The Ignorance That Arises Alone

As the sūtra states, there are five hindrances — do the five hindrances subsume every hindrance, or does every hindrance subsume the five hindrances? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution. As the sūtra states, there are five hindrances: first, the hindrance of desire and greed; second, the hindrance of hatred; third, the hindrance of torpor and drowsiness; fourth, the hindrance of restlessness and worry; fifth, the hindrance of doubt. There are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that there exist only these five hindrances, and that ignorance is not itself a hindrance; this treatise now wishes to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that, beyond these five hindrances, there exists a further, distinct sixth — namely, the hindrance of ignorance — and it is on account of this cause and condition that this treatise is composed. Do the five hindrances subsume every hindrance, or does every hindrance subsume the five hindrances? Taken together, every hindrance subsumes the five hindrances;

it is not the case that the five hindrances subsume every hindrance. What, then, do they fail to subsume? It is the hindrance of ignorance — since hindrances, taken as a whole, are numerous, they are able to subsume the five hindrances, while the five hindrances, being fewer, are unable to subsume every hindrance, exactly as a large vessel is able to cover a small one, while a small vessel is unable to cover a large one. The latent tendency of ignorance, though itself indeed a hindrance, is, on account of its own weightiness, not included among the five hindrances; the Blessed One separately established it as a sixth hindrance, since the former five hindrances are all of roughly equal force, while ignorance is disproportionately weighty, and it is for this reason that it is spoken of separately. In order to establish this same meaning, the treatise further cites a sūtra passage, as the Blessed One has stated:

"Covered by the hindrance of ignorance, bound by the fetter of craving, both the foolish and the wise alike acquire just such a body endowed with consciousness." One asks: ignorance is both a hindrance and a fetter, and craving is both a fetter and a hindrance — why, then, does this passage speak of ignorance only as a hindrance, and of craving only as a fetter? The answer: ignorance, too, ought properly to be spoken of as a fetter, and craving, too, ought properly to be spoken of as a hindrance, and that this is not so stated should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, it is in order to display a variety of wordings and a variety of expressions — for, when expressed through a variety of wordings and expressions, the meaning is thereby more easily understood and more easily retained, whereas otherwise it becomes needlessly cumbersome. Further, it is in order to display two approaches, and so on, at length — just as ignorance is spoken of as a hindrance, so too, one might expect, ought craving to be; and just as craving is spoken of as a fetter, so too, one might expect, ought ignorance to be — yet it is precisely in order to display these two distinct approaches that ignorance is spoken of only as a hindrance, and craving only as a fetter. Further, the sense of "hindrance" predominates in ignorance, and the sense of "fetter" is but slight, and it is for this reason that it is called only a hindrance; the sense of "fetter" predominates in craving, and the sense of "hindrance" is but slight, and it is for this reason that it is called only a fetter. Further, the sense of "hindrance" is weighty in ignorance, and the sense of "fetter" is light, and it is for this reason that it is called only a hindrance; the sense of "fetter" is weighty in craving, and the sense of "hindrance" is light, and it is for this reason that it is called only a fetter. Further, the sense of "covering" is the meaning of "hindrance" — among all the afflictions, there exists no second affliction, apart from ignorance, capable of covering over a sentient being's own eye of wisdom, and it is for this reason that it is called a hindrance. The sense of "binding" is the meaning of "fetter" — among all the afflictions, there exists no second affliction, apart from craving, capable of binding a sentient being fast within birth and death for so long a time, and it is for this reason that it is called a fetter. Sentient beings, blinded by the hindrance of ignorance and bound by the fetter of craving, are thereby unable to relinquish birth and death and proceed toward nirvāṇa — exactly as a certain man, beset by two hateful bandits, one of whom bound his hands and feet while the other threw dirt into his eyes, was thereby, being bound and unable to see, unable to flee to any place of safety — so too is it with sentient beings, who, covered by ignorance and fettered by craving, are unable to relinquish birth and death and proceed toward nirvāṇa. Here, one ought to relate the simile of the two hateful bandits — it is told that, in ancient times, there were two bandits, one named Ili and the other named Śeśa, who forever traveled and dwelt together; whenever they encountered a wealthy man, one would bind his hands and feet while the other threw dirt into his eyes, and, having taken his wealth, they would depart, leaving the man bound and blind, so that he would, on the very spot, suffer and perish. Sentient beings, too, are just the same — covered and bound by ignorance and craving, they sink and drown within birth and death. It is on this basis that the Venerable Ghoṣa has stated: sentient beings, blinded by ignorance and bound by craving, dwell for a long time within birth and death, and thereby increase every evil dharma — and it is for this reason that ignorance is spoken of, in particular, as a hindrance, and craving, in particular, as a fetter, this designation being well established in principle. Yet the hindrance of ignorance is so disproportionately weighty in its own force and function, surpassing the former five, that the Buddha did not include it among the five hindrances, since the force of the five hindrances is roughly equal among themselves. Does every hindrance cover, and so on, at length? One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: the foregoing, following the approach of the sūtra, established only that, beyond the five hindrances, there exists a further, distinct sixth, ignorance, as a hindrance; this treatise now wishes, following the approach of the Abhidharma, to state that every affliction whatsoever is without exception a hindrance, since the sense of covering and obstructing is the very meaning of "hindrance," and every affliction is capable of covering and obstructing the noble path, and the wholesome roots that prepare for the noble path, and it is for this reason that all are called hindrances — and it is on account of this cause and condition that this treatise is further composed. Does every hindrance cover? The answer: this ought to be set out in four alternatives. Here, "hindrance" is spoken of with reference to inherent nature and characteristic — desire and greed, and the rest of the five, whether past, future, or present, are all, without exception, established within these five and possess the nature and characteristic of a hindrance, and are therefore all called hindrances. "Covering," here, is spoken of with reference to actual function — every affliction, while present, possesses the function of covering, and is therefore called "covering"; a past or future affliction possesses no function of covering, and is therefore not called "covering." On account of this mutual relation of broader and narrower scope between the two, four alternatives are formed. There is that which is a hindrance but does not cover — namely, the five hindrances, past or future; these possess the nature and characteristic of a hindrance, and are therefore called hindrances, yet possess no function of covering, and are therefore not called "covering," since a past hindrance's function has already ceased, and a future hindrance's function has not yet come to be. One asks: a past hindrance covers a past continuum, a future hindrance covers a future continuum, and a present hindrance covers a present continuum — why, then, does this passage state that a past or future hindrance is a hindrance yet does not cover? The answer: if one speaks with reference to a dharma's own inherent nature, then covering extends across all three time-periods,

