presence, seeking to become his disciples,

he would surely expound his scripture and treatise broadly for them, and, having heard it, they might return and teach it to us. Having so deliberated, they together went to where Susīma was, consoled and encouraged him, and urged him on. He accordingly accepted their charge, and went to where the Buddha was, seeking, through skillful means, to steal the Dharma. The Buddha, through the ten powers and the four kinds of fearlessness, expounded the essentials of the Dharma broadly amid the great assembly. At that time, this outsider paced back and forth nearby, and, since his mind was fearful and hollow, being there for the purpose of stealing the Dharma, he was unable to fully receive what was expounded in its entirety, or, even if he was able to receive it fully, he failed to understand its meaning. Yet what the Blessed One expounds as the essentials of the Dharma is, at times, complete, and, at times, incomplete, though with respect to the matter it is intended to accomplish, it is never anything but complete. As the sūtra states: if sentient beings are able, with respect to their own inner body, to abide in the contemplation that follows the body, this is like a speck of dirt upon a fingernail; if sentient beings are unable to abide, with respect to their own inner body, in the contemplation that follows the body, this is like the dirt of the great earth itself. What this sūtra states, with respect to the matter it is intended to accomplish, is indeed called complete, yet, with respect to what it explicitly names, it is not complete. As the sūtra states: the four establishments of mindfulness — what this sūtra states is complete in both respects. As the sūtra states: the six elements, the five hindrances, the seven limbs of enlightenment, and the like — with respect to the matter they are intended to accomplish, these, too, are called complete, yet, with respect to what is explicitly named, they are not complete. As the sūtra states: the eighteen elements, the ten hindrances, the fourteen limbs of enlightenment, and the like — what these state is complete in both respects. Thus does the Buddha's own teaching sometimes prove complete, and sometimes incomplete, and yet those outsiders were unable to receive it fully, or, even having received it fully, failed to understand its meaning — and, following only whatever portion they happened to grasp, they thereupon falsely posited their own teachings. In order to establish this same meaning further, the treatise cites yet another sūtra passage:

it is related that, when a great many monks were gathered together in one place, certain outsiders came and said to them: just as Gautama expounds the essentials of the Dharma for his own disciples, saying, "you monks ought to cut off the five hindrances, since these five hindrances defile the mind, weakening the power of wisdom and harming the limbs of enlightenment, obstructing nirvāṇa; with respect to the four establishments of mindfulness you ought to abide with a well-settled mind, and with respect to the seven limbs of enlightenment you ought to diligently cultivate" — we, too, are able to expound this same essential teaching for our own disciples; what distinction is there, then, between what Gautama expounds and what we ourselves expound, that you monks alone should turn to him? Yet those outsiders were not even able to recognize the names and characteristics of the five hindrances — how much less could they penetrate the abiding in the four establishments of mindfulness or the cultivation of the seven limbs of enlightenment? They had merely overheard the Buddha's own words, and it was for this reason that they spoke as they did. What this passage says about positing the cutting off of graspings should be understood in just the same way — that is, those outsiders, born together with the hindrances and dying together with the hindrances, were not even able to recognize the hindrances themselves — how much less could they know the very antidotes that establish mindfulness and the limbs of enlightenment? In order to reveal this same principle further, the treatise cites a further, separate piece of evidence: there was also an outsider, Māgandika, who, without understanding that his own body was itself a heap of every kind of illness, and, not remaining still even for a single moment, was suffering, empty, and without self, who came to where the Buddha was, and, patting his own belly, declared: my body now being free of every illness, one should know that this is itself the utterly culminating nirvāṇa. He did not even know the name and characteristic of "freedom from illness" — how much less could he penetrate the utterly culminating nirvāṇa? Yet, having overheard the Buddha's own words, he spoke as he did, since those outsiders take having a body free of pain to be freedom from illness, and take having obtained fine food and drink to be nirvāṇa. They did not even know that the harmonious balance of the four great elements is called freedom from illness — how much less could they penetrate that the harmonious settling of the mind is called nirvāṇa? Further, they did not even know that the uncontaminated noble path is called freedom from illness — how much less could they penetrate that the utterly culminating fruit of the path is called nirvāṇa? They merely overheard the Buddha's own words and falsely spoke as they did.

"They posit the cutting off of graspings" — one should know this in just the same way. Having answered the middle question, the treatise next answers the latter question: for what reason do the outsiders posit only the cutting off and full understanding of three graspings, and not the grasping that clings to a real self? This question means: the outsiders are likewise able, to some small degree, to cut off the grasping that clings to a real self — why, then, do they not posit this as well? The answer: throughout the long night of their existence, they have held fast to the view that there truly exists a self, a sentient being, a life, one who is born, one who is able to be nurtured, a person — since they already hold that there truly exists a self and the rest, how could they possibly be willing to posit the cutting off of the grasping that clings to a real self? That is, the various outsiders take the notion of self as their own fundamental doctrine — were they to posit the cutting off of the grasping that clings to a real self, they would thereby be relinquishing their own fundamental doctrine and taking refuge in another's view, and it is for this reason that they do not posit the cutting off of the grasping that clings to a real self. Further, the various outsiders, holding that there truly exists a self, dread the absence of self exactly as one dreads standing at the edge of a deep pit, and it is for this reason that they do not posit the cutting off of the grasping that clings to a real self. Further, the various outsiders think as follows: it is because there is a self that one lives; were there no self, then, having no one to be one's life, one would thereby cease to live — and it is for this reason that they do not posit the cutting off of the grasping that clings to a real self. Further, the various outsiders think as follows: were I to posit the cutting off of the grasping that clings to a real self, then even my own fellow practitioners of the pure conduct would hold me in contempt and abandon me, departing from me — how much more would others hold me in dread and contempt! And it is for this reason that they do not posit the cutting off of the grasping that clings to a real self. Having thus answered the latter question, the treatise next answers the first question, concerning the meaning of the claim that the outsiders, too, posit the cutting off and full understanding of the various graspings. This question means: the outsiders genuinely do not understand the meaning of cutting off the various forms of grasping — so why does the Blessed One say that they, too, posit the cutting off and full understanding of the various graspings? The answer: it is the Blessed One's own way of speaking, following the outsiders' own words — that is, those outsiders themselves declare that they understand it, and the Blessed One merely relates what they themselves say, not what he himself intends. In order to establish this same meaning, the treatise cites a further sūtra passage: as the Blessed One has stated, those various outsiders posit that a sentient being truly exists and is subject to cutting-off and destruction — yet, according to the ultimate meaning, there exists no real sentient being at all; the Blessed One merely follows their own words in speaking as he does. The same holds true here as well, and it is for this reason that no fault attaches to it — it is not that, in merely relating another's own words, the Blessed One thereby becomes identical to that other's position.