Arising, Aging, and Ceasing in One Instant
Fascicle 39 completes the Characteristics Nyāsa opened in fascicle 38, working through whether a single instant can genuinely hold arising, aging, and cessation together, whether formations undergo real transformation, whether an unlisted "abiding" characteristic secretly exists, and why gray hair and corpses do not appear at every single passing moment despite impermanence's constant operation. It then opens the Meaninglessness Nyāsa with Māra's own direct verse-challenge to the newly-enlightened Buddha, and closes by explaining why every buddha meditates cross-legged. This page carries Ru-Yi's complete translation.
Translation Method
The Chinese source is Xuánzàng's seventh-century translation of the Abhidharma-mahāvibhāṣā-śāstra (阿毘達磨大毘婆沙論), preserved in the Taishō canon (T1545, vol. 27) via the CBETA digital edition — public domain text, translated directly from the Chinese. The English wording throughout is Ru-Yi's own, and the reading notes are original, grounded in standard Sarvāstivāda scholarship rather than a specific named commentator's lecture transcript.
Fascicle 39 completes the Characteristics Nyāsa's second part (相納息第六之二) and opens the first part of the Meaninglessness Nyāsa (無義納息第七之一). Terms established in earlier fascicles, such as the four conditioned characteristics and the class of homogeneous being, recur here and are not re-explained at each occurrence.
Classical text is set in the left-hand column below, our English in the right.
1. Can Arising, Aging, and Cessation All Occur Within a Single Instant?
Fascicle 39 opens the Characteristics Nyāsa's second part with a genuinely difficult question: scripture speaks of formations' arising, exhaustion, abiding, and alteration all being knowable — but how can a single instant hold arising, aging, and cessation together, when these seem to be flatly contradictory states? The treatise refutes the Dārṣṭāntika solution, which spreads the three characteristics out across a dharma's whole lifespan (first instant arising, last instant ceasing, everything between aging), insisting instead that every single instant genuinely contains all three, distinguished only by which one's function is presently active. A further debate follows on whether formations undergo any real transformation at all.
如世尊說有三有為之有為相。有為之起亦可了知。盡及住異亦可了知。一剎那中云何起。答生云何盡。答無常。云何住異。答老。問何故作此論。答為欲分別契經義故。謂契經說有三有為之有為相。
As the Blessed One has stated, there are three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned; the arising of the conditioned may likewise be known, and its exhaustion, and its abiding and alteration, may likewise be known. Within a single instant, what is arising? The answer: birth. What is exhaustion? The answer: impermanence. What is abiding and alteration? The answer: aging. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to analyze the meaning of scripture — that is, scripture states that there are three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned,
乃至廣說。雖作是說而不顯示云何起盡云何住異經是此論所依根本。彼不說者今應說之。復次為止他宗顯正義故。謂或有執三有為相非一剎那。如譬喻者彼作是說。若一剎那有三相者。則應一法一時亦生亦老亦滅。然無此理互相違故。應說諸法初起名生。後盡名滅。中熟名老。為遮彼執顯一剎那具有三相。問若如是者。則應一法一時亦生亦老亦滅答作用時異故不相違。謂法生時生有作用。滅時老滅方有作用。體雖同時用有先後。一法生滅作用究竟名一剎那故無有失。或生滅位非一剎那。然一剎那具有三體故。說三相同一剎那。由此因緣故作斯論問諸行自性有轉變不。設爾何失。若有轉變云何諸法不捨自相。若無轉變云何此中說有住異。答應說諸行自性無有轉變。問若爾何故此中說有住異。答此中住異是老別名。非謂轉變。如生名起無常名盡老名住異應知亦然。復次有因緣故說無轉變。有因緣故說有轉變。有因緣故無轉變者。謂一切法各住自體。自我自物自性自相無有轉變。有因緣故有轉變者。謂有為法得勢時生。失勢時滅。得力時生。失力時滅。得士用時生。失士用時滅。得增上時生。失增上時滅。得功能時生。失功能時滅。熾盛時生。萎歇時滅。增進時生。衰退時滅。興舉時生。墮落時滅。猛利時生遲鈍時滅。滋茂時生。枯瘁時滅。和合時生。離散時滅。故有轉變。復次轉變有二種。一者自體轉變。二者作用轉變。若依自體轉變說者。應言諸行無有轉變。以彼自體無改易故。若依作用轉變說者。應言諸行亦有轉變。謂法未來未有作用。若至現在便有作用。若入過去作用已息。故有轉變。復次轉變有二種。一者自體轉變。二者功能轉變。若依自體轉變說者。應言諸行無有轉變。以彼自體無改易故若依功能轉變說者。應言諸行亦有轉變。謂未來世有生等功能現在世有滅等功能。過去世有與果功能。故有轉變復次轉變有二種。一者物轉變。二者世轉變。若依物轉變說者。應言諸行無有轉變以物恒時無改易故。若依世轉變說者。應言諸行亦有轉變。謂有未來現在過去世改易故。既有轉變說有異相無違理失問諸有為相於有為法。為是自相為共相耶。設爾何失。若是自相云何一法而有四相。若是共相云何一切有為法各各別有四相耶。有作是說。此是自相。問若爾云何一法有四相耶。答一法四相亦無有失。
and so on, at length, yet, though it states this much, it does not reveal how arising and exhaustion, and abiding and alteration, can all occur within a single instant. Scripture is the very root this treatise depends upon; what that scripture leaves unrevealed, this treatise should now reveal. Further, it is composed in order to refute a rival position and manifest the correct meaning — that is, there are those who hold that the three conditioned characteristics cannot occur within a single instant, as the Dārṣṭāntikas maintain, who say as follows: were there three characteristics within a single instant, then a single dharma would, at one and the same time, both be born and age and cease — yet there exists no such principle, since these three stand in mutual contradiction; rather, it should be said that a dharma's very first arising is called birth, its very last exhaustion is called cessation, and its ripening in between is called aging — and it is precisely in order to block this position and reveal that a single instant genuinely possesses all three characteristics together that this treatise is composed. One asks: if this is so, then would not a single dharma, at one and the same time, both be born and age and cease? The answer: it is because their functions occur at different times that there is no contradiction — that is, when a dharma is born, birth alone possesses function; when it ceases, aging and cessation only then possess function; though the dharma's own substance is present all at once, its various functions occur in sequence, and it is because a single dharma's birth-and-cessation function is completed all within a single instant that no fault follows. Or else, the stages of birth and cessation are not strictly a single instant, yet a single instant genuinely possesses all three substances together, and it is for this reason that the three characteristics are said to belong to one and the same instant. It is on account of these causes and conditions that this treatise is composed. One asks: do formations possess any real transformation of their own nature, or not? Suppose either is granted — what fault follows? If they do possess transformation, how is it that dharmas never relinquish their own particular characteristic? If they possess no transformation, how can this passage speak of their abiding and alteration? The answer: it should be said that formations possess no transformation of their own inherent nature. One asks: if that is so, then why does this passage speak of abiding and alteration? The answer: abiding and alteration, here, are merely another name for aging, not a genuine transformation — just as "birth" is named "arising," and "impermanence" is named "exhaustion," so too should "aging" be understood as named "abiding and alteration." Further, there are causes and conditions on account of which one may speak of no transformation, and causes and conditions on account of which one may speak of transformation existing. The causes and conditions for speaking of no transformation are these: every dharma abides in its own substance — its own self, its own particular thing, its own inherent nature, its own particular characteristic — possessing no transformation at all. The causes and conditions for speaking of transformation existing are these: a conditioned dharma arises when it gains ascendant force, and ceases when it loses ascendant force; arises when it gains power, and ceases when it loses power; arises when it gains functional efficacy, and ceases when it loses functional efficacy; arises when it gains predominance, and ceases when it loses predominance; arises when it gains capability, and ceases when it loses capability; arises in blazing vigor, and ceases in withered decline; arises in advancing growth, and ceases in declining loss; arises in rising ascent, and ceases in falling collapse; arises with keen sharpness, and ceases in dull sluggishness; arises in flourishing luxuriance, and ceases in withered exhaustion; arises through harmonious union, and ceases through separation and dispersal — and it is on this account that transformation is said to exist. Further, transformation is of two kinds: first, transformation of one's own substance; second, transformation of one's own function. If one speaks with reference to transformation of substance, it should be said that formations possess no transformation, since their own substance undergoes no alteration; if one speaks with reference to transformation of function, it should be said that formations do indeed possess transformation, since a dharma, while still future, possesses no function, yet, upon reaching the present, does possess function, and, upon entering the past, its function has already ceased — and it is on this account that transformation is said to exist. Further, transformation is again of two kinds: first, transformation of one's own substance; second, transformation of capability. If one speaks with reference to transformation of substance, it should be said that formations possess no transformation, since their own substance undergoes no alteration; if one speaks with reference to transformation of capability, it should be said that formations do indeed possess transformation, since, in the future period, there exists the capability of arising and the like, in the present period, the capability of ceasing and the like, and, in the past period, the capability of bestowing a fruit — and it is on this account that transformation is said to exist. Further, transformation is again of two kinds: first, transformation of the thing itself; second, transformation of the time-period. If one speaks with reference to transformation of the thing, it should be said that formations possess no transformation, since a thing, across all time, undergoes no alteration; if one speaks with reference to transformation of the time-period, it should be said that formations do indeed possess transformation, since there exists alteration among the future, present, and past time-periods — and it is on this account that transformation is said to exist. Given that transformation may be spoken of in these several ways, no contradiction or fault follows from also speaking of the characteristics as distinct. One asks: are the conditioned characteristics, with respect to the conditioned dharmas they characterize, particular characteristics, or shared characteristics? Suppose either is granted — what fault follows? If they are particular characteristics, how can a single dharma possess four characteristics? If they are shared characteristics, how can every conditioned dharma each individually possess its own four characteristics? There are those who say: these are particular characteristics. One asks: if that is so, then how can a single dharma possess four characteristics? The answer: a single dharma possessing four characteristics involves no fault whatsoever.
The distinction between a dharma's substance, present all at once within an instant, and its functions, which occur in strict sequence within that same instant, is the load-bearing move here: it lets the treatise affirm that arising, aging, and cessation are all genuinely there together without collapsing into the absurdity of a single dharma simultaneously being born and dying in some ordinary, extended sense — much as a single object can simultaneously possess the properties of weight and color without those properties ever competing for the same job.
2. Is a Characteristic a Thing's Own Property, or Something Shared?
A further puzzle follows: are the four conditioned characteristics particular to each individual dharma, or shared in common across every conditioned dharma alike? Both horns seem to lead to trouble — particular characteristics seem to force an awkward one-dharma-many-characteristics arithmetic, while shared characteristics seem to erase what makes each dharma's own arising distinctively its own. The treatise settles on "shared characteristic," but immediately subdivides this into a shared characteristic of one's own substance (each dharma genuinely possesses its own arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation) and a shared characteristic of harmonious union (each dharma is conjoined with these four in the very same structural way every other dharma is) — resolving the tension by separating what a dharma has from how it has it.