since a dharma's own inherent nature extends across all three time-periods. If one speaks with reference to the person, then covering belongs solely to the present, since a person exists only in the present — that is, a person is established only with reference to present aggregates, elements, and sense-fields, not with reference to the past or the future, since these latter belong to the category of dharmas, not to that of a sentient being; and it is, in this passage, with reference to that very person alone that the sense of "covering" is established, and it is for this reason that covering belongs solely to the present. Further, it has already been stated above that "covering" is established with reference to function, and this ought not to be pressed as an objection. There is that which covers but is not a hindrance — namely, every affliction, apart from the five hindrances, presently manifest before one. What does this mean? It refers to every affliction of the form and formless realms, and, within the desire realm, the view of the perishable aggregation of self, conceit, ignorance, and every entanglement not subsumed within the five hindrances, when presently manifest before one — this is called covering but not a hindrance. One asks: why does this passage speak only of present affliction as "covering," and not of any other? The answer: in speaking of the present, the past and future should be understood to be thereby spoken of as well, since their nature and characteristic are the same; yet, since the function of covering is manifest specifically in the present time, this passage speaks of it in particular. Further, present affliction, within its own continuum, covers and obstructs the noble path and the wholesome roots that prepare for the noble path; the past and future do not, and it is for this reason that the present is spoken of. Further, present affliction, within its own continuum, gives rise to karma; the past and future do not, and it is for this reason that the present is spoken of. Further, present affliction, within its own continuum, takes hold of its fruit and confers its fruit; the past and future do not, and it is for this reason that the present is spoken of. Further, present affliction, within its own continuum, is able to serve as the homogeneous cause, the all-pervading cause, and the cause of ripening, taking hold of the outflow-fruit and the ripened fruit; the past and future do not, and it is for this reason that the present is spoken of. Further, present affliction, within its own continuum, is able to defile, is presently blameworthy, submerges one within the mire, and casts one down into what is contrary to reason; the past and future do not, and it is for this reason that the present is spoken of. Further, present affliction, within its own continuum, causes affliction and causes harm; the past and future do not, and it is for this reason that the present is spoken of. Further, present affliction, within its own continuum, produces delusion with respect to its own nature and delusion with respect to its object; the past and future do not, and it is for this reason that the present is spoken of. Further, present affliction, within its own continuum, produces delusion with respect to the three time-periods and with respect to what is beyond time; the past and future do not, and it is for this reason that the present is spoken of. Further, present affliction obstructs its own support, its own object, and its own aspect, within its own continuum, preventing liberation; the past and future do not, and it is for this reason that the present is spoken of. It is on account of such manifold causes and conditions as these that only present affliction is called "covering." There is that which is both a hindrance and covers — namely, any one of the five hindrances presently manifest before one — that is, when the hindrance of desire and greed is presently manifest before one, then, in the waking state, three hindrances are presently manifest — namely, desire and greed, torpor, and restlessness; in the sleeping state, four hindrances are presently manifest — namely, the former three, together with drowsiness. And just as with the hindrance of desire and greed, so too with the hindrances of hatred, worry, and doubt. If the hindrance of torpor is presently manifest before one, then, in the waking state, two hindrances are necessarily presently manifest — namely, torpor and restlessness; in the sleeping state, three hindrances are necessarily presently manifest — namely, the former two, together with drowsiness. And just as with the hindrance of torpor, so too with the hindrance of restlessness. If the hindrance of drowsiness is presently manifest before one, then three hindrances are necessarily presently manifest — namely, drowsiness, torpor, and restlessness. Thus, when any of the five hindrances is presently manifest before one, it is called both a hindrance, on account of its possessing the nature and characteristic of a hindrance, and covering, on account of its possessing the function of covering. There is that which is neither a hindrance nor covers — namely, whatever remains apart from the foregoing.

Here, the naming in this passage is expressed through the language of "characteristic." Whatever dharma has already been named and already been spoken of is included in the first three alternatives; whatever has not yet been named and not yet been spoken of forms the fourth alternative, and it is for this reason that the passage speaks of "whatever remains apart from the foregoing." What does this mean? Within the aggregate of formations, these four alternatives are formed as follows: past or future hindrances form the first alternative; every remaining present affliction apart from the five hindrances forms the second alternative; the present five hindrances form the third alternative; and every remaining associated and dissociated formation, together with the four aggregates in their entirety, and the three unconditioned dharmas, form the fourth alternative. Is every latent tendency of ignorance bound to the desire realm thereby unwholesome? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: the foregoing has already revealed that ignorance, too, possesses the nature of a hindrance,

yet has not yet revealed whether it is unwholesome — this treatise now wishes to reveal this. Further, it is composed in order to refute other schools and to reveal the correct meaning — that is, there are those who hold that every affliction whatsoever is unwholesome, as the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain, who say as follows: since every affliction is not held together by any skillful, expedient wisdom, all are unwholesome; this treatise, in order to refute that position, reveals that some afflictions are unwholesome, while others are indeterminate. One asks: if every affliction, being not held together by skillful, expedient wisdom, ought therefore to be unwholesome, then how can it also be said that some are indeterminate? The answer: it is because they draw forth an undesired fruit that they are called unwholesome, not because they are not held together by skillful means — were it otherwise, then the non-obstructive indeterminate, too, ought to be unwholesome, since that nature, too, is not held together by skillful means in the same way. Further, there are those who hold that every affliction of the desire realm is unwholesome, while every affliction of the form and formless realms is indeterminate; this treatise, in order to refute that position, reveals that the view of the perishable aggregation of self, and the extreme views, together with their associated ignorance, belonging to the desire realm, are likewise indeterminate — and it is on account of these causes and conditions that this treatise is composed. Is every latent tendency of ignorance bound to the desire realm thereby unwholesome? The answer: every unwholesome latent tendency of ignorance is indeed bound to the desire realm; yet there exists a latent tendency of ignorance bound to the desire realm that is not unwholesome — namely, the ignorance associated with the view of the perishable aggregation of self and the extreme views, bound to the desire realm.

One asks: why are the desire realm's own view of the perishable aggregation of self, the extreme views, and the dharmas associated with and accompanying them, not unwholesome? The answer: if a dharma's own substance is shamelessness or lack of moral dread, or is associated with them, or accompanies them, or arises from them, it is unwholesome; the view of the perishable aggregation of self and the like stand in opposition to these, and are therefore not unwholesome — the remainder is broadly explained as in the later Chapter on the Unwholesome, within the Fetters Nyāsa. Is every latent tendency of ignorance bound to the form and formless realms thereby indeterminate? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: the foregoing has already revealed that ignorance may be either unwholesome or indeterminate, without yet revealing that it may also be indeterminate in the higher two realms — this treatise now wishes to reveal this, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. Is every latent tendency of ignorance bound to the form and formless realms thereby indeterminate? The answer: every latent tendency of ignorance bound to the form and formless realms is indeed indeterminate; yet there exists an indeterminate latent tendency of ignorance that is not bound to the form and formless realms — namely, the ignorance associated with the view of the perishable aggregation of self and the extreme views, bound to the desire realm. One asks: why are the afflictions and associated and accompanying dharmas bound to the higher two realms not unwholesome? The answer: if a dharma's own substance is shamelessness or lack of moral dread, or is associated with them, or accompanies them, or arises from them, it is unwholesome; the afflictions and the like bound to the higher two realms stand in opposition to these, and are therefore not unwholesome — the remainder is broadly explained as in the later Chapter on the Unwholesome, within the Fetters Nyāsa. Is every latent tendency of ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering and origin thereby all-pervading? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: the foregoing has already stated that ignorance may be unwholesome or indeterminate, without yet stating whether it is all-pervading or not all-pervading — this treatise now wishes to state this. Is every latent tendency of ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering and origin thereby all-pervading? The answer: every all-pervading latent tendency of ignorance is indeed abandoned by seeing suffering and origin; yet there exists a latent tendency of ignorance abandoned by seeing suffering and origin that is not all-pervading — namely, the ignorance associated with the non-all-pervading latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering and origin, that is, the ignorance associated with the latent tendencies of craving, hatred, and conceit abandoned by seeing suffering and origin. Is every latent tendency of ignorance abandoned by seeing cessation and the path thereby not all-pervading? The answer: every latent tendency of ignorance abandoned by seeing cessation and the path is indeed not all-pervading; yet there exists a non-all-pervading latent tendency of ignorance that is not abandoned by seeing cessation and the path — namely, the ignorance associated with the non-all-pervading latent tendencies abandoned by seeing suffering and origin, that is, the ignorance associated with the latent tendencies of craving, hatred, and conceit abandoned by seeing suffering and origin. The meaning of "all-pervading" and "not all-pervading" within this passage is broadly explained elsewhere, and is therefore not further displayed here.

What is the unique, non-shared latent tendency of ignorance? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: the foregoing has already stated that ignorance is likewise of the nature of a hindrance, is unwholesome or indeterminate, and is all-pervading or not all-pervading, without yet stating whether it is unique or not unique — this treatise now wishes to state this. Further, the foregoing has already spoken of the ignorance associated with affliction, without yet speaking of the ignorance not associated with affliction — this treatise now wishes to speak of this, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. What is the unique, non-shared latent tendency of ignorance? The answer: it refers to whatever ignorance fails to comprehend suffering, fails to comprehend origin, cessation, and the path. Here, "fails to comprehend" reveals the sense of being unwilling and unable to accept — that is, on account of the confusion and covering ignorance casts upon the mind, one is unwilling and unable to accept the four noble truths, and it is for this reason that this is called "failing to comprehend," not merely a lack of clarity — exactly as a poverty-stricken person, poor food already filling his belly, though he encounter fine food, has no wish to eat it; an ordinary being is just the same.

Ignorance covers the mind, so that, hearing the four noble truths, one is unwilling and unable to accept them. One asks: if so, then why is this not called wrong view? The answer: what operates without any aspect at all is called wrong view; this ignorance is merely unwilling, not without any aspect whatsoever, and it is therefore not wrong view. Further, it is slander and disparagement of what is actually real that is called wrong view; this ignorance is merely unable to accept, and it is therefore not wrong view. One asks: does the word "failing to comprehend," spoken of in this passage, reveal its own inherent nature, or does it reveal its aspect, or does it reveal its object? There are those who say: this reveals ignorance's own inherent nature. One asks: if so, then what is this ignorance's own aspect? The answer: absence of knowledge, dark obscurity, and delusion — these are this ignorance's own aspect. One asks: what is this ignorance's own object? The answer: precisely the four noble truths. There are other masters who say: this reveals ignorance's own aspect — that is, this ignorance operates only through the aspect of failing to comprehend the four noble truths. One asks: if so, then how is what the Prakaraṇapāda states to be reconciled? As it is stated: what is meant by "the unique, non-shared latent tendency of ignorance, which underlies and increases"? It refers to absence of knowledge, dark obscurity, and delusion. The answer: one should know that that treatise's own statement is one of surplus meaning left implicit, since it does not fully state ignorance's own aspect — that is, there further exists the aspect of failing to comprehend besides. There are those who say: "failing to comprehend" is itself precisely absence of knowledge, dark obscurity, and delusion, and there is no conflict whatsoever between the two statements. One asks: what, then, is this ignorance's own inherent nature?

The answer: its own substance, its own particular characteristic, is precisely its own inherent nature — exactly as it is said, the inherent nature of dharmas is precisely their own particular characteristic, and their belonging to the same class is their shared characteristic. One asks: what is this ignorance's own object? The answer: precisely the four noble truths. There are yet others who say: this reveals ignorance's own object — that is, with respect to failing to comprehend suffering, it is said to take the truth of suffering as its object, and, with respect to failing to comprehend origin, cessation, and the path, it is said to take the truths of origin, cessation, and the path as its object; its own inherent nature and aspect are as explained above. The verdict: it ought to be said that this ignorance, with respect to the four noble truths, is uniformly dull and blunt, uniformly dark and obscure, uniformly unclear, and uniformly undiscriminating — this constitutes its own inherent nature. Its own nature having now been explained, the reason for this shall now be stated. One asks: why is this ignorance called "unique, non-shared"? What is the meaning of "unique, non-shared"? The answer: this ignorance arises through its own power alone, not associated with any other latent tendency, and it is for this reason that it is called "unique, non-shared" — unlike the ignorance associated with craving and the rest, which arises through another's power. There are those who say: this ignorance does not arise intermixed with any other latent tendency, and it is for this reason that it is called "unique, non-shared." There are other masters who say: this ignorance does not share the same intention as any other latent tendency, and it is for this reason that it is called "unique, non-shared." There are others who say: this ignorance's own function differs from that of every other latent tendency, and it is for this reason that it is called "unique, non-shared." There are yet others who say: this ignorance, confused with respect to the four noble truths, arises without being associated with any other latent tendency, and it is for this reason that it is called "unique, non-shared."

There are yet others who say: this ignorance is not associated with any latent tendency, and arises solely within an ordinary being, and it is for this reason that it is called "unique, non-shared." There are yet others who further say: this ignorance is foremost among every affliction that arises, and it is for this reason that it is called "unique, non-shared." One asks: is this unique, non-shared ignorance abandoned by seeing alone, or does it extend across all five sections? Suppose either is granted — what fault would follow? If it is abandoned by seeing alone, then how is what the Vijñānakāya states to be reconciled? As it is stated: that mind, abandoned by cultivation, is associated with unique, non-shared ignorance. And if it extends across all five sections, then why does this treatise's own passage not state this, speaking only of failing to comprehend suffering, and failing to comprehend origin, cessation, and the path? The answer: it ought to be said that this ignorance is abandoned by seeing alone. One asks: if so, then how is what the Vijñānakāya states to be reconciled? The answer: that passage ought properly to state that that mind, abandoned by cultivation, is associated with ignorance not associated with any latent tendency, and ought not to state that it is associated with unique, non-shared ignorance. One asks: what distinction is there between speaking of "a mind associated with unique, non-shared ignorance" and speaking of "a mind associated with ignorance not associated with any latent tendency"? The answer: ignorance abandoned by cultivation may indeed sometimes be not associated with any latent tendency, yet is not thereby called "unique, non-shared." Why is this so? It arises through another's power — that is, ignorance that arises through its own power alone, not associated with any other latent tendency, is called "unique, non-shared"; ignorance abandoned by cultivation, though it may sometimes arise without being associated with any latent tendency, does not arise through its own power, but rather through the power of anger, resentment, and the like, and is therefore not called "unique, non-shared." There are those who say: unique, non-shared ignorance exists across all five sections. One asks: if so, then why does this treatise's own passage not state this? The answer: this passage speaks only of the unique, non-shared ignorance abandoned by the path of seeing, since this ignorance is confused with respect to the four noble truths and does not arise in association with any latent tendency; that abandoned by cultivation, though not arising in association with any latent tendency, is not confused with respect to the truths, and it is for this reason that it is not spoken of here. Further, this passage speaks only of the unique, non-shared ignorance that arises solely within an ordinary being; that abandoned by cultivation may arise even within a noble one, and it is for this reason that it is not spoken of here. Further, this passage speaks only of the unique, non-shared ignorance that broadly takes as its object both the contaminated and the uncontaminated, both the conditioned and the unconditioned; that abandoned by cultivation takes only the contaminated and the conditioned as its object, and it is for this reason that it is not spoken of here. Further, this passage speaks only of the unique, non-shared ignorance that arises through its own power; that abandoned by cultivation arises through another's power, and it is for this reason that it is not spoken of here. One asks: within which minds does this ignorance abandoned by cultivation, not associated with any latent tendency, occur? The answer: if belonging to the desire realm, it may be found within a mind accompanied by the ten minor grounds of affliction and the like; if belonging to the first dhyāna, it may be found within a mind accompanied by flattery, deception, and arrogance; if belonging to the second dhyāna or above, it may be found only within a mind associated with arrogance. One asks: at what stage does this unique, non-shared ignorance spoken of here manifest before one? The answer: it is when ordinary beings, through the power of resolute conviction, give rise to correct view, or give rise to wrong view,

or, when their minds grow weary and fatigued, that this repeatedly and intermittently arises — this unique, non-shared ignorance confused with respect to the four noble truths, taking the four truths as its object, unwilling and unable to accept, and operating without discernment as its aspect. One asks: every mind possesses wisdom — why, then, does this passage say that unique, non-shared ignorance fails to comprehend the truths? The answer: it is because wisdom is covered and obscured by ignorance that it is unclear and impure, and is thereby likewise unable to comprehend the four noble truths. Further, this passage speaks only of unique, non-shared ignorance's own failure to comprehend the truths, and does not speak of wisdom, and this ought not to be pressed as an objection. One asks: is there any latent tendency that is not associated with any latent tendency? The answer: there is —

namely, the aforementioned unique, non-shared ignorance, and the latent tendency of ignorance arising together with anger and the like abandoned by cultivation. One asks: is there any latent tendency that is not called "possessing latent tendencies"? The answer: there is — namely, the aforementioned unique, non-shared ignorance, and the latent tendency of ignorance arising together with anger and the like abandoned by cultivation, taking as their object a latent tendency already permanently cut off. One asks: is there any latent tendency that does not underlie and increase with respect to the latent tendencies? The answer: there is — namely, the aforementioned unique, non-shared ignorance, taking the uncontaminated as its object. One asks: is there any latent tendency that is not underlain and increased by the latent tendencies? The answer: there is — namely, whatever latent tendency has already attained freedom from bondage. One asks: just as there exists a latent tendency that does not arise in association with any latent tendency, is there likewise a latent tendency that does not arise in association with any entanglement? The answer: there is not, since every latent tendency alike arises together with torpor and restlessness. One asks: just as there exists a latent tendency that does not arise in association with any latent tendency, is there likewise an entanglement that does not arise in association with any entanglement? The answer: there is not, since every defiled mind alike arises together with torpor and restlessness. One asks: just as there exists a latent tendency that does not arise in association with any latent tendency, is there likewise an entanglement that does not arise in association with any latent tendency?

The answer: there is not, since every entanglement necessarily arises in association with the latent tendency of ignorance.

What is the unique, non-shared entanglement of restlessness? The answer: there exists no unique, non-shared entanglement of restlessness. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, ignorance and restlessness alike pervade the three realms and the five sections, and the six consciousnesses, and both, whether unwholesome or indeterminate, pervasively accompany every defiled mind; there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that, just as ignorance possesses a unique, non-shared form, so too might restlessness — this treatise now wishes to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that no entanglement of restlessness is ever unique, non-shared, since the entanglement of restlessness necessarily arises together with the latent tendency of ignorance, and is also associated with the entanglement of torpor, and is therefore not called "unique." One asks: torpor and restlessness alike accompany every defiled mind — why, then, does this passage speak only of restlessness, and not of torpor? The answer: this is simply because the author of the treatise intended it so, and so on, at length. Further, torpor, too, ought properly to be spoken of, and that it is not so spoken of should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, since torpor and restlessness are forever mutually associated, speaking of one is to have already spoken of the other as well. Further, it is because the entanglement of restlessness accords with heedlessness, carries many faults, and is firm and forceful, while torpor is not so, that this passage speaks of it in particular. It is on this basis that the sūtra, among the gateway of the five fetters pertaining to the higher portion, establishes only restlessness; the Prakaraṇapāda states only that restlessness is among the ten mental factors of the great grounds of affliction; and the Prajñaptiśāstra states only that restlessness is among the five dharmas, exactly as it is stated: when an ordinary being's latent tendency of desire-realm craving arises, five dharmas necessarily arise together with it — first, the latent tendency of desire-realm craving; second, the growth and arising of the latent tendency of desire-realm craving; third, the latent tendency of ignorance; fourth, the growth and arising of the latent tendency of ignorance; fifth, restlessness. In passages such as these, it is always restlessness, on account of its many faults, that is spoken of in particular, not torpor — and the same holds true here as well. Further, it is because the entanglement of restlessness operates frequently and forcefully, disturbing and disordering the four or five limbs of dhyāna, that this passage speaks of it in particular; torpor is dull and blunt, according with concentration, resembling absorption in its operation — when torpor manifests before one, one swiftly enters concentration, its fault being light, and it is for this reason that this passage does not speak of it. Further, it is because the entanglement of restlessness ruins the wholesome category, preventing one from concentrating one's attention upon the object of meditation, that this passage speaks of it in particular; torpor is not so. Further, it is because the entanglement of restlessness disturbs and disorders the mental cluster, so that one has no wish to diligently cultivate the wholesome dharmas, and, even should one wish to cultivate them diligently, one swiftly reverts to indolence and abandonment, that this passage speaks of it in particular; torpor is not so. Further, it is because torpor resembles ignorance in its operation, and ignorance's own latent tendency has already been fully explained above, that this is not spoken of here. Further, it is because the entanglement of restlessness is forceful, firm, and carries many faults, that there are those who suppose it, like the latent tendencies, to likewise possess a unique, non-shared form — and it is for this reason that this passage speaks of it in particular, revealing that no such unique form exists.

Vibhāṣā, Miscellaneous Aggregates, Chapter One, the First Part of the Characteristics Nyāsa: "Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a material dharma to be called material, or non-material?" — such is the chapter, and the meaning of the chapter is thus explained. Having already grasped its sense, one ought now to set it forth fully. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to fully discriminate the meaning of this sūtra passage. As the sūtra states, the Buddha told the monks: dharmas are of two kinds — first, conditioned; second, unconditioned. The arising of a conditioned dharma may likewise be known, and its exhaustion, and its abiding, and its alteration, too, may likewise be known; the unconditioned possesses no arising that may be known, nor any exhaustion, abiding, or alteration that may be known. Various masters, with respect to the intent of this sūtra passage, failing to understand it as it truly is, give rise to all manner of divergent positions. There are those who hold that the characteristics of the conditioned possess no real substance whatsoever, as the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain, who say as follows: these characteristics of the conditioned are subsumed within the aggregate of formations dissociated from mind, and the aggregate of formations dissociated from mind possesses no real substance — and it is therefore that the characteristics of the conditioned possess no real substance. This treatise, in order to refute that position, reveals that the characteristics of the conditioned genuinely do possess their own substance. There are others who hold that the characteristics of the conditioned are all themselves unconditioned, as the Vibhajyavādins maintain, who say as follows: were the substance of a characteristic of the conditioned itself of a conditioned nature, being thereby feeble and weak, it would be unable to give rise to a dharma, to cause it to abide, to alter it, or to bring about its cessation; it is precisely because the substance of a characteristic of the conditioned is of an unconditioned nature, being thereby vigorous and strong, that it is able to give rise to a dharma, and so on, up through bringing about its cessation. There are others who hold that the three characteristics — arising, abiding, and aging — are conditioned, while the characteristic of cessation alone is unconditioned, as the Dharmaguptakas maintain, who say as follows: were the substance of the characteristic of impermanence itself of a conditioned nature, being thereby feeble and weak, it would be unable to bring a dharma to cessation; it is precisely because it is of an unconditioned nature, being thereby vigorous and strong, that it is able to bring a dharma to cessation — this treatise, in order to refute that position, reveals that the characteristics of the conditioned are, without exception, all themselves conditioned. There are others who hold that a characteristic and what it characterizes are, in every respect, alike, as the śramaṇas of the Resembling-Continuum school maintain, who say as follows: the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a material dharma are themselves substantially material, and so on, up through the arising, aging, abiding, and impermanence of a dharma of consciousness being themselves substantially consciousness — this treatise, in order to refute that position, reveals that the characteristics of the conditioned are subsumed solely within the aggregate of formations dissociated from mind. There are others who hold that the five aggregates, such as material form, are called "arising" at the moment they emerge from the womb, "abiding" during their continued existence, "aging" at the moment of their decline and alteration, and "cessation" at the moment of death, as the Sautrāntika masters maintain — this treatise, in order to refute that position, reveals that this describes solely the characteristic of the class of homogeneous being, not the characteristic of the conditioned; the characteristic of the conditioned refers to the fact that every conditioned dharma, in each and every single instant, possesses all four characteristics together. Further, this treatise is composed in order to bring those in doubt to a settled resolution — that is, as the Concentration Nyāsa states, the acquisition of a past dharma may be past, or future, or present, and the acquisition of a future or present dharma is likewise so; there are those who thereby give rise to the doubt that, just as an acquisition and its corresponding dharma may exist within the same time-period, or within different time-periods, so too, one might suppose, should a characteristic and what it characterizes likewise admit of this same possibility —

and it is in order to bring this doubt to a settled resolution, revealing that a characteristic and what it characterizes never exist within different time-periods, that this treatise is composed. Why is this so? An acquisition and what is acquired do not share the same fruit, and do not necessarily arise together, and are not a co-existent cause of one another, and may therefore exist within different time-periods; a characteristic and what it characterizes, by contrast, share the same fruit, and necessarily arise together, and serve as a co-existent cause of one another, and must therefore necessarily exist within the same time-period. It is in order to refute the various divergent positions already stated above, and in order to dispel this doubt, that this treatise is composed.

Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a material dharma to be called material, or non-material? The answer: they ought to be called non-material. Here, "a material dharma" refers to the ten material sense-fields together with a small portion of the dharma-field; their characteristics of the conditioned are solely non-material, subsumed within the dharma-field alone — this is a case where what is characterized and what characterizes it belong to different categories, being non-material. Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a non-material dharma to be called non-material, or material? The answer: they ought to be called non-material. Here, "a non-material dharma" refers to the mental sense-field together with a small portion of the dharma-field; their characteristics of the conditioned are as stated above — this is a case where what is characterized and what characterizes it belong to the same category, both possessing visibility as material dharmas do not. Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a dharma possessing visible appearance to be called possessing visible appearance, or lacking it? The answer: they ought to be called lacking visible appearance. Here, "a dharma possessing visible appearance" refers to the sense-field of visible form; its characteristics of the conditioned are solely lacking visible appearance, subsumed within the dharma-field alone — this is a case where what is characterized and what characterizes it belong to different categories. Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a dharma lacking visible appearance to be called lacking visible appearance, or possessing it? The answer: they ought to be called lacking visible appearance. Here, "a dharma lacking visible appearance" refers to the eleven sense-fields excepting the sense-field of visible form; their characteristics of the conditioned are as stated above — this is a case where what is characterized and what characterizes it belong to the same category. Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a dharma possessing resistance to be called possessing resistance, or lacking it? The answer: they ought to be called lacking resistance. Here, "a dharma possessing resistance" refers to the ten material sense-fields; its characteristics of the conditioned are solely lacking resistance, subsumed within the dharma-field alone — this is a case where what is characterized and what characterizes it belong to different categories. Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a dharma lacking resistance to be called lacking resistance, or possessing it? The answer: they ought to be called lacking resistance. Here, "a dharma lacking resistance" refers to the mental sense-field and the dharma-field; their characteristics of the conditioned are as stated above — this is a case where what is characterized and what characterizes it belong to the same category. Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a contaminated dharma to be called contaminated, or uncontaminated? The answer: they ought to be called contaminated. Here, "a contaminated dharma" refers to the ten material sense-fields together with a small portion of two other sense-fields; its characteristics of the conditioned are solely contaminated, subsumed within the dharma-field alone — every subsequent gateway's own instance of what is characterized and what characterizes it belongs to the same category. Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of an uncontaminated dharma to be called uncontaminated, or contaminated? The answer: they ought to be called uncontaminated. Here, "an uncontaminated dharma" refers to the mental sense-field together with a small portion of the dharma-field; their characteristics of the conditioned are solely uncontaminated, subsumed within the dharma-field alone. Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a conditioned dharma to be called conditioned, or unconditioned? The answer: they ought to be called conditioned. Here, "a conditioned dharma" refers to the eleven sense-fields together with a small portion of the dharma-field; its characteristics of the conditioned are solely conditioned, subsumed within the dharma-field alone. Are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of an unconditioned dharma to be called unconditioned, or conditioned? The answer: an unconditioned dharma possesses no arising, abiding, aging, or impermanence — here, "an unconditioned dharma" refers to a small portion of the dharma-field, which, being unconditioned, possesses no characteristic of the conditioned at all. The five kinds of twofold gateway stated in the earlier portion of this passage show, between what is characterized and what characterizes it, both instances of belonging to the same category and instances of belonging to different categories; the five kinds of threefold gateway stated in the latter portion of this passage show, between what is characterized and what characterizes it, only instances of belonging to the same category, in every case. One should understand accordingly how many sense-fields each gateway subsumes, and, correspondingly, which divergent position stated above each is meant to refute — that is, in stating that what is characterized and what characterizes it exist within the same time-period, this refutes the Sautrāntikas' own divergent view of a characteristic existing at a different time from what it characterizes; in stating that the characteristics of material form and the rest are not themselves subsumed within material form and the rest, this refutes the śramaṇas of the Resembling-Continuum school, who state that the characteristics of material form and the rest are themselves subsumed within material form and the rest; in stating that the characteristics of arising and the rest are all themselves conditioned, this refutes the Dharmaguptakas and the Vibhajyavādins, who state that the characteristics of arising and the rest are themselves unconditioned dharmas. This tenfold gateway of discrimination concerning the characteristics of arising and the rest, in every instance, refutes the Dārṣṭāntikas, who state that the various characteristics of arising and the rest possess no real substance at all — for a dharma without real substance, such as a jar or a robe, ought not to admit of such broad and detailed discrimination as this.

What is aging? And so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: the foregoing has already, in dependence on the reasoning proper to the noble ones and the saints, revealed the characteristics of the conditioned; this treatise now wishes, in dependence on the reasoning proper to the conventional world, to reveal the characteristics of the conditioned. The foregoing has already, in dependence on the noble ones' own manner of speaking, revealed the characteristics of the conditioned; this treatise now wishes, in dependence on the conventional world's own manner of speaking, to reveal the characteristics of the conditioned. The foregoing has already, in dependence on the ultimate truth, revealed the characteristics of the conditioned; this treatise now wishes, in dependence on the conventional truth, to reveal the characteristics of the conditioned. Further, the foregoing has already revealed the subtle characteristics of the conditioned; this treatise now wishes to reveal the coarse characteristics of the conditioned. The foregoing has already revealed the characteristics of the conditioned as directly perceived by discerning wisdom; this treatise now wishes to reveal the characteristics of the conditioned as directly perceived by the physical senses. The foregoing has already revealed the momentary characteristics of the conditioned; this treatise now wishes to reveal the continuum-based characteristics of the conditioned. The foregoing has already revealed the characteristics of the conditioned in their unbroken connection; this treatise now wishes to reveal the characteristics of the conditioned according to their distinct stages — and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. One asks: why does this passage not inquire into "arising"? The answer: this is simply because the author of the treatise intended it so, and so on, at length. Further, that it ought to be inquired into but is not inquired into here should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, this passage speaks of whatever causes dharmas to diminish and scatter and fall into ruin; arising, by contrast, causes dharmas to grow and flourish, and it is for this reason that it is not spoken of here. Further, this passage speaks of whatever causes dharmas to decline and disperse; arising, by contrast, causes dharmas to grow and gather together, and it is for this reason that it is not spoken of here. What is aging? The answer: the characteristic of formations turning and inclining toward their own ripened alteration — this is called aging. The sūtras state: the hair grows sparse, the hair turns white, the skin grows slack, the skin wrinkles, the complexion fades, the strength diminishes, the body stoops, the back bends, the breath grows short and urgent, one's energy withers and weakens, one's gait grows slow and faint, one leans on a staff to move about, the body is much covered in dark spots, resembling a painted image, the faculties grow dull and ripened, the limbs are altered and ruined, the whole body trembles and shakes, one groans and moans as one moves — this is called aging, formations having grown decayed and worn. The Abhidharma speaks, at times, of the ripening of the aggregates, and, at times, of the characteristic of aging as stated in this passage. As for formations "turning": this refers to their proceeding toward the gate of death. As for formations "inclining": this refers to their abandoning youthful vigor. As for formations "ripening": this refers to the faculties growing dull and ripened. As for formations "altering": this refers to the body's own strength declining and altering.