如一色法有多種相。所謂如病如癰如箭。乃至廣說百四十相。然此自相非如四大種堅濕煖動相。但一一法各各別有生住異滅故名自相。復次自相有二種。一者主自相。二者客自相。此有為相是有為法客自相非主自相。故一法有四相亦無有失。復次自相有二種。一者本性自相。二者他合自相。此有為相是有為法。他合自相。非本性自相故一法有四相亦無有失。有餘師說。此是共相。問若爾云何一切有為法各各別有四相耶。答以相似故名為共相。如一法上有生等四。餘法亦然非如一縷貫在眾花故名共相。復有說者。此非自相亦非共相。諸有為法生住異滅名義同故體各別故。然此生等是法標印。若有此者知是有為。如大士相於彼大士。不名自相亦非共相但是標印。若有此者知是大士。生等亦然評曰。應作是說。此是共相。然共相有二種。一者自體共相。謂一一有為法自體各有生等四義。二者和合共相。謂一一有為法各與生等四相和合。此四但是和合共相問生相復有餘生相不。設爾何失。若有者此復有餘。此復有餘如是展轉應成無窮。若無者誰生此生而生他耶。答應作是說。生復有生。問若爾生相應成無窮。有作是說。許此無窮亦無有失。三世寬博豈無住處。由是因緣生死難斷難破難越眾苦生長連鎖無窮。
Just as a single material dharma possesses many characteristics — spoken of as being like a disease, like a boil, like an arrow, and so on, at length, up through a hundred and forty characteristics — and yet these particular characteristics are not like the characteristics of hardness, moisture, warmth, and motion belonging to the four great elements; rather, it is simply that each individual dharma separately possesses its own arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation, and this is therefore called a particular characteristic. Further, a particular characteristic is of two kinds: first, a primary particular characteristic; second, a guest particular characteristic. These conditioned characteristics are the conditioned dharma's own guest particular characteristic, not its primary particular characteristic — and it is for this reason that a single dharma possessing four characteristics involves no fault. Further, a particular characteristic is again of two kinds: first, an inherent particular characteristic; second, an adventitiously-conjoined particular characteristic. These conditioned characteristics are the conditioned dharma's own adventitiously-conjoined particular characteristic, not its inherent particular characteristic — and it is for this reason that a single dharma possessing four characteristics involves no fault. There are yet other masters who say: these are shared characteristics. One asks: if that is so, then how can it be that every conditioned dharma each individually possesses its own four characteristics? The answer: it is on account of their mutual resemblance that they are called shared characteristics — just as a single dharma possesses these four, arising and the rest, so too does every other dharma; yet this is not like a single thread strung through many flowers, and it is for this reason that they are called shared. There are yet others who say: these are neither particular characteristics nor shared characteristics — every conditioned dharma's arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation share the same designation in meaning, yet possess distinct substances individually; these characteristics of arising and the rest are merely a dharma's own hallmark seal — whatever possesses this is known to be conditioned, exactly as the marks of a great being, with respect to that great being, are called neither a particular characteristic nor a shared characteristic, but merely a hallmark seal, whatever possesses this being known to be a great being; and arising and the rest should be understood in just the same way. The verdict: it should be said that these are shared characteristics; yet a shared characteristic is itself of two kinds: first, a shared characteristic of one's own substance, referring to the fact that each and every conditioned dharma individually possesses, within its own substance, the four meanings of arising and the rest; second, a shared characteristic of harmonious union, referring to the fact that each and every conditioned dharma is individually conjoined with the four characteristics of arising and the rest — and these four are merely a shared characteristic of harmonious union. One asks: does this characteristic of arising possess any further characteristic of arising? Suppose either is granted — what fault follows? If it does, then this further characteristic of arising would itself require yet another, and so on, unfolding without end. If it does not, then who gives rise to this arising, that it should give rise to other dharmas? The answer: it should be said that arising does indeed possess a further arising.
The great-being's-marks analogy offered by one rejected position is worth lingering over even though the treatise moves past it: a thirty-two-marks checklist that simply certifies "this is a great being" without itself being any kind of property of that being gestures at a third way of thinking about identity-markers, neither strictly particular nor strictly shared, that the Abhidharma elsewhere never quite develops into its own full category.
3. Does Arising Itself Need to Arise? Nine Dharmas in a Single Instant
A classic regress threatens: if the characteristic of arising is itself something that comes to be, does it too need its own further characteristic of arising, ad infinitum? The treatise's considered answer is elegant: when formations arise, nine dharmas arise together — the dharma itself, plus a primary and an auxiliary marker for each of the four characteristics (arising and the arising-of-arising, abiding and the abiding-of-abiding, and so on) — with each primary characteristic generating eight companions while each auxiliary characteristic generates only the one primary characteristic that in turn generated it, closing the loop without ever chasing the regress past a second layer.
又同一剎那故無無窮失。有餘師說。諸行生時三法俱起。一者法二者生三者生生。此中生能生二法。謂法及生生。生生唯生一法。謂生。由此道理無無窮失。問何故生能生二法。生生唯生生耶。答法性爾故不應為難。如諸女人有生二子有生一子。豈應為難評曰。應作是說。諸行生時九法俱起。一者法。二者生。三者生生。四者住。五者住住。六者異。七者異異。八者滅。九者滅滅。此中生能生八法。謂法及三相四隨相。生生唯生一法。謂生由此道理無無窮失。問何故生能生八法。生生唯生生耶。答法性爾故不應為難。如鷄犬等有生八子有生一子。豈應為難。如生與生生。住與住住。異與異異。滅與滅滅。應知亦爾。問諸行起時除其自性餘有為法皆有作用能生此法。何故唯說生能生此法耶。答諸行起時生正能生。餘但佐助故但說生能生此法。如女產時雖有諸女而為佐助母正生故獨名產者。尊者世友作如是說。要有生故此法得生故但說生能生此法。此義有餘亦待餘緣此法生故。復作是說。若無生者此法不生故但說生能生此法。此亦有餘。若無餘緣法不生故。大德說曰。生相勝故說生能生。謂法起時雖有餘緣而生最勝。如伎書畫染衣等時雖有餘緣而說勝者。如但說生能生此法故名生相。住異滅相應知亦然。
One asks: if that is so, then the characteristic of arising should unfold without end. There are those who say: granting this endlessness involves no fault whatsoever — the three time-periods are vast and expansive; how could there fail to be room enough to hold it? It is on account of just such causes and conditions as these that birth and death are so difficult to cut off, so difficult to break through, so difficult to transcend, and the chain that gives rise to and extends the manifold sufferings of sentient beings is itself without end. Yet, since this all occurs within one and the same instant, there is no fault of endlessness. There are yet other masters who say: when formations arise, three dharmas arise together — first, the dharma itself; second, arising; third, the arising of arising. Here, arising is able to give rise to two dharmas — namely, the dharma itself and the arising of arising; the arising of arising gives rise to only a single dharma — namely, arising itself. It is on this principle that there is no fault of endlessness. One asks: why is it that arising is able to give rise to two dharmas, while the arising of arising gives rise to only arising itself? The answer: this is simply the nature of the dharma, and ought not to be pressed as an objection — just as, among women, some give birth to two children, and some give birth to only one, and this ought not to be pressed as an objection. The verdict: it should be said that, when formations arise, nine dharmas arise together — first, the dharma itself; second, arising; third, the arising of arising; fourth, abiding; fifth, the abiding of abiding; sixth, alteration; seventh, the alteration of alteration; eighth, cessation; ninth, the cessation of cessation. Here, arising is able to give rise to eight dharmas — namely, the dharma itself, together with the three characteristics and the four auxiliary characteristics; the arising of arising gives rise to only a single dharma — namely, arising itself — and it is on this principle that there is no fault of endlessness. One asks: why is it that arising is able to give rise to eight dharmas, while the arising of arising gives rise only to arising itself? The answer: this is simply the nature of the dharma, and ought not to be pressed as an objection — just as, among hens and dogs, some give birth to eight offspring, and some give birth to only one, and this ought not to be pressed as an objection; and, just as with arising and the arising of arising, so too should abiding and the abiding of abiding, alteration and the alteration of alteration, and cessation and the cessation of cessation, be understood. One asks: when formations arise, every conditioned dharma apart from their own inherent nature possesses the function capable of giving rise to this dharma — why, then, does this passage speak only of arising as what gives rise to it? The answer: when formations arise, arising is the proper, direct cause of their birth, while every other dharma merely assists — and it is for this reason that this passage speaks only of arising as giving rise to the dharma, exactly as, when a woman gives birth, though many women may be present, and though they assist her, it is the mother alone who properly gives birth, and she alone is therefore called the one who gives birth. The Venerable Vasumitra states as follows: it is only because arising exists at all that this dharma is able to arise, and it is for this reason that this passage speaks only of arising as giving rise to the dharma — though this, too, depends on other conditions besides for this dharma to arise. He further states: if there were no arising, this dharma would not arise, and it is for this reason that this passage speaks only of arising as giving rise to the dharma — though this, too, depends on other conditions, since, absent other conditions, the dharma would likewise not arise. The Great Virtuous One states: it is because the characteristic of arising is preeminent that arising is said to give rise to the dharma — that is, when a dharma arises, though other conditions are indeed present, arising is the most preeminent among them, exactly as, when a skilled craftsman paints or dyes a garment, though other conditions are indeed present, it is the preeminent one alone who is spoken of — and it is for this reason that only arising is said to give rise to this dharma, and it is thereby named the characteristic of arising; abiding, alteration, and the characteristic of cessation should be understood in just the same way.
The asymmetry stipulated here — a primary characteristic gives rise to many dharmas, while its own auxiliary characteristic gives rise to just one, and that one is the very primary characteristic that produced it — is frankly stipulated rather than derived, and the treatise says so candidly through its "some women bear one child, some bear eight" comparison: not every explanatory gap needs to be closed by further argument, so long as the resulting system is internally consistent and stops the regress cold.
4. Does the Conditioned Even Have an "Abiding" Characteristic?
The treatise now confronts an apparent contradiction across its own sources: earlier chapters spoke as though abiding were a genuine fourth characteristic alongside arising, aging, and impermanence, yet the sūtra names only three conditioned characteristics, and elsewhere states outright that "formations do not abide." The treatise's own resolution affirms that conditioned dharmas do possess a genuine abiding characteristic, even though the canonical formula names only three — the fourth being left as a matter of surplus meaning never spelled out, and, further, so closely resembling the unconditioned in its stabilizing function that the Buddha chose not to list it among the marks that most define the conditioned as conditioned.