The Venerable Vasumitra states as follows: it is because formations decline and are ruined that this is called aging, exactly as with a worn-out garment; it is because formations decay and crumble that this is called aging, exactly as with a broken cart; it is because formations grow feeble and weak that this is called aging, exactly as with a decaying house; it is because formations wither and fade that this is called aging, exactly as with a withered flower; it is because formations grow slack and slow that this is called aging, exactly as with a musical instrument. The Great Virtuous One says: it is because formations, once having arisen, decline in their own vigor and are led toward decay that this is called aging. What is death? The answer: it is when a given sentient being, departing from the class of homogeneous being to which he belonged, undergoes ruin and loss, relinquishing his lifespan, warmth, and the life faculty, so that they cease, casting aside the aggregates that constituted his own body, and perishing — this is called death. The sūtra's own account of death is the same in substance as this — though the wording differs somewhat, the meaning is no different, both alike revealing death. What is impermanence? The answer: the scattering, breaking, ruin, loss, and decline of formations — this is called impermanence.

Here, although the wording differs in various ways, the meaning is likewise no different, all alike revealing the meaning of impermanence. One asks: how does impermanence scatter and ruin formations? The answer: it is not like the scattering and ruin of scattered grain or beans and the like; it merely causes formations to lose all further function, and it is for this reason that it is called "scattering and ruin" — that is, in a single instant, having accomplished what it is to accomplish, in the second instant it is no longer able to accomplish anything further. What distinction is there between death and impermanence? The answer: every death is impermanence; there exists impermanence that is not death — namely, the cessation of every formation apart from death. One asks: why is this treatise further composed? The answer: the world commonly holds that impermanence and death are no different from one another;

this treatise now wishes to reveal their distinction, and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. That is, death is solely internal, solely pertaining to sentient beings, solely possessing faculties and mind; impermanence, by contrast, extends to what is internal and external, to sentient and non-sentient beings, to what possesses faculties and what lacks them, and to what possesses mind and what lacks it — such is their distinction. One asks: how is it that death is likewise impermanence, and how is impermanence not death? The answer: the very last cessation of the life faculty is called death, and is also impermanence; the cessation of the life faculty at any other time is called impermanence, but not death. Further, the very last cessation of the aggregates is called death, and is also impermanence; the cessation of the aggregates at any other time is called impermanence, but not death. Further, the cessation of the internal aggregates is called death, and is also impermanence; the cessation of the external aggregates is called impermanence, but not death — and, just as with internal and external, sentient and non-sentient, possessing faculties and lacking them, and possessing mind and lacking it, so too should this same distinction be understood. Is the force of karma stronger, or the force of impermanence? The answer: the force of karma is stronger, not the force of impermanence. Here, the word "karma" refers to the noble path; "impermanence" refers to the characteristic of cessation. The Buddha, with respect to the noble path, speaks of it, at times, as feeling, at times, as perception, at times, as volition, at times, as intention, at times, as a lamp, at times, as faith, diligence, mindfulness, concentration, or wisdom, at times, as a boat or raft, a mountain, a stone, water, or a flower, and, at times, as loving-kindness, compassion, joy, or equanimity — each of these being separately explained, as in the sūtras. In this passage, the noble path is spoken of as "karma," and it is for this reason that the force of karma is stronger, not the force of impermanence. There are those who say: the force of impermanence is stronger, not the force of karma. Why is this so?

This karma, too, is itself impermanent — exactly as a man capable of slaying a thousand enemies is thereby called "one who overcomes a thousand enemies," so too is it here,

and it is for this reason that the force of impermanence is stronger, not the force of karma. With respect to this same meaning, it ought to be said that the force of karma is stronger, not the force of impermanence. Why is this so? Karma is able to extinguish formations belonging to all three time-periods; impermanence is able to extinguish only present formations, since the power of the noble path extinguishes formations belonging to all three time-periods, cutting off these formations and thereby attaining their analytical cessation, whereas impermanence is able only to extinguish present formations, causing them no longer to possess any further function. Further, the force of the noble path, karma, is able to extinguish both formations capable of arising and formations not capable of arising, causing them to attain their analytical cessation, and is also able to cause formations, in the future, ultimately never to arise, attaining their non-analytical cessation; impermanence is able only to extinguish formations capable of arising, not those incapable of it, and it is for this reason that the force of karma is stronger. There are those who say: in this passage, "karma" refers to the karma capable of drawing forth the class of homogeneous being belonging to the five destinies; "impermanence" refers to the characteristic of cessation — and it is for this reason that the force of karma is stronger, not the force of impermanence. There are those who say: the force of impermanence is stronger, not the force of karma.

Why is this so? This karma, too, is itself impermanent. With respect to this same meaning, it ought to be said that the force of karma is stronger, not the force of impermanence. Why is this so?

The force of karma is able to draw forth the class of homogeneous being across all five destinies; impermanence is able only to extinguish present formations. There are other masters who say: in this passage, "karma" refers to what is able to bring about harmonious union; "impermanence" refers to what is able to bring about separation and dispersal — and it is for this reason that the force of karma is stronger, not the force of impermanence. There are those who say: the force of impermanence is stronger, not the force of karma. Why is this so? This karma, too, is itself impermanent. With respect to this same meaning, it ought to be said that the force of karma is stronger, not the force of impermanence. Why is this so? Bringing about harmonious union is difficult, while bringing about separation is easy — exactly as fashioning a vessel is difficult, while breaking it is easy — so too is it here, and it is for this reason that the force of karma is stronger. There are yet others who say: in this passage, "the force of karma" refers to every kind of bodily, verbal, and mental karma whatsoever; "the force of impermanence" refers to the characteristic of impermanence — and it is for this reason that the force of karma is stronger, not the force of impermanence. There are those who say: the force of impermanence is stronger, not the force of karma. Why is this so? This karma, too, is itself impermanent. With respect to this same meaning, it ought to be said that the force of karma is stronger, not the force of impermanence. Why is this so? The force of karma is able to bring about every kind of resultant dharma;

impermanence is able only to extinguish arisen dharmas.