問諸有為法有住相不。設爾何失。若有者有為相中何故不說。如世尊說有三有為之有為相不說有四。又契經說復云何通。如說苾芻諸行。不住若無者此前所說當云何通。如說色法生住老無常當言色耶。非色耶。乃至廣說。品類足說復云何通。如說云何生謂諸行起。云何住。謂諸行生已不壞。云何老謂諸行熟。云何無常謂諸行生已壞。答應作是說。有為法有住相。問若爾有為相中何故不說。
One asks: do conditioned dharmas possess an abiding characteristic, or not? Suppose either is granted — what fault follows? If they do possess it, then why does this passage, among the conditioned characteristics, fail to mention it — for, as the Blessed One has stated, there are three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned, not four? And how, further, is what scripture states to be reconciled — as it is said, monks, formations do not abide? If they do not possess it, then how is what was stated just above to be reconciled — as it is said, are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a material dharma to be called material, or not, and so on, at length? And how is what the Prakaraṇapāda states to be reconciled — as it is said, what is arising? It refers to formations coming into being. What is abiding? It refers to formations, once already arisen, not yet having broken apart. What is aging? It refers to formations ripening. What is impermanence? It refers to formations, once already arisen, having broken apart? The answer: it should be said that conditioned dharmas do indeed possess an abiding characteristic. One asks: if that is so, then why does this passage, among the conditioned characteristics, fail to mention it?
答契經應說有四有為之有為相。而不說者應知彼是有餘之說。復次諸有為法實有住相。似無為故佛不說在有為相中。復次若法能令諸行損減。世尊說在有為相中。住相能令諸行增益故不說在有為相中。問生亦能令諸行增益。何故說在有為相中。答生最能令諸行損減非老無常。所以者何。若生不引令入現在。老何所衰。無常寧滅。由生引行令入現在故。老能衰。無常能滅。故生最能損減諸行。譬如有人隱在稠林。有三怨敵欲為損害。一從稠林牽之令出。
The answer: it ought properly to be said that there are four conditioned characteristics of the conditioned, and that this is not so stated should be understood as a matter of surplus meaning left implicit. Further, conditioned dharmas genuinely do possess an abiding characteristic, yet, since it so closely resembles the unconditioned, the Buddha did not include it among the conditioned characteristics. Further, whatever dharma causes formations to diminish, the Blessed One placed among the conditioned characteristics; the abiding characteristic, by contrast, causes formations to increase and grow, and it is for this reason that it is not placed among the conditioned characteristics. One asks: birth, too, causes formations to increase and grow — why, then, is it placed among the conditioned characteristics? The answer: birth is that which most causes formations to diminish, not aging or impermanence. Why is this so? If birth did not draw a formation into the present, how could aging cause it to decline, or impermanence bring it to cessation? It is precisely because birth draws a formation into the present that aging is then able to cause its decline, and impermanence its cessation — and it is for this reason that birth is that which most causes formations to diminish, exactly as a certain man, hiding within a dense thicket, is beset by three hateful enemies who wish to do him harm: one drags him out from the thicket, one saps his strength,
The bandit-in-the-thicket image doing the real work here is subtle: it isn't illustrating that arising is worse than aging or impermanence in some moral sense, but that arising is causally prior in a specific structural way — nothing else in the sequence of decline can happen to a formation until arising has first dragged it out of potentiality and into the present, which is exactly the kind of asymmetry that explains why arising, alone among the four, earned its place in the official threefold list.
5. Why the Buddha Left Abiding Off the List
Two further reasons for the abiding characteristic's quiet omission follow: unlike arising, which brings formations into harmonious union, and unlike alteration and cessation, which scatter and ruin them, abiding does neither — and unlike arising, which carries a formation from the future into the present, and alteration and cessation, which carry it onward from the present into the past, abiding does not carry a formation across time-periods at all, remaining seated within a single moment rather than marking any kind of transition.
一損其力。一斷彼命。若一不從稠林牽出。二何損害。三相於行應知亦然。復次若法能令諸行和合及令散壞世尊說在有為相中。生相能令諸行和合。異滅能令諸行散壞。住相不爾故不說在有為相中。
and one takes his very life — yet, were he not first dragged out from the thicket by the one, what harm could the other two possibly do him? The three characteristics, with respect to formations, should be understood in just the same way. Further, whatever dharma is able to bring formations into harmonious union, or bring about their scattering and ruin, the Blessed One placed among the conditioned characteristics — the characteristic of arising is able to bring formations into harmonious union, while alteration and cessation are able to bring about their scattering and ruin; the abiding characteristic is not so, and it is for this reason that it is not placed among the conditioned characteristics.
復次若法能令諸行歷世。世尊說在有為相中。生相令行從未來世入現在世。異滅令行從現在世入過去世。住相不爾。故不說在有為相中。復次標別有為名有為相。住相墮在無為部中。故佛不說名有為相。有說彼經亦說住相。如彼經說。盡及住異亦可了知。住即住相。問何故但說有三有為之有為相。答住異合立故但說三。世尊欲令厭有為法欣求寂滅故於彼經住異合說。
Further, whatever dharma is able to carry formations across the three time-periods, the Blessed One placed among the conditioned characteristics — the characteristic of arising carries a formation from the future time-period into the present time-period, while alteration and cessation carry it from the present time-period into the past time-period; the abiding characteristic is not so, and it is for this reason that it is not placed among the conditioned characteristics. Further, that which distinctively marks out the conditioned is called a conditioned characteristic; the abiding characteristic falls within the category of the unconditioned, and it is for this reason that the Buddha did not name it a conditioned characteristic. There are those who say that that very scripture does indeed speak of an abiding characteristic, for, as that scripture states, exhaustion, and abiding and alteration, may likewise be known — this "abiding" is precisely the abiding characteristic. One asks: why, then, does this passage speak only of there being three conditioned characteristics of the conditioned? The answer: abiding and alteration are established as one combined category, and it is for this reason that this passage speaks only of three — the Blessed One, wishing to lead sentient beings to grow weary of the conditioned and to seek liberation, thus, within that scripture, speaks of abiding and alteration together as one.
There is a quiet elegance in noticing that three of the four characteristics are all, in their own way, verbs of movement — arising imports, aging and cessation export — while abiding alone is a verb of simply staying put; a canonical formula built to mark the distinctively conditioned nature of things naturally gravitates toward naming the characteristics that actually do something to a formation's location in time, leaving the one that merely holds it in place for a passing mention rather than a headline slot.
6. Not Absent, Just Momentary: Reconciling "Formations Do Not Abide"
The apparent contradiction with the sūtra's flat statement that "formations do not abide" is resolved through Vasumitra's own careful reading: the sūtra denies only abiding beyond a single instant, not the momentary abiding within that instant — no more than a supernormal being's bend-of-the-arm journey from one end of the universe to the other denies that continuous, if inconceivably fine-grained, motion occurred along the way, a measure of subtlety the treatise says only a buddha can actually perceive.
如示室利與黑耳俱。令諸有情住異俱捨。問契經所說復云何通。如說苾芻諸行不住。答不久住故說不住言。非謂全無剎那住相。尊者世友作是釋言。契經但遮剎那後住說不住言。非謂諸行無剎那住。
This is exactly as when Śrī and Kālakarṇī are shown together, so that sentient beings, in the face of abiding and alteration, relinquish both alike. One asks: how, then, is what scripture states to be reconciled — as it is said, monks, formations do not abide? The answer: it is because they do not abide for long that the passage speaks of "not abiding," not because they possess no momentary abiding whatsoever. The Venerable Vasumitra offers this explanation: scripture merely blocks any abiding beyond the single instant when it speaks of "not abiding," not any denial that formations possess a momentary abiding.
若全無住。世尊不應建立施設世及剎那。復作是釋。剎那住相微細難知難可施設故說不住。謂剎那量是佛所知非諸聲聞獨覺等境。如乘神通屈伸臂頃從此處沒至色究竟於其中間非不相續可有從此往至彼義亦非一法移轉至彼。又無從此越至彼義。是故決定剎那剎那生滅相續。從此至彼於其中間諸剎那量最極微細唯佛能知。由此故言諸行不住。大德釋曰。諸行生已雖少時住而老無常速即損滅故言不住。有作是說。有為法無住相。問此前所說當云何通。如說色法生住老無常。乃至廣說。答此前應說色法生老無常。乃至廣說。不應言住而言住者。應知此住是老別名。如生名起無常名盡老名為住應知亦爾。故三相中老名住異。問品類足說復云何通。如說云何住謂諸行生已不壞。答彼論所說我不能通。評曰。既不能通應信有住。
Were there no abiding whatsoever, the Blessed One would never have been able to establish and designate time-periods or instants at all. He offers a further explanation: momentary abiding is so subtle and so difficult to know that it is difficult to designate at all, and it is for this reason that the passage speaks of "not abiding" — that is, the measure of a single instant is something known to the Buddha alone, not something within the domain of any śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha, or the like — exactly as one who rides supernormal power, bending and extending an arm's length, vanishes from this place and arrives at Akaniṣṭha, and, within that interval, though it is not the case that there is no continuity at all, there exists no sense in which one could speak of "going from here to there," nor is there any single dharma that shifts and moves over to that place, nor any sense in which one leaps across from here to there — it is, rather, decisively the case that instant by instant, arising and ceasing in unbroken succession, from here to there, within that very interval, the measure of the instants involved is so exceedingly subtle that the Buddha alone is able to know it, and it is on this account that the passage speaks of "formations do not abide." The Great Virtuous One offers this explanation: once formations have arisen, though they do abide for a brief while, aging and impermanence swiftly bring about their ruin and dissolution, and it is for this reason that the passage speaks of "not abiding." There are those who say: conditioned dharmas possess no abiding characteristic at all. One asks: if that is so, then how is what was earlier stated to be reconciled — as it is said, are the arising, abiding, aging, and impermanence of a material dharma to be called material, and so on, at length? The answer: what was earlier stated ought properly to speak only of a material dharma's arising, aging, and impermanence, and so on, at length; that it speaks of "abiding" should be understood as follows: this "abiding" is merely another name for aging, exactly as "birth" is named "arising," and "impermanence" is named "exhaustion" — so, too, should "aging" be understood as named "abiding" — and it is for this reason that, among the three characteristics, aging is also called "abiding and alteration." One asks: how, then, is what the Prakaraṇapāda states to be reconciled — as it is said, what is abiding? It refers to formations, once already arisen, not yet having broken apart? The answer: what that treatise states, I am unable to reconcile. The verdict: since it cannot be reconciled, one ought rather to believe that an abiding characteristic does indeed exist.
The image of instant-by-instant arising and ceasing occurring in such fine-grained succession that ordinary perception experiences it as continuous, unbroken travel — rather than as a staccato sequence of discrete stops — anticipates, in its own idiom, a genuinely modern intuition about the relationship between continuous experience and a discrete underlying structure: what feels smooth from the inside can still, at a fine enough grain, be made of separate, countable moments.
7. The Verdict: Abiding Must Exist, or Nothing Coheres
The treatise closes this question with its own considered verdict, favoring the position that an abiding characteristic genuinely exists over the alternative view that treats "abiding" as nothing more than another name for aging. The deciding consideration is functional: without some genuine moment of abiding, a formation could never take hold of its own fruit or its own object, and thought itself would have nothing stable enough to fasten onto — cause and effect, and the very possibility of mind having an object at all, both require formations to hold still for at least an instant.
由住相力諸行生已能取自果能取所緣。由異滅力一剎那後無復作用。若無住相諸行應無因果相續。心心所法應無所緣。故必有住。
It is by the power of the abiding characteristic that formations, once arisen, are able to take hold of their own fruit and to take hold of their own object; it is by the power of alteration and cessation that, after a single instant, no further function remains. Were there no abiding characteristic, formations would possess no continuity of cause and effect whatsoever, and mind and mental factors would possess no object at all — and it is for this reason that an abiding characteristic must indeed exist.
This is a rare moment where the treatise explicitly declines to reconcile a conflicting canonical source (the Prakaraṇapāda's own definition of abiding) rather than forcing an artificial harmony, choosing instead to trust the functional argument over textual smoothing — a useful reminder that even a tradition this committed to systematic consistency sometimes simply says "I cannot reconcile this" and moves forward on the strength of the better argument.
8. What Alteration Actually Means, Against the Heretical Transformationists
The treatise turns to precisely defining the third characteristic, alteration (異), carefully distinguishing it from both ruin (which would collapse it into cessation) and transformation in the heretical sense (which would align the treatise with rival non-Buddhist schools holding that an earlier state literally becomes a later one, as firewood becomes ash or milk becomes curds). The treatise's own alternative reading of "transformation" preserves momentariness intact: formations do not persist and change, but rather cease and are replaced, and it is this cessation-and-replacement itself, tracked across a long list of paired descriptors — vigorous versus declined, new versus old, luxuriant versus withered — that counts as genuine transformation without contradicting anything already established about momentary arising and ceasing.
問言異相者。為滅壞故名為異相。為轉變故名異相耶。設爾何失。
One asks: when this passage speaks of the "characteristic of alteration," does it name this characteristic on account of ruin and dissolution, or on account of transformation? Suppose either is granted — what fault follows?
若滅壞故名異相者。應有為相但有三種。異即滅故。若轉變故名異相者。應同轉變外道所宗。答應作是說。非滅壞故及轉變故名為異相。然令諸行作用損敗。作用朽故作用羸弱。作用衰瘁。作用慢緩。故名異相。有作是說。令轉變故名為異相問若爾應同轉變外道所立宗義。答彼執諸行相續轉時前位不滅轉變為後。如薪成灰乳為酪等。今說諸行相續轉時前滅後生而有轉變。謂有為法生時勢盛。
If it is named on account of ruin and dissolution, then there ought properly to exist only three conditioned characteristics, since alteration would then be identical with cessation. If it is named on account of transformation, then this ought to align with the very tenet of the heretical transformationists. The answer: it should be said that it is named neither on account of ruin and dissolution, nor on account of transformation — rather, it is because it causes a formation's own function to become damaged, its function to decay, its function to grow feeble and weak, its function to wither and waste, its function to grow slack and slow, that it is named the characteristic of alteration. There are those who say: it is named on account of causing transformation. One asks: if that is so, then does this not align with the very tenet the heretical transformationists themselves establish? The answer: those heretics hold that, as formations continue in their own succession, the earlier stage does not cease but is itself transformed into the later — exactly as firewood becomes ash, or milk becomes curds; this treatise, by contrast, states that, as formations continue in their own succession, the earlier ceases and the later arises, and yet a genuine transformation nonetheless occurs — that is, when a conditioned dharma is born, its vigor is at its height;
滅時勢衰。生時力強。滅時力劣。生時名新。滅時名故。生時滋茂。滅時枯瘁。生時和合滅時離散生時興舉滅時墮落。生時猛利。
when it ceases, its vigor has declined; when born, its power is strong; when it ceases, its power is weak; when born, it is called new; when it ceases, it is called old; when born, it is luxuriant; when it ceases, it is withered; when born, it is in harmonious union; when it ceases, it is scattered and dispersed; when born, it rises and ascends; when it ceases, it falls and collapses; when born, it is keen and sharp;
滅時遲鈍。生時得作用。滅時失作用。生時得增上滅時失增上。生時得功能。滅時失功能。生時熾盛。滅時萎歇。生時增進滅時退減生時得士用。滅時失士用。生時未熟。滅時已熟故名轉變非同外道問諸有為相與所相法。為同為異設爾何失。若同者云何四不為一。
when it ceases, it is dull and sluggish; when born, it gains function; when it ceases, it loses function; when born, it gains predominance; when it ceases, it loses predominance; when born, it gains capability; when it ceases, it loses capability; when born, it is blazing and vigorous; when it ceases, it is withered and spent; when born, it is advancing and growing; when it ceases, it is declining and diminishing; when born, it gains functional efficacy; when it ceases, it loses functional efficacy; when born, it is not yet ripe; when it ceases, it has already ripened — and it is for these reasons that it is named "transformation," yet not in the same sense as the heretics' own. One asks: are the conditioned characteristics, with respect to the dharmas they characterize, identical, or different? Suppose either is granted — what fault follows? If they are identical, how can the four fail to be reducible to one,
Redefining "transformation" so carefully here is a defensive maneuver worth appreciating on its own terms: the treatise wants the ordinary, intuitive vocabulary of change — growing old, declining, fading — without importing the persisting-substance metaphysics that vocabulary usually smuggles in, and it manages this by relocating the entire burden of change onto a relationship between successive, discrete, momentary dharmas rather than onto any single enduring thing that undergoes the change itself.
9. Same Thing, or Different? And Why Gray Hair Doesn't Appear at Every Instant
A structurally similar question to fascicle 38's own opening returns in sharper form: is a characteristic identical with the dharma it characterizes, or genuinely distinct from it? The treatise favors distinctness, given added texture by Vasumitra's own smoke-and-fire simile (a characteristic depends on what it characterizes for its own arising, exactly as smoke depends on fire, and is for this reason never applied to characterize anything else) and by the Great Virtuous One's own illness-and-patient simile, which explains why a characteristic and what it characterizes, though never separated, are nonetheless never identical: were a disease identical with the person who suffers it, curing the disease would have to annihilate the person along with it. The same block then turns to a pointed objection: if every single instant genuinely carries the aging characteristic, why doesn't gray hair appear at every single moment rather than gradually, over years? The treatise separates the abstract, universal aging characteristic (non-material, invisible, present in every instant) from gray hair itself, a material symptom depending on further specific conditions — and holds that the Buddha alone, among every noble one, is entirely exempt from gray hair and every mark of physical decline, a fruit of three incalculable eons of unflagging virtuous cultivation.
一不為四。又取一時應作四解。若異者云何不以餘相為相。有作是說。相所相同。問若爾云何四不為一。一不為四。又取一時應作四解。答相雖有四而體是一。於一自體有多相故。於一所緣作四種解理亦無違。如於一物起無常等多行相故。有餘師說。相所相異。問若爾云何不以餘相為相。答無如是失能相所相從無始來互相屬故。
or the one fail to expand into four — and, further, in taking hold of them at a single moment, ought one not to arrive at four distinct understandings? If they are different, then why is a given characteristic not applied to characterize some other dharma? There are those who say: the characteristic and what it characterizes are identical. One asks: if that is so, then how can the four fail to be reducible to one, or the one fail to expand into four — and, further, in taking hold of them at a single moment, ought one not to arrive at four distinct understandings? The answer: though the characteristics are four, their substance is a single one — it is simply that a single substance possesses multiple characteristics, and there is no contradiction in arriving, with respect to a single object, at four distinct understandings, exactly as, with respect to a single thing, one may give rise to the many aspects of impermanence and the rest. There are yet other masters who say: the characteristic and what it characterizes are different. One asks: if that is so, then why is a given characteristic not applied to characterize some other dharma? The answer: no such fault follows, since the characteristic and what it characterizes have, from beginningless time, belonged to one another.
復次能相所相從無始來恒和合故。不相離故。常相隨故。相雜住故。尊者世友作如是說。相所相異。然諸能相依所相起。如煙依火。是故不以餘相為相。復次能相既是所相過患。雖不相離而相不同如病既是人之過患雖不相離而相各別。若病與人相不異者。其病若愈人亦應無。大德說曰。佛說生等是有為之相故知相屬而相不同。如舍等屬人而相有異問若一切剎那皆有老相何不一切時首生白髮答此難非理老相白髮不相即故。白髮是色有見有對。老相非色無見無對。二體既異如何難言有老相時即有白髮。復次老與少壯或有相違或不相違。若相違者首生白髮。不相違者不生白髮。復次若增益大種多損減大種少者不生白髮。若損減大種多增益大種少者首生白髮。復次氣勢強者不生白髮。氣勢弱者首生白髮。復次白髮不由老相故起。但眾同分將欲盡時有此異熟可厭相起。如酒油等將欲盡時法爾於中有滓穢起。問何界趣處有白髮耶。答在欲界有非色無色。地獄趣無。傍生鬼有。人三洲有。除北俱盧。彼無如是可厭相故。乘純淨業而生彼故。由雜穢業白髮生故。問如是白髮何等人有。答異生聖者皆有白髮。諸聖者中從預流果乃至獨覺皆有白髮唯除世尊。佛無此等可厭相故。以白髮等是滓穢故。諸佛皆無髮希髮白皮緩皮皺音聲破壞解支節苦。亦無心亂漸捨諸根般涅槃時諸根頓滅問佛田何業得此果耶。答先菩薩時三無數劫修集種種難行苦行所起善業。後後剎那轉增轉盛。信慧堅猛諸所施為。無萎歇故。由此善業為相似因。今受如斯相似勝果。故無髮白面皺等事問若一切剎那皆有無常相者。何不一切時皆有屍骸相現。答若有根身滅有根身生者無屍骸相現。若有根身滅無根身生者有屍骸相現。復次若有心身滅有心身生者無屍骸相現。若有心身滅無心身生者有屍骸相現。
Further, the characteristic and what it characterizes have, from beginningless time, forever existed in harmonious union, never separated from one another, forever mutually accompanying one another, dwelling intermixed with one another. The Venerable Vasumitra states as follows: the characteristic and what it characterizes are different, yet every characteristic depends upon what it characterizes in order to arise, exactly as smoke depends upon fire — and it is for this reason that a given characteristic is not applied to characterize some other dharma. Further, the characteristic, though it is a fault belonging to what it characterizes, is nonetheless, though never separated from it, of a different character from it — exactly as a disease, though it is a fault belonging to the person who suffers it, is nonetheless, though never separated from that person, of a different character; were the disease not different in character from the person, then, were the disease cured, the person too would have to cease to exist. The Great Virtuous One states: the Buddha taught that birth and the rest are the characteristics of the conditioned, and it is thereby known that a characteristic belongs to what it characterizes, and yet is of a different character from it — exactly as a house belongs to its owner, yet is of a different character from him. One asks: if every single instant possesses the aging characteristic, then why does every moment not produce gray hair on the head? The answer: this objection does not hold, since the aging characteristic and gray hair are not identical with one another — gray hair is a material dharma, visible and resistant; the aging characteristic is non-material, invisible, and non-resistant — the two substances being thus quite different, how could one press the objection that, wherever the aging characteristic is present, gray hair must also be present? Further, aging and youthful vigor either stand in mutual opposition, or do not: where they stand in mutual opposition, gray hair appears on the head; where they do not, it does not appear. Further, if the increase of the great elements is greater and their diminishment lesser, gray hair does not appear; if the diminishment of the great elements is greater and their increase lesser, gray hair appears on the head. Further, where one's vital energy is strong, gray hair does not appear; where one's vital energy is weak, gray hair appears on the head. Further, gray hair does not arise from the aging characteristic at all, but rather, when the class of homogeneous being is about to be exhausted, this ripened, disagreeable mark arises — exactly as wine or oil, when about to be exhausted, naturally develops sediment and impurity within it. One asks: in which realms, destinies, or places does gray hair occur? The answer: it occurs within the desire realm, not among the formless or form realms. Among the hell-destiny it does not occur; among the destinies of beasts and hungry ghosts it does occur; among humans, it occurs on the three continents excepting Uttarakuru, since that continent possesses no such disagreeable mark, its beings having been born there through purely wholesome karma, whereas gray hair arises through mixed, impure karma. One asks: among what kinds of persons does gray hair occur? The answer: it occurs among both ordinary beings and noble ones — among noble ones, gray hair occurs from the fruit of stream-entry all the way up through pratyekabuddhas, with the sole exception of the Blessed One, since the Buddha possesses none of these disagreeable marks, gray hair and the rest all being marks of impurity. The buddhas possess no baldness, no thinning hair, no whitened hair, no slackened or wrinkled skin, no ruined or broken voice, no painful dissolution of the joints, nor any confusion of mind; and, at the moment of entering final nirvāṇa, their faculties cease all at once, gradually relinquishing none. One asks: through what karma did the Buddha's own field obtain this fruit? The answer: in his former life as a bodhisattva, across three incalculable eons, he cultivated manifold difficult and arduous practices, accumulating wholesome karma, each successive instant growing ever more increased, ever more abundant, his faith and wisdom firm and vigorous, whatever he undertook never withering or flagging — and it is by this wholesome karma serving as a resembling cause that he now receives just such a resembling, supreme fruit, and it is for this reason that he is without white hair, a wrinkled face, or any such thing. One asks: if every single instant possesses the impermanence characteristic, then why does a corpse's appearance not manifest at every single moment? The answer: where a body possessing faculties ceases and another body possessing faculties arises, no corpse-appearance manifests; where a body possessing faculties ceases and no body possessing faculties arises, a corpse-appearance manifests. Further, where a body possessing mind ceases and another body possessing mind arises, no corpse-appearance manifests; where a body possessing mind ceases and no body possessing mind arises, a corpse-appearance manifests.
The illness simile earns its place here by doing something the smoke-and-fire image alone cannot: it explains not just dependence but survivability — a characteristic can come and go without the dharma it belongs to being destroyed in the process, exactly as a patient can be cured of an illness without that curing entailing the patient's own death. And insisting that the Buddha's own body is entirely free of decline, even while every instant of his own bodily formations still bears the aging characteristic, forces a clean separation between the universal metaphysical claim (everything conditioned ages every instant) and the empirical, karma-dependent question of which visible symptoms that aging happens to produce.
10. Why Doesn't a Corpse Appear at Every Single Moment?
A parallel puzzle follows for impermanence rather than aging: if every instant carries the impermanence characteristic, why doesn't a corpse-appearance manifest at every single moment of the body's own instant-by-instant arising and ceasing, rather than only once, at the moment of final death? The treatise answers that a corpse manifests only when a body possessing faculties, mind, or sentient status ceases without another such body immediately arising to replace it — during ordinary life, each instant's cessation is immediately covered by the next instant's arising, a mercy the treatise attributes to the sheer, staggering scale of instants (over six billion per day) that would otherwise leave the earth littered beyond bearing. A further puzzle then opens: why do transformation-born beings leave no corpse at all, even at death?
復次若有情數身滅有情數身生者無屍骸相現。若有情數身滅無情數身生者有屍骸相現。復次若有執受身滅有執受身生者無屍骸相現若有執受身滅無執受身生者有屍骸相現。復次由諸有情業增上力命終後有屍骸相現。謂諸有情須受用彼皮肉筋骨髮毛爪齒蹄角等故。由諸有情業增上力活時未有屍骸相現。謂一晝夜總有六十四億九萬九千九百八十剎那五蘊生滅。若一一剎那皆有屍骸相現者則一有情屍骸大地無容受處。既不埋殯深為可惡諸有情類逃避無方故。由有情業增上力活時未有屍骸相現。問化生有情於命終後何故無有屍骸相現。答以彼受生及命終時諸根身分頓得捨故。如人水中暫出暫沒。
Further, where a body belonging to the category of sentient beings ceases and another body belonging to that category arises, no corpse-appearance manifests; where a body belonging to that category ceases and no body belonging to that category arises, a corpse-appearance manifests. Further, where an appropriated body ceases and another appropriated body arises, no corpse-appearance manifests; where an appropriated body ceases and no appropriated body arises, a corpse-appearance manifests. Further, it is through the predominant power of sentient beings' own karma that, after death, a corpse-appearance manifests, since sentient beings must make use of that being's skin, flesh, sinew, bone, hair, fur, nails, teeth, hooves, and horns; and it is likewise through the predominant power of sentient beings' own karma that, while alive, no corpse-appearance manifests — that is, within a single day and night there occur, in total, six billion, four hundred ninety-nine million, nine hundred eighty thousand instants of the five aggregates' arising and ceasing; were a corpse-appearance to manifest at every single one of these instants, then a single sentient being's corpses would be more than the great earth could hold, and, being unburied and left exposed, would become deeply repugnant, so that sentient beings of every kind would flee with nowhere to escape to — and it is on account of the predominant power of sentient beings' own karma that, while alive, no corpse-appearance manifests. One asks: why is it that transformation-born sentient beings, after death, leave no corpse-appearance at all? The answer: it is because, at the moment of their own birth and at the moment of their own death, their faculties and bodily parts are relinquished all at once, exactly as a person emerging briefly from water and then briefly submerging again —
The number given for daily instants of arising and ceasing — nearly six and a half billion — functions less as a precise doctrinal figure than as a vivid argument from absurdity: the treatise is essentially saying that a theory of literal, momentary corpse-appearance at every instant would be not merely false but grotesquely, world-endingly false, and it uses the sheer scale of the claim to make the alternative, continuity-preserving reading self-evidently correct.
11. The Corpseless Death of a Transformation-Born Being
The treatise now completes its account of transformation-born beings (those born instantaneously and completely formed, without gestation) — why do they leave no corpse at all, even at the moment of final death? Several distinct explanations follow: their bodies vanish as completely and instantly as they appeared, resembling a flame or a flash of lightning rather than a persisting physical structure; they possess an abundance of derivative, non-elemental material qualities rather than dense elemental matter; they possess proportionally more faculty-dharmas and fewer discardable parts like hair and nails; and, most fundamentally, since their bodies were never formed by drawing upon semen and blood in the first place, there is no such coarse physical residue left behind for a corpse to consist of.
不可知彼沒何所至出何所從。故化生死後無屍骸相現復次化生有情其身輕妙。猶如火焰雲霧電光滅則無餘故無屍現。復次大種多者無有屍骸。彼造色多故無屍骸。復次非根多者死有屍骸。彼根法多故無屍骸。復次髮毛爪等可捨法多者死有屍骸。化生有情可捨法少故無屍骸。復次覽精血等以成身者死有屍骸。化生不爾故無屍骸。
it cannot be known where he submerged to, or where he emerged from — and it is for this reason that a transformation-born being, after death, leaves no corpse-appearance. Further, a transformation-born being's own body is light and subtle, resembling a flame, a cloud or mist, or a flash of lightning — once it ceases, nothing remains at all, and it is for this reason that no corpse manifests. Further, where the great elements are more abundant, there is no corpse; a transformation-born being's derivative material dharmas are more abundant, and it is for this reason that there is no corpse. Further, where the non-faculty portion is more abundant, death leaves a corpse; a transformation-born being possesses a greater abundance of faculty-dharmas, and it is for this reason that there is no corpse. Further, where hair, fur, nails, and the like — dharmas that may be relinquished — are more abundant, death leaves a corpse; a transformation-born being possesses fewer such relinquishable dharmas, and it is for this reason that there is no corpse. Further, where a body is formed by drawing upon semen and blood, death leaves a corpse; a transformation-born being is not so formed, and it is for this reason that there is no corpse.
That a transformation-born being's total absence of any corpse traces all the way back to how that being's body was originally assembled — never built from semen and blood in the first place — quietly reveals how thoroughly the treatise treats embodiment itself as conditioned and contingent rather than as a single uniform category: a body is, on this reading, simply whatever a particular mode of conception happens to produce, and its manner of ending is continuous with its manner of beginning.
12. Does a Dharma Arise Because It Simply Is Arising, or Because It Meets Arising?
A precise causal puzzle closes out the technical portion of the Characteristics Nyāsa: does a dharma arise because its own substance already belongs to the class of arising-capable dharmas, or because it happens to be conjoined with the separate characteristic of arising? Either horn threatens to make one of the two — substance or characteristic — entirely superfluous. The treatise's resolution keeps both: a dharma's substance must already be of the arising-capable kind, yet this alone is not sufficient, since it is specifically the conjunction with the characteristic of arising, as the preeminent cause among several contributing conditions, that actually triggers the arising — exactly as a breakable object still requires an actual cause of breaking to break it, and the unconditioned, lacking any capacity for such conjunction at all, remains permanently exempt from arising, aging, or ceasing.
問諸有為法生時。為體是生法故生。為與生相合故生耶。設爾何失。若體是生法故生者。生相則應無用。若與生相合故生者。則無為法生相合故亦應可生。答應作是說。體是生法故生。問若爾生相則應無用。答雖體是生法若無生相合者則不可生。故彼生時由生相合生相是彼生勝因故如可破法破因能破及可斷法斷因能斷。故可生法生相能生。有作是說。與生相合故生問若爾無為與生相合亦應可生。答無為無有生相合義故不可生。如虛空等。無破因合故不可破。無斷因合故不可斷。無生相合故不可生應知亦爾。生相與彼未甞合故。有為住異二種問答應知亦爾。問諸有為法滅時。為體是無常法故滅為與無常相合故滅耶設爾何失。若體是無常法故滅者則無常相應成無用。若與無常相合故滅者。則無為法無常合故亦應可滅答應作是說體是無常法故滅。問若爾無常相則應無用。答雖體是無常法。若無無常相合者則不可滅。故彼滅時由無常合。無常是彼滅勝因故。如可生法生因能生此亦如是。有作是說。與無常相合故滅。問若爾無為與無常合應亦可滅。答無為無有無常合義故不可滅。如虛空等無生相合故不可生。此亦如是無常與彼未甞合故。有餘師說。有為體是生住異滅若無四相則不可知。猶如闇中有瓶衣等。若無燈照則不可知。此亦如是。故有為相是彼了因。評曰。應知此中初說為善問如有為法有有為相。無為亦有無為相耶。設爾何失。若有者云何無為名非聚法。若無者品類足說當云何通。如說云何不生不住不滅法。謂一切無為法。答應作是說諸無為法無無為相問若爾品類足說當云何通。答翻對有為故作是說。謂有為法有生住滅。無為異彼說不生等。非謂別有不生等相如契經說。佛告苾芻。
One asks: when conditioned dharmas arise, is it because their own substance is itself a dharma of the arising-class that they arise, or is it because they are conjoined with the characteristic of arising that they arise? Suppose either is granted — what fault follows? If it is because their own substance is itself a dharma of the arising-class, then the characteristic of arising would be rendered useless. If it is because they are conjoined with the characteristic of arising, then the unconditioned, too, being conjoined with the characteristic of arising, ought likewise to be capable of arising. The answer: it should be said that it is because their own substance is itself a dharma of the arising-class that they arise. One asks: if that is so, then would not the characteristic of arising be rendered useless? The answer: although a dharma's own substance is of the arising-class, if it is not conjoined with the characteristic of arising, it is nonetheless incapable of arising — it is precisely because, at the moment of its arising, it is conjoined with the characteristic of arising, this characteristic of arising being the preeminent cause of its arising, that it arises, exactly as a breakable dharma requires a cause of breaking capable of breaking it, and a cuttable dharma requires a cause of cutting capable of cutting it — so too, a dharma capable of arising is given rise to by the characteristic of arising. There are those who say: it is because they are conjoined with the characteristic of arising that they arise. One asks: if that is so, then the unconditioned, too, being conjoined with the characteristic of arising, ought likewise to be capable of arising. The answer: the unconditioned possesses no sense of conjunction with the characteristic of arising, and is therefore incapable of arising, exactly as space and the like, possessing no conjunction with a cause of breaking, cannot be broken, and possessing no conjunction with a cause of cutting, cannot be cut — so too should it be understood that, possessing no conjunction with the characteristic of arising, the unconditioned cannot arise, since the characteristic of arising has never once been conjoined with it. Just as with the two kinds of characteristic of abiding and alteration, so too should this question-and-answer be understood. One asks: when conditioned dharmas cease, is it because their own substance is itself a dharma of the impermanence-class that they cease, or is it because they are conjoined with the characteristic of impermanence that they cease? Suppose either is granted — what fault follows? If it is because their own substance is itself a dharma of the impermanence-class, then the characteristic of impermanence would be rendered useless. If it is because they are conjoined with the characteristic of impermanence, then the unconditioned, too, being conjoined with impermanence, ought likewise to be capable of ceasing. The answer: it should be said that it is because their own substance is itself a dharma of the impermanence-class that they cease. One asks: if that is so, then would not the characteristic of impermanence be rendered useless? The answer: although a dharma's own substance is of the impermanence-class, if it is not conjoined with the characteristic of impermanence, it is nonetheless incapable of ceasing — it is precisely because, at the moment of its cessation, it is conjoined with impermanence, impermanence being the preeminent cause of its cessation, that it ceases — and this, too, is exactly as with the arising-capable dharma and its cause of arising, explained just above. There are those who say: it is because they are conjoined with the characteristic of impermanence that they cease. One asks: if that is so, then the unconditioned, too, being conjoined with impermanence, ought likewise to be capable of ceasing. The answer: the unconditioned possesses no sense of conjunction with impermanence, and is therefore incapable of ceasing, exactly as space and the like, possessing no conjunction with the characteristic of arising, cannot arise — this, too, is exactly the same, impermanence having never once been conjoined with it. There are yet other masters who say: the conditioned's own substance is arising, abiding, alteration, and cessation, and, without these four characteristics, it could not be known at all, exactly as a vessel or a garment within darkness cannot be known without the illumination of a lamp — this, too, is exactly the same, these conditioned characteristics being the very means by which the conditioned is known. The verdict: it should be known that the first position stated above is sound. One asks: just as the conditioned possesses conditioned characteristics, does the unconditioned likewise possess unconditioned characteristics? Suppose either is granted — what fault follows? If it does, then how can the unconditioned be called "not an aggregated dharma"? If it does not, then how is what the Prakaraṇapāda states to be reconciled — as it is said, what is the dharma that neither arises, nor abides, nor ceases? It refers to every unconditioned dharma? The answer: it should be said that unconditioned dharmas possess no unconditioned characteristics. One asks: if that is so, then how is what the Prakaraṇapāda states to be reconciled? The answer: it speaks in this way simply in order to stand in contrast to the conditioned — that is, since conditioned dharmas possess arising, abiding, and cessation, the unconditioned, differing from these, is said to be without arising and the rest; it is not that there exists any separate characteristic of non-arising and the like, exactly as scripture states, the Buddha told the monks:
Keeping both substance and characteristic in play, rather than letting one collapse into the other, mirrors a distinction familiar from thinking about dispositions and their triggers elsewhere in philosophy: being breakable is a standing property of a glass, yet the glass still needs an actual blow to break, and neither the disposition alone nor the triggering event alone fully explains the breaking without the other — the treatise is applying exactly this same two-part structure to something as fundamental as a dharma's own arising into existence.
13. Birth, Aging, Death, Disappearing: Five Masters, Five Readings
The section closes with the Buddha's own sobering teaching that sentient beings possess birth, aging, death, disappearing, and appearing, their own formations being no more substantial than an illusion or a mirage — prompting five named masters to offer five distinct technical readings of exactly how birth, appearing, death, and disappearing differ from one another: Vasumitra ties them to entering and leaving the womb versus the aggregates ripening and being relinquished; Pārśva ties them to the intermediate state's own aggregates versus the aggregates of a new life; Ghoṣa distinguishes womb-born beings (gradual arising, a remaining corpse) from transformation-born beings (instantaneous arising, no corpse); the Great Virtuous One ties all four simply to a single continuum's first and last moments versus its in-between instants; and Buddhadeva ties them to whether a being possesses material form at all.
汝等有生有老有死有沒有出。所以者何。汝等諸行猶如幻事陽焰等故。問此中所說生出死沒有何差別。有作是說無有差別。生即是出死即是沒。一切皆是剎那性故。尊者世友作如是說。入母胎時名生出母胎時名出。諸蘊熟時名沒。捨諸蘊時名死。脇尊者曰。中有諸蘊得時名出。捨時名沒。生分諸蘊得時名生。捨時名死。尊者妙音作如是說。胎卵濕生諸蘊起時名生諸根漸生故壞時名死有餘屍骸故。化生諸蘊起時名出諸根頓出故。壞時名沒無餘屍骸故。大德說曰。於諸趣中初受生時名生。命根盡時名死。中間諸蘊剎那生時名出。剎那滅時名沒。尊者覺天作如是說。有色有情生時名生。死時名死。無色有情生時名出。死時名沒。是謂生出死沒差別。
"you possess birth, you possess aging, you possess death, you possess disappearing, you possess appearing — why is this so? Your own formations are just like an illusion, a mirage, and the like." One asks: within this passage, what distinction is drawn among "birth," "appearing," "death," and "disappearing"? There are those who say there is no distinction at all — birth is precisely appearing, and death is precisely disappearing, since all alike possess the nature of a single instant. The Venerable Vasumitra states as follows: entering the mother's womb is called birth; emerging from the mother's womb is called appearing; the aggregates, once ripened, is called disappearing; relinquishing the aggregates is called death. The Venerable Pārśva says: at the moment of obtaining the aggregates of the intermediate state, this is called appearing; at the moment of relinquishing them, this is called disappearing; at the moment of obtaining the aggregates proper to the stage of birth, this is called birth; at the moment of relinquishing them, this is called death. The Venerable Ghoṣa states as follows: for beings born from a womb or an egg, or born from moisture, the arising of the aggregates is called birth, since the faculties arise gradually, and their ruin is called death, since a remaining corpse is left behind; for a transformation-born being, the arising of the aggregates is called appearing, since the faculties emerge all at once, and their ruin is called disappearing, since no remaining corpse is left behind. The Great Virtuous One states: among every destiny, the moment of first receiving birth is called birth; the moment the life faculty is exhausted is called death; the moment, in between, when the aggregates arise instant by instant is called appearing; the moment they cease instant by instant is called disappearing. The Venerable Buddhadeva states as follows: for a being possessing material form, the moment of birth is called birth, and the moment of death is called death; for a formless being, the moment of birth is called appearing, and the moment of death is called disappearing. Such, then, are the distinctions among birth, appearing, death, and disappearing.
That five careful, serious masters can each propose an internally consistent yet mutually incompatible mapping of the same four terms is itself a small lesson in how technical Abhidharma vocabulary actually functioned in practice: these were not settled definitions handed down from on high, but live interpretive proposals under active debate, each one trying to do justice to the same brief canonical passage from a slightly different angle.
14. A New Nyāsa Opens: Māra's Challenge in the Verse of Meaningless Austerities
The Characteristics Nyāsa now concludes, and an entirely new topic opens: the Meaninglessness Nyāsa, framed around a scene shortly after the Buddha's own enlightenment beneath the bodhi tree, teaching that he has been liberated from meaningless austerities. Māra, alarmed at the monks' rapt attention, disguises himself as a young brahmin student and challenges the Buddha directly in verse, accusing him of having abandoned the true, ancient path of purity practiced by the sages of old in favor of some lesser, impure substitute — a direct, public challenge to the very legitimacy of the Buddha's own break from prior ascetic tradition.
雜蘊第一中無義納息第七之一如世尊說。
Vibhāṣā, Miscellaneous Aggregates, Chapter One, the First Part of the Meaninglessness Nyāsa: as the Blessed One has stated —
修諸餘苦行 當知無義俱彼不獲利安 如陸揮船棹如是等章及解章義既領會已。次應廣釋。問何故作此論。答為欲分別契經義故。雖一切論皆為釋經。然此納息釋多經義。謂契經說世尊住在鄔盧頻螺池邊泥爛繕那河側菩提樹下。成佛未久為諸聲聞略說法要。告諸苾芻我已解脫無義苦行得解脫彼甚為善哉。自正願力速證無上佛菩提故。時諸苾芻聞佛所說歡喜踊躍恭敬尊重。攝心屬耳聽受法要爾時惡魔作如是念。今彼沙門喬答摩種。菩提樹下為眾說法。其諸聲聞恭敬聽受。我今應往為作留難。便自化作摩納婆身。來至佛前說伽他曰。
"To cultivate every other kind of austerity — know that this is joined with meaninglessness; it gains no benefit, no peace, exactly as one rows an oar upon dry land." Having already grasped the sense of such verses and topics as these, one ought now to set them forth fully. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to analyze the meaning of scripture — for although every treatise is composed in order to explain scripture, this particular nyāsa explains a great many scriptural passages in particular. As scripture states: the Blessed One dwelt beside the pool at Uruvilvā, on the bank of the Nairañjanā river, beneath the bodhi tree, and, not long after attaining buddhahood, briefly expounded the essentials of the Dharma to his śrāvakas, telling the monks: I have already been liberated from meaningless austerities, and this liberation is truly excellent — for it is through the power of my own correct aspiration that I swiftly realized unsurpassed buddha-bodhi. At that time, the monks, hearing what the Buddha had spoken, rejoiced and leapt with joy, reverent and respectful, gathering their minds and attentively listening, receiving the essentials of the Dharma. At that time, Māra, the Evil One, thought as follows: now this ascetic of the Gautama clan, beneath the bodhi tree, is expounding the Dharma to his assembly, and his śrāvakas are reverently listening and receiving it — I should now go and create an obstruction for him. He thereupon transformed himself into the body of a young brahmin student, and, coming before the Buddha, spoke this verse:
仁今捨苦行 古仙真淨道更修餘穢道 必不獲清淨此中義者。謂彼惡魔於諸天身作真淨想。於昔外道所修苦行。起能證得真淨道想故。白佛言。仁今何故捨舊諸仙能得真淨苦行妙道。
"You have now abandoned austerities, the true, pure path of the ancient sages; cultivating instead some other, impure path, you will surely never attain purity." The meaning here is this: that Evil One, holding a mistaken notion of true purity with respect to the bodies of the gods, and holding a further mistaken notion that the austerities formerly practiced by the outsiders were capable of attaining the true path of purity, thus said to the Buddha: why have you now abandoned the wondrous path of true purity, capable of being attained through the austerities of the ancient sages,
修餘鄙穢逸樂道耶。此必不能獲得清淨宜時速捨。故佛為彼說此頌言修諸餘苦行。乃至廣說。此頌意言。非我於彼外道苦行不能修故而棄捨之。但審觀察如是苦行。畢竟不能斷諸煩惱得真義利。故我捨之更修真實處中妙行。由斯已證無上菩提能拔眾生生死劇苦。此頌義者。外道所修種種苦行。在正法外故說諸餘。有說。應言下賤苦行。謂諸苦行略有二種。一者上勝。謂八聖道及彼眷屬。二者下賤。謂諸外道所修苦行。雜我執故立下賤名復次彼諸外道所修苦行。為求世間生死苦果。以果劣故立下賤名。有說應言不死苦行。
to cultivate instead some other, base and impure path of indulgence and ease? This can surely never attain purity — you ought swiftly to abandon it. And so the Buddha, for his sake, spoke this verse: "to cultivate every other kind of austerity," and so on, at length. The meaning of this verse is this: it is not that I was incapable of cultivating those outsiders' own austerities, and so abandoned them; rather, having carefully observed that such austerities as these are, in the end, incapable of cutting off the afflictions or attaining any true benefit, I therefore abandoned them, cultivating instead the true, moderate, excellent practice — and it is by means of this that I have already realized unsurpassed enlightenment, able to rescue sentient beings from the extreme suffering of birth and death. As for the meaning of this verse: the various austerities cultivated by the outsiders lie outside the true Dharma, and it is for this reason that the verse speaks of "every other kind." There are those who say: it ought rather to be said "base austerities" — for austerities are, in brief, of two kinds: first, the superior kind, referring to the noble eightfold path and its accompanying factors; second, the base kind, referring to the austerities cultivated by the outsiders, which, being intermixed with the view of self, are given the name "base." Further, those outsiders cultivate such austerities in pursuit of the worldly fruit of birth and death — and, this fruit being inferior, the name "base" is likewise given. There are those who say: it ought rather to be said "deathless austerities" —
言不死者是天別名。即呼天魔名為不死魔祟。如是外道苦行。故此名為不死苦行。復次諸外道等希求天中諸妙欲樂。修此苦行故說名為不死苦行。次言當知無義俱者。修彼苦行當知能引此世他世諸衰損事名無義俱。復言彼不獲利安者。重釋前義。利謂利益。安謂安樂彼諸苦行不能永斷諸煩惱故。不能引生殊勝善故。不獲究竟利益安樂。如在陸地揮船棹者。唐設劬勞終無所遂。外道苦行當知亦爾。雖勤修習不獲利安。時彼天魔復請佛曰。若此苦行不獲利安。
for "deathless" is another name for the gods, and it is precisely this deathless demon-king who is invoked when the outsiders' austerities are named — and it is for this reason that these are called "deathless austerities." Further, these outsiders hope thereby to gain the wondrous sensual pleasures enjoyed among the gods, and it is for this reason that they cultivate such austerities as these, which are for this reason called "deathless austerities." As for the verse's further words, "know that this is joined with meaninglessness": cultivating such austerities as these will, one should know, draw forth manifold calamities in this life and in lives to come, and it is for this reason called "joined with meaninglessness." As for the further words, "it gains no benefit, no peace": this reiterates the meaning just stated — "benefit" refers to true benefit, and "peace" refers to true happiness; since such austerities are incapable of permanently cutting off the afflictions, and incapable of giving rise to any excellent wholesome quality, they are incapable of attaining ultimate benefit and happiness — exactly as one who rows an oar upon dry land labors in vain, never accomplishing anything at all; the outsiders' austerities, one should know, are just the same — however diligently practiced, they gain neither benefit nor peace. At that time, Māra, the heavenly demon, further petitioned the Buddha, saying: if these austerities gain neither benefit nor peace,
Māra's chosen strategy here is worth noticing for its subtlety: rather than tempting the Buddha with pleasure, as in the more familiar temptation narratives, this Māra attacks through moral and traditionalist appeal, framing abandonment of extreme austerity as a lapse from an ancient, venerable standard rather than as the hard-won insight it actually represents — a reminder that the treatise treats resistance to awakening as capable of wearing a genuinely respectable, even pious, face.
15. The True Path, and Why Old Austerities Were Abandoned
The Buddha's own reply comes in verse: he cultivated discipline, concentration, and wisdom — the true, moderate path — and thereby attained both the ultimate pure fruit and unsurpassed enlightenment, not from any incapacity to endure the old austerities but from having carefully observed that they were incapable of cutting off affliction at all. Three named masters then each offer their own gloss on why those older practices are called "meaningless": Ghoṣa ties meaning to whether a practice tends toward the flow of continued becoming or toward its cessation; the Great Virtuous One ties it to whether a practice tends toward the evil destinies or toward liberation; and Vasumitra ties it simply to whether a practice causes beings to fall further into the sufferings of birth and death.
佛修何道得真清淨。世尊告曰。
then by what path did the Buddha attain true purity? The Blessed One told him:
我修戒定慧 處中真淨道得究竟淨果 及無上菩提契經雖作是說而不分別其義。經是此論所依根本。彼所不分別者今應盡分別之故作斯論。何故世尊作如是說。修餘苦行無義俱耶。答彼行趣死近死至死非如是苦行能超越死故。謂諸有情為欲超越老死海故修彼苦行。然彼苦行從見趣起倍令沈沒老死海故。佛說修彼與無義俱。生老死三遍在諸有。老死正是有情所厭死起厭強故此偏說。尊者妙音作如是說。一切流轉皆名無義。一切還滅皆名有義。
"I cultivated discipline, concentration, and wisdom, the true, pure, moderate path, and attained the ultimate, pure fruit, together with unsurpassed enlightenment." Although scripture states this much, it does not analyze its meaning; scripture is the very root this treatise depends upon, and what it leaves unanalyzed, this treatise should now fully analyze — and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. Why did the Blessed One state that the cultivation of every other kind of austerity is joined with meaninglessness? The answer: that practice tends toward death, draws near to death, arrives at death, and is incapable of transcending death in the way this path can — that is, sentient beings, wishing to transcend the ocean of aging and death, cultivate such austerities, yet these austerities arise from the view of belief in extremes, and instead cause one to sink all the more deeply into the ocean of aging and death — and it is for this reason that the Buddha said that cultivating them is joined with meaninglessness. Birth, aging, and death pervade every state of existence, yet aging and death are precisely what sentient beings find most disagreeable, and, since the arising of weariness toward death is especially strong, this passage speaks of it in particular. The Venerable Ghoṣa states as follows: every instance of turning and flowing onward is called meaningless; every instance of returning and ceasing is called meaningful.
如是苦行從見趣起違背還滅。隨順流轉。故說修彼與無義俱。大德說曰。三惡趣苦皆名無義。善趣解脫皆名有義。如是苦行邪方便起。違善趣等。順惡趣苦故。說修彼與無義俱。尊者世友作如是說。如是苦行能令眾生墮在生死。恒受諸界諸趣諸生諸處眾苦。故說修彼與無義俱。又世尊說結加趺坐端身正願住對面念。乃至廣說。問何故作此論。答為欲分別契經義故。如契經說有諸苾芻。居阿練若。或在樹下。或在靜室結加趺坐。端身正願住對面念。乃至廣說。契經雖作是說。而不分別其義。經是此論所依根本。彼不說者今欲說之故作斯論。問諸威儀中皆得修善。何故但說結加趺坐。
Such austerities as these arise from the view of belief in extremes, running contrary to returning and ceasing, and in accordance with turning and flowing onward — and it is for this reason that the Buddha said that cultivating them is joined with meaninglessness. The Great Virtuous One states: the suffering of the three evil destinies is entirely called meaningless; the good destinies and liberation are entirely called meaningful. Such austerities as these arise from a wrongful, expedient means, running contrary to the good destinies and the rest, and in accordance with the suffering of the evil destinies — and it is for this reason that the Buddha said that cultivating them is joined with meaninglessness. The Venerable Vasumitra states as follows: such austerities as these cause sentient beings to fall into birth and death, forever undergoing the manifold sufferings of every realm, destiny, birth, and place — and it is for this reason that the Buddha said that cultivating them is joined with meaninglessness. Further, the Blessed One has stated: sitting cross-legged, holding the body upright, abiding in correct aspiration, and abiding in face-to-face mindfulness, and so on, at length. One asks: why is this treatise composed? The answer: it is composed in order to analyze the meaning of scripture — as scripture states, there are monks who, dwelling in a forest retreat, or beneath a tree, or within a quiet chamber, sit cross-legged, holding the body upright, abiding in correct aspiration, and abiding in face-to-face mindfulness, and so on, at length. Although scripture states this much, it does not analyze its meaning; scripture is the very root this treatise depends upon, and what it does not state, this treatise now wishes to state — and it is for this reason that this treatise is composed. One asks: wholesome cultivation may be undertaken in any of the four postures — why, then, does this passage speak only of sitting cross-legged?
That the old austerities are diagnosed as arising specifically from "the view of belief in extremes" (邊執見) rather than from mere excessive zeal is a precise doctrinal move: the problem was never that those ascetics tried too hard, but that their effort was built on a mistaken metaphysical picture of self and annihilation from the very start, so that no amount of further exertion along that same mistaken path could ever have led anywhere but deeper into exactly the suffering it was meant to escape.
16. Why Cross-Legged Sitting, and What "Face-to-Face Mindfulness" Really Means
A closing topic within this same nyāsa turns from why old practices fail to what the correct posture for meditation actually is, and why. Every buddha and every disciple across countless past and future eons has entered absorption seated cross-legged, a posture the treatise defends through an unusually long list of reasons — it alone avoids the fatigue of standing and the drowsiness of lying down, opposes rather than accords with unwholesome states, draws even non-human beings toward the Dharma, and is entirely unshared with any outsider tradition. The treatise then carefully glosses "holding the body upright," "correct aspiration," and, most subtly, "face-to-face mindfulness" (對面念) — mindfulness that keeps the mind's object of concentration presently, undistortedly in view, with a wordplay reading "face" as both the meditation object and, quite literally, one's own face, the specific place where a practitioner's mind is instructed to rest.
答此是賢聖常威儀故。謂過去未來過殑伽沙數量諸佛及佛弟子皆住此威儀而入定故。復次如是威儀順善品故。謂若行住身速疲勞。若倚臥時便增惛睡。唯結加坐無斯過失。故能修習殊勝善品。復次如是威儀違惡法故。謂餘威儀順婬欲等諸不善法。唯結加坐能違彼故。復次如是威儀引人天等入正法故。謂餘威儀不能引導人天龍鬼阿素洛等令入佛法。如結加坐威儀者故。復次如是威儀生人天等敬信心故。謂餘威儀不能發起人天龍鬼阿素洛等敬信之心。如結加坐威儀者故。設此威儀生惡尋伺為生他善尚應住之。況自順生殊勝善品。復次唯依此威儀證得無上佛菩提故。謂依餘威儀亦能證得二乘菩提。不能證得佛菩提故。復次住此威儀怖魔軍故。謂佛昔於菩提樹下結加趺坐破二魔軍。謂自在天及諸煩惱故。令魔眾見此威儀即便驚恐多分退散。復次此是不共外道法故。謂餘威儀外道亦有。唯結加坐外道無故。復次結加趺坐順修定故。謂諸散善住餘威儀皆能修習。若修定善唯結加坐最為隨順。由如是等種種因緣。是故但說結加趺坐。問結加趺坐義何謂耶。答是相周圓而安坐義。聲論者曰。以兩足趺加致兩髀。如龍盤結端坐思惟。是故名為結加趺坐。
The answer: this is the constant posture of the noble and the sagely — that is, every buddha and every disciple of the buddhas, throughout the past and future, in numbers surpassing the sands of the Ganges, has entered meditative absorption while dwelling in just this posture. Further, this posture accords with the wholesome category — that is, in walking or standing, the body swiftly grows fatigued, and, in lying down, drowsiness readily increases; only in sitting cross-legged does neither of these faults arise, and it is for this reason that one is thereby able to cultivate the most excellent wholesome qualities. Further, this posture stands in opposition to unwholesome dharmas — that is, every other posture accords with sensual desire and other unwholesome dharmas, while sitting cross-legged alone opposes them. Further, this posture is able to draw humans, gods, and the rest into the true Dharma — that is, every other posture is unable to draw humans, gods, dragons, spirits, or asuras into the Buddhadharma, as the posture of sitting cross-legged is able to do. Further, this posture gives rise to reverent faith in humans, gods, and the rest — that is, every other posture is unable to arouse reverent faith in humans, gods, dragons, spirits, or asuras, as the posture of sitting cross-legged is able to do; and even were this posture merely to give rise to distracted thought in others, one ought still to adopt it for the sake of arousing wholesome faith in them, how much more so when it accords with one's own excellent wholesome cultivation. Further, it is by relying on this posture alone that unsurpassed buddha-bodhi is realized — that is, by relying on every other posture, one is indeed able to realize the enlightenment of the two lesser vehicles, yet unable to realize buddha-bodhi. Further, abiding in this posture strikes fear into the armies of Māra — that is, the Buddha, in ancient times, beneath the bodhi tree, sat cross-legged and shattered the two armies of Māra, namely the Sovereign God and the afflictions, and it is on account of seeing him in this posture that Māra's own host, for the most part, grew terrified and retreated in confusion. Further, this is a dharma not shared with the outsiders — that is, every other posture is likewise found among the outsiders, while the posture of sitting cross-legged alone is not found among them. Further, sitting cross-legged accords with the cultivation of concentration — that is, every kind of scattered wholesome practice may be cultivated in any posture, yet, in cultivating the wholesomeness of concentration, sitting cross-legged alone is most fitting. It is on account of manifold causes and conditions such as these that this passage speaks only of sitting cross-legged. One asks: what is the meaning of "sitting cross-legged"? The answer: it means a posture that is well-rounded and settled in its sitting. Grammarians state: it is called sitting cross-legged because the two feet are crossed and placed upon the two thighs, coiled like a dragon, sitting upright in contemplation.
脇尊者言。重壘兩足左右交盤正觀境界名結加坐。唯此威儀順修定故。大德說曰。此是賢聖吉祥坐故名結加坐。問端身者是何義。答是身正直而安坐義。問正願者是何義。答是順善品而注心義。問住對面念是何義耶。答面謂定境。對謂現矚。此念令心現矚定境。無倒明了名對面念。復次面謂煩惱。對謂對治。此念對治能為生死上首煩惱名對面念。復次面謂自面。對謂對矚此念令心對矚自面。而觀餘境名對面念。問何故繫念在自面耶。答無始時來男為女色。女為男色。多分依面故觀自面伏諸煩惱。復次有情貪心多依面上眉眼脣齒耳鼻等生非餘身支故。觀自面伏除貪欲。復次面有七孔不淨常流。生厭離心過餘身分。故觀自面而修厭捨。復次自面見希不多起愛故彼繫念在面非餘。若不照時自不見故。復次修觀行者多樂觀察十二處相。面上恒有九處差別。是故觀之。有亦說為住背面念對背二義俱理無違。所以者何。由此念力棄背雜染。對向清淨故。棄背生死。對向涅槃故。棄背流轉。對向還滅故。棄背五欲。對向定境故。棄背薩迦耶見。對向空解脫門故。棄背我執。對向無我故。棄背邪法。對向正法故。由是對背俱理無違。安住此念者。名住對面念。
The Venerable Pārśva states: it is called sitting cross-legged when the two feet are folded one atop the other, left and right crossed, correctly observing one's own object, this posture alone being most fitting for the cultivation of concentration. The Great Virtuous One states: this is the auspicious posture of the noble and the sagely, and it is for this reason called the cross-legged posture. One asks: what is the meaning of "holding the body upright"? The answer: it means a posture in which the body is held straight and settled in its sitting. One asks: what is the meaning of "correct aspiration"? The answer: it means according with the wholesome category and fixing the mind upon it. One asks: what is the meaning of "abiding in face-to-face mindfulness"? The answer: "face" refers to the object of concentration; "face-to-face" refers to its being presently regarded. This mindfulness causes the mind to be presently regarded upon the object of concentration, undistorted and clearly manifest, and it is for this reason called face-to-face mindfulness. Further, "face" refers to affliction; "face-to-face" refers to counteracting it. This mindfulness counteracts the affliction that stands foremost in birth and death, and it is for this reason called face-to-face mindfulness. Further, "face" refers to one's own face; "face-to-face" refers to regarding it directly. This mindfulness causes the mind to regard one's own face directly, while observing every other object, and it is for this reason called face-to-face mindfulness. One asks: why is mindfulness fixed specifically upon one's own face? The answer: from beginningless time, men have taken women's forms as their object, and women have taken men's forms as their object, and, for the most part, this depends upon the face — and it is for this reason that one contemplates one's own face in order to subdue the afflictions. Further, sentient beings' own thoughts of desire, for the most part, arise dependent upon the eyebrows, eyes, lips, teeth, ears, and nose upon the face, and not upon any other part of the body — and it is for this reason that one contemplates one's own face in order to subdue and remove desire. Further, the face possesses seven openings, from which impurity constantly flows — giving rise to a mind of weariness and disgust surpassing that aroused by any other part of the body, and it is for this reason that one contemplates one's own face and thereby cultivates weariness and renunciation. Further, one's own face is rarely seen, and thus rarely gives rise to attachment — and it is for this reason that mindfulness is fixed upon the face rather than elsewhere, since, when not illuminated by a mirror, one cannot see one's own face at all. Further, one who cultivates the practice of meditative observation delights, for the most part, in observing the characteristics of the twelve sense-fields, and the face constantly presents nine distinct openings — and it is for this reason that one contemplates it. There are also those who say that this is called abiding in mindfulness turned away from the face, "facing" and "turning away" both being principles without contradiction. Why is this so? By the power of this mindfulness, one turns away from defilement and faces toward purity; turns away from birth and death and faces toward nirvāṇa; turns away from the turning and flowing onward and faces toward returning and ceasing; turns away from the five desires and faces toward the object of concentration; turns away from the view of the perishable aggregation of self and faces toward the gate of emptiness-liberation; turns away from the grasping of self and faces toward the absence of self; turns away from wrongful dharmas and faces toward the true Dharma — and it is on this account that both "facing" and "turning away" are principles without contradiction. One who abides in this mindfulness is called one who abides in face-to-face mindfulness.
The instruction to fix mindfulness specifically on one's own face carries a genuinely practical psychological insight beneath its more devotional trappings: the face is named as the place from which desire for others most commonly arises, and yet, being rarely seen by its own owner, it is also the part of the body least likely to become an object of one's own attachment — turning attention toward exactly the site of temptation's origin, but in the one direction from which self-directed craving has the least purchase, is a subtly different maneuver from simply looking away from temptation altogether.
Fascicle 39 Complete
This closes fascicle 39 of Ru-Yi's translation, drawn from the treatise's true CBETA boundary. Fascicle 39 completed the Characteristics Nyāsa by settling the reality of the abiding characteristic, defining what genuine transformation means for a strictly momentary dharma, and explaining why aging's and impermanence's own universal presence does not produce gray hair or a corpse-appearance at every single instant, before opening the Meaninglessness Nyāsa with Māra's own verse-challenge to the Buddha and a careful account of cross-legged sitting and face-to-face mindfulness. Fascicle 40 continues the same nyāsa